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Grounds publishedDecided 31 Mar 2020

Court of Appeal

Muhammad Nabill bin Mohd Fuad v Public Prosecutor

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[2020] SGCA 25Case no. Criminal Appeal No 40 of 2018

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] The appellant, Muhammad Nabill bin Mohd Fuad (“the Appellant”), claimed trial to two capital charges of trafficking in a controlled drug under s 5(1)(a) read with s 5(2), and punishable under s 33(1) of the Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed) (“MDA”). The first charge was for having in his possession for the purpose of trafficking 64 packets containing 1,827.21g of granular/powdery substance, which was analysed and found to contain not less than 63.41g of diamorphine (“the diamorphine”). The second charge was for having in his possession for the purpose of trafficking nine blocks containing not less than 2,251.90g of vegetable matter, which was analysed and found to be cannabis (“the cannabis”).

  3. [2] At the trial, the Appellant disputed all the elements for both charges. The High Court judge (“the Judge”) convicted the Appellant of both charges. She also found that the Appellant was not a courier, and in any case, the Public Prosecutor had not issued a Certificate of Substantive Assistance. Accordingly, she imposed the mandatory death sentence on the Appellant: see Public Prosecutor v Muhammad Nabill bin Mohd Fuad [2018] SGHC 268 (“GD”) at [2].

  4. [3] The Appellant has appealed against his conviction as well as his sentence. On appeal, the Appellant does not dispute that he had possession of the diamorphine and that he knew what it was. The sole issue in relation to the first charge is whether the Appellant possessed the diamorphine for the purpose of trafficking. As for the second charge, the Appellant accepts that he was in possession of the cannabis, but contends that he did not have the requisite knowledge of the nature of the drugs; nor did he possess the cannabis for the purpose of trafficking.

  5. [4] In the present case, an issue which is of central importance is the Prosecution’s duty in relation to witnesses who can be expected to confirm or, conversely, contradict an accused person’s defence in material respects (“material witnesses”). Given the Prosecution’s overarching duty of fairness, we were troubled that statements recorded from four such witnesses were not disclosed to the Defence in the present case; neither were these witnesses called by the Prosecution to rebut the Appellant’s defence if, indeed, their accounts of the events supported the Prosecution’s case. At the end of the hearing of this appeal, we therefore directed the parties to tender further submissions on what, if anything, was the Prosecution’s duty in these circumstances.

  6. [5] This appeal also presents us with the opportunity to examine the issue of excessive judicial interference in the specific context of criminal proceedings, as that was a further point taken by the Appellant. We are satisfied, having reviewed the record of the proceedings and considered the entirety of the context, that the complaint of excessive judicial interference is not made out. Nonetheless, we take this opportunity to examine and reiterate the need for judges to exercise especial prudence, caution and restraint in criminal proceedings, where the consequences of excessive judicial interference on an accused person’s life and liberty may be severe indeed.

  7. Background facts

  8. The events leading to the Appellant’s arrest

  9. [6] We begin our narrative by setting out the events leading to the Appellant’s arrest. In doing so, we largely use the account given by the Appellant at the trial, which was generally consistent with the contents of the last four of his ten statements to the Central Narcotics Bureau (“CNB”). The Appellant admitted that the account reflected in his first six statements, in which he referred to the involvement of someone called “Danish”, was essentially untrue, a point to which we will return below (at [83]–[88]).

  10. [7] At the material time, the Appellant lived with his wife, Mashitta binte Dawood (“Mashitta”), their children and their domestic helper (“the Helper”) in their flat at Fernvale Link (“the Flat”). The Appellant’s cousin, Sheikh Sufian bin Sheikh Zainal Abidin (“Sufian”), also stayed with them in the Flat. The Appellant and Mashitta occupied the master bedroom, the children and the Helper occupied one bedroom, while Sufian occupied another bedroom (“Bedroom 1”).

  11. [8] The Appellant would smoke methamphetamine in the Flat daily. Sometimes he would do so alone, and several times a week, he would do so with other individuals in Bedroom 1. These individuals included Sufian and two of the Appellant’s friends, Muhammad Faizal bin Mohd Shariff (“Faizal”) and Mohammad Khairul bin Jabar (“Khairul”). Faizal, in particular, provided the Appellant with his supply of methamphetamine.

  12. [9] On 26 January 2016, at around 8.20pm, Faizal brought a trolley bag (“the trolley bag”) to the Flat, and the Helper let him into the Flat. The Appellant claimed that unknown to him at the time, the trolley bag was placed in the storeroom of the Flat by the Helper.

  13. [10] A key issue that was raised in this case was whether the Appellant knew that Faizal would be bringing the trolley bag to the Flat on 26 January 2016, and that the trolley bag contained drugs. The Prosecution’s case is that the Appellant knowingly received the trolley bag, which contained both the diamorphine and the cannabis, from Faizal. The diamorphine was found in Bedroom 1 after the Appellant’s arrest, while the cannabis was found in the trolley bag (see [16]–[17] below).

  14. [11] The Appellant, however, testified that he did not know that Faizal would be bringing the trolley bag to the Flat on 26 January 2016. He claimed that he had been asleep from about 7.00pm until about 10.00pm on the night of 26 January 2016, and after he woke up, he left the Flat with Faizal at about 10.20pm. It was only on the next day, 27 January 2016, that he discovered the diamorphine and the trolley bag in the Flat. According to the Appellant, on 27 January 2016, at about 2.00pm, he noticed several packets of diamorphine laid out on the bed in Bedroom 1. He got into a quarrel with his wife, Mashitta, who was angry that the Appellant allowed people to come to the Flat to “do ‘drugs’” and “make use of [him]”. The Appellant then placed the packets of diamorphine into an “Akira” fan box (“the Akira box”) which was in Bedroom 1. He suspected that it was Sufian, the occupier of Bedroom 1, who had laid out the diamorphine on the bed.

  15. [12] Shortly thereafter, at about 4.00pm, the Appellant discovered the trolley bag in the storeroom. He was informed by Mashitta, who in turn had been told by the Helper, that Faizal had brought the trolley bag to the Flat. According to the Appellant, the diamorphine must have been taken out of the trolley bag as there had been no drugs in the Flat on the previous day, apart from some drugs in the master bedroom which were for his own consumption.

  16. [13] On the same afternoon, the Appellant called Sufian and Faizal and asked them to return to the Flat to “clear the stuff”. They both agreed to do so. The Appellant testified that he called Faizal “straightaway” upon discovering the trolley bag. While the Appellant initially suspected that the trolley bag might contain drugs, Faizal apparently informed him that it contained cigarettes instead, and the Appellant did not check whether this was true. He evidently trusted Faizal. He claimed that Faizal had previously left drugs of various types and in various quantities, as well as cigarettes, in the Flat. On those occasions, the Appellant would call Faizal to ask him to retrieve the relevant items and he would do so.

  17. [14] The Appellant’s iPhone call records were not referred to at the trial to identify the phone calls that he claimed he had made to Sufian and Faizal on the afternoon of 27 January 2016 after discovering the trolley bag and the diamorphine in the Flat. On appeal, we were referred to these call records, which corroborated the Appellant’s claim. These call records showed that on 27 January 2016, the Appellant called Sufian at 4.38pm (for 53 seconds), 5.10pm (for 34 seconds) and 5.20pm (for 61 seconds). The Appellant also called Faizal at 5.47pm (for 47 seconds). While the Appellant testified that he called Faizal “straightaway” after discovering the trolley bag at around 4.00pm, nothing turns on this slight discrepancy in timing, especially given that the Appellant was never referred to his call records either in the course of the investigations or at the trial.

  18. The events following the Appellant’s arrest

  19. [15] On the night of 27 January 2016, at around 7.00pm, CNB officers began observing the Flat because of the Appellant’s suspected involvement in drug activities. At that time, the Appellant, Mashitta, their children, the Helper and Khairul were in the Flat. The Appellant was arrested at about 8.00pm as he was leaving the Flat.

  20. [16] The CNB officers proceeded to search the Flat in the Appellant’s presence, beginning with Bedroom 1. From Bedroom 1, Staff Sergeant Richard Chua Yong Choon (“SSgt Chua”), assisted by Sergeant Muhammad Farhan bin Sanusi (“Sgt Farhan”), seized the 64 packets of diamorphine that formed the subject matter of the first charge. Sixty-three packets were found in the Akira box, and the last packet was found in a “Mintek” bag (“the Mintek bag”) on the bed. The search of Bedroom 1 concluded at around 8.40pm.

  21. [17] Later, at around 9.45pm, Senior Staff Sergeant Ika Zahary bin Kasmari (“Senior SSgt Ika”) asked the Appellant a question. The precise terms of the question were disputed and will be discussed later. In response to the question, the Appellant answered “storeroom”. Senior SSgt Ika then escorted the Appellant to the storeroom, and SSgt Chua seized the trolley bag, which contained all the nine blocks of vegetable matter constituting the cannabis that was the subject matter of the second charge. He also seized a black plastic bag containing 40 cartons of contraband cigarettes which, according to the Appellant, had been placed in the storeroom a few days earlier. There were other drugs and drug paraphernalia seized from the Flat which, unless referred to below, are not material to the present appeal.

  22. The parties’ respective cases at the trial

  23. [18] At the trial, the Prosecution only called the relevant CNB officers and those involved in the CNB’s investigations as its witnesses. The Appellant gave evidence in his own defence but did not call any other witnesses. This meant that no evidence was led from Sufian, Faizal, Mashitta and the Helper. Plainly, they were material witnesses as they could have confirmed or, conversely, contradicted material aspects of the specific account of events given by the Appellant which we have set out above.

  24. [19] Significantly, statements were recorded from each of these four individuals. The defence counsel who represented the Appellant at the trial had requested the Prosecution to make available the statements taken from Sufian, Faizal and the Helper. However, this request was not acceded to. The learned deputy public prosecutor (“DPP”), Mr Lau Wing Yum, told us that the Prosecution took this position because it was of the view that these statements neither undermined its case nor strengthened the Defence’s case, and therefore did not fall within its disclosure obligations as set out in Muhammad bin Kadar and another v Public Prosecutor [2011] 3 SLR 1205 (“Kadar”).

  25. The Prosecution’s case

  26. [20] At the trial, the Prosecution’s case was, first, that in respect of both charges, it had proved that the Appellant had both possession and knowledge of the nature of the drugs. The Prosecution then relied on the presumption of trafficking under s 17 of the MDA.

  27. [21] The Prosecution’s alternative case was that in respect of both charges, it would rely on the presumption of possession under s 18(1) and the presumption of knowledge under s 18(2) of the MDA, and in all the circumstances, it could safely be inferred that the Appellant had possession of the drugs for the purpose of trafficking.

  28. The Appellant’s defence

  29. [22] For both charges, the Appellant generally disputed that he had possession of the drugs, and in particular, physical control of the drugs. He also disputed that he knew the nature of the drugs. The Appellant contended that the drugs were not his but Sufian’s and/or Faizal’s. In relation to the second charge of trafficking in the cannabis, the Appellant submitted that he thought that the trolley bag contained cigarettes. For both charges, the Appellant also disputed that he had possession of the drugs for the purpose of trafficking, on the basis that he had not brought the drugs to the Flat, and on discovering them there, had told Sufian and Faizal to remove them.

  30. The decision below

  31. [23] The Judge found the Appellant guilty of both charges. In relation to the first charge, the Judge made the following findings. First, the Appellant had possession of the diamorphine since he had physical control of the Akira box and the Mintek bag, which together contained the 64 packets of diamorphine. Second, the Appellant, by his own evidence, knew at the material time that those 64 packets contained diamorphine. Third, the Appellant had not rebutted the presumption of trafficking under s 17 of the MDA. The Judge rejected the Appellant’s evidence that he had merely been holding the diamorphine pending its retrieval by Sufian and/or Faizal. The Judge reasoned that the Appellant’s evidence as to the intended purpose of the diamorphine was “inextricably linked to his wider story” about how the drugs came to be present in the Flat without his knowledge. Rejecting his assertions, the Judge found that the Appellant knew that Faizal would be delivering the drugs to the Flat on 26 January 2016. The Judge also noted the large quantity of diamorphine in the Appellant’s possession, more than four times the amount which mandated the imposition of capital punishment (see GD at [89]–[91]). Having rejected the Appellant’s primary case as to how he came to be in possession of the diamorphine, the Judge had no difficulty finding that the Appellant had failed to rebut the presumption of trafficking.

  32. [24] On the Prosecution’s alternative case, the Judge was satisfied that the Appellant had failed to rebut the presumptions of possession and knowledge under ss 18(1) and 18(2) respectively of the MDA. The Judge was also satisfied that the Prosecution had proved that the Appellant had possession of the diamorphine for the purpose of trafficking. The sheer quantity of the diamorphine, the Appellant’s possession of four weighing scales seized from Bedroom 1 and the presence of the Appellant’s DNA on the exterior surface of a group of ten mini packets of diamorphine (F1D3A) showed that he was involved in packing the diamorphine. Further, his attempts to distance himself from the drugs through the fabrication of elaborate accounts about Danish showed that he was determined to conceal his involvement (see GD at [92]–[94]).

  33. [25] Turning to the second charge, the Judge made the following findings. First, the Appellant had possession of the cannabis since he had physical control of the trolley bag in which the cannabis was contained. Second, the Appellant knew at the material time that the trolley bag contained cannabis, and not cigarettes. Third, the Appellant had failed to rebut the presumption of trafficking under s 17 of the MDA, for similar reasons as those in relation to the first charge. In this regard, the Judge noted that the trolley bag contained more than twice the amount of cannabis which mandated the imposition of capital punishment (see GD at [89]–[91]). The Prosecution’s alternative case was also accepted, for essentially the same reasons as those given for the first charge.

  34. [26] In coming to her decision, the Judge rejected the Appellant’s submission that the Prosecution should have disclosed the statements recorded from Sufian, Faizal and Mashitta. She noted that under s 259(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) (“CPC”), statements made by any person (other than an accused person) in the course of any investigations into an offence were generally inadmissible, and pointed out that the Appellant had not attempted to show how the statements of Sufian, Faizal and Mashitta could be admitted pursuant to one of the exceptions set out in ss 259(1)(a) to 259(1)(e) of the CPC. Neither had the Appellant shown how these statements could be said to come within the ambit of the Prosecution’s disclosure obligations as set out in Kadar ([19] supra) (the “Kadar obligations”). The Judge also held that it was immaterial that the Prosecution had refused to produce the Helper’s statement as the Helper’s evidence would not have impacted her reasons for finding that the Appellant knew that Faizal would be bringing the trolley bag to the Flat on 26 January 2016 (see GD at [85]–[86]).

  35. The parties’ respective cases on appeal

  36. The Appellant’s case

  37. [27] As we mentioned at [3] above, the Appellant is appealing against his conviction and his sentence on both charges. We briefly set out his position on appeal.

  38. [28] In relation to the first charge, the Appellant no longer disputes that he had possession and also knowledge of the diamorphine (see [3] above). He contends, however, that he did not have the diamorphine, which did not belong to him, in his possession for the purpose of trafficking, but only for the purpose of returning it to Sufian and/or Faizal, who had left it at the Flat. This would not constitute trafficking, as we held recently in Ramesh a/l Perumal v Public Prosecutor and another appeal [2019] 1 SLR 1003 (“Ramesh”) at [110].

  39. [29] In relation to the second charge, the Appellant does not dispute that he had possession of the cannabis (see [3] above). However, he contends that he did not know that the trolley bag contained the cannabis. The Appellant claims that he was informed by Faizal that the trolley bag contained cigarettes, and he genuinely believed Faizal. The Appellant further submits that, in any event, he did not have the cannabis in his possession for the purpose of trafficking because the trolley bag was to be retrieved by Faizal, who had left it at the Flat.

  40. [30] In addition, the Appellant argues, in relation to both charges, that the Judge failed to appreciate in particular the significance of the non-availability of the statements of Sufian, Faizal and the Helper. Finally, while there is no allegation of bias, the Appellant contends that the Judge’s conduct and her questioning of the witnesses at the trial amounted to excessive judicial interference and gave rise to the impression that her judgment had been clouded.

  41. The Prosecution’s case

  42. [31] In contrast, the Prosecution’s position on appeal is that none of the Judge’s findings were plainly wrong or against the weight of the evidence, and therefore, they should not be disturbed.

  43. The issues to be determined

  44. [32] The issues that arise in this appeal are as follows.

  45. [33] First, we consider what, if anything, is the Prosecution’s duty in relation to a material witness in the sense defined at [4] above.

  46. [34] Second, we analyse the charges before us. This requires us to consider:

  47. (a) for the first charge concerning the diamorphine, whether the Appellant has rebutted the presumption of trafficking under s 17 of the MDA; and

  48. (b) for the second charge concerning the cannabis, whether the Appellant has rebutted the presumption of knowledge under s 18(2) of the MDA, and if not, whether the Prosecution has proved that the Appellant possessed the cannabis for the purpose of trafficking.

  49. [35] Third, and finally, we consider whether the Appellant’s complaint of excessive judicial interference is made out, and if so, what consequences ought to follow.

  50. Issue 1: The Prosecution’s duty in relation to material witnesses

  51. [36] We begin with our decision on the question in respect of which we had directed the parties to tender further submissions at the end of the hearing of this appeal (see [4] above). We framed this question (“the Question”) as follows:

  52. [37] In our judgment, this raises a broader question as to the proper ambit of the Prosecution’s role. It is helpful to begin with first principles. The Prosecution acts at all times in the public interest. In that light, it is generally unnecessary for the Prosecution to adopt a strictly adversarial position in criminal proceedings. As we stated in Kadar ([19] supra), “the Prosecution owes a duty to the court and to the wider public to ensure that only the guilty are convicted, and that all relevant material is placed before the court to assist it in its determination of the truth” [emphasis in original omitted] (at [200]). Pursuant to this duty, under the Kadar obligations (at [113]):

  53. [38] In the subsequent analysis, we propose to address the Question in the following manner:

  54. (a) first, we consider whether the Prosecution has a duty to disclose a material witness’s statement to the Defence; and

  55. (b) second, we consider whether the Prosecution has a duty to call a material witness. The Prosecution’s evidential burden to rebut an accused person’s claim and the role of adverse inferences will also be discussed.

  56. Issue 1(a): Whether the Prosecution has a duty to disclose a material witness’s statement to the Defence

  57. [39] Where the first of the two aforesaid sub-issues is concerned, both parties accept that the Prosecution ought to be under a duty to disclose a material witness’s statement to the Defence. We agree. For convenience, we will refer to this duty as the “additional disclosure obligations”.

  58. [40] We state at the outset that, as with the Kadar obligations, the additional disclosure obligations are laid down pursuant to s 6 of the CPC, which provides as follows:

  59. As we stated in Kadar, the reference to what “the justice of the case may require” includes “procedures that uphold established notions of a fair trial in an adversarial setting where not already part of the written law” (at [105]).

  60. [41] We should point out two key differences between the Kadar obligations and the additional disclosure obligations:

  61. (a) The first difference is that where the additional disclosure obligations are concerned, it does not matter whether the statement in question is: (a) favourable (and so triggers the Kadar obligations); (b) neutral; or (c) adverse to the accused person. If appropriate, and if there are valid reasons, the Prosecution can apply to the court for the redaction of those portions of the statement that have nothing to do with the accused person’s defence, relevance to the defence being the factor that renders the statement a material statement in the first place.

  62. (b) The second difference is that the additional disclosure obligations do not require the Prosecution to carry out a prior assessment of whether a material witness’s statement is prima facie credible and relevant to the guilt or innocence of the accused person. Such an assessment is required for material that is disclosed pursuant to the Prosecution’s Kadar obligations because we were concerned in Kadar to reasonably limit the amount of unused material that the Prosecution would have to disclose. This concern does not arise in relation to the statements of material witnesses because the number of such statements will in most cases be limited. The burden to disclose such statements would not be onerous on the Prosecution in most cases, and hence, there would be no need for the Prosecution to undertake any wide-ranging review or assessment of prima facie credibility and relevance before disclosing such statements.

  63. [42] For the avoidance of doubt, we should add that neither the Kadar obligations nor the additional disclosure obligations affect the operation of any ground for non-disclosure recognised by law.

  64. The basis for the Prosecution’s additional disclosure obligations

  65. [43] We turn to the basis for finding a duty on the part of the Prosecution to disclose a material witness’s statement to the Defence.

  66. [44] First, the Prosecution candidly acknowledged that there might be instances where “[t]he Prosecution may not, despite acting in good faith, fully appreciate the defence the accused is running or intends to run”. In such circumstances, the Prosecution contemplated that it might “inadvertently” fail to disclose statements which might tend to support the defence. In our judgment, it would be an intolerable outcome if the court were deprived of relevant evidence that might potentially exculpate the accused person simply because the Prosecution made an error in its assessment of the significance of certain evidence. The fact that such an error is made in good faith does not change the analysis.

  67. [46] There is a further dimension to the disadvantage faced by the Defence in such circumstances. Suppose, in this case, the Defence had interviewed Faizal, and Faizal had confirmed the Appellant’s defence that he had called Faizal on the afternoon of 27 January 2016 to ask Faizal to retrieve the drugs from the Flat, and Faizal had agreed to do so. It would ordinarily seem sensible and logical for the Appellant to then call Faizal as a defence witness to corroborate his defence. The Appellant might, however, have yet been faced with a real dilemma as to whether or not to do so. The Appellant would be aware that the Prosecution had access to whatever statements Faizal had previously made, and that those statements were thought by the Prosecution not to be subject to disclosure pursuant to its Kadar obligations. In considering the possible reasons why the Prosecution considered that Faizal’s statements did not fall within the ambit of its Kadar obligations, the Appellant would have had to contemplate at least the following scenarios: (a) Faizal’s statements were in fact adverse to him, contrary to what Faizal might have told him; (b) Faizal’s statements were neutral to both parties; or (c) possibly, as the Prosecution recognised in its submissions, the Prosecution had wrongly assessed that Faizal’s statements did not undermine its case or strengthen the Defence’s case. Thus, in deciding whether or not to call Faizal as a defence witness, the Appellant would have had to consider the risk that Faizal’s statements might contradict his defence and likely end up being used to undermine his credibility as a witness, all of which might ultimately harm his case at the trial.

  68. [47] In our judgment, leaving an accused person in a situation where he chooses not to call a material witness because of the dangers arising from his not being aware of what that witness has previously said in his statements to the investigating authorities does not reflect a satisfactory balance between ensuring fairness to the accused person on the one hand, and preserving the adversarial nature of the trial process on the other. As we have noted, the duty on the Prosecution to disclose a limited amount of unused material to the Defence (of which the Kadar obligations are a part) is premised on the Prosecution’s duty to the court and to the public to ensure that only the guilty are convicted, and that all relevant material is placed before the court to assist it in its determination of the truth (see [37] above). The court’s fundamental objective in criminal trials is to arrive at a just outcome through a fair process. This is what our decision in this case seeks to advance.

  69. [48] Further, it bears emphasis that where there is any doubt over whether a particular statement is subject to disclosure, whether under the Kadar or the additional disclosure obligations, the Prosecution ought to err on the side of disclosure. This is because the consequences of non-disclosure could be severe. As we stated in Kadar ([19] supra) at [120]:

  70. [49] We turn to the remaining points where there was some disagreement between the parties. These relate to:

  71. (a) when the Prosecution should be required to disclose to the Defence the statement of a material witness; and

  72. (b) whether that statement would be subject to disclosure if the material witness is called as a prosecution witness.

  73. [50] In our judgment, the Prosecution ought to satisfy its additional disclosure obligations when it files and serves the Case for the Prosecution on the accused person (if the statutory disclosure procedure applies), or at the latest, before the trial begins (if the statutory disclosure procedure does not apply). These are the same timelines as those that apply in respect of the Prosecution’s Kadar obligations (see Kadar at [113]). Like the Kadar obligations, the Prosecution’s additional disclosure obligations constitute a continuing obligation which only ends when the proceedings against the accused person (including any appeal) have been completely disposed of. Thus, if the relevance of a particular material witness’s evidence only becomes apparent after the accused person has testified at the trial, then that witness’s statement should be disclosed to the Defence at that juncture. As for whether the Prosecution is required to disclose the statement of a material witness who is a prosecution witness, we leave this issue open for determination on a future occasion. The issue does not arise here as none of the material witnesses in the present case was a prosecution witness. We elaborate on each of these points in turn below.

  74. The time of disclosure

  75. [51] While the Appellant contended that a material witness’s statement should be disclosed to the Defence before the trial, the Prosecution submitted that the statement ought to be disclosed only after the accused person has testified for two principal reasons. First, the Prosecution suggested that if a material witness’s statement were disclosed to the Defence at an earlier stage, the accused person might tailor his defence to bring it in line with that witness’s account. Second, the Prosecution suggested that the accused person might seek to influence that witness into giving evidence favourable to the Defence’s case, or otherwise retracting or neutralising his evidence.

  76. [52] With respect, we think that these concerns are overstated. This is because the triggering of the additional disclosure obligations is itself a response to a defence which the accused person has already alluded to in his statements to the investigating authorities. If the concern is that the accused person might further “tailor” his defence at the trial after having had sight of the relevant material witnesses’ statements, it is open to the Prosecution to challenge that defence by, for instance, taking further statements from the relevant material witnesses and calling them as rebuttal witnesses to contradict any new contentions that the accused person might put forth. If the Prosecution fails to do so, it may well be that the accused person is simply speaking the truth, rather than tailoring his defence. It should be emphasised that there is no principle of law that the evidence of an accused person must be treated as inherently incredible or being of suspect value merely because it advances his defence and is, in that sense, self-serving. If the presumption of innocence means anything at all, it must mean that an accused person who testifies to exonerate himself may be telling the truth. The assessment of whether or not he is doing so must, in the final analysis, depend on the totality of the evidence. And it should not be overlooked that courts are entirely capable of assessing the credibility of the claims made by witnesses, that being among the most basic aspects of fact-finding, which is a core judicial task.

  77. [53] In our judgment, requiring the Prosecution to disclose a material witness’s statement to the Defence before the trial is also consistent with the twin rationales underlying the additional disclosure obligations which we have identified above and which the Prosecution accepts (see [44]–[45] above). Since one of the reasons for imposing the additional disclosure obligations is to address the Prosecution’s difficulties in assessing whether a material witness’s statement falls within its Kadar obligations, it follows that the respective timelines for disclosure should be aligned. Moreover, as we have stated above (at [45]–[47]), the disclosure of a material witness’s statement is also meant to enable the Defence to make an informed choice in deciding whether or not to call the witness concerned in the specific circumstance where the Prosecution has chosen not to call that witness. We reiterate that an accused person should not be left in a position where he chooses not to call a material witness because of the possibility that that witness’s statement may be adverse to him, when that may not in fact be the case. If a potential defence witness has provided a statement to the Prosecution that is inconsistent with what he has told the Defence, it is only fair for the Defence to have prior notice of this statement when deciding on the witnesses that it intends to call. In this connection, the Defence ought to be able to decide on the witnesses that it wishes to call before the trial and before the accused person has given evidence. This is contemplated by the statutory scheme for disclosure, which requires the Defence to list the names of its witnesses in the Case for the Defence (see ss 165 and 217 of the CPC). It is obvious that the decision on which witnesses to call is a crucial part of the Defence’s preparation for trial and its assessment of the strength of its case. The latter may be a relevant consideration in deciding whether the accused person himself should testify, or, even more fundamentally, whether he should contest the charge against him. For these reasons, we are satisfied that the risks and concerns identified by the Prosecution, even assuming their validity, would in any event be outweighed by the need to ensure that the Defence is able fairly to prepare for trial and assess the strength of its case.

  78. Whether the statement of a material witness who is a prosecution witness is subject to disclosure

  79. [54] We next address the Prosecution’s submission that it should not be obliged to disclose a prosecution witness’s statement to the Defence, even if that witness is a material witness. As we mentioned at [50] above, this issue falls outside the scope of the Question because we are concerned here with a situation where none of the material witnesses in question was called by the Prosecution. We therefore leave open for another time, when the issue is squarely raised, the question whether the statement of a material witness who is a prosecution witness is subject to the additional disclosure obligations set out here. That said, if a prosecution witness has provided a statement that is inconsistent with his testimony at the trial, we see no reason why that statement ought not to be disclosed to the Defence as part of the Prosecution’s Kadar obligations. The Defence ought to have that statement for the purposes of cross-examination and impeachment of the witness’s credit if appropriate.

  80. [55] We also observe that the “Code of Practice for the Conduct of Criminal Proceedings by the Prosecution and Defence”, jointly issued by the Attorney-General’s Chambers and the Law Society of Singapore, states as follows at para 41:

  81. [56] With these observations, we leave this issue for detailed consideration on a future occasion.

  82. Issue 1(b): Whether the Prosecution has a duty to call a material witness

  83. [57] We turn to the second part of the Question, which is whether the Prosecution has a duty to call a material witness (who, as we stated at [4] above, can be expected to confirm or, conversely, contradict an accused person’s defence in material respects). Here, both parties agreed that the Prosecution has no duty (in the sense of a legal duty) to call any witness, including a material witness. The Appellant, however, suggested that the Prosecution does not have an unfettered discretion, and that it should call witnesses who are “necessary to the unfolding of the narrative”.

  84. [58] We agree with the broad proposition that the Prosecution has no duty to call particular individuals as witnesses. We have previously stated that “the Prosecution has a discretion whether or not to call a particular witness, provided that there is no ulterior motive and the witness, who is available to, but not called by, the Prosecution, is offered to the Defence” (see Lim Young Sien v Public Prosecutor [1994] 1 SLR(R) 920 (“Lim Young Sien”) at [35]). In this connection, we have also previously noted that “[t]here may be many legitimate reasons why the Prosecution may not wish to call a particular person as a witness, examples of which would be the lack of credibility of his evidence and/or the immateriality of his evidence (despite its apparent credibility)” (see Yong Vui Kong v Public Prosecutor [2012] 2 SLR 872 at [30]).

  85. [59] In this regard, it is helpful to briefly refer to the position in other common law jurisdictions.

  86. [60] The position in Malaysia is set out in the decision of the Federal Court of Malaysia in Siew Yoke Keong v Public Prosecutor [2013] 3 MLJ 630 (see also Ghasem Hozouri Hassan v Public Prosecutor [2019] 6 MLJ 231 at [28]). There, the Federal Court stated as follows at [42]:

  87. [61] As for the English position, both parties referred us to the decision of the Privy Council in Adel Muhammed El Dabbah v Attorney-General for Palestine [1944] AC 156, where it was said at 168:

  88. [62] We note further that in England and Wales, the Prosecution’s discretion is guided by the principles set out in the decision of the English Court of Appeal in R v Russell-Jones [1995] 3 All ER 239 (“Russell-Jones”) (see also R v Dania (Jordan) [2019] EWCA Crim 796 at [37]). We set out some of these principles below (see Russell-Jones at 244–245):

  89. [63] Finally, we turn to the Australian position, which requires the Prosecution to call both witnesses who are favourable and witnesses who are unfavourable to its case. The High Court of Australia summed up the position as follows in Diehm and another v Director of Public Prosecutions (Nauru) (2013) 303 ALR 42 at [63]:

  90. [64] We pause to note that the Australian position is to some extent shaped by s 38 of the Australian Evidence Act 1995 (Act No 2 of 1995) (Cth), which permits the Prosecution to cross-examine its own witness if the evidence given by the witness is “unfavourable” to it. In other words, it is not necessary to show that the witness has turned “hostile”, for example, by departing from an earlier statement given to the Prosecution (see Bianca Shandell Santo v R [2009] NSWCCA 269 at [26]–[27]).

  91. [65] In this regard, s 156 of our Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed) (“EA”) states that “[t]he court may, in its discretion, permit the person who calls a witness to put any questions to him which might be put in cross-examination by the adverse party”. The Prosecution contended that leave may only be granted if the witness has been shown to be hostile. As against this, we note that in Public Prosecutor v BAU [2016] 5 SLR 146, Woo Bih Li J observed at [24] that:

  92. [66] It is not necessary for the purposes of this appeal to arrive at a concluded view on the proper interpretation of s 156 of the EA. Nevertheless, given the general rule that a party may not cross-examine its own witness, in our judgment, the Australian position ought not to apply in our context. Nor do we think it necessary to set out detailed principles to guide the Prosecution in the exercise of its discretion in calling witnesses, as is the English position. It is also unhelpful to state, as the Appellant suggested, that the Prosecution is required to call witnesses who are “necessary to the unfolding of the narrative” as this expression is vague and bears no legal meaning.

  93. [67] In our judgment, it suffices to highlight that the Prosecution has no duty to call a material witness. However, in appropriate circumstances, the failure to call a material witness might mean that the Prosecution has failed to discharge its evidential burden to rebut the defence advanced by an accused person. In addition, the court may in certain circumstances be entitled to draw an adverse inference pursuant to s 116, Illustration (g) of the EA that the evidence of a material witness who could have been but was not called by the Prosecution would have been unfavourable to the Prosecution. Our reasons are as follows.

  94. The Prosecution’s evidential burden and the drawing of adverse inferences

  95. [68] The principles relating to the Prosecution’s burden of proof were the subject of our recent decision in Public Prosecutor v GCK and another matter [2020] SGCA 2 (“GCK”). There, we explained that embedded within the concept of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the Prosecution’s legal burden to prove the charge against the accused person beyond a reasonable doubt and its evidential burden to adduce sufficient evidence to address facts that have been put in issue (see GCK at [130] and [132]). The latter burden might also rest on the Defence, depending on the nature of the defence and the fact in issue that is being raised (see GCK at [133]).

  96. [69] As regards the evidential burden, it is well established that this is a burden which can shift between the parties. This burden was explained in Britestone Pte Ltd v Smith & Associates Far East, Ltd [2007] 4 SLR(R) 855 at [58] as follows:

  97. [70] In our judgment, the Question in the present case squarely engages the Prosecution’s evidential burden to adduce sufficient evidence to rebut a defence raised by the accused person that has properly come into issue. We are concerned here with the narrow situation where an accused person has advanced a specific defence which identifies specific material witnesses and the Prosecution, despite having had access to these witnesses, has chosen not to call them.

  98. [72] In addition, it is well established that the Prosecution’s failure to a call a material witness may justify the court drawing an adverse inference against it. In Public Prosecutor v Muhammad Farid bin Mohd Yusop [2015] 3 SLR 16 (“Muhammad Farid”) at [45], we endorsed the following observations of the High Court in Mohamed Abdullah s/o Abdul Razak v Public Prosecutor [2000] 1 SLR(R) 922 (“Mohamed Abdullah”) at [41]:

  99. [73] In the present context, where the Prosecution has had access to a material witness whose evidence would be directly relevant to discharging its evidential burden and is in possession of a statement from that witness, the failure to call that witness to refute the evidence led by the Defence on a fact in issue may more readily justify an inference being drawn against the Prosecution that that witness’s evidence, if led, would have been adverse to it on that fact in issue. However, at the risk of stating the obvious, we stress that the drawing of an adverse inference must, in the final analysis, depend on the circumstances of each case. That is to say, while the Prosecution is always required to discharge its evidential burden whenever a defence raised by the accused person has properly come into issue, it does not inevitably follow that an adverse inference will be drawn against the Prosecution for its failure to call a material witness to testify on that defence. Nonetheless, in the context of absent witnesses, we note that it may be useful to refer to the following principles which were set out in Sudha Natrajan v The Bank of East Asia Ltd [2017] 1 SLR 141 (“Sudha Natrajan”) at [20]:

  100. [74] We should also mention the following principles which are applicable to the drawing of adverse inferences generally (see Sudha Natrajan at [21], [23] and [26]):

  101. (a) first, an adverse inference ought not to be drawn where the failure to produce evidence is reasonably attributable to reasons other than the merits of the case;

  102. (b) second, in drawing the relevant inference, the court must put its mind to the manner in which the evidence that is not produced is said to be unfavourable to the party who might reasonably have been expected to produce it; and

  103. (c) third, applying the best evidence rule, an adverse inference should not be drawn unless it can be said that the evidence that is withheld is superior to the evidence already adduced.

  104. [75] Returning to the Question in the present case, we are satisfied that the Prosecution’s failure to call a material witness may result in the court finding that it has thereby failed to discharge its evidential burden in respect of a material fact in issue and/or may justify the court drawing an adverse inference if the Prosecution is unable to satisfy the court that it had good reason not to call that witness.

  105. [76] In this regard, it may not suffice for the Prosecution to justify its failure to call a material witness on the basis that that witness’s prospective evidence seemed to be “neutral” if, clearly, that witness would have been in a position to either confirm or, conversely, contradict the accused person’s defence in material respects. In the present case, given that the statements of the material witnesses concerned – namely, Sufian, Faizal, Mashitta and the Helper –were not disclosed to the Defence pursuant to the Prosecution’s Kadar obligations, and these witnesses were also not called by the Prosecution to discharge its evidential burden, the logical conclusion is that their statements must have been neutral in the sense that they did not speak on the matters put in issue by the Appellant.

  106. [77] This suggests, and indeed, leads to the inference that questions on material aspects of the Appellant’s defence were not posed to these material witnesses when their statements were being recorded. In this regard, two important aspects of the Appellant’s defence which emerged from his last four statements to the CNB (the account given by the Appellant in his first six statements being, as we noted at [6] above, essentially untrue) were that: (a) he did not know that Faizal would be bringing the trolley bag to the Flat on 26 January 2016 and had been asleep when Faizal arrived at the Flat with the trolley bag; and (b) he only discovered the trolley bag and the diamorphine in the Flat the following afternoon. It would appear that Faizal might not have been asked questions relating to his purpose of bringing the trolley bag to the Flat on 26 January 2016 and whether he had handed the trolley bag to the Appellant or to the Helper. It would also appear that the Helper might not have been asked whether she was the one who had placed the trolley bag in the storeroom and what the Appellant had been doing when Faizal arrived at the Flat with the trolley bag. If that was indeed the case, then, with respect, regardless of whether Faizal’s and the Helper’s statements were recorded before or after the Appellant’s last four statements to the CNB, we cannot see any justification for the Prosecution not having asked Faizal and the Helper these questions, which would have confirmed or, conversely, contradicted the two aforesaid aspects of the Appellant’s defence in material ways. If the statements of Faizal and the Helper had been recorded before the Appellant’s last four statements to the CNB, further statements could have been taken from them in relation to the questions outlined above had their initial statements been neutral to the Appellant. This would likewise be the position if the two aforesaid aspects of the Appellant’s defence had only emerged at the trial, even though this might conceivably have necessitated an adjournment of the trial. After all, returning to first principles, the Prosecution is duty-bound to place before the court all relevant material to assist it in its determination of the truth. In our judgment, it would be quite unfair to expect the Defence, in place of the Prosecution, to pose to material witnesses questions which may confirm or, conversely, contradict the accused person’s defence in material ways. The accused person might not have the ability or resources to mount a reasonably robust investigation to find out what evidence a material witness might give. Further, as a practical matter, it might be difficult for the Defence to elicit evidence from a material witness if such evidence would necessarily incriminate the witness.

  107. [78] We turn to address some other submissions made by the Prosecution.

  108. [79] The Prosecution submitted that the court should not draw an adverse inference against it for failing to call a material witness where the witness has been offered to the Defence or where the Defence is able on its own to trace the witness to testify (citing Lim Young Sien ([58] supra) at [35] and Yoganathan R v Public Prosecutor and another appeal [1999] 3 SLR(R) 346 at [37] respectively). However, we are presently concerned with a situation where the accused person has made a specific claim and the evidential burden falls on the Prosecution to rebut that claim. That being the case, it is for the Prosecution to call a material witness whose evidence may rebut that claim; the mere fact that the witness has been offered to the Defence or that the Defence can on its own trace the witness to testify does not change the analysis in any way. In such circumstances, if the Prosecution fails to call the witness, it may simply be found to have failed to discharge its evidential burden. There may be no need for the court to go further and draw an adverse inference as to what the missing evidence might have revealed.

  109. [80] Finally, the Prosecution submitted that if we were to hold that it has a duty to disclose a material witness’s statement to the Defence in circumstances where it has chosen not to call that witness, then the court should “impose a stricter duty on the Defence to call that witness” [emphasis in original]. This would mean that the court would more readily draw an adverse inference against the Defence if the Defence, having seen that witness’s statement, fails to call that witness without providing a satisfactory explanation.

  110. [81] We do not accept this submission. We reiterate that the additional disclosure obligations seek (among other things) to assist the Defence in assessing whether or not to call a material witness by requiring the Prosecution to disclose that witness’s statement, and not thereby to compel the Defence to call that witness as a defence witness. It is apposite to refer to the following observations of the High Court in Mohamed Abdullah ([72] supra), which we endorsed in Muhammad Farid ([72] supra) at [45], in relation to the drawing of adverse inferences against the Defence for failing to call a material witness:

  111. [82] Aside from this, there is simply no basis at all for the submission that an adverse inference should be drawn against the Defence for failing to call a material witness when it is the Prosecution’s evidential burden that is in issue. The Prosecution cannot seek to discharge that burden by relying on the Defence not calling particular evidence from a material witness to advance its case, regardless of whether or not the Defence has access to statements previously given by that witness to the investigating authorities.

  112. Preamble to Issue 2: Inconsistencies in the Appellant’s ten statements to the CNB

  113. [83] Before turning to the charges before us, we make a preliminary point concerning the inconsistencies in the Appellant’s ten statements to the CNB, which we alluded to earlier (see [6] above). The contents of these statements were set out by the Judge at [25]–[34] of the GD. In brief terms, the Appellant’s initial account in his first six statements was that it was Danish who had left “things” in the Flat in the early morning of 27 January 2016. The Appellant claimed that Danish then sent him a text message informing him that someone would come to collect the “things”, but that did not happen despite the Appellant repeatedly calling Danish later that day. The Appellant claimed that he knew the “things” were drugs only after he was arrested. The Appellant’s account of Danish was elaborate and included details as to how he had first met Danish as well as how Danish would stay over at the Flat regularly almost every weekday since October 2015.

  114. [84] It is not disputed that the Appellant fabricated or at least embellished his account of Danish in the original version of the events that he gave in his first six statements. In his ninth statement, the Appellant admitted that Danish had never been to the Flat before, and that he had in fact never seen Danish before. At the trial, the Appellant testified that he had given this fictitious account of Danish in his defence to the two capital trafficking charges for a few reasons, including the following: he felt that he had to provide an answer to the charges; he was suffering from drug withdrawal symptoms; he was confused, in fear, in shock and not in the right state of mind; he knew that Danish was the ultimate supplier of the drugs; and he deliberately made up the story concerning Danish. Evidently, some of these reasons were conflicting.

  115. [85] The Judge found the Appellant to be “an untruthful and unreliable witness, who kept changing his story along the way”. She also concluded that he had made up stories about Danish in his first six statements “to hide the fact that he knew that Faizal had come to the Flat on 26 January 2016 with [the trolley bag]” and “to disassociate himself from the drugs” in the Flat (see GD at [82]). This seems to us to be a significant part of the Judge’s reasoning that led her to conclude that the Appellant was guilty of both trafficking charges.

  116. [86] It is useful to set out the basic principles concerning the corroborative effect of lies told by an accused person. In this regard, an accused person’s lies can only amount to corroboration of guilt under carefully prescribed conditions. One such condition is that the lies must relate to a material issue (see Public Prosecutor v Ilechukwu Uchechukwu Chukwudi [2015] SGCA 33 at [60]). Further, even where lies which can amount to corroboration of guilt are established, they can only be employed to support other evidence adduced by the Prosecution and cannot by themselves make out the Prosecution’s case (see GCK ([68] supra) at [141], citing Public Prosecutor v Chee Cheong Hin Constance [2006] 2 SLR(R) 24 at [92]).

  117. [87] In this regard, the Appellant submitted that his lie about the involvement of Danish in the events of 26 and 27 January 2016, when it was in fact Faizal who had been involved, was a lie as to the identity of the person who had brought the diamorphine and the cannabis to the Flat. The Appellant contended that this was not a material issue; rather, it was a non-issue because, first, the identity of that person was in no way relevant to the criminality that was inherent in the situation, and, second, there was, in any case, independent evidence, in particular, CCTV records, establishing that Faizal was the one who had brought the trolley bag (which contained the diamorphine and the cannabis) to the Flat. We agree. The fact of the matter is that the trolley bag was not already in the Flat prior to the events of 26 and 27 January 2016, and it was brought to the Flat by a third party on the night of 26 January 2016. This much cannot seriously be disputed. The substance of the Appellant’s defence in all his ten statements to the CNB remained that when he discovered the trolley bag and the diamorphine in the Flat on the afternoon of 27 January 2016, he sought to return them to whoever had left them at the Flat, which, by the original account in his first six statements, was Danish (or someone acting on Danish’s instructions and behalf). We are unable to see how, in lying that Danish, rather than Faizal, had been involved, the Appellant could be said to have disassociated himself from the drugs, as the Judge thought. In particular, we do not see how this lie could be said to be a lie that somehow corroborated his guilt in respect of the charges that he faced, even if it damaged his trustworthiness.

  118. [88] At the same time, it should be emphasised that this lie does not necessarily mean that the Appellant lied about other matters as well. This too would have to be considered in the round in the light of all the evidence.

  119. [89] In that light, we turn to the two charges before us.

  120. Issue 2: The charges

  121. [90] In relation to the first charge, the sole issue, as we mentioned at [3] above, is whether the Appellant possessed the diamorphine for the purpose of trafficking. There is no dispute that the Appellant had possession and knowledge of the diamorphine. The Prosecution is entitled to rely on the presumption of trafficking under s 17 of the MDA, and we thus consider whether the Appellant has rebutted that presumption.

  122. [91] As for the second charge, there are two issues, it being common ground that the Appellant had possession of the cannabis (see [3] and [29] above). The first issue is whether the Appellant knew that the trolley bag contained the cannabis. In this regard, since the Prosecution has relied on the presumption of knowledge under s 18(2) of the MDA, we will have to consider whether the Appellant has rebutted that presumption. If the presumption of knowledge is not rebutted, it will then become necessary to consider the second issue, which is whether the Appellant possessed the cannabis for the purpose of trafficking.

  123. [92] In considering whether the Appellant has rebutted the relevant presumptions, we bear in mind the inherent difficulties of proving a negative, and therefore, that the burden on an accused person to rebut a presumption which operates against him should not be so onerous that it becomes virtually impossible to discharge (see Gopu Jaya Raman v Public Prosecutor [2018] 1 SLR 499 (“Gopu Jaya Raman”) at [2] and [24]).

  124. Issue 2(a): The first charge of trafficking in the diamorphine

  125. [93] In concluding that the Appellant possessed the diamorphine for the purpose of trafficking, the Judge made the following findings (see GD at [94]):

  126. (a) First, the Judge rejected the Appellant’s evidence “that he had nothing to do with how the drugs came to be found in the Flat” and “that he intended to return the drugs to Faizal or Sufian”.

  127. (b) Second, the Appellant’s DNA was found on the exterior surface of F1D3A, a group of ten mini packets of diamorphine (see [24] above), which showed that he was involved in packing the diamorphine.

  128. (c) Third, the sheer quantity of the diamorphine made an inference of trafficking “irresistible”.

  129. (d) Fourth, it was not the Appellant’s case that the diamorphine was intended for his personal consumption.

  130. (e) Fifth, the Appellant did not deny that the four weighing scales seized from Bedroom 1 were in his possession and were used by him (although he claimed that he used them only to ascertain the weight of the methamphetamine that he obtained for his own consumption).

  131. (f) Sixth, the Appellant’s fabrication of elaborate accounts to distance himself from the drugs showed that he was concerned to conceal his involvement.

  132. [94] We develop our subsequent analysis in the following sequence:

  133. (a) We begin by considering whether the Appellant’s account of the events was inherently incredible. If it was not, it was incumbent on the Prosecution to adduce sufficient evidence to discharge its evidential burden to rebut the Appellant’s defence (see [68]–[71] above).

  134. (b) In that regard, we then consider whether the Judge erred in: (i) rejecting the Appellant’s evidence that he did not know about the trolley bag and the diamorphine until 27 January 2016, the day after Faizal brought these items to the Flat; and (ii) rejecting the Appellant’s evidence that after discovering these items on the afternoon of 27 January 2016, he called Faizal and Sufian that same afternoon to ask them to return to the Flat to “clear the stuff”, and they agreed to do so.

  135. (c) Thereafter, we consider whether the presence of the Appellant’s DNA on the exterior surface of F1D3A showed that he was involved in packing the diamorphine.

  136. [95] In our judgment, in the context of the particular facts that are before us, if we find that the Judge erred in these material respects, the Appellant would have rebutted the presumption of trafficking. The fact that there was a large quantity of diamorphine in the Appellant’s possession would be beside the point, as would be the fact that he did not possess the diamorphine for his personal consumption. This is because the Appellant’s case is that he never wanted to come into possession of the drugs, and once he found the drugs, he tried to return them to those whom he thought owned them. Further, although the Appellant admitted that he possessed the four weighing scales seized from Bedroom 1, he explained, in respect of the two weighing scales that he was questioned on, that he had only used them to measure the weight of the methamphetamine that he obtained for his own consumption. We note too that in the Appellant’s first statement to the CNB, he had explained that the weighing scales were used by Sufian or Danish for packing drugs and that he was not involved in packing drugs. So far as Sufian is concerned, this would not be an incredible assertion, given that he was the occupier of Bedroom 1. The Prosecution could have led evidence from Sufian to confirm or, conversely, contradict the Appellant’s claim as to the use of the weighing scales, but it did not do so. Accordingly, if we accept the Appellant’s account of the events, the fact that he possessed the four weighing scales seized from Bedroom 1 would not in itself be sufficient to displace the conclusion that he had rebutted the presumption of trafficking.

  137. [96] We turn to consider whether the Appellant’s account of the events was inherently incredible, and if not, whether it shifted the evidential burden to the Prosecution.

  138. The Appellant’s account of the events

  139. [97] We first set out the key assertions made by the Appellant in claiming that he did not possess the diamorphine for the purpose of trafficking. In so doing, we also identify in parentheses the statements in which these assertions were first made.

  140. (a) The trolley bag was brought to the Flat by Faizal on the night of 26 January 2016 (seventh statement). This fact is no longer disputed and is confirmed by the CCTV records. The Appellant explained that it was “[n]ot possible” that the diamorphine could have been from somewhere other than the trolley bag as there were “no drugs” in the Flat the day before (tenth statement). It is similarly not disputed that the diamorphine was indeed initially contained in the trolley bag, although it was found in Bedroom 1 during the search of the Flat after the Appellant’s arrest.

  141. (b) The Appellant was asleep when Faizal brought the trolley bag to the Flat. The trolley bag was placed in the storeroom by the Helper while the Appellant was asleep (eighth statement).

  142. (c) The Appellant did not know about the diamorphine until he saw it laid out on the bed in Bedroom 1 at around 2.00pm on 27 January 2016 (tenth statement). Similarly, the Appellant did not know about the trolley bag until he saw it in the storeroom on the afternoon of 27 January 2016. He did not open the trolley bag (tenth statement). While the Appellant initially said that he saw the trolley bag at around 2.00pm, he later clarified at the trial that he saw it at around 4.00pm. We do not think that anything turns on this slight discrepancy in timing given that the Appellant’s statements were recorded months after the relevant events.

  143. [98] One material aspect of the Appellant’s account of the events which did not emerge from his statements were the phone calls that he made to Faizal and Sufian upon discovering the trolley bag and the diamorphine in the Flat on the afternoon of 27 January 2016 and the contents of those phone calls. Nonetheless, it is not disputed that the Appellant did indeed call Faizal and Sufian that afternoon as this is evident from the call records (see [14] above). Given that Faizal and Sufian were not called by the Prosecution as witnesses, the only account of these phone calls came from the Appellant himself. In this regard, his evidence at the trial was as follows:

  144. [99] In our judgment, this aspect of the Appellant’s evidence at the trial could not be described as an afterthought. It should be emphasised that throughout all of his statements, the Appellant was consistent in maintaining that he did not possess either the trolley bag or the diamorphine for the purpose of trafficking. Based on the original account in the Appellant’s first six statements, the person to whom these items were supposed to be returned was Danish; and based on the account in his last four statements, those persons were Sufian and/or Faizal. Seen in this light, the Appellant was therefore consistent in his defence that after he discovered the trolley bag and the diamorphine in the Flat, he sought to return these items to their actual owners rather than to distribute the drugs in the trolley bag onwards to third parties.

  145. [100] Significantly, the Appellant’s claim that he was seeking to return the trolley bag and the diamorphine to their actual owners was also not inconsistent with his past interactions with Faizal in particular. The Appellant elaborated as follows in his ninth statement:

  146. [101] Given this account of the Appellant’s previous interactions with Faizal and the fact that the Appellant had informed the CNB that Faizal was the individual who had brought the trolley bag to the Flat, it is unclear why the Appellant was never asked, when his statements were being recorded, whether he had called Faizal to ask him to remove the trolley bag and the diamorphine from the Flat on this particular occasion. Had the Appellant been asked that question, it is possible that his claim that he had called Faizal and Sufian to ask them to remove the trolley bag and the diamorphine from the Flat and they had agreed would not have been made for the first time only at the trial.

  147. [102] In addition, had the records of the Appellant’s phone calls to Faizal and Sufian on the afternoon of 27 January 2016 been referred to the Appellant in the course of the investigations, he might then have been able to provide his account as to the contents of these phone calls at an earlier stage.

  148. [103] In these circumstances, we are satisfied that the Appellant’s defence had been properly put in issue. There was nothing inherently incredible about the Appellant’s account of the events, and the evidential burden therefore shifted to the Prosecution to rebut the Appellant’s defence (see [68]–[71] above). We proceed to consider whether, in the light of the Prosecution’s failure to call any evidence from the relevant material witnesses, this conclusion is affected either by the Judge’s analysis or by the Prosecution’s submissions.

  149. Whether the Appellant knew that Faizal would be bringing the trolley bag to the Flat on 26 January 2016

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