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Grounds publishedDecided 20 Dec 2019
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Court of Appeal

Singapore Shooting Association and others v Singapore Rifle Association

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[2019] SGCA 83Case no. Civil Appeal No 103 of 2018

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  1. Introduction

  2. [2] The High Court judge (“the Judge”) found in favour of SRA and held that the resolution was ultra vires SSA’s constitution (“the SSA Constitution”). He also found that the Individual Defendants had conspired to cause SRA damage by procuring the passage of that resolution ultra vires. He further dismissed SSA’s counterclaim: see Singapore Rifle Association v Singapore Shooting Association and others [2019] SGHC 13 (“GD”).

  3. Background facts

  4. The parties

  5. [4] As we mentioned at [1] above, the first appellant, SSA, is the national sports association for the sport of shooting. It is a registered charity under the Charities Act, a registered society under the Societies Act (Cap 311, 2014 Rev Ed) (“the Societies Act”), and an Institution of Public Character. The respondent, SRA, is a founder member and constituent club of SSA, as is the Singapore Gun Club (“SGC”). SRA, too, is a registered society under the Societies Act.

  6. [5] The Individual Defendants occupied key leadership roles in the SSA Council at the time of the material events in this dispute. The second appellant, Mr Michael Vaz Lorrain (“Mr Vaz”), was the president of SSA; the third appellant, Mr Yap Beng Hui (“Mr Yap”), was the secretary-general of SSA; and the fourth appellant, Mr Chen Sam Seong Patrick (“Mr Patrick Chen”), was the treasurer of SSA. Each of the Individual Defendants was a volunteer in respect of his work with SSA. The three Individual Defendants and one Mr Peter Teh Kah Hoon (“Mr Peter Teh”), one of SSA’s vice-presidents, comprised the SSA Executive Committee, a smaller grouping within the SSA Council.

  7. The NSC

  8. [6] The dispute is largely concerned with events that took place at the NSC. The NSC is a complex of shooting ranges at Old Choa Chu Kang Road used by various shooting clubs and associations in Singapore.

  9. [7] The land on which the NSC stands is owned by the State. The State leased the land to the Singapore Sports Council, which was subsequently rebranded as Sport Singapore (“Sport SG”). Sport SG in turn sub-leased the land to SSA. SSA was entitled to manage and operate the NSC. The tenancy agreement in force at the material time was entered into on 1 August 2015, but prior to that, a tenancy agreement on similar terms had been in force from 29 December 2008.

  10. The Proprietary Range

  11. [8] SSA entered into a “Proprietary Range Agreement” (“the Agreement”) with SRA on 18 November 2014 for SRA to construct the Proprietary Range within a specified area of the NSC. The Proprietary Range would be for SRA’s exclusive use, subject to certain conditions, and would be constructed at SRA’s own expense.

  12. [9] The area given over to SRA’s use had in fact been used in the past as an operational shooting range, but it had fallen into disuse by the time the Agreement was entered into. There were therefore some pre-existing structures at the Proprietary Range. SRA decided to carry out reinstatement works, including the replacement and refurbishment of dilapidated trusses, bullet baffles, and the bullet stop area, as well as construction works consisting primarily of the erection of metal roofing and insulation over the rest area. Phase 1 of the construction works commenced in or around December 2014, and was completed in or around March 2015. SRA spent nearly $300,000 in total on the construction works.

  13. Complaints made by the appellants to the Building and Construction Authority and the ensuing investigations

  14. [10] At the time SRA was carrying out the construction works at the Proprietary Range, the appellants started complaining to the Building and Construction Authority (“BCA”) about those works. This was done without SRA’s knowledge.

  15. [11] The crucial complaint seems to have been made in September 2015. On 15 September 2015, Mr Vaz sent an email to Ms Lu Ji Ju (“Ms Lu”) from BCA to report “the construction of illegal structures which were erected without building permits and are being occupied without a [Temporary Occupation Permit]”. In that email, Mr Vaz said that the structures had been erected by SRA without approval from either Sport SG or SSA, and confirmed that SRA had never applied for a building permit. He therefore questioned the safety of the structures and “urgently ask[ed] that BCA [call] for the demolition of the structures before anyone [was] seriously hurt”.

  16. [12] BCA commenced investigations into this complaint and conducted a site visit at the Proprietary Range on 21 September 2015. Two members of BCA’s staff, one of whom was Ms Lu, and two SSA representatives – Mr Vaz and SSA’s general manager, Mr David Lieu Da-Yan (“Mr David Lieu”) – were the only individuals present at the site visit. No SRA representative was invited.

  17. BCA’s issuance of the demolition order and the regularisation letter

  18. [15] Mr Lim Chuan Lye (“Mr Lim”), Senior Manager (Business Operations) of Sport SG, gave evidence that Sport SG forwarded all three documents to SSA on 11 November 2015 by email for its action. Sport SG informed SSA that it could either regularise the Proprietary Range or demolish it, and left it at SSA’s option. Sport SG did not issue any direction to SSA to take any particular course of action, although it did expect SSA to take one of those two steps.

  19. SSA’s decision to demolish the Proprietary Range

  20. The SSA Council meeting on 14 November 2015

  21. [20] Mr Ong followed up with another question as to whether complaints had been made about the Proprietary Range which might have prompted BCA’s investigations. The minutes recorded the following:

  22. SRA’s response to SSA’s instructions to demolish the Proprietary Range

  23. [22] In the meantime, SRA mounted its own efforts to resist the demolition of the Proprietary Range. On 17 November 2015, Mr Eng Fook Hoong (“Mr Eng”), Chairman of SRA, had a conversation with BCA’s Ms Lu, one of the engineers who had conducted the site visit on 21 September 2015 (see [12] above). Mr Eng wrote an email to Ms Lu the next day, 18 November 2015, recording that “SRA shall initiate a meeting of all the parties namely [Sport] SG, SSA and SRA at a time mutually convenient. Timing and venue to be suggested by BCA on or after 30Nov2015 [sic]”. This email was copied to, among other persons, Mr Vaz and Mr Yap from SSA. Mr Vaz then wrote to Ms Lu as well on 19 November 2015, stating that it was “unfortunate that Mr. Eng … [had] dragged [her] into SRA’s defiance of SSA authority”.

  24. [23] On 20 November 2015, SSA issued its own invitation for quotations for the demolition of the Proprietary Range. Pikasa Builders Pte Ltd (“Pikasa”) was awarded the contract on 24 November 2015 at a price of $24,800, although, as the Judge noted (GD at [16]), the price it ultimately charged was higher at $26,536.

  25. SRA discovers the option of regularisation

  26. [24] On 23 November 2015, Mr Eng and two other SRA representatives attended a meeting with Ms Lu at BCA’s office. This was the first time SRA discovered that there was an alternative to demolishing the Proprietary Range, which was to take steps to regularise it.

  27. [26] On 30 November 2015, the SSA Council met to ratify various resolutions that had been passed earlier in the year. One of these was the resolution that had apparently been passed on 14 November 2015 to demolish the Proprietary Range. At the trial, Mr Vaz explained that he called this meeting to ratify those resolutions as they had not been passed by a show of hands, but he had thereafter received legal advice that they ought to have been so passed.

  28. [27] While SSA and SRA were grappling over the fate of the Proprietary Range, Sport SG reached out to BCA. On 3 December 2015, BCA granted an extension of time for the demolition of the Proprietary Range until 31 January 2016.

  29. The circular resolution of 16 December 2015

  30. [30] Shortly after this, Mr Vaz prepared the draft circular resolution and sent it to Mr Yap and some of the SSA Council members on 16 December 2015, requesting Mr Yap to circulate it amongst the council. Mr Yap did so later that same day. The salient parts of this resolution (the “Circular Resolution”) read as follows:

  31. [31] The rest of the Circular Resolution reflected the key terms proposed by Mr Vaz in his email, namely, that certain concessions would be granted to SRA members in their personal capacities. Later that same day, D&N sent a letter to SSA’s solicitors objecting to the Circular Resolution and demanding its retraction by 5.00pm the following day, 17 December 2015.

  32. [32] Mr Vaz, Mr Patrick Chen and Mr Yap voted in favour of the Circular Resolution, Mr Loo Woei Harng (from SRA) voted against it, and the other SSA Council members either abstained or did not respond. A majority was achieved and the Circular Resolution was therefore passed.

  33. The Proprietary Range is demolished

  34. [33] Even as SSA and SRA remained at loggerheads with each other, SSA proceeded unilaterally with its efforts to have the Proprietary Range demolished. On 18 December 2015, BCA issued SSA a permit to carry out the demolition. Pikasa, SSA’s hired contractor, began to demolish the Proprietary Range on 21 December 2015, and BCA was informed on 22 January 2016 that the demolition had been completed.

  35. The Board of Inquiry hearings and the attendant SSA Council meetings

  36. [34] After the SSA Council voted to approve the Circular Resolution, Mr Vaz convened a Board of Inquiry (“BOI”) to investigate the breaches complained of in that resolution, naming retired Brigadier-General Lim Kim Lye, who had joined the SSA Council as an advisor in 2013, as the chairman of the BOI. Two rounds of BOI hearings were held, the first in February 2016, and the second in March 2016: see GD at [23] and [25]. The mandate given to the BOI was to “determine if SRA had indeed committed the SRA Breaches … as set out in the Circular Resolution”. The BOI took the view that SRA had done so, and resolutions were later passed by the SSA Council on 13 February 2016 and 9 April 2016, after, respectively, the first and second rounds of BOI hearings, suspending SRA as a member of SSA and, as a corollary, SRA’s privileges at the NSC. It is unnecessary for us to go into the BOI hearings or its findings in any great detail because we agree with the Judge that the BOI proceedings were essentially a sham exercise undertaken for the purposes of fashioning, after the event, grounds for the decision that had already been taken in the Circular Resolution.

  37. Sport SG terminates SSA’s sub-lease of the NSC

  38. [35] While the BOI hearings were ongoing, the police audited the armouries at the NSC on 2 and 4 February 2016, and discovered that the armouries contained firearms with no proper records because they belonged to members of shooting clubs who had died, quit their respective clubs, or left Singapore. As a result, the police seized 75 firearms from SRA’s armoury, and two firearms from SGC’s armoury. This led Sport SG to terminate its tenancy agreement with SSA with immediate effect on 6 February 2016, with Sport SG resuming control of the NSC, although it appointed SSA as its interim managing agent for the NSC subject to various conditions.

  39. SRA commences the present suit

  40. [36] On 6 May 2016, SRA brought the present suit against the appellants.

  41. [37] Some seven months after the present suit was commenced, the SSA Council held an Extraordinary General Meeting (“EGM”) on 10 December 2016, at which the council expelled SRA from SSA as a member with immediate effect.

  42. The decision below

  43. The Circular Resolution was ultra vires

  44. [39] On the first main issue, the Judge held that the Circular Resolution was ultra vires for three reasons: see GD at [36]. First, the SSA Council had no power to suspend the privileges of a member of SSA. Second, the SSA Constitution did not empower the SSA Council to make decisions by circular resolution. Third, the Circular Resolution was passed without SRA having been given a reasonable opportunity to be heard, and was therefore void for being in breach of natural justice.

  45. [40] The Judge also dealt with SSA’s argument that SRA’s challenge against the validity of the Circular Resolution was moot given that: (a) SRA was no longer a member of SSA, having been expelled at the EGM on 10 December 2016; and (b) the Circular Resolution had in any event been superseded by the SSA Council resolutions passed on 13 February 2016 and 9 April 2016 subsequent to the BOI hearings. As regards (a), the Judge noted that SRA was still a member of SSA when the present suit commenced. SRA had not accepted the legality of its expulsion and had continued to contest it, and the time limit for SRA to bring legal action had not expired: see GD at [60]. As regards (b), the Judge considered that the BOI hearings were an empty formality intended only to create the impression that SRA had been accorded due process when in fact, the suspension of its privileges at the NSC was a fait accompli: see GD at [57] and [63]. The resolutions passed by the SSA Council were part of a smokescreen; the Circular Resolution was intended to be “the effective instrument for bringing about the suspension of SRA’s privileges”: see GD at [58]–[59].

  46. The Individual Defendants were liable for unlawful means conspiracy

  47. [41] Turning to the second main issue, the Judge found the Individual Defendants liable in the tort of unlawful means conspiracy. He found that the unlawful means in this case was the SSA Council’s passing of the ultra vires Circular Resolution to suspend SRA’s privileges at the NSC: see GD at [67].

  48. [42] The other elements of the tort were also made out. The Individual Defendants had collaborated together in issuing the Circular Resolution to the SSA Council members. Mr Vaz had informed Mr Yap of his intention to table the resolution and had indicated that he would draft it. Mr Yap had been asked to find a seconder, and had duly done so in the person of Mr Patrick Chen. And after Mr Vaz had prepared the resolution, Mr Yap had circulated it to the SSA Council members, with Mr Vaz said to be the proposer and Mr Chen, the seconder: see GD at [72]. The Judge found further support for this from the fact that on 18 December 2015, Mr Vaz had sent an email to Mr Peter Teh, one of the SSA Council members as well as a member of the SSA Executive Committee (see [5] above), informing him that the council had sufficient votes to suspend SRA. Only Mr Vaz and Mr Patrick Chen had voted in favour of the Circular Resolution at that time, but it emerged from the evidence that Mr Vaz had already reached an understanding with Mr Yap that he, too, would support the resolution: see GD at [73].

  49. [43] The Judge also considered that the Individual Defendants had intended to cause damage to SRA because the Circular Resolution had been aimed at suspending SRA’s privileges at the NSC: see GD at [79].

  50. [45] For completeness, the Judge also considered s 32A of the Charities Act, which empowers the court to relieve (among other persons) a person on the governing board of a charity for liability in respect of any “negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust” if it appears to the court that the person “has acted honestly and reasonably and, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, … ought fairly to be excused for the negligence, default or breach”. The Judge held that the Individual Defendants, having acted not only in breach of the SSA Constitution but also in breach of natural justice, could not be said to have acted reasonably. Thus, they could not rely on s 32A: see GD at [94].

  51. SSA was not entitled to the cost of demolishing the Proprietary Range

  52. [46] The third and last main issue that the Judge dealt with was SSA’s counterclaim for $26,536, being the sum that it paid Pikasa to demolish the Proprietary Range. The Judge held that SSA was not entitled to this sum as the loss was sustained as a result of SSA’s own breach of an implied term in the Agreement that it would use reasonable efforts to assist SRA in obtaining planning and building approval from BCA for the construction of the Proprietary Range (“the Implied Term”): see GD at [118] and [147]. This term had to be implied because the Agreement was silent on SSA’s role and responsibilities in relation to the regulatory approval process for the construction works: see GD at [119]–[120]. The Implied Term would fill that gap because SRA could only obtain the relevant regulatory approvals with SSA’s co-operation: see GD at [125] and [131]. And the Implied Term was breached because SSA had concealed the Regularisation Letter and the option of regularising the Proprietary Range from SRA, and, moreover, had presented a false state of affairs to SRA which impeded its regularisation efforts. Further, SSA had also deliberately obstructed SRA’s efforts in engaging BCA on the regularisation process: see GD at [142(c)]–[142(e)] and [143].

  53. The declarations ordered

  54. [47] The Judge concluded by making some of the declarations sought by SRA. The declarations granted were that (see GD at [156]):

  55. (a) The Circular Resolution suspending SRA’s privileges at the NSC was null and void.

  56. (b) SSA had no power to suspend the rights of its members save as expressly provided for in the SSA Constitution.

  57. (c) Unless and until the SSA Constitution was amended to provide otherwise, the SSA Council did not have the power to make decisions by circular resolution.

  58. The parties’ cases on appeal

  59. The appellants’ case

  60. [48] The appellants make three main points in this appeal. First, they argue that the Judge erred in making the three declarations. They contend that SRA does not have standing to seek those declarations because the Circular Resolution was not a resolution that was intended to have legal effect in and of itself, but would only have effect if it was communicated, which it never was. That being the case, SRA’s privileges at the NSC were never suspended and its legal rights never put in question. The declarations therefore served no purpose in fact. Alternatively, the appellants argue that there was no real controversy for the court to resolve. This was because the Circular Resolution was superseded by the resolutions passed at the SSA Council meetings on 13 February 2016 and 9 April 2016. Further, SSA’s sub-lease of the NSC was lost when Sport SG terminated its tenancy agreement with SSA on 6 February 2016, so the Circular Resolution, which purported to suspend SRA’s privileges at the NSC, became purely academic as SSA was no longer in a position to implement any suspension of SRA’s privileges even if it wanted to. In short, by the time SRA commenced the present suit on 6 May 2016, it no longer faced any consequences arising from the Circular Resolution, and there was therefore no controversy surrounding that resolution.

  61. [49] Second, the Individual Defendants contest their liability for unlawful means conspiracy. They argue that the passing of the Circular Resolution does not constitute “unlawful means” for the purposes of the tort of unlawful means conspiracy; the Individual Defendants did not have the requisite intention to cause damage to SRA; and the legal fees and disbursements incurred by SRA in investigating, detecting and responding to the alleged conspiracy cannot amount to “damage” for the purposes of the tort. In any event, the Individual Defendants contend, they are saved from liability either by the application of the principle in Said v Butt [1920] 3 KB 497 (“Said v Butt”), which grants a company director immunity from tortious liability for procuring his company’s breach of contract so long as he acts bona fide within the scope of his authority, or by virtue of s 32A of the Charities Act.

  62. SRA’s case

  63. [51] SRA’s rebuttal to each of the three main issues identified by the appellants is as follows. First, it argues that the declarations made by the Judge were duly granted. It contends that it did have standing to seek those declarations because the Circular Resolution was passed in breach of the SSA Constitution, and SRA, as a member of SSA, was entitled to enforce the latter’s constitution by seeking declaratory relief. Further, the declarations were not academic because the Judge found that the two SSA Council resolutions passed on, respectively, 13 February 2016 and 9 April 2016 after the BOI hearings were merely part of a smokescreen to conceal the fact that the Circular Resolution was intended to be, and was, the effective instrument of the suspension of SRA’s privileges at the NSC. In any event, the declarations “clarify” SSA’s powers in relation to the very real possibility of SSA attempting to suspend another of its members’ privileges or to pass another circular resolution in the future, and are therefore of value to SRA.

  64. The issues to be determined

  65. [55] Apart from these three issues, two additional issues crystallised at the oral hearing. In the course of oral argument, we probed Mr Wendell Wong (“Mr Wong”), counsel for SRA, as to the extent of loss or damage suffered by SRA. We pointed out to him that it was striking that the only loss or damage claimed by SRA in respect of the conspiracy consisted of the fees that his firm had charged for investigating the conspiracy. Those fees, at their highest, amounted to only around $63,000. This was well below the threshold for a case to be mounted in the High Court. We also expressed our concern that this dispute had not only been commenced in the High Court, but also taken up nine days of the court’s time for trial and an additional two days for oral submissions, with five lawyers in total appearing in the High Court proceedings and a sixth added to Mr Wong’s team for the appeal. Mr Wong’s response essentially was that this was a case involving the governance of a charity, and thus, the proceedings had to be initiated in the High Court. He relied in this regard on s 31 of the Charities Act. This raises an important issue of charities governance and, relatedly, the preservation of a charity’s assets for use towards its charitable objects instead of being frittered away on wasteful litigation. We will therefore also address in this judgment the proper interpretation of s 31 of the Charities Act in examining whether this dispute should have been litigated in the High Court.

  66. [57] In summary, the issues that we will address are as follows:

  67. (a) First, are the Individual Defendants liable in the tort of unlawful means conspiracy?

  68. (b) Second, is SRA entitled to declaratory relief in respect of the Circular Resolution?

  69. (c) Third, is SSA entitled to an indemnity for the cost of demolishing the Proprietary Range?

  70. (d) Fourth, does s 31 of the Charities Act require that this dispute be litigated in the High Court?

  71. (e) Fifth, how should the disproportionate litigation in this case be addressed in terms of costs?

  72. Issue 1: Are the Individual Defendants liable in the tort of unlawful means conspiracy?

  73. [58] It was clear, both from the length of the parties’ written submissions on this issue and the amount of time that the parties devoted to it at the oral hearing before us, that SRA’s claim against the Individual Defendants in the tort of unlawful means conspiracy lay at the heart of the dispute between the parties. We therefore address it first.

  74. [59] The parties’ submissions raise two sub-issues: first, whether the passing of the Circular Resolution constituted the requisite “unlawful means”; and second, whether solicitors’ fees allegedly incurred for the purposes of investigating a conspiracy can constitute actionable loss or damage in the tort of unlawful means conspiracy. Although the discussion of whether the requisite “unlawful means” were made out in this case ought, conceptually, to precede the discussion of whether there was any actionable loss or damage, we will consider the latter sub-issue first because, as will shortly be shown, our holding on that sub-issue is determinative of SRA’s claim in unlawful means conspiracy.

  75. [60] In short, we hold that solicitors’ fees, even if they are expenses incurred in investigating a conspiracy and labelled as “investigative fees”, cannot generally, and do not in this case, constitute actionable loss or damage for the purposes of the tort of unlawful means conspiracy. It follows that the tort of unlawful means conspiracy is not made out in this case, and the Individual Defendants succeed in this aspect of the present appeal.

  76. Can solicitors’ fees allegedly incurred for the purposes of investigating a conspiracy constitute actionable loss or damage in the tort of unlawful means conspiracy?

  77. The parties’ arguments

  78. The Singapore authorities relied upon below

  79. [63] We begin our analysis with a survey of the relevant authorities, starting with the three local authorities relied upon by the Judge.

  80. (1) Ong Han Ling

  81. [64] The first authority the Judge referred to was the High Court’s decision in Ong Han Ling, which involved a claim brought by an elderly Indonesian couple against American International Assurance Co Ltd and its successor corporation (collectively, “AIA”) for selling them a fictitious policy ostensibly offered by the company. The couple brought claims for breach of contract, fraud, and negligence. AIA counterclaimed, alleging that the plaintiffs had engaged in a conspiracy with one of its agents to defraud it.

  82. (2) Clearlab

  83. [68] The next decision the Judge relied upon was the decision of the High Court in Clearlab. There, the plaintiff company, Clearlab SG Pte Ltd (“Clearlab”), sued the defendants, who were its ex-employees, for breach of confidence and unlawful means conspiracy, amongst other heads of claim. The defendants had left Clearlab for a rival, but before doing so, they had allegedly taken confidential documents from Clearlab that benefited its rival.

  84. [70] Lee J then turned to the facts before him. He found that Clearlab had expended money to have IT forensic experts uncover the confidential documents that had been taken by the defendants, and accepted that significant time and effort had been spent subsequently to analyse what information in those documents had been illegitimately exploited by Clearlab’s rival. Lee J considered that the forensic examination and analysis “flowed from the conspiracy”, and sufficed to constitute actionable loss: at [243].

  85. [71] It is significant that Lee J only mentioned the expenses of the IT forensic experts as constituting the relevant loss. He did not specifically accept Clearlab’s submission that the legal fees it had incurred in prosecuting the action would also have constituted the relevant loss. Thus, Clearlab, too, does not answer the precise question that is before us.

  86. (3) Li Siu Lun

  87. The English authorities

  88. [74] We turn to the key English authorities which have touched on this question.

  89. (1) Salvadori

  90. (2) Tate & Lyle Food and Distribution Ltd and another v Greater London Council and another

  91. [77] A similar distinction was drawn in another decision of the English High Court, Tate & Lyle Food and Distribution Ltd and another v Greater London Council and another [1982] 1 WLR 149 (“Tate & Lyle”). This case did not concern a claim in conspiracy, but rather, a claim for damages in respect of managerial time that had been spent on initiating and supervising remedial work occasioned by the defendants’ negligent acts, which time might otherwise have been spent on the plaintiffs’ trading activities. It was cited by Gloster J in Risk Insurance in discussing whether wasted managerial time could amount to actionable loss or damage in the tort of conspiracy. We will not go into the facts of the case, but it is helpful to reproduce the question that Forbes J considered he had to address (at 152):

  92. (3) Lonrho

  93. [81] Again, it is relevant to note that nothing was said of lawyers’ fees being claimable as expenses incurred in investigating a conspiracy. The head of loss described in Lonrho was confined to “managerial and staff time”, and the English Court of Appeal, in allowing the statement of claim to be amended, expected to hear more about what work “Lonrho staff” had done to investigate the conspiracy.

  94. (4) Risk Insurance

  95. [82] We turn now to Gloster J’s decision in Risk Insurance, which, as we noted earlier, was relied upon by Belinda Ang J in Ong Han Ling. The claimant in Risk Insurance was a major German reinsurance company. The defendants comprised companies under the “Risk” umbrella of companies and individuals employed by them. The claimant authorised the first defendant to write on its behalf contracts of reinsurance obtained through the London market: at [4]. The claimant succeeded in its claim against the defendants in respect of a conspiracy by unlawful means that, in gist, enabled the defendants to obtain a large amount of commission contrary to the interests of the claimant. The parties came before Gloster J for a hearing to determine certain issues of principle in relation to the quantum of damages to be paid to the claimant: at [1].

  96. [83] Gloster J characterised the “real issue” before her as the question whether the claimant could “recover, as damages, internal management and staff time and internal overheads” [emphasis added], except for the amount it would be claiming under the separate head of loss of profits: at [55].

  97. (5) Rustem Magdeev v Dimitry Tsvetkov and others

  98. [86] Finally, there is the decision of the English High Court in Rustem Magdeev v Dimitry Tsvetkov and others [2019] EWHC 1557 (Comm) (“Magdeev”), a case that does squarely deal with the question whether solicitors’ fees incurred in investigating a conspiracy can constitute actionable loss or damage for the purposes of the tort of unlawful means conspiracy. This decision was released after the parties had filed their written cases for this appeal, but prior to the hearing before us. Unfortunately, neither party drew our attention to it.

  99. [87] In Magdeev, Mr Tsvetkov counterclaimed against Mr Magdeev and one Mr Gaynulin in unlawful means conspiracy, alleging that they had conspired to injure him by depriving his company of its assets. Mr Gaynulin applied for the counterclaim to be struck out for Mr Tsvetkov’s failure to establish claimable heads of loss.

  100. Legal fees that can be recovered as costs cannot constitute actionable loss or damage in the tort of unlawful means conspiracy

  101. [99] We should point out here that since the present case was argued on the footing that the conspiracy alleged by SRA was one of conspiracy by unlawful means, the general rule that we have laid down at [92] above applies, strictly speaking, only to this form of conspiracy. That said, we note that Salvadori did not distinguish between unlawful means conspiracy and lawful means conspiracy, and that Lonrho was a case involving lawful means conspiracy. We see no reason in principle why the three reasons which we have given for the general rule set out at [92] above should not apply with equal force to cases of lawful means conspiracy. It is therefore likely that this general rule will apply to the tort of lawful means conspiracy as well, although we leave this for determination on a future occasion if and when the question does arise before us.

  102. Application to the facts

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