Skip to content
Grounds publishedDecided 27 Mar 2019

Court of Appeal

Thio Syn Pyn v Thio Syn Kym Wendy and others and another appeal

Feedback & support

[2019] SGCA 19Case no. Civil Appeal No 56 of 201828 paragraphs

What happened, in plain English

There is no plain-English summary of this judgment yet.

Ask about this judgment

Grounds of decision

Official text from eLitigation

  1. Introduction

  2. [1] Both appeals are the latest instalment in a series of suits between the members of the Thio family. These suits concern the management of three companies incorporated in the 1960s (“the Group”) by Mr Thio Keng Poon (“Mr Thio”), the family patriarch. One of those companies, Malaysia Dairy Industries Pte Ltd (“MDI”), is the subject of these appeals.

  3. [2] Three of the Thio siblings, namely, Thio Syn Kym Wendy (“Wendy”), Thio Syn San Serene (“Serene”) and Thio Syn Ghee (“Michael”), are the respondents in these appeals (“the Respondents”). They are minority shareholders of the Group, including MDI. They acquired their shares by way of bonus issues in 2002, because their parents, Mr Thio and Mdm Kwik Poh Leng (“Mdm Kwik”), wished to provide for them financially. Their brothers, Thio Syn Pyn (“Ernest”) and Thio Syn Wee (“Patrick”), are the appellants (“the Appellants”). They are controlling shareholders of the Group, including MDI.

  4. [4] In the CA Judgment, we affirmed the Judge’s finding that while the Group were “family companies” in the sense that most of the directors were members of the Thio family, the Thios did not operate on the basis of a relationship of mutual trust and confidence in relation to how the companies were run. Neither was there a common understanding among the parties that the Respondents were entitled to participate in the management of the Group as directors. Thus, the companies were neither quasi-partnerships nor akin to quasi-partnerships (CA Judgment at [6]–[7]).

  5. [6] Second, the Appellants’ conduct in selectively using the results of an independent report prepared by Aon Hewitt, a consultancy firm (“the AH report”) to justify increasing their remuneration, drastically reducing Michael’s remuneration and taking away long established benefits for non-executive directors (including the other Respondents), while simultaneously refusing to implement comments that would have taken away their own benefits, was oppressive and unfair. Pertinently, Michael’s employment resulted from familial, not corporate, considerations. Mdm Kwik wanted his livelihood to be provided for, and Ernest and Patrick accordingly found a position for him and paid him a salary that would achieve that aim. In other words, Michael was not recruited on the usual basis of a company with a vacancy giving a qualified applicant a market rate salary for the job. His position was special and, therefore, using the AH report to justify a return to market rates for Michael’s remuneration and to deprive him of an allowance from MDI would not have been anticipated. Seen in this context, the reduction of Michael’s remuneration was a spiteful act and not one motivated by rational corporate considerations (Liability Judgment at [81]–[90]; CA Judgment at [15]).

  6. [8] As it turned out, parties could not agree whether a discount should be applied to the valuation of the Respondents’ shares in MDI. They therefore sought a court determination of the issue. The Judge’s decision can be found at Thio Syn Kym Wendy and others v Thio Syn Pyn and another [2018] SGHC 54 (“Valuation Judgment”). The present appeals arise out of the Valuation Judgment.

  7. The decision in the court below

  8. [10] On the facts of this case, the Judge concluded that the Respondents’ shares should not be valued on a discounted basis. She reached her decision on the basis that the Group was “family-run and family-owned, even if it did not amount to a quasi-partnership or import any obligations of mutual trust and confidence between the shareholders”. She found that “[t]he family-run nature of the Group and the way in which the various parties had come into their shareholdings suggest that the [Appellants] were always meant to ensure that the interests of MDI and their siblings would be protected or at least not harmed”. She also took into account “the [Appellants’] commercially unfair and oppressive actions and the [Respondents’] lack of culpability as minority shareholders in causing the breakdown of the relationship between the parties” (Valuation Judgment at [39]).

  9. [11] While the parties had also relied on other factual aspects of the case to support their respective positions as to whether a discount should be applied, the Judge did not think that much weight should be placed on most of them (Valuation Judgment at [35]–[38]). We will address these factual aspects below.

  10. The issue

  11. The parties’ arguments

  12. The Appellants’ arguments

  13. [13] The Appellants urged this court to recognise a presumption that shares in non-quasi-partnerships should be valued on a discounted basis. They relied on a line of English cases, including Irvine v Irvine (No 2) [2006] EWHC 583 (“Irvine v Irvine”), Strahan v Wilcock [2006] 2 BCLC 555 (“Strahan v Wilcock”) and Booth v Booth [2017] EWHC 457 (Ch) (“Booth v Booth”) in support of their proposition. They submitted that the purpose of a buyout is to bring to an end to, or remedy the oppression, not to punish the shareholder who has acted oppressively. Thus, a minority shareholding should be valued in the ordinary way unless there is any reason why that particular shareholding has special characteristics. They submitted that where the minority shareholder was not entitled to participate in management (as in non-quasi-partnerships), any buyout should proceed on the general basis that a minority discount should be applied to reflect the value of the shareholding which is fair to both the vendor and purchaser, because (a) while the shareholder is not a willing seller, an ordinary minority shareholder who takes shares as an investment has no right or expectation to receive more than the actual value of his shares; and (b) no rights of control are attached to the minority shareholding. They argued that a valuation of minority shares which do not reflect these realities would be “artificial”.

  14. [14] The Appellants further submitted that the facts of this case did not justify a pro-rata valuation. In particular, they pointed out that the Respondents acquired the shares by way of a gift and did not contribute to the financial success of the company. They also emphasised that the Respondents were interested in selling their shares in 2011 – in other words, they were not unwilling sellers and should not be treated as such.

  15. The Respondents’ arguments

  16. [16] On the facts of this case, the Respondents agreed with the Judge that while MDI was not a quasi-partnership, the family-run nature of the company gave rise to certain expectations which were not met, and this justified a pro-rata valuation of the shares. They further pointed out that the Appellants would control 76% of the company’s shares after the buyout, up from 56%. They submitted that this was a substantial increase in control which justified a pro-rata valuation.

  17. [19] However, even if we take the Appellants’ case at its highest, a non-quasi-partnership is (compared to a quasi-partnership) a much broader category that can cover (potentially at least) a myriad of situations (including situations where there is not only, in substance, a free election by the minority shareholder to sell its shares and which therefore would justify (albeit not necessarily mandate) applying a discount but also situations where there is no choice on the part of the minority shareholder which would justify not applying a discount). In the circumstances, the Judge’s approach, which applies no presumption and which (most importantly) entails the court having to look at all the facts and circumstances of the case in arriving at its decision as to whether a discount ought or ought not to be applied – instead of (as the Appellants argued) there being a presumption of the application of a discount – appears to be a sound one. As Chua J aptly observed in Koh Keng Chew at [11], “the party asserting that a discount should be applied has to satisfy the court that the discount would be fair and equitable in the circumstances of the case” (see also at [15], [18], [22(a)] and [22(c)], as well as Hollington at para 8-152). Indeed, what relevant legal material that exists points, on balance, in favour of the Judge’s approach instead of that advocated by the Appellants. Let us turn, at this particular juncture, to the relevant case law as well as legal literature.

  18. [20] The relevant case law is, in our view, ambiguous at best. Indeed, on a closer examination of the case law, it appears clear to us that it does not in fact support the presumption in the context of non-quasi-partnerships that a discount ought to be applied (in contrast to the situation of quasi-partnerships where there is, as noted above, a strong presumption that no discount should be applied). Let us elaborate.

  19. [22] For example, the English Court of Appeal decision of Strahan v Wilcock was cited – in particular, the observations by Arden LJ (as she then was) at [17]. However, a close perusal of that particular paragraph will reveal that the learned judge was by no means expressing a definite view and, in any event, her observations were clearly obiter dicta simply because that particular case related to a quasi-partnership (instead of a non-quasi-partnership). Hence, the Appellants’ reliance on the subsequent English High Court decision of Irvine v Irvine – inasmuch as it relied upon Arden LJ’s observations in Strahan v Wilcock – is also unpersuasive in so far as case law authority in favour of the Appellants is concerned (although the court in Irvine accepted that the company concerned was a non-quasi-partnership). We note that the subsequent English High Court decision of Re McCarthy Surfacing Ltd, Hequet and others v McCarthy and others [2009] 1 BCLC 622 relied, inter alia, on Irvine v Irvine (at [92]) – which, as we have just seen, is itself unpersuasive authority (see, to like effect, the English High Court decision of Booth v Booth at [140]; the Scottish Court of Session decision of Fowler v Gruber [2010] 1 BCLC 563 (“Fowler v Gruber”) at [184]−[186] (citing, successively, Strahan v Wilcock and Irvine v Irvine at [184] and [185], respectively, and distinguishing (at [183]) Bird Precision as relating to a quasi-partnership); the Irish High Court decision of In the matter of Skytours Travel Limited [2011] 4 IR 651 (citing Strahan v Wilcock at [32], Irvine v Irvine at [33], and Fowler v Gruber at [34] before arriving at the conclusion (at [35]) that “it is only in the case of a quasi-partnership company or where some other exceptional circumstance exists that a minority shareholding should be valued on a non-discounted basis” and that a discount ought to apply (on the basis of the authorities just cited) as what was involved in that case was a non-quasi-partnership company)).

  20. [23] The English High Court decision of Croly v Good [2010] EWHC 1 (Ch) related to a quasi-partnership company and, hence, the court’s observations at [8] were obiter dicta; more importantly, they are, with respect, mere statements without more.

  21. [24] As for the English High Court decision of Re Sunrise Radio, whilst the court did cite Irvine v Irvine (at [291]) and Strahan v Wilcock (at [292]), it also cited Bird Precision and (more importantly) appeared (at [297] and [299]) to endorse the approach adopted by the Judge in this case in the court below – which is the precise opposite of the argument which the Appellants were relying upon.

  22. [25] Indeed, we observe that where the court concerned has in fact applied a discount in non-quasi-partnership context, this has been after the court has considered all the relevant facts and circumstances – an approach that is consistent with that adopted by the Judge in the present case (see eg, the English High Court decision of Re Elgindata Ltd [1991] BCLC 959 at 1007).

  23. [26] We now turn to more recent English decisions which appear to be contrary to the legal proposition which the Appellants argued for in the present appeals and which expressly adopted the approach set out by the Judge in the present case.

  24. [27] One such decision is that of the English High Court in Re Blue Index Ltd; Murrell v Swallow and others [2014] EWHC 2680 (Ch) (“Re Blue Index”), which (perhaps significantly) is a decision by Mr R Hollington QC who was sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court (and who is, not insignificantly in our view, also the author of one of the leading texts to which we have already had occasion to refer (viz, Hollington)). In that case, the learned judge undertook a detailed analysis of the leading English decision of Bird Precision (to which we have already referred above). He then proceeded to observe as follows (at [23]–[26]):

  25. [28] Another is the English High Court decision of Estera Trust, which, in fact, cited Re Blue Index (at [638]; see also at [640]).

  26. [29] Turning to relevant local cases, in the Singapore High Court decision of Lim Chee Twang v Chan Shuk Kuen Helina and others [2010] 2 SLR 209, Quentin Loh JC (as he then was) found (at [79(a)]) that no quasi-partnership existed. Whilst he did (at [150(a)]) in fact apply a discount in so far as the valuation of the shareholding was concerned, this was not effected by way of a general presumption as such and appeared to be based on the specific facts and circumstances of the case (which is, in fact, consistent with the approach adopted by the Judge in the present case).

  27. [30] In Sharikat Logistics Pte Ltd v Ong Boon Chuan and others [2014] SGHC 224, another decision of the Singapore High Court, Judith Prakash J (as she then was) was prepared (at [246]) to acknowledge the possibility of a discount if the minority had acted in such a way as to deserve its exclusion from the company. This does not contradict any of the general propositions we have considered. More importantly, we must assume that the learned judge (who was the same judge in this case in the court below) was aware of her previous decision and nevertheless proceeded to articulate a clear legal proposition which the Appellants controverted.

  28. [31] At the hearing, counsel for Ernest, Mr Cavinder Bull SC (“Mr Bull”), directed us to North Coast, where the court stated at [24] that “the remedy under s 233 [of the Australian Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)] is one that must be calculated to alleviate the consequences of the oppressive conduct and no more”. On this premise, Mr Bull submitted that that the court’s focus should be on compensating the oppressed shareholders, and no more. He further argued that since the value of the Respondents’ shareholding was not reduced by the Appellants’ oppressive conduct, there was no reason to value the shares otherwise than on a discounted basis. While we agree that the Appellants’ conduct in this respect is relevant, it is but one factor in the analysis. Further, the minority in North Coast had always been liable to compulsory acquisition by another interest willing to pay for it in an auction, oppression or no oppression. As a result, the court held that the minority could not be entitled to a result superior to which would have prevailed under the auction process (North Coast at [24]). This was the context in which the quotation which Mr Bull relied on was made. The court was not laying down a general rule that minority shares in non-quasi-partnerships should be valued at a discount. Indeed, it recognised at [23] that when valuing shares of a company in a buyout, the court “usually does not provide for a discount for minority interest for the minority shareholder”.

  29. [32] The relevant legal literature also suggests that there ought not to be a presumption of a discount in the context of non-quasi-partnerships. What the court concerned ought to do is simply to look at all the facts and circumstances of the case in arriving at its decision as to whether a discount ought or ought not to be applied (see eg, Margaret Chew, Minority Shareholders’ Rights and Remedies (LexisNexis, 3rd Ed, 2017) (“Chew”) at paras 4.303–4.304 and Hollington at para 8-153).

  30. [35] As the situation we are now concerned with in the present appeals does not relate to the situation of a quasi-partnership, we will not set out a definitive view until the situation (relating directly to a quasi-partnership) comes squarely before this Court.

  31. Our decision

  32. [36] We note, first, that the shares were meant to be “financial provision” for the Respondents. By way of background, the Respondents did not hold any shares in the Group companies immediately prior to 2002. This changed when Mdm Kwik expressed her wish that some financial provision be made for her daughters. Mr Thio then decided that Michael and his sisters should receive shares in the Group companies by way of bonus issues. Indeed, Mr Thio was so adamant about this that he had threatened to disown Ernest if the latter did not agree to his proposal. The shares were thus issued to the Respondents in March and April 2002, although Mr Thio retained full power in respect of those shares.

  33. [39] That this is an important factor that the court does take into account is also evidenced by the case law (and see, in the Singapore context, the decision of this Court in Over & Over Ltd v Bonvests Holdings Ltd and another [2010] 2 SLR 776 at [132] (where the majority would become the sole shareholder, viz, having a shareholding of 100% (and see, to like effect, the Manitoba Court of Appeal decision of Kummen v Kummen-Shipman Ltd [1983] 2 WWR 577 at [16] (Huband JA dissenting))) and, in the English context, Estera Trust (at [644]−[647], especially at [646] (reference, inter alia, to the raising of the majority’s combined shareholding above 75%); reference may also be made to the Supreme Court of Queensland decision of Re D G Brims and Sons Pty Ltd (1995) 16 ACSR 559 at 595) as well as legal literature (see Corporate Law at para 11.097 as well as Shapira at pp 12–13).

  34. [40] We briefly address the remaining arguments. We did not accept the Appellants’ submission that allowing the Respondents to realise the full value of their shares would result in an unjustified “windfall” since the Appellants were largely responsible for the financial success of MDI. In our view, having regard to the fact that the shares were only meant to be financial provision for the Respondents, it is only natural that the Respondents did not participate in the management of MDI, and this should not be held against them. We also rejected the Appellants’ submission that the shares should be discounted because the Respondents had wanted to sell their shares in 2011, ie, they were not unwilling sellers, a reason for not ordering a discount (see [14] and [17] above). As the Judge pointed out, the Respondents had eventually refused to sell their shares in 2012 over a disagreement in price, and this showed that the Respondents were not willing to sell at any price (Valuation Judgment at [36]).

  35. [41] For the reasons given above, we dismissed the appeals.