Court of Appeal · Decided 26 November 2019
Armstrong, Carol Ann (executrix of the estate of Peter Traynor, deceased and on behalf of the dependents of Peter Traynor, deceased) v Quest Laboratories Pte Ltd and another and other appeals
Feedback & support[2019] SGCA 75 · Case no. Civil Appeal No 70 of 2018
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Introduction
- [1]
[1] In a case we heard barely two years ago, ACB v Thomson Medical [2017] 1 SLR 918 (“Thomson Medical”), we were concerned with assisted reproduction and medicine’s ability to help bring life into the world. In these appeals, we are concerned with medicine’s ability to detect cancer, and which the appellant (“the Appellant”) contends would have averted death. Scientific advances can ameliorate illness and even extend life when it was heretofore impossible, but by that same token medicine’s promise of health and healing can amount to nought if we fail to capitalise on it. As has been aptly observed: “The paradox at the heart of [modern] medical care is that it works so well, and yet never well enough” (see Dr Atul Gawande, Better: A Surgeon’s Notes on Performance (Picador, 2007), at p 105).
- [2]
[2] These cross-appeals are brought against the decision of the High Court judge (“the Judge”) in Armstrong, Carol Ann (executrix of the estate of Peter Traynor, deceased and on behalf of the dependents of Peter Traynor , deceased) v Quest Laboratories Pte Ltd and another [2018] SGHC 66 (“the Judgment”). The Appellant, Ms Carol Ann Armstrong, as executrix of the estate of her husband, Mr Peter Traynor (“Mr Traynor”) and his dependents, has sued the respondents, Quest Laboratories Pte Ltd (“Quest”) and Dr Tan Hong Wui (“Dr Tan”) (collectively, “the Respondents”), in the tort of negligence, alleging a misdiagnosis of Mr Traynor, who ultimately died from melanoma. The next issue which arises is whether such negligence caused damage to Mr Traynor.
- [3]
[3] As to this last mentioned issue of causation, the Judge appeared to rely on the minority’s decision in Gregg v Scott [2005] 2 AC 176 (“Gregg v Scott”), where the House of Lords by a majority of three to two held that a claim for damages in clinical negligence would be resolved on a balance of probabilities that the defendant’s breach was not the cause of the adverse consequences. Conversely, the minority of Law Lords were prepared to have recourse to the “loss of a chance” doctrine, and to hold that the alleged negligence resulted in the reduced prospects for treatment.
- [4]
[4] The Appellant has two legal strings to her bow. The first (and primary) string is that she is entitled to damages because the alleged negligence of the doctor resulted (on a balance of probabilities) in the loss of a complete cure for Mr Traynor. This resulted in his death. Her position was also that since Mr Traynor’s initial prospects had been reduced from 77 per cent (above 50 per cent) to effectively zero, this should be regarded on a balance of probabilities as amounting to a complete cure, thus justifying a full award. The Appellant’s second (and fall-back) position is that the alleged negligence resulted in the reduced prospects of a cure. The Appellant sought a proportionate award of this reduction in prospects. The Respondents, on the other hand, submitted that a reduction in prospects is not a recognisable head of damage in the law of negligence.
Brief overview
- [5]
[5] In September 2009, Mr Traynor discovered a bloodstain on his shirt while changing. Mr Traynor consulted his general practitioner, who undertook a shave biopsy of a mole on Mr Traynor’s back. The specimen was sent to the Respondents who returned a pathological report indicating that this was an “[u]lcerated intradermal naevus” and concluding that “[t]here is no malignancy”. It transpired that the mole on Mr Traynor’s back was, in fact, a malignant melanoma. Shortly after Christmas in 2011, Mr Traynor discovered a lump under his right armpit while getting dressed. A biopsy of his lymph nodes under his right armpit (ie, his axillary lymph nodes) revealed metastatic melanoma. Despite repeated medical procedures and multiple rounds of chemotherapy, Mr Traynor passed away from metastatic melanoma in December 2013 at the age of 49. Mr Traynor left behind his wife, the Appellant, Ms Armstrong, and their daughters, Kate and Emily, who were aged 10 and 12, respectively, at the time of their father’s death.
The parties’ cases and the decision below
- [6]
[6] The Appellant claims that the Respondents had breached their respective duties of care in misdiagnosing her husband’s malignant melanoma in September 2009 (“the Breach Question”). The Appellant further claims that the Respondents’ alleged breach ultimately caused Mr Traynor to pass away from metastatic cancer at the age of 49, when he would have otherwise lived to the age of 82 (“the Causation Question”).
- [7]
[7] The Judge considered the answer to the Breach Question “straightforward and obvious”. He was unquestioningly of the view that the Respondents had breached their respective duties of care. The Judge held that the Respondents had simply been negligent in sending a pathology report indicating a clean bill of health to Mr Traynor when the circumstances required at least further examination on their part (see the Judgment at [8]).
- [8]
[8] However, the Judge’s answer to the Causation Question was more complex. The Respondents claimed that even prior to September 2009, Mr Traynor’s fate was “biologically determined” as melanoma had already seeded into his distant organs via his bloodstream. The Judge rejected the Respondents’ explanation, which explanation was, however (and as we shall see), pursued vigorously in the appeal before this court.
- [9]
[9] On the other hand, the Appellant suggested that Mr Traynor would have availed of surgical treatment that would have cured him. In the alternative, she presented statistical evidence suggesting that at the point of the Respondents’ alleged misdiagnosis in September 2009, Mr Traynor’s melanoma would have been what is known in the large scale studies as “Stage IIIB”. The Appellant contended that patients with Stage IIIB melanoma would have a 77 per cent chance of surviving ten years, which she claimed the law should treat as “equivalent to a cure”. In this regard, the Judge appears to have rejected the Appellant’s claim for a cure. As the Judge put it, Mr Traynor “might have been among the minority in the data. In other words, no one can be sure that Peter Traynor was not the black swan of melanoma” (see the Judgment at [15]).
- [10]
[10] The Judge declined to follow the majority’s ruling in Gregg v Scott and held that “if this case should indeed turn on the law”, he was emphatically on the side of the minority Law Lords in Gregg v Scott (comprising Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead) and that he would “leap an evidentiary gap when overall fairness plainly so requires” (see the Judgment at [16]).
- [11]
[11] Although he was of the view that the Respondents’ alleged breach had caused Mr Traynor to “lose a fighting chance”, the Judge declined to accept statistical evidence that Mr Traynor would have an at least 68 per cent chance of surviving 10 years. Instead, following from the minority’s judgment in Gregg v Scott, he opted to “leap where Lord Nicholls had leapt” and estimated that if not for the said breach, Mr Traynor would have lived for four more years from 2013. In so doing, the Judge remarked that the present case had a stronger claim based on the “lost years” argument as presented in Gregg v Scott. The Judge considered that the “lost years” were four years’ worth of Mr Traynor’s life expectancy (see the Judgment at [19]). At this juncture, we would note that even though the Judge had recourse to the reasoning of Lord Nicholls and Lord Hope in Gregg v Scott, the award that he had made was couched in terms of the number of years lost (ie, four years of Mr Traynor’s life expectancy). It is therefore, with respect, not entirely clear to us if the basis of the Judge’s award as to these “lost years” was predicated on the loss of a chance doctrine, or on a claim for a loss of expectation of life (as a matter of loss of income) under section 11 of the Civil Law Act (Cap 43, 1999 Rev Ed).
- [12]
[12] Having considered that causation was established in the manner set out above, the Judge proceeded to consider the amount of the award (“the Damages Question”). The Appellant had claimed under a Dependency Claim for benefits the dependents would have received from Mr Traynor, a Loss of Inheritance Claim for the sums she would have inherited from Mr Traynor, a Loss of Appreciation Claim for the decline in value to the Traynor family’s home, and the Estate Claim for medical, funerary, out of pocket, grant of probate expenses as well as damages for bereavement, pain and suffering. The Appellant suggested that Mr Traynor’s annual income would have been $450,000.
- [13]
[13] Conversely, the Respondents had submitted that if causation was proved, there should be a discount rate applied to the multiplier-multiplicand. They also submitted, among other things, that the Dependency Claim and Inheritance Claim should be calculated together, and that Mr Traynor’s annual income would not have been $450,000.
- [14]
[14] The Judge rejected the Respondents’ submissions that the multiplier-multiplicand for the Dependency and Inheritance Claims should be determined together, and that Mr Traynor’s annual income would have been lower than $450,000 (see the Judgment at [23] and [35]). He also held that as Mr Traynor would not have lived to his full life expectancy, but would instead have lived four more years, this would have brought the claim exactly to the date of trial. As such, it was not necessary to make a finding on the multiplier-multiplicand and he also dismissed the Loss of Appreciation and the Estate Claims.
- [15]
[15] In so far as the Dependency and the Loss of Inheritance Claims were concerned, the Judge accepted the amounts claimed by the Appellant up to four years’ worth for each Claim, but held that the Appellant had failed to prove that the value of the benefits to herself and her daughters out of the Traynor family’s annual expenses were of the conventional percentages laid down in precedents and therefore removed this amount from the Dependency Claim, awarding Mr Traynor’s dependents $346,677 (see the Judgment at [24]–[26]). The Appellant was also awarded $894,657 for the Loss of Inheritance Claim (see the Judgment at [32]–[38]).
- [16]
[16] Before us, the Appellant appeals against the Judge’s findings on the Causation and Damages Questions, as follows.
- [17]
[17] First, the Appellant claims that if not for the Respondents’ misdiagnosis, Mr Traynor would have availed himself of the appropriate medical procedures such that he would have been “cured” or effectively cured. In the court below, the Appellant had initially also claimed in the alternative for “loss of a chance”, but in her closing submissions she stated that it was no longer necessary for her to rely on the loss of a chance claim, as it was her view that Mr Traynor’s 77 per cent “chance of survival” under the law was tantamount to a cure.
- [18]
[18] During the hearing, Mr Edmund Kronenburg (“Mr Kronenburg”), counsel for the Appellant, confirmed that although his primary position was that Mr Traynor would have been cured, his secondary position was that, according to the statistical evidence, the Appellant should nevertheless succeed on her claim for the loss of a better medical outcome leading to a proportionate award.
- [19]
[19] Second, it was the Appellant’s case on the Damages Question that, following from her submission on a “cure”, damages should have been awarded for Mr Traynor’s full life expectancy up until the age of 82. Accordingly, the Loss of Appreciation and Estate Claims should be reinstated, while the Dependency and Loss of Inheritance Claims should have been calculated according to Mr Traynor’s full life expectancy. It was also her case that the Judge had erred in not awarding the full amount in relation to the Dependency Claim.
- [20]
[20] In contrast, the Respondents submitted that the Judge had erred in finding them liable for a breach of duty (see [7] above). It was also the Respondents’ case that even if they had been in breach, there was no causation established inasmuch as there had not been a loss of an early opportunity for treatment. In the further alternative, the Respondents submitted that if they were found liable in negligence, damages should nevertheless be calibrated downward as the Dependency and Loss of Inheritance Claims should be computed collectively and awarded as a single award, and that damages in relation to Mr Traynor’s estimated income should be reduced.
Background facts
- [21]
[21] On 24 December 2008, Mr Traynor consulted his general practitioner, Dr Christopher Huang Chia Yung (“Dr Huang”), about a mole on his back. Dr Huang’s clinical notes indicated that the mole had no change for years.
- [22]
[22] Sometime in September 2009, Mr Traynor noticed a bloodstain on his shirt while he was changing. On 12 September 2009, Mr Traynor consulted Dr Huang again. This time, a procedure known as a “shave biopsy” was performed on the mole, which removed the portion of the mole on the skin. The biopsied specimen was sent to the 1st Respondent, Quest, for an examination and preparation of a pathology report. It is undisputed that this mole was the “primary tumour” (ie, where all the melanoma originated from).
- [23]
[23] It is this specimen from September 2009 that was the critical focus in the trial below. The 2nd Respondent, Dr Tan, a consultant pathologist from Quest, testified that the practice would have been to embed the specimen into a paraffin block. The block would be thinly sliced into cross sections and placed onto a single glass slide. On 14 September 2009, Dr Tan was given four thinly sliced and stained tissue sections of the specimen in a glass slide (“the original slide”) for examination under microscopy. The original slide was accompanied by a clinical request form from Dr Huang.
- [24]
[24] After examining the original slide, Dr Tan issued a pathology report (“the 2009 pathology report”). In his pathology report, Dr Tan described the relevant findings as follows:
- [25]
[25] The 2009 pathology report was sent to Dr Huang on 16 September 2009. The Appellant stated that Mr Traynor had received a copy of the report, and was advised on its contents by Dr Huang. They understood the 2009 pathology report to mean that the mole was not cancerous. It does not appear that any further action was taken by Mr Traynor.
Facts pertaining to the Causation Question
- [26]
[26] Some two years later, around Christmas in 2011, Mr Traynor discovered a lump under his right armpit while getting dressed. Mr Traynor consulted another general practitioner, and was recommended to undergo a biopsy. On 6 January 2012, Mr Traynor underwent a Computed Tomography (“CT”) scan, a core biopsy, and a Positron Emission Tomography (“PET”) scan. The biopsy revealed that the lymph nodes under Mr Traynor’s armpits had metastatic melanoma. The CT scan showed adenopathy (ie, swelling) under Mr Traynor’s right and left armpits, which was confirmed by the PET scan. However, the PET scan showed no definite evidence of distal metastasis (ie, cancer in the distant organs). Mr Traynor was placed on four rounds of chemotherapy, starting on 16 January 2012.
- [27]
[27] On 9 April 2012, PET and CT scans continued to show stable lymphadenopathy (disease of the lymph nodes) and that distal metastasis was not detected. On 19 April 2012, Mr Traynor underwent a “bilateral axillary clearance”, ie, the removal of the right and left lymph nodes under the armpit. The removed lymph nodes were examined by a pathologist, Dr Fong Chee Meng (“Dr Fong”). Dr Fong noted as follows:
(a) Four of the right lymph nodes contained metastatic melanoma. “[O]ne [was] completely replaced by tumour while the remaining three show[ed] focal melanoma cells”. The largest right lymph node measured 6cm x 4.5cm x 3.5cm; and
(b) One of the left lymph nodes was “completely replaced by metastatic melanoma with epithelioid and spindle morphology” and measured 5cm x 3.5cm x 2cm.
- [28]
[28] It is undisputed that the bilateral axillary clearance on 19 April 2012 had removed the lymph nodes and the melanoma there. Also on 19 April 2012, Mr Traynor underwent a “wide excision” of the primary site of the tumour, ie, a removal of the skin where the mole was to remove any residual disease there. The wide excision showed there was no residual tumour in the primary site.
- [29]
[29] We pause to note that, at the trial, it was eventually undisputed that the shave biopsy in 2009 had removed the primary tumour from the primary site. Dr Nigel Kirkham (“Dr Kirkham”), the expert pathologist for the Appellant, had confirmed that if there had been some primary tumour left, this would have continued growing in the nodule. However, since the 2012 wide excision showed no residual tumour, this must have meant that in 2009 all of the primary tumour had been removed.
- [30]
[30] After the wide excision and bilateral axillary clearance procedures on 19 April 2012, Mr Traynor underwent adjuvant chemotherapy. CT and PET scans were performed for subsequent monitoring on 25 June and 8 November 2012, both of which showed no detectable melanoma. In April 2013, there was “some suggestion that the cancer had relapse[d]. [But], this was not definite”.
- [31]
[31] On 30 August 2013, the PET and CT scans showed that there were nodule growths in Mr Traynor’s body suspicious of metastatic deposits. On 2 September 2013, Mr Traynor was restarted on chemotherapy. On 14 October 2013, the PET and CT scans confirmed that distal metastasis had grown relative to the August 2013 scans in some regions.
- [32]
[32] Mr Traynor subsequently passed away on 6 December 2013. The Appellant’s expert oncologist, Professor William McCarthy (“Prof McCarthy”), testified that when Mr Traynor passed away, he had about 30 metastatic nodules about 3mm in size throughout his body.
Facts pertaining to the Breach Question
- [33]
[33] Concurrently, a number of events were occurring which were relevant to the Breach Question. When the core biopsy on 6 January 2012 revealed metastatic melanoma in Mr Traynor’s right axilla lymph node, the original slide from 2009 was recalled.
- [34]
[34] On 30 January 2012, Dr Fong examined this original slide and issued the following findings (“Dr Fong’s pathology report”):
- [35]
[35] Dr Tan stated that in February 2012, he learnt that Dr Huang had recalled the original slide from 2009. Upon hearing this, Dr Tan requested another slide containing deeper levels of the specimen from the paraffin block. Then, on 13 February 2012, Dr Tan issued a supplementary report (“the 2012 supplementary report”) stating as follows:
- [36]
[36] Dr Tan claimed that this 2012 diagnosis indicating “suggestive of a melanoma” was only apparent on hindsight and with the knowledge that Mr Traynor had had a recurrence.
- [37]
[37] On 22 March 2012, a third opinion was sought from Professor Lee Yoke Sun (“Prof Lee”) and Associate Professor Tan Hong Bing (“A/Prof Tan”). They reviewed the original slide from 2009 in their report (“Prof Lee and A/Prof Tan’s pathology report”) and commented as follows:
- [38]
[38] The Appellant’s expert pathologist, Dr Kirkham, was of the view that the specimen was “consistent with an invasive melanoma in vertical growth phase”. In his view, the Respondents’ 2009 diagnosis that “[t]here [was] no malignancy” [emphasis added] was incorrect: “[N]o competent pathologist would have taken the view that the skin biopsy showed an unequivocally benign lesion. At the very least suspicion of possible malignancy should have been raised and a further expert opinion sought”.
- [39]
[39] Even Dr Tan’s own 2012 supplementary report, after he had obtained deeper levels of the same specimen from 2009, had diagnosed an “[u]lcerated atypical melanocytic lesion, suggestive of a melanoma”. It was Dr Kirkham’s view that it was only this later report that correctly recognised the specimen was an ulcerated melanocytic lesion. Prof McCarthy similarly considered Dr Tan’s 2012 supplementary report to be “so different [from the 2009 pathology report] that the reports are virtually incompatible”. Prof McCarthy was of the view that the later report where Dr Tan indicated the specimen was in fact an atypical melanocytic lesion was an acknowledgment by Dr Tan that his original 2009 pathology report was both inadequate and inaccurate.
- [40]
[40] In contrast, the Respondents relied on the evidence of their expert pathologist, Dr Lee Siong See Joyce (“Dr Joyce Lee”), that Dr Tan had performed a proper examination of the specimen in 2009. She considered that his diagnosis of “no malignancy” was “an interpretation that Dr Tan made in his professional judgment based on the combination of histopathological features that he saw … favouring a benign melanocytic nevus”.
- [41]
[41] Dr Joyce Lee acknowledged that the correct finding was one of malignant melanoma with ulceration. But she nevertheless claimed that a “good proportion of reasonable pathologists would fail to arrive at the correct findings of malignant melanoma” because of the specimen’s intrinsic limitations as a shave biopsy. Dr Joyce Lee claimed that the shave biopsy which had been performed in September 2009 was a “sub-optimal” biopsy (as compared to a more complete wide excision). She claimed that “further interpretation was hindered by a “lack of full visualisation” of the specimen”.
- [42]
[42] Dr Kirkham and Prof Joyce Lee issued a joint report (“the joint report”) which stated that “[u]lceration was extensive with only a small amount of residual epidermis present at the edge of the extensive ulcer”, “[s]ome of [the] cells appeared to be maturing towards the base of the lesion”, “some mild atypia was present” and “increased cellularity” was observed.
The Judge’s findings on the Breach Question
- [43]
[43] The Judge rejected the Respondents’ explanation that the original slide in 2009 could have indicated a benign Spitz naevus. He was persuaded by Dr Kirkham’s evidence that this should have raised alarm bells as Mr Traynor was “a 47-year old man. Spitz neavi are benign neavi seen in children” (see the Judgment at [6]). We pause here to note that Mr Traynor was in fact 45 years old when he was first diagnosed by the Respondents, but this does not affect the essential point that the Judge was making, and that such information pertaining to Mr Traynor’s age was in fact available to the Respondents in the accompanying information to the specimen sent to them in 2009.
- [44]
[44] The Judge considered that, even accepting Dr Joyce Lee’s evidence that the original slide in 2009 had insufficient features to indicate melanoma, it was clear that the slide did not present a normal, healthy cell. In this regard, Dr Tan himself had acknowledged in cross-examination that he had noticed ulceration and a lack of epidermis. The Judge was of the view that Dr Tan ought to have investigated further and that the Respondents had “deeper, clearer portions [of the specimen] with [them] at the time”. Once a further check was done, the Respondents would have reached the accurate diagnosis that the specimen was suggestive of melanoma, and which Dr Tan did in fact reach in 2012 (see the Judgment at [6]).
- [45]
[45] The learned Judge stated that “no clever twisting and turning around” the tests in Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582 (“Bolam”) and Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority [1998] 1 AC 232 (“Bolitho”) was “of any use” (see the Judgment at [8]). He went on to hold (see the Judgment at [8]):
The Breach Question
The parties’ case on the Breach Question on appeal
- [46]
[46] Before us, Ms Kuah Boon Teng SC (“Ms Kuah”), counsel for the Respondents, launched a root and branch attack on the Judge’s findings in relation to the Breach Question.
- [47]
[47] First, Ms Kuah relied on Dr Joyce Lee’s testimony that this was a “diagnostically challenging” case. Dr Joyce Lee suggested that the features on the 2009 original slide favouring a benign naevus compared to a malignant melanoma were balanced on a “see-saw” and that Dr Tan had simply accorded the same observable features a different diagnostic weight as the Appellant’s experts. This led Dr Tan to a different (and incorrect), but nevertheless reasonable and professionally defensible, diagnosis.
- [48]
[48] Second, Ms Kuah claimed that this was a case with a reasonable variance in interpretation as the experts had arrived at different diagnoses. In her oral submissions, Ms Kuah sought to draw a parallel between Dr Tan’s erroneous diagnosis in 2009 with Prof Lee and A/Prof Tan’s diagnosis of an “Atypical Spitz Tumour”. Ms Kuah submitted that there were other experts who had not reached a firm finding of malignant melanoma. In the alternative, Ms Kuah submitted that the diagnosis of all the other experts, and even Dr Tan (when he corrected himself in 2012) had been made with the benefit of hindsight.
- [49]
[49] Third, Ms Kuah relied on Dr Joyce Lee’s evidence that this was a superficial shave biopsy where the features could not be completely visualised. She submitted that Dr Tan only had the deeper clearer portions of the sample in 2012, and that none of the other experts had opined that Dr Tan should have obtained deeper cuts of the specimen in 2009 when he first viewed the sample.
- [50]
[50] Fourth, Ms Kuah submitted that the Judge had erred in law by eschewing the test in Bolam and Bolitho (“the Bolam-Bolitho test”) in favour of his “newly minted “balsamic test”” [emphasis in original].
- [51]
[51] Mr Kronenburg, counsel for the Appellant, focused on the Respondents’ 2009 pathology report, which had unequivocally stated there “[t]here [was] no malignancy”. This was to be contrasted with several pathologists who had reviewed the original slide from 2009 and concluded that the specimen had malignant potential. Dr Fong’s diagnosis was “Malignant melanoma with ulceration”. Prof Lee and A/Prof Tan had also reached a diagnosis of “Atypical Spitz Tumour” and “high risk features for aggressive behaviour”. Although Dr Kirkham did not fully agree with Prof Lee and A/Prof Tan’s diagnosis, he stated that the “clinical implication [of their report was] the same as [Dr Fong’s] report”, which was that the original slide showed a “lesion with a significant potential to progress and metastasise to other sites in the body”.
- [52]
[52] Mr Kronenburg submitted that the original slide was not sub-optimal and that all the other pathologists were able to reach relatively consistent conclusions on the features they had observed. In the alternative, Mr Kronenburg defended the Judge’s findings that Dr Tan had access to the entire specimen and that the option to prepare a further slide with a deeper and clearer cut of the specimen was always available to the Respondents since 2009.
Our analysis on the Breach Question
- [53]
[53] We agree with the Judge that this was a straightforward case. The standard required of Dr Tan was that of a reasonable and competent pathologist. It required Dr Tan to have diagnosed Mr Traynor in a way that “at least some responsible body” of pathologists would have done. The Bolitho addendum is engaged where it is clear that there is a “genuine difference of opinion … within the medical community” as to what that medical practitioner ought to have done (see the decision of this court in Hii Chii Kok v Ooi Peng Jin London Lucien and another [2017] 2 SLR 492 (“Hii Chii Kok”) at [109] [emphasis in original]).
- [54]
[54] In our view, the Bolitho addendum has not even been engaged to begin with. There does not appear to have been an actual material difference in opinion between any of the pathologists or experts. Regardless of whether there was a variance in opinion, none of the pathologists and experts (even Dr Tan in his 2012 supplementary report) was prepared to conclusively state that the original slide displayed a benign tumour. And yet this was exactly what Dr Tan had done in his 2009 pathology report by stating that “[t]here is no malignancy”. Even if we accept Ms Kuah’s claim that the diagnosis of benignity and malignancy was balanced on a “see-saw”, this is very different from the firm and incorrect diagnosis that the Respondents had provided to Mr Traynor and the Appellant.
The original slide was at least suggestive of malignant melanoma
- [55]
[55] In our judgment, a reasonable and competent pathologist would at least have reached the conclusion that this was an atypical melanocytic lesion suggestive of melanoma, if not one that was straightforwardly a malignant melanoma. It will be recalled that this was in fact Dr Tan’s own view in 2012. Upon viewing the deeper levels of the specimen in 2012, Dr Tan revised his diagnosis from stating there was “no malignancy” to diagnosing an “[u]lcerated atypical melanocytic lesion” that was “suggestive of a melanoma”. We agree with the Judge that this latter diagnosis from 2012 should have been the diagnosis provided to the Appellant and Mr Traynor in 2009 (see the Judgment at [6]).
- [56]
[56] The Judge’s finding is supported by the diagnoses of the other pathologists and experts who had examined the original slide from 2009. Examining this slide, Dr Kirkham diagnosed the specimen as an “invasive malignant melanoma with epithelioid and spindle cell histology”. Dr Fong’s diagnosis was similarly one of “[m]alignant melanoma with ulceration”. Even though Prof Lee and A/Prof Tan did not diagnose malignant melanoma, they opined that this was an atypical Spitz naevus/tumour with “high risk features for aggressive behaviour” requiring “[c]lose clinical correlation”.
- [57]
[57] We are not persuaded by Ms Kuah’s contention that the later diagnoses of the original slide by Dr Kirkham, Dr Fong, Prof Lee, and A/Prof Tan were made because they had already known of the eventual diagnosis of malignant melanoma (ie, it was made with the benefit of hindsight). Nor are we persuaded that Dr Tan’s own diagnosis in 2012 was due to his receiving additional information. The assertion that the later diagnoses were made with the benefit of hindsight of the eventual diagnosis was not put to Dr Kirkham in cross-examination, nor to Dr Fong, Prof Lee and A/Prof Tan (who were not called to the stand). We note that the Respondents’ own expert, Dr Joyce Lee, testified that looking at the original slide without the benefit of hindsight she would not have said that it was a benign specimen, and would have instead diagnosed it as an atypical melanocytic lesion.
- [58]
[58] Even putting to one side the differences in diagnoses, we are not fully persuaded that the correct diagnosis could have been an equivocal one. In fact, several of the observable features in the original slide were indicative of malignancy. In this regard, as a starting point, it is necessary to determine what could have been observed, which is a pure finding of fact and a precursor inquiry without recourse to the Bolam test (see the recent observations of this court in Noor Azlin bte Abdul Rahman v Changi General Hospital Pte Ltd and others [2019] 1 SLR 834 (“Noor Azlin”) at [63]). Here, Dr Tan accepted that he had observed features such as ulceration and spindled naevus cells. In the joint report, Dr Kirkham and Dr Joyce Lee agreed that ulceration was clearly present and extensive, that spindled cells were present, and that there was “increased cellularity”. Hence, crucial features of the slide were in fact unequivocally observable.
- [59]
[59] As for whether the Respondents’ interpretation of the original slide was reasonable, this was an inquiry subject to the Bolam standard (see Noor Azlin at [64]). In this regard, both Dr Kirkham and Dr Joyce Lee agreed that “[n]aevoid cells of the kind to be expected to be seen in a benign banal melanocytic naevus were not present”. Dr Joyce Lee accepted that the fact the specimen was in a vertical growth phase and ulcerated would increase the risk of it being “highly aggressive”. She also accepted that if there was an extensively ulcerated lesion with increased cellularity one could not say the specimen was benign. In our view, all of these observable features and the subsequent interpretation of those features all support Dr Kirkham’s and Dr Fong’s diagnoses that the 2009 slide showed an unequivocally malignant melanoma (see [56] above), or if equivocal, at the very least one suggestive of melanoma.
The original slide could not have shown “no malignancy”
- [60]
[60] In any event, the Respondents’ attempt to cast this as an equivocal case is ultimately irrelevant. It must be recalled that Dr Tan’s 2009 pathology report was not at all an equivocal diagnosis, but a firm one of “no malignancy”. It was clear that whatever the original slide might have indicated, it could not have indicated a firm finding of no malignancy. Dr Joyce Lee accepted that, as a responsible and competent pathologist, she would have sent the sample to someone else to have another look. She further accepted that it would be completely wrong to rule out a malignancy.
- [61]
[61] We also find Ms Kuah’s equation during her oral submissions of the Respondents’ diagnosis of “[u]lcerated intradermal naevus” with that of Prof Lee and A/Prof Tan’s diagnosis of “atypical Spitz naevus/tumour” to be unhelpful. If anything, Prof Lee and A/Prof Tan were quite clear in their report that even if the specimen indicated an atypical Spitz naevus, several of the features in the original slide such as ulceration, asymmetry, increased cellularity and blunted maturation, were all “high risk features for aggressive behaviour” [emphasis added]. In addition, Prof Lee and A/Prof Tan noted the “adult age-group” of Mr Traynor was another high risk factor. We note that Mr Traynor’s age was information on the clinical request form that had accompanied the specimen that had been sent to the Respondents. It was clear to us that even if Dr Tan had not reached the same conclusion that the other pathologists had, at the very least, the circumstances warranted further examination on his part (see also the Judgment at [8]). These were steps which the Respondents had neglected to perform.
The Respondents had deeper and clearer cross-sections available in 2009
- [62]
[62] We find Ms Kuah’s suggestion that the Respondents did not have deeper and clearer cross-sections available to them in 2009 to be patently unsustainable. When the specimen was sent to the Respondents, it was placed in a paraffin block from which the original slide was prepared (see [23] above). It was undeniable that the paraffin block containing the rest of the specimen had been with the Respondents throughout. There was simply no other way in which Dr Tan could have prepared his 2012 supplementary report, when he requested for deeper cross-sections from the same specimen from Quest.
- [63]
[63] Ms Kuah then submitted that even if the Respondents had such deeper and clearer cross-sections with them in 2009, none of the pathologists and experts had opined that Dr Tan should have obtained deeper cuts of the paraffin block in 2009. We do not accept this submission. On the contrary, Dr Kirkham had testified that “[o]ne of the first things to do would be to cut some further sections … to get a clearer view”. Dr Kirkham’s recommendation for a deeper cross-section was supported by Prof Lee and A/Prof Tan’s recommendation for a complete excision of the lesion. Hence, even if Dr Joyce Lee was correct that the view in the original slide was obstructed due to the “superficial nature of the shaved biopsy”, she also accepted complete excision was probably mandatory. In this regard, we would note that it is irrelevant that the wide excision in 2012 showed no further traces of melanoma in the primary site. Rather, it seems to us that the experts’ recommendation for a wide excision was in part to get a more accurate look at the specimen. This was in fact already possible without a wide excision, as the Respondents already had deeper levels of the specimen with them at that time.
- [64]
[64] Most significantly, far from testifying that the Respondents did not have deeper cross-sections available then, it was Dr Tan’s own testimony that in 2009 (before he wrote the pathology report) he had decided that deeper cross-sections were not required for examination because he had deemed the levels of the specimen to be sufficient for him to make a diagnosis. Hence, on the Respondents’ own evidence, they clearly could have made a further check, but in the event, erroneously and unreasonably chose not to do so.
The Respondents’ breach was straightforward and obvious
- [65]
[65] We would also observe that Dr Tan had candidly admitted in cross-examination that he had interpreted the original slide as showing a benign lesion. Dr Tan had in fact intended that his 2009 pathology report reflect precisely this diagnosis of a benign lesion. Leaving aside Dr Kirkham’s, Dr Fong’s, and Dr Tan’s 2012 pathology reports which all alluded to melanoma, Dr Tan’s 2009 pathology report with its firm diagnosis that “[t]here is no malignancy” was a very far cry from those pathology reports diagnosing malignant melanoma. Indeed, as Dr Kirkham observed in relation to Dr Tan’s 2009 pathology report, there was “no suggestion of doubt, uncertainty, equivocation, or malignancy in that report”. Even Dr Joyce Lee, who was the Respondents’ expert, accepted that no competent pathologist would have taken the view that the skin biopsy showed an unequivocally benign lesion, and that in atypical cases the approach taken should be to give “a preferred diagnosis, acknowledging the degree of uncertainty”. In the circumstances (and as we have already noted above at [54]), the Bolitho addendum is not even engaged since the tenor of the Respondents’ evidence does not even begin to contradict the Appellant’s case.
- [66]
[66] Dr Kirkham testified that the effect of the Respondents’ unequivocal diagnosis (in the 2009 pathology report) was to lead any general practitioner to “pat the patient on the back” and tell the patient that the biopsy showed benignity. Misled by the Respondents, Mr Traynor did not seek further medical treatment when, in fact, the mole on his back was a cancerous melanoma.
- [67]
[67] It is difficult to understate the significance of the Respondents’ breach. As Dr Joyce Lee accepted, lives depend upon accurate diagnoses by pathologists, and diagnoses had therefore to be undertaken with due diligence. This does not mean that pathologists are expected to get it right all the time, but, at a minimum (a point which Dr Joyce Lee also accepted), if a pathologist could not rule out the worst-case scenario, they should have stated so in their report. In the present case, Dr Tan not only failed to state that he could not rule out melanoma, he also delivered a report indicating the exact opposite – that there was no malignancy. Put simply, Dr Tan intended to convey, and did convey, that the lesion was benign.
- [68]
[68] We agree with the Judge that the Respondents’ misdiagnosis was a straightforward breach. We accept that if Mr Traynor had been informed that the mole was not benign, this “would have resulted in a completely different course of action for both physician and patient” (see the Judgment at [8]). At the very least, it was Dr Joyce Lee and Dr Kirkham’s evidence that they would have sought a second opinion. In her oral submissions, Ms Kuah conceded that if Mr Traynor had been told the mole was not benign, at the very least there would have been a follow-up. In our view, even a follow-up would almost certainly have led to a diagnosis of “malignant melanoma” or one “suggestive of melanoma”.
- [69]
[69] Ms Kuah argued that the Judge had “failed to apply the Bolam-Bolitho test” and instead “substituted his own brand of “plain old common sense” to disregard the expert evidence in favour of “his newly minted “balsamic test”” [emphasis in original]. We disagree. The Judge was clearly aware of the Bolam and Bolitho tests and had clear regard and recourse to them. Rather, it was the Judge’s view that the Respondents were so obviously in breach that no twisting and turning of Bolam or Bolitho could prevent a finding against them (see the Judgment at [8]; see also [45] above). For the reasons set out above, we are similarly unimpressed with Ms Kuah’s argument and are also of the view that the Respondents had clearly breached their respective duties of care.
The Causation Question
- [70]
[70] Having rejected the Respondents’ case on the Breach Question, we turn to the Causation Question. An essential element of the tort of negligence is that of causation. It is not sufficient to show that there has been a breach; the Appellant must also show that there was a necessary link based on the “but for” test between the Respondents’ wrongful conduct and the damage to Mr Traynor (see the decision of this court in Sunny Metal & Engineering Pte Ltd v Ng Khim Ming Eric [2007] 3 SLR(R) 782 (“Sunny Metal”) at [64]; see also Winfield and Jolowicz, Tort (Edwin Peel and James Goudkamp gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 19th Ed, 2014) (“Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort”), at para 7–024).
- [71]
[71] We must stress that in most cases of medical negligence – as in the present case – many of the questions of causation are not questions of statistical evidence, but are, strictly speaking, simple determinations based on the “but for” test, to be answered on a balance of probabilities.
- [72]
[72] The following questions are in fact determinations to be resolved on the balance of probabilities and can be conceptualised chronologically and sequentially:
(a) Was the Respondents’ negligence, in allowing the melanoma in Mr Traynor’s lymph nodes to grow from 2009 to 2012, likely to have caused Mr Traynor’s eventual death in 2013 (independent of any pre-existing condition)?
(b) If the answer in (a) is in the affirmative, was Mr Traynor’s fate already conclusively biologically determined in September 2009 when the Respondents had misdiagnosed him?
(c) If the answer in (b) is in the negative, were there available treatments that would have prevented Mr Traynor from dying in the way that he did?
(d) If the answer in (c) is in the affirmative, would Mr Traynor have availed himself of these treatments?
(e) If the answer in (d) is in the affirmative, would Mr Traynor have been “cured” and would he have lived to his full life expectancy if he had availed himself of the said treatments?
Preliminary observations on the Causation Question
- [73]
[73] Before we resolve these factual difficulties, we elucidate several conceptual points which are of particular significance to the facts of this case.
The Bolam-Bolitho test is not applicable in the causation context
- [74]
[74] Ms Kuah submitted that the Judge should not have held the Respondents liable in causation. She argued that, in preferring Prof McCarthy’s evidence over the Respondents’ expert, A/Prof John Chia Whay Kuang’s (“Prof Chia”) evidence, the Judge had erred in “failing to apply the Bolam-Bolitho test when determining causation”.
- [75]
[75] With respect, Ms Kuah appears to have gotten the legal position the other way around. There is in fact no basis in the law of medical negligence for the Bolam-Bolitho test to be applied to the concept of causation; instead the test has historically been regarded as relevant only in assessing the question of breach (see Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort, at para 6-034). As this court had explained in Hii Chii Kok at [2], [54] and [76(b)], the Bolam-Bolitho test is concerned with whether “the general professional standard has been met” [emphasis added]. The Bolam-Bolitho test is therefore concerned with a potential diversity of views as to the standard of care when a person exercises a special skill (a quasi-normative question), and not with a diversity of views as to causation, which is about what had actually happened (a purely descriptive question).
- [76]
[76] In Hii Chii Kok at [56], this court had elaborated that the Bolam-Bolitho test was an attempt to strike a balance between “the need to respect the diversity of views within a profession and the need to hold members of that profession responsible for their acts”. This was because of the potential difficulties of attempting to identify a single professional consensus on the correct course that ought to have been taken, and if there was genuine controversy about those professional standards that the experts were unable to resolve, whether it would be fair to hold the practitioner liable for that deviation (at [55] and [56]).
- [77]
[77] Causation, on the other hand, is a matter of evidence and while there may be a role to be played by expert opinion, at this stage of the inquiry the court is not concerned with what the defendant practitioner ought to have done, but whether the defendant’s action or omission was or was not a necessary condition for the plaintiff’s loss under the “but-for” test (factual causation) and whether we should attribute responsibility for the consequences to that cause (see Peter Cane, Atiyah’s Accidents, Compensation and the Law (Butterworths, 6th Ed,1999) (“Atiyah on Compensation”) at pp 92 and 99).
- [78]
[78] It has been occasionally observed that the different stages of the inquiry do not necessarily matter in terms of duty of care, breach, or causation: see the English Court of Appeal’s comments in Vellino v Chief Constable of the Greater Manchester Police [2001] 3 All ER 78 at [59] in the context of dismissing a claim based on the turpitude doctrine. It is also true that the limits of liability are ultimately a question of policy (see the observations of this court in Thomson Medical at [1]). However, we echo the views of the learned commentators in Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort (at para 5-005) that it remains useful that the test of negligence is organised into its constituent elements (ie, duty of care, breach, causation, and the appropriate remedy). These provide judges with sequential frames of analyses. We also note the comments by Kirby J in the High Court of Australia’s decision in Neindorf v Junkovic (2005) 222 ALR 631 at [55], that the stages of analysis also help to narrow the respective inquires:
- [79]
[79] Most importantly, we are of the view that the elements are organised sequentially and separately as a matter of principle, because the different stages may have different policy considerations underpinning them. As to when the Bolam-Bolitho test should apply, it seems to us that the policy considerations underpinning breach and causation present subtle but important differences.
- [80]
[80] In Hii Chii Kok at [79], this court had observed that one powerful criticism of the Bolam test is that it is said to have reduced negligence to an exercise of doctors judging doctors. Negligent doctors would, when sued, look for sympathetic experts, and the combination of such evidence from partial experts and the possibility of judicial deference inherent in the Bolam test might confer near immunity on the medical profession. However, in Hii Chii Kok, this court had at [81] contemplated that a wholesale rejection of the Bolam test might be “unnecessarily radical” and held that the considerations inherent in the Bolam test remained valid in the context of diagnosis and treatment (at [100]).
- [81]
[81] The retention of the Bolam-Bolitho test is a matter of principle, because it would be unfair to impute liability on a medical practitioner for holding a medical opinion which others in his profession quite reasonably held (see Hii Chii Kok at [56]). This court also noted the practice of defensive medicine might be a concern that the courts should be mindful of, only in so far as it would have an impact on whether the proposed standard would fortify or hinder the medical profession’s fulfilment of its duties to its patients (at [85]). In other words, the Bolam-Bolitho test remained of relevance in the context of breach – which was a matter of professional standards.
- [82]
[82] Nevertheless, the foregoing considerations of what the practitioner ought to have done, and concerns over defensive medicine, are fundamentally irrelevant in the context of causation. What the general professional standard(s) are have nothing to do with whether or not the defendant has or has not caused damage to a particular patient. For example, consider a doctor, who had prescribed highly toxic chemotherapy to a patient, which ends up killing the patient in the effort to save him from his underlying cancer. That doctor could be said to have caused the patient’s death. However, if there was wide consensus within the profession that this was the appropriate mode of treatment, and this was indeed a logical consensus, the toxic treatment would not constitute a breach of that doctor’s duty of care, and he or she would be free of liability.
- [83]
[83] Similarly, the argument of defensive medicine has very little to do with the question of causation. Doctors, we believe, do not practise medicine with an eye to whether they might cause some potential loss to the patient. That is because causation (as we will discuss in a moment) is often a retrospective analysis. Arguments of causation often arise only after a practitioner has breached his or her duties of care, and when he or she seeks to escape liability. At this particular moment, the law of negligence asks whether, despite having breached professional standards, a practitioner should not be found liable because the damage was ultimately not caused by him or her, or would have otherwise occurred despite his or her breach.
- [84]
[84] Even more significantly, defensive medicine, if at all practised, goes toward the issue of breach and not causation because a breach is the antecedent stage in the analysis (and the precondition) for a practitioner to be liable for negligence in the first place. If a practitioner has complied with professionally reasonable standards, it would not matter whether the treatment he or she has or has not prescribed led to the patient concerned suffering loss. The doctor has not breached her professional duties and would not be held liable. It is for these reasons that the spectre of defensive medicine, which is often raised when a defendant is held liable in medical negligence, is simply a red herring. We cannot emphasise enough that as long as a practitioner takes reasonable care – a standard which the medical profession laudably adheres to – he or she has nothing to fear even if her actions may have ultimately caused a patient damage. By that same token, the considerations underpinning the Bolam-Bolitho test (which are to do with matters of professional standards and breach) ought not apply to the question of causation.
Causation in fact, in law, and as a matter of expert evidence
- [85]
[85] We turn to the “but for” test, which we have just considered at [70] above. The “but for” test is a means of establishing the inquiry of causation in fact, which is “the question of whether the relation between the defendant’s breach of duty and the claimant’s damage is one of cause and effect in accordance with scientific or objective notions of physical sequence” (see Sunny Metal at [52]). This aspect of the inquiry is about the physical connection between the defendant’s actions and the damage suffered by the plaintiff.
- [86]
[86] The question of factual causation has long exercised philosophers. Many events in the natural world may be a factual “cause” of any particular effect as long as they are “precedent and contiguous” to each other (see David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (Lewis Amherst Selby-Bigge gen ed) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1896) at p 170). Hence, for practical purposes, the courts generally apply “but-for” causation to narrow down the possible causes of an event to only the necessary conditions, or the causa sine qua non (see Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort, at para 7-007). We should emphasise that “but for” causation is not the only test in causation, as the common law contemplates at least six different causation tests (see Kumaralingam Amirthalingam, “Causation, Risk and Damage” (2010) 126 LQR 162 at p 164).
- [87]
[87] The “but for” test only serves as a first filter to exclude irrelevant causes. As H L A Hart and Tony Honoré have observed, there remains a potentially infinite number of necessary conditions fanning back in time (see Causation in the Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd Ed, 1985) at p 69; see also Sunny Metal at [53]). For instance, a necessary condition for a driver to have caused injury to a pedestrian would be the asphalt laid on the road some years back. But it would be absurd to hold the asphalt layer liable for the driver’s negligence. To resolve these difficulties, the courts undertake inquiries into causation in law, which is an attributive question as to whether the defendant should be made responsible for the consequences of his actions that have befallen the plaintiff. Put another way, legal causation consists of picking out one or more necessary conditions (ie, the causa causans as opposed to the causa sine qua non) which are in a sense “more important” than the mass of conditions that makes up the background of the causal picture (see Atiyah on Compensation at pp 98–99).
- [88]
[88] In the present case, in arriving at his findings on causation, the learned Judge “accept[ed] Prof McCarthy’s assessment, but with some caution”. This led the Judge to decline the Appellant’s submission that he should find that Mr Traynor would have survived outright. Instead, the Judge estimated that but for the Respondents’ negligence, Mr Traynor would have survived for only another four years (see the Judgment at [19]). The Judge’s finding came under heavy attack from both Mr Kronenburg for the Appellant, and Ms Kuah for the Respondents. Counsel for both parties argued that the Judge should not have substituted his view for those of the experts. Ms Kuah, in particular, forcefully submitted that the Judge “should defer to the opinion of either of the experts”. In other words, the parties were urging us to adopt the entirety of the opinions of their respective experts as to the factual findings on causation.
- [89]
[89] Although we ultimately respectfully disagree with the Judge’s findings of fact on causation, we are not persuaded by the parties’ submissions that a judge must inexorably make a finding that accepts the entirety of an expert’s opinion. Both parties cited the decision of the British Columbia Supreme Court in McLean v Weir [1977] BCJ No 935 (“McLean”) at [28] (which was cited in part in the decision of this court in Muhammad Jefrry v Public Prosecutor [1996] 2 SLR(R) 738 (“Muhammad Jefrry”) at [98]) that the court was bound to accept one or the other medical theory advanced. However, it is useful to set out more fully Gould J’s observation in McLean at [28] as follows:
The emphasised portions of McLean were not cited in this court’s observations in Muhammed Jefrry. When appreciated in the proper context, Gould J was not stating that a court must be forced to undertake a binary choice wherever medical evidence is proffered, and certainly not a binary choice as to the entirety of an expert’s evidence. Rather, he was suggesting that if there was no contrary evidential basis (particularly in the case of a unanimous medical opinion), a judge should not adopt an alternative theory unfounded on the evidence.
- [90]
[90] This much is also obvious when one considers this court’s observations in Saeng-Un Udom v Public Prosecutor [2001] 2 SLR(R) 1 (“Saeng-Un Udom”) at [26] (which was also cited to us by the parties):
[emphasis in italics in original; emphasis added in bold italics]
As this court had observed in Saeng-Un Udom, a court is not bound to accept an expert’s opinion merely because it is uncontroverted. However, a court may find that it should accept uncontroverted expert evidence if the opinion was grounded on a sound basis. Hence, it appears to us that the question of whether to accept or reject an expert’s evidence is ultimately not a question of whether and how the evidence is controverted, but whether any eventual view arrived at is supportable in logic and evidence. The court’s determination as to whether it should accept parts of an expert’s evidence (and if so which parts) is guided by considerations of consistency, logic, and coherence (see Sakthivel Punithavathi v Public Prosecutor [2007] 2 SLR(R) 983 at [75]–[76]). This requires a scrutiny of the expert’s methodology and the objective facts he had based his opinion upon (see the High Court decision of Public Prosecutor v Choo Peng Kuen [2018] SGHC 230 at [64]).
- [91]
[91] It has also not escaped our attention that several of the observations that parties cited to us about the court’s purported binary selection of expert evidence were in the context of breach (see McLean at [3], and Khoo James and another v Gunapathy d/o Muniandy and another appeal [2002] 1 SLR(R) 1024 (“Gunapathy”) at [3]). However, as we have made clear at [75]–[84] above, the same considerations that attenuate the court’s view of expert evidence as to professional standards are not always applicable to questions of causation. Indeed, in Gunapathy, this court had observed at [70] as follows:
- [70]
[70] The second and final comment we would make relates to the right of the trial judge to make a finding of fact preliminary to the application of the Bolam test. It is a well-settled principle that a question of fact, as opposed to a question of the standards of medical practice, does not fall within the province of the Bolam test. Questions of fact are therefore rightly capable of adjudication by the judge. …
[emphasis added]
Those observations were echoed recently by this court in Noor Azlin at [63]. If questions of fact prior to the application of the Bolam-Bolitho test remain within the province of the judge, then the judge would, a fortiori, retain the ultimate discretion to determine questions of fact subsequent to breach (ie, in the area of causation).
- [92]
[92] Drawing the threads of the foregoing analysis together, a judge is not invariably bound to make findings of fact, but where he or she does so, it need not be an invariable election between competing expert opinions. Certainly, the judge is not bound to accept any opinion in its entirety. The ultimate consideration in deciding whether to reject or accept expert evidence, and whether to do so in part or in whole is driven by, among other things, considerations of consistency, logic, and coherence, and with a powerful focus on the objective evidence before the court.
Fact probability, belief probability, and statistical outcomes
- [93]
[93] Our third preliminary observation relates to a tendency in medical negligence cases (and indeed in the present case) to focus overwhelmingly on the statistical evidence presented. A careful appreciation of what statistical evidence means and how it should be applied is necessary, and we hope to provide some guidance in this regard.
(1) The distinction between fact probability and belief probability
- [94]
[94] In the trial below, the Respondents’ expert on oncology, Prof Chia, and the Appellant’s experts, Prof McCarthy and Prof Kirkham, adduced several large scale studies to assist their respective cases. Many of these studies involved cohorts of melanoma sufferers, and their survival outcomes. On appeal, Ms Kuah relied heavily on Prof Chia’s evidence and the studies to suggest that since the course of Mr Traynor’s melanoma would have portended a negative outcome anyway, the Respondents ought not to be held liable.
- [95]
[95] Without pre-empting our deliberations on the matter, we think it useful to consider the observations of Prof Steve Gold in his article, “Causation in Toxic Torts: Burdens of Proof, Standards of Persuasion, and Statistical Evidence” (1986) 96 Yale LJ 376 (“Gold on Statistical Evidence”), cited by the UK Supreme Court in Sienkiewicz v Greif (UK) Ltd [2011] UKSC 10 (“Sienkiewicz”) at [217].
- [96]
[96] Prof Gold’s work was subsequently elaborated on by Prof David W Barnes in “Too Many Probabilities: Statistical Evidence of Tort Causation” (2001) 64 Law and Contemporary Problems 192 (“Barnes on Statistical Evidence”) and Prof Claire McIvor, “The ‘Doubles the Risk’ Test for Causation and Other Related Judicial Misconceptions about Epidemiology” in Ch 8 of Stephen GA Pitel, Jason W Nyers and Erika Chamberlain (gen eds), Tort Law: Challenging Orthodoxy (Hart Publishing, 2013) (“McIvor on Causation”).
- [97]
[97] The learned commentators illustrate a helpful conceptual framework:
(a) “Fact probability” is a piece of probabilistic evidence that speaks to the existence (or non-existence) of a causal connection between the defendant’s actions (or omissions) and the pleaded damage. For example, a statistical study showing that 64 per cent of employees contracted mesothelioma at a defendant’s work site might speak in favour of the existence of “but for” connection between the plaintiff employee’s mesothelioma and the defendant’s negligence in exposing the plaintiff employee to asbestos.
(b) “Belief probability” is the degree of overall strength and credibility attributed by the decision-maker to the fact probability evidence (ie, the statistical study). A court may look at, among other things, the credibility of the study, its authors, and the reliability of the study.
(c) “Sampling error probability” refers to indicators of scientific reliability such as p-values and confidence intervals. These measure the degree of variation in the results against the sample size. They indicate the likelihood that the results produced by the study is due to the unrepresentativeness of the sample rather than a biological association. A sampling error probability is just one factor that is relevant to determining a court’s belief probability in a piece of statistical evidence.
- [99]
[99] It should be understood that statistical evidence is really just fact probability: just because a statistical study shows a 64 per cent likelihood that the pleaded damage was caused by the defendant’s conduct does not automatically mean that the test for causation is satisfied. The statistical value of 64 per cent holds no intrinsic legal significance, and depends entirely on the belief probability (ie, the level of confidence the courts holds in it) (see McIvor on Causation at p 223). Hence, while a court could place its belief in the reliability and appropriateness of that piece of fact probability (the statistical evidence), it need not invariably do so. Statistical evidence is but one factor to be weighed in the overall mix (see McIvor on Causation at p 225).
(2) Statistical evidence and epidemiological studies
- [100]
[100] As we noted above, several of the studies alluded to by the parties were cohort studies. As Prof Gold has observed, such studies are concerned with populations rather than individuals. Hence, although proper scientific interpretation may mean that the correlations within the studies might lend weight to an inference of causation, they cannot in the individual case conclusively prove causation (see Gold on Statistical Evidence at p 380).
- [101]
[101] The matter can be illustrated with the case of Gregg v Scott, which we have cited at the outset of this Judgment at [3] above. In Gregg v Scott, the claimant, Mr Gregg, who suffered from non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, was unable to prove on the balance of probabilities that the defendant’s misdiagnosis had prevented an outright cure. This is unsurprising, since as Prof Gold notes, in these situations the usual form of fact probability (direct observation of the patient) may provide little or no evidence of causation (see Gold on Statistical Evidence at p 379). Rather, Mr Gregg pointed to statistical evidence suggesting that 42 per cent of the patients with his symptoms (at that stage of cancer) at the time of the misdiagnosis (and when treatment should have been commenced) would survive to the 10-year interval. By the time he had been accurately diagnosed, the tumour under Mr Gregg’s left arm had grown and invaded the neighbouring tissues in the left side of his chest. The statistical evidence showed that patients in Mr Gregg’s position (at this progressed stage of cancer) would by then only have a survival rate of 25 per cent.
- [102]
[102] For present purposes, we focus on just one aspect of the majority’s reasoning in Gregg v Scott. Both Lord Hoffmann (at [64]–[65]) and Baroness Hale of Richmond (at [204]–[205]) alluded to the trial judge’s findings that the statistical evidence showed that Mr Gregg’s initial condition was, on the balance of probabilities, not susceptible to treatment, or would have produced a relapse. This led Lord Hoffmann (at [71]) to affirm that “it was likely that [Mr Gregg’s] life would have been shortened to less than ten years anyway”. Lady Hale similarly concluded (at [205]) that even if Mr Gregg were treated in time, the relapses would have happened anyway.
- [103]
[103] As can be seen, the focus of the House of Lords in Gregg v Scott was on determining what was the relevant damage. It is trite that damage is the gist of negligence (see Jane Stapleton, “The Gist of Negligence” (1988) 104 LQR 213, at p 214). To locate that damage, a court compares the initial state of the plaintiff with his post-breach state. It appears to us that it is this exercise of comparison that led the House of Lords in Gregg v Scott to differing answers – although, as we shall see in a moment, the majority did not, in substance, distinguish between the initial state of the plaintiff and his post-breach state.
- [104]
[104] The majority accepted it was not possible to tell for certain what the patient’s initial state was at the time of misdiagnosis. However, it decided that the statistics should be applied to find that he would have died in any event. This came across most strongly in Lord Hoffmann’s judgment (at [71] and [80]), but was also alluded to by Lady Hale (at [198] and [203]). Since the patient’s initial state was assumed to be the same as the post-breach state (as, in both cases, he would have died), the majority reasoned that the patient had not actually lost anything (Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers MR took a slightly different tack, declining to allow Mr Gregg’s appeal on the basis that the adverse outcome had not materialised since the patient had not actually died yet (at [189])).
- [105]
[105] The majority accepted that there had been a breach causing a delay in treatment and that there was a physical injury in the form of the growth of Mr Gregg’s tumour. However, the tumour might have grown anyway due to a pre-existing condition (Lord Hoffmann at [80]), or even with remission the cancer might have relapsed in any event (Lady Hale at [205]). As the majority saw it, if the cancerous outcome would still occur because of some other reason despite timely treatment, then it could not be said that, but for the defendant’s breach, Mr Gregg would have survived. There was in effect no damage. It is this aspect of the majority’s reasoning that leads to all patients whose characteristics appear to correspond to survival outcomes that are below 50 per cent to be left without any compensation, whereas those with characteristics corresponding to survival rates above 50 per cent are given a full award.
- [106]
[106] We do not think it is correct for the statistics to have been applied by the majority (at [104]–[105] above) in the way that they did. There are two reasons why this is so. First, the fallacy lies in the comparison. To decide (using the balance of probabilities test) what Mr Gregg’s initial state was, the majority reasoned backwards, looking at how many persons with similar characteristics perished 10 years from that initial state. Since more of them died (58 per cent) than survived (42 per cent), the majority decided it was likely Mr Gregg was initially doomed anyway. But this misses the point. Mr Gregg never got to the 10-year mark and hence could not have been the appropriate subject of such an approach. This is because the defendant’s breach interrupted the usual course of events. With great respect, the error by the majority in Gregg v Scott lies in transposing the endpoints of other patients to Mr Gregg’s initial state. The outcomes of the other patients’ cancers at the 10-year mark depend on the patients never having experienced a negligent delay in treatment. But that is, without more, not determinative of the course of Mr Gregg’s cancer. By definition, Mr Gregg’s post-breach state cannot be the same as those of the other patients at the 10-year mark. At best, the statistical outcome was a proxy for what might have been; it did not reflect what actually happened, as the breach precluded timely treatment from ever occurring. The fallacy in the reasoning can also be viewed in light of how this piece of statistical evidence is to be construed as a piece of fact probability (see [99] above). Given that the large scale study cannot be determinative of what had actually happened (the fact probability), a court must consider whether, and to what extent they can rely on this information (the belief probability) to make findings on causation.
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