Court of Appeal · Decided 26 March 2020
Mohammad Farid bin Batra v Public Prosecutor and another appeal and other matter s
Feedback & support[2020] SGCA 19 · Case no. Criminal Appeal No 17 of 2016
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Introduction
- [1]
[1] The appellants are Mohammad Farid bin Batra (“Farid”), a 47-year-old male Singaporean, and Ranjit Singh Gill Manjeet Singh (“Ranjit”), a 46-year-old male Malaysian. They were found guilty and convicted of trafficking in not less than 35.21g of diamorphine (ie, heroin) in 2016 after a joint trial before a High Court Judge (“the Judge”), an offence which carries the death sentence.
- [2]
[2] The Judge found that Ranjit was a courier within the meaning of s 33B(2) of the Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed) (“MDA”). As the Public Prosecutor had issued a certificate of substantive assistance to Ranjit, the Judge exercised her discretion not to impose the death penalty and sentenced Ranjit instead to life imprisonment and the mandatory 15 strokes of the cane. The Judge held that Farid was not a mere courier. In any event, Farid did not receive a certificate of substantive assistance from the Public Prosecutor. Accordingly, the Judge imposed the mandatory death sentence on him.
- [3]
[3] Criminal Appeal No 17 of 2016 (“CCA 17/2016”) and Criminal Appeal No 19 of 2016 (“CCA 19/2016”) are, respectively, Farid’s and Ranjit’s appeals against conviction and sentence. Farid is appealing against his conviction on the ground that he did not have the intention of trafficking the drugs. For his appeal against sentence, he contended that the Judge was wrong to find that he was not a courier. Ranjit’s argument on appeal was that he had no knowledge of the nature of the drugs that were in his possession. Ranjit also made several complaints against his former defence counsel alleging that they had not conducted his defence at trial according to his instructions and thereby deprived him of the opportunity to put across his intended defence. This allegation was the subject of a criminal motion before us to adduce further evidence which we discuss subsequently in this judgment.
Background
Facts of the arrest
- [5]
[5] The factual background was set out in a Statement of Agreed Facts. On 6 February 2014, at about 6.10pm, a party of officers from the Central Narcotics Bureau (“CNB”) was despatched to conduct surveillance in the vicinity of Choa Chu Kang Way on Farid who was expected to be using a car bearing registration number SJK 5768J (“the Car”). The CNB officers were also told to look out for a Malaysian-registered bus which was suspected to be carrying a consignment of drugs.
- [6]
[6] At about 8.35pm, a Malaysian-registered bus bearing registration number JHD 5635 (“the Bus”) was seen parked beside the multi-storey car park at Block 610A, Choa Chu Kang Way.
- [7]
[7] At about 9.20pm, the Car, whose driver was later identified as Farid, was seen travelling along Choa Chu Kang Way and making a U-turn. Shortly thereafter, the Car stopped in front of the Bus. A male Indian, later identified as Ranjit, alighted from the Bus. Ranjit was observed to be carrying a white plastic bag in one hand. Ranjit walked towards the Car. Through the open window at the front passenger side of the Car, Ranjit placed the said plastic bag on the front passenger seat. Farid then passed Ranjit a red and yellow package. Ranjit walked back to the Bus and boarded it. Thereafter, both of them went their separate ways in their respective vehicles.
- [8]
[8] The Car and the Bus were followed separately by two groups of CNB officers. At about 9.25pm, the CNB officers intercepted the Car at the slip road of Choa Chu Kang North 6 and Choa Chu Kang Drive, beside Yew Tee MRT station and placed Farid under arrest. At about 10.10pm, the CNB officers intercepted the Bus along Seletar Expressway and arrested Ranjit. Inside the Bus, the CNB officers found two envelopes under the driver’s seat containing $4,050 and $1,470 in cash.
- [9]
[9] Inside the Car, a white and black plastic bag with the word “ROBINSONS” was recovered (“the Robinsons Bag”). The Robinsons Bag contained a blue plastic bag containing another blue plastic bag containing three bundles wrapped in newspapers. One of the bundles contained one plastic packet containing a brownish granular/powdery substance. The other two bundles each contained two plastic packets containing a brownish granular/powdery substance. In total therefore, there were five such plastic packets.
- [10]
[10] The five plastic packets containing the brownish granular/powdery substance were sent to the Health Sciences Authority (“HSA”) for analysis. The HSA found that the five packets collectively contained not less than 1,359.9g of granular/powdery substances which contained not less than 35.21g of diamorphine (“the drugs”).
- [11]
[11] After Farid’s arrest, the CNB officers recorded his statement and then escorted him to his flat in Choa Chu Kang Street 52 which was his residential address on record. They did not find anything incriminating in his flat. Upon further questioning about whether there was anything else in Farid’s unit at the Regent Grove Condominium (“the Unit”), Farid answered in English “Got balance. About half.” This was recorded by a CNB officer. Farid was then escorted to the Unit. The CNB officers entered the Unit using the combination lock number given by Farid and his keys. Inside the Unit, Farid told the CNB officers where he kept the “balance” packet. Among other things, numerous empty plastic packets, two electronic weighing scales and a total of $13,888 in cash were found and seized.
The charges
- [12]
[12] Farid faced three charges under the MDA. The Prosecution stood down two of the charges at the start of the trial in the High Court and proceeded with the first charge, which was a capital charge. The first charge under s 5(1)(a) read with s 5(2) of the MDA was as follows:
- [13]
[13] Ranjit faced one charge under s 5(1)(a) of the MDA. His charge reads as follows:
Statements by Farid and Ranjit
- [14]
[14] The CNB recorded the following statements from Farid:
(a) Three contemporaneous statements on the night of the arrest. They were marked Exhibits P122 , P123 and P124 ;
(b) One cautioned statement recorded on 7 February 2014 which was marked as Exhibit P125 ; and
(c) Five long statements recorded between 9 and 14 February 2014. These were marked Exhibits P128 , P129 , P131 , P132 and P133.
- [15]
[15] The pertinent portions of Farid’s statements can be summarised as follows:
(a) Farid knew the Robinsons Bag contained heroin but he did not know its quantity. He had collected it on the instructions of a person known to him as “Abang”.
(b) Farid had been working for Abang for about two weeks prior to his arrest. In those two weeks, he had collected three drug consignments, inclusive of the consignment on the day of his arrest (the Robinsons Bag). He would be paid a salary of $300 per pound of heroin that he helped to repack and/or deliver. However, he had not received any payments from Abang at the time of his arrest because he had not discussed payment terms with Abang yet.
(c) Farid admitted that the empty plastic packets and two electronic weighing scales found in the Unit belonged to him and were used by him to weigh and pack the heroin that he collected on Abang’s instructions. With one of the weighing scales found in the Unit, Farid would weigh the heroin so as to pack it into half or one-pound orders. With the other weighing scale, he would weigh the heroin so as to pack it into small packets of 7.7-7.9g. Prior to his arrest, he had received two consignments of drugs from Abang.
(d) Farid elaborated that on 4 February 2014, he received two pounds of heroin from a Chinese woman. On 5 February 2014, Abang contacted him and instructed him to pack the heroin into one one-pound packet and two half-pound packets. After doing so, he received instructions from Abang to pass one half-pound packet and one one-pound packet to his customers at Yio Chu Kang Stadium and at Bedok Stadium respectively. After he made those deliveries, Abang telephoned him and asked him to collect and to find buyers for a consignment of “Air Batu” (which was methamphetamine) as the original customer was uncontactable. Farid agreed. Farid then collected the Air Batu from the same Chinese woman. The Air Batu was in a red and yellow plastic packet. However, Farid was unable to find any buyers for the Air Batu and he informed Abang about this.
(e) On 5 February 2014, on the same evening that Farid received the call regarding the Air Batu above, Abang called Farid to inform him that a consignment of heroin would be coming in the next day, 6 February 2014, and asked Farid to collect it.
(f) On 6 February 2014, when Farid met Abang, Abang wanted to discuss the terms of Farid’s payment but Farid declined to have the discussion at that time as he was in a rush.
(g) Farid identified Ranjit as Abang.
- [16]
[16] The CNB recorded the following statements from Ranjit:
(a) One contemporaneous statement recorded on the night of the arrest on 6 February 2014. This was marked Exhibit P121 ;
(b) One cautioned statement recorded on 7 February 2014. This was marked Exhibit P126 ; and
(c) Three long statements recorded between 9 and 14 February 2014. They are Exhibits P127 , P130 and P134.
- [17]
[17] The pertinent portions of Ranjit’s statements can be summarised as follows:
(a) Ranjit had been working for a person known as Siva for about two months. His job was to deliver what he referred to as “barang” or “makan” into Singapore. He knew that makan or barang referred to something illegal.
(b) By way of background, Ranjit owned a bus business which he started about four years prior to his arrest. He only started working for Siva because he was in financial difficulties. He explained that sometime in May 2013, he took a loan of RM6,000 from loan sharks to help one of his friends. At the start of August 2013, he started facing financial problems with his business and he had to sell some of his buses to sustain it. Eventually, he was unable to maintain the liquidity necessary to keep his business going. Siva then offered him a job to deliver makan into Singapore. He said that Siva did not know what these items were because they were all pre-packed. The frequency of his deliveries of makan increased when Farid started to place orders.
(c) Whenever Ranjit was unable to make a delivery for Siva, he would ask a woman known as “Perl” to make the delivery instead. On 5 February 2014, Ranjit informed Perl about Siva’s instructions to pass 75g of Air Batu to a person known as Bro Choa Chu Kang and to collect $7,400 from him. Perl was to change the money into a different currency, keep RM1,000 for herself as payment for accepting the job and deposit the remainder into Ranjit’s account. On the same day, Perl informed Ranjit that Bro Choa Chu Kang was uncontactable and he thus told her to pass the Air Batu to Bro Bukit Timah (identified as Farid) instead.
(d) For the events on 6 February 2014 leading up to his arrest, Ranjit gave two different accounts:
(i) In his first long statement, Ranjit claimed that he delivered the Robinsons Bag at the request of a person known as Roy, who was Ranjit’s friend. Roy had told him that a customer in Singapore had left the Robinsons Bag on the bus and asked Ranjit to help return that bag to the customer in Singapore.
(ii) In his third long statement, Ranjit claimed instead that he delivered the Robinsons Bag after receiving a telephone call from Siva sometime between 2 and 3pm informing him that there was barang to be delivered into Singapore.
(e) Ranjit did not know the contents of the Robinsons Bag. He only knew that it contained three packets.
- [18]
[18] At the trial below, Farid and Ranjit did not challenge the voluntariness of their statements made to the CNB as set out above.
The trial
Prosecution’s case
- [19]
[19] The Prosecution’s case against Ranjit was that he was presumed under s 18(2) of the MDA to have had knowledge of the nature of the drugs in his possession. Section 18(2) of the MDA reads as follows:
- [20]
[20] Relying on the s 18(2) presumption, the Prosecution submitted that Ranjit had trafficked the diamorphine to Farid when he passed the Robinsons Bag to Farid, thereby committing an offence under s 5(1) of the MDA.
- [21]
[21] In Farid’s case, the Prosecution submitted that the evidence showed that Farid admitted that the Robinsons Bag contained heroin and that his purpose in receiving the heroin was to distribute it.
Farid’s case at trial
- [22]
[22] Farid did not dispute that he had possession of the Robinsons Bag or that he was aware of its contents. His counsel conceded expressly in the closing submissions that the elements of the charge against Farid were met. Farid only attempted to show that he had acted as a courier and co-operated with the CNB.
Ranjit’s case at trial
- [23]
[23] At the trial in the High Court, Ranjit was represented by Mr Singa Retnam (“Mr Retnam”), Mr Dhanaraj James Selvaraj (“Mr Selvaraj”) and Mr Gino Hardial Singh (“Mr Singh”) (collectively “Ranjit’s trial counsel”).
- [24]
[24] On the first day of trial, Ranjit’s trial counsel made an application to exclude certain evidence (“Disputed Evidence”), namely:
(a) portions of Farid’s statements to the CNB where he mentioned transactions with Abang (whom he claimed to be Ranjit) involving heroin;
(b) portions of Ranjit’s statements to the CNB regarding transactions said to involve something illegal (which he referred to as makan or barang) and those transactions involving Farid, Perl and one Mohd Hafiz bin Mohamad Arifin (“Hafiz”);
(c) portions of both Farid’s and Ranjit’s statements to the CNB involving the red and yellow package (which Ranjit referred to as the “Sotong Bag”) which was later found to contain methamphetamine;
(d) Two HSA certificates relating to the methamphetamine in the red and yellow package;
(e) Three photographs of the red and yellow package and the methamphetamine; and
(f) A photograph of another quantity of drugs found in the Unit.
- [25]
[25] In Ranjit’s defence, Ranjit’s trial counsel argued that he had no knowledge that the Robinsons Bag contained heroin and at most, only knew that he was delivering something illegal or even drugs generally but not diamorphine. Ranjit testified that the man named Roy was employed by Siva as a tour coordinator and that Roy had asked Ranjit to deliver the Robinsons Bag to Farid. When they met on 6 February 2014, Farid told Ranjit to call Siva about the red and yellow package. Thereafter, Ranjit received Hafiz’s contact number from Siva and proceeded to deliver the red and yellow package to Hafiz. Ranjit denied being Farid’s boss and claimed that they had not met prior to 6 February 2014.
The decision of the High Court
- [26]
[26] The Judge’s grounds of decision can be found in Public Prosecutor v Ranjit Singh Gill Menjeet Singh and another [2016] SGHC 217 (“the GD”).
Farid’s conviction and sentence
- [27]
[27] As Farid had admitted every element of the offence in his charge, the Judge convicted him. The Judge noted that Farid had consistently admitted in his various statements to the CNB that the Robinsons Bag was in his possession and that it contained heroin which he was meant to distribute.
- [28]
[28] The Judge stated (at [63] of the GD) that Farid had not shown on a balance of probabilities that he was a mere courier within the meaning of s 33B of the MDA. The Judge found it clear that repacking drugs for the purpose of further distribution and sale was integral to Farid’s role. Farid had admitted during cross-examination that he was going to use the weighing scales and plastic packets at the Unit to repack the heroin. The Judge was not convinced by the argument by Farid’s counsel that the five packets of heroin in the Robinsons Bag were already in one-pound and half-pound packages and therefore did not require repacking. The Judge noted that Farid had admitted to having repacked heroin into smaller packets between 7.7 and 7.9g for the previous consignments. The Judge was of the view (at [64]), following Public Prosecutor v Yogaras Poongavanam [2015] SGHC 193 at [28], that Farid was “someone who packs drugs into bundles as a routine after ensuring that the right type and quantity of the drugs go into the right packaging” and therefore did not qualify as a courier under s 33B(2)(a) of the MDA. In any event, the Prosecution did not issue a certificate of substantive assistance to Farid. Accordingly, the Judge imposed the mandatory death penalty on Farid.
Ranjit’s conviction and sentence
- [29]
[29] On the issue of the admissibility of the Disputed Evidence, the Judge followed the approach articulated by the Court of Appeal in Tan Meng Jee v Public Prosecutor [1996] 2 SLR(R) 178 at [41], [48] and [52] and considered three factors to determine whether the evidence was sufficiently probative to be admitted: (a) the cogency or reliability of the evidence; (b) the strength of inference provided by the evidence; and (c) the relevance of the evidence.
- [30]
[30] Applying these factors, the Judge held that some of the Disputed Evidence were admissible (namely the portions of Farid’s and Ranjit’s statements). These portions of the Disputed Evidence formed cogent evidence as they were contained in Ranjit’s and in Farid’s statements, which were not challenged on the ground of voluntariness. They provided relevant and sufficiently weighty evidence for the consideration of Ranjit’s state of mind and, specifically, the merits of any potential defence that he did not know what the Robinsons Bag contained apart from “something illegal”. The Judge added that Farid’s counsel intended to rely on the entirety of Farid’s statements for the purposes of Farid’s defence and that therefore it would have been premature to exclude them at that fairly early stage of the trial when it was still unclear as to what Ranjit’s defence would be. The Judge left it open for Ranjit’s trial counsel to submit on the relevance and/or weight to be accorded to such evidence later in the proceedings. The Judge also accepted the Prosecution’s submission that the photographs of the red and yellow package and the methamphetamine found therein were admissible as a matter of completeness.
- [31]
[31] However, the Judge excluded the two HSA certificates from the evidence, as the evidence on the quantity and quality of methamphetamine was irrelevant to Ranjit’s state of mind. The Judge also excluded the photograph of the drugs found subsequently in the Unit as that was irrelevant to the charge against Ranjit and appeared to have little or no relevance to the charge against Farid.
- [32]
[32] The Judge found that it was undisputed that Ranjit had possession of the Robinsons Bag which contained the heroin and he was thereby presumed to have been in possession of the drugs pursuant to s 18(1) of the MDA. The Judge found that Ranjit failed to rebut the presumption of knowledge of the nature of the drugs under s 18(2) of the MDA as three aspects of the transaction, taken together, made it so clearly suspicious that Ranjit’s failure to check or enquire into the contents of the Robinsons Bag must have been deliberate (GD at [38]–[44]):
(a) First, Ranjit had stated in his second long statement to the CNB that he knew that the makan he was delivering was something illegal and that Siva had given him an evasive answer when asked about the contents, such as claiming not to know as the items would have been packed already.
(b) Second, Siva had tasked him to procure the delivery of Air Batu which Ranjit did through Perl. The Judge found it unbelievable that Ranjit understood Air Batu to refer to ice cubes and not methamphetamine when Perl had been asked to collect $7,400 upon delivery of the 75g of the substance.
(c) Third, Ranjit had also admitted in his third long statement that he knew that the barang in the Robinsons Bag was something illegal but he did not know the contents. He conceded in cross-examination that Siva had contacted him to deliver barang to Singapore.
Further, the Judge noted Ranjit’s overall low level of credibility demonstrated in his oral testimony and found that Ranjit had failed to provide any sensible explanation for his failure to check or enquire into the contents of the Robinsons Bag (GD at [46]–[49]). The Judge was not convinced by Ranjit’s testimony that he was not at all curious or interested in the contents in the Robinsons Bag. As Ranjit could not prove that he had no knowledge of the nature of the contents in the Robinsons Bag, the Judge convicted him as charged.
- [33]
[33] For completeness, the Judge made clear (at [50]) that she did not rely on Farid’s assertions that Ranjit was his boss Abang. Farid had claimed that he had not met Ranjit or Abang prior to 6 February 2014 and his conclusion that Ranjit was Abang was based on only two facts: that Abang had told Farid that he would be coming to Singapore and that Ranjit’s voice sounded like that of Abang over the phone. On the stand, Farid testified that “Ranjit was possibly the person that [he had] talked to on the phone”. The Judge considered this to be too tenuous a basis on which to find that Ranjit was Abang.
- [34]
[34] The Judge found that Ranjit’s role in giving delivery instructions to Perl and collecting the two envelopes of cash did not disqualify him from being a courier as these acts were in respect of distinct and separate drug transactions (GD at [55]–[59]). The Judge held, on a balance of probabilities, that Ranjit’s role in dealing with the drugs was merely to deliver them to Farid on Siva’s instructions and that this fell squarely within the acts of a courier set out in s 33B(2)(a) of the MDA. As the Public Prosecutor issued a certificate of substantive assistance to Ranjit, both requirements in s 33B were satisfied. In the exercise of her discretion under s 33B(1)(a) of the MDA, the Judge saw no reason to impose the death penalty. Ranjit was therefore given the alternative mandatory sentence of life imprisonment and the mandatory minimum of 15 strokes of the cane (GD at [60]).
The criminal appeals
- [35]
[35] Farid and Ranjit appealed against the Judge’s decision on their respective convictions and sentences.
Farid’s appeal (CCA 17/2016)
- [36]
[36] Farid filed his notice of appeal against conviction and sentence on 1 July 2016 and his petition of appeal on 16 November 2016. Subsequently, he filed Criminal Motion No 4 of 2018 on 19 January 2018 for leave to amend his petition of appeal. The amendments were essentially to elaborate on the reasons supporting his contention that he had rebutted the presumption of trafficking in s 17 of the MDA and that, alternatively, he was a mere courier in the particular drug transaction before the court. We granted Farid’s application to amend his petition of appeal on 12 February 2018.
- [37]
[37] In the amended petition, Farid contended that he had provided sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption under s 17 of the MDA (ie, that the drugs he had in his possession were for the purpose of trafficking). Farid argued that he was acting on Abang’s instructions when he collected the drugs. Given that Abang had not given any instructions on what to do with the drugs, the Judge erred in finding that Farid intended to traffic those drugs. Farid also argued that he had provided sufficient evidence to prove that he was a mere courier for the purposes of the alternative sentencing regime under s 33B(2) of the MDA. Relying again on the fact that Abang had not issued any instructions yet on what to do with the drugs in this particular transaction, Farid argued that he could not be said to have intended to repack the drugs, which would have enlarged his role to one beyond that of a mere courier.
Ranjit’s appeal (CCA 19/2016)
- [38]
[38] Ranjit filed his appeal on 5 July 2016. In his appeal, he was represented by Mr Bachoo Mohan Singh and Mr Too Xing Ji (“Ranjit’s counsel on appeal”).
- [39]
[39] Ranjit’s case on appeal was that the Judge was wrong to have found that Ranjit did not rebut the presumption in s 18(2) of the MDA (ie, that he had knowledge of the nature of the drugs in his possession) when he passed the Robinsons Bag containing the heroin to Farid on 6 February 2014. First, Ranjit’s counsel on appeal argued that the Judge was wrong to have admitted the portions of the Disputed Evidence and to have relied on them (see above at [30] and [31]). Ranjit’s counsel on appeal argued that such evidence was not cogent, did not raise a strong inference and was irrelevant.
- [40]
[40] Second, Ranjit’s counsel on appeal advanced the following main factual arguments:
(a) That it was implausible for Ranjit to risk his life for a mere RM100 when his net assets were worth RM377,824 at the time of his arrest;
(b) That it was improbable for Ranjit to risk the forfeiture of the Bus worth RM100,000 by driving it into Singapore while knowingly trafficking drugs;
(c) That Ranjit was consistent in his position that he was a businessman who did not know the contents of the Robinsons Bag that was left behind on the Bus by a customer;
(d) That if Ranjit knew that he was carrying drugs, he would not have (a) kept the Robinsons Bag at such an open and accessible place as the side pocket of the driver’s seat while passing through the immigration checkpoints in Malaysia and Singapore; (b) agreed to meet Farid at such a public place like Yew Tee MRT station without fixing a meeting time beforehand; (c) left the drugs on the bus for some 20 to 30 minutes while he went to the toilet while waiting for Farid; and (d) approached a stranger to ask if the stranger was there to collect the Robinsons Bag; and
(e) That the sum of money found on Ranjit ($5,520) was inconsistent with the amount of drugs delivered by Ranjit to Farid. Based on reported decisions, the value of one pound of heroin when delivered by a courier to a drug trafficker is about $5,000. As such, Ranjit ought to have collected about $15,000 for the 1,359.9g of drugs (roughly equivalent to three pounds) that he delivered to Farid on the day of his arrest.
- [41]
[41] Finally, Ranjit’s counsel on appeal argued that the Prosecution had breached its obligations set out in Muhammad bin Kadar and another v Public Prosecutor [2011] 3 SLR 1205 (“the Kadar obligations”) by failing to (a) call Siva as a witness and being slow in disclosing Siva’s availability; (b) investigate Ranjit’s financial situation at the material time when Ranjit had informed the investigators that he was a businessman; (c) disclose the fact that the CNB had returned Ranjit’s ATM cards after the Royal Malaysian Police investigated his bank accounts and concluded that they were clean in that they did not contain moneys obtained from drug or crime-related transactions; and (d) disclose the phone records of Ranjit’s main phone which held no incriminating evidence.
- [42]
[42] In an attempt to strengthen Ranjit’s case on appeal, Ranjit’s counsel on appeal filed Criminal Motion No 5 of 2017 (“CM 5/2017”) seeking to adduce further evidence at the hearing of his main appeal and also to withdraw Ranjit’s admission to the Statement of Agreed Facts. The further evidence comprised nine categories of documents and the oral testimony and/or affidavits of four persons (“Further Evidence”). The Further Evidence pertained to Ranjit’s personal financial status as well as that of his business at the time leading up to his arrest on 6 February 2014.
Ranjit’s application to adduce further evidence (CM 5/2017)
- [43]
[43] CM 5/2017 was first heard before us on 18 August 2017. At that hearing, we rejected Ranjit’s application to withdraw his consent to the Statement of Agreed Facts. We will explain our reasons later in this judgment. As for Ranjit’s application to adduce further evidence, we ruled that the application should be heard together with Ranjit’s main appeal. We stated the following:
- [44]
[44] CCA 17/2016 and CCA 19/2016 came before us for hearing on 12 February 2018. In that hearing, we gave our preliminary view that the application to adduce the Further Evidence did not meet the criteria set out in Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489 (“Ladd v Marshall”). In response, Ranjit’s counsel on appeal submitted that the Further Evidence was not adduced during the trial because Ranjit’s trial counsel did not abide by Ranjit’s instructions about his defence. We therefore gave Ranjit and his trial counsel the opportunity to file affidavits to explain what transpired during the trial. We stated the following:
- [45]
[45] CM 5/2017 and both the appeals therefore had to be adjourned.
Further affidavits
- [46]
[46] Pursuant to the above directions, Ranjit filed an affidavit. Mr Retnam and Mr Selvaraj then filed an affidavit each in response.
(1) Ranjit’s affidavit
- [47]
[47] In Ranjit’s affidavit, he claimed that he had given Mr Retnam three handwritten notes containing his instructions. These were dated 21 May 2015, 15 October 2015 and 3 December 2015. Ranjit had also told his ex-wife, one Mahgeswari, to pass to Mr Retnam three diary log books containing the trip logs for his three buses. Subsequently, Mahgeswari informed Ranjit sometime in December 2015 that she had passed the log books to one Rani. Rani visited Ranjit in prison at a later date to confirm that she had passed the log books to Mr Retnam.
- [48]
[48] Ranjit also affirmed that he had given verbal instructions to Mr Retnam during his prison interviews.
- [49]
[49] Ranjit’s instructions to Mr Retnam which he alleged were not followed in the trial can be summarised as follows:
(a) to challenge the voluntariness of his statements (ie, to assert that they were made under threat, inducement or promise) ; and
(b) to challenge the accuracy of the contents of his long statements on the following points:
(i) that he knew makan and barang were illegal ;
(ii) that he was in financial difficulties and thus failed to introduce evidence regarding his financial status ; and
(iii) that Sarr borrowed RM12,000 when it was actually only RM6,000 ; and
(c) to challenge the accuracy of his contemporaneous statements.
- [50]
[50] Ranjit alleged that his trial counsel’s failure to follow his instructions could be seen from the way Mr Retnam: (a) failed to challenge the prosecution witnesses in these material aspects during cross-examination; (b) led Ranjit’s evidence-in-chief in his defence; (c) failed to re-examine him on the points set out above; and (d) made submissions which were against his instructions. Ranjit argued that he was therefore unable to put his true case before the Judge.
- [51]
[51] Ranjit also claimed that his trial counsel (ie, Mr Retnam, Mr Selvaraj and Mr Singh) did not visit him frequently in prison before the trial. He also complained that he was given the full committal bundle by his trial counsel only after the second day of trial.
- [52]
[52] Finally, Ranjit claimed that he was not consulted on the Statement of Agreed Facts. In the Statement of Agreed Facts, it was stated that all of Ranjit’s statements were given voluntarily without any threat, inducement or promise. Ranjit alleged that he came to know that such a statement was consented to when his counsel on appeal informed him about it. Had he been consulted on the Statement of Agreed Facts, he would not have agreed to this statement as it was not true.
(2) Mr Retnam’s affidavit
- [53]
[53] In Mr Retnam’s affidavit, Mr Retnam stated that the instructions Ranjit was now claiming were the instructions given to him were not the instructions he received. Ranjit did not inform him that he was a “rich travel agent with houses [and] buses and so on”. Ranjit also did not instruct him that he did not need to traffic in drugs. Mr Retnam also affirmed that he did not receive any log books from Ranjit.
- [54]
[54] According to Mr Retnam, Ranjit did not at any time say that his statements were involuntary and were made under inducement, threat or promise.
- [55]
[55] As for the committal bundle, Mr Retnam said that he did pass the committal bundle to Ranjit and this was evidenced by a letter dated 28 September 2015 to the Prisons Superintendent showing that the committal documents were received by the prison.
(3) Mr Selvaraj’s affidavit
- [56]
[56] In Mr Selvaraj’s Affidavit, Mr Selvaraj said that Ranjit’s assertions that he was a successful businessman and about his wealth were never made known to him nor Mr Retnam. Mr Selvaraj also recalled informing Ranjit that his statements were inconsistent and pushing this at trial would have an adverse impact on Ranjit’s credibility as a witness. We understood Mr Selvaraj as referring to Ranjit’s case that he was not in financial difficulties.
- [57]
[57] Mr Selvaraj further attested that Ranjit had always confirmed that there were no threats, inducements or promises made to him and that his statements to the CNB were all voluntary.
Order for remittal
- [58]
[58] On 26 March 2018, the matter returned before us for hearing. Having considered the above-mentioned affidavits, we remitted this case to the Judge to take further evidence on Ranjit’s allegations against his trial counsel.
- [59]
[59] We made the following orders :
- [60]
[60] As a result, CCA 17/2016, CCA 19/2016 and CM 5/2017 were adjourned.
- [61]
[61] For the purpose of this judgment and for easy reference, s 392 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) (“CPC”) provides:
- [62]
[62] As the allegations made by Ranjit also involved allegations of inadequate legal assistance, we also directed his counsel on appeal to make further submissions on the following points when the matter returned to the Court of Appeal for decision (“Further Legal Questions”):
(a) What should the applicable legal test be in situations where an accused person in a criminal case alleges inadequate assistance of counsel in the proceedings below as a ground of appeal? In particular:
(i) Must the accused person show that counsel’s conduct of the defence below was deficient? If so, what should the exact legal threshold be (eg, “objective unreasonableness” or “flagrant incompetence”)?
(ii) Must the accused person show that counsel’s performance caused actual prejudice to his defence at trial? If so, what is the degree of certainty required for the accused person to succeed (eg, “reasonable possibility” or “on the balance of probabilities”)?
(iii) Must the accused person show that the conviction is unsafe or unsatisfactory in all the circumstances, and/or that there has been a miscarriage of justice in the proceedings below? If so, are these requirements the same as the requirement of prejudice in (ii) above, or are they overarching requirements?
(iv) How closely should the Court of Appeal follow the legal tests articulated in the foreign case authorities, considering that these cases may have involved jury trials, and that the principles in these cases may have been based on the constitutional and statutory provisions of these jurisdictions? Which constitutional and/or statutory provisions in Singapore law are relevant to this issue?
(b) Do the facts of this case show that there was inadequate assistance of counsel in the proceedings below that would warrant the reliefs sought by Ranjit or some other relief?
- [63]
[63] Both the Prosecution and Ranjit’s counsel on appeal made substantial submissions on the Further Legal Questions. We will discuss them later in this judgment when considering whether Ranjit’s complaints against his trial counsel have any merit.
The Judge’s findings on remittal
- [64]
[64] The remittal hearing was heard by the Judge over two days on 25 and 26 September 2018. Ranjit and his trial counsel gave evidence during the hearing. The Judge gave her decision on 19 March 2019. Her grounds of decision can be found in Ranjit Singh Gill Menjeet Singh v Public Prosecutor [2019] SGHC 75 (“Findings on Remittal”).
- [65]
[65] The Judge held that Ranjit failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that his trial counsel had failed to present his case in accordance with his instructions save for one limited aspect. This was Mr Retnam’s failure to cross-examine the recording officer and the interpreter on the statement recording process and to dispute the accuracy of Ranjit’s statement which mentioned that he knew barang to be illegal (Findings on Remittal at [72] and [79]).
- [66]
[66] On the alleged failure of Ranjit’s trial counsel to challenge the admissibility of his statements on the basis that they were involuntarily made, the Judge found that there was no such instruction for the trial counsel to do so and that the agreed position was to the contrary. The Judge relied on the contemporaneous record of the prison visit on 29 December 2015 by Mr Retnam and Mr Selvaraj. The Judge gave full weight to this record because it was not alleged that it was fabricated and Ranjit was unable to challenge the accuracy of this record (Findings on Remittal at [51] to [54]).
- [67]
[67] The Judge was also of the view that it would be quite wrong to elevate each and every assertion made by Ranjit in his written notes to his trial counsel to the status of an “express instruction” to them. Ranjit’s notes which Ranjit claimed were his instructions contained his narration of the events and his responses to the contents of his statements to CNB. The Judge held that it was for Ranjit’s trial counsel to assess the information and to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the assertions made by Ranjit, to advise him on their merits and to agree on the position to be taken at trial. On this basis, the Judge found that the position agreed with Ranjit was that there would not be any objection to the admissibility of the statements (see Findings on Remittal at [55] to [57]).
- [68]
[68] On the alleged failure to present evidence that Ranjit was not in financial difficulties and to dispute portions of his long statement dated 11 February 2014 which stated that he was in financial difficulties, the Judge rejected Ranjit’s contention. The Judge held that while Ranjit had made such assertions, it remained for the previous lawyers to assess their merits and for parties to agree on the stance to be adopted at the trial. On this, the Judge accepted Mr Retnam’s and Mr Selvaraj’s explanation that raising Ranjit’s assertion regarding his financial position would affect his credibility as a witness given that it was inconsistent with his previous statement and his interview with Dr Kenneth Koh (“Dr Koh”), a psychiatrist from the Institute of Mental Health. As such, disputing the portions of the long statement dated 11 February 2014 on this point carried some risk. The Judge found that in not dealing with this area, the trial counsel acted in accordance with the agreed approach to focus on the material aspects of the defence. Finally, the Judge also took note of the fact that in cross-examination, Ranjit admitted that he did not tell Mr Retnam or Mr Selvaraj that he wanted his financial status to be an important part of his defence (see Findings on Remittal ([64] supra) at [60] to [65]).
- [69]
[69] On the alleged failure to challenge other aspects of Ranjit’s statements, the Judge noted that there were two main aspects to this allegation. The first pertained to the trial counsel’s failure to dispute the accuracy of Ranjit’s contemporaneous statement where he mentioned that there were three bundles in the Robinsons Bag. Ranjit’s assertion was that he only saw the three bundles after the Robinsons Bag was placed in the Bus. On this, the Judge accepted Mr Retnam’s position that he advised Ranjit not to challenge portions of his statements to the CNB which were irrelevant to the defence and Ranjit agreed with this general approach (see Findings on Remittal at [68] and [69]).
- [71]
[71] However, the Judge was of the view that the aforesaid failure on Mr Retnam’s part had no effect on the verdict. Apart from the admission in the statement, there was overwhelming evidence that Ranjit knew he was delivering illegal items for Siva and that the Robinsons Bag contained something illegal (see Findings on Remittal at [74]).
- [72]
[72] Finally, on the allegation that Ranjit’s trial counsel did not raise a full defence, the Judge rejected this contention (see Findings on Remittal ([64] supra) at [78]). The Judge found that at all times, the defence raised was that Ranjit did not know that the Robinsons Bag contained drugs.
- [73]
[73] In summary, the Judge found that Ranjit’s trial counsel, in particular Mr Retnam, did present the defence case in accordance with Ranjit’s instructions save for the one limited aspect mentioned above. The Judge also said that the failure on that limited aspect did not have any effect on her verdict at the trial. She also held that the additional evidence adduced on the other issues had no effect on her verdict. She found no merit in Ranjit’s complaint that his instructions were ignored (see Findings on Remittal at [79] to [82]).
Ranjit’s further submissions
- [74]
[74] In the light of the Judge’s decision in the Findings on Remittal, Ranjit’s counsel on appeal filed further submissions addressing both the issue of inadequate legal assistance and Ranjit’s application to adduce the further evidence.
- [75]
[75] It is pertinent to note that in Ranjit’s further submissions, Ranjit’s counsel on appeal did not challenge the Judge’s findings in the Findings on Remittal. In other words, Ranjit’s counsel on appeal was no longer contending that Ranjit’s trial counsel did not pursue Ranjit’s defence according to Ranjit’s instructions. Instead, Ranjit’s counsel on appeal argued that the Further Evidence should be admitted because the availability criterion in the Ladd v Marshall test should not be held strictly against accused persons in criminal appeal cases. Ranjit’s counsel on appeal relied on the case of Public Prosecutor v Mohd Ariffan bin Mohd Hassan [2018] 1 SLR 544. Ranjit’s counsel on appeal also argued that the Further Evidence was credible and relevant in that it would undermine a key plank of the Prosecution’s case at trial.
- [76]
[76] As for the Further Legal Questions, Ranjit’s counsel on appeal was in broad agreement with the Prosecution on the legal framework to be adopted, which we will set out in greater detail below. Applying this legal framework, Ranjit’s counsel on appeal argued that Ranjit had received inadequate legal assistance from his trial counsel and as a result, Ranjit was not able to advance his defence. There was therefore a miscarriage of justice.
The Prosecution’s case in reply
- [77]
[77] In relation to Farid’s appeal, the Prosecution argued that Farid had not given any evidence in the course of the trial below that could rebut the presumption of trafficking under s 17 of the MDA. On the contrary, in Farid’s statements to the CNB (the accuracy of which he had confirmed in his testimony at trial), he consistently and candidly admitted that the Robinsons Bag was in his possession, that he knew or at least assumed it contained heroin and that his purpose in receiving those drugs was to distribute them according to Abang’s instructions. Further, Farid’s evidence regarding his role in the previous consignments of heroin that he collected on Abang’s instructions showed that he was expected to distribute those drugs for Abang. No evidence was tendered to show that Abang would want him to do otherwise.
- [78]
[78] As for Farid’s appeal against the Judge’s finding that he was not a courier, the Prosecution argued that the Judge was correct to rely on the fact that Farid had drug paraphernalia such as weighing scales and empty plastic bags in his possession to infer that his role went beyond that of a mere courier. His role involved the weighing and repacking of the drugs that he collected for Abang. Farid had also admitted in cross-examination that he intended to repack the drugs. The Prosecution also argued that little weight should be placed on the fact that the drugs in the Robinsons Bag came pre-packed in half-pound packets and so Farid need not repack them. Based on his previous consignments of heroin, Farid had been asked by Abang to repack the drugs into packages of various weights such as one-pound, half-pound and 7.7-7.9g packets.
- [79]
[79] As for Ranjit’s appeal, the Prosecution’s case can be summarised as follows:
(a) The Judge was correct to admit portions of the Disputed Evidence. This evidence demonstrated strongly that (i) Ranjit had carried out delivery of illegal items for Siva in the past; (ii) Ranjit knew that he was delivering something illegal to Farid; and (iii) Ranjit was simultaneously carrying out a suspicious transaction pertaining to 75g of Air Batu which was worth $7,400. Furthermore, this evidence was cogent because it was consistent with Ranjit’s conduct and explained why Ranjit was in possession of the drugs. Finally, it was not disputed at trial that Ranjit gave his statements to the CNB voluntarily.
(b) As for Ranjit’s counsel on appeal’s allegation that the Prosecution had breached its Kadar obligations, the Prosecution submitted that in relation to the phone records of Ranjit’s main phone, these records would neither undermine the Prosecution’s case nor strengthen Ranjit’s defence. As to the Prosecution’s failure to investigate into Ranjit’s financial status at the material time, the Prosecution submitted that its Kadar obligations did not extend to an obligation to search for additional materials. In any event, Ranjit admitted in his statement to the CNB and informed Dr Koh that he was in financial difficulties and that his business was not doing well. There was no reason for the Prosecution to pursue a line of inquiry to prove otherwise. Finally, on not calling Siva to the stand, the Prosecution submitted that it had offered Siva to the defence as a witness and it was always open for Ranjit’s trial counsel to ask for time to interview Siva before deciding whether to take up the Prosecution’s offer. Ranjit’s counsel did not do so.
(c) On CM 5/2017, the Prosecution submitted that the Further Evidence was available to Ranjit to adduce at his trial below. The Further Evidence was also not credible and ultimately not relevant because the Judge did not rely on Ranjit’s financial circumstances as a basis for accepting the Prosecution’s case or rejecting Ranjit’s defence.
(d) On Ranjit’s main appeal, the Prosecution submitted that the evidence before the Judge showed clearly that Ranjit knew that the Robinsons Bag contained illegal items. Ranjit also failed to provide any sensible explanation for why he failed to check and enquire about the contents of the Robinsons Bag. Ranjit’s failure to check was especially suspicious given that he did not know the intended recipient of the bag. Ranjit was also not credible in his defence. As such, Ranjit failed to rebut the presumption under s 18(2) of the MDA.
- [80]
[80] In the result, the Prosecution submitted that CCA 17/2016, CCA 19/2016 and CM 5/2017 should be dismissed.
The Court of Appeal’s decision
- [81]
[81] We dismiss Farid’s appeal against conviction except that we hold that he has proved on a balance of probabilities that he was a courier within the meaning of s 33B of the MDA. As for Ranjit, we have dismissed both CM 5/2017 and his appeal.
- [82]
[82] We will first give our reasons for our decision in Farid’s appeal before discussing Ranjit’s appeal and his application to adduce the Further Evidence.
Farid’s appeal (CCA 17/2016)
Appeal against conviction
- [83]
[83] It was not disputed that Farid was in possession of the drugs when he was arrested (see above at [9] and [10]). Given the amount of 35.21g of diamorphine found in Farid’s possession, the presumption of trafficking under s 17 of the MDA applies:
- [84]
[84] At the trial, Farid’s evidence showed that he intended to traffic the drugs for Abang and would only await Abang’s instructions to do so. In his contemporaneous statement at Exhibit P123, when asked whether the drugs in the Robinsons Bag belonged to him, Farid said that he would wait for Abang to call him to give him instructions to deliver the drugs to Abang’s clients. In his cautioned statement, Farid admitted that he would “just take, do and send”. Finally, in cross-examination, Farid admitted that for the heroin consignment he received on 6 February 2014, he would await instructions on repackaging and delivery.
- [85]
[85] The definition of “traffic” under s 2 of the MDA includes the acts of offering to sell, give, administer, transport, send, deliver or distribute. Section 2 of the MDA reads:
- [86]
[86] As Farid had admitted in his evidence that he had offered and was prepared to deliver or distribute the drugs to Abang’s clients, it is beyond dispute that he intended to traffic the drugs.
- [87]
[87] Farid’s counsel submitted that there was a possibility that Farid could be instructed by Abang to return the drugs to Abang. Farid’s counsel relied on a previous consignment of methamphetamine (ie, the Air Batu consignment) to show that Abang had previously instructed Farid to return the drugs he had collected for Abang after receiving the consignment.
- [88]
[88] Farid stated in his statements that Abang had telephoned him on 5 February 2014 and asked him to collect the drugs and to find buyers for a consignment of Air Batu (“Ice” or methamphetamine) as the original customer was uncontactable. Farid told him he did not know who would want to buy it. Later that night, Farid collected the Air Batu which was in a red and yellow plastic packet from the same Chinese woman (see [15(d)] above). However, Farid was not able to find any buyers for the Air Batu and he then informed Abang accordingly.
- [89]
[89] From Farid’s account of his role in relation to the methamphetamine consignment, Abang’s instructions were not for Farid to merely hold on to the Air Batu so that he could return it to Abang the next day. Abang’s instructions were for Farid to try to sell the methamphetamine and it was only when Farid could not find a buyer that he was instructed to return the drugs. There was therefore no basis for Farid’s counsel to argue that this particular consignment supported the possibility that Farid’s role might be to hold on to the drugs in issue with the intention of returning them to Abang. In fact, this incident concerning the methamphetamine supports the Prosecution’s case that Farid’s role was to deliver and/or distribute controlled drugs for Abang.
- [90]
[90] We agree with the Prosecution that Farid did not adduce any evidence in the trial to establish that the drugs in his possession were for purposes other than delivery or distribution for Abang. In the light of Farid’s evidence at trial, we find no merit in Farid’s counsel’s argument that Farid had not formed the intention to traffic the drugs when he was arrested because he had not received any instructions from Abang as to whether he should return the drugs to Abang or to deliver them to Abang’s clients. We therefore uphold Farid’s conviction.
Appeal against finding on courier status
- [91]
[91] Farid’s counsel argued that the following factors proved that Farid was a mere courier:
(a) First, Farid had no executive decision-making powers. He was consistent in stating that he only acted on Abang’s instructions;
(b) Second, the drugs which formed the subject matter of the charge came pre-packed in a one-pound bundle and in half-pound bundles unlike previous consignments of heroin where Farid received a two-pound bundle and was asked to repack the drugs; and
(c) Third, evidence was adduced that Farid only stood to be paid $300 per consignment.
- [92]
[92] Farid’s counsel argued further that the Judge erred in relying on Farid’s conduct in previous heroin consignments to infer what he intended to do with the drugs when he was arrested. As Abang had not given him any instructions on what to do with the drugs, the Judge was wrong to infer that Farid’s role was to do more such that he was not a mere courier. On this, Farid’s counsel relied on the case of Zamri bin Mohd Tahir v Public Prosecutor [2019] 1 SLR 724 (“Zamri”).
- [93]
[93] The Prosecution submitted that the Judge did not err in her findings that Farid was not a mere courier in relation to the drugs. Farid was consistent in his evidence at the trial that he intended to repack the drugs and little weight should be given to the fact that the drugs came pre-packed in a one-pound bundle and in half-pound bundles.
- [94]
[94] Having considered the evidence and the parties’ submissions, we agree with Farid’s counsel’s argument that given Farid’s role in the transaction, which was to collect the drugs and await Abang’s instructions and the fact that Abang had not given any instructions as to what Farid should do with the drugs as at the time of Farid’s arrest, it would be wrong to infer that Farid’s role in the drug transaction in question here was more than that of a mere courier. We therefore accept, on a balance of probabilities, that Farid was a mere courier. In our view, evidence of repacking drugs in previous transactions did not mean that the trafficker could not be a courier for the particular transaction that he is charged for.
- [95]
[95] The following paragraphs in Zamri are apposite for the present case:
- [96]
[96] Farid was consistent in his evidence that what he would do with the drugs in this case depended entirely on what Abang’s instructions were and no instructions had been received at the time of his arrest. This was consistent with what had happened in the previous heroin consignments. We therefore find the present case to be similar to the situation in Zamri ([92] supra).
- [97]
[97] We agree with Farid’s counsel that little weight should be given to Farid’s conduct in previous heroin consignments. Abang’s instructions for each of those consignments were different and so it was not possible to infer what Abang’s instructions would be in relation to the drugs in the present case. For the heroin consignment on 4 February 2014 in which he received two pounds of heroin from a Chinese woman, Abang’s instruction was to repack the drugs into one-pound and half-pound packets. Farid also admitted that on another occasion, he repacked a portion of the heroin consignment into 7.7g packets in accordance with Abang’s instructions.
- [98]
[98] We mentioned earlier that Farid’s counsel contended that since the drugs came pre-packed in a one-pound bundle and four half-pound bundles, it was unlikely that Farid would need to repack the drugs. As pointed out above, Abang’s instructions to Farid in previous consignments were not consistent. It was therefore not possible, on this evidence alone, to infer what Abang’s instructions on this particular occasion would be.
- [99]
[99] Applying the reasoning in Zamri at [16], the evidence here only showed that Farid would do as he was instructed. In the absence of evidence that Farid had already been instructed by Abang to repack the drugs or that his role in the drug transactions was to repack the drugs unless otherwise instructed by Abang, it could not be said that Farid had done or was committed to doing anything that would make him more than a mere courier and thereby take him outside the ambit of s 33B(2)(a) of the MDA.
- [100]
[100] We therefore allow Farid’s appeal on this issue only and hold that, for this particular drug transaction, he was a mere courier within the meaning of s 33B(2)(a) of the MDA. However, as the Prosecution did not issue a certificate of substantive assistance under s 33B to Farid, this finding does not change the outcome of the case and the mandatory death penalty stands.
Ranjit’s appeal (CCA 19/2016)
- [101]
[101] We dismissed Ranjit’s application and his appeal on 17 October 2019. As noted earlier, Ranjit’s counsel on appeal did not seek to challenge the Judge’s findings in the Findings on Remittal and her conclusion that Ranjit’s trial counsel presented his case in accordance with his instructions, save for the failure to cross-examine the recording officer and the interpreter as to whether they had recorded accurately that Ranjit knew that barang was something illegal.
CM 5/2017: Application to withdraw Statement of Agreed Facts and to adduce the Further Evidence
(1) Application to withdraw Statement of Agreed Facts
- [102]
[102] Ranjit’s second prayer in CM 5/2017 was for leave to withdraw the Statement of Agreed Facts. The crux of Ranjit’s complaint was that he agreed to admit to the matters set out in the Statement of Agreed Facts under a mistake or misunderstanding. Ranjit claimed in his affidavit in support of CM 5/2017 that he did not understand what the Statement of Agreed Facts was and that he saw the statement only during the trial. He spotted numerous errors in the Statement of Agreed Facts only after his counsel on appeal went through the statement with him. He also claimed that he could not confirm or agree with the statement given that it contained admissions from Farid. Therefore, any admissions in the statement would tend to be misleading and prejudicial.
- [103]
[103] The Prosecution argued that Ranjit’s application for leave to withdraw the Statement of Agreed Facts should be dismissed because there was no basis to show that Ranjit did not understand the Statement of Agreed Facts when he agreed to it. He was represented by counsel at all times and on the first day of the trial, the Statement of Agreed Facts was read out in court and was interpreted to Ranjit in Malay. The Statement of Agreed Facts was also referred to no less than six times over the course of the trial. At no point in time did Ranjit make any objections to the statement. After Ranjit chose to give evidence through a Punjabi interpreter, he was asked by the Judge whether he was able to follow the proceedings and he confirmed that he could and that he understood what had transpired thus far in the proceedings.
- [104]
[104] Having considered the evidence, we agreed with the Prosecution. Ranjit’s allegations against the admission of the Statement of Agreed Facts were without basis. The Statement of Agreed Facts was read out in full on the first day of trial in the High Court and a Malay interpreter was present to assist both Farid and Ranjit (we say more about this at [142] below). It could not be the case that Ranjit did not understand or agree with the contents of the Statement of Agreed Facts since he made no complaints about it throughout the trial. As mentioned earlier, on 18 August 2017, we dismissed Ranjit’s application to set aside the Statement of Agreed Facts (see [43] above). Now that we have the benefit of the Judge’s findings in her Findings on Remittal issued in the remittal hearing which took place after 18 August 2017, those findings fortify the correctness of our earlier decision to dismiss this prayer in CM 5/2017.
(2) Application to adduce the Further Evidence
- [105]
[105] On Ranjit’s application to adduce the Further Evidence, as we had noted at the hearing on 12 February 2018, this application did not meet the criteria set out in Ladd v Marshall. We noted then as we also do now that the Further Evidence was available to Ranjit to adduce at trial. The Judge found in the Findings on Remittal, that Ranjit’s instructions to his trial counsel were not to raise arguments on his financial status at the trial (see Findings on Remittal at [60] to [65]). As such, the Further Evidence was available at the trial but Ranjit chose not to adduce it. The Further Evidence was also not reliable in that it contradicted Ranjit’s own evidence that he was in financial difficulties. It was therefore not open to Ranjit to seek to adduce the Further Evidence in an attempt to present a different case at the appeal stage. The Further Evidence would also not be material because the Judge’s conclusion on Ranjit’s guilt was based on the totality of the evidence and was not anchored on Ranjit’s financial position. Accordingly, we dismissed CM 5/2017.
CCA 19/2016: Ranjit’s appeal against conviction
- [106]
[106] The essence of Ranjit’s appeal against conviction was that he had rebutted the presumption under s 18(2) of the MDA that he had knowledge of the nature of the drugs in his possession. To recapitulate, Ranjit brought the Robinsons Bag into Singapore in the Bus and passed it together with its contents to Farid on the night of 6 February 2014. As the Robinsons Bag was found to contain the drugs, s 18(2) of the MDA applied and it was presumed that Ranjit knew the nature of the drugs.
- [107]
[107] In our view, the Judge was justified in admitting the relevant Disputed Evidence (see [29] to [31] above). Ranjit’s statements relating to his previous dealings with Siva on transporting Air Batu, makan and barang and his statements that he knew these were illegal things were made voluntarily. They were therefore cogent evidence and were highly relevant in that they provided the necessary context to Ranjit’s relationship with Siva and his role in transporting items for Siva into Singapore. The evidence also allowed the court to draw the necessary inference on Ranjit’s state of mind when he was asked to deliver items for Siva.
- [108]
[108] Ranjit’s statements to the CNB indicated that he suspected the items he was asked to deliver for Siva, whether they were barang or makan, were illegal things. Ranjit attempted to disavow those portions of his statements by alleging that they were not accurately recorded. Ranjit’s assertion was that the recorder of the statements failed to translate the words barang and makan into their English equivalent of “things” and “food”, thus giving the impression that these words in his statements had a different or a special meaning.
- [109]
[109] On the evidence, we placed no weight on Ranjit’s allegations against the recorder of the statements. The Judge dealt with this point in some detail (GD at [45]) and we agree with her reasoning. Ultimately, Ranjit conceded in cross-examination that he did say barang and makan referred to something illegal.
- [110]
[110] In addition, there was one transaction which showed clearly that Ranjit must have known that he was involved in delivering illegal items for Siva into Singapore. This was when he conveyed Siva’s instructions to Perl to pass 75g of Air Batu to another person and to collect $7,400 in return. Ranjit tried to explain that he understood Air Batu to mean “ice cubes” literally in Malay. The Judge found this to be unbelievable and we agree. It would not require a genius to know that 75g of ice cubes could not be worth that amount of money, never mind why someone needed this miniscule amount of ice cubes delivered.
- [111]
[111] Even if we place Ranjit’s evidence at its highest in that he brought the Robinsons Bag into Singapore without knowing or seeing what it contained, we are of the view that Ranjit would still have failed to rebut the presumption of knowledge under s 18(2) of the MDA on a balance of probabilities if we apply the principles set out in this court’s decision in Obeng Comfort v Public Prosecutor [2017] 1 SLR 633 (“Obeng Comfort”) at [39]. The judgment in Obeng Comfort was delivered on 15 February 2017 after the Judge’s decision in the present appeal was made on 27 June 2016 and after the Judge’s GD was delivered on 6 October 2016.
- [112]
[112] In Obeng Comfort, we said at [39]:
At [40] of that decision, we set out some examples on the practical application of the above principles.
- [113]
[113] Applying the above principles to the facts of the present appeal, if Ranjit’s case in rebutting the presumption was that he was carrying something innocuous, his evidence could not be believed because he stated to the contrary in his statements. Further, as discussed earlier, his credibility was severely affected when he asserted that he believed that the Air Batu delivered by Perl was literally ice cubes. However, if Ranjit’s case in rebutting the presumption was that he knew he was delivering something illegal but did not turn his mind to what exactly it was, which appeared to be what he was asserting when he claimed that he was not at all interested or curious about the Robinsons Bag’s contents (see [32] above), then again he has not rebutted the said presumption. This is because, first, for the reasons already stated, he was found not to be credible as a witness. Second, to avoid the presumption becoming all bark and no bite as we said in Obeng Comfort, it cannot be rebutted by merely saying that he did not know what the thing in the Robinsons Bag was without proving that he believed it was something else when that was the very thing being presumed. Otherwise, his case would amount to nothing more than an assertion that the presumption should not apply and that would be impermissible given its statutory force.
- [114]
[114] We therefore agreed with the Judge that Ranjit had not rebutted the presumption under s 18(2) of the MDA.
- [115]
[115] As for Ranjit’s allegations that the Prosecution did not comply with its Kadar obligations (see above at [41]), we found these allegations to be without merit. We agreed with the Prosecution there was no reason for the CNB to investigate further into Ranjit’s business and financial situation after he admitted that he was in financial difficulties. The fact that the Malaysian police looked into his bank accounts and could not find money tainted by illegality would make no material difference to the Judge’s findings which were amply supported by the evidence. In relation to the allegation that the Prosecution was slow in disclosing Siva’s availability as a witness for the Defence, the Prosecution did disclose about Siva to Ranjit’s trial counsel and it was open to the counsel to ask for an adjournment if they really needed more time to interview Siva. There was no evidence on record of Ranjit’s trial counsel applying for such adjournment. Finally, on the point that the Prosecution did not disclose the phone records of Ranjit’s main phone which held no incriminating evidence, this evidence alone would not dispel doubts that he was not involved in drug transactions. People who carry more than one phone could dedicate one phone for normal daily activities while using another phone for illegal activities. Overall, all these matters did not prejudice Ranjit’s defence given the other overwhelming evidence against him.
Ranjit’s claim on inadequate legal assistance
- [116]
[116] Ranjit claimed that he received inadequate legal assistance from his trial counsel and that his defence was not properly and adequately put across during the trial. We shall first discuss the applicable legal principles when allegations of inadequate legal assistance during trial are raised in an appeal.
Singapore’s jurisprudence
- [117]
[117] Our courts have recognised the possibility that inadequate legal assistance of counsel could be used as a ground of appeal in criminal appeals. For example, in Juma’at bin Samad v Public Prosecutor [1993] 2 SLR(R) 327, Yong Pung How CJ considered the possible argument of inadequate legal assistance:
- [118]
[118] Another pronouncement on inadequate legal assistance of counsel as a ground of appeal can be found in Zhou Tong and others v Public Prosecutor [2010] 4 SLR 534. There, eight appellants appealed against their sentences for offences under the Common Gaming Houses Act (Cap 49, 1985 Rev Ed) on the basis that they were manifestly excessive. At [2], V K Rajah JA stated that “[i]f the matter proceeds to court, a solicitor’s failure to assist the court adequately would also result in wastage of judicial time and resources, and could even, in some instances, result in miscarriages of justice”. Rajah JA then made some observations on the conduct of the counsel at the trial below. At [11], Rajah JA found that “[i]t was clear from the outset that Mr Loo was dreadfully unprepared and had manifested a disturbingly careless attitude about the conduct of this matter even prior to the filing of the appeals”. Nevertheless, Rajah JA found that the sentences were not manifestly excessive and so dismissed the appeal.
- [119]
[119] We will now consider how other common law jurisdictions have dealt with this issue before setting out the position which we think should be adopted in Singapore.
Other common law jurisdictions
(1) United Kingdom
- [120]
[120] In Regina v Clinton [1993] 1 WLR 1181 at 1187–1188 (“Clinton”), the English Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) held that “exceptionally, where it is shown that the decision was taken either in defiance of or without proper instructions, or when all the promptings of reason and good sense pointed the other way, it may be open to an appellate court to set aside the verdict by reason of the terms of section 2(1)(a) of the [Criminal Appeal Act 1968 (c 19) (UK)]”. This statutory provision states that the court shall allow an appeal against conviction if it thinks that the conviction should be set aside on the ground that under all the circumstances of the case, it is unsafe or unsatisfactory. The court noted (at 1187) previous case law which held that the court should intervene only when counsel’s conduct of the case could be described as flagrantly incompetent advocacy and opined that such pronouncements were general guidelines on the approach to take rather than the legal standard.
- [121]
[121] After the United Kingdom adopted the European Convention of Human Rights and the passage of the Human Rights Act 1998 (c 42) (UK), the cases have generally echoed the position in Clinton.
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