Court of Appeal · Decided 20 November 2020
Michael Vaz Lorrain v Singapore Rifle Association
Feedback & support[2020] SGCA 114 · Case no. Civil Appeal No 60 of 2019 · 44 paragraphs
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Introduction
- [1]
[1] The appellant in CA/CA 60/2019 (“CA 60”) is Mr Michael Vaz Lorrain (“Mr Vaz”). The respondent, the Singapore Rifle Association (“SRA”), is a member of the Singapore Shooting Association (“SSA”). Mr Vaz is the president of SSA’s council. HC/S 109/2017 (“Suit 109”) is SRA’s action against Mr Vaz for breach of a mediation agreement entered into between, inter alia, SRA and Mr Vaz (“the Mediation Agreement”) and/or a duty of confidence owed to SRA. As Mr Vaz did not dispute liability, interlocutory judgment was entered against him.
Background facts
- [4]
[4] We begin with a brief summary of the background facts.
- [5]
[5] In 2016, the parties entered into the Mediation Agreement in an attempt to resolve certain disputes. The Mediation Agreement contained terms pertaining to the confidentiality of the mediation. Pursuant to that agreement, the parties attended a mediation session which proved to be unsuccessful.
- [6]
[6] Subsequently, Mr Vaz, in his capacity as president of the Singapore Gun Club Committee, sent a 12-page document to its members. This document contained a short extract which revealed details of what had transpired during the mediation session (“the Published Statement”). The document was later uploaded onto the Facebook page of a public Facebook group named “Singapore Gun Club” by one James Blackmore (“Mr Blackmore”). Thereafter, Mr Blackmore’s Facebook post was shared by Mr Vaz on his personal Facebook page. Mr Vaz’s post was accessible to any member of the public.
- [7]
[7] SRA commenced Suit 109 on 8 February 2017. SRA contended that by disseminating the Published Statement in the manner described above, Mr Vaz had breached the Mediation Agreement and/or a duty of confidence. Apart from claiming compensatory damages, SRA also sought punitive damages, which was quantified at $1.5m in SRA’s Opening Statement filed on 5 September 2018.
- [8]
[8] Mr Vaz filed his Defence on 2 March 2017. On 22 March 2017, SRA’s solicitors noted in a letter to Mr Vaz’s solicitors that Mr Vaz “ha[d] not raised any legal defences in his Defence on the issue of liability”. Accordingly, SRA sought Mr Vaz’s agreement for the parties to record a consent interlocutory judgment on the following terms:
- [9]
[9] In response, Mr Vaz’s solicitors informed SRA’s solicitors on 30 March 2017 that Mr Vaz was disputing SRA’s claim for punitive damages. However, if SRA withdrew that claim, Mr Vaz would be prepared to consent to interlocutory judgment.
- [10]
[10] Meanwhile, on 3 April 2017, Mr Vaz served the OTS on SRA. The terms of the OTS were as follows:
- [11]
[11] SRA did not accept the OTS. On 7 April 2017, SRA filed HC/SUM 1604/2017, an application under O 14 of the Rules of Court for, among other things, “interlocutory judgment [to] be entered against [Mr Vaz] with damages, including punitive damages, to be assessed” (the “Summary Judgment Application”).
- [12]
[12] On 23 May 2017, the parties appeared before the Judge for the hearing of the Summary Judgment Application. At that hearing, Mr Vaz consented to interlocutory judgment being entered against him after, inter alia, it was clarified that his liability for punitive damages was to be determined at the trial for the assessment of damages. Accordingly, the Judge made the following orders pursuant to O 14 r 3:
The decision below
Assessment of damages
- [13]
[13] On 25 February 2019, the Judge gave his decision in respect of the assessment of damages. We briefly summarise the Judge’s oral grounds.
- [15]
[15] The Judge did not allow SRA’s claim for the time, effort and expense incurred by SRA’s council members to investigate and uncover Mr Vaz’s breaches. The Judge also did not allow SRA’s claim for the expenses it had incurred for the mediation.
Costs orders and OTS
Parties’ respective positions on the three main issues to be determined in this appeal
- [20]
[20] We have already outlined broadly the three main issues in this appeal at [3] above.
- [23]
[23] Finally, on the third issue, SRA contends that even if the requirements in O 22A r 9(3) are fulfilled, we should exercise our discretion under O 22A r 9(5) not to apply O 22A r 9(3). Among other reasons, there were novel and complex issues of significant public interest in Suit 109. In such circumstances, the public interest is served by the courts making a legal pronouncement on these issues and the purpose underlying the O 22A regime, namely, to bring litigation to an expeditious end without judgment, has limited force. On the other hand, Mr Vaz submits that none of the reasons put forward by SRA provide a sufficient basis for O 22A r 9(3) not to be applied.
Issue 1: Whether the Legal Advice Costs could be recovered as damages
- [30]
[30] An application of this general principle can be found in this court’s recent decision in Singapore Shooting Association and others v Singapore Rifle Association [2020] 1 SLR 395 (“Singapore Shooting Association”). Incidentally, the parties to the present appeal were also involved in that matter. There, SRA pursued a claim in the tort of unlawful means conspiracy against the members of SSA’s council, including Mr Vaz. In the court below, the Judge had held that the legal fees and disbursements incurred by SRA in investigating, detecting and responding to the conspiracy could amount to actionable loss or damage (at [44]).
- [31]
[31] On appeal, this court disagreed with the Judge on this point, and held that (at [97]):
- [33]
[33] Although the relevant cause of action in Singapore Shooting Association was the tort of unlawful means conspiracy, the aforesaid rationale applies with equal force to any cause of action, including claims for breach of contract and breach of confidence.
- [37]
[37] In our judgment, the Judge’s award of $8,100 as damages is erroneous. Only nominal damages might be awarded given SRA’s inability to prove that it had suffered any loss as a result of Mr Vaz’s breach including the quantum of its loss, if any. Accordingly, the Judge’s damages award of $8,100 is set aside and nominal damages of $1,000 is awarded to SRA.
Issue 2: The applicability of O 22A r 9(3) of the Rules of Court
- [39]
[39] We refer to the requirement in O 22A r 9(3)(a) as the “Validity Requirement” and the requirement in O 22A r 9(3)(b) as the “Favourability Requirement”.
Validity Requirement
- [41]
[41] To determine whether the Judge should have applied O 22A r 9(3), this requires us to consider whether the Validity Requirement and the Favourability Requirement were satisfied at the time of the Judge’s decision. In this regard, there can be no dispute that the OTS had not been accepted, withdrawn nor had it expired when the Judge made his decision. Hence, the Validity Requirement is satisfied. In the context of this appeal, we note that the parties have unnecessarily invited this court to examine one particular aspect of this court’s earlier decision in NTUC Foodfare Co-operative Ltd v SIA Engineering Co Ltd and another [2018] 2 SLR 1043 (“NTUC Foodfare”). In that case, this court noted that the expression “the disposal of the claim” in O 22A r 9(3)(a) refers to “the final disposal of the claim on appeal if an appeal is filed” (at [17]). Significantly, the issue in NTUC Foodfare was whether the offer to settle served by the defendants before the trial had expired at the conclusion of the trial (see NTUC Foodfare at [16]). That issue is irrelevant for present purposes because, as stated above, the Validity Requirement is clearly satisfied and the only remaining consideration is whether the Favourability Requirement is also satisfied which we now turn to examine.
Favourability Requirement
(b) In determining if the Favourability Requirement is satisfied, the court is to compare the judgment and the terms of the offer to settle. This comparison is to be made as of the date of the offer to settle.
(c) The comparison under O 22A r 9(3)(b) must be between like and like:
(i) Where the offer to settle states a monetary sum, but is either silent on interest and costs, or states that the settlement sum is inclusive of interest and costs, it should be interpreted as an “all-in” offer inclusive of interest and costs. The court should compare the settlement sum with the judgment sum together with interest and costs up to the date of the offer to settle.
(ii) Where the offer to settle provides for the plaintiff to receive a fixed sum in addition to interest and costs, it would typically suffice for the court to compare the judgment sum (without accounting for interest and costs) with the fixed sum in the offer to settle to determine whether the Favourability Requirement is satisfied.
Whether the approach in NTUC Foodfare should be modified
- [44]
[44] In our judgment, this contention is untenable for the following two reasons.
- [46]
[46] Second, the approach in NTUC Foodfare is consistent with O 22A r 9(4), which stipulates that in considering the Favourability Requirement, the court should only account for the interest awarded in respect of the period before the offer to settle was served:
- [47]
[47] Hence, we affirm the approach in NTUC Foodfare and do not see any reason to depart from it.
Whether the judgment is more favourable than the OTS
(a) First, $10,000 for the costs of the work done up to the close of pleadings. This was also reflected in SRA’s costs schedule which Mr Vaz’s counsel, Mr Anthony Lee, drew this court’s attention to.
(b) Second, $6,500 for the Summary Judgment Application, given that some of the costs would have been incurred before the service of the OTS on 3 April 2017. The Summary Judgment Application was filed on 7 April 2017 (see [11] above).
(c) Third, $1,568.65 for disbursements incurred before the OTS was served.
- [53]
[53] We do not see any reason to disturb the Judge’s assessment. We accept that the Judge had to grapple with what was put forward as novel issues, such as whether a breach of a mediation agreement constitutes an exception to the general rule that punitive damages cannot be awarded for breach of contract: see PH Hydraulics & Engineering Pte Ltd v Airtrust (Hong Kong) Ltd and another appeal [2017] 2 SLR 129 (“PH Hydraulics”) at [135]. The Judge held that punitive damages may, in principle, be awarded for a breach of a mediation agreement if the defendant’s conduct was “outrageous”. For the avoidance of doubt, since this issue is not before us, we neither affirm nor overrule the Judge on this point.
Whether the non-monetary value of the judgment should be considered
- [55]
[55] SRA elaborates on the non-monetary value that it derived from the judgment. According to SRA, the judgment vindicated its “legitimate expectation of utmost confidentiality in the mediation process”. In addition, the court had agreed with its claim that Mr Vaz breached his confidentiality obligations and ought to be sanctioned. Finally, SRA vindicated its “reputational interests that were compromised and/or damaged by Mr Vaz’s repeated circulation of the Confidential Information to the shooting fraternity and members of the public”.
- [56]
[56] In our judgment, the court is entitled to consider the non-monetary remedies obtained from the judgment, such as the injunction (which was also one of the terms of the OTS) (see [10] and [12] above). However, in so far as the alleged non-monetary value derived from the judgment is concerned (as described by SRA), we do not see any basis to account for that when considering the Favourability Requirement.
- [58]
[58] Second, SRA’s contention is not supported by the case law that it cites – CCM Industrial Pte Ltd v Uniquetech Pte Ltd [2009] 2 SLR(R) 20 (“CCM Industrial”) and Ram Das V N P v SIA Engineering Co Ltd [2015] 3 SLR 267 (“Ram Das”).
- [59]
[59] In CCM Industrial, Chan Sek Keong CJ explained the Favourability Requirement in the following terms (at [40]):
- [60]
[60] These propositions were endorsed in NTUC Foodfare ([41] supra) (at [22]). The point emphasised by Chan CJ was simply that in determining whether the Favourability Requirement is satisfied, the court should consider all the terms of the offer to settle. There is nothing in the passage above which suggests that the court should take into account the non-monetary value of the judgment.
- [61]
[61] In CCM Industrial, the defendant made an offer to settle with a settlement sum of $2,018.32, which the plaintiff did not accept. Eventually, the parties recorded a consent judgment in the sum of $2,018.32, with interest thereon at 5.33% per annum from the date of writ to the date of judgment. The District Judge, taking into account the relevant interest on the judgment sum, held that the judgment was more favourable than the OTS by $8.96. Hence, the Favourability Requirement was not satisfied (at [4], [9] and [13]).
- [62]
[62] It was in this context that Chan CJ made the propositions excerpted at [59] above. He noted that the duration of the offer to settle should be considered in determining the Favourability Requirement. The offer to settle was open for acceptance for at least eight months. The interest or benefit that would have accrued to the plaintiff had it accepted the offer to settle at an early date was a relevant consideration. On that basis, and contrary to the District Judge’s finding, the judgment obtained by the plaintiff was not more favourable than the terms of the offer to settle (at [41]–[43]).
- [63]
[63] Accordingly, CCM Industrial ([58] supra) does not stand for the proposition that the court should consider the non-monetary value of the judgment. In fact, CCM Industrial weakens SRA’s case in so far as it suggests that the court should account for the interest or benefit that would have accrued to SRA had it accepted the OTS at an early date.
- [64]
[64] Next, in Ram Das ([58] supra), Hoo Sheau Peng JC (as she then was) stated that “favourability should not be restricted only to monetary terms” (at [45]). However, this statement should not be read out of context. The full passage in which that statement is contained reads:
- [65]
[65] Read in context, the point made by Hoo JC was no different to the one made by Chan CJ in CCM Industrial. In addition, the reference to LK Ang ([42] supra) was to illustrate that O 22A has been held to be available for non-monetary claims, such as where a plaintiff sues a defendant for a license. However, whether or not the court should consider the non-monetary value of the judgment is a separate issue altogether.
- [66]
[66] For these reasons, we hold that the Favourability Requirement is satisfied in the present case.
Issue 3: Whether the court should exercise its discretion under O 22A r 9(5) not to apply O 22A r 9(3) even when the two requirements have been satisfied
Novel and complex issues of significant public interest
- [70]
[70] SRA submits that Suit 109 concerned issues that were “novel, complex and of significant public interest”. Accordingly, while the O 22A regime is intended to encourage the parties to bring litigation to an expeditious end without judgment, SRA contends that “this consideration should have limited force when the public interest is served by the [c]ourts making a legal pronouncement on the issues in the suit”.
- [71]
[71] In our judgment, the mere fact that there are novel and complex legal issues of public interest, does not, in and of itself, ordinarily provide a sufficient basis not to apply O 22A r 9(3). In fact, as this court has previously observed, “[i]t is precisely in a case … where the question of law involved is of some complexity, that there should be some give and take on both sides” (see Man B&W Diesel S E Asia Pte Ltd and another v PT Bumi International Tankers and another appeal [2004] 3 SLR(R) 267 at [17]).
- [72]
[72] Furthermore, although there were novel issues in Suit 109, the strength of SRA’s claim must still be considered in the final analysis. In that regard, we emphasised in PH Hydraulics ([53] supra) that even if we were minded to depart from the general rule that punitive damages cannot be awarded for breach of contract, the breach must be of “a particularly outrageous type” (at [136]). In the present case, we do not see how SRA could have seriously maintained the position that Mr Vaz’s conduct was sufficiently “outrageous” to warrant the imposition of punitive damages of $1.5m. Accordingly, SRA should have accepted the OTS, and the application of O 22A r 9(3) is merely a consequence of its failure to do so.
The OTS was a serious and genuine attempt to settle Suit 109
- [73]
[73] SRA contends that the OTS was not a serious and genuine attempt to settle Suit 109. According to SRA, there was “no logic” behind the OTS Sum and the OTS was merely a “tactical ploy to attract the application of [O 22A r 9(3)]”.
SRA’s purported reasons as to why it did not accept the OTS
- [77]
[77] In its written submissions as well as at the hearing before us, SRA provided various reasons as to why it did not accept the OTS, and submitted that O 22A r 9(3) should not apply in view of these reasons. To begin with, we do not think that it matters whether or not we accept SRA’s reasons for not accepting the OTS. Besides, the reasons advanced are simply lawyers’ arguments without legal and factual foundation:
(a) First, it was “inherently difficult” for SRA to assess whether the OTS should be accepted given the “unique circumstances” of the case. “The law on remedies for breaches of mediation confidentiality was (and remains) in a state of flux” and the “damages were inherently hard to quantify with precision”.
(b) Second, SRA had suffered “deep and irreparable intangible losses” and “needed vindication and some measure of restoration”. The OTS contained no admission of liability.
(c) Third, SRA was, as Mr Wong put it, troubled by the operation of the OTS as it required SRA to discontinue its claim, notwithstanding the fact that Mr Vaz had consented to interlocutory judgment.
- [78]
[78] As we pointed out to Mr Wong in the course of the arguments, there is no evidence before us that any of these considerations had influenced SRA’s decision not to accept the OTS. There was therefore no basis for us to consider these submissions from the Bar.
- [79]
[79] In any event, none of the reasons provide a sufficient basis for us not to apply O 22A r 9(3). On the point about SRA not accepting the OTS because it did not contain an admission of liability, Mr Wong confirmed that SRA did not at any time counter-propose for the OTS to include such a term. Furthermore, if SRA was indeed concerned about there being no admission to liability, SRA could have accepted the OTS after Mr Vaz had consented to interlocutory judgment. We also do not understand what was troubling about the term requiring discontinuance of the action, given that the issue of damages had not been decided by the Judge and it was open for SRA to discontinue the action at that stage. Moreover, the fact that SRA saw fit to accept the OTS after the first instance judgment puts paid to the suggestion that it was troubled by the term requiring discontinuance. We digress to note that in Michael Vaz (Preliminary Judgment) ([22] supra), this court held that SRA’s purported acceptance of the OTS after the first instance judgment was not valid, for reasons which we do not need to go into in this judgment.
- [80]
[80] In our view, given that SRA was claiming punitive damages of $1.5m, the inference must be that SRA had deemed the OTS Sum to be derisory and not worthy of consideration. That, in our view, was the likely reason why the OTS was not accepted.
Mr Vaz’s alleged wasteful conduct
- [81]
[81] Finally, SRA submits that Mr Vaz’s conduct was wasteful and protracted the proceedings. However, we note that the Judge did not make any finding on Mr Vaz’s allegedly wasteful conduct. Furthermore, Mr Vaz has made similar allegations against SRA. Having regard to the entirety of the record, it appears to us that both parties could have conducted the litigation in a more proportionate manner. We therefore do not think that either party’s conduct ought to have a material bearing on whether O 22A r 9(3) should apply.
The appropriate costs orders
(a) Mr Vaz shall pay SRA’s costs incurred in Suit 109 on a standard basis on the High Court scale up to 3 April 2017 (ie, the Pre-OTS Costs). We have fixed this at $15,000 inclusive of disbursements (see [50] above).
(b) SRA shall pay Mr Vaz’s costs incurred in Suit 109 on an indemnity basis on the High Court scale from 3 April 2017 (ie, the Post-OTS Costs). This would comprise the costs of the trial for the assessment of damages, the Summary Judgment Application, the Amendment Application and the Setting Aside of Service Application (ie, the costs orders appealed against by Mr Vaz).
(c) The costs orders made by the Judge which are summarised at S/N 1 to 4 of the table at [18] above are set aside (ie, the costs orders relating to the trial for the assessment of damages, the Summary Judgment Application, the Amendment Application and the Setting Aside of Service Application).
(d) The costs orders made by the Judge which are summarised at S/N 5 to 7 of the table at [18] above shall remain and Mr Vaz is not to be awarded any costs for these applications.
Conclusion