Court of Appeal · Decided 29 October 2020
Recovery Vehicle 1 Pte Ltd v Industries Chimiques Du Senegal and another appeal and another matter
Feedback & support[2020] SGCA 107 · Case no. Civil Appeal No 31 of 2020
✱ What happened, in plain English
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Grounds of decision
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Introduction
- [1]
[1] These appeals arose from an application to, inter alia, set aside the service of a writ outside of jurisdiction. There was no controversy as to the requirements which a plaintiff has to satisfy to obtain leave for service outside of jurisdiction. Neither was there any dispute that the burden to satisfy each of the requirements rested with such a plaintiff.
- [2]
[2] In determining whether the burden for each of the requirement is satisfied, the court typically undertakes an analysis of each discrete requirement. However, it should not be overlooked that the analysis of any one of the requirements may have consequential impact on the other requirements.
- [3]
[3] Unfortunately, this was precisely what occurred in the court below. In determining whether Singapore was the forum conveniens for the resolution of the dispute, it was essential to examine whether there was any available competing jurisdiction. The High Judge below (“the Judge”), for the purposes of the forum non conveniens analysis, found that the claim was time-barred in the other competing jurisdiction, Senegal. The Judge went on rightly to find that as the plaintiff had not acted reasonably in failing to issue a protective writ in Senegal, it could not rely on the unavailability of Senegal to tilt the balance in favour of Singapore as the forum conveniens. However, the court below should have been mindful that the effect of a finding of time bar has a significant impact on the sufficiency of merits requirement for the purposes of obtaining leave for service outside of jurisdiction. After all, by definition, a time-barred claim would have no merit and consequently, such a finding would in itself establish that there was no sufficient degree of merit which would defeat any leave application for service outside of jurisdiction.
- [4]
[4] Similarly, when a party accepts a fact in aid of a specific legal argument, it may unwittingly cause consequential impact on other legal arguments. In this case, in its quest to establish that Senegal was not an available forum, it was conceded that the claims were time-barred in Senegal. However, that factual concession was made in tandem with the argument that the governing law was Singapore law notwithstanding the opposing party’s contention that it was Senegalese law. The Judge found that Senegalese law was the governing law. Such a finding gave rise to unintended consequences because under Senegalese law, the claims were time-barred. Under such circumstances, is it open to such party to resile from its factual concession on the basis that the concession was made in aid of a different legal argument? As explained below, this would not be permissible as it would constitute an abuse of process. In any event, the evidence before the court was consistent with the factual concession.
- [5]
[5] This judgment will serve to remind litigants and their legal advisors of the risks in adopting a pigeon-holed view when examining each of the legal requirements for service outside of jurisdiction. Quite often, the analysis is not static but dynamic in nature requiring parties to connect the dots after the analysis to consider and understand the ramifications prior to settling their legal submissions. An omission or failure to do so may give rise to unanticipated adverse consequences.
Facts
- [6]
[6] The appellant in Civil Appeal No 31 of 2020 (“CA 31”), Recovery Vehicle 1 Pte Ltd (“RV1”), is a Singapore company in the business of recovering stressed debts, and has been assigned the debts purportedly owed by Industries Chimiques Du Senegal (“ICS”) to Affert Resources Pte Ltd (“Affert”). ICS is the appellant in Civil Appeal No 32 of 2020 (“CA 32”).
- [7]
[7] Affert is a Singapore company which business includes the manufacturing and trading of fertilisers and mineral ores, as well as the charter of ships and barges. Its directors are Mr Syam Kumar Ampajalam (“Mr Syam”) and Ms Vandana Hanumanth Rao Bhounsle (“Ms Vandana”). Mr Syam was the sole shareholder of Affert. Ms Vandana is from the corporate secretarial firm of Crystalbiz Pte Limited and was not involved in the running of Affert. She was based in Singapore.
- [8]
[8] It is common ground that Affert was controlled by the Archean Group, which is a conglomerate managed from India by the Pendurthi family. Affert’s only active director, Mr Syam, was primarily based in Hong Kong during his conduct of Affert’s business. Both parties agreed that Affert had no active employees in Singapore.
- [9]
[9] ICS is a Senegal-incorporated company which business includes the production and export of phosphate fertiliser products. ICS was also related to the Archean Group in that 66% of its shares were owned by Senfer Africa Ltd (“Senfer”), which was controlled by the Archean Group. The remaining shares in ICS were held by the State of Senegal, the Government of India and the Indian Farmers Fertilisers Cooperative Ltd.
The Sulphur Contracts
- [10]
[10] The crux of this dispute concerns six contracts made between Affert and ICS from 11 May 2012 to 10 June 2013 for the purchase of sulphur. We refer to these as the “Sulphur Contracts”. It is undisputed that the Sulphur Contracts were not written. The key details of the Sulphur Contracts may be found in six invoices dated from 11 May 2012 to 10 June 2013 (“the Six Invoices”). We briefly recount the material information as stated in the Six Invoices.
(a) An invoice dated 11 May 2012 for US$1,573,000 issued by Affert to ICS for the delivery of Sulphur from Canada to Senegal (“the MV Xenia Shipment”): In respect of this invoice, RV1 claims the sum of US$962,000, after taking into account a part payment made by ICS to Affert’s bank account in Hong Kong on 12 June 2012. Payment for this shipment was to be made within 90 days of the Bill of Lading (“BL”) date (ie, by 19 July 2012). The shipper was listed as Primary Resources, Inc (“Primary Resources”). The BL was endorsed in blank by the Bank of India (Singapore Branch).
(b) An invoice dated 6 August 2012 for US$5,800,837 issued by Affert to ICS for the delivery of sulphur from the United Arab Emirates (“the UAE”) to Senegal (“the Transfert Shipment”): In respect of this invoice, RV1 claims the sum of US$1,120,837, after deducting part payments that ICS made in Hong Kong on 7 December 2012, 20 February 2013, 15 April 2013 and 9 January 2014 although payment was to be made within 60 days from the BL date (ie, by 27 September 2012). Affert purchased this shipment from Transfert FZCO (“Transfert”) for US$5,674,313.09. Affert, however, did not make any payment to Transfert. This subsequently led to a dispute between Transfert and Affert, with Transfert commencing Suit No 1072 of 2014 against Affert on 9 October 2014. On 30 March 2015, Transfert filed a Notice of Discontinuance after payment was made to Transfert.
(c) An invoice dated 27 September 2012 for US$6,475,350 issued by Affert to ICS for the delivery of Sulphur from Poland to Senegal (“the Solvadis Shipment”): RV1 claims the full price of US$6,475,350. Payment was to be made at sight of the cargo. Affert’s Ledger Account for the period from 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2012 indicated that Solvadis Commodity Chemicals Gmbh (“Solvadis”) had charged Affert US$5,761,740 for this shipment. Presumably, Affert intended to make the difference of US$713,610 as profit by on-selling the sulphur to ICS.
(d) An invoice dated 7 March 2013 for US$6,012,500 issued by Affert to ICS for the delivery of sulphur from Ukraine to Senegal (“the MV Amanda C Shipment”): RV1 claims the full price of US$6,012,500. Payment was to be made at sight of the cargo. The shipper named in the BL was Tengizchevroil International (Bermuda) Limited, a Bermuda company. The consignee was named as the Bank of India (Singapore Branch), and the notify party was ICS.
(e) An invoice dated 7 May 2013 for US$1,247,077.60 issued by Affert to ICS for the delivery of sulphur from Canada to Senegal (“the MV Beauforte Shipment”): RV1 claims the full price of US$1,247,077.60. Payment was to be made within 60 days from the BL date (ie, by 5 July 2013). This shipment was purchased by Affert from the Mineral Trade Group based in Dubai. The shipper named in the BL was Primary Resources and the notify party was ICS. The BL was endorsed in blank by Mashreqbank, Dubai.
(f) An invoice dated 10 June 2013 for US$1,189,500 issued by Affert to ICS for the delivery of sulphur from Spain to Senegal (“the MV Lena Shipment”): RV1 claims the full price of US$1,189,500. Payment was to be made within 60 days from the BL date by 29 June 2013. According to RV1, Affert purchased this shipment from Mineral Trade Group. The named shipper was Primary Resources and the notify party was ICS. The BL was endorsed in blank by Mashreqbank, Dubai.
- [11]
[11] In total, RV1 claims the sum of US$17,007,263.60 from ICS (“the ICS Debt”).
- [12]
[12] Apart from the issue of payment, there was also a dispute between ICS and Affert concerning the quality of the Solvadis Shipment. According to ICS, it informed Affert in 2012 and 2013 that the sub-standard quality of the Solvadis Shipment sulphur had led to the closure of one its plants. Affert had, in a letter to the Inland Revenue Authority dated on 14 June 2016, recorded the sum of US$6,475,350 (the sum due pursuant to the Solvadis Shipment) as a “doubtful debt” for the 2014 Year of Assessment. RV1’s representative, Mr Damian John Prentice (“Mr Prentice”) exhibited in his affidavit certain answers provided by Ms Vandana in Examination of Judgment Debtor proceedings commenced by Solvadis against Affert. There, Ms Vandana stated that Affert had not pursued ICS for the Solvadis Shipment as it did not have the funds to “fight” ICS and that it did not wish to provoke a counter-claim by ICS for damage to ICS’s plant, which purportedly came up to US$22.4 million.
Acquisition of ICS and Waiver of the ICS Debt
- [13]
[13] In the proceedings before the Judge, a key aspect of ICS’s defence against RV1’s claim under the Sulphur Contracts was that Affert had waived the ICS Debt (“the Waiver Defence”). According to ICS, Affert had agreed in or around October 2014 to waive the ICS Debt as part of an acquisition of Senfer’s stake in ICS (“the Acquisition”) by Indorama Holdings B.V. (“Indorama”).
- [14]
[14] The Acquisition was to proceed in the following manner. First, Indorama would inject the sum of US$50 million to various other entities in the Archean Group and its creditors. In exchange, Indorama would receive 66% of the shareholdings in ICS. As part of the Acquisition, Affert would unconditionally waive and forego all of its past claims against ICS, including the ICS Debt.
- [15]
[15] ICS relies on a number of documents to prove the Waiver Defence. We refer to the first category of documents as “the Acquisition Documents”, which consist of the following:
(a) The Share Transfer Agreement: This was executed in Senegal by Senfer and Indorama. Under this agreement, Indorama paid US$11 million for Senfer’s ICS’s shares. This agreement is stated to be governed by the Organisation for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa Act (“OHADA Act”) and the disputes thereunder are to be submitted to the Regional Court of Dakar, Senegal.
(b) An Assumption of Debt Agreement (“ADA”): Indorama paid US$30 million to Senfer’s creditor banks under this agreement. The ADA is governed by English law.
- [16]
[16] We refer to the second category of documents which ICS relies on as “the Waiver Documents”. These consist of the following:
(a) An email sent by Mr Syam to Mr Munish Jindal (“Mr Jindal”), a representative of Indorama and possibly a representative of ICS, on 1 October 2014 stating that “[a]s per the overall understanding on takeover of ICS by Indorama, we, hereby, agree to consider the dues of ICS to us as part of the overall consideration for the transaction” [emphasis added] (“the 1 October 2014 email”).
(b) An email sent by Mr Jindal to Mr Syam on 3 October 2014 stating “[w]e acknowledge receipt of your confirmation that the dues of ICS to [Affert] are part of the settlement reached between Archean Group and Indorama and part of the overall consideration for the acquisition of Archean’s shares in ICS by Indorama; therefore it is mutually agreed that the dues to Affert are no longer payable.” [emphasis added] (“the 3 October 2014 email”).
(c) An email sent by Mr Jindal to Mr Anil Jain on 6 October 2014 forwarding the 1 October 2014 email and the 3 October 2014 email (“the 6 October 2014 email”).
(d) A letter sent by Mr Syam to Mr Jindal on 7 October 2014, stating: “[a]s per the books of Accounts of ICS USD 17,277,886 is due to [Affert] as on 17th September 2014. We confirm that we will not claim this amount as per our understanding. We hereby confirm that we will not in future dispute or make any claim on ICS or its subsidiaries for any sort of dues to [Affert]” (“the 7 October 2014 letter”).
- [17]
[17] Affert’s purported Waiver of the ICS Debt was also referred in a Deed of Termination (“DOT”) dated 24 March 2015, which was signed by Affert, ICS and Transfert. The DOT mainly concerned the issue of payment for the Transfert Shipment. Recital B of the DOT provided that “[Affert] further confirmed in [the 7 October 2014 letter] to ICS that they have no further claim on ICS for any amounts whatsoever” [emphasis added]. On 25 February 2015, Ms Vandana and Affert’s company secretary, Mr Hanumanth Rao Bhounsle, signed a board resolution authorising Mr Syam to sign the DOT on behalf of Affert.
- [18]
[18] It is RV1’s position that Affert had not waived the ICS Debt and that the Waiver is a sham in that it is devoid of consideration and/or should be set aside as an undervalued transaction. In support of this, Mr Prentice made several allegations, including the claim that ICS had surreptitiously entered into an agreement with Affert’s former directors who acted with the knowledge that they were in breach of their fiduciary duties.
Singapore proceedings
- [19]
[19] On 8 February 2017, Affert was placed in creditor’s voluntary winding-up and appointed Foo Kon Tan LLP (“FKT”) as its liquidators. On 7 June 2017, FKT sent ICS a letter demanding payment of the ICS Debt. ICS’s Senegalese lawyers responded on 3 July 2017 stating that “[a]ll amounts then due from ICS to Affert were settled as part of the acquisition of ICS from [the Archean Group] by [Indorama] in 2014” whilst also denying that it owed any sum to Affert. In that same letter, ICS’s Senegalese lawyers attached, amongst other things, the 7 October 2014 Letter and the DOT. That letter, however, was only received by FKT on 24 July 2017.
- [20]
[20] On 18 September 2017, Affert was compulsorily wound up by Solvadis in Companies Winding Up No 17 of 2017 (“CWU No 17”). Affert’s current liquidators are AAG Corporate Advisory Pte Ltd (“the Liquidators”). On 26 September 2017, the Liquidators also sent a letter of demand to ICS to recover the ICS Debt.
- [21]
[21] On 18 July 2018, the Liquidators filed a writ of summons with an endorsement of claim, seeking the repayment of the sums due under the Sulphur Contracts. On 17 September 2018, Affert (through its Liquidators) assigned to RV1, pursuant to a document entitled “Deed of Assignment of Receivable”, the ICS Debt with effect from 29 August 2018. On 4 October 2018, RV1 filed an amended writ of summons (“the Amended Writ”) substituting RV1 in place of the Liquidators as the plaintiff in the present suit.
- [22]
[22] On 9 October 2018, RV1 filed an ex parte application in Summons No 4699 of 2018 for leave to serve the Amended Writ on ICS in Senegal. RV1 did not inform the court of the Waiver Defence at this stage. On 10 October 2018, ICS’s Senegalese lawyers sent a letter to RV1 enclosing the following: (a) a letter it had sent to FKT dated 3 July 2017 (in which it stated that the ICS Debt had been settled as part of the acquisition of ICS by Indorama); (b) the 1 October 2014 email; (c) the 7 October 2014 letter; and (d) the DOT (“the 10 October 2018 Letter”). In the letter, ICS’s Senegalese lawyers also stated that “all amounts due from ICS to Affert have been settled as part of the acquisition of ICS from the Archean Group by [Indorama] in 2014 and therefore, there is nothing due and payable from ICS” [emphasis added].
(a) the Amended Writ and/or service of the Amended Writ on ICS in Senegal be set aside; and
(b) the costs of the application be paid by RV1 to ICS.
- [25]
[25] In a letter to RV1’s lawyers on 7 February 2019, the Liquidators claimed that it was only around 31 October 2018 that they first knew of the existence of FKT’s 7 June 2017 Letter, ICS’s 3 July 2017 Letter, as well as the various other correspondence pertaining to the Waiver and the DOT.
- [26]
[26] In the minute sheet detailing his decision, the Assistant Registrar stated that RV1 ought to have brought the existence of the Waiver to the court’s attention in the light of the notice given to it in October 2018. He noted that FKT was privy to the information and there was therefore sufficient ground to set aside the Amended Writ and/or the service of the Amended Writ. The main reason for setting aside the Amended Writ and/or the service of the Amended Writ was premised on RV1’s purported failure to comply with its duty of full and frank disclosure in the ex parte application.
- [27]
[27] On 24 April 2019, the Liquidators filed an application in Originating Summons No 544 of 2019 (“OS 544”) to set aside the Waiver of the ICS Debt on the basis that it was a transaction at an undervalue under s 329 read with s 98 of the Bankruptcy Act (Cap 20, 2009 Rev Ed) and is therefore void and unenforceable. The summons was served on ICS in Senegal on 7 June 2019. On 11 October 2019, OS 544 was stayed pending the determination of these proceedings. The Liquidators have filed an appeal against the decision to stay OS 544.
Dakar proceedings
- [28]
[28] Amidst the Singapore proceedings, ICS commenced proceedings against RV1 in Senegal (“the Dakar proceedings”).
- [29]
[29] On 19 December 2018, ICS applied by summons to the Dakar Commercial Court in Senegal for a “Declaration to Extinguish Debt” on the basis of the Waiver Defence as evidenced by the 7 October 2014 Letter. Whilst ICS claimed to have satisfied the procedural requirements for service of the summons in the Dakar proceedings, it was not disputed that neither Affert, the Liquidators nor RV1 were notified of the summons and they came to know of the Dakar proceedings only after ICS had obtained a default judgment and served the default judgment on Affert and the Liquidators.
- [30]
[30] Two hearings took place in Dakar, Senegal on 31 December 2018 and 16 January 2019 and on 23 January 2019, the Dakar Commercial Court gave default judgment in favour of ICS, holding that Affert’s 7 October 2014 Letter constituted a unilateral act of debt relief, was valid under Senegalese law, and that Affert had waived the ICS Debt. The finalised default judgment was released on 19 February 2019 (“the Dakar Judgment”).
The decision below
Order 11 rule 1(d)(iii)
- [34]
[34] The Judge found that the jurisdictional gateway under O 11 r 1(d)(iii) was not satisfied.
- [36]
[36] The Judge rejected RV1’s contention that the Sulphur Contracts were governed by Singapore law and found that they were instead governed by Senegalese law, applying the three-stage test in Pacific Recreation Pte Ltd v S Y Technology Inc and another appeal [2008] 2 SLR(R) 491 (“Pacific Recreation”). Under the three-stage test for determining the governing law of a contract, the first stage requires the court to determine if there was an express choice of governing law. If not, the second stage asks whether an intention of the parties to choose a governing law can be inferred. If the court is faced with a multiplicity of factors, with each factor pointing to a different governing law, then the proper approach would be to move on to the third stage, which was to determine the law with the closest and most real connection with the contract (Pacific Recreation at [36], [37] and [47]). The Judge found that there was insufficient evidence to show that the parties had intended for Singapore law to govern the Sulphur Contracts, and that Senegalese law had the “closest and most real connection” to the Sulphur Contracts (under the third stage of Pacific Recreation) for the following reasons (Judgment at [37]):
(a) The pre-contractual negotiations leading up to the formation of the Sulphur Contracts were between representatives of ICS (in Senegal) and the Archean Group (in India). RV1 did not show how Affert (a Singapore entity) was involved in the negotiations.
(b) The place of discharge of the cargoes was Senegal and all the cargoes were in fact delivered to Senegal.
(c) All the part payments were paid by ICS to Affert’s bank account in Hong Kong.
(d) The invoices issued by Affert in Singapore were not determinative as they were issued after the Sulphur Contracts had been formed.
- [37]
[37] This finding by the Judge led to RV1’s appeal in CA 31.
Order 11 rule 1(e)
- [38]
[38] The Judge instead found that RV1 had satisfied the jurisdictional gateway under O 11 r 1(e) which provides as follows:
- [39]
[39] Despite the absence of an express clause stipulating the place of payment under the Sulphur Contracts, the Judge held that the applicable rule was that the debtor (ie, ICS) must seek out the creditor (ie, Affert) at the creditor’s place of business and pay him there (Judgment at [41]). According to the Judge, Affert, being a Singapore entity, had its place of business in Singapore, and therefore had a right to be paid in Singapore (Judgment at [43]). Despite the fact that Affert may have agreed to accept partial payments in Hong Kong, the Judge deemed this insufficient to show that Affert had agreed to accept all future payments under the Sulphur Contracts in Hong Kong. The Judge therefore found that RV1 had demonstrated a good arguable case that its claim was “in respect of a breach committed in Singapore” (Judgment at [48]).
- [40]
[40] The Judge also considered the merits of the Waiver Defence, and found that the Waiver was not legally valid as it was not adequately supported by consideration. The Judge further noted that there was force in the assertion that the Waiver was a sham (Judgment at [52]–[53]).
Forum non conveniens analysis
- [41]
[41] The Judge found that Singapore was the forum conveniens to try the dispute. Her main basis was that Singapore law governed the Waiver, and that the Waiver Defence was ICS’s primary defence to RV1’s claim for the ICS Debt. Apart from this, the Judge also considered the following factors in her determination that Singapore was the forum conveniens to try the dispute:
(a) The Liquidators had applied in OS 544 to set aside the Waiver as a transaction at an undervalue, as well as in Senegal to set aside the Dakar Judgment. OS 544 is governed by Singapore law. As the effect of the Waiver was a crucial issue, especially in the light of RV1’s claim that the Waiver was a sham transaction, the Singapore court’s decision in OS 544 would have a material bearing on ICS’s defence in the Suit (Judgment at [68]).
(b) The place of the breach of the Sulphur Contracts would be a connecting factor that tilts the balance in favour of Singapore as the forum conveniens. However, it was not as strong a factor as the Liquidator’s proceedings in OS 544 (Judgment at [69]).
- [42]
[42] The Judge did not regard the Dakar Judgment as a significantly weighty factor. This was because it had been obtained in default of appearance and was not at such an advanced stage so as to tilt the balance in favour of Senegal. The Judge also found the following factors to be of neutral weight: (a) the parties’ place of incorporation; (b) the place of the transaction and the place of performance of the Sulphur Contracts; (c) the location of the witnesses and their compellability; (d) the language of the documents; (e) the availability of transfer to the Singapore International Commercial Court; (f) the contents of the Acquisition Documents; and (g) the existence of a time bar in relation to RV1’s claim under the Sulphur Contracts.
Parties’ submissions
RV1’s case in CA 31 and Summons No 84 of 2020
- [45]
[45] RV1 also points to two errors made by the Judge. First, the Judge should not have emphasised the actual place of physical delivery of the cargoes (ie, Senegal), as a CFR seller such as Affert was not under any contractual duty to ensure the actual physical delivery of the cargo. Relatedly, RV1 contends that the sole factor pointing to Senegal as the governing law is the place of delivery of the cargoes. As the actual place of physical delivery should not be taken into account, the court should therefore find that Singapore law governs the Sulphur Contracts.
- [46]
[46] RV1 also seeks leave to adduce fresh evidence on appeal in Summons No 84 of 2020 (“SUM 84”), including the fourth affidavit of Mr Kebe, which consists of, inter alia, his opinion on the applicable limitation period for RV1’s claim and whether any exceptions apply to the limitation period under Senegalese law.
ICS’s case in CA 32
- [47]
[47] ICS appeals against the Judge’s decision to grant leave to RV1 to serve the Amended Writ out of jurisdiction.
(a) First, ICS claims that RV1 has failed to make out a good arguable case under O 11 r 1(e) because RV1’s claim under the Sulphur Contracts is not brought “in respect of a breach of contract in Singapore”.
(b) Second, RV1’s claim lacks sufficient merit as it is time-barred under Senegalese law. This was a concession made by RV1 in the hearing before the Judge.
(c) Third, Singapore is not the forum conveniens to try the dispute.
(d) Fourth, RV1 has failed to comply with its duty to make full and frank disclosure of the Waiver defence. The court should therefore exercise its discretion to refuse the service of the Amended Writ.
Issues before this court
- [48]
[48] The following issues arise in these appeals:
(a) Whether the Sulphur Contracts are governed by Singapore law or Senegalese law.
(b) Whether RV1 has established a good arguable case that its claim is brought “in respect of a breach in Singapore” for the purpose of O 11 r 1(e).
(d) Whether Singapore is the forum conveniens to try the dispute.
Analysis
(a) the claim must come within one of the jurisdictional gateways in O 11 r 1 (“the jurisdictional requirement”);
(b) the claim must have a sufficient degree of merit (“the merits requirement”); and
(c) Singapore must be the more appropriate forum for the trial or determination of the action (“the forum non conveniens requirement”).
- [51]
[51] The court must bear in mind that a finding on the jurisdictional requirement may inevitably have an impact on the merits requirement. In other words, even if the court finds that the jurisdictional requirement (eg, O 11 r 1(d)(iii)) is not satisfied, and that the relevant contract is governed by a foreign law, this may still have a consequential impact on the merits requirement under another jurisdictional gateway. Similarly, the findings made by the court in the context of the forum non conveniens requirement may also have a bearing on the merits requirement. Ultimately, the court should not examine the three requirements in isolation, but must also proceed to examine whether its findings in relation to one requirement are consistent with its findings in relation to the other requirements for service outside of jurisdiction.
Issue 1: Whether the Sulphur Contracts are governed by Singapore law or Senegalese law
- [52]
[52] We first examine RV1’s contention that the Sulphur Contracts are governed by Singapore law such as to satisfy O 11 r 1(d)(iii). There is no dispute that the Sulphur Contracts do not contain an express governing law clause in favour of either Singapore or Senegalese law. The Judge was thus correct in analysing the issue with reference to the second and third stages of Pacific Recreation ([36] supra)).
- [54]
[54] In our judgment, RV1’s submissions on this point are misconceived as they are not supported by the authorities it relies on. Before examining the authorities, it is important to understand the nature of a CFR contract and how it is different from other types of contract for the sale of goods such as CIF and Free on Board (“FOB”) contracts. At its core, CFR, CIF and FOB contracts are contracts for the sale of goods and their main difference lies in the allocation of obligations/expenses and the passing of risks in relation to the shipment of the goods. For instance, as regards the significance of the difference between a FOB and CIF contract, it has been stated in the Sale of Goods at para 20-012 that:
- [56]
[56] In an effort to demonstrate that the Judge had erred in attaching weight to the fact that the goods were discharged in Senegal, RV1 relies principally on the New South Wales Supreme Court ’s decision in Mendelson-Zeller Co Inc v T&C Providores Pty Ltd [1981] 1 NSWLR 366 (“Mendelson”) to support its contention that the court should disregard the actual place of delivery in a CFR contract, and points to the observation by the court that “the fact that delivery was made in Sydney was not an essential incident of the contract between the parties”.
- [58]
[58] In our view, far from establishing any kind of rule that the court must disregard the actual place of delivery in certain categories of contracts, the court in Mendelsohn was plainly alive to the principle that the weight to be given to various factors would vary according to the precise facts of each case (Mendelson at 369). The court noted that these factors included, inter alia, the place of contracting, the place of performance, the place of residence or business of the parties as well as the nature and subject matter of the contract (citing Re United Railways of the Havana & Regla Warehouses Ltd [1960] 1 Ch 52 at 91). In Mendelson, the buyer submitted that the four contracts were governed by New South Wales law as the shipping documents had been sent to Sydney, the shipped goods were to be ultimately sold in Australia for consumption and that the place of delivery of the goods was Australia. The court, however, considered various countervailing factors and found that the contracts had a much closer connection with the State of California. In this regard, the court stated as follows (Mendelson at 371):
- [59]
[59] It is clear from the above passage that the court’s observation that “[t]he fact that delivery was made in Sydney was not an essential incident of the contract” was a fact-sensitive determination that was not tied to the fact that the four contracts were C&F contracts. The fact that delivery was made in Sydney was ultimately outweighed by the various other considerations referred to, including the fact that all of the shipper’s obligations, save for the presentation of the shipping documents, had taken place in the State of California.
- [60]
[60] As regards it’s submission that the court should attach weight to the contemplated place of performance as opposed the actual place of performance of the contractual obligations, RV1 relies on Habib Bank Ltd v Central Bank of Sudan (formerly known as Bank of Sudan) [2007] 1 WLR 470 (“Habib Bank”). In that case, Habib Bank sought to satisfy Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (No 3132) (UK) (“CPR”) r 6.20(5)(c) by showing that its contracts with the Central Bank of Sudan (“CBS”) were governed by English law. The contracts were two confirmed letters of credit. Habib Bank (as the confirming bank for reimbursement) was claiming against CBS (as the issuing bank) under the two letters of credit. The two letters of credit contained undertakings by the CBS to make payment. At [43] and [44] of the judgment, Field J held as follows:
- [61]
[61] RV1’s reliance of the choice of “contemplated performance” in Habib Bank is however misplaced. Without a proper understanding of the context under which words/phrases in a judgment are used, there is a risk or tendency to cite or quote a passage out of context. This was precisely the case with RV1’s reliance on the reference to “contemplated performance” in Habib Bank. In that case, it should be borne in mind that the contracts were letters of credit and not contracts for the sale of goods. The parties under a letter of credit are only concerned with documents, in particular, whether the tendered documents are in strict compliance with its terms. Such contracts do not involve the performance of obligations which would typically concern contracts for the sale of goods. Therefore, it seems to us that in referring to “contemplated performance”, the court in Habib Bank was neither seeking nor intending to make any distinction between the contemplated place and actual place of performance. There is nothing in Habib Bank to suggest that the contemplated place of performance was different from the actual place of performance to begin with. In short, nothing had turned on the mere reference to the contemplated place of performance in Habib Bank. It is plainly erroneous for RV1 to suggest otherwise.
- [62]
[62] In our view, the correct approach towards determining the governing law of CFR contracts should be no different from determining the governing law of any other type of contract. In this respect, we endorse the general position referred to by the authors in Sale of Goods at para 26-012:
- [63]
[63] This approach would be consistent with existing case law, in particular, this court’s decision in Pacific Recreation ([36] supra). In Pacific Recreation, we stated at [48] that the aim of the third stage of the test was not to divine any “intent” of the parties, but was instead a pragmatic exercise in which various factors would be taken into account:
- [64]
[64] In any event, it is clear that RV1 did not in fact adduce any evidence that the contemplated place of performance of the obligations under the Sulphur Contracts was in Singapore. What RV1 purported to do was to rely primarily on the incorporation of Affert in Singapore to invite the court to draw the inference that the contemplated place of these obligations must have been in Singapore. This is made clear when we examine each of the four core obligations referred to by RV1 in turn:
(a) Obligation to make out the invoices: RV1 argues that that it can be inferred that the Six Invoices were issued in Singapore as they all bore Affert’s Singapore address and that this showed that the actual place from which Affert issued the Six Invoices was Singapore. From this, RV1 contends that it may be inferred from that the contemplated place of performance under the Sulphur Contracts was also Singapore. However, Affert is a Singapore-incorporated entity with a Singapore-registered address. Further, Mr Syam, Affert’s main director, was based in Hong Kong and Affert had no active employees in Singapore. It seems to us that irrespective of the country where the Six Invoices were issued, Affert’s Singapore address would still have been stated on the Six Invoices.
(b) Obligation to ship at the port of shipment: RV1 claims that because Affert was not a manufacturer of sulphur, but was only an intermediate seller (which ICS does not seriously dispute), Affert must have performed this obligation from its place of business, ie, Singapore, as the goods must have already been afloat at the time the Sulphur Contracts were entered into. RV1 further points to the fact that the BL for the MV Xenia Shipment was endorsed in blank by the Bank of India (Singapore Branch) and Primary Resource’s own invoice dated 20 April 2012 was addressed to Affert’s Singapore address. As we have mentioned above, there was insufficient evidence that Affert actually carried out any business from Singapore, given the absence of any active employees or directors in Singapore. The fact that the bank had endorsed the BL in Singapore, as well as Primary Resource’s invoice, does not in our view demonstrate that Affert had actually procured the shipment of goods from Singapore. There was thus no evidence that Affert had performed this obligation in Singapore or that the contemplated place of performance of this obligation was in Singapore.
(c) Obligation to procure a contract of affreightment: RV1 argues that given Affert’s position as the intermediate seller of the goods, it also had to procure the contracts of affreightment in or out of Singapore from which it carried out its business. This argument suffers from the same flaw in that it assumes that because Affert is a Singapore incorporated company, it must have conducted its business in Singapore. There is, however, no evidence that Affert had actually procured the contracts of affreightment in or out of Singapore.
(d) Obligation to tender the shipment documents: There is nothing to show that the parties had actually tendered, or contemplated to tender the shipping documents out of Singapore. We note that the various BLs were issued in different countries in Dubai, Canada, Poland and Spain. They therefore do not necessarily point to Singapore as the contemplated place where the tender of the shipping documents was to take place.
- [65]
[65] In sum, RV1 has not adduced any evidence as to the actual or contemplated place of performance of these obligations. This may well be due to RV1’s position as the assignee of the ICS Debt which somewhat hindered its ability to obtain direct evidence from the individuals who were involved in the actual performance of those obligations. However, this does not change the position that RV1 cannot stand in a better position than the assignor, Affert. In this court’s decision in MAN Diesel ([50] supra), we made it clear at [66] that “the mere act of assigning a claim, in and of itself, cannot possibly convert a claim which does not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement in O 11 r 1 into an otherwise valid claim”. We further observed that if this were done, “parties would effectively be allowed to circumvent O 11 r 1 by assigning their alleged claims (which are otherwise outside the scope of O 11 r 1) to a party whose own claim is able to satisfy one or more of the jurisdictional gateways under O 11 r 1”. Similarly, the court cannot grant RV1 greater latitude in terms of the assessment of the evidence under this jurisdictional gateway (ie, O 11 r 1(d)(iii)) on account of RV1’s status as an assignee.
- [66]
[66] Ultimately, the court cannot speculate on where the contemplated or actual place of performance of the obligations was in the absence of any evidence. This evidence would have been in the possession of Affert’s director, Mr Syam, but he was not called to give evidence. While there might have been valid reasons for RV1’s failure to obtain that evidence, such as the inability of RV1 to contact Mr Syam, any such difficulty cannot be used by RV1 to somehow lessen its burden of proof. In short, there is no free pass to dispense with proof on account of difficulties in obtaining evidence by reason of RV1’s status as an assignee.
- [67]
[67] Having dealt with RV1’s submissions, we now turn to consider which system of law bears the closest and most real connection with the Sulphur Contracts. We are broadly in agreement with the Judge’s analysis of this issue and her determination that Senegalese law governs the Sulphur Contracts.
- [68]
[68] A factor of some significance, in our view, is the common commercial purpose underpinning all the Sulphur Contracts. In this respect, it is imperative to note that the Sulphur Contracts were not mere trading contracts. Instead, Affert had entered into the Sulphur Contracts for ICS to use the sulphur for manufacturing fertiliser in Senegal. Another common thread running through the Sulphur Contracts is that all the cargoes were eventually shipped to Senegal even though they may have been sourced and shipped from different countries – Canada, the UAE, Poland, Ukraine, and Spain. Counsel for RV1, Mr Dominic Chan, appears to have accepted that there was no evidence that the BLs had been endorsed in Singapore or that they had been given to Affert in Singapore to be transmitted to ICS in Senegal (Judgment at [34]).
- [69]
[69] The negotiations preceding the formation of the Sulphur Contracts also reveal more connection to Senegal than to Singapore. According to the Chief Executive Officer of ICS, Mr Alassane Diallo (“Mr Diallo”), he and his team based in Senegal communicated directly with Mr Ranjit Pendurthi (“Mr Pendurthi”) of the Archean Group, who was based in India at the material time, on the sale of the cargoes under the Sulphur Contracts. Mr Diallo also testified that Affert was not directly involved in these negotiations. In separate proceedings involving Solvadis and Affert, Solvadis’ Managing Director, Mr Andreas Weimann, affirmed on affidavit that it was the Archean Group which was the effective owners and controllers of Affert. By way of contrast, RV1 did not advance any positive case as to where the negotiations actually took place, but simply denied that they had taken place in Senegal. On balance, therefore, it appears that the negotiations took place at least partly out of Senegal, while there is no evidence of any negotiations having taken place in Singapore.
- [70]
[70] RV1 also urges the court to consider the impact of the Waiver Documents, the Settlement Agreement and the DOT in determining the governing law of the Sulphur Contracts. These documents, however, were only issued after the formation of the Sulphur Contracts and do not, in our view, shed any light on the governing law of the Sulphur Contracts.
- [71]
[71] Finally, RV1 submits that should this court find that the Sulphur Contracts are governed by Senegalese law, this finding should only be expressed as “provisional”. There is plainly no basis for the court to make only a provisional determination of this issue, especially as it was RV1 that raised the issue of the governing law of the Sulphur Contracts in the context of satisfying the jurisdictional requirement under O 11 r 1(d)(iii). Any finding by this court on this issue must cut both ways. It would be incongruous for RV1 to suggest that if we were to find Singapore law to be the governing law thereby satisfying the jurisdictional gateway under O 11 r 1(d)(iii), such a finding should likewise be “provisional”. A jurisdictional gateway cannot be satisfied on a “provisional” basis.
Issue 2: Whether RV1’s claim is brought in respect of a breach committed in Singapore such as to satisfy O 11 r 1(e)
- [74]
[74] ICS submits that RV1 has failed to discharge the burden of proving that it ought to, pursuant to the Sulphur Contracts, make payment in Singapore. ICS points to the fact that past payments by ICS were made to Affert’s bank account in Hong Kong, as well as the fact that Affert’s key director, Mr Syam, was domiciled in Hong Kong. ICS also asserts that there is no evidence of any payment ever having been made by ICS to Affert in Singapore. In the circumstances, there was no contractual obligation on ICS to make payments to Affert under the Sulphur Contracts only in Singapore.
- [77]
[77] In Cuban Atlantic Sugar Sales Corporation v Compania De Vapores San Elefterio Limitada [1960] 1 QB 187 (“Cuban Atlantic”), the English Court of Appeal found (at 193–195) that the contract could be performed in the United Kingdom or elsewhere, that until the nomination of a port had been made, it could not be said that there was a contract to be performed within the United Kingdom, and that there was no breach within the United Kingdom because the time for nomination never arrived.
- [79]
[79] The only seemingly contrary authority referred to us was the Hong Kong Court of Appeal decision in Komaia Deccof and Co SA and others v Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyik Dan Gas Bumi Negara [1982] HKCA 253 (“Komaia Deccof”). In that case, the plaintiffs, Liberia-incorporated companies whose business was in Hong Kong, sued the defendant. The issue was whether the plaintiffs could make out a good arguable case under the Hong Kong equivalent of O 11 r 1(e), namely, whether the breach of each relevant contract had been committed within Hong Kong. The court considered two questions to be relevant. First, whether the plaintiffs had a good arguable case for contending that their activities vis-à-vis the defendant were conducted from Hong Kong. Second, whether the plaintiffs had a good arguable case that the defendant’s obligation under the relevant contracts was to pay at the place from which the plaintiffs’ activities were conducted (ie, Hong Kong). The court found that the evidence pointed “all one way” and that the plaintiffs had actually conducted business from Hong Kong. To answer the second question, the court deemed the correct approach to be as follows (at [9], [12] and [15]):
(a) First, enquire whether the parties had expressly agreed a place of performance.
(b) Second, investigate whether the parties had impliedly agreed such a place.
(c) Third, where stages one and two produce no result, apply a rule of law that the debtor had to pay the creditor at the creditor’s place of business. Where the creditor had two places of business, the relevant place of business is that from which he has dealt with the defendant in relation to the transaction in question.
- [80]
[80] On the difference between the second stage and the third stage, the court stated as follows at [12]:
- [81]
[81] RV1’s case rests primarily on the rule extracted from The Eider [1893] Probate 119 (“The Eider”), viz, there is a general rule of law in which the debtor must pay the creditor at the debtor’s place of business and that this is a general principle of law to be applied where there is no express or implied term under the contract stating the place from which payment must be made. In The Eider, Lord Esher MR stated as follows (at 131):
- [82]
[82] The rule that the debtor must seek out the creditor in the absence of an express or implied term is also mentioned in Dicey, Morris and Collins on The Conflict of Laws (Sweet & Maxwell, 15th Ed, 2012) at para 11-197:
- [83]
[83] The rule in The Eider appears be an established feature of English law. It has been referred to by the English Court of Appeal in Sharab v HRH Prince ([78] supra) at [38] and several decisions by the English High Court (see eg, Commercial Marine Piling Limited v Pierse Contracting Limited [2009] EWHC 2241 at [38] and Zebrarise Ltd and another v de Nieffe [2005] 2 All ER (Comm) 816 at [30], where Judge Havelock-Allan described it as an “well established” general rule).
- [84]
[84] In any event, in our judgment, the “general rule” would clearly have no place in a situation where there is a history of past payments by the debtor to the creditor in respect of the transaction in question in a jurisdiction other than the place of business of the creditor.
- [85]
[85] It is also important to appreciate the true scope of the rule in The Eider. It does not establish the proposition that the debtor must seek out the creditor at the creditor’s place of incorporation but instead, the place from which the creditor performs his business. This point is amply illustrated by the facts in Komaia Deccof ([79] supra). In that case, the plaintiffs were Liberian-incorporated companies but had their place of business in Hong Kong. The court thus applied the rule in The Eider to find that the plaintiffs were entitled to be paid in Hong Kong, as Hong Kong was their place of business. In fact, none of the parties had suggested that the payment could only be validly made in Liberia, the place where the plaintiffs were incorporated.
- [86]
[86] Having set out the applicable principles, we turn to the question of whether RV1 had shown a good arguable case that ICS had breached a contractual obligation to make payment in Singapore.
- [87]
[87] It is common ground that there is no express clause under the Sulphur Contracts providing where payment is to be made. In our view, the most material fact is that part payments were made by ICS to Affert’s Hong Kong bank account on multiple occasions (12 June 2012, 7 December 2012, 20 February 2013, 15 April 2013, and 9 January 2014) in respect of both the MV Xenia Shipment and the Transfert Shipment. This history of part payment by ICS to RV1 in Hong Kong, despite the existence of four live bank accounts in Singapore (with the Bank of India, OCBC Bank and Standard Chartered Bank) strongly militate against the application of the “general rule” in The Eider.
- [88]
[88] In any case, the rule in The Eider does not assist RV1. As mentioned at [85] above, the rule in The Eider requires the debtor to make payment at the creditor’s place of business, does not apply to assist RV1. The rule does not require payment by the debtor at the creditor’s place of incorporation where the creditor performs his business elsewhere than in the place of incorporation. It is undisputed that Affert’s main director, Mr Syam, was based in Hong Kong, and that Affert had no active employees in Singapore. Apart from the fact that Affert was incorporated in Singapore, there is simply no evidence that Affert had carried out any business in Singapore.
- [89]
[89] The very fact that the payments were made and accepted in Hong Kong must mean either that (a) there was a waiver by Affert to have the payment made in Singapore; or (b) that it was legally permissible to make the payment either in Hong Kong or in Singapore. As no evidence was adduced by RV1 to suggest that there was a waiver, the more natural inference is that it was not an exclusive obligation to pay in Singapore and only in Singapore.
- [90]
[90] Given the above, we find that RV1 has not shown a good arguable case that its claim was brought in respect of a breach committed in Singapore under O 11 r 1(e).
Issue 3: Whether RV1’s claim is time-barred under Senegalese law such that it cannot satisfy the merits requirements for service out of jurisdiction
- [91]
[91] As we have explained above, the court’s finding on the governing law of a contract may have an effect on the merits of a plaintiff’s claim.
- [92]
[92] In this case, the court’s finding that the governing law of the Sulphur Contracts will inevitably have an impact on the analysis of the merits of RV1’s claim, given ICS’s primary defence in these appeals is that RV1’s claim is time-barred under Senegalese law.
The Judge’s findings on the time bar and RV1’s submissions below
- [94]
[94] Although RV1’s primary position before the Judge was that the Sulphur Contracts were governed by Singapore law and not Senegalese law, it nonetheless advanced a positive case that its claim under the Sulphur Contracts was time-barred under Senegalese law (albeit in the context of its submissions that Singapore was the forum conveniens to try the dispute). In its submissions, it stated that:
- [95]
[95] Most significantly, RV1 expressly conceded to the Judge that irrespective of whether the limitation period was two years or five years (under Senegalese law), it would have already set in. The relevant portion of the transcript reads as follows:
- [96]
[96] Thus, at the time of hearing before the Judge, RV1 had accepted that the claim was time-barred under Senegalese law. This was, in our view, an entirely reasonable position for RV1 to have taken in the light of the evidence provided by RV1’s own expert, Mr Kebe, in his first affidavit. Having regard to RV1’s concession, the Judge made a factual finding that RV1’s claim under the Sulphur Contracts was time-barred under Senegalese law (Judgment at [82]).
- [98]
[98] On appeal, RV1 submits that the time bar under Senegalese law no longer applies. In this respect, RV1 seeks to admit Mr Kebe’s fourth affidavit in SUM 84, which consists of Mr Kebe’s revised position on the applicable limitation period under Senegalese law. In substance, Mr Kebe now claims that the applicable limitation period no longer applies as there are various exceptions to that limitation period. The question which arises here is whether RV1 can resile from its factual concession before the Judge even though that concession was made in aid of its submission that Singapore was the forum conveniens to try the dispute, and to adopt, on appeal, a completely opposing position in the context of its submissions on the merits requirement.
Approbation and reprobation
- [99]
[99] In our judgment, RV1’s stark shift in positions in respect of the limitation period engages both the doctrine of approbation and reprobation and the doctrine of abuse of process which we will deal with in turn.
- [101]
[101] Given that the Judge below did not accept RV1’s submission that the claim being time-barred made Senegal an unavailable forum such as to tilt the balance towards Singapore, we do not think that the doctrine of approbation and reprobation strictly applies, particularly as RV1 did not receive any benefit as a result of its earlier position on the time bar. If RV1 had successfully convinced the Judge that Senegal was an unavailable forum by reason of the time bar in aid of its submission that Singapore was the forum conveniens, we would have had no hesitation in holding that RV1’s conduct constituted approbation and reprobation.
- [102]
[102] Nonetheless, RV1’s starkly contradictory position in this appeal is highly unsatisfactory and attracts the criticism raised in Swiber that such changes of position would attract the circumspection and scepticism of the court. The fact that RV1’s concession on the time bar was made in the context of its submissions on forum non conveniens does not, in our view, alter the analysis or excuse its change of position.
Abuse of process
- [103]
[103] We now consider whether RV1’s change of position on the time bar issue offends the doctrine of abuse of process.
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