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Grounds publishedDecided 28 Feb 2020

Court of Appeal

Han Fang Guan v Public Prosecutor

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[2020] SGCA 11Case no. Criminal Appeal No 31 of 2018

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] The appellant, Han Fang Guan (“Han”), claimed trial to a capital charge of attempting to possess one bundle containing not less than 18.62g of diamorphine for the purpose of trafficking, an offence under s 5(1)(a) read with s 5(2) and s 12 of the Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed) (“MDA”).

  3. [2] Han was tried jointly with one Khor Chong Seng (“Khor”), who had been apprehended by officers from the Central Narcotics Bureau (“CNB”) shortly after entering Singapore through Woodlands Checkpoint, and who was found to be in possession of seven bundles of controlled drugs. Khor agreed to assist in a follow-up operation against the intended recipients of the drugs. He was instructed by the CNB officers to continue communicating with the drug supplier in Malaysia from whom he received instructions, as well as with the intended recipients of the drugs in Singapore. The phone conversations between Khor, the drug supplier in Malaysia and the intended drug recipients were recorded by the CNB officers. It transpired that Khor was instructed by the drug supplier to deliver a single bundle of drugs to Han. The drug supplier put Han and Khor in touch with each other, and they in turn arranged to meet at a location in Toa Payoh. CNB officers were dispatched to the arranged location, where they arrested Han.

  4. [3] The Prosecution’s case against Han was that the drug supplier had instructed Khor to deliver to Han any one of three bundles of similar size, colour and weight, containing similar amounts of diamorphine. Seeking to be fair to Han, the Prosecution proceeded against him in respect of the bundle that contained the smallest quantity of diamorphine.

  5. [4] Following a six-day trial, the High Court judge (“the Judge”) found that the charge against Han was made out and convicted him. Han was not issued a certificate of substantive assistance by the Public Prosecutor, and the Judge found, in any event, that he was not a mere courier. The Judge therefore imposed the mandatory death sentence on him: see Public Prosecutor v Khor Chong Seng and another [2018] SGHC 219 (“the GD”).

  6. Background facts

  7. [7] On the night of 1 March 2016, Khor collected two motorcycle helmets containing several bundles of drugs from someone in Malaysia, known to him as “Lao Ban”. Before us, it was not seriously disputed that “Ah Tiong” and “Lao Ban” are one and the same person, and in this judgment, we refer to him as “Lao Ban”.

  8. [8] Khor’s task on the night of 1 March 2016, and extending into the early hours of the next morning, was to deliver the drugs to various intended recipients in Singapore. This was to be Khor’s fourth drug delivery. The three prior deliveries had all been executed in a similar manner:

  9. (a) Khor would collect the drugs from Lao Ban in Malaysia. The drugs would have been packed in motorcycle helmets by Lao Ban’s associates.

  10. (b) Khor would then cross from Malaysia into Singapore on his motorcycle. After clearing the Singapore customs, he would call Lao Ban for instructions. Lao Ban would send him text messages containing phone numbers, code names and the amount of money to collect from each recipient, while also identifying the bundles that were to be handed to each recipient.

  11. (c) Khor would then liaise with each recipient and make arrangements for each delivery. After Khor completed the deliveries, he would return to Malaysia and hand the money that he had collected to Lao Ban.

  12. [9] On 2 March 2016, at about 12.10am, Khor entered Singapore through Woodlands Checkpoint. He was stopped and searched by CNB officers. The search revealed that the two motorcycle helmets in his possession contained seven bundles of controlled drugs as follows:

  13. (a) A large bundle wrapped in black tape, with a yellow sticker bearing the word “KEN”. The bundle was marked “C1B”. It weighed 458.9g, and was subsequently analysed and found to contain not less than 18.80g of diamorphine.

  14. (b) A large bundle wrapped in black tape, with a yellow sticker bearing the word “KEN”. The bundle was marked “C1C”. It weighed 457.3g, and was subsequently analysed and found to contain not less than 19.63g of diamorphine.

  15. (c) A small bundle wrapped in black tape, with a yellow sticker bearing the words “KEN 水 500”. The bundle was marked “C1D”. It weighed 49.85g, and was subsequently analysed and found to contain not less than 34.04g of methamphetamine.

  16. (d) A bundle wrapped in transparent tape, with a yellow sticker bearing the word “KEN”. The bundle was marked “C1E”. It contained 400 nimetazepam tablets.

  17. (e) A large bundle wrapped in black tape, with a yellow sticker bearing the word “KEN”. The bundle was marked “D1B”. It weighed 457.4g, and was subsequently analysed and found to contain not less than 18.62g of diamorphine. The drugs in D1B formed the subject matter of the charge against Han.

  18. (f) A bundle wrapped in transparent tape, with a yellow sticker bearing the word “KEN”. The bundle was marked “D1C”. It contained 400 nimetazepam tablets.

  19. (g) A bundle wrapped in transparent tape, with a yellow sticker bearing the word “KEN”. The bundle was marked “D1D”. It contained 200 nimetazepam tablets.

  20. [10] For reasons that will become clear later, it is useful to note the following:

  21. (a) Four of the seven bundles were wrapped in black tape, while three were wrapped in transparent tape.

  22. (b) Each of the seven bundles had a yellow sticker with the word “KEN”, and in one case, there were some other markings on the sticker as well.

  23. (c) Three of the bundles wrapped in black tape were large and contained diamorphine, while the fourth was small and contained methamphetamine.

  24. (d) The three bundles wrapped with transparent tape each contained nimetazepam tablets.

  25. [11] Khor informed the CNB officers that he had been tasked to deliver the drugs to recipients in Singapore and was awaiting instructions from Lao Ban. As mentioned at [2] above, he agreed to assist in a follow-up operation against the intended recipients of the drugs. The follow-up operation was conducted in the following manner:

  26. (b) All the phone conversations between Khor and Lao Ban, as well as between Khor and the intended recipients of the drugs were recorded by the CNB officers.

  27. (c) Based on the information obtained by and through Khor, CNB officers were despatched to various parts of Singapore to effect arrests.

  28. [12] At about 1.55am on 2 March 2016, Khor called Lao Ban to explain his delay and requested instructions on the drug deliveries. Lao Ban accepted Khor’s explanation and told him that he would send him “the phone number”.

  29. [13] At 2.02am and 2.04am, Khor received two text messages from Lao Ban. Each text message contained a code name, a phone number and an amount of money. For instance, the message sent at 2.04am read “T-98676050=$3600”. Shortly after, Lao Ban called Khor and gave instructions for the delivery of the drugs to three individuals, whom Lao Ban referred to as “99”, “T” and “Ken”. Lao Ban told Khor to deliver “[t]wo big bundles, yellow one” to 99 and “one yellow bundle” to T, while the rest of the bundles would be “[a]ll for Ah Ken”. Lao Ban also told Khor to collect $3,600 from T. As we have already noted, all the bundles had yellow stickers on them, though none of the bundles were in fact yellow.

  30. [14] The call records show that Han received a phone call from Lao Ban at 2.43am, and again at 2.45am. In between, at 2.44am, Khor received a phone call from Lao Ban, who told Khor that he would ask T to call Khor. At 2.45am, Han received a text message from Lao Ban stating “T-86531409=$3600”. At 2.47am, Han called Khor and introduced himself as T.

  31. [15] During this period, Khor also engaged in several recorded conversations with 99 and Ken. Using the information obtained in these conversations, CNB officers arrested 99 and Ken at 3.20am and 3.30am respectively.

  32. [16] Subsequently, over four phone calls that took place between 4.02am and 4.40am, Han and Khor made arrangements to meet at Block 5, Lorong 7, Toa Payoh (“Block 5”). While Han was making those arrangements, CNB officers were despatched to the arranged location to effect his arrest. A CNB officer assumed the place of Khor and travelled to Block 5 in a taxi. Upon reaching Block 5, that officer remained in the taxi and did not alight or attempt to approach Han because the CNB officers had learnt that Han knew what Khor looked like. Instead, after the officer confirmed Han’s identity from within the taxi, CNB officers trailing the taxi in another vehicle alighted to effect the arrest. As the CNB officers approached Han, he started walking away quickly and was eventually arrested at Block 4, Lorong 7, Toa Payoh. He was searched, and $3,600 in cash was found in the front left pocket of his shorts. The cash was bundled with a rubber band and was kept separate from his wallet, which contained some other cash. The CNB officers brought Han to his apartment and searched it. Various other amounts of drugs were recovered there, including a bundle, which was subsequently analysed and found to contain not less than 6.77g of diamorphine, and a small packet, which was likewise analysed and found to contain not less than 0.19g of diamorphine. There are, however, no pending charges in relation to the drugs found in Han’s apartment.

  33. [18] In the course of the investigations, the CNB officers recorded six statements from Han, namely:

  34. (a) two contemporaneous statements recorded pursuant to s 22 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) (“CPC”) at 5.15am and 10.55am on 2 March 2016, the day of his arrest;

  35. (b) a cautioned statement recorded pursuant to s 23 of the CPC at 10.45pm on 2 March 2016;

  36. (c) two long statements recorded pursuant to s 22 of the CPC on 8 and 9 March 2016; and

  37. (d) one long statement recorded pursuant to s 22 of the CPC on 31 August 2016.

  38. [20] Han faced the following charge at the trial:

  39. [21] As we noted earlier (see [9(e)] above), the diamorphine listed in the charge corresponded with the drugs found in D1B, which was the bundle that contained the smallest amount of diamorphine among the three bundles of diamorphine.

  40. The decision below

  41. (b) The Judge found that the sum of $3,600 found on Han when he was arrested was meant to be the exact payment for the diamorphine contained in D1B. One of the CNB officers had testified that the market price of one pound of heroin was approximately $3,600. Han’s explanations of the purpose of the $3,600 were inconsistent, in that the explanations that he gave: (i) in his contemporaneous statement recorded shortly after his arrest on 2 March 2016; (ii) in his long statement recorded on 8 March 2016; (iii) in his long statement recorded on 9 March 2016; and (iv) at the trial all differed from each other (see the GD at [82]–[84]).

  42. [26] On whether Han had “embarked on the crime proper”, the Judge found that Han: (a) had been in communication with Lao Ban; (b) had contacted Khor and arranged to meet him at the foot of Block 5; (c) had waited for Khor’s arrival at Block 5; and (d) had brought along $3,600 to pay for the drugs. Those steps were sufficient to show that Han had “embarked on the crime proper” (see the GD at [97]–[98]).

  43. [27] As for Han’s sentence, the Judge found that Han had not proved that he was a mere courier because he had not adduced any evidence to that effect. The Public Prosecutor had also not issued Han a certificate of substantive assistance. Hence, the alternative sentencing regime was not available to Han, and the Judge imposed the mandatory death sentence on him (see the GD at [102]).

  44. The parties’ respective cases on appeal

  45. [28] Han’s appeal rests on three broad grounds:

  46. (b) The second ground involves an attack on the Judge’s finding that the actus reus of the offence charged was made out. Han argues that the Judge should have applied a stricter test in determining whether the Prosecution had proved the actus reus of an attempt to commit an offence under the MDA. Han also argues that, in any event, even under the more lenient test applied by the Judge, the acts undertaken by him were insufficient to satisfy the threshold to establish the actus reus of the offence charged.

  47. (c) The third ground is that the Judge erred in finding that Han intended to traffic in the diamorphine contained in D1B because there was insufficient evidence to prove this beyond a reasonable doubt.

  48. [29] The Prosecution’s case is that:

  49. (b) The Judge, in considering whether Han had carried out the actus reus of the offence of attempting to possess diamorphine, did not apply the wrong test. In any event, the actus reus of the offence would be satisfied whichever test was applied.

  50. (c) The Judge was right in finding that Han intended to traffic in the 18.62g of diamorphine contained in D1B. That quantity of diamorphine was more than nine times the amount that triggered the presumption of trafficking under s 17(c) of the MDA. Han’s counsel had expressly confirmed at the trial that Han would not be relying on the personal consumption defence. The absence of drug paraphernalia in Han’s possession was not probative of a lack of intention to traffic, especially since it was clear that Han did not require any drug trafficking paraphernalia to sell drugs.

  51. The issues to be determined

  52. [30] The parties raised three issues before us, corresponding to the three broad grounds raised by Han:

  53. (b) second, whether the Judge erred in finding that the actus reus of the offence charged was made out; and

  54. (c) third, whether the Judge erred in finding that Han intended to traffic in the diamorphine contained in D1B.

  55. [31] As the parties’ arguments developed over the course of the appeal, it became apparent that the unusual circumstances at the time of Han’s arrest (see [17] above) necessitated consideration of a further question, which we posed to the parties in the following terms:

  56. (b) If so, then under what circumstances can criminal liability attach to impossible attempts?

  57. We did not think it was necessary for us to consider whether the acts done by Han were sufficient to warrant his being charged with attempting to possess the diamorphine contained in D1B for the purpose of trafficking because regardless of the test that is applied, we considered that Han’s acts were more than sufficient for the reasons identified by the Judge and summarised at [26] above.

  58. Was there a reasonable doubt that Han had ordered a bundle of diamorphine from Lao Ban?

  59. (a) Han intended to possess the drugs in D1B, which contained not less than 18.62g of diamorphine, and knew that D1B contained diamorphine; and

  60. (b) Han intended to traffic in those drugs.

  61. [36] In Public Prosecutor v GCK and another matter [2020] SGCA 2 at [149(b)]–[149(h)], we very recently explained the concept of a reasonable doubt as follows:

  62. [37] In the present case, we find that there is a significant inconsistency within the Prosecution’s case, as is evident from the record of the critical phone conversation shortly after 2.00am on 2 March 2016 in which Lao Ban instructed Khor as to which bundle he was to deliver to Han (see [13] above). The relevant portion of the translated record reads as follows:

  63. [38] It is evident that in the aforesaid phone conversation, Lao Ban repeatedly referred to the bundle that he intended Han to receive as a “yellow bundle” [emphasis added]. Yet, D1B, the bundle eventually attributed to Han in the charge, was a black bundle.

  64. [39] There are three possible explanations for this inconsistency:

  65. (a) Lao Ban and/or his associates mistakenly failed to hand one or more yellow bundles to Khor. Thus, in asking Khor to deliver “one yellow bundle” to Han, Lao Ban was actually referring to a bundle that had never been in Khor’s possession (“Scenario One”).

  66. (b) Lao Ban and/or his associates placed the correct bundles with Khor, but Lao Ban made a mistake in describing the bundle earmarked for Han as a yellow bundle, when he meant to refer to one of the three big black bundles instead (“Scenario Two”).

  67. (c) Lao Ban and/or his associates placed the correct bundles with Khor, but Lao Ban made a mistake in describing the bundle earmarked for Han as a yellow bundle, when he meant to refer to another bundle in Khor’s possession other than the three big black bundles (“Scenario Three”).

  68. [41] The first reason arises out of the difficulties that are inherent in the Prosecution’s evidence concerning the critical phone conversation between Khor and Lao Ban shortly after 2.00am on 2 March 2016.

  69. [42] This phone conversation took place in the course of the CNB’s follow-up operation against the intended recipients of the drugs found in Khor’s possession. The follow-up operation was conducted in the following manner:

  70. (a) The CNB team in charge of the operation was led by ASP Lim Peng Chye (“ASP Lim”). The other officers included SSI Pang Hee Lim (“SSI Pang”), Sgt Muhammad Firdaus Bin Salleh (“Sgt Firdaus”) and Sgt Zakaria Bin Zainal (“Sgt Zakaria”).

  71. (b) At the time of the aforesaid phone conversation, Khor was in a car belonging to the CNB, together with SSI Pang and Sgt Firdaus. SSI Pang was seated in the driver’s seat, Sgt Firdaus was seated behind SSI Pang, and Khor was seated next to Sgt Firdaus, behind the front passenger seat. ASP Lim and Sgt Zakaria were outside the car.

  72. (c) SSI Pang, who is fluent in Mandarin and Hokkien, directed Khor in Mandarin, listened in on the aforesaid phone conversation as well as the other phone conversations outlined at [14]–[16] above, and stepped out of the car in between the various phone conversations to update ASP Lim on these conversations. SSI Pang also translated these conversations for Sgt Firdaus.

  73. [43] At the trial, there was some initial confusion over whether the drug exhibits were within sight of SSI Pang and Khor at the time of the various phone conversations. Initially, SSI Pang testified that the drug exhibits were in the car with Khor while the phone conversations were going on, and that he had sight of the drug exhibits. Sgt Firdaus’s subsequent testimony, however, contradicted SSI Pang’s testimony, in that Sgt Firdaus maintained that the drug exhibits were not in the car during the follow-up operation. Upon re-examination, Sgt Firdaus changed his earlier account and said that he could not remember whether or not the drug exhibits were in the car. Eventually, Sgt Zakaria and another CNB officer, Senior Staff Sgt Samir Bin Haroon (“SSgt Samir”), testified that SSgt Samir had handed the drug exhibits to Sgt Zakaria, who had in turn handed them to SSI Pang during the follow-up operation. SSI Pang was then recalled to the stand, and he confirmed that the chain of custody of the drug exhibits was as narrated by Sgt Zakaria and SSgt Samir.

  74. [44] If the testimony of SSI Pang, Sgt Zakaria and SSgt Samir were accepted, then the drug exhibits would have been in the car at the time the various phone conversations took place, and it would have been obvious to SSI Pang that none of the bundles of drugs corresponded to Lao Ban’s reference to yellow bundles. Yet, no instruction was given to Khor to clarify with Lao Ban what he meant when he referred to yellow bundles. Instead, without clarifying this, SSI Pang informed ASP Lim that Khor was required to deliver two of the three big black bundles to 99 and the remaining big black bundle to T.

  75. [45] At the trial, SSI Pang confirmed that he did not at any point instruct Khor to clarify with either Lao Ban or Han which bundle Han was supposed to receive:

  76. [46] While SSI Pang’s explanation was directed more at the question of whether he had instructed Khor to clarify the matter with Han, his explanation reveals an insight into his general approach towards the discrepancy between the colour of the bundles mentioned by Lao Ban in his instructions to Khor and the colour of the bundles that were actually with Khor. In short, SSI Pang seemed unwilling to try to resolve any doubts arising from this discrepancy lest it alert those with whom Khor was communicating that something was amiss. From an operational perspective, we can well understand SSI Pang’s approach, but it is quite a different matter when it comes to the evidential question of whether, in all the circumstances, it can be said that the Prosecution has discharged its burden of dispelling any reasonable doubt that Scenario One might have represented the true state of affairs.

  77. [47] In fact, the conclusion that Lao Ban was referring to the big black bundles, even though he had expressly mentioned yellow bundles in his instructions to Khor, was premised entirely on SSI Pang’s assumption at the material time as to what Lao Ban must have meant. SSI Pang confirmed as much on the stand when he admitted that it was his “presumption” that Lao Ban was referring to the big black bundles when he mentioned the yellow bundles. It was this presumption that he conveyed to ASP Lim. When pressed on how he came to this “presumption”, SSI Pang said that he drew from his experience that “six thousand eight is 2 pound” (referring to the two yellow bundles that Lao Ban had instructed Khor to deliver to 99) and “two [sic] thousand six is 1 pound”. We note that although SSI Pang spoke of a sum of $2,600 in the latter statement, this was undoubtedly a mistaken reference to the sum of $3,600 that was meant to be collected from Han and that was in fact found in his possession at the time of his arrest.

  78. [51] As we alluded to earlier (at [19] above), in his cautioned statement recorded on 2 March 2016, in response to a charge of conspiring with Khor and other unknown persons to import diamorphine into Singapore, Han stated:

  79. [54] It bears emphasis that at the time Han gave these statements, he had not, so far as we are aware, been given access to the record of the phone conversations between Khor and Lao Ban (in particular, the critical phone conversation shortly after 2.00am on 2 March 2016), which would have indicated the possibility of a mix-up in the drug orders. Despite this, Han independently offered up a defence that was consistent with the objective evidence presented by these phone conversations.

  80. [55] In our judgment, in the light of these two points, at least taken together, it is impossible to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Scenario One indeed did not represent the true state of affairs. We therefore find that the Prosecution has failed to discharge its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Han intended to possess the diamorphine contained in D1B, and we acquit Han of the charge against him as it currently stands.

  81. Under what circumstances can criminal liability attach to impossible attempts?

  82. [58] To address this, it is necessary for us to survey and take account of some of the key tensions that have arisen in this area of the law. We therefore begin our analysis by examining the approaches that have been taken in various jurisdictions to the issue of impossible attempts.

  83. The existing law on impossible attempts

  84. Singapore

  85. [59] At the time of Han’s acts and his arrest, s 511 of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed) (“Penal Code”), which is the general provision dealing with attempts to commit offences, read as follows:

  86. Section 511 has since been amended by the Criminal Law Reform Act 2019 (Act 15 of 2019), but the amended version of s 511 is not applicable for the purposes of this appeal.

  87. [60] Two Singapore cases are relevant to the issue of impossible attempts.

  88. [61] The first is the decision of the High Court in Chua Kian Kok v Public Prosecutor [1999] 1 SLR(R) 826 (“Chua Kian Kok”). There, at [43]–[45], the court set out four categories of impossibility: (a) physical impossibility; (b) impossibility because of the non-criminality of the intended offence; (c) impossibility by law; and (d) impossibility through the ineptitude of the would-be criminal.

  89. [62] The court gave the examples of attempting to steal jewels from an empty safe and stabbing a corpse believing it to be alive as examples of physical impossibility. The court held that physical impossibility was the type of impossibility covered by the illustrations to s 511 of the Penal Code. Thus, it was clear that physical impossibility was not a defence to a charge of attempt under s 511 (see Chua Kian Kok at [43]).

  90. [63] In relation to impossibility because of the non-criminality of the intended offence (“no-offence impossibility”), the court cited the example of a situation where a citizen from another country travelled to Singapore and had carnal relations with a girl aged 19, believing it to be illegal to have such relations with a girl below the age of 21. The court held that “[c]ommon sense dictates this type of impossible attempts is not caught by s 511” (see Chua Kian Kok at [43]).

  91. [64] As for impossibility by law (“legal impossibility”), the court described as the “classic example” the situation where a man took away his own umbrella from an umbrella stand intending to steal it, genuinely believing that it belonged to another. The court noted that there were two reasons underlying the initial hesitancy to find that attempts involving legal impossibility would be caught by s 511. First, it was thought that these were situations which most people, as a matter of common sense, would not regard as involving criminality. The court did not consider this a very strong point, noting that there were other hypothetical situations of legal impossibility which would, as a matter of common sense, militate in favour of imposing liability. The court gave the example of a scenario where a man entered a darkened room and raped a resisting woman as he intended, but it turned out that the woman was his wife (Chua Kian Kok having been decided at a time when there was still immunity for marital rape). Second, it seemed illogical to impose liability for attempts involving legal impossibility because it would entail saying, for instance, that the would-be umbrella thief was in fact setting out to steal his own umbrella. This appeared wholly illogical because it would never be illegal for a person to take his own umbrella, and in the circumstances, it was difficult to understand how it could be an offence for him to attempt to do so. The court considered that this too was not a valid objection to imposing criminal liability for attempts involving legal impossibility because, in truth, “the attempt was in respect of the intended offence”. In other words, the character of the attempt was to be assessed by reference to what the actor in fact intended to do, and that was to take someone else’s umbrella. In the case of the empty box (see Illustration (a) to s 511 of the Penal Code), the thief was liable not for attempting to steal from an empty box, but for attempting to steal from a box that he expected would contain jewels; likewise, the would-be umbrella thief would be liable not for attempting to steal his own umbrella, but for attempting to steal an umbrella belonging to another. The court concluded that since the two common reasons for hesitancy to attach criminal liability to attempts involving legal impossibility did not withstand scrutiny, legal impossibility was also not a valid answer to a charge under s 511 (see Chua Kian Kok at [44]).

  92. [65] On the last category, impossibility through the ineptitude of the would-be criminal (“inept-offender impossibility”), the court considered the situation of a man who tried to break into a safe using a jemmy that was too small for the task, and concluded that in those circumstances, the offender would be found liable for the attempt. The court noted the objection that there could be extreme cases giving rise to absurdity. An example of this would be where a person purported to use telepathic powers to open a safe and “teleport” the contents of the safe out to himself. It seemed wrong to hold such a person guilty of attempted safe-breaking. However, the court considered that such cases were unlikely to come before a court as they would be filtered out by the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, and highlighted that the UK Law Commission, in its report entitled “Criminal Law: Attempt, and Impossibility in Relation to Attempt, Conspiracy and Incitement” (Law Commission No 102, 1980) (“the 1980 Law Commission Report”), had come to the same conclusion (see Chua Kian Kok at [45]–[46]). Having rejected all but one category of impossibility (namely, no-offence impossibility) as being capable of affording a viable defence to a charge under s 511, the court concluded that there was “very little room” for the defence of impossibility to operate in this area of the law (see Chua Kian Kok at [47]).

  93. [66] The second case is our decision in Mas Swan. That involved an accused person who had imported 21.48g of diamorphine from Malaysia into Singapore. His defence, which was accepted by the trial judge, was that he believed he was carrying ecstasy pills instead of diamorphine. One issue on appeal was whether the accused person could be convicted of the offence of attempting to import ecstasy, given that it was impossible for him to have committed the primary offence of importing ecstasy because the drug that he had actually brought into Singapore was diamorphine (see Mas Swan at [22] and [39]).

  94. [67] The court briefly reviewed the history of s 12 of the MDA, and concluded that there was nothing in the drafting history of the provision which shed light on how it should be interpreted (see Mas Swan at [26]–[28]). The court held that the elements of the general offence of attempt under s 511 of the Penal Code should be adopted in the context of s 12 of the MDA for two reasons. First, there was nothing in the words of s 12 of the MDA which suggested that a different approach should be taken. Second, there was also nothing in the origins of s 12 of the MDA which suggested that the provision should be interpreted in a different manner from s 511 of the Penal Code (see Mas Swan at [37]).

  95. [68] The court highlighted the four categories of impossibility set out in Chua Kian Kok, and observed that Mas Swan concerned physical impossibility, which would not afford a defence. It was not a case of legal impossibility because the accused person was not mistaken as to the legal status of the object that he possessed: both the object that he intended to possess and the object that he actually possessed were controlled drugs. The accused person was instead mistaken only as to the physical quality of the object (see Mas Swan at [38]–[39]). The court agreed with the ruling in Chua Kian Kok that attempting the physically impossible was an offence under s 511 of the Penal Code as this was made clear by Illustration (b) to s 511 (see Mas Swan at [40]).

  96. [69] The court held that the same position should apply under s 12 of the MDA. The court noted that prior to the decision of the House of Lords in Haughton v Smith [1975] AC 476 (“Haughton”), physically impossible attempts were crimes under English law. Haughton changed that position, but that decision had been criticised (by academics and in the 1980 Law Commission Report), and it was later legislatively reversed by the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 (c 47) (UK) (“the CAA (UK)”). The court noted that the current position in England was that physically impossible attempts were offences. The court held that when our Parliament enacted s 12 of the MDA in 1973 (in the form of s 10 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1973 (Act 5 of 1973) (“Act 5 of 1973”)), it must be presumed, in the absence of contrary intention, to have intended to follow the existing English common law position on physically impossible attempts (meaning the pre-Haughton position that physically impossible attempts were offences). The court went on to state at [41]:

  97. [70] Before moving from the Singapore cases, it should be noted that while this court in Mas Swan was of the view that the pre-Haughton English common law position on impossible attempts was that physically impossible attempts were criminalised, the court in Chua Kian Kok seemed to take a different view at [38]:

  98. [71] In our judgment, the view expressed in Mas Swan is a more accurate description of the development of English common law in this respect. This will be apparent in the following discussion of the English position on impossible attempts.

  99. England

  100. [72] The judgment of Lord Mansfield in Rex v Scofield (1784) Cald 397 (“Scofield”) is generally accepted to be the first decision to firmly establish the modern doctrine that an attempt to commit a crime is itself a crime (see J W Cecil Turner, “Attempts to Commit Crimes” (1934) 5(2) CLJ 230 at p 230, and Kayla Barkase & David MacAlister, “Impossibility in the Law of Criminal Attempt: A Comparison of Canada, Australia and New Zealand” (2014) 14(2) Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal 153 (“Barkase”) at p 156). In Scofield, Lord Mansfield stated (at 403):

  101. [73] This was qualified somewhat in Reg v Collins and Others (1864) 9 Cox CC 497 (“Collins”), where the English Court of Criminal Appeal held that attempting to steal out of an empty pocket could not constitute a crime. There could only be a criminal attempt to commit an offence where, if no interruption had taken place, the attempt could have been carried out successfully. The court observed (at 499):

  102. [74] That in turn was doubted in Reg v Brown (1889) 24 QBD 357 (“Brown”) and Reg v Ring and others (1892) 17 Cox CC 491 (“Ring”). In Brown at 358–359, Lord Coleridge CJ stated:

  103. [75] Following the decisions in Brown and Ring, physically impossible attempts to commit offences were considered crimes under English law until the decision in Haughton (see Haughton at 495, and the 1980 Law Commission Report at para 2.58). We digress to note that the pre-Haughton English common law position is precisely the position reflected in Illustrations (a) and (b) to s 511 of the Penal Code.

  104. [76] The House of Lords in Haughton doubted the decisions in Brown and Ring. Haughton involved a van that was loaded with stolen corned beef. The van was intercepted by police officers partway through its intended journey. The police officers decided to let the van continue on its journey to the place where the van driver was supposed to meet with the respondent, but with police officers on board the van. At the designated meeting place, the respondent got onto the van and directed that it be driven to London. Upon reaching London, the respondent played a prominent part in assisting in the unloading of the corned beef and the disposal of the van, and thus handled the corned beef within the meaning of s 22 of the Theft Act 1968 (c 60) (UK), which codified the offence of handling stolen goods. The respondent was then arrested. However, it was not disputed that by the time the respondent handled the corned beef, it was no longer considered stolen because it had been restored to lawful custody when the police intercepted the van. The question was whether the respondent could nevertheless be convicted of the offence of attempting to handle stolen goods (see Haughton at 489). The House of Lords in Haughton unanimously held that the respondent was not guilty of that offence (see Haughton at 497, 500, 502 and 506). Viscount Dilhorne observed as follows at 506:

  105. [77] As highlighted earlier (see [69] above), Haughton was subject to much criticism, and following the 1980 Law Commission Report, s 1 of the CAA (UK) was enacted in response to this criticism. Section 1 reads:

  106. [78] In the initial years following the enactment of s 1 of the CAA (UK), there was significant uncertainty over whether the CAA (UK) had the effect of legislatively reversing Haughton. This uncertainty is reflected in the decision of the House of Lords in Anderton v Ryan [1985] 2 WLR 968 (“Anderton”). There, the accused person purchased a video recorder for an extremely low price. She believed that the video recorder was stolen, although that belief was incidental to her decision to purchase the video recorder. There was no other proof that the video recorder was in fact stolen, and for the purposes of the appeal, it was assumed that the video recorder was not stolen. The accused person was charged with attempting to dishonestly handle stolen goods, contrary to s 1(1) of the CAA (UK). The question before the court was whether this charge could be sustained. Lord Bridge of Harwich, with whom the majority of the court agreed, couched the issue in the following terms (see Anderton at 982):

  107. [79] Lord Bridge concluded that the question must be answered in the negative because to hold otherwise would entail convictions in a number of surprising cases, including (see Anderton at 982):

  108. [80] Lord Bridge highlighted that in all these cases, “the mind alone is guilty, the act is objectively innocent” (see Anderton at 982). He held that “if the action is throughout innocent and the actor has done everything he intended to do”, there would be no offence under s 1 of the CAA (UK) (see Anderton at 983). If the English Parliament had intended to make “purely subjective guilt” criminally punishable, it should have done so with clearer language, especially in a section aimed specifically at inchoate offences (see Anderton at 982).

  109. [81] Lord Roskill agreed with Lord Bridge as follows (see Anderton at 980):

  110. [82] Thus, the House of Lords held, by a majority of 4:1 (Lord Edmund-Davies dissenting), that in the situation where the accused person had done all that he intended to do and the relevant acts were “objectively innocent”, such acts would not amount to a criminal attempt even if the accused person mistakenly thought the factual position was otherwise. On this basis, the charge against the accused person in Anderton was set aside (see Anderton at 981). Lord Bridge noted that the majority’s decision would mean that the decision in Haughton had not been legislatively reversed by the CAA (UK) (see Anderton at 983).

  111. [83] Anderton was itself overruled a year later by the House of Lords in Regina v Shivpuri [1987] AC 1 (“Shivpuri”). The appellant there was charged with attempting to knowingly deal with and harbour diamorphine with the intent to evade the prohibition on its importation. Although the appellant believed that he was involved in the importation of diamorphine, the substances in question were harmless. He was convicted at first instance, and his conviction was upheld by the Criminal Division of the English Court of Appeal. The issue before the House of Lords was as follows (see Shivpuri at 4):

  112. [84] Lord Bridge delivered the leading opinion in Shivpuri. He first noted that, applying the language of the CAA (UK) to the facts of the case, the appellant in Shivpuri would be liable for attempting to knowingly deal with and harbour diamorphine with the intent to evade the prohibition on its importation (see Shivpuri at 18–20). However, in the light of the decision of the majority in Anderton, the court had to consider whether there was a principled distinction between the situation in Shivpuri and that in Anderton (see Shivpuri at 20). Lord Bridge stated that the concern of the majority in Anderton had been to “avoid convictions in situations which most people, as a matter of common sense, would not regard as involving criminality” (see Shivpuri at 21). In doing so, the majority in Anderton had drawn a distinction between “objectively innocent” acts and “guilty” acts (see Shivpuri at 20–21). Lord Bridge said that on further consideration (see Shivpuri at 21–22):

  113. [85] Lord Bridge noted (at 21) that the majority in Anderton had not given due regard to the fact that the concern of injustice in exceptional cases had been specifically addressed in the 1980 Law Commission Report, which preceded the enactment of the CAA (UK). In particular, he highlighted para 2.97 of the 1980 Law Commission Report, which reads:

  114. [86] In the circumstances, in Shivpuri, the House of Lords was persuaded to overrule Anderton and find that the decision in Haughton had in fact been legislatively reversed by the CAA (UK). The House of Lords thus upheld the appellant’s conviction (see Shivpuri at 23).

  115. Australia

  116. [87] The decision of the Supreme Court of Victoria in Britten v Alpogut [1987] VR 929 (“Britten”) is the leading decision on the common law position in Australia in relation to impossible attempts, and it has been followed in a number of Australian states (see R v Irwin (2006) 94 SASR 480 at [13] and the cases cited therein: R v Lee (1990) 1 WAR 411, R v English (1993) 10 WAR 355, R v Mai (1992) 26 NSWLR 371, R v Barbouttis (1995) 37 NSWLR 256, R v Prior (1992) 65 A Crim R 1, R v Barnes (1993) 19 MVR 33, and Guillot v Hender (1997) 102 A Crim R 397). The court in Britten reviewed the decision in Haughton and the English cases preceding it, and declined to follow Haughton. After considering various English authorities pre-dating Haughton, Murphy J stated (see Britten at 932–933):

  117. [88] Murphy J further noted (see Britten at 935):

  118. [89] We should highlight that the preceding extract captures one permissible avenue in which the defence of impossibility may play a part in the law on criminal attempts: where the intended conduct is not a crime at all, there would be no criminal liability for the attempt to commit that supposed crime. This was reiterated by Murphy J in a later part of his judgment (see Britten at 938):

  119. [90] Thus, the Supreme Court of Victoria declined to follow Haughton, and held that impossibility was not a valid defence to a charge of criminal attempt save in the situation of no-offence impossibility.

  120. India

  121. [91] Section 511 of the Indian Penal Code 1860 (Act No 45 of 1860) (“IPC”) is the provision that sets out the law on attempts in India, and it is in terms identical to s 511 of our Penal Code. Despite this, the Indian authorities adopt a different approach to the question of impossibility.

  122. [92] In Queen Empress v Mangesh Jiva’ji (1887) ILR 11 Bom 376 (“Mangesh”), the defendant was charged with attempting to commit the offence of criminal intimidation. The defendant had sent a letter to a Divisional Commissioner, threatening to kill a particular officer of the Forest Department unless certain demands were met. It was found that the Divisional Commissioner was not interested in that particular officer, as a result of which the threat was unlikely to have an effect on the Divisional Commissioner’s feelings or conduct. Thus, it would have been impossible for the threat to have fallen within the ambit of the offence of criminal intimidation under s 503 of the IPC since that provision required the relevant threat to be towards (among other possibilities) “the person or reputation of any one [sic] in whom [the person threatened] is interested”. The court distinguished the case before it from Illustration (b) to s 511 of the IPC in the following manner (see Mangesh at 379):

  123. [93] Mangesh thus approached the issue by distinguishing between two categories of attempts. In the first category, the attempt would never have succeeded under any circumstances, and the accused person would fail to consummate the offence even if he were to make a fresh attempt. In the second category, the attempt failed only because it was rendered impossible by one-off circumstances, and a subsequent attempt might well succeed. Criminal liability would only be imposed in the latter situation.

  124. [94] Mangesh was criticised by the Singapore High Court in Public Prosecutor v Ketmuang Banphanuk and Another [1995] SGHC 46. The court considered that the illustrations to s 511 of the Penal Code did not in fact draw the distinction that was relied upon in Mangesh, and thus, it was inappropriate to rely on such a distinction:

  125. [95] A different approach was taken by the High Court of Calcutta in Asgarali Pradhania v Emperor (1934) ILR 61 Cal 54 (“Asgarali”). There, the appellant was convicted of attempting to cause a miscarriage, but there was no evidence to show that the substances that the appellant had given the victim were capable of causing a miscarriage (see Asgarali at [2]). The court drew a distinction between cases where the accused person’s failure to consummate the crime was due, broadly speaking, to his own volition and cases where the failure to consummate the crime was due to an independent factor. Criminal liability for an attempt would only attach in the latter situation (see Asgarali at [9]–[11]):

  126. [96] The court noted that since the substances administered by the appellant to the victim could not have caused a miscarriage, the appellant’s failure was not due to a factor independent of himself and set aside the appellant’s conviction (see Asgarali at [17]).

  127. [97] It can be seen that the Indian cases offer two alternative approaches to cases involving impossible attempts. One is to distinguish situations where the accused person’s conduct would normally result in the commission of the primary offence from situations where such conduct would never lead to the commission of that offence; the other is premised on whether the attempt failed because of a factor independent of the accused person or because of a factor intrinsic to the accused person.

  128. Summary

  129. [98] Having examined the position in the various jurisdictions surveyed above, we make a few broad observations:

  130. (a) We question the correctness of the classifications of impossibility adopted by the High Court in Chua Kian Kok. It seems to us that at least one of the four categories identified there, namely, inept-offender impossibility (see [65] above), is not a case of impossibility at all. The very nature of an attempted offence is that the primary offence has not been consummated. The ineptitude of the offender does nothing more than provide the explanation for why the primary offence was not consummated, but it does not make the attempt to commit the primary offence an impossible attempt for that reason, any more than it can be said that any uncompleted offence was, because it was not completed, impossible. Second, it seems to us that the categorisation adopted in Chua Kian Kok fails to pay due attention to the one key element in any criminal attempt, which is the intent to commit the specific act constituting the primary offence. It is that intent which is made the subject of a charge of attempt under s 511 of the Penal Code as long as it is accompanied by sufficient steps taken towards its fulfilment: see [33] above.

  131. (b) It is evident from the analysis of the English cases that the law on impossible attempts has undergone a difficult and circuitous path of development. With great respect, it seems to us that at least part of the reason for this is the inability, or perhaps more correctly, the unwillingness of the courts to apply a workable principle to resolve cases involving impossible attempts, ostensibly because the principle in question is not workable. That principle is to ask whether the accused person did in fact intend to commit the specific act constituting the primary offence. We will elaborate on this shortly. The English courts have eschewed this approach on the ground that it is too uncertain, but have then resorted to dealing with individual cases by working backwards from desired or acceptable outcomes: see above at [78]–[79] and [84] in particular. This is seldom, if ever, a reliable guide to a court, and still less can it be an acceptable approach in our context, where much of the criminal law is codified and subject to periodic legislative review.

  132. (c) The one area where there is a measure of common ground is in respect of what has been described as no-offence impossibility: see [63] and [89] above. We agree that no criminal liability should attach in such cases because the mistaken belief of the actor that what he has done is criminal cannot possibly make his conduct an offence if it is not in fact so.

  133. (d) Much of the difficulty in this area of the law has stemmed from a tendency to analyse the accused person’s actions from the standpoint of what has in fact been done, rather than beginning from the standpoint of what, on the evidence, it can be said the accused person in fact intended to do, and then considering whether there is sufficient evidence of action to manifest that intention. After all, the very essence of a criminal attempt is an intended act which, for some reason, is not brought to fruition. In this regard, the Australian jurisprudence provides a useful reminder that the focus should instead be on the criminal intent of the actor, rather than on the criminality or otherwise of the act that has in fact been carried out: see [87]–[88] above).

  134. (e) While the Indian case law that we have considered does not commend itself to us as providing a principled way forward, it does suggest that in considering liability in this area, it may be relevant to examine, among other things:

  135. (i) Whether the actions taken by the accused person were so far-fetched that it could not reasonably be said in the circumstances that his actions in fact extended beyond a mere guilty intention. This would cover cases where, for instance, the accused person intended to cause injury to the targeted victim by uttering a meaningless curse.

  136. (ii) Whether there is any relevant fact that accounts for the failure to consummate an initially guilty intent. We will touch on this below.

  137. (f) Finally, in this area of the law, there are likely to be a number of challenging fact situations that may strain any attempt to develop and apply a principled approach. While the court should attempt to address these situations as best as it can, it should also recognise that some will best be left to be dealt with as and when they arise.

  138. The appropriate approach to cases involving impossible attempts

  139. [99] In this light, we turn to consider the appropriate approach to cases involving impossible attempts. The choice between widening or narrowing the scope of impossibility as a defence to the offence of criminal attempt reflects the tension between a more objectivist and a more subjectivist approach towards criminal liability (see Stanley Yeo, Neil Morgan & Chan Wing Cheong, Criminal Law in Malaysia and Singapore (LexisNexis, 3rd Ed, 2018) at para 36.10). In Glanville Williams, “The Lords and Impossible Attempts, or Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?” (1986) 45(1) CLJ 33 (“The Lords and Impossible Attempts”), Professor Williams described this tension in the following manner (at p 36):

  140. [100] We also draw attention to Professor Stanley Yeo’s observation in “Clarifying Impossible Attempts and Criminal Conspiracies” (2007) 19 SAcLJ 1 at para 6 that:

  141. [101] There are existing statutes that govern this area, and hence, in making this policy choice, the court is obliged as far as possible to give effect to any intention that is expressed or implied in the relevant statute. Thus, the first port of call in the present case is to examine the text and the context of s 12 of the MDA, which we again reproduce below:

  142. [102] Section 12 of the MDA is silent on the issue of impossible attempts. As we alluded to earlier (see [69] above), in Mas Swan at [41], we held that there was nothing in the text or the origins of this provision which suggested that at the time it was enacted in 1973 (in the form of s 10 of Act 5 of 1973), Parliament intended to depart from the existing English common law position on physically impossible attempts. We therefore held that the pre-Haughton English common law position (which is set out at [72]–[75] above) ought to apply. It should be noted, however, that the common law position at the time of the enactment of s 12 was not uniform among all the common law jurisdictions. Significantly, the Indian position had departed from the English position by that time (see [91]–[97] above).

  143. [103] Further, as was noted at [37] of Mas Swan (see [67] above), there is nothing in the text or the origins of s 12 of the MDA which suggests that the provision should be interpreted in a manner different from s 511 of the Penal Code. This suggests that the approach taken by the Indian authorities (which is premised on interpreting a provision virtually identical to s 511 of our Penal Code) ought, at least in theory, to be potentially more persuasive than the English approach.

  144. [104] Having said that, given the tenor of our comments at [98] above, we consider it appropriate to reconsider the position from first principles. Before doing so, we set out again in full s 511 as it stood at the time of Han’s acts and his arrest:

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