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Grounds publishedDecided 26 Nov 2019

Court of Appeal

Harmonious Coretrades Pte Ltd v United Integrated Services Pte Ltd

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[2019] SGCA 77Case no. Civil Appeal No 126 of 201929 paragraphs

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Grounds of decision

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  1. Introduction

  2. Background facts

  3. Parties to the dispute

  4. [3] UIS was engaged as the main contractor for a construction project. It engaged CTPL to carry out construction works for the project. CTPL in turn engaged HCPL as its sub-contractor for the project to carry out reinforced concrete works.

  5. Procedural history

  6. HCPL obtaining the Final Garnishee Order

  7. [4] On 31 August 2018, HCPL obtained against CTPL an adjudication determination in Adjudication Application No 288 of 2018 under the SOPA. Pursuant to the adjudication determination, CTPL was to pay HCPL $1,261,096.71, as well as adjudication fees and interest.

  8. [5] CTPL failed to make payment. On 10 September 2018, HCPL commenced Originating Summons No 1113 of 2018 (“OS 1113”) seeking the following reliefs:

  9. Response to the Final Garnishee Order

  10. [11] On 22 November 2018, UIS filed Original Summons No 1433 of 2018 (“OS 1433”) as well as Summons No 5522 of 2018 (“SUM 5522”) against CTPL and HCPL. UIS sought substantially the same reliefs in OS 1433 and SUM 5522, namely:

  11. [12] In Mr Wang Haw-Li’s affidavit filed on 22 November 2018 in support of OS 1433 and SUM 5522, he stated that UIS had grounds to believe that CTPL was in financial difficulties, noting that UIS had taken over CTPL’s sub-contractors, that CTPL failed to pay foreign worker levies and that there were winding up applications against CTPL. He also stated that UIS had terminated CTPL’s sub-contract on 4 October 2018, on account of various breaches by CTPL. He estimated that CTPL owed UIS about $7m due to CTPL’s incomplete works on site. This sum was based on a payment response issued by UIS on 23 October 2018 (“the Payment Response”), in response to CTPL’s payment claim issued on 10 October 2018 for approximately $6.8m (“the Payment Claim”). In the Payment Response, UIS indicated that CTPL in fact owed it approximately $7.1m as a result of amounts previously paid, back charges and liquidated damages, among other things.

  12. [14] Coming back to SUM 5522, although the reliefs prayed for were framed generally in terms of a stay of any or all enforcement proceedings against UIS arising from any judgment obtained as a result of any determination under the SOPA, for all intents and purposes, UIS was seeking a stay of enforcement of AD1 by CTPL against it.

  13. [15] On 15 January 2019, HCPL, UIS and CTPL attended before the Judge in relation to SUM 5522. The Judge made the following orders:

  14. [16] On 29 January 2019, CTPL wrote to the court, requesting further arguments in relation to SUM 5522. There was no response to this request. The next day, the parties (ie, UIS, CTPL and HCPL) attended a pre-trial conference before senior assistant registrar Christopher Tan (“SAR Tan”). Counsel for CTPL informed SAR Tan that it had filed a request for further arguments before the Judge in relation to SUM 5522.

  15. [19] The next day, on 14 February 2019, the Judge released his grounds of decision in SUM 5522 (which was filed in OS 1433), reported in United Integrated Services Pte Ltd v Civil Tech Pte Ltd and another [2019] 3 SLR 1426 (“the Stay GD”). The Judge gave the following reasons, which were of significance to the appeal before us:

  16. (a) CTPL did not have the right to choose which adjudication determination – whether AD1 or AD2 – it wished to enforce. It followed from the cumulative nature of adjudication determinations that only the final adjudication determination between the parties, “which has accumulated the findings of all prior [adjudication determinations]”, would be enforceable. Consequently, as between UIS and CTPL, AD2, which determined that no amount was payable to CTPL, superseded AD1 (Stay GD at [12], [20] and [23]).

  17. (b) There was also clear and objective evidence that CTPL was insolvent and such insolvency was not caused by UIS’ failure to pay the adjudicated amount in AD1 (Stay GD at [26]).

  18. Application to set aside the Final Garnishee Order

  19. [21] On 18 January 2019, UIS and HCPL attended before assistant registrar Li Yuen Ting (“AR Li”) for the hearing of SUM 5838. After hearing the parties, AR Li dismissed the application, giving the following reasons:

  20. (c) In any event, UIS was not prejudiced in that it could take the necessary steps to recover the sums owed to it.

  21. Decision of the High Court

  22. The parties’ cases on appeal

  23. [26] HCPL advanced two broad submissions:

  24. [27] UIS responded with the following submissions:

  25. Our decision

  26. Preliminary issue: the further arguments hearing in SUM 5522

  27. [29] We first address a preliminary issue that initially gave us some cause for some concern. As we noted above, SUM 5522 was an application by UIS against CTPL and HCPL. It was heard on 15 January 2019. Subsequently, further arguments were made at a hearing on 31 January 2019. However, at this second hearing, HCPL was not present. HCPL in its written submissions stated that it was not given notice of this hearing. Before us, counsel for HCPL reiterated that they only learnt that there was a hearing on 31 January 2019 when they received a copy of the Stay GD and saw the reference to a hearing on that date.

  28. Power to set aside

  29. [35] Prakash J reiterated these three grounds in her subsequent decision in Sunny Daisy (at [21]).

  30. [37] On this point, we agree with the Judge. The court’s inherent powers are preserved by O 92 r 4 of the Rules of Court which reads as follows:

  31. [39] In our opinion, such a view about the High Court’s inherent power accords with this court’s decision in Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No 301 v Lee Tat Development Pte Ltd [2011] 1 SLR 998 where it was held that the Court of Appeal has the inherent jurisdiction to reopen and rehear an issue which it decided in breach of natural justice, as well as to set aside the whole or part of its earlier decision founded on that issue (at [55]). A breach of natural justice does not fall within the three circumstances as identified in Ong Cher Keong. In holding that the Court of Appeal has the inherent jurisdiction to set aside a decision reached in breach of natural justice, this court reasoned as follows (at [55]):

  32. No grounds to set aside

  33. [42] It is worthwhile at this point to refer to this court’s explanation in Wee Soon Kim Anthony v Law Society of Singapore [2001] 2 SLR(R) 821 (“Anthony Wee”) about how the court’s inherent power should be exercised (at [27]):

  34. AD1 not extinguished or superseded

  35. [45] We disagree with the Judge on the last-mentioned point. Adjudication determinations do not supersede one another but are each enforceable independently in their own right unless or until impugned on the grounds as provided in the SOPA. Section 21(1) of the SOPA provides as follows:

  36. [46] As this court held in W Y Steel Construction Pte Ltd v Osko Pte Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 380 (“W Y Steel”), s 21 of the SOPA provides for the temporary finality of adjudication determinations. Indeed, the scheme of the SOPA is “an intervening, provisional process of adjudication which, although provisional in nature, is final and binding on the parties to the adjudication until their differences are ultimately and conclusively determined or resolved” (at [18]).

  37. [47] It was not disputed that AD1 was not impugned under any of the three grounds as provided in s 21 of the SOPA. Accordingly, AD1 was imbued with temporary finality and was binding as between UIS and CTPL. The narrow question that remained, therefore, was whether AD2 could nonetheless impugn or supersede AD1. In our view, AD2 could have no such effect for two reasons.

  38. Legislative purpose of the SOPA

  39. [48] The first reason is that it would run counter to the legislative purpose behind the SOPA to hold that parties could seek to rely on subsequent adjudication determinations to impugn, set-off, or otherwise diminish the enforceability of an earlier adjudication determination. This court in W Y Steel explained that the legislative purpose of the SOPA was to facilitate cash flow in the building and construction industry, given that “cash flow is the life blood of those in the building and construction industry” (at [18]). It was further observed that the adjudication process established under the SOPA was modelled after systems already established in other jurisdictions, albeit with some adaptations, but which shared the common idea that parties to a construction contract should “pay now, argue later” (at [20]).

  40. [49] More recently in Civil Tech Pte Ltd v Hua Rong Engineering Pte Ltd [2018] 1 SLR 584 (“Hua Rong”), this court had the opportunity to consider which of two competing conceptions of cash flow the SOPA aimed to promote. It was argued by the respondent there that cash flow would be promoted if a respondent to payment claims could not rely on reasons for withholding payment that did not arise out of the payment claim contract, as to allow such arguments to be raised would prolong adjudications (at [14]). The appellant in Hua Rong, while not denying that the purpose of the SOPA was to promote cash flow, argued that “true” cash flow reflected and gave effect to the net financial position between the parties. On this conception, facilitating cash flow would require accounting for parties’ mutual rights and liabilities across all contracts (at [23]).

  41. [50] In Hua Rong, this court rejected the latter conception of cash flow as reflecting the “net financial position between the parties”. This court held that such a notion of cash flow was foreign to the purpose of the SOPA (at [24]). Such a conception would also revert the law to its position prior to the enactment of the SOPA. Previously, an upstream party could withhold payment by asserting a set-off or cross-claim. As the ultimate validity of such a set-off or cross-claim could turn on complex issues that could only be resolved after lengthy and expensive proceedings, downstream parties may only receive payment long after payment became due. The SOPA was introduced to tackle this precise problem, by ensuring that downstream parties are paid timeously for work done or materials supplied (at [23]-[32]). This court thus concluded as follows (at [32]):

  42. [51] This court in Hua Rong proceeded to make the following observations on the adjudication process and its role in facilitating cash flow in the SOPA scheme (at [36]):

  43. [52] In the light of the above, we could not accept UIS’ submission that AD1 was impugned or superseded by AD2. For the same reasons, we disagree with the Judge’s reasoning in the Stay GD that “when faced with two or more [adjudication determinations] which have not been enforced … only the final [adjudication determination] … is enforceable” [emphasis in original] (Stay GD at [23]). In our opinion, such reasoning would run counter to the philosophy underpinning the SOPA of “pay now, argue later” and change it to “pay only at the end”. The scheme of the SOPA is that even if the upstream party has valid counter-claims against a downstream party, its obligation is to pay up on an adjudication determination and pursue those counter-claims later. In this way, the temporary finality of every adjudication determination will be respected and the life-sustaining cash flow of the downstream party will be preserved.

  44. The nature of AD2

  45. [53] The second reason we could not accept that AD2 had the effect of impugning AD1 was that AD2 did not, in itself, create a debt owing from CTPL to UIS. Although the adjudicator in AD2 found, taking into account the sums owed by CTPL to UIS under AD1, that it was UIS that had a net claim against CTPL for $1,176,050.67, that did not have the effect in law of giving UIS a claim against CTPL for $1,176,050.67. Instead, all that was decided under AD2 was that UIS did not have to pay CTPL on that Payment Claim.

  46. [54] It is well established that the SOPA only provides for downstream parties to apply for adjudication (Hua Rong at [43]). In a related vein, an adjudication determination cannot result in a downstream party paying an upstream party. This follows from the language of s 17(2) of the SOPA which refers to “the adjudicated amount (if any) to be paid by the respondent to the claimant”. This remains the case even if the respondent has raised counter-claims in excess of the claimant’s claim. Chow Kok Fong, Security of Payments and Construction Adjudication (LexisNexis, 2nd Ed, 2013) puts this point across in the following way (at para 16.63):

  47. [55] The net effect of both adjudication determinations in AD1 and AD2 is that the sums owing under AD1 still stand. AD1 was not impugned by the reasoning or findings of the adjudicator in AD2.

  48. No injustice by reason of CTPL’s insolvency

  49. [58] In respect of the second ground that the Judge relied upon, we do not agree that injustice that would be occasioned by reason of CTPL’s insolvency.

  50. Conclusion