Skip to content
Grounds publishedDecided 8 Nov 2019

Court of Appeal

Ong Wui Teck (personal representative of the estate of Chew Chen Chin, deceased) v Ong Wui Swoon and another and another appeal

Feedback & support

[2019] SGCA 61Case no. Civil Appeal No 178 of 201748 paragraphs

What happened, in plain English

There is no plain-English summary of this judgment yet.

Ask about this judgment

Laws this judgment relies on

Grounds of decision

Official text from eLitigation

  1. Introduction

  2. [1] The present appeals are the latest instalment in the long running dispute between the Ong siblings over their deceased mother, Madam Chew Chen Chin’s (“the Deceased”) will and estate. The appellant, Mr Ong Wui Teck (“the Appellant”), is the eldest son of the Deceased and the sole executor and trustee of the Deceased’s will (“the Will”). The Appellant acts in these appeals as the personal representative of the Deceased’s estate (“the Estate”). The respondents are also the children of the Deceased and beneficiaries under the Will. The first respondent, Ms Ong Wui Swoon (“the First Respondent”), is the Deceased’s daughter; the second respondent, Mr Ong Wui Jin (“the Second Respondent”), is the Deceased’s son (collectively, “the Respondents”).

  3. Procedural history and background facts

  4. The Will

  5. [6] Given that the present dispute has its genesis in the Will, we set out the relevant portions as follows:

  6. [7] The Will was executed by the Deceased on 3 January 2005, while she was warded in the Singapore General Hospital. The Deceased subsequently passed away on 8 January 2005. Apart from the Appellant and the Respondents, the Deceased has two other children who are beneficiaries under the Will but are not parties to the present appeals.

  7. The challenge to the validity of the Will

  8. [8] Upon the Deceased’s passing, the Appellant commenced District Court Suit No 2260 of 2005 (“DC 2260”) to apply for a grant of probate in respect of the Will. The Respondents and their other two siblings (collectively, “the Four Siblings”) sought to challenge the validity of the Will. In Ong Wui Teck v Ong Wui Jin and others [2008] SGDC 103 (“the Validity Decision (DC)”), District Judge James Leong (“DJ Leong”) found that the Will was validly executed by the Deceased and granted probate of the same to the Appellant. DJ Leong’s decision was subsequently upheld on appeal by Chan Sek Keong CJ in Ong Wui Jin and others v Ong Wui Teck [2009] SGHC 50 (“the Validity Decision (HC)”).

  9. [9] One of the issues relevant to these appeals, specifically the $20,000 Claims, that was heavily contested before both DJ Leong and Chan CJ was in relation to $50,000 that was bequeathed to the Appellant pursuant to cl 3.1 of the Will. The Four Siblings argued before DJ Leong and Chan CJ that the Deceased could not have intended to execute the Will with cl 3.1 in it, because it went against her intention to divide the Estate equally among her five children. Chan CJ observed that the attendance note of Ms Spring Tan (“Ms Tan”), an advocate and solicitor who was present at the signing of the Will, indicated that the Deceased was aware of the terms of the Will when she executed it: the Validity Decision (HC) at [28]. Of particular significance is the following portion from the said attendance note, which alludes to the circumstances under which the Respondents had broached the topic of the $50,000 that was bequeathed to the Appellant. It also shows how the Respondents had relied on the fact that the Appellant was being given an additional $50,000 to ask the Deceased for an additional $20,000 each for themselves:

  10. Originating Summons No 365 of 2014

  11. The underlying application

  12. [11] On 7 August 2014, the Appellant filed the underlying application, OS 763, claiming, inter alia, various sums which were allegedly unaccounted for by the Respondents on behalf of the Estate. The Judge heard OS 763 for the first time on 29 December 2016. He conclusively dealt with most of the prayers in OS 763, and adjourned the matter to consider the remaining prayers. At this hearing, the First Respondent raised the issue of the Deceased’s medical expenses that she had allegedly paid for on the Deceased’s behalf using her Central Provident Fund’s Medisave account moneys and her American Express credit card. The Appellant denied these claims on the basis that the Deceased had paid for her own medical expenses while she was alive. The Judge held that the First Respondent’s claim for the medical expenses that she had incurred on the Deceased’s behalf was a claim for a debt as a creditor of the Estate, and that she should make a claim with the Appellant for this debt. The Judge further stated that if the Appellant did not admit to the debt, the First Respondent would then have the option of commencing legal proceedings to make a claim for the debt.

  13. The Respondents’ counterclaims

  14. [13] On 31 January 2017, the First Respondent filed an affidavit stating that she wished to make a claim against the Estate for, inter alia:

  15. (a) $20,000 that was promised to her by the Deceased; and

  16. (b) reimbursement for the Deceased’s cancer medication expenses which she paid for with her American Express credit card and moneys from her Medisave account, including interest on those amounts.

  17. [14] On 3 February 2017, the Second Respondent filed an affidavit stating that he too wished to make a claim for the $20,000 that was also promised to him by the Deceased. The Respondents both relied on the fact that Ms Tan had witnessed the Deceased making the promise to give them $20,000 each in support of their claims.

  18. The Appellant’s claim for administration costs

  19. (a) “accounting costs” for accountancy services provided by the Appellant’s wife in the administration of the Estate in the sum of $10,000 (“the Accounting Costs Claim”);

  20. (b) work done by the Appellant as a litigant-in-person representing the Estate in the sum of $20,000 (“the Litigation Costs Claim”); and

  21. (c) costs for storage and archiving of the Estate’s records in the sum of $5,000. Given that the Judge had allowed this head of claim on a reimbursement basis, and since no appeal has been filed against this aspect of the Judge’s decision, we will say no more on this.

  22. Parties’ cases below

  23. [16] In so far as the $20,000 Claims were concerned, the Respondents claimed that the Deceased had promised them $20,000 each as repayment for the monthly allowances that they had given her. In the First Respondent’s case, the $20,000 was also in return for her effort in caring for the Deceased in her final days. The Respondents further argued that the $20,000 Claims should be characterised as a repayment of a debt, given that the Appellant had admitted that the $50,000 bequeathed to him in the Will was meant as repayment for the monthly allowances that he had given the Deceased, and further that the word “return” was used in cl 3.1 of the Will.

  24. [17] In response, the Appellant argued that the $20,000 which the Deceased had promised to give each of the Respondents were meant to be gifts, and not repayments for a debt. Therefore, given that these gifts were not perfected in the Deceased’s lifetime, they could no longer be enforced. The Appellant suggested in the alternative that the Deceased could have already paid the Respondents, given that there was evidence to show that the Deceased had made significant cash withdrawals prior to her passing.

  25. [18] As for the Medical Expenses Claim, the First Respondent was able to produce her American Express credit card and Medisave statements to prove that she had made payments to the Singapore General Hospital and the National Cancer Centre for the Deceased’s medical expenses. The First Respondent admitted that most of the Deceased’s medical expenses were paid for by the Deceased herself, but stated that she would use her American Express credit card to pay for the Deceased whenever the Deceased forgot to bring money with her. The First Respondent further admitted that some of these medical expenses had already been reimbursed to her by the Deceased.

  26. [19] The Appellant argued that all the medical expenses that the First Respondent incurred on behalf of the Deceased had already been reimbursed. The Appellant relied on evidence of withdrawals from the Deceased’s bank accounts from 14 January 2004 to 21 August 2004 amounting to a sum of around $72,000 to argue that these moneys must have been used to reimburse the First Respondent for the medical expenses that she had incurred on the Deceased’s behalf. In response, the First Respondent contended that the $72,000 was withdrawn for the Deceased’s own use.

  27. Decision below

  28. [22] At the hearing of 10 April 2017, the Judge allowed the $20,000 Claims. The Judge held that at the point in time when the Deceased was making the Will, she acknowledged that she did owe money to her children and that she should return the moneys she had previously received from them. The Judge further relied on the specific use of the word “return” in cl 3.1 of the Will, in relation to the $50,000 bequeathed to the Appellant, as an indication that the Deceased had treated the sum as a repayment of a debt. The Judge cited [31] of the Validity Decision (HC), where Chan CJ noted that the Deceased had “agreed to return $20,000” [emphasis added] to the Respondents when they pressed her on the $50,000 that she was giving the Appellant. The Judge concluded that the Deceased owed a debt of $20,000 to each of the Respondents and allowed their counterclaims on that basis. The Judge further noted that there was no evidence that this debt had been repaid by the Deceased.

  29. [23] The Judge rejected the Appellant’s argument that DJ Leong and Chan CJ had both characterised the $50,000 and $20,000 as gifts in their respective decisions. The Judge held that those decisions were concerned primarily with the validity of the Will, and therefore he was not bound by the remarks made in relation to the legal characterisation of the $50,000 and $20,000.

  30. [24] At the hearing of 17 July 2017, the Judge allowed the Medical Expenses Claim in the amount of $13,597.10. The Judge found that there was sufficient evidence, in the form of the First Respondent’s American Express credit card statements and Medisave statements, to prove that she had actually incurred medical expenses on the Deceased’s behalf. The Judge further noted that “there was a pattern of conduct by the [Deceased], when she was alive, to repay [the First Respondent] the medical expenses incurred by the [First Respondent] on the [Deceased’s] behalf”. Therefore, the question in his view was not whether there was an agreement for reimbursement, but rather, whether there were sums outstanding that had not yet been reimbursed. However, there was no evidence to show that the First Respondent had been reimbursed for these expenses incurred by her. The Judge rejected the Appellant’s contention that the withdrawals amounting to $72,000 from the Deceased’s account were used to reimburse the First Respondent for the medical expenses, because there was no clear explanation for what those withdrawals were for.

  31. [25] On balance, the Judge found that there was some credibility in the First Respondent’s story. In particular, he noted that the First Respondent was not claiming all the medical expenses she had incurred on the Deceased’s behalf. He further stated that the items that she had admitted to being reimbursed for were not minor items at all. However, the Judge rejected the First Respondent’s claim for interest on the payments that she had made on the Deceased’s behalf, on the basis that there was no evidence to prove that she had in fact incurred interest on the sums paid.

  32. Parties’ cases on appeal

  33. [29] On 27 September 2017, the Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal for CA 178, setting out the following grounds of appeal:

  34. (a) appeal against the Judge’s “award of non-testamentary cash gifts” ie, in relation to the $20,000 Claims;

  35. (b) appeal against the legitimacy of the “medical claim” ie, in relation to the Medical Expenses Claim; and

  36. The $20,000 Claims

  37. [32] With regard to his appeal against the Judge’s decision to allow the $20,000 Claims, the Appellant’s main contention is that the $20,000 which was promised by the Deceased to each of the Respondents were meant to be gifts and are therefore unenforceable. The Appellant points to the Validity Decision (DC) at [26] (which was reproduced in the Validity Decision (HC) at [27]), where DJ Leong referred to the $20,000 promised to each of the Respondents as “cash gifts”. Given that these gifts were not completed during the Deceased’s lifetime, they cannot now be enforced. The Appellant further argues that there cannot be any intention to create legal relations when children give contributions and allowances to their mother, and therefore there is no binding debtor-creditor relationship between the Deceased and the Respondents in relation to the monthly allowances that they had given her. The Appellant also contends that the use of the word “return” in cl 3.1 of the Will does not mean that the $50,000 bequest was meant for the repayment of a debt. Rather, it was simply a testamentary gift. Finally, the Appellant suggests that the Deceased could already have given the respondents the $20,000, or could have simply changed her mind about giving them the gift.

  38. [33] The Respondents argue that there was an agreement for the Deceased to compensate the First Respondent for the salary that she had foregone because she had been the Deceased’s primary caregiver, and that this was witnessed by Ms Tan during the execution of the Will. We note that the Second Respondent had not made any submissions in support of his claim to the $20,000.

  39. Medical Expenses Claim

  40. [34] In relation to the Medical Expenses Claim, the Appellant similarly argues that in the absence of a binding contract or agreement, any payment that the First Respondent made on the Deceased’s behalf should be regarded as a gift to the Deceased for which reimbursement cannot be claimed. The Appellant points out that the Deceased’s other children had also paid for the Deceased’s medical expenses, and none of them expected to be reimbursed. Even if the First Respondent was entitled to be reimbursed, the Appellant contends that $37,000 was withdrawn from the Deceased’s bank account and given to the First Respondent as a cash float to attend to the Deceased’s various needs and expenses, and that this would have been sufficient to reimburse the First Respondent for any medical expenses that she would have incurred on the Deceased’s behalf. Further, the Deceased had a significant amount of funds available in her various bank accounts, which she could have used to top up this cash float if it ran out.

  41. [35] In response, the Respondents allege that when the Appellant found out about the $20,000, he took steps to freeze the Deceased’s bank account, which prevented the Deceased from reimbursing the First Respondent for the medical expenses that she had incurred.

  42. Administration Costs Claims

  43. Preliminary issue: whether leave to appeal is required

  44. [40] Before delving into the substantive merits of the appeals, a preliminary issue that arises for our consideration is whether leave of court was required for these appeals to be brought before us, given that the sum in dispute is less than $250,000. The Judge expressed his tentative view that the Appellant would require leave, but ultimately stated that it would be for this court to decide whether leave was necessary, and if so, whether leave should be granted.

  45. Our decision

  46. The $20,000 Claims

  47. [43] The Judge’s decision to allow the $20,000 Claims essentially hinged on his characterisation of the sums as repayments for debts that the Deceased acknowledged she owed to the Respondents. The bases for these alleged debts were the monthly allowances that the Respondents had given her while she was alive, and additionally in the case of the First Respondent, the effort that she had expended in looking after the Deceased. The Judge also relied heavily on the use of the word “return”, in both cl 3.1 of the Will in relation to the $50,000 bequest to the Appellant as well as in [31] of the Validity Decision (HC) where Chan CJ stated that the Deceased had agreed to “return” the money to the Respondents. In the Judge’s view, the use of the word “return” was deliberate, and an indication that the moneys were intended for the repayment of a debt.

  48. [44] With respect, we consider that the Judge had erred in finding that there was a binding and enforceable debt between the Deceased and the Respondents, and that the $20,000 was meant as repayment for this debt. At the outset, we should state that claims for repayment of debts made against deceased persons should be supported by compelling evidence, given that the deceased persons would be unable to rebut such claims posthumously. We agree with the English High Court decision of In re Gonin, decd [1977] 3 WLR 379 at 392 cited by the Appellant, where Walton J observed as follows:

  49. Therefore, the burden falls squarely on the Respondents to adduce compelling evidence to show that there was in fact a valid and binding debt owed to them by the Deceased.

  50. The presumption in Balfour is not restricted only to arrangements between husbands and wives, but applies also to other types of familial relationships, such as those involving parent and child, or between siblings: see The Law of Contract in Singapore at para 05.015.

  51. [46] However, this does not mean that agreements made in the domestic or social context are never capable of constituting legally binding obligations. We must emphasise that arrangements made in the domestic or social context merely give rise to a presumption that parties do not intend to create legal relations, which puts the burden of proof on the party seeking to enforce the agreement to prove that parties did in fact intend for their arrangement to have legal consequences. As Tay Yong Kwang JC (as he then was) observed in the Singapore High Court decision of Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corp Ltd v Jurong Engineering Ltd [2000] 1 SLR(R) 204 at [43] (albeit in the context that there is a presumption that the parties intend to create legal relations if an agreement is made in a commercial context):

  52. For example, where there is evidence that an agreement was made between family members in a business context, the presumption may not apply or may be easily rebutted. The presumption may also be inappropriate where parties are estranged notwithstanding their family ties, because they can no longer be assumed to trust the other to fulfil his or her promise on the basis of their natural love and affection. The fact that one party to the arrangement relied on the promise to his or her detriment may also constitute sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption that there was no intention to create legal relations: see The Law of Contract in Singapore at paras 05.013, 05.016 and 05.017.

  53. [47] In our judgment, there was simply nothing on the evidence before us to rebut the presumption that there was no intention to create legal relations. In fact, the circumstances under which the promise was made, as evident from the contemporaneous attendance note of Ms Tan (see [9] above), seemed to us to suggest otherwise. The Deceased was lying on a hospital bed when the Second Respondent arrived and began questioning her about the $50,000 that was allegedly being “returned” to the Appellant pursuant to the Will. When the Appellant explained that this was in “repayment” for the $800 monthly allowances that the Appellant had given the Deceased throughout the years, the Second Respondent argued that he should be entitled to at least $20,000 given that he had also given the Deceased an allowance of $300 per month. It was only as a result of the Second Respondent’s complaint that the Deceased agreed to give him $20,000 after she was discharged from hospital. Subsequently, as Ms Tan was going through cl 3.1 of the Will with the Deceased, she asked the Deceased if there was anyone else she wanted to give money to. The Deceased initially said no, but Ms Tan reminded her about the Respondents who had come forward, and the First Respondent told the Deceased that she deserved a salary for looking after the Deceased. The Deceased relented and agreed to give $20,000 to both Respondents. Crucially, however, when Ms Tan asked the Deceased if she wanted to include these amounts in the Will, the Deceased declined and said that she would give the money to the Respondents herself after she was discharged.

  54. [48] If the Deceased had truly intended for her promise of $20,000 to have legal effect, there was no reason for her not to include it in the Will. Further, if she had intended for the moneys to be in repayment for a debt owed to the Respondents, there was no reason for her to insist that she make payment herself after she was discharged from the hospital. Yet further, there would at least have been some attempt on her part to determine the exact amount that was due. Instead, the Deceased decided to give the same lump sum figure of $20,000 to each of the Respondents, despite them having different bases for their claims. Given the sequence of events leading up to the making of the promise, we find the Deceased’s behaviour to be more consistent with a mother attempting to pacify her children for their complaints of being treated unfairly, as opposed to someone who genuinely believed that she owed a legal debt to her children and who had wanted to repay them.

  55. [49] Additionally, we do not think that the bases upon which the Respondents founded these alleged debts were even valid to begin with. The Respondents contend that the $20,000 was in repayment for the monthly allowances that the Respondents had given the Deceased. It is presumed that monthly payments made by children to their aged mother are intended to be gratuitous contributions to their mother’s living expenses. Indeed, the fact that the Respondents themselves had referred to these payments as “allowances” indicates that they too intended for these to be gratuitous payments. No evidence was adduced to show that these monthly allowances were intended, instead, to be loans which had to be repaid. As for the First Respondent’s contention that the $20,000 was also to repay her for the effort that she had expended in looking after the Deceased, the presumption is that the First Respondent was looking after the Deceased because of the love and affection that she had for her mother. There was similarly no evidence to show that the First Respondent had intended to provide a service to the Deceased for which she expected to be remunerated.

  56. [50] For completeness, we also deal with the Judge’s reliance on the word “return” in cl 3.1 of the Will in finding that the $50,000 was meant as repayment for a debt, and therefore that the $20,000 were also meant as repayments for debts owed to the Respondents. With respect, we do not think that the Judge should have placed so much reliance on just the use of the word “return”. First, the use of the word “return” does not necessarily lead to the inference that the $50,000 was intended to be repayment for a debt. There could potentially be multiple interpretations of the word “return” depending on the context in which it is used. Indeed, the $50,000 could have been given to the Appellant by the Deceased out of goodwill, in “return” for the Appellant providing for and caring for the Deceased. We find this to be a more reasonable interpretation given the mother-son relationship between the parties. In any event, the use of the word “return” is irrelevant to the legal character of the $50,000. Given that it was a gift made pursuant to a will, it is regarded as a testamentary bequest. In other words, the reason why the $50,000 can be enforced against the Estate has nothing to do with whether it is for the repayment of a debt. It is enforceable solely because it is a testamentary bequest. Second, the Judge’s reasoning presupposes that the legal character of the $50,000 is indicative of the legal character of the $20,000. However, the Deceased’s refusal to include the $20,000 payments in the Will clearly demonstrates that the Deceased had intended to treat the $20,000 differently from the $50,000. Therefore, even if the Deceased had intended to treat the $50,000 as repayment of a debt to the Appellant, the same cannot necessarily be said of the $20,000 that was promised to the Respondents.

  57. [51] As for the Judge’s reliance on Chan CJ’s use of the word “return” in relation to the $20,000 at [31] of the Validity Decision (HC), the Judge himself had noted at the hearing of 25 September 2017 that DJ Leong and Chan CJ’s decisions were concerned primarily with determining whether the Will was valid, and not with the legal nature or characterisation of the $50,000 and $20,000. Therefore, any observations that were made in DJ Leong’s and Chan CJ’s judgments should not be taken as their findings in relation to the legal nature of these sums. As the Appellant points out, the Validity Decision (HC) itself is internally contradictory as to whether the $20,000 should be characterised as a gift or a repayment of a debt. At [27] of the Validity Decision (HC), Chan CJ reproduces the parts of DJ Leong’s judgment which refers to the $20,000 as “cash gifts”, without expressing any disagreement with DJ Leong’s characterisation of the $20,000. Chan CJ then goes on at [31] to state that the Deceased had agreed to “return” $20,000 to the Respondents. This apparent inconsistency shows that Chan CJ was probably not applying his mind to the issue of how the $20,000 should be properly characterised or the significance of the word “return”. Indeed, given that he was concerned with the validity of the Will, there would have been no need for him to be concerned with a payment which the Deceased had expressly intended to be made outside the Will.

  58. [52] We are therefore satisfied that the $20,000 which the Deceased had said that she would give the Respondents were intended to be gifts and are not legally enforceable. In the circumstances, we set aside the Judge’s decision to allow the $20,000 Claims.

  59. The Medical Expenses Claims

  60. [53] Turning next to the Medical Expenses Claim, there are two main prongs to the Appellant’s argument. First, he argues that in the absence of a binding contract or agreement, any payment that the First Respondent made on behalf of the Deceased should be regarded as a gift to the Deceased on account of their familial relationship. Second, even if the First Respondent was meant to be reimbursed for the medical expenses that she had incurred on the Deceased’s behalf, she would already have been fully reimbursed and there would be no further sums left for her to claim from the Estate.

  61. [54] The First Respondent was able to adduce evidence in the form of her American Express credit card statements, as well as her Medisave statements, to show that she had made certain payments to the Singapore General Hospital and the National Cancer Centre. We agree with the Judge that these documents were sufficient to prove that the First Respondent had actually incurred medical expenses on behalf of the Deceased. In fact, the First Respondent’s Medisave statements expressly state that the deductions from her account were for payment of hospital charges incurred by the Deceased at the National Cancer Centre.

  62. [55] However, we agree with the Appellant that given the mother-daughter relationship between the Deceased and the First Respondent, there is a presumption that any payments made by the latter on the former’s behalf were intended to be gratuitous payments for which she did not expect to be reimbursed. In other words, there is a presumption that there was no intention to create legal relations when the First Respondent made payments for medical expenses on the Deceased’s behalf.

  63. [56] Further, we are satisfied that there was insufficient evidence for this presumption to be displaced in the present case. We reiterate the observations that we made at [44] above, that compelling evidence is generally required to establish claims against a deceased person who is unable to rebut such claims posthumously. First, as the Judge had himself noted, there was a complete lack of documentary evidence to prove that the First Respondent had in fact been reimbursed by the Deceased, let alone that there was an agreement for her to be reimbursed. The Judge relied solely on the First Respondent’s bare (albeit unchallenged) assertion to find that “there was a pattern of conduct by the [Deceased], when she was alive, to repay the [First Respondent] the medical expenses incurred by the [First Respondent] on the [Deceased’s] behalf” [emphasis added]. Be that as it may, the mere fact that there was a “pattern of conduct” by which the Deceased reimbursed the First Respondent does not in and of itself mean that there was an agreement for the First Respondent to be reimbursed. While a contract may in certain cases be implied from a course of conduct or dealings between the parties, such a contract must satisfy all the elements necessary for the formation of a contract, including offer and acceptance, consideration, intention to create legal relations, and certainty of terms: see the decision of this court in Cooperatieve Centrale Raiffeisen-Boerenleenbank BA (trading as Rabobank International), Singapore Branch v Motorola Electronics Pte Ltd [2011] 2 SLR 63 at [46] and [50]. While the First Respondent’s evidence shows that the Deceased would habitually reimburse the First Respondent for any medical expenses incurred, it does not go so far as to show that this was done pursuant to a binding and enforceable agreement between the parties. Given the familial relationship between the parties, it is presumed that the medical expenses incurred by the First Respondent on the Deceased’s behalf, and the reimbursement that she would subsequently receive, were made out of goodwill as opposed to a legal obligation.

  64. [57] Secondly, the First Respondent’s own evidence was that she was reimbursed for some of the medical expenses she incurred on the Deceased’s behalf but not for others. In other words, there was no systematic pattern of reimbursement between the Deceased and the First Respondent. This runs counter to any suggestion that there was an agreement for the First Respondent to be reimbursed whenever she paid for the Deceased’s medical expenses on her behalf.

  65. [58] Thirdly, if there was in fact an agreement for the First Respondent to be reimbursed, we find it puzzling that she did not seek reimbursement while the Deceased was still alive, or at the very latest at the hospital as the Will was being drafted. In this regard, the First Respondent alleged that she had in fact broached the topic of the Deceased’s medical expenses together with her claim for lost income at the meeting for the drafting of the Will, and that Ms Tan had heard her make these claims. The Second Respondent stated that he could not “really recall”, but that he thought that the First Respondent did mention the issue of medical expenses and salaries to Ms Tan. The Judge appeared to have accepted this evidence. However, we must respectfully disagree. In particular, we consider that the attendance note of Ms Tan seems to paint a very different picture. It was recorded in the attendance note that as Ms Tan was reading out cl 3.1 of the Will, she asked the Deceased whether there was anyone else that she wished to bequeath further sums to. The Deceased had initially responded in the negative, but when Ms Tan reminded her about the Respondents who had come forward with their claims, the issue of the $20,000 was then raised. It is significant that the attendance note made no mention of the medical expenses that the Deceased allegedly owed the First Respondent. If there were indeed outstanding sums that the First Respondent had yet to be reimbursed for at the time, there should have at least been some mention or record of this in the attendance note. If it was the usual practice for the First Respondent to be reimbursed by the Deceased, there was no reason for her not to have brought this up with the Deceased, and if she had in fact brought it up, there was no reason for her request to be denied. Further, the corroborative value of the Second Respondent’s evidence as to what transpired during the meeting for the drafting of the Will should also be limited, given his own admission that he could not quite recall what had happened. Therefore, we consider it more likely that the First Respondent had not broached the topic of the Deceased’s medical expenses during the drafting of the Will, and that the first time such a claim was made was sometime in 2012 or 2013, seven or eight years after the Deceased had passed away. To this end, we disagree with the Judge’s holding that even if the claim was made for the first time in 2012 and 2013, it would not have prejudiced the Estate’s ability to dispute the claim. The fact is that the claims were only made after the Deceased had passed away, which made it impossible for the only person who would have had personal knowledge of the matter to defend against the claim. Therefore, contrary to what the Judge had found, we consider that the Estate was irreparably prejudiced by the Medical Expenses Claim being made only after the Deceased had passed away.

  66. [59] In the circumstances, we do not think that the First Respondent’s bare assertion that she would be habitually reimbursed by the Deceased is sufficient evidence of a binding and enforceable agreement for reimbursement that would be sufficient to displace the presumption that there was no intention to create legal relations. In fact, all the evidence seems to point towards the opposite conclusion. We are therefore of the respectful view that the Judge had erred in allowing the Medical Expenses Claim.

  67. Administration Costs Claims

  68. [61] The main thrust of the Appellant’s argument is that having collected the assets of the Estate, he is no longer an executor and administrator but is instead a trustee of the Will. Therefore, it is the Trustees Act, and not the PAA, which should govern his and his wife’s entitlement to remuneration for services provided on behalf of the Estate. In any event, $40,000 out of the $75,000 which was awarded in OS 365 was remuneration for the accounting services provided by the Appellant’s wife, which should be regarded as an administration expense and not executor’s commission. Therefore, even if s 66 was applicable, the court still had the discretion to grant further sums in executor’s commission.

  69. [63] In cases such as the present, a personal representative of an estate can be appointed as both the executor and the trustee of the will. Indeed, cl 2 of the Will states that the Appellant is appointed as both executor and trustee of the Will. The question that then arises is, at what point does the personal representative cease to be an executor and start to be a trustee? Indeed, this is an important distinction to make, given that an executor and a trustee have different duties and powers. The need for this distinction is also highlighted in the present case, where the capacity of the personal representative determines which statutory provision will govern his entitlement to remuneration.

  70. [64] In our judgment, a personal representative ceases to be an executor and administrator only after all the assets of the estate have been vested in the personal representative, and the estate has been fully administered: see G Raman, Probate and Administration in Singapore and Malaysia (LexisNexis, 4th Ed, 2018) at para 12.19. This involves, inter alia, getting in all the assets of the estate, paying for any funeral, testamentary and administrative expenses, and satisfying all outstanding debts against the estate. As trustee, the personal representative then becomes concerned with the problems of distribution of the administered estate among the persons entitled: see Williams, Mortimer and Sunnucks on Executors, Administrators and Probate (Alexander Learmonth et al gen eds) (Sweet & Maxwell, 21st Ed, 2018) (“Williams, Mortimer and Sunnucks”) at para 65-05. We note that this also accords with the terms of the Will in the present case, which provides at cl 3 that all of the Deceased’s property is bequeathed upon her trustee ie, the Appellant, subject to payment of the Deceased’s debts, funeral and testamentary expenses.

  71. [65] Once an executor decides that he no longer requires the estate’s assets for the satisfaction of the liabilities of the estate, he should then “assent” to the legacy. This is explained by the learned authors of Williams, Mortimer and Sunnucks at para 76-01 (see also Arthur Dean, “When Does an Executor become a Trustee?” (1935-1938) 1 Res Judicatae 92 at p 93):

  72. [66] It follows that before the debts and liabilities of the estate have been fully settled, the beneficiaries to the will cannot claim to have a beneficial interest in the assets of the estate, since some of the assets may have to be used in satisfaction of the said debts and liabilities. Therefore, if the beneficiaries do not have an equitable interest in the assets of the Estate, the personal representative cannot be regarded as a trustee over those assets. This was also the view of Asher J in the New Zealand High Court decision of Re Maguire (deceased) [2010] 2 NZLR 845 (at [18] and [20]):

  73. [68] We add for completeness that in a case such as the present where the alleged creditors of the Estate are also the beneficiaries under the Will, it is necessary to draw a distinction between the Appellant in his capacity as executor vis-à-vis the Respondents as creditors of the Estate, and the Appellant in his capacity as trustee of the Estate vis-à-vis the Respondents as beneficiaries under the Will. In so far as the counterclaims in OS 763 are concerned, it is the former relationship that is more appropriate.

  74. [70] Similarly, s 43 of the Trustees Act does not apply to govern the Appellant’s remuneration for services that he had allegedly rendered to the Estate as a litigant-in-person in defending against the Respondents’ counterclaims. Therefore, since the Appellant had previously been awarded executor’s commission amounting to 5% of the assets collected, he is statutorily barred from being awarded further sums by virtue of s 66.

  75. [71] In any event, even if s 43 of the Trustees Act were applicable, the discretion to award remuneration for services rendered as a trustee of the Estate vests solely in the court. Personal representatives are bound by the rule in equity that no one who has a duty to perform shall place himself in a situation to have his interests conflicting with that duty. It is a part of this rule that a personal representative is not entitled to profit from his position as representative. Thus, while the personal representative is entitled to out of pocket expenses, he is not (unless the will provides otherwise) entitled to remuneration for personal trouble and loss of time in the execution of his duties: see Williams, Mortimer and Sunnucks at para 51-02. As observed by the learned authors of Lewin on Trusts (Lynton Tucker, Nicholas Le Poidevin, James Brightwell gen eds) (Sweet & Maxwell, 19th Ed, 2015) at paras 20-240 and 20-242 and 20-243:

  76. [72] It was further noted in Williams, Mortimer and Sunnucks at para 51-09 that in determining when to exercise its discretion to grant remuneration to the trustee, the task of the court is “to balance competing equities; on the one hand, the equity which seeks to discourage conflicts of interest in trustees and executors and, on the other hand, the idea that in certain circumstances it would be inequitable for beneficiaries to step in and take the benefit of the representative’s efforts without paying for the skill and labour which produced it”.

  77. [73] In the present case, we do not think that the services rendered by the Appellant in the administration of the Estate were particularly exceptional or onerous. There is also no evidence to suggest that the Estate had appreciated in value as a result of his administration. In other words, the Appellant had not done anything beyond what he was expected to do as an administrator and trustee of the Estate that would warrant remuneration. Therefore, even if the Appellant were to be regarded as a trustee and s 43 of the Trustees Act were to apply, we can see no reason to exercise our discretion to award him with remuneration.

  78. Conclusion