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Grounds publishedDecided 15 Dec 2020

Court of Appeal

Denka Advantech Pte Ltd and another v Seraya Energy Pte Ltd and another and other appeals

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[2020] SGCA 119Case no. Civil Appeal No 37 of 2019

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] For almost a century, the law relating to contractual penalties (hereafter the “Penalty Rule”) was regarded as being very well-established across the Commonwealth. The leading statement of principles was that famously laid down by Lord Dunedin in the House of Lords decision of Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Company, Limited v New Garage and Motor Company, Limited [1915] AC 79 (“Dunlop”); indeed, these principles have been described as having “been treated in Australia as holy writ for over 100 years” (see N C Seddon & R A Bigwood, Cheshire & Fifoot Law of Contract – Eleventh Australian Edition (LexisNexis Butterworths Australia, 2017) at p 1230). This was in 1914. Nearly a century later, in 2012, the High Court of Australia, in Andrews and others v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited (2012) 247 CLR 205 (“Andrews”), extended the scope of the law in this area in a rather radical fashion (specifically by holding that a breach of contract was no longer a prerequisite to the application of the Penalty Rule). Shortly thereafter, in 2015, the UK Supreme Court, in Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2016] AC 1172 (“Cavendish Square Holding”), not only disagreed with Andrews but also restated the substantive criteria (previously laid down in Dunlop) for ascertaining whether a particular clause was a penalty clause. The present appeal affords this court the opportunity of considering these developments in the context of the Penalty Rule in Singapore.

  3. [2] Not surprisingly, much academic ink has been spilt on the Penalty Rule in recent years – in particular, with regard to both Andrews and Cavendish Square Holding. In addition to the numerous articles and case notes, both the aforementioned cases have also been considered in two learned (and recent) treatises (see Roger Halson, Liquidated Damages and Penalty Clauses (Oxford University Press, 2018) (“Halson”) and Nicholas A Tiverios, Contractual Penalties in Australia and the United Kingdom – History, Theory and Practice (The Federation Press, 2019) (“Tiverios”)). Indeed, the first treatise comes from the pen (or, perhaps more appropriately in these more modern times, keyboard) of a leading contract scholar whilst the second is based on a doctoral thesis (which is, in the nature of things, the scholarly fruit of many years of extremely focused academic labour (see also, by the same author, Nicholas A Tiverios, “A Restatement of Relief Against Contractual Penalties (I): Underlying Principles in Equity and at Common Law” (2017) 11 J Eq 1 and “A Restatement of Relief Against Contractual Penalties (II): A Framework for Applying the Australian and English Approaches” (2017) 11 J Eq 185)).

  4. [3] What is interesting, in our view, is that the various academic views have in fact diverged (often quite radically). Hence, whilst these views are useful in setting out as well as illustrating the various controversies and arguments, we are best served by going back to first principles. In this regard (and as we shall see), we will need to examine not only the past in terms of the history of the Penalty Rule but also the present in relation to the logic and coherence of the (doctrinal) rules and principles proffered in the various cases. Finally, we will also need to consider the theoretical underpinnings of the aforementioned rules and principles which (by their very nature) transcend both space and time. All three aspects (also present in the sub-title of Tiverios) reflect the interactive elements of the law in general and the Penalty Rule in particular. The historical aspect is particularly important in the context of ascertaining the scope of the Penalty Rule, whilst the doctrinal and theoretical aspects are of special importance in ascertaining the content of that rule.

  5. [5] Given the number of issues (and sub-issues) involved in the present judgment, it is helpful to set out a table of contents for reference:

  6. [6] A glossary of key terms and their abbreviations used in this judgment is also annexed after the end of this judgment.

  7. The factual background

  8. [7] The present appeals arise from the consolidated trial below of HC/S 1328/2014 and HC/S 1329/2014 (“the Suits”). The plaintiff in the Suits is Seraya Energy Pte Ltd (“Seraya”). It is a retailer of electricity and a wholly owned subsidiary of YTL PowerSeraya Pte Ltd (“YTL”), an electricity generator. Together, Seraya and YTL form what is known as a “gentailer”, which refers to the vertical integration of a generation company and its corresponding retailer chiefly for the purpose of mitigating the group’s exposure to price fluctuations. YTL is the third party to the counterclaims in the Suits.

  9. [8] The defendants in the Suits are Denka Advantech Pte Ltd (“DAPL”) and Denka Singapore Pte Ltd (“DSPL”). DAPL and DSPL are customers of Seraya. As many of the claims and arguments are common to both entities, we refer to the two defendants simply as “Denka” where it is not important to differentiate between them.

  10. [9] Seraya commenced the Suits against DAPL and DSPL, claiming Denka’s repudiatory breach of three electricity retail agreements (“ERAs”). Seraya claimed damages under the liquidated damages (“LD”) clause contained in each ERA, or common law damages in the alternative.

  11. [10] To understand the issues in contention, it is necessary to set out briefly the structure of the electricity market and the context in which the parties entered into the ERAs. As most of these facts are comprehensively set out in the decision of the High Court judge (“the Judge”) below, we detail only the facts that are essential to the appeals.

  12. The structure of the electricity market

  13. [11] All electricity in Singapore is bought and sold through the National Electricity Market of Singapore (“NEMS”). NEMS is regulated by the Energy Market Authority, which facilitates market transactions through the Energy Market Company Pte Ltd (“EMC”). The electricity market is divided into two sections: the wholesale market in which generation companies operate, and the retail market in which retailers operate.

  14. [12] In the wholesale market, electricity generators such as YTL are required to sell electricity to NEMS. Every half hour, generation companies submit bids to NEMS for the quantity and price of electricity they are able and willing to supply. Based on supply and demand, NEMS’s computer model generates a fixed price known as the Uniform Singapore Energy Price (“USEP”). The USEP represents the weighted average of all the nodal prices of nodes from which electricity is deemed to be withdrawn in that half hour. All bids that do not exceed the USEP are accepted, and generators whose bids are accepted will be called upon to supply electricity and are paid at the USEP.

  15. [13] In turn, NEMS sells electricity to energy retailers such as Seraya. The price of electricity sold to retailers is known as the Pool Price, which is derived, in the main, by adding an Hourly Energy Uplift Charge (“HEUC”) to the USEP.

  16. [14] In turn, energy retailers may only sell electricity to contestable consumers such as Denka. Contestable consumers are consumers with a high average electricity consumption of at least 2,000 kWh per month and are typically commercial or industrial entities.

  17. [15] If a contestable consumer does not wish to purchase electricity from a specific retailer, it may also purchase from the wholesale market, either from the Market Support Services Licensee (“MSSL”), ie, SP Services Ltd, at the Pool Price, or as a direct market customer registered with the EMC. Purchasing from one retailer, however, allows the parties to fix the price of electricity or peg the price to a different index, instead of being subject to fluctuations in the USEP and the Pool Price.

  18. [16] As between YTL, NEMS, Seraya and Denka, the pricing relationship between them is illustrated as follows:

  19. (Diagram 1 – Pricing relationship in the gentailer structure)

  20. [17] We pause to note Seraya’s submission that in a gentailer, it is common for parties to enter into a contract for differences to enable the group as a whole to mitigate its exposure to the fluctuations of the USEP and Pool Price. YTL and Seraya had a Contract for Differences dated 1 April 2012 (“the CFD”) under which YTL bore most of the risk from Seraya’s contracts with its customers. Should Seraya suffer losses from its contract price being lower than the Pool Price, the CFD provided for YTL to pay the difference to Seraya. Conversely, if Seraya made a profit from its contract price being higher than the Pool Price, Seraya would pay a portion of the excess of the contract price over the Pool Price to YTL. We return to this point later as it assumes some significance in analysing Seraya’s remedies for breach of contract.

  21. [18] With this context in mind, we turn to the specifics of the parties’ contractual relationships.

  22. The Steam Supply Agreement

  23. [19] Denka first became customers of Seraya in May 2005, although they did change electricity retailers from time to time. In 2012, DSPL also entered into a steam supply agreement dated 16 January 2012 (“the SSA”) with PowerSeraya Limited, who novated the contract to YTL with effect from 1 April 2012.

  24. [20] DSPL had two core obligations with regard to its purchase of steam under the SSA. These were:

  25. (a) to take or pay (“TOP”) a certain minimum volume of steam from YTL each month (“the TOP Volume”); and

  26. (b) to ensure that DSPL’s steam consumption for the duration of the contract did not:

  27. (i) fall below the Minimum Acceptable Flow Level (“Minimum Flow”) of 6.0 tonnes per hour; or

  28. (ii) exceed the Committed Capacity of 10.5 tonnes per hour (“Committed Capacity”), which was the maximum amount of steam that YTL was obliged to supply to DSPL on an hourly basis.

  29. [21] These obligations for the supply and consumption of steam were to take effect from the Commercial Operation Date under the SSA, which was initially scheduled for 1 February 2012 but was eventually delayed to 1 September 2012.

  30. [22] Sometime in June 2012, DSPL requested to reduce the amount of steam that it was obliged to buy under the SSA. It sought a reduction of the Minimum Flow and Committed Capacity, which in turn affected the TOP Volume. YTL agreed to discuss the request and this resulted in negotiations over July 2012.

  31. [23] By a letter dated 7 August 2012, YTL offered DSPL a concession of the original terms of the SSA (“the Concession Offer”) on the terms and conditions set out in the letter (“the Concession Terms”). The Concession Terms provided, inter alia, that:

  32. (a) the Committed Capacity and TOP Volume would be reduced;

  33. (b) that “DSPL shall execute or procure the execution of any ancillary supplemental agreement(s) prepared by [YTL] to record the parties’ agreement in respect of the Concession Terms as set out in this letter”; and

  34. (c) that “DSPL shall … execute an electricity retail agreement with [Seraya] on [Seraya’s] standard terms and conditions for the supply of electricity to all of DSPL’s premises in Singapore, for the period commencing from 1 September 2012 to 31 January 2021 …” [emphasis added].

  35. DSPL accepted the Concession Terms by counter-signing on the acceptance slip on 14 August 2012.

  36. [24] As it turned out, the ancillary supplemental agreement (“ASA”) referenced in the Concession Terms could not be finalised and executed by 1 September 2012 because the parties had yet to agree on the scope of modification works needed to accommodate the reduced steam supply. In an e-mail on 30 August 2012, YTL proposed to DSPL additional terms to the earlier Concession Offer (“Additional Concession Terms”), including that YTL would not be liable for any non-delivery of steam prior to the completion of any modification works on Denka’s end. DSPL accepted those additional terms.

  37. [25] The parties began implementing the SSA, as amended by the Concession Terms and the Additional Concession Terms, on 1 September 2012. YTL began supplying steam to DSPL pending agreement on the modification works to be done to DSPL’s premises.

  38. The Electricity Retail Agreements

  39. [26] Since YTL’s offer of the Concession Terms on 7 August 2012, Seraya had also been negotiating separately with Denka on the standard terms of the ERAs for the supply of electricity to all three of Denka’s plants in Singapore. Seraya began supplying electricity under the ERAs on 1 September 2012, although the ERAs were only signed between 4 September 2012 and 9 November 2012. In total, Denka and Seraya entered into three ERAs, as follows:

  40. (a) ERA 2012/099 between Seraya and DSPL, as later amended by a supplemental agreement dated 1 November 2013 (“ERA 99”);

  41. (b) ERA 2012/100 between Seraya and DSPL, which was later superseded by an updated agreement signed on or about 21 February 2014 (“ERA 100”) and which is the relevant agreement for present purposes; and

  42. (c) ERA 2012/101 between Seraya and DAPL, as later amended by a supplemental agreement dated 1 November 2013 (“ERA 101”).

  43. [27] The parties agreed that the pricing plan under the three ERAs would be based on a formula which took into account the prevailing High Sulphur Fuel Oil prices and Foreign Exchange rates. This was referred to in the ERAs as the Index Price Plan. Nevertheless, Denka also had the right to request Seraya to fix the price of electricity for a period of three years, at any point during the duration of the ERAs. As contemplated in the Concession Terms, the ERAs were for a duration of 101 months and were due to expire only on 31 January 2021.

  44. [28] Finally, as alluded to in our introduction, the ERAs each contained an LD clause. These LD clauses were tied, among other things, to Seraya’s express contractual right to terminate the ERAs under various scenarios, but most notably for any breach by Denka of its obligations under the ERAs. This point will assume central importance in our analysis of the enforceability of the LD clauses later in this judgment.

  45. Events leading to the termination of the ERAs

  46. [29] On 23 July 2014, representatives from YTL and Denka met. At that meeting, Denka’s General Manager, Ms Chia Miaw Ling (“Ms Chia”), mentioned that Denka wanted to “get out” of the ERAs as the price under the ERAs was significantly higher than the prevailing market conditions at the time. Denka had recently completed a round of steam testing and discovered that Denka’s steam usage across all three plants was close to 10.5 tonnes per hour. Accordingly, Ms Chia stated that Denka no longer required the steam reduction under the Concession Terms and desired to return to the original terms of the SSA, and at the same time cease the operation of the ERAs. Denka followed up on the meeting with an e-mail to YTL with presentation slides “outlining Denka’s effort to revert back to the original SSA T&C and hence redeem [themselves] from the electricity contract [ie, the ERAs]” [emphasis added].

  47. [30] Discussions continued between the parties, as evidenced by a proposal attached to an e-mail from YTL on 11 August 2014. YTL proposed that in exchange for an increase in the TOP Volume and Committed Capacity to 6.0 tonnes per hour and 10.5 tonnes per hour respectively (ie, the original TOP Volume and Committed Capacity envisioned under the SSA (see [20] above)), YTL would grant Denka certain reductions in the price of electricity under the ERAs. Denka indicated that it would consider this proposal.

  48. [31] On 20 August 2014, however, DSPL wrote to YTL stating that after some consideration, it was unable to take up YTL’s proposal. The letter went on to state:

  49. [32] YTL and Seraya regarded this letter as evidence of Denka’s intention to repudiate the ERAs. In relation to the SSA, YTL agreed to return to the original terms of the SSA, without amendment. But where the ERAs were concerned, YTL wrote back on 25 August 2014 to state that:

  50. (a) YTL regarded DSPL’s unilateral termination of the ERAs as a repudiatory breach of ERA 99 and ERA 100.

  51. (i) For ERA 99, YTL gave notice of the repudiation and requested DSPL to perform its obligations under ERA 99 within ten calendar days (failing which Seraya was entitled to terminate the contract immediately under cl 8.2.2 of ERA 99).

  52. (ii) For ERA 100, YTL accepted the repudiation and stated that it would transfer DSPL’s account to MSSL with effect from 2 September 2014.

  53. (b) As ERA 101 was between Seraya and DAPL, YTL sought written confirmation that DAPL likewise wished to cease its supply of electricity under the ERA.

  54. [33] On 28 August 2014, DSPL wrote back to YTL on behalf of the Denka companies, strongly denying any allegations of repudiation or other breaches of the ERAs. Denka stated that the Concession Offer was “subject to contract”, namely the execution of the ASA. Since the ASA was never signed, under the original terms of the SSA, Denka was only required to purchase steam and not electricity under the ERAs.

  55. [34] Further correspondence was exchanged between YTL, Denka and Seraya in the ensuing months. Eventually, each of the ERAs was terminated as follows:

  56. (a) ERA 100: By way of a letter dated 28 August 2014, Seraya accepted DSPL’s cessation of ERA 100 and indicated that the effective date of termination was 1 September 2014.

  57. (b) ERA 99: On 4 September 2014, Seraya wrote to DSPL and again gave notice to the latter to perform its obligations under ERA 99. DSPL was invited to reconsider its cessation of the contract, and to confirm its position by 11 September 2014. DSPL responded on 7 October 2014 to confirm its intention to cease performing both ERA 99 and ERA 101, and contended that it was only required to pay for electricity based on the open market rates charged by MSSL after 1 September 2014. ERA 99 was terminated by Seraya with effect from 15 October 2014.

  58. (c) ERA 101: Notwithstanding DSPL’s reply to YTL on DAPL’s behalf (see [33] above), Seraya wrote to DAPL on several occasions between 4 September 2014 and 13 October 2014 to further confirm DAPL’s position on whether it would cease performing its obligations under ERA 101. DAPL did not reply. Eventually, Seraya gave notice of termination of ERA 101 with effect from 14 November 2014.

  59. Seraya claimed LD under all three ERAs. For ERA 99 and ERA 101, Seraya additionally claimed payment for electricity supplied up to their respective dates of termination.

  60. [35] It also bears mentioning that in a letter dated 3 September 2014, Denka offered to continue purchasing electricity under the three ERAs while the dispute was being determined by the court (“the Mitigation Offer”). This was, as Denka added, “to protect [its] rights”. Seraya did not accept the Mitigation Offer.

  61. [36] On 19 December 2014, Seraya commenced the Suits against DAPL and DSPL for breaches of their respective ERAs and sought LD or common law damages in the alternative. YTL was joined as a third party to Denka’s counterclaims in the Suits. The Suits were eventually consolidated by consent of the parties.

  62. The parties’ cases below

  63. [37] Seraya argued that Denka was liable for breaching all three ERAs. Seraya’s primary claim against Denka was for LD due to the wrongful termination of the three ERAs. Alternatively, Seraya sought common law damages.

  64. [38] Denka denied liability for wrongful termination of the ERAs on several bases. It also advanced several counterclaims against Seraya and YTL. As against Seraya, Denka counterclaimed, inter alia, for (a) damages in respect of the extra electricity charges which Denka had to pay Seraya from the latter’s delay in transferring its accounts to MSSL after issuing its notice of termination; and (b) damages for the amounts which Seraya received by calling on the three bank guarantees that covered Denka’s obligations under the ERAs. As against YTL, Denka sought a declaration of non-liability under the three ERAs, or for YTL to indemnify and/or pay damages to Denka for breach of contract and/or fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation.

  65. [39] The question of liability turned on whether Denka was in breach of the ERAs. Denka advanced a number of arguments as to why its termination of the ERAs did not amount to a breach of contract. First, Denka argued that the ERAs contained no obligation for Denka to purchase a minimum volume of electricity from Seraya each month. Consequently, it was not obliged to purchase electricity from Seraya at all. Second, Denka submitted that its letter of 20 August 2014 stating that Denka did not wish to continue purchasing electricity under the three ERAs did not amount to either a termination or repudiation of the ERAs. Finally, Denka argued that the ERAs were not standalone contracts, but were entered into only in exchange for YTL’s grant of the steam concessions and entry into the ASA. The parties did not execute the ASA in the end and Denka was thus free to walk away from the ERAs as well (“the package deal argument”). Denka claimed misrepresentation and estoppel in respect of this last “package deal” argument. In the alternative, a term ought to be implied into the ERAs that the signing of the ERAs was contingent on the parties’ entry into the ASA, the failure of which would allow Denka to stop purchasing electricity under the ERAs.

  66. [40] On the issue of remedies, Denka argued that Seraya was not entitled to claim LD. Noting that the law in Singapore remained the test in Dunlop ([1] supra) but that the UK Supreme Court had adopted a new test for the Penalty Rule in Cavendish Square Holding ([1] supra), Denka submitted that on either test, the LD clauses in the ERAs would amount to penalties and were unenforceable. Seraya was also precluded from claiming common law damages under ERA 99 and ERA 101 because of express provisions therein stating that neither party would be liable for “any indirect or consequential loss … including any loss of profits”.

  67. [41] In any case, even if Seraya was entitled to either LD or common law damages, Denka contended that Seraya had a duty to mitigate its loss, which it had failed to do when it rejected Denka’s Mitigation Offer.

  68. The decision below

  69. [43] The Judge held in Seraya’s favour on the question of liability and found that Denka was in repudiatory breach of the ERAs. The Judge found – contrary to Denka’s submissions – that the ERAs imposed a positive obligation on Denka to buy electricity exclusively from Seraya notwithstanding that there was no minimum quantity specified in the contracts (see Seraya Energy (No 1) at [69]). The ERAs were clearly binding contracts and the parties had in fact proceeded on that basis (see Seraya Energy (No 1) at [73]–[74]).

  70. [44] The Judge dismissed the package deal argument run by Denka. While he accepted that the agreement to amend the SSA was subject to a condition subsequent, namely, the entry into the ASA, no such similar condition was attached to the ERAs (see Seraya Energy (No 1) at [92] and [100]). The Judge found that there was no representation made by YTL that Denka could pull out of the three ERAs if the ASA was not signed, and there was no basis to imply a term to that effect into the ERAs (see Seraya Energy (No 1) at [118]). Accordingly, DSPL’s 20 August 2014 letter constituted repudiatory conduct (see Seraya Energy (No 1) at [121]). Nonetheless, the Judge found that not all the three ERAs were terminated by Seraya’s acceptance of this repudiation. The Judge held that Seraya validly terminated the ERAs in the following ways:

  71. (a) For ERA 100, Seraya relied on its common law right of termination based on Denka’s repudiation (see Seraya Energy (No 1) at [132]);

  72. (b) For ERA 99, Seraya exercised its right to terminate pursuant to cl 8.2.2 for Denka’s failure to remedy its breach of the contract (ie, its repudiation) within ten days (see Seraya Energy (No 1) at [137]); and

  73. (c) For ERA 101, Seraya exercised its right to terminate the contract in November 2014 pursuant to cl 8.2.1 for Denka’s failure to make payment for electricity under an October 2014 invoice (see Seraya Energy (No 1) at [143]).

  74. Consequently, the contractual provisions for LD in each of the three ERAs were also engaged (see Seraya Energy (No 1) at [144]).

  75. [45] The question then turned to what remedies Seraya was entitled to. The Judge first concluded, in respect of the Mitigation Offer given by Denka to Seraya, that it was not a reasonable one and that Seraya had not acted unreasonably in rejecting it (see Seraya Energy (No 1) at [156]).

  76. [46] The Judge then considered that while Cavendish Square Holding ([1] supra) has been said to have reformulated the Penalty Rule in Dunlop ([1] supra), it did not do away completely with the principles contained in the latter case (see Seraya Energy (No 1) at [159] and [162]). As a matter of stare decisis in Singapore, he was nevertheless bound to apply the principles in Dunlop. On the basis of those principles, the Judge found that the LD clauses in each of the ERAs were not a genuine pre-estimate of Seraya’s damage (see Seraya Energy (No 1) at [194]). According to the Judge, the formula “was plucked from the air” and used “without distinguishing between the differences in each contract”. Thus, the LD clauses in each of the ERAs were unenforceable penalty clauses (see Seraya Energy (No 1) at [200]–[208]). Even under Cavendish Square Holding, Seraya had failed to plead any legitimate interest as a reason for requiring Denka to pay LD (see Seraya Energy (No 1) at [188], [190] and [192]). In any event, Seraya had failed to establish any legitimate interest on the facts. Seraya did not have any legitimate interest in Denka’s continued performance of the ERAs other than financial loss (see Seraya Energy (No 1) at [192]).

  77. [47] The Judge held that Seraya was not precluded by the relevant clauses in ERA 99 and ERA 101 (see [40] above) from claiming common law damages since that was a claim for loss of profits, which loss was a direct result within the reasonable contemplation of both sides (see Seraya Energy (No 1) at [213]–[214]). In computing the appropriate quantum of common law damages that ought to be awarded, the Judge proceeded on the following premises: (a) the CFD between YTL and Seraya was to be taken into account for the calculation of common law damages since Denka is liable to Seraya as it finds Seraya (see Seraya Energy (No 1) at [218]–[219]); (b) the benefit of accelerated payment (from Seraya’s call on the bank guarantees vis-à-vis Denka’s performance of the ERAs) was to be taken into account (see Seraya Energy (No 1) at [223]); and (c) Seraya’s expert’s figures for Denka’s future monthly electricity consumption, had the ERAs not been terminated, were to be used (see Seraya Energy (No 1) at [224]–[225]). Therefore, the Judge directed that parties attempt to agree, inter alia, on the quantum for Seraya’s loss of profit based on the above premises.

  78. [48] Subsequently, the Judge issued Seraya Energy (No 2), calculating the quantum of damages payable by taking into account (see Seraya Energy (No 2) at [2]–[5]):

  79. (a) Loss of profit for Seraya in the amount of $390,853 as agreed by the parties;

  80. (b) The unpaid amounts due and owing by Denka to Seraya for electricity supplied until the dates of termination was to be calculated at the contractual rate under the ERAs; and

  81. (c) The fact that Seraya had already received a total of $1.85m pursuant to a call on three bank guarantees on 22 December 2014.

  82. The issues

  83. [51] The parties’ arguments on the appeals and cross-appeals largely track those taken below and will be explored in greater detail when each issue is addressed below. In CA/CA 38/2019 (“CA 38”), Seraya appeals against two main issues on damages. First, whether the LD clauses under each of the ERAs are indeed penalties and are thus unenforceable. Second, even if the Judge was correct that the LD clauses are unenforceable penalties, whether the CFD between Seraya and YTL is to be taken into account in the assessment of common law damages for Seraya’s loss of profit.

  84. [53] In CA/CA 37/2019 (“CA 37”), Denka cross-appeals against the Judge’s decision on both liability and damages. On liability, Denka argues that it did not repudiate the ERAs. On damages, it argues that Seraya acted unreasonably in rejecting the Mitigation Offer and, even if the ERAs were repudiated by Denka, the quantum of damages payable to Seraya should not be pegged to the contractual rates in the ERAs and Seraya would not be entitled to statutory interest on those sums as well.

  85. [55] The appeals and cross-appeals engage a number of issues, which can be summarised as follows:

  86. (a) whether Denka breached the ERAs and is thus liable for wrongful termination of the same;

  87. (b) if Denka breached the ERAs, whether the LD clauses in the three ERAs are enforceable;

  88. (c) if the LD clauses are unenforceable because they are penalties, what common law damages are payable by Denka to Seraya;

  89. (d) whether Seraya was justified in rejecting Denka’s Mitigation Offer;

  90. (e) whether Denka was required to pay for the additional electricity supplied to it after 20 August 2014 at the higher contractual rate under the respective ERAs or at the open market rate;

  91. (f) Seraya’s entitlement to statutory interest on the damages awarded; and

  92. (g) the various issues relating to costs as between the parties.

  93. [56] As already alluded to at the outset of the present judgment, the first substantive issue (see [55(a)] above) is whether Denka has breached the contracts between the parties (hereafter referred to as “Issue 1”). Put simply, it deals with the issue of (contractual) liability as between the parties.

  94. [57] The second substantive issue arises only if Issue 1 has been decided in the affirmative, ie, that Denka had in fact breached the contract between the parties. As also alluded to at the outset of this judgment, this particular issue is remedial in nature (hereafter referred to as “Issue 2”). Issue 2 is, in turn, divided into Issue 2(a) (see [55(b)] above), Issue 2(b) (see [55(c)] above), Issue 2(c) (see [55(d)] above), Issue 2(d) (see [55(e)] above) and Issue 2(e) (see [55(f)] above). In this regard, the focus is on the Penalty Rule. Given the legal developments in other major Commonwealth jurisdictions as described briefly above, it is necessary to, inter alia, analyse those developments as well as clarify what the precise legal position is in the Singapore context.

  95. [59] Let us now turn to consider the applicable legal principles – beginning with the well-established principles on discharge by breach of contract before focusing on the Penalty Rule.

  96. Breach of contract

  97. [60] The applicable legal principles in so far as the law relating to discharge by breach of contract in Singapore are found in the decision of this court in RDC Concrete Pte Ltd v Sato Kogyo (S) Pte Ltd and another appeal [2007] 4 SLR(R) 413 (“RDC Concrete”). Before proceeding to set out a summary of the principles laid down in that case, it is important to note that those principles deal with the circumstances under which an innocent party to a breach of contract is entitled to elect to treat the contract concerned as discharged. Indeed, if it is not so entitled to elect and nevertheless does so, the innocent party would itself be in breach of contract. All this does not, however, detract from the fact that the innocent party is always entitled to claim damages at common law as of right if it can establish that the other party has in fact been in breach of the contract concerned. Such a claim to damages will, of course, be subject to the relevant legal limitations such as adducing sufficient evidence of damage to begin with (see, for example, the decisions of this court in Robertson Quay Investment Pte Ltd v Steen Consultants Pte Ltd and another [2008] 2 SLR(R) 623 (“Robertson Quay”) and Biofuel Industries Pte Ltd v V8 Environmental Pte Ltd and another appeal [2018] 2 SLR 199 (“Biofuel Industries”)) as well as the doctrines of remoteness of damage (see, in particular, the decisions of this court in MFM Restaurants Pte Ltd and another v Fish & Co Restaurants Pte Ltd and another appeal [2011] 1 SLR 150 and Out of the Box Pte Ltd v Wanin Industries Pte Ltd [2013] 2 SLR 363) and mitigation of damage. Indeed, this last-mentioned doctrine (ie, mitigation of damage) does figure in the present appeal as well.

  98. [61] Returning to the issue as to whether or not the innocent party is entitled to elect to treat itself as discharged from the contract, as already mentioned, the relevant statement of principles is set out in RDC Concrete, where this court discussed (at [90]−[113]) the various tests (viz, the “condition-warranty approach” and the “Hongkong Fir approach”) as well as how they are to be applied, summarising the legal position in tabular/diagrammatic form (at [113]). In the subsequent decision (also of this court) in Man Financial (S) Pte Ltd (formerly known as E D & F Man International (S) Pte Ltd) v Wong Bark Chuan David [2008] 1 SLR(R) 663, a similar summary in non-tabular/diagrammatic form (at [153]−[158]) was provided, as follows:

  99. [62] Before we turn to consider the applicable legal principles in relation to the Penalty Rule, an important point of legal interface should be noted here – the (further (and possible)) relevance of the principles laid down in RDC Concrete in relation to the Penalty Rule will be contingent upon this court’s determination of the scope of the Penalty Rule. This includes a consideration of whether the Penalty Rule applies to situations regardless of a breach of contract (which is the current Australian position, but not that in the UK). If that is the case, then the determination of the court that there was a breach of contract will be relevant only with regard to the (potential) right of the plaintiff to elect to treat the contract as discharged as well as the right to claim damages at common law but will have no bearing on the operation of the Penalty Rule. Conversely, if this court determines that the scope of the Penalty Rule is narrower and is triggered only if there is a breach of contract, then the principles relating to discharge by breach of contract as summarised above are also relevant in the context of the operation of the Penalty Rule – although it is important not to conflate both these areas of the law of contract, each of which has its respective sphere of operation as well as attendant legal consequences (a point to which we shall return below).

  100. [63] Finally, it bears noting that in so far as Situation 1 of RDC Concrete is concerned, “its basis is founded on giving effect to the parties’ intention by way of a termination clause that may not necessarily involve a breach of contract but nevertheless has the legal effect (in substance) of a condition (pursuant to the condition-warranty approach)” [emphasis in italics in original; emphasis added in bold italics] (see this court’s decision in Sports Connection Pte Ltd v Deuter Sports GmbH [2009] 3 SLR(R) 883 (“Sports Connection”) at [53]; see also this court’s decision in Fu Yuan Foodstuff Manufacturer Pte Ltd v Methodist Welfare Services [2009] 3 SLR(R) 925 at [33]). Leaving aside for the moment the possible ramifications (or perhaps potential complications) from a remedial perspective, the issue as to whether or not a contract was terminated pursuant to Situation 1 of RDC Concrete might become relevant (indeed, crucially relevant) if this court decides – contrary to the approach taken in Andrews ([1] supra) (and consistently with the approach taken in Cavendish Square Holding ([1] supra)) – that a breach of contract is indeed a prerequisite before the Penalty Rule applies.

  101. The Penalty Rule

  102. Recent developments in the Penalty Rule

  103. [64] We turn now to consider the applicable legal principles in relation to the Penalty Rule. As already mentioned, because those principles have been in a relative state of flux across the Commonwealth (especially due to developments in the apex courts of Australia and the UK), the task of this court is to consider these developments before deciding what the position in Singapore should be. To situate the discussion that follows, it is helpful to first outline, in very broad strokes, the recent developments surrounding the Penalty Rule.

  104. [65] We begin with the 1914 case of Dunlop ([1] supra), which until recently was the seminal case on the Penalty Rule in the common law universe. There, the House of Lords was concerned with the LD payable on the respondents’ breach of contract. The House of Lords held that the clause was a valid and enforceable LD clause. In Lord Dunedin’s words, “the essence of liquidated damages is a genuine covenanted pre-estimate of damage” whereas “[t]he essence of a penalty is a payment of money stipulated as [in terrorem] of the offending party” (see Dunlop at 86). Whether a sum stipulated is a penalty or LD is a question of construction to be decided upon the terms and circumstances of each particular contract, judged at the time of the making of the contract. In this regard, the expressions used by the parties are indicative but inconclusive (see Dunlop at 86–87).

  105. [66] To assist the court’s construction of the contract, Lord Dunedin posited four principles, which became the leading statement of the law on penalties for most of the last century: (a) that the provision would be penal if the sum stipulated for is extravagant and unconscionable in comparison with the greatest loss that could conceivably be proved to have followed from the breach; (b) that the provision would be penal if the breach consisted only in the non-payment of money and it provided for the payment of a larger sum; (c) that there was a rebuttable presumption that the provision would be penal if the sum stipulated for was payable on a number of events of varying gravity; and (d) that the provision would not be penal because of the impossibility of precise pre-estimation in the circumstances of the true loss (see generally Dunlop at 87−88). We will return to these principles in greater detail when discussing the criteria applicable to the Penalty Rule below.

  106. [67] Then came the decision of the High Court of Australia in Andrews ([1] supra) in 2012. In a radical departure from the position in Dunlop, the court held that the Penalty Rule’s scope of application was not limited to clauses purporting to take effect only upon a breach of contract (see Andrews at [46]). This was premised on the court’s survey of the historical development of the Penalty Rule, and its conclusion that it is a rule of equity rather than the law. In doing so, the court made two key observations. First, equitable relief against penalties, which first arose in cases involving conditional defeasible bonds, was available in respect of payments and detriments activated by various events, and relief was not limited to obligations activated by breach of contractual duty (see Andrews at [45]). Second, the equitable jurisdiction had not been supplanted by the introduction of the Judicature system (see Andrews at [61]–[63]).

  107. [68] The High Court of Australia defined a penalty in this way (see Andrews at [10]):

  108. The crux of this formulation is that a penalty is a collateral or accessory stipulation to a primary stipulation, which imposes an additional detriment on one party upon the failure of the primary stipulation. Importantly, this primary stipulation may, but need not necessarily, amount to a contractual obligation that is breached upon the promisor’s failure to perform.

  109. [69] The next major development was the UK Supreme Court’s decision in Cavendish Square Holding ([1] supra) in 2015. In that case, having undertaken their own historical analysis of the penalties doctrine, the court parted ways with Andrews and maintained that the scope of the Penalty Rule in English law was limited to situations involving a breach of contract (see Cavendish Square Holding at [41]–[43]). But where the substantive test as to what constituted a penalty was concerned, the court expressed dissatisfaction inasmuch as the real inquiry had, in their view, become lost in a mechanical application of Lord Dunedin’s principles in Dunlop (at [31]):

  110. [70] Moving away from Lord Dunedin’s principles in Dunlop ([1] supra), Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury and Lord Sumption in their leading judgment reformulated the Penalty Rule in this way (at [32]):

  111. Although their Lordships presented this new formulation as a restatement of the principles on penalties in Dunlop, it did not escape academic attention that the decision had fundamentally reformulated the substantive test for the Penalty Rule in English law (see, for example, Halson at para 2.38).

  112. [71] The next year, the High Court of Australia again had occasion to consider the Penalty Rule, although its focus this time around was on the substantive criteria rather than the scope of the rule. In Paciocco and another v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2016) 258 CLR 525 (“Paciocco”), which arose out of the same set of facts as Andrews ([1] supra) (the court having earlier remitted the case to the lower court after addressing the scope of the penalties jurisdiction), the High Court agreed in substance with the “legitimate interest” formulation of the Penalty Rule in Cavendish Square Holding, adopting it as the new test for penalties in Australia (see [122]–[123] below).

  113. [72] Having traced, at a general level, the developments surrounding the Penalty Rule, we turn now to examine its scope and the applicable criteria in more detail.

  114. The scope of the Penalty Rule

  115. [73] The first key issue for our consideration is the proper scope of application of the Penalty Rule. In particular, the question is this: should the Penalty Rule be confined only to clauses that impose obligations upon one party’s breach of contract? To answer this, we must begin – as both Andrews and Cavendish Square Holding ([1] supra) did – with an appreciation of the historical roots of the penalty jurisdiction.

  116. (1) The extension of the rule in Andrews

  117. [74] As a matter of historical fact, it is clear that the Penalty Rule originated in equity and that, as originally conceived, it was a rule that granted relief from the strict enforcement of penal bonds (a point accepted by both Andrews and Cavendish Square Holding). That very specific historical point of origin constitutes the basis for the decision in Andrews that the Penalty Rule was not – and (more importantly) ought not – to be confined to situations relating to breach of contract. A leading historical essay in this regard is by Prof Simpson (see A W B Simpson, “The Penal Bond with Conditional Defeasance” (1966) 82 LQR 392 (“Simpson”)), which is referred to in both Andrews and Cavendish Square Holding (other interesting historical accounts include William H Loyd, “Penalties and Forfeitures” (1915) 29 Harv L Rev 117 (“Loyd”) and Joseph Biancalana, “Contractual Penalties in the King’s Court 1260−1360” [2005] CLJ 212; reference may also be made, most recently, to ch 2 of Tiverios). What should be noted, though, is that Prof Simpson also observes that the penal bond “has long since ceased to be the normal business practice” (see Simpson at 393). Indeed, this learned essay attempts, inter alia, “to give some explanation of the decline in the bond as a contractual institution, and … [to] say something of the relationship between this decline and the rise of the action of assumpsit” [emphasis added] (see Simpson at 393). As the learned author observes, it was, in fact, “the evolution of the modern rules governing penalties [that] led to a decline in the use of bonds” (see Simpson at 412; see also at 415). We will return to this point in a moment (see below at [86]).

  118. [75] A brief explanation of the historical use of conditional bonds may be necessary for context. The conditional bond was a written instrument which recorded one party’s unilateral promise to do something by a set date, unless an accompanying condition was satisfied. An example in Prof Simpson’s article best illustrates the operation of the conditional bond (see Simpson at 395):

  119. [77] By way of the Statutes of William and Anne adopted around the turn of the 18th century (see the Administration of Justice Act 1696 (8 & 9 Will 3 c 11) (UK) and the Administration of Justice Act 1705 (4 & 5 Anne c 16) (UK)), the common law also came to adopt equity’s approach of granting relief from penal bonds. As a result, it became unnecessary for litigants to proceed first to the Court of Chancery for relief from the penalty and then to the common law courts for assessment of the true loss suffered (see also Andrews ([1] supra) at [53]–[54]). From then on, the development of the Penalty Rule took place almost entirely at common law. Eventually, the common law came to develop the notion that the Penalty Rule was a rule relating to remedies, beginning in all likelihood with the unreported decision of Elsey & Co Ltd v Hyde (9 June 1926, Divisional Court) (UK), where Salter J opined that the question of whether a stipulation was a penalty only arose “in cases where the person who is to pay has broken a contract with the other or done something which entitles the other to damages against him” [emphasis added]. It is said that that proposition was wrong, and that the introduction of the breach of contract requirement into the Penalty Rule was an accident of history (see Tiverios at p 57; J D Heydon, M J Leeming & P G Turner, Meagher, Gummow & Lehane’s Equity: Doctrines & Remedies (LexisNexis, 5th Ed, 2015) at pp 554–555). Regardless of how it came to be, the notion that the Penalty Rule is a rule to prevent the imposition of a payment disproportionate to the amount of loss suffered upon contractual breach has since persisted in the case law (see, for example, the judgment of Lord Roskill in the House of Lords decision of Export Credits Guarantee Department v Universal Oil Products Co and others [1983] 1 WLR 399 at 402–403).

  120. [78] It will be seen that the explanation at [76] above of the early Penalty Rule in equity is very close to the manner in which the High Court of Australia explained the scope of the rule that was ultimately adopted in Andrews. In that case, the court reached its decision on the scope of the Penalty Rule by reasoning from two interlinking premises. First, referring to the structure of the conditional bond, the court emphasised that the equitable rule that gave relief from such bonds did not depend on a breach of obligation. Although the purpose of the bond was obviously to secure the performance of the condition, the real promise extracted from the obligor was to pay the penalty, unless the stated condition was fulfilled (see Andrews at [36]–[37]). Non-fulfilment of the condition was not itself a breach of any obligation; the condition could easily be an event independent of any act or omission by the obligor (see Andrews at [39]).

  121. [79] Building on this historical premise, the second strand of reasoning in Andrews was that the jurisdiction to grant relief from penal collateral stipulations even in modern times remained the (wider) equitable jurisdiction. The development of the Penalty Rule at law in the last century did not supplant the equitable jurisdiction; neither did the fusion of law and equity through the Judicature system affect the existence of separate equitable doctrines. In sum, in Australia at least, the equitable rule remains available even where the situations engaging the impugned clause did not involve a breach of contract. In line with equity’s response to penalty clauses, if the clause is indeed found to be a penalty, the court will enforce the clause, but only to the extent that compensation can be made for the non-fulfilment of the primary stipulation (see Andrews at [10], excerpted at [68] above; see also Andrews at [11], citing Peachy v Duke of Somerset ([76] supra)).

  122. [80] Both strands of reasoning in Andrews were heavily criticised by the UK Supreme Court in Cavendish Square Holding ([1] supra). Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption, though agreeing with the shape in which the Penalty Rule had developed over centuries, disagreed with the premises and conclusion reached in Andrews, stating as follows (see Cavendish Square Holding at [42]):

  123. [81] Whilst historical fact and context are often important in legal analysis, their role in respect of the legislative sphere on the one hand and case law on the other are quite different. Because the former concerns specific legislative text, the historical materials are often (albeit not invariably) of substantial assistance. The development of case law, on the other hand, is somewhat different. Whilst the courts ought not to be “mini-legislatures”, their remit in relation to the development of the rules and principles of common law and equity is quite flexible – provided that such development is premised upon sound logic, doctrine and (in limited circumstances) policy. And this is the approach that we adopt, particularly in the light of the different historical approaches that have hitherto been considered. That the High Court of Australia in Andrews ([1] supra) on the one hand, and the UK Supreme Court in Cavendish Square Holding on the other, adopted quite different historical approaches was remarked upon by James Allsop CJ in an extra-judicial lecture (see James Allsop, “The Doctrine of Penalties in Modern Contract Law” (2018) 30 SAcLJ 1 (“Allsop”) at 3−13). And there is much to be said for the following (and very perceptive) observations by Allsop CJ (see Allsop at 13):

  124. [82] Returning to Andrews, the court had held that the Penalty Rule, which was a rule of equity, ought not be limited to situations of breach as the latter requirement only developed at law (this is now the established legal position in Australia (see, for example, the High Court of Australia decision of Paciocco ([71] supra) and the New South Wales Court of Appeal decision of Arab Bank Australia Ltd v Sayde Developments Pty Ltd (2016) 93 NSWLR 231)). Instead, the Penalty Rule would cover any collateral or accessorial obligation meant to secure the performance of a primary obligation (see Andrews at [10]). The removal of the breach requirement appears attractive at first blush. With respect, however, whilst the Penalty Rule originally developed in the context of equity, it was developed in relation to a very specific situation (viz, that relating to the enforcement of penal bonds). Why then, as Andrews appears to suggest, should the Penalty Rule in equity, in the form as developed in the penal bonds cases, apply in the same manner to all modern contracts, in the absence of sound reasons that would undergird such an extension (cf also Sarah Worthington, “The Death of Penalties in Two Legal Cultures?” in The UK Supreme Court Yearbook 2015–2016 vol 7 (Daniel Clarry ed) (Appellate Press, 2016) (“Worthington”) at pp 136–137)? On the contrary, any extension of the Penalty Rule in the manner just described would vest in the courts a discretion that is at once both wide as well as uncertain. Just as importantly, such a discretion would permit the courts to review a wide range of clauses on substantive (and not merely procedural) grounds, thus constituting a general, uncertain and significant legal incursion into the freedom of contract that hitherto existed between the parties concerned. We would respectfully endorse the concern of Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption that the approach taken in Andrews “[transforms] a rule for controlling remedies for breach of contract into a jurisdiction to review the content of the substantive obligations which the parties have agreed” (see Cavendish Square Holding at [42]). Given that freedom of contract is the rule rather than the exception in the context of the law of contract, this would – in and of itself – be an insuperable objection to such an extension of the Penalty Rule. And it certainly could not be argued that such a discretion is sound because it is one that originates in equity for that would, with respect, be a circular argument.

  125. [83] As a learned commentator has perceptively observed, the court in Andrews did not, in fact, go further and canvass the broader grounds of principle and policy both for as well as against the extension of the Penalty Rule from its historical origins as a legal control mechanism in the enforcement of penal bonds to the much broader application to contracts generally (see Sirko Harder, “The Scope of the Rule Against Contractual Penalties: A New Divergence” in Divergences in Private Law (Andrew Robertson & Michael Tilbury eds) (Hart Publishing, 2016) ch 8 at pp 140–141; see also Anthony Gray, “Contractual Penalties in Australian Law After Andrews: An Opportunity Missed” (2013) 18 Deakin LR 1 (“Gray”) at 17). Indeed, this line of argument has been developed very fully by five leading contract scholars in a joint article (see J W Carter, Wayne Courtney, Elisabeth Peden, Andrew Stewart and G J Tolhurst, “Contractual Penalties: Resurrecting the Equitable Jurisdiction” (2013) 30 JCL 99 (“Carter et al”)). They are of the view that the court in Andrews “treats the penal bond cases as shaping the modern law of contract” and has, in the process, ignored “well over 100 years of case law” (at 104 and 105). The learned authors observe thus (at 109):

  126. [84] And later on in the same article, the learned authors observe thus (see Carter et al at 131):

  127. [85] It might be argued, however, that the argument just set out takes as its starting point the law of contract, which is a common law doctrine. Whilst the law of contract is not, strictly speaking, a common law doctrine only, even if we assume for the sake of argument that that is the case, this raises the related (yet no less important) question as to whether or not it was within the power of the courts at common law to develop the Penalty Rule along the lines of contractual breach – an issue to which our attention now turns. Before proceeding to do so, we should note that the authors of the article presently considered also emphasise the fact that the approach in Andrews ([1] supra) did not furnish an adequate and contemporary justification for adhering to a set of rules that had their origin in penal bonds. In their words (see Carter et al at 132):

  128. [86] Although the decision in Andrews has also had its academic defenders, the arguments in this particular regard have, with respect, been pitched at a rather general level of abstraction (see, for example, Nicholas A Tiverios, “Doctrinal Approaches to the Law of Penalties: A Post-Andrews Intention-based Defence of Relief against Fixed Contractual Penalties” in Contract in Commercial Law (Simone Degeling, James Edelman & James Goudkamp eds) (Lawbook Co, 2016) ch 20; (for an article that in fact pre-dated Andrews and which relied similarly on the specific historical context, see William Newland, “Equitable Relief Against Penalties” (2011) 85 ALJ 434)). They do not address directly the argument that, in extending the Penalty Rule along equitable lines, the court in Andrews did not give specific reasons in principle and policy as to why that extension was justified. Instead, we are brought back, full circle, to the counter-argument that the courts ought not to have developed the Penalty Rule along the lines of the common law (specifically in the context of the law of contract). However, such a counter-argument merely repeats what needs to be justified and, in particular, does not really address the need for sound justification(s) rooted in principle and (where applicable) policy (see [81] above). This is even more needful given that the original equitable jurisdiction (in relation to penal bonds) was not only a very specific one, but had (as we noted at [74] above) already declined, particularly in the light of the development of the Penalty Rule as we know it today.

  129. [87] Before turning to the common law in general and the development of the Penalty Rule thereunder in particular, we pause to consider what is probably the most systematic and powerful scholarly defence of the approach adopted in Andrews to date. It is to be found in Tiverios (at ch 3), where the learned author raises three main reasons as to why the approach in Andrews is to be preferred.

  130. [88] The first main reason proffered by the learned author is that Andrews has a firm historical basis. We have already dealt with this point in some detail above, addressing not only the inadequacy of a purely historical analysis as a foundation for modern doctrine, but also the fact that arguments of principle and policy that could have justified the extension of the scope of the Penalty Rule were not canvassed in Andrews itself. On the contrary, there were, in fact, specific arguments of both principle as well as policy that militated against the approach adopted in Andrews (see [82]−[85] above).

  131. [89] The second main reason proffered by the learned author is that the approach adopted in Cavendish Square Holding ([1] supra) was not developed from appropriate legal principle and that the introduction of the breach requirement into the Penalty Rule was “an accident of history” (at p 57). That, again, relates to the issue of historical analysis and, regardless of whether the first cases to articulate a requirement of breach in the Penalty Rule at law had done so on a misunderstanding of history, the more important question remains whether the breach requirement as subsequently entrenched in common law can in fact be justified on principle and policy − a question which we have answered in the affirmative (see further [92]–[93] below).

  132. [90] The third main reason proffered by the learned author justifies the approach in Andrews ([1] supra) on a few bases: that it creates a counter-factual test which can be used to determine whether or not the impugned clause is punitive, and “imposes a principled wider area of operation pursuant to which a court can limit consent-based contractual punishments” while ensuring that the Penalty Rule “no longer benefits only those who have first committed a breach of contract” (see Tiverios at p 84). These sub-arguments are, with respect, not persuasive. As we will explain, the statement of principles set out by Lord Dunedin in Dunlop furnishes sufficient legal guidance for determining whether a given clause is a penalty. The wider reach of the Penalty Rule does in fact (as we have observed above at [82]) vest in the courts a discretion that is at once both wide as well as uncertain and which would lead to interference with clauses based on substantive (as opposed to merely procedural) grounds. And, apart from our view that the prerequisite of a breach of contract can indeed be justified on principle and policy, the Penalty Rule does not exist to benefit wrongdoers (cf Lord Denning in Bridge v Campbell Discount Co Ltd [1962] AC 600 (“Bridge”) at 629). The mischief that the Penalty Rule ultimately seeks to prevent is the imposition of a remedy that is clearly disproportionate to the loss suffered as a result of the breach. Put another way, the purpose of the Penalty Rule is simply to avoid unfairness to the defaulting party when apportioning the extent of their contractual liability. We continue this analysis below.

  133. (2) Justifications for the requirement of breach

  134. [92] At this juncture, it is important to emphasise that while we have not seen any persuasive reason in logic and principle as to why the Penalty Rule should operate regardless of whether there was a breach of contract, there are (in contradistinction) persuasive reasons in logic and principle as to why the prerequisite of a breach of contract is to be preferred. In essence, the concept of a breach of contract means that the Penalty Rule is confined to the sphere of secondary obligations only – specifically, the obligation on the part of the defendant to pay damages to the plaintiff. In this regard, primary obligations between the contracting parties are not interfered with at all, unlike in the broader equitable jurisdiction mooted in Andrews. This distinction between primary and secondary obligations is vital to the way our modern contract law has developed. In Cavendish Square Holding, it was observed thus (at [13]):

  135. [93] The prerequisite of a breach of contract, apart from being a practically enforceable limit on the penalties doctrine, is also normatively sensible given a common law court’s reluctance to intervene in the contents of the parties’ contractual bargain. Although it is said that a clause stipulating remedies for breach of contract is as much a part of the parties’ bargain as other obligations (see Tiverios at p 81), the greater judicial intervention in this area is justified on the basis that secondary obligations, which are traditionally imposed by operation of law, are the province of the courts. To the extent that the parties’ agreed remedies are intended only as a convenient substitute for the court’s determination of the appropriate extent of compensation, such clauses are necessarily subject to judicial scrutiny. Further, the broad policy underlying an award of contractual remedies must always be to compensate, and not to punish; this creates another limit on the parties’ freedom to agree on their remedial obligations.

  136. [94] These ideas were succinctly summarised by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in 127 Hobson Street Ltd v Honey Bees Preschool Ltd [2019] 2 NZLR 790 (“Honey Bees (NZCA)”), where in upholding the requirement for a breach of contract, the court reasoned as follows (at [40]):

  137. The decision of the New Zealand Supreme Court in 127 Hobson Street Ltd v Honey Bees Preschool Ltd (2020) 20 NZCPR 840 (“Honey Bees (NZSC)”) at [56] has since confirmed that in New Zealand, the Penalty Rule only applies to clauses stipulating consequences for a breach of contract.

  138. [95] We acknowledge that the threshold of a breach of contract may be thought of as being too easy to circumvent by clever drafting (see in this regard, similar acknowledgement in Cavendish Square Holding ([1] supra) at [14]–[15] and [43]). In our view, this does not justify removing the prerequisite of breach altogether, given our conception of the Penalty Rule as a doctrine to regulate party autonomy in the sphere of remedial obligations. The problem of drafting is dealt with in the way that courts have always dealt with problems of construction – by prioritising substance over form, bearing in mind all the circumstances of the case in line with the contextual approach to contractual interpretation (see, in particular, this court’s recent observations in Leiman, Ricardo and another v Noble Resources Ltd and another [2020] 2 SLR 386 (“Ricardo Leiman”) at [99]–[101]).

  139. [96] Seen in this light, an argument to the effect that the prerequisite of a breach of contract constitutes an “arbitrary” limit (see Tiverios at p 73) is, with respect, not persuasive. The distinction between primary and secondary obligations in the Penalty Rule’s scope of operation also has a crucial effect on another important issue which we deal with in the next part of this judgment – what legal criteria ought to be applicable in guiding the courts in applying the Penalty Rule.

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