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Grounds publishedDecided 27 Mar 2020

Court of Appeal

Ernest Ferdinand Perez De La Sala v Compañía De Navegación Palomar, SA and others

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[2020] SGCA 24Case no. Civil Appeal No 193 of 201956 paragraphs

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] Various types of injunctive relief have been developed by the courts to address different situations. They are governed by different sets of principles though they share some common features. Therefore, to ensure that the correct set of principles is applied, it is first important to understand the specific type of injunction that is in play. The difficulty in identifying and applying the correct principles may be complicated by the fact that different types of injunctions have been issued in the same action.

  3. [2] The appeal arose from a complicated and drawn-out dispute over very substantial assets which were eventually found to be held on resulting trust. Over the course of the convoluted litigation, the court issued both Mareva as well as proprietary injunctions. Several applications were filed to vary the injunctions and at times, the distinction between the Mareva and proprietary injunction might not have been properly appreciated.

  4. [3] At the heart of this appeal lies the essential question as to the circumstances under which a defendant can be permitted to invoke the Trustees Act (Cap 337, 2005 Rev Ed) (“Trustees Act”) and the court’s inherent jurisdiction to permit a withdrawal of funds seized under a proprietary injunction for living, legal and other expenses. We heard and dismissed the appeal on 14 January 2020. We now provide our detailed grounds of decision.

  5. Background

  6. (a) US$60,000 per month, to be released to Ernest’s personal bank account; and

  7. (b) US$6m as a lump sum for legal expenses reasonably incurred, to be released to Cavanagh Law LLP, Ernest’s lawyers.

  8. [5] SUM 2794 was filed pursuant to s 56 of the Trustees Act and/or the inherent jurisdiction of the court in Suit 178. In essence, Ernest sought the court’s exercise of its jurisdiction to release, from trust assets, the requested moneys for his living and legal expenses.

  9. [6] The Judge below dismissed SUM 2794. Instead, he varied a previously-granted carve-out of a Mareva injunction (which is distinct from the Proprietary Injunction), such that Ernest was permitted to spend S$10,000 per week on living expenses and S$40,000 per week on legal expenses.

  10. The parties in Suit 178

  11. [7] Ernest had taken over his family business and assets following his father’s death. This included the management of the first to sixth respondents in this appeal (the first to sixth plaintiffs and fourth to ninth defendants in the counterclaim in Suit 178) (“the Companies”). In the course of such management, Ernest had transferred to himself certain assets of the Companies (“the Assets”). Suit 178 was brought by the Companies to seek, in the main, (a) recovery of the Assets; and (b) a declaration that the Assets in each of their names belonged absolutely to each of them. Ernest’s defence was that he was the sole and beneficial owner of the Companies and the Assets.

  12. [8] The key members of the family involved in the dispute in Suit 178 were Ernest’s mother and three siblings. Ernest, his siblings and his mother were referred to collectively in the proceedings below as “JERIC”, while JERIC sans Ernest was referred to as “JRIC”. For consistency, we adopt these abbreviations here.

  13. [9] The seventh to ninth respondents in this appeal, which we refer to collectively as “ECJ”, were involved in the management of the Companies as directors.

  14. Procedural history

  15. [11] The Proprietary Injunction was thereafter varied on several occasions. Notably, the enjoined sum in the Injunction Account was increased to US$250m on 17 May 2017.

  16. [12] On 22 March 2018, the Court of Appeal pronounced judgment on the appeals arising out of the High Court’s decision in Suit 178 – Civil Appeals Nos 34, 35, 59 and 60 of 2017 – as reported in Ernest Ferdinand Perez De La Sala v Compañia De Navegación Palomar, SA and others and other appeals [2018] 1 SLR 894 (“Ernest Ferdinand Perez De La Sala (CA)”). Therein, this Court found that:

  17. (a) Ernest is not the sole beneficial owner of the Companies or the Assets (at [154]).

  18. (b) The Companies are also not the absolute owners of the Assets. Instead, by operation of a presumption of resulting trust, the Companies hold the Assets on resulting trust for two Hong Kong companies, Northern Enterprises Ltd (“NEL”) and John Manners and Company Limited (Hong Kong) (“JMC”) (at [121]–[124] and [155]).

  19. (c) It was clear that a significant portion of the Assets existed for the benefit of JRIC in addition to Ernest, and that Ernest and JRIC had beneficial interests in NEL and JMC. The court held that the issues of precisely who else had a beneficial interest in the Assets, and what the nature and proportion of that beneficial interest is, did not arise to be determined in Suit 178 (at [5], [144] and [186]).

  20. [13] Thereafter, in Summons No 1587 of 2018 (“SUM 1587”), the Companies sought a further proprietary injunction over the portion of the Assets which were held in Ernest’s personal accounts with UBS Bank (Canada) and UBS AG (Singapore branch) (“the SUM 1587 proprietary injunction”). On 6 April 2018, upon Ernest’s counsel’s request, the Judge granted a lump sum carve out of S$500,000 for Ernest’s living and medical expenses on compassionate grounds (the “S$500,000 Carve-out”). Ernest was, however, to file an affidavit within two weeks of the hearing to justify this carve-out, and to state whether he had any other funds elsewhere. However, Ernest later declined to file this affidavit. As a result, on 21 May 2018, the S$500,000 Carve-out was rescinded. On the same day, the SUM 1587 proprietary injunction was granted.

  21. [15] Alongside the Mareva Injunction, several conditions were imposed by the court:

  22. (a) The Mareva Injunction was subject to a carve-out (the “Mareva Carve-out”): Ernest was allowed to spend S$5,000 a week towards his ordinary living expenses and S$20,000 a week on legal advice and representation. The Mareva Carve-out was subject to the following conditions:

  23. (i) before spending any money, Ernest was to inform the Companies’ solicitors where the money was to come from; and

  24. (ii) the assets spent was not to be derived from the Assets which the Companies held on trust.

  25. (b) In addition, Ernest was to disclose all assets worldwide in which he had any interest whatsoever, giving the value, location and details including the nature of interest of all such assets, via an affidavit (“Disclosure Affidavit”).

  26. It should be noted that, from this juncture onwards, both the Mareva Injunction and the Proprietary Injunction were in force concurrently. Ernest’s Disclosure Affidavit (his 72nd affidavit) was filed on 27 March 2019.

  27. [16] On 12 March 2019, Originating Summons No 317 of 2019 (“OS 317”) was filed by the Companies for a determination of the precise beneficial interests, whether direct or indirect, in the Assets found to be held on resulting trust by the Companies for NEL and JMC. This was the issue left outstanding in Ernest Ferdinand Perez De La Sala (CA). OS 317 was pending before the courts at the time of the hearing of this appeal.

  28. [17] Coming back to SUM 2794, which was filed on 6 June 2019, the application was for a variation of the Proprietary Injunction to permit trust assets (ie, the Assets held on trust by the Companies) to be released, in the amount of US$60,000 per week for living expenses and a lump sum of US$6m for legal expenses incurred before or after the date of SUM 2794. At the hearing on 8 July 2019, the Judge directed that Ernest file a further affidavit to justify the orders sought in SUM 2794. Ernest filed his 77th affidavit on 15 July 2019, and the hearing was resumed on 22 October 2019. At this second hearing, the Judge dismissed SUM 2794. The Judge, however, accepted the Companies’ submission that a variation of the Mareva Carve-out was more appropriate than a variation of the Proprietary Injunction. The Judge therefore doubled the Mareva Carve-out: Ernest was thereby allowed to spend S$10,000 a week towards his ordinary living expenses and S$40,000 a week on legal advice and representation. Ernest thereafter brought this appeal, ie, Civil Appeal No 193 of 2019 (“CA 193”), against the Judge’s dismissal of SUM 2794.

  29. Decision on the appeal

  30. [18] We dismissed the appeal. The central issues before us involved the particular legal bases relied on in Ernest’s application in SUM 2794 to vary the Proprietary Injunction, which were (a) s 56 of the Trustees Act; and (b) the inherent jurisdiction of the court in the administration of trusts.

  31. [19] We also dismissed an application, vide Summons No 11 of 2020, made by Ernest for further documents to be admitted as evidence at the hearing of the present appeal (“SUM 11”).

  32. Section 56 of the Trustees Act

  33. [20] Ernest’s primary case on appeal was that the court has the power to vary the Proprietary Injunction pursuant to s 56 of the Trustees Act, and should exercise that power as it was expedient to do so.

  34. [21] The relevant provisions of s 56 state as follows:

  35. [22] In its previous iteration, the equivalent of s 56 was s 59(1) of the Trustees Act (Cap 337, 1985 Rev Ed) (“Trustees Act 1985”), which is identical to the current s 56 for our purposes. In the case of Rajabali Jumabhoy and others v Ameerali R Jumabhoy and others [1998] 2 SLR(R) 434 (“Rajabali Jumabhoy”), the court established that s 59(1) of the Trustees Act 1985 contemplated the following elements (at [78], citing In re Downshire Settled Estates; In re Chapman’s Settlement Trusts; In re Blackwell’s Settlement Trusts [1953] Ch 218 (“Re Downshire (CA)”) at 244–245):

  36. (a) an act unauthorised by a trust instrument,

  37. (b) to be effected by the trustees thereof,

  38. (c) in the management or administration of the trust property, and

  39. (d) which the court will empower them to perform if in its opinion the act is expedient.

  40. If these conditions are met, the court may then (a) confer upon the trustees the necessary power for the transaction; and (b) direct the manner in which the moneys are to be expended (s 59(1) of the Trustees Act 1985).

  41. The purpose of s 56 of the Trustees Act

  42. [24] Section 56 of the Trustees Act has its origins in, and is identical to, s 57(1) of the Trustee Act 1925 (c 19) (UK) (“the UK Trustee Act”). The court’s power under s 57(1) of the UK Trustee Act is in turn historically part of a broader body of jurisprudence in relation to the court’s authority to sanction departures from trusts. Broadly, the starting point is the court’s inherent jurisdiction to authorise otherwise unauthorised acts of management or administration of the trust property in cases of emergency or “salvage”. Mere expediency is insufficient to invoke the court’s inherent jurisdiction to permit departure from the trust. We discuss the scope of the court’s inherent jurisdiction to vary trusts in further detail at [44]–[46] below.

  43. [25] Section 57 of the UK Trustee Act was thereafter introduced to expand the court’s jurisdiction to vary trusts. The court’s statutory jurisdiction under s 57 is wider than its inherent jurisdiction, because it is not predicated on a situation of urgency or emergency. Instead, s 57 of the UK Trustee Act is premised on the proposed departure from the trust being expedient in the management and administration of the trust property, and this enables the court to confer power on trustees to undertake a wide range of dispositions and transactions where such power is otherwise absent (Gelber and another v Sunderland Foundation and others [2018] EWHC 2344 (Ch) at [7]–[8]). The objective of s 57 of the UK Trustee Act is to ensure that trust property is managed as advantageously as possible in the interests of the beneficiaries as a whole and, to that end, to authorise specific dealings with the property in situations where the court is of the view that it cannot be achieved by way of its inherent jurisdiction (Re Downshire (CA) at 248). This was cited in Rajabali Jumabhoy with approval at [78] in relation to s 59(1) of the Trustees Act 1985, which is in pari materia with s 56(1) of the Trustees Act, and the same objectives and principles would clearly apply to s 56(1) as well. While the application of s 56 would typically be invoked in relation to express trusts, the provision is not so limited, and it applies to trusts more generally.

  44. Whether Ernest has standing to make the application under s 56 of the Trustees Act

  45. [26] Applications under s 56 of the Trustees Act may be made “by the trustees, or by any of them or by any person beneficially interested under the trust” [emphasis added]: s 56(3) of the Trustees Act.

  46. [27] While there is sparse authority on the scope of the term “any person beneficially interested under the trust”, we were of the view that the term should be construed to mean “beneficiaries of the trust”. The purpose of s 56 of the Trustees Act is for the authorisation of transactions and powers to effect transactions concerning trust property, in the interests of the beneficiaries as a whole (see above at [25]). In this context, it is clear that, short of being a trustee or a beneficiary of the trust, one does not have locus standi to apply under this provision.

  47. [28] It was a vital part of Ernest’s case that he is a beneficiary of the Assets by virtue of his beneficial ownership of NEL and JMC. This reasoning was flawed. Merely having beneficial ownership in the beneficiary companies does not equate to having a beneficial interest in the Assets. This was aptly put by this court in Ernest Ferdinand Perez De La Sala (CA) at [119], when it observed that even if Ernest had fully bought out JRIC’s shares in NEL and JMC, it would not ipso facto have given Ernest ownership of NEL and JMC’s assets. Such a conclusion was reached on a simple application of the doctrine of separate legal personality – shareholders qua shareholders have no proprietary interest in the company’s assets.

  48. [29] We acknowledge that, following the determination of Ernest Ferdinand Perez De La Sala (CA), Ernest might stand to derive some sort of benefit from the Assets. Notably:

  49. (a) This court first rejected Ernest’s claim that he had beneficial ownership of all of the Assets, and found that the Assets were instead held on resulting trust for NEL and JMC, with the Companies as trustees, given that the Assets were substantially derived from NEL and JMC (at [144]). Ernest was not specifically mentioned in this resulting trust.

  50. (b) This court then addressed the issue as to whether Ernest had made fraudulent misrepresentations to ECJ as regards a “family legacy” in favour of the De La Sala family. In holding that ECJ’s understanding of the “family legacy” accorded with reality, that reality being that “[while] Ernest has not demonstrated that he has beneficial ownership of all the Companies’ assets; … [w]hat is clear is that a significant portion of the pool of assets [ie, the Assets] existed for the benefit of JRIC” (at [186]).

  51. (c) This court also earlier ruled out the possibility that NEL and JMC, being beneficiaries of the resulting trust, in turn held the Assets on trust for JERIC (at [119]).

  52. [30] Taken together, while the capacity in which Ernest stands to benefit from the Assets is not entirely clear, what is clear is that Ernest has not been adjudged a beneficiary of the Assets that are being held on resulting trust for NEL and JMC. It was further stressed that NEL and JMC do not hold the Assets on any further trust for JERIC. Ernest would thus not be a beneficiary of the Assets, whether directly or indirectly, and would therefore not have standing under s 56(3).

  53. Whether the relief sought pertains to “management or administration of the trust property”

  54. [31] In any case, assuming that Ernest had locus standi to bring the application under s 56 of the Trustees Act, the relief sought by Ernest fell outside the “management or administration” of the Assets. We recognise that the recent UK cases have given the term “management or administration” a broad interpretation in the context of s 57(1) of the UK Trustee Act, which is identical to s 56 of the Trustees Act. In the case of South Downs Trustees Limited v GH and others [2018] EWHC 1064 (Ch) (“South Downs Trustees Limited”), the court stated as follows at [39]:

  55. [33] Likewise in Singapore, this court in Rajabali Jumabhoy ([22] supra) at [83] cited Re Downshire (CA) at 247 to stress the point that the “management or administration” of the trust property “is confined to ‘the managerial supervision and control of trust property on behalf of the beneficiaries’”.

  56. [34] The decision in Re Downshire (CA) was upheld by the House of Lords on appeal in Chapman and others v Chapman and others [1954] AC 429 (“Chapman (HL)”), although the House of Lords did not consider the court’s jurisdiction under s 57 of the UK Trustee Act. Instead, its analysis focused on the inherent jurisdiction of the court, which we address below.

  57. [35] In the present appeal, Ernest argued that distributions of trust assets fall within “management or administration”. There are several difficulties with this argument. First, the authorities relied on by Ernest concerned distribution of trust assets to beneficiaries with determined beneficial interest:

  58. (a) In re Mair [1935] Ch 562 pertained to a trust for the benefit of two women in equal shares. The court was asked to sanction, under s 57 of the UK Trustee Act, a proposal for the payment to each woman of a portion of the capital of the trust fund, to enable one of them to pay pressing debts. The court allowed the application.

  59. (b) South Downs Trustees Limited ([31] supra) involved a discretionary express trust which had purchased some shares in a company, and the beneficiaries were the current and former employees of the company’s business. The proposal, initiated by the trustee, was for the shares in the company to be sold and the proceeds distributed to all the beneficiaries. The court allowed the application.

  60. [36] In the present case, the proportion of beneficial interest in the Assets remains a hotly contested subject, and is pending the court’s determination in OS 317. It was also not entirely clear whether, as at the time of the hearing of this appeal, Ernest had been adjudged to have a beneficial interest in the Assets at all (see discussion above at [30]). A direction that the resulting trustees release the sums of monies sought by Ernest would amount to (at least a tentative) determination that Ernest is beneficially entitled to those sums. This would clearly fall outside mere “management or administration” of trust assets. The effect of Ernest’s application was to convert his unascertained beneficial interests in the shares of NEL and JMC into a beneficial interest in the Assets held on resulting trust for NEL and JMC. As explained at [32] above, this would amount to an impermissible alteration of the nature of Ernest’s beneficial interest in the shares of NEL and JMC.

  61. Whether the relief sought was “expedient”

  62. [37] In addition, Ernest did not discharge his burden of satisfying this court that granting the relief sought would be expedient.

  63. [38] Expediency requires that the proposed transaction be for the benefit of the whole trust, in that it facilitates better administration and management of the trust as a whole (Lewin at para 45–023). This does not mean the court needs to be satisfied that the transaction is in the interest of each and every individual beneficiary; rather, a broad view of the matter should be taken: Leo Teng Choy v Leo Teng Kit and others [2000] 3 SLR(R) 636 at [24]; In re Craven’s Estate; Lloyds Bank Limited v Cockburn (No 2) [1937] Ch 431 at 436.

  64. [40] No authority was provided by Ernest in support of his proposition that such a use of trust funds is “expedient”. It was difficult to square Ernest’s proposed transaction with the requirement of expediency. First and most crucially, the notion of the transaction relating to “management and administration” of the trust is linked to the requirement that it is “expedient” – the transaction is expedient if it facilitates the management and administration of the trust as a whole. However, we have already found that the relief sought does not involve the management and administration of the trust at all. Second, Ernest’s application essentially sought a distribution of the Assets for the purpose of funding his legal representation in proceedings against other potential beneficiaries of the trust. Ernest’s counsel was unable to explain how this was for the benefit of the trust as a whole. In our view, it was clear that s 56 of the Trustees Act could not be used to assist one potential beneficiary in adversarial proceedings against other potential beneficiaries, as such a course would not be in the beneficiaries’ interests as a whole.

  65. [41] Another argument explored by Ernest was that it was expedient because he potentially, and very likely, has the largest interest in the Assets. In our view, this was speculative. As we have explained at [28]–[30] above, until the conclusion of OS 317, the question of Ernest’s beneficial interest in the shares of NEL and JMC (let alone his alleged beneficial interest in the Assets) remains unascertained.

  66. [42] For the above reasons, s 56 of the Trustees Act was not available to assist Ernest in his application.

  67. Inherent jurisdiction

  68. [43] Ernest’s alternative case on appeal was that the court should exercise its inherent jurisdiction to vary the Proprietary Injunction. Ernest characterised the court’s inherent jurisdiction in the administration of trust assets as a wide one. He submitted that the court has “wide powers to intervene and assist or regulate the management or administration of trust property” (citing Halsbury’s Laws of Singapore vol 9(3) and 9(4) (LexisNexis, 2018) (“Halsbury’s Laws of Singapore”) at para 110.853), and may give directions to trustees to distribute trust property when it is “just and expedient” to do so (citing In re MF Global UK Ltd (in special administration) (No 3) [2013] 1 WLR 3874 (“MF Global (No 3)”).

  69. [44] In our judgment, Ernest’s submissions missed a crucial prerequisite for the exercise of the court’s inherent jurisdiction – that it be exercised only in a handful of narrowly-defined and well-established cases. In the leading case of Rajabali Jumabhoy ([22] supra) at [68]–[75], this court had traced the origins of the court’s inherent jurisdiction to sanction a variation of trust. Importantly, it cited with approval the Re Downshire (CA) ([22] supra) and Chapman (HL) ([34] supra) judgments, which examined the principles governing the exercise of such inherent jurisdiction. In sum, there are three key classes of cases in which the court’s inherent jurisdiction to vary a trust will be asserted:

  70. (b) Cases of maintenance of minors: these are cases where a trust only provided for accumulation of income for infant beneficiaries during their minority, without providing for maintenance. In such cases, the court can authorise maintenance to be provided, on the basis that the settlor would not have established a trust to benefit those beneficiaries in the future, and yet intend that they be left unprovided for in the meantime: Chapman (HL) at 455–456, 469.

  71. (c) Cases of compromise: these relate to cases where there is a compromise of rights under a settlement or will which are the subject of real doubt or dispute. In such cases, the court may approve the compromise on behalf of minor, unborn or unascertained beneficiaries: Chapman (HL) at 445–447 and 469.

  72. [45] In Chapman (HL) at 469–470, Lord Asquith of Bishopstone observed that the inherent jurisdiction of the court would be asserted “mainly, if indeed not solely”, in the above three classes of cases, and his view was that the inherent jurisdiction of the court was “limited to these three classes of cases”. In Rajabali Jumabhoy at [75], this court recognised that the court’s inherent jurisdiction would be exercised “mainly” in circumstances such as emergency.

  73. [46] Notably, in Re Downshire (CA) (cited in Rajabali Jumabhoy at [72]), the court stressed that:

  74. [47] Similarly, Lord Morton in Chapman (HL) at 462 affirmed the words of Roxburgh J in In Re Downshire Settled Estates [1952] 2 TLR 483 at 488 (reproduced in Chapman (HL) at 448–449), that where “the admitted purpose of the [proposed transaction] is not to solve any administrative problem but to rearrange beneficial interests to greater advantage”, it falls outside the scope of the court’s inherent jurisdiction. Lord Morton also held that the court would not exercise its inherent jurisdiction in cases of compromise where the compromise is simply sought between the beneficiaries to re-arrange the beneficial interests under the trust instrument (and to bind infants and unborn persons), and where there is no real dispute as to rights (at 445–446).

  75. [48] Ernest’s application does not fall within any of the narrow, established classes of cases in which the court’s inherent jurisdiction can be exercised to vary the trust. His case does not fall into the category of “salvage” or “emergency”, as these cases pertain to the preservation and management of trust property. The present trust is not one for the accumulation of income, and there has clearly been no compromise between the potential beneficiaries of the resulting trust.

  76. [49] The narrowly-defined categories reflect the court’s reluctance to expand the scope of its inherent jurisdiction. The concern, in a case of an express trust, in keeping the court’s inherent jurisdiction narrow is to “give effect to the intention of the settlor or testator as expressed in the trust instrument or the will”. Hence, the court “should not arrogate to itself any inherent overriding jurisdiction to disregard that intention and rewrite the trust” (Rajabali Jumabhoy at [75]).

  77. [50] Such considerations regarding the sanctity of the settlor’s intentions do not apply here, where the trust is a resulting trust. It may therefore be argued that the categories need not be so narrowly circumscribed. Even if that were the case, we were nonetheless satisfied that the inherent jurisdiction of the court does not assist Ernest in his application, for the reason that Ernest’s application falls foul of the fundamental rule that the exercise of such inherent jurisdiction cannot be for the re-arrangement of beneficial interest under the trust (see [46]–[47] above). To exercise the court’s inherent jurisdiction to sanction a distribution of assets in this case would be tantamount to a premature and tentative determination of beneficial interests in the Assets.

  78. [51] We now address some other authorities cited by Ernest. In sum, upon closer examination, they do not stand for his proposition that the court has “wide powers” to intervene (and direct trust property to be distributed) as long as it is simply “just and expedient”. Instead, they relate to vastly different situations involving trustees who have already been authorised to distribute the trust assets to ascertained beneficiaries in question. Ernest’s situation is distinct from these cases as he is not even an ascertained beneficiary of the resulting trust.

  79. [53] Second, where the time arrives for the trustee to distribute trust property, but a third party issues proceedings to enforce an adverse claim to the trust property or any part of it, no distribution can safely take place until the proceedings are disposed of in some way. Nonetheless, the court has jurisdiction to permit or direct a trustee to distribute notwithstanding the existence of claims or potential claims from such third parties: Finers (a firm) and others v Miro [1991] 1 WLR 35 (“Finers v Miro”). This does not have the effect of destroying a proprietary right of third parties, but would afford protection against personal claims against the trustees by third parties: Lewin at para 26–033. In Finers v Miro, a solicitor-trustee held funds on behalf of a client absolutely. Later, the client faced allegations that he had acquired those assets from an insurance company by fraud, and liquidators of the insurance company had commenced proceedings against the client on the basis that the assets were held on constructive trust. Notwithstanding the claim, the court held that there could be payment out of the trust moneys to meet the client’s legal expenses. As Balcombe LJ explained (at 46), the court has the jurisdiction to authorise payment out by a trustee who prima facie holds his assets for a named person absolutely, although with the possibility that there may be other persons interested in those assets.

  80. [55] Ernest relied on these two cases of Finers v Miro and MF Global (No 3) for the proposition that the court should exercise its “inherent jurisdiction to sanction the distribution of trust property according to the practical probabilities” in this case, such that Ernest, being the probable beneficiary of the Assets, would receive a distribution. We disagreed. Both of these cases involve distributions to ascertained beneficiaries. In MF Global (No 3), these were the clients who had filed successful claims with the investment bank. In Finers v Miro, the trustee prima facie held the assets for the sole client absolutely. In contrast, Ernest has not yet been adjudged a beneficiary of the Assets. In fact, in Benjamin and MF Global (No 3), the distribution in accordance with “practical probabilities” meant that those unascertained (and unlikely) beneficiaries were disregarded in the distribution. They do not stand for the proposition that the court can and should direct or permit a distribution to someone who is not an ascertained beneficiary but merely lays claim to that title, no matter how probable that claim may be.

  81. Relevance of Ernest’s alleged need for the enjoined funds

  82. [56] Before we address the last issue, we pause to discuss the relevance of Ernest’s ability to show a need for the enjoined funds to his application in SUM 2794.

  83. [57] Given that the primary ground for Ernest’s application was based on s 56 of the Trustees Act, the question as to whether he has a need for funds was strictly irrelevant to that analysis. It would ultimately not have made any difference to the outcome of the issues concerning Ernest’s locus standi, whether the distribution sought related to the “management or administration” of trust assets, and whether the distribution sought was “expedient” (as defined above at [40]).

  84. [58] Nevertheless, the question of the availability of Ernest’s personal funds was more broadly relevant to the question of whether the Proprietary Injunction should be varied to permit him to draw on the Assets which are subject to the Proprietary Injunction to meet his living and legal expenses. However, Ernest’s case was not pursued in such explicit terms. In the usual case of a defendant who is subject to a Mareva injunction, provision is invariably made for the defendant’s ordinary living and legal expenses. Should the defendant have other free assets which he can use to make payments, the court will then have to consider whether it is nevertheless just and convenient to permit him to use the enjoined assets for such purposes. There is no objection in principle to a defendant being allowed to use assets subject to a Mareva injunction as long as the purpose for which he requires the assets does not conflict with the policy underlying the Mareva jurisdiction: Singapore Civil Procedure 2020 (Vol 1) (Sweet & Maxwell 2020) at p 669, para 29/1/72; Tribune Investment Trust Inc v Dalzavod Joint Stock Co [1997] 3 SLR(R) 813 at [20]–[24]; Royal Global Exports Pte Ltd and others v Good Stream Co Ltd and another [2004] 4 SLR(R) 247 at [3]. The following passage was approved by Clarke LJ in Halifax plc v Chandler [2001] EWCA Civ 1750 at [19]:

  85. [59] However, Ernest’s application in SUM 2794 sought to vary the Proprietary Injunction, and not the Mareva Injunction. A proprietary injunction is a relief, having its origins in the exercise of the Chancery Court’s jurisdiction, that “fastens on the specific asset” in which the plaintiff asserts a proprietary interest, and prevents the defendant from dealing with that asset and its traceable proceeds. The applicable test for granting such a proprietary injunction would be that set out in American Cynamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396. In contrast, a Mareva injunction is granted in support of a claim for personal relief, which does not latch on to any specific asset of the defendant, but prevents the defendant from disposing of his own assets beyond a certain value to defeat a possible judgment that may be rendered against him: Bouvier, Yves Charles Edgar and another v Accent Delight International Ltd and another and another appeal [2015] 5 SLR 558 at [143]–[144]. The short point is that unlike a proprietary injunction where the claim for the assets in question is the very subject matter of the injunction, in the case of a Mareva injunction, it assumes that the enjoined assets belong to the defendant.

  86. [60] The distinction is not a novel one, but was a notable one in this case. As recently recognised in Frédéric Marino v FM Capital Partners Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 1301 (“Marino”) at [18] and [21], while living and legal expenses might ordinarily be provided for in a Mareva injunction, such would not be the case in a proprietary injunction:

  87. [62] Lastly, we note that Ernest had not justified his expected living and medical expenses, and had merely made a bare assertion in his affidavit as to their quantum. Ernest had previously refused to provide the same in respect of the S$500,000 Carve-out in the past, resulting in the discharge of the S$500,000 Carve-out (see [13] above). The fact that this was not the first time that Ernest has been elusive about his actual living and medical expenses is further cause for concern. Ernest has also not provided any explanation how he has been able to fund his legal fees to-date.

  88. [63] For completeness, we should add that even if Ernest was able to show that he has no other sources of funds unaffected by the Proprietary Injunction, the cases show that it does not follow that the variation should be allowed. As the court stated in Marino at [19], it should undertake “a careful and anxious judgment” to determine:

  89. Lewison J in Independent Trustee Services Ltd v GP Noble Trustees Ltd [2009] EWHC 161 (Ch) at [6] had set out four questions to be addressed in the inquiry (cited with approval in Marino at [23]): (a) Does the claimant have an arguable proprietary claim to the funds in issue? (b) If yes, does the defendant have arguable grounds for denying that claim? (c) If yes, has the defendant demonstrated that without the release of the funds in issue he cannot effectively defend the proceedings (or, it may be added, meet his legitimate living expenses)? (d) If yes, where does the balance of justice lie as between, on the one hand, permitting the defendant to expend funds which might belong to the claimant and, on the other hand, refusing to allow the defendant to expend funds which might belong to it?

  90. The appropriate proceedings in which to bring SUM 2794

  91. [64] Finally and for completeness, we address the question as to the appropriate proceedings in which Ernest ought to have brought SUM 2794. The Companies argued on appeal that SUM 2794 was incorrectly filed in Suit 178. We agreed. Suit 178 involved a cause of action whereby the Companies sought recovery of the Assets as misappropriated by Ernest. The end result of Suit 178 was not a distribution of the Assets but only an account of it. In filing SUM 2794 in Suit 178, Ernest was effectively seeking an advance of his share of the Assets prior to the determination of their beneficial interest which is precisely the subject matter of OS 317. The proper process was for Ernest to make an application for interim payment under OS 317, not Suit 178. Having said that, it is likely that Ernest’s application, even if it was filed in OS 317, would be met with the same difficulties which we have identified above.

  92. Conclusion

  93. [65] For the reasons set out above, we dismissed Ernest’s appeal.

  94. (a) Ernest was to pay the Companies costs fixed at S$30,000 inclusive of disbursements for CA 193 and SUM 11.

  95. (b) Ernest was to pay ECJ costs fixed at S$15,000 inclusive of disbursements for CA 193 and SUM 11.