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Grounds publishedDecided 17 Nov 2020

Court of Appeal

Feen, Bjornar and others v Viking Engineering Pte Ltd and another appeal and another matter

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[2020] SGCA 112Case no. Civil Appeal No 45 of 2020 and Summons No 81 of 202017 paragraphs

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Grounds of decision

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  1. Introduction

  2. [2] In the proceedings below and in these appeals, the appellants contended that the valuation should be set aside because the independent valuer materially departed from his instructions and the valuation was in manifest error. Having carefully considered the evidence and the parties’ submissions, we dismissed the appeals and CA/SUM 81/2020 (“SUM 81”), the appellants’ application in CA 45 to adduce a competing valuation report. We now provide the detailed grounds for our decision.

  3. Background facts

  4. [3] The first appellant in CA 45 and the appellant in CA 46 is Mr Bjornar Feen (“Mr Feen”). Mr Feen and the respondent in the appeals, Viking Engineering Pte Ltd (“Viking Engineering”), were joint venture partners in Viking Inert Gas Pte Ltd (“VIG”).

  5. (a) An independent valuer was to be appointed by agreement within 14 days of 9 April 2018 (para 2(a)).

  6. (b) The valuer was to ascertain the fair value of the Shares as at 9 April 2018 on a going concern basis (para 2(b)), without applying a discount to account for the fact that the Shares were a minority shareholding (para 2(c)).

  7. (d) The valuer was to adjust the purchase price of the Shares on the assumption that VIG had undertaken all the business that was diverted away from it to any one or more of the Defendants (para 2(e)). The adjustments were to be made on the following bases (para 2(f)):

  8. (i) the valuer was only to take into account the business of inert gas systems and exhaust gas cleaners (para 2(f)(i));

  9. (ii) all goodwill and revenue earned by the other Defendants in respect of the aforesaid business was to be attributed to VIG, unless that goodwill or revenue arose from a contract that would have been physically impossible for VIG to have earned (para 2(f)(ii)); and

  10. (e) By agreement, Mr Feen would bear the costs of the valuation exercise (para 2(g)).

  11. (f) The parties had liberty to apply (para 2(h)).

  12. [6] Mr Richard Hayler (“Mr Hayler”) of FTI Consulting (Singapore) Pte Ltd (“FTI”) was appointed by the parties’ agreement on 8 June 2018. He subsequently circulated a letter of engagement dated 13 June 2018 (“the LOE”) to the parties. The parties signed and returned the LOE. Mr Hayler finalised a valuation report (“the FTI Report”) around 2 November 2018, following delays by the Defendants in providing the documents that he had requested. The FTI Report was released to the parties around 29 July 2019.

  13. [7] In the FTI Report, Mr Hayler determined that as at 9 April 2018, VIG was valued at $44m. This figure was the average of the valuations obtained using: (a) a discounted cash flow (“DCF”) analysis of VIG’s revenue; and (b) a comparative analysis taking into account the share valuations of two listed companies. The FTI Report correspondingly valued the Shares at $13.2m.

  14. The proceedings and the decision below

  15. [9] In the proceedings below, the parties agreed that the FTI Report was an expert determination and that, applying the principles in the Singapore High Court decision of The Oriental Insurance Co Ltd v Reliance National Asia Re Pte Ltd [2009] 2 SLR(R) 385 (“Oriental Insurance”) at [47], it could only be set aside on the following three grounds:

  16. (a) where the expert materially departed from instructions;

  17. (b) where there is a manifest error in the expert’s determination that justly requires judicial intervention; or

  18. (c) there was fraud, corruption, collusion, dishonesty, bad faith, bias, or the like.

  19. The issues to be determined

  20. (c) third, whether the FTI Report should be set aside.

  21. Our decision in CA 45 and CA 46

  22. Issue 1: Leave to raise a new argument challenging the validity of the Buyout Order

  23. [13] We did not accept this submission for the following reasons. In the first place, the “extended” doctrine of res judicata barred this issue from being raised. This doctrine applies to points that were not previously decided because they were not raised in earlier proceedings, even though they could and should have been raised in those proceedings (see the decision of this court in The Royal Bank of Scotland NV (formerly known as ABN Amro Bank NV) and others v TT International Ltd (nTan Corporate Advisory Pte Ltd and others, other parties) and another appeal [2015] 5 SLR 1104 at [102]). The inquiry is directed to whether, having regard to the substance and reality of the earlier action, an issue reasonably ought to have been raised (see the Singapore High Court decision of Goh Nellie v Goh Lian Teck and others [2007] 1 SLR(R) 453 at [53]). In our judgment, the answer to this question was in the affirmative. Viking Engineering’s application in SUM 4101 was for the court to enter summary judgment in S 294 pursuant to O 14 r 1 of the ROC. Any submission that the commencement of S 294 was an abuse of process should have been ventilated at that stage but was not.

  24. [14] In any event, we were not persuaded by the merits of the Defendants’ new legal argument. The Defendants relied on this court’s statements in Ting Shwu Ping (administrator of the estate of Chng Koon Seng, deceased) v Scanone Pte Ltd and another appeal [2017] 1 SLR 95 (“Ting Shwu Ping”) that the existence of a shareholder exit mechanism in a company’s articles may affect the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction under s 216 of the Companies Act in the following ways (at [75]):

  25. [16] We were also not persuaded by the Defendants’ reliance on the statements in Ting Shwu Ping (see [14] above). Seen in their proper context, those statements do not indicate that the existence of alternative remedies is determinative of whether a shareholder may commence an s 216 action. Rather, as we stated in Ho Yew Kong v Sakae Holdings Ltd and other appeals and other matters [2018] 2 SLR 333, while the presence of and reliance upon any available alternative remedy is inextricably tied to the ultimate inquiry into the commercial fairness or otherwise of the defendant’s conduct (at [163]), whether an action for relief from oppression under s 216 may be pursued depends on the relevance and suitability of the alternative remedies in question, and whether they are adequate and appropriate in bringing an end to the prejudicial state of affairs complained of (at [162] and [165]).

  26. Issue 2: Grounds for challenging the court-ordered valuation

  27. [20] Oriental Insurance and Poh Cheng Chew are cases where the parties agreed to resolve their disputes through expert determination, a mode of alternative dispute resolution. Where parties contractually provide for their dispute to be resolved in this manner and consequently appoint an expert by contract, the Singapore High Court has explained that judicial intervention is only justified where “necessary to uphold the parties’ contractual bargain” (see Poh Cheng Chew at [37]). In this connection, the Judge considered the arrangement between the parties to be contractual in nature, especially in relation to the LOE (see the GD at [64]).

  28. [24] Without expressing a conclusive view, it also seemed to us that the legal position will be the same where the court has appointed an independent valuer without the consent or agreement of the parties, subject to the precise terms on which the independent valuer was appointed. As this issue was not crucial to the decision in the present proceedings, we left this question to be decided in a future case when it arises directly for determination.

  29. Issue 3: Whether the FTI Report should be set aside

  30. [25] Having clarified the legal basis on which the court may intervene in respect of the valuation in the FTI Report, we considered the merits of the Defendants’ contentions in CA 45 that the FTI Report should be set aside. In this regard, the Defendants submitted that Mr Hayler had materially departed from his instructions in two key respects, that these material departures also amounted to manifest errors in the FTI Report, and that, in any event, the Judge ought to have exercised her discretion under s 216(2)(d) of the Companies Act to adjust the valuation reached in the FTI Report.

  31. [28] At the hearing, counsel for the Defendants, Mr Ramesh Bharani s/o K Nagaratnam, further drew our attention to specific information that Mr Hayler had allegedly failed to take into account in his assessment of the business that Mr Feen had diverted from VIG. This information concerned: (a) VIG’s financial statements from 2016 to 2018; (b) the suspension of VIG’s contract with STX Offshore & Shipbuilding Co Ltd in 2016; and (c) the “blacklisting” of VIG by a third party, Navig8 Ship Management Pte Ltd (“Navig8”), due to allegations of racism against VIG. The latter two incidents were raised in a letter dated 7 September 2018 that the Defendants’ previous solicitors sent to Mr Hayler (“the 7 September Letter”).

  32. [30] Moreover, quite apart from the specific arguments run, we considered that there had been a consistent and deliberate lack of co-operation on the Defendants’ part in respect of the valuation process (see the GD at [51] and [52]). In particular, Mr Hayler had requested for the parties to provide him with various documents. It was because the Defendants did not provide him with the requested information that he proceeded to rely on assumptions in his valuation of VIG. Furthermore, in an e-mail sent to the parties’ solicitors on 15 July 2018, Mr Hayler had notified the parties that he would commence the valuation of VIG and the Shares in the absence of the requested information. The Defendants’ solicitors at the time had replied by e-mail on 18 July 2018 to state that they would be “be seeking directions from the Court as to how best to proceed in the interests of all concerned”. However, no directions were sought (see the GD at [56] and [58]). In these circumstances, it did not lie in the mouth of the Defendants to rely on their own failure to provide the requested information and their failure to co-operate, so as to set aside the FTI Report on the basis that Mr Hayler had proceeded with the valuation.

  33. [31] We turn to the issue of manifest error. The Defendants’ submissions on this issue in CA 45 were predicated on this court finding that Mr Hayler had materially departed from his instructions. As we dismissed that ground of appeal, this basis for finding that the FTI Report was in manifest error also fell away.

  34. [32] The final argument put forward by the Defendants in CA 45 concerned the Judge’s alleged failure to exercise her discretion under s 216(2)(d) of the Companies Act to adjust Mr Hayler’s valuation. The Defendants relied on the Singapore High Court’s statements in Poh Fu Tek ([22] supra) that the court in a s 216 action has the flexibility to adjust an expert’s valuation “to arrive at a value which is fair and just in the particular circumstances of the case” (at [27]). Moreover, it is the court’s duty to assess the reasonableness of an expert’s opinion by considering “whether it is logical in its own context, whether it is justified by the facts on which it is based, and whether it is compromised by any other evidence including an opposing opinion” (at [34]). The Defendants submitted that the Judge had failed to qualitatively and quantitatively assess the reasonableness of the valuation despite being presented with an opposing expert report from KPMG.

  35. (a) VIG’s revenue was valued using a compound annual growth rate of 20%, which was erroneously arrived at and unrealistic;

  36. (b) the 15% discount rate applied in the DCF analysis was too low;

  37. (c) the comparative analysis was based on companies that were not comparable to VIG; and

  38. (d) FTI’s methodology of valuing VIG by adopting the average of the valuations under the DCF analysis and the comparative analysis was inconsistent with International Valuation Standards Council guidelines.

  39. [35] In our judgment, we saw no reason to disagree with the Judge’s determination that these alleged “errors” only amounted to differences in opinion between experts on the valuation of VIG. This did not rise to the threshold of a manifest error or patent error by Mr Hayler that warranted judicial intervention.

  40. Our decision in SUM 81 of 2020

  41. [37] Finally, we considered the Defendants’ application in SUM 81 to adduce a competing valuation report. In our judgment, as there were no grounds to set aside the FTI Report, there was no need to consider a competing valuation report. We accordingly dismissed SUM 81.

  42. Conclusion