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Grounds publishedDecided 9 Apr 2020

Court of Appeal

Sim Poh Ping v Winsta Holding Pte Ltd and another and other appeals

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[2020] SGCA 35Case no. Civil Appeal No 218 of 2018

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  1. Introduction and overview

  2. [1] These are three related appeals arising out of the decision of the High Court judge (“the Judge”) in Winsta Holding Pte Ltd and another v Sim Poh Ping and others [2018] SGHC 239 (“the Judgment”). In essence, they relate to two main areas. The first concerns the liability of the relevant defendants for alleged breaches of fiduciary duties. The second is closely related to the first inasmuch as if any breaches of fiduciary duties are in fact established, the question arises as to what remedies are available to the plaintiff concerned.

  3. [2] We commence by observing that the former relates, in the main, to factual findings in relation to liability by the Judge in the court below, whilst the latter raises, inter alia, difficult legal issues which have hitherto not been decided definitively by this court.

  4. [3] Not surprisingly, in so far as the former (ie, the issue of liability for alleged breaches of fiduciary duties) is concerned, the inquiry is a fact-centric one that, in turn, engages (in a holistic fashion) all the relevant facts and circumstances of the case. This will, indeed, be evident in the analysis that follows.

  5. [4] In so far as the latter (ie, remedial aspect) is concerned, the difficult legal issue that must be decided by this court relates to the role (if any) of causation when a breach of fiduciary duty has been established. We will explore this – as well as other related issues – later in this judgment. Let us turn now to the factual background to the present appeals.

  6. Facts

  7. [5] Winsta Holding Pte Ltd (“Winsta Holding”) is the holding company, and beneath it were seven subsidiaries (singly, a “Winsta Subsidiary” and collectively, “the Winsta Subsidiaries”). Six of these subsidiaries were primarily in the hostel business, and the last ran a serviced apartments business. Winsta Holding and its 51% shareholder, M Development Ltd (“M Development”), were the plaintiffs in the action below. Because cross-appeals have been brought against the Judge’s decision, we refer to Winsta Holding and M Development collectively as “the Winsta Companies” for convenience. We will also refer hereafter to Winsta Holding as well as the Winsta Subsidiaries as “the Winsta Group”.

  8. [6] The chief antagonists in the action were Mr Sim Poh Ping (“Mr Sim”), Ms Sim Pei Yee (“Ms Lynn Sim”) and Ms Sim Pei San (“Ms Joyce Sim”) (collectively, “the Sims” or the “Sim family”). Mr Sim is the father of Ms Lynn Sim and Ms Joyce Sim. Each of them was a director of Winsta Holding and of all of the Winsta Subsidiaries. The allegations were that they had breached their fiduciary duties by diverting opportunities away from the Winsta Group to their own corporate vehicles or by entering into interested party transactions between the Winsta Group and these corporate vehicles. These are the seven named corporate defendants in the suit below (which are separate and distinct from the Winsta Subsidiaries, and are therefore not to be confused with the latter; see also [17] below); we will refer to them as “the Corporate Defendants”. In addition, the Winsta Companies pursued claims against three other individuals, Mr Kong Weijia (“Mr Dave Kong”), Ms Ng Connie (“Ms Connie Ng”), and Mr Tan Choon Leong (“Mr Shawn Tan”). These individuals allegedly dishonestly assisted the Sims in breaching their fiduciary duties to the Winsta Group. The total value of the claims pursued was in the range of $16.3m to $39.8m, as quantified by the Winsta Companies’ expert. The thirteen defendants are collectively referred to as “the Defendants”.

  9. [7] The Judge explained his holdings in the Judgment. The Judge found that the Sims had committed a large number of breaches of fiduciary duty against the Winsta Group. Some of these included the diversion of corporate opportunities from a Winsta Subsidiary to their own vehicles, but most of them concerned interested party transactions where the Sim sisters (Ms Lynn Sim and Ms Joyce Sim) stood on both sides of the transaction. Although liability for breach of fiduciary duty was established, the Judge determined that the burden fell on the Winsta Companies to establish but-for causation, rejecting the rule in the Privy Council decision (on appeal from the Supreme Court of Canada) of Brickenden v London Loan & Savings Co et al [1934] 3 DLR 465 (“Brickenden”, and therefore commonly referred to as “the Brickenden rule”) that had been interpreted (in the Singapore context (though cf the strict reading of the Brickenden rule, as to which see [89] below)) to entail the burden being placed on the wrongdoing fiduciaries instead to prove that their principals would have suffered the loss in any event. The Winsta Companies faced significant difficulties in proving but-for causation, and ultimately only two of their claims, concerning the diversion of two opportunities, succeeded. Mr Dave Kong, Ms Connie Ng and Mr Shawn Tan were also found to have assisted the Sims in carrying out the breaches of fiduciary duty.

  10. [8] The Winsta Companies and some of the Defendants filed appeals against the Judge’s decision. We summarise the thrust of these three appeals briefly. Civil Appeal No 218 of 2018 (“CA 218”) is Mr Sim’s appeal against the Judge’s decision finding him liable for breaching his fiduciary duties towards the Winsta Group. The Judge accepted that the evidence did not show that Mr Sim had an interest or control in any of the corporate defendants which had benefited from the various breaches of fiduciary duty, apart from Overseas Students Placement Centre Pte Ltd (“OSPC”), but nevertheless found Mr Sim to have breached the no-conflict and no-profit rules. Mr Sim alleges that this is a “quantum leap” in reasoning and must be overturned on appeal.

  11. [10] Civil Appeal No 220 of 2018 (“CA 220”) is the most legally complex of the three appeals. In this appeal, the Winsta Companies appeal against the Judge’s decision to reject Brickenden and require them to prove but-for causation. They say that Brickenden is justified on the basis of authority, principle, and policy, and is particularly apt for this case where they, as principals, face difficulty in establishing but-for causation given that the Sims as directors had such pervasive control over the Winsta Subsidiaries.

  12. [11] We now go into the facts in greater detail.

  13. The parties

  14. The Plaintiffs

  15. [12] Winsta Holding, the first respondent in CA 218 and CA 219 and the first appellant in CA 220, was the first plaintiff in the High Court. It is the holding company in a group of companies (viz, the Winsta Group) which are in the hostel and serviced apartments business. The Winsta Group comprises Winsta Holding and the following wholly owned subsidiaries of Winsta Holding (viz, the Winsta Subsidiaries):

  16. [13] On 20 May 2015, Winsta Holding and the Winsta Subsidiaries commenced Suit No 491 of 2015 (“the Suit”) in the High Court claiming breach of fiduciary and other duties, knowing receipt, dishonest assistance, conspiracy to injure and/or deceit. The Winsta Subsidiaries were placed under creditors’ voluntary liquidation between 3 August 2015 and 4 August 2015.

  17. [14] M Development, the second respondent in CA 218 and CA 219 and the second appellant in CA 220, was the second plaintiff in the Suit. M Development holds 51% of the issued share capital of Winsta Holding and is a public company listed on the Singapore Exchange. M Development was assigned the claims by the Winsta Subsidiaries in the Suit on 29 October 2015.

  18. The Defendants

  19. [15] Mr Sim, the appellant in CA 218 and the first respondent in CA 220, was the first defendant in the Suit. His daughters, Ms Lynn Sim and Ms Joyce Sim, are the appellants in CA 219 and two of the respondents in CA 220. Mr Sim and Ms Joyce Sim, together with two related companies, held 34% of the shares in Winsta Holding. The remaining 15% of the shareholding was owned by various unrelated third parties.

  20. [16] The directorships of the Sims in the Winsta Group at all material times were as follows:

  21. [17] Seven companies were made defendants to the action below (viz, the Corporate Defendants). The Corporate Defendants were alleged to have been the vehicles of the Sim family which were used to facilitate the Sims’ wrongdoing, and are as follows:

  22. [18] In addition (and as alluded to above), claims were brought against three other individuals who were alleged to have dishonestly assisted the Sims in their breaches of fiduciary duty:

  23. Background to the dispute

  24. [19] The Judge has comprehensively set out the facts in the Judgment at [17]–[36] and in his discussion of each of the claims. Here, we offer only a brief summary of the most pertinent facts that are germane to the present appeals.

  25. [20] The Sims, in particular Mr Sim, were the original driving force behind the Winsta Subsidiaries and the creation of the Winsta Group. Mr Sim entered the property leasing business and hostel business in 2002–2003. In 2003, Katong Hostel was incorporated and it started its first student hostel. The business was profitable and Mr Sim expanded it by opening more hostels. For each new hostel opened, a new company would also be incorporated to manage it. Pearl Hill Hostel was incorporated on 25 May 2004 and Hill Lodge on 9 January 2006. Mr Sim then decided to strike out into the business of managing serviced residences in 2007, and incorporated Global Residence that year to manage rented serviced apartments.

  26. [21] Winsta Holding was incorporated on 27 February 2008 and became the holding company of the various individual hostel and serviced apartment companies. Expansion of the hostel business also continued at a steady pace. On 13 March 2008, Queensway Hostel was incorporated as another subsidiary of Winsta Holding. In 2009, Winsta Holding acquired Carlisle Hostel. Evan Hostel was later incorporated in 2012.

  27. [22] M Development entered the picture in January 2010. It bought 51% of the shares of Winsta Holding. Mr Sim was invited but declined to join the board of M Development. Ms Lynn Sim was appointed to the board of M Development by September 2010. As stipulated under the terms of M Development’s purchase of the shares in Winsta Holding, the Sims continued to manage Winsta Holding and its subsidiaries. Mr Sim was in charge of charting the overall direction of the Winsta Group and handling key contracts with governmental authorities whilst the Sim sisters were the directors in charge of the day-to-day operations. In 2011, Mr Huang Wen-Lai, a nominee of M Development, was appointed to the board of Winsta Holding.

  28. [23] The profits of the Winsta Subsidiaries declined between 2010 and 2012. In 2013, the Winsta Group registered a loss of $8.5m. Further losses were projected for 2014. In July 2014, M Development appointed additional directors, Ms Huang Tzu Ting (“Ms Huang”), Mr David Chin and Mr Yap Kian Peng, to the board of Winsta Holding. At the same time, Mr Sim was appointed as managing director of Winsta Holding.

  29. [24] Winsta Holding and M Development began to suspect very significant interested party transactions in the Winsta Group after the additional directors were appointed to the board of Winsta Holding. Ms Huang was given the authority to take necessary steps to protect, secure and preserve the company’s records and financial information. She engaged KordaMentha Pte Ltd (“KordaMentha”), a company specialising in forensic accounting, review and investigation services. In April 2015, KordaMentha produced its draft Preliminary Findings. On 7 May 2015, the Preliminary Findings were discussed by the Winsta Holding board. Two weeks later, the Suit was commenced. The dispute concerns alleged breaches of fiduciary duty in respect of duties owed to the Winsta Subsidiaries.

  30. [25] On 22 May 2015, the Sims’ employment with Winsta Holding was terminated. Ms Lynn Sim’s directorship in M Development was also terminated. But the Sims remained directors of Winsta Holding. In June 2015, Winsta Holding appointed The Uncharted Co (“TUC”) to provide management services to its businesses, primarily in relation to Katong Hostel, Evan Hostel, Hill Lodge and Global Residence. In July 2015, the TUC produced its report on its observations and suggested steps to turn around the business units. It stated that Katong Hostel’s losses for the first half of 2015 were about $0.5m and its losses might be about $1.8m by December 2015, and that it did not have enough cash to meet all its obligations. It also stated that the Winsta Group was expected to face a shortfall of about $11.2m in December 2015.

  31. [26] The Winsta Subsidiaries were placed under creditors’ voluntary liquidation between 3 August 2015 and 4 August 2015. The decisions were made by the directors nominated by M Development. Winsta Holding and M Development alleged that the liquidations were due to the subsidiaries having been run to the ground by the Sims’ fraudulent and/or wrongful conduct. This is a matter of contention in these appeals as well.

  32. [27] Katong Hostel and Evan Hostel had leases with the Singapore Land Authority (“SLA”). The latter called on the insurance bonds issued as security in connection with the leases after Katong Hostel and Evan Hostel were placed under liquidation. The bonds amounted to $2.1m, and were guaranteed by Winsta Holding, the Sims and the four directors of Winsta Holding nominated by M Development. Mr Sim paid $276,666.67 in this regard. In addition, ORIX Leasing Singapore Limited (“ORIX”) called on the guarantees provided by Mr Sim, Ms Lynn Sim, Winsta Holding and Global Residence for a $2.5m loan facility to renovate a hostel leased to Evan Hostel. Mr Sim paid ORIX $681,542.20.

  33. Claims pursued below

  34. [28] The Winsta Companies pursued eight discrete categories of claims against the Defendants in the High Court. We briefly summarise each of these as follows.

  35. [29] First, the Winsta Companies claimed that the Sims had breached their fiduciary duties to Global Residence by diverting an opportunity to operate serviced apartments at a property called Illuminaire to their own vehicle, OSPC. The Illuminaire opportunity arose in 2012 (see the Judgment at [43] and [54]).

  36. [30] Second, the Winsta Companies claimed that the Sims had breached their fiduciary duties by diverting an opportunity to provide serviced apartments at Scotts Square to their own vehicle ATAS, which competed with the business of a Winsta Subsidiary, Global Residence. This opportunity arose in May 2014 (see the Judgment at [58]).

  37. [31] Third, the Winsta Companies claimed that the Sims had breached their fiduciary duties towards Hill Lodge and Evan Hostel by subletting blocks of buildings at these two properties under the Winsta Group to their own vehicles Uni-House and Unihouse@Evans respectively. The Winsta Companies claimed that the homestay business run by Uni-House and Unihouse@Evans was in competition with the hostel business of Hill Lodge and Evan Hostel (see the Judgment at [80]). Uni-House was incorporated in February 2012 (see the Judgment at [81]). Unihouse@Evans was wholly owned by Uni-House (see the Judgment at [92]).

  38. [32] Fourth, the Winsta Companies claimed against the Sims for allegedly misusing Winsta Group’s resources to run JMJ Hotpot, and for using JMJ Hotpot as a conduit to divert revenue arising from Mongolian students attending a summer camp to their own benefit (see the Judgment at [100]). The Winsta Group had been contracting with Help International LLC to provide accommodation for a group of Mongolian students visiting Singapore in the summers of 2011 to 2013. In 2014, however, the students were housed at Devonshire, a property owned by Ms Joyce Sim’s husband, and the monies were paid to JMJ Hotpot instead of to the Winsta Group (see the Judgment at [104]).

  39. [33] Fifth, the Winsta Companies claimed against the Sims for the provision of catering services by their vehicle, ICS Catering, to the Winsta Group. The allegation was that the Sim sisters had received personal benefits in the form of monthly fees from ICS Catering, and no disclosure of their interests had been made to Winsta Holding (see the Judgment at [115]). ICS Catering was incorporated on 1 November 2012, and was a vendor to the Winsta Group in 2013 and 2014 (see the Judgment at [114]). ICS Catering also took over the running of the cafeteria at Hill Lodge.

  40. [34] Sixth, the Winsta Companies claimed against the Sims for holding an interest, through OSPC, in I-Masters, which provided air-conditioning and general contracting and maintenance (“ACM”) work to the Winsta Group. The allegation was that OSPC’s divestment of its shareholding to one Zhao Feng for no consideration was a sham, and that the Sims acted in conflict of interest in awarding the ACM work to I-Masters (see the Judgment at [133]). I-Masters was incorporated on 23 April 2013, and received payments from various Winsta Subsidiaries from 2013 to 2015.

  41. [35] Seventh, the Winsta Companies pursued claims against Mr Dave Kong, Mr Shawn Tan and Ms Connie Ng in dishonest assistance. Mr Dave Kong was alleged to have dishonestly assisted the Sims by diverting the Illuminaire and Scotts Square opportunities to the Sims’ vehicles, OSPC and ATAS, and by managing the Illuminaire and Scotts Square properties, all while knowing of the Sims’ interests in OSPC and ATAS (see the Judgment at [151]). Mr Shawn Tan was alleged to have dishonestly assisted the Sim sisters by fronting the management and operations of I-Masters for the Sim sisters, who were its real owners and controllers (see the Judgment at [164]). Ms Connie Ng, a senior employee of Winsta Holding, was alleged to have dishonestly assisted the Sim sisters by assisting with the accounting work for various Sim family vehicles, even though she knew they were not part of the Winsta Group (see the Judgment at [170]).

  42. [36] Eighth, claims were also pursued against OSPC and JMJ Hotpot. OSPC was alleged to have dishonestly assisted in the diversion of the Illuminaire opportunity. JMJ Hotpot’s account was allegedly used to receive payment from Help International LLC for housing the Mongolian students when they visited the in summer of 2014 (see the Judgment at [173]–[174]).

  43. The decision below

  44. [37] The Judge dealt with each of the categories of claims largely in the sequence in which we have set them out at [29]–[36] above, except that where the Sims were concerned, he considered the liability of the Sim sisters separately from the liability of Mr Sim.

  45. [38] First, the Judge found that the Sim sisters had breached the no-conflict rule and the no-profit rule when they directed the Illuminaire opportunity to OSPC and procured OSPC to compete with Global Residence (see the Judgment at [54]). The Judge rejected the explanations provided by the Sim sisters in relation to the Illuminaire project (see the Judgment at [50]). He considered that there was no reason why it could not have been directed to Global Residence. Mr Dave Kong confirmed on the stand it was entirely possible for the project to have been a Global Residence project. It was also clear that the serviced apartment business at Illuminaire competed with Global Residence’s business (see the Judgment at [53]). The evidence showed that the Sim sisters received the opportunity in their capacities as directors of Winsta Holding or Global Residence. The Sim sisters’ interest in OSPC placed them in a position of conflict in respect of their duties to Winsta Holding and Global Residence. This conflict of interests was compounded by the fact that the Sim sisters received profits earned by OSPC (see the Judgment at [54]). The Sims’ interest in OSPC was disclosed to the board of Winsta Holding in 2010 but no disclosure was made regarding OSPC’s subsequent involvement in the Illuminaire project; thus, the disclosure was wholly insufficient for purposes of the conflict of interests arising from the fact that OSPC was in a business in competition with Global Residence (see the Judgment at [56]). Thus, the Sim sisters had breached the no-conflict and no-profit rules.

  46. [39] Second, the Judge also found that the Sim sisters had breached their fiduciary duties towards Global Residence when they diverted an opportunity to lease apartment units at Scotts Square to their own vehicle, ATAS. Contrary to the sisters’ arguments, the Judge found that both of them had interests in ATAS: they were the sole directors and shareholders of ATAS when it was incorporated, and although the shares were transferred away to Ms Lynn Sim’s mother-in-law (see the Judgment at [60]), they continued to be heavily involved in ATAS so much so that they were considered by Mr Dave Kong to be the de facto controllers of ATAS (see the Judgment at [66]). The Judge found that there had been a breach of fiduciary duty because Global Residence could have taken up the opportunity as it was involved in the serviced apartment business as well, but that the Sim sisters had directed the Scotts Square opportunity to ATAS instead and had procured ATAS to compete with Global Residence (see the Judgment at [72]), without disclosing this and obtaining the informed consent of Winsta Holding. This was a breach of both the no-conflict and no-profit rules (see the Judgment at [72]–[73]).

  47. [40] Third, the Judge considered the claims brought for alleged breach of fiduciary duties by the Sim sisters in having Hill Lodge lease out two blocks of buildings to Uni-House and in having Evans Hostel lease out one block of buildings to Unihouse@Evans. The Sim sisters argued that they had no personal interests in either Uni-House or Unihouse@Evans. The Judge disagreed. It was significant to him, amongst several other reasons, that the Sim sisters were appointed as bank signatories of Uni-House even before the tenancy agreement for Uni-House was signed (see the Judgment at [84]); the person whom the Sim sisters claimed was running the homestay business at Uni-House had no experience in running such a business, and instead gave evidence that Ms Joyce Sim made the key decisions (see the Judgment at [85]); Ms Joyce Sim had substantial involvement in the operations of Uni-House (see the Judgment at [86]); and they had effectively treated Uni-House as if it was their own company, for example, where Ms Joyce Sim used a personal bank account to collect rentals from Uni-House customers in China (see the Judgment at [89]). The Judge found a breach of fiduciary duty not in the fact that the opportunity to run a homestay business was diverted from the Winsta Group – he considered that this was quite a different kind of business from the hostel business the Winsta Group was in – but, instead, found the breach in the interested party transactions that took place between Uni-House and Hill Lodge, as well as between Unihouse@Evans and Evan Hostel, because the Sim sisters stood on both sides of the transactions in violation of the no-conflict rule (see the Judgment at [95]).

  48. [41] Fourth, the Judge found, contrary to the Sim sisters’ arguments, that they were the beneficial owners of JMJ Hotpot. Although the shares in JMJ Hotpot had been transferred to Mr Dave Kong, this was done only to enable JMJ Hotpot to apply for work permits, as Ms Joyce Sim had been blacklisted by the Ministry of Manpower (see the Judgment at [98]–[99]). Ms Lynn Sim admitted that Winsta Group personnel provided support and administrative services to JMJ Hotpot without any disclosure to or approval of the board of Winsta Holding, and without any payment to the Winsta Group for such services (see the Judgment at [101]). By misusing Winsta Group’s resources, the Sim sisters had breached their fiduciary duties to act in the best interests of Winsta Holding and not to place themselves in a position of conflict (see the Judgment at [103]).

  49. [42] In so far as the accommodation of Mongolian students was concerned, Ms Joyce Sim said that payment was made to JMJ Hotpot’s account because Help International LLC needed a company’s bank account to make payment to and so she gave them JMJ Hotpot’s account. However, she admitted that she had received $31,250 which was deposited into her joint account with her husband. None of this was disclosed to the board of Winsta Holding (see the Judgment at [105]). The Judge accepted Ms Joyce Sim’s evidence that when she offered Devonshire to Help International LLC, the intention was to surrender the lease of Katong Hostel. Thus, the Winsta Group could not have taken advantage of the 2014 summer camp opportunity (see the Judgment at [110]). Nevertheless, the 2014 summer camp opportunity came to the Sim sisters because of their position as directors of Winsta Holding and Katong Hostel. Clearly, Ms Joyce Sim had a personal interest in Devonshire and in fact profited personally from the opportunity. By reason of their relationship, Ms Lynn Sim was also an interested party. Thus, the Sim sisters had breached the no-profit rule (see the Judgment at [111]).

  50. [43] Fifth, in so far as the claims pursued in respect of ICS Catering were concerned, the Judge concluded that the Sim sisters had committed breaches of fiduciary duty. ICS Catering was in fact owned and controlled by the Sim family: the Sim sisters were the only directors of ICS Catering at its incorporation and were heavily involved in running it, and although Winsta Holding was given a 70% shareholding in ICS Catering, Winsta Holding itself was never told of this, and its 70% shareholding was later transferred away without consideration (see the Judgment at [120]–[121]). The breaches lay in the Sim sisters’ standing on both sides of the transactions, with ICS Catering on the one hand, and various Winsta Subsidiaries on the other, which amounted to breaches of the no-conflict and no-profit rules (see the Judgment at [128]–[129]).

  51. [44] Sixth, in so far as I-Master’s provision of ACM work to the Winsta Group was concerned, the Judge found that the Sim sisters had an interest in I-Masters, but did not control it (see the Judgment at [137]). OSPC had a shareholding in I-Masters when the latter was incorporated, and the divestment of that shareholding to one Zhao Feng for no consideration was considered by the Judge to be a sham. OSPC was the Sims’ vehicle, so the Sim sisters retained an interest in I-Masters. They had breached the no-conflict rule when they procured the Winsta Group to enter into transactions with I-Masters, since they stood on both sides of the transactions and had not disclosed this (see the Judgment at [144]).

  52. [45] Having considered the liability of the Sim sisters in respect of the six claims for breach of fiduciary duty above, and having found that all the claims succeeded, the Judge turned to consider Mr Sim’s liability. It was not disputed that he had an interest in OSPC. The Judge accepted, however, that there was no evidence that Mr Sim had an interest in and/or controlled any of the remaining corporate defendants, ie, ATAS, Uni-House, Unihouse@Evans, JMJ Hotpot, ICS Catering and I-Masters (see the Judgment at [145]). He stated that the mere fact that Mr Sim was the patriarch of the Sims was insufficient to support such an inference. The question therefore was whether Mr Sim knew of his daughters’ interests in the Corporate Defendants and/or of their wrongdoings. The Judge found that Mr Sim must have known that the Sim sisters had interests in the Corporate Defendants and of Ms Joyce Sim’s interest in Devonshire. In view of their relationship, Mr Sim would also be regarded as having personal interests in the Corporate Defendants and in Devonshire. Mr Sim must have agreed to the actions taken by the Sim sisters (see the Judgment at [148]). Thus, the Judge found that Mr Sim had breached his fiduciary duties in the same way as the Sim sisters had. If Mr Sim had not agreed with the actions taken by the Sim sisters, he ought to have taken steps to protect the Winsta Group’s interests once he had learned of what the Sim sisters had wanted to do. By taking no action, he had breached his fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of Winsta Holding (see the Judgment at [149] and [150]).

  53. [46] The seventh category of claims concerned claims in dishonest assistance brought against Mr Dave Kong, Mr Shawn Tan and Ms Connie Ng. The Judge found Mr Dave Kong liable in dishonest assistance with regard to the Illuminaire and Scotts Square properties. He considered that Mr Dave Kong did not actively assist in the decision to divert the Illuminaire opportunity to OSPC (see the Judgment at [158]) but that he did bring the Scotts Square opportunity to Ms Lynn Sim’s attention, which amounted to active assistance. He further actively assisted by managing OSPC’s business at Illuminaire and ATAS’s business at Scotts Square in competition with Global Residence (see the Judgment at [161]). This assistance was dishonest, because he knew that the shareholders of Winsta Group and OSPC were different, and that ATAS was not a Winsta Group company (see the Judgment at [162]). Mr Dave Kong himself was placed in a position of conflict of interest because he was managing the serviced apartment business at Illuminaire and Scotts Square in competition with Global Residence’s business (see the Judgment at [163]). Global Residence was also managed by him through OSPC, which had acted as the marketing and sales agent for Global Residence (see the Judgment at [41]).

  54. [47] The Judge also found Mr Shawn Tan liable in dishonest assistance for actively assisting the Sim sisters by awarding the ACM works to I-Masters (see the Judgment at [168]). Mr Shawn Tan represented Winsta Group in awarding these works, while knowing of the Sim sisters’ interests in I-Masters (through OSPC) (see the Judgment at [165]). This was active involvement amounting to a breach of the standards of honest conduct.

  55. [48] Finally, the Judge found Ms Connie Ng liable in dishonest assistance for assisting the Sim sisters’ breaches with respect to OSPC, ATAS and JMJ Hotpot (see the Judgment at [171]). Ms Connie Ng was a senior employee of Winsta Holding, and yet she had helped with the accounting functions for OSPC and ATAS and had helped set up the accounting system for JMJ Hotpot (see the Judgment at [171]). She had to have known of the Sim sisters’ interests in OSPC, ATAS and JMJ Hotpot (see the Judgment at [172]).

  56. [49] On the eighth category of claims, brought against OSPC and JMJ Hotpot for dishonest assistance, the Judge found that the claims had been made out. The Judge considered it clear that OSPC had dishonestly assisted in the Sim sisters’ breaches of the no-conflict rule in respect of the diversion of the Illuminaire opportunity and with regard to OSPC competing with Global Residence. He also noted that JMJ Hotpot’s account had been used to receive payment from Help International LLC for the 2014 summer camp, which amounted to dishonest assistance of the Sim sisters’ breach of the no-profit rule in respect of that opportunity (see the Judgment at [173]–[174]).

  57. [50] The Judge then turned to the issue of remedies. The Winsta Companies had sought compensation to place each of the Winsta Subsidiaries in the position they would have been had the Defendants not breached their duties and the Winsta Subsidiaries not been liquidated, as well as various expenses incurred in reviewing the Winsta Group’s records (see the Judgment at [183]). The Judge considered that there were two possible approaches to be taken in ascertaining whether the Defendants’ breaches had caused the Winsta Companies’ loss.

  58. [51] On the one hand, there was the approach taken in Brickenden ([7] supra), which the Judge considered stood for the proposition that but-for causation was not essential for breach of fiduciary duty; as the Judge put it, it was “not necessary to show a causal link between the breach and the loss claimed” (see the Judgment at [185]). The Judge acknowledged, however, that this strict interpretation of Brickenden had been superseded in Singapore, where Brickenden was now limited to cases involving fiduciaries in one of the well-established categories of fiduciaries who had committed culpable breaches of core duties of honesty and fidelity (see the Judgment at [190]). Further, a wrongdoing fiduciary in Singapore could seek to limit the amount of equitable compensation payable by showing that the principal would have suffered the loss even if he had not breached his fiduciary duties (see the Judgment at [192]).

  59. [52] On the other hand, there was the approach that did require the plaintiff to prove but-for causation of his loss, as represented by the cases of Target Holdings Ltd v Redferns (a firm) and another [1996] 1 AC 421 (“Target Holdings”) and AIB Group (UK) plc v Mark Redler & Co Solicitors [2015] AC 1503 (“AIB”), which were decisions of the House of Lords and the UK Supreme Court, respectively.

  60. [53] The Judge preferred the approach taken in Target Holdings and AIB. In his view, principle demanded that where there was a breach of fiduciary duty, the principal “should be compensated for loss suffered as a result of that breach and no more”. Justice, too, demanded that “the law … not punish the wrongdoer by making him liable for loss not causally linked to his breach” (the Judgment at [193]). In the Judge’s view, the middle path of employing a burden-shifting device which had been taken in some of the cases was unsatisfactory. He considered that there was no reason in principle why the evidential burden of proving causation should shift to the fiduciary once the principal had proved that the breach was “in some way connected” to the loss; instead, the principal squarely bore the legal burden of proof to show that his loss was causally linked to the fiduciary’s breach of duty, and the evidential burden was similarly placed on the principal to adduce evidence of loss that was causally linked to the breach (see the Judgment at [194]).

  61. [54] The Judge turned to apply his holdings on the law to the facts of the case. He first examined the claim for equitable compensation for post-liquidation loss of profits. The Winsta Companies’ arguments were essentially that because of the Sims’ breaches of fiduciary duty, there was no choice other than to liquidate the Winsta Subsidiaries (see the Judgment at [205]).

  62. [55] The Judge disagreed with this contention. The Judge found that “it [was] abundantly clear from the evidence that the reason for the decision to liquidate the Winsta Subsidiaries was the projected shortfall” of funds if the businesses of Katong Hostel, Evan Hostel, Hill Lodge and Global Residence were to continue, when M Development was unwilling to provide further funding (see the Judgment at [210]). The question, then, was whether that shortfall was causally linked to the Defendants’ wrongdoings. The Judge considered that it was not. Examining the evidence, the Judge found that the reasons for the projected shortfall with regard to Katong Hostel, Evan Hostel and Global Residence were all commercial (see the Judgment at [216] and [218]). In short, the expected shortfall of $11.2m and the Winsta Subsidiaries’ general financial predicament had “nothing to do with [the Defendants’] wrongdoings” (see the Judgment at [220]). The Judge therefore held that the Winsta Companies had failed to establish causation in respect of the post-liquidation losses.

  63. [56] The Judge then turned to consider the claims made for pre-liquidation losses. A number of discrete claims were made. The Judge considered that the Winsta Companies had only succeeded in establishing but-for causation in respect of two of the losses, namely, those concerning the diversion of the Illuminaire and Scotts Square opportunities (see the Judgment at [222]). But for the breaches of fiduciary duty, these two opportunities would have been directed to Global Residence instead of OSPC and ATAS. The Sim family, Mr Dave Kong and OSPC were liable to M Development in respect of the Illuminaire opportunity, and the Sim family, Mr Dave Kong and ATAS were liable to M Development in respect of the Scotts Square opportunity. Winsta Holding could not claim the losses suffered by the Winsta Subsidiaries (see the Judgment at [227]). As for the other breaches of fiduciary duty, the Judge considered that the Winsta Companies had not proved that they had suffered any loss (see the Judgment at [229] and [230]). Only a nominal amount of equitable compensation would therefore be awarded for these breaches (see the Judgment at [233]).

  64. Issues before this court

  65. [57] We will describe the parties’ cases in detail when we address each of the appeals below. For present purposes, the essential thrust of each appeal has already been adequately set out at [8]–[10] above. The appeals raise the following issues for our determination:

  66. (a) CA 218:

  67. (i) Whether Mr Sim breached his fiduciary duties to the Winsta Group;

  68. (ii) If his breaches are established, what losses can the Winsta Companies establish and what is the quantification of compensation?

  69. (b) CA 220:

  70. (i) What are the appropriate causation principles governing the determination of compensable loss for breaches of fiduciary duties?

  71. (ii) Applying the principles derived from (i) above, what is the equitable compensation established?

  72. (c) CA 219:

  73. (i) Should the amount of equitable compensation and costs awarded by the Judge to the Winsta Companies be reduced?

  74. Our decision

  75. CA 218

  76. Mr Sim’s liability for breach of fiduciary duty

  77. Mr Sim’s knowledge of the Sim sisters’ breaches of fiduciary duty

  78. [61] We begin first with the Judge’s findings as regards Mr Sim’s knowledge of the Sim sisters’ breaches of fiduciary duty. The Judge made several findings in the Judgment (at [147]) to support his conclusion that Mr Sim must have known of the Sim sisters’ actions. We think it is fair to say that the Judge comprehensively examined the way Mr Sim interacted with his daughters, and how they worked with each other to run the Winsta Group, in coming to the conclusion that Mr Sim must have known of his daughters’ actions, and must have agreed to them (see the Judgment at [148]).

  79. [62] Mr Christopher Daniel (“Mr Daniel”), counsel for Mr Sim, argued that the Judge had erred in drawing the inference as to Mr Sim’s knowledge. We cannot accept Mr Sim’s arguments. As we pointed out to Mr Daniel at the hearing, it is not the role of an appellate court to delve into the minutiae of the factual findings made by the trial judge and make findings of our own, unless the findings were plainly inconsistent with the evidence which had been given. This would also be true of the inferences drawn by the Judge, which ought to stand unless they were plainly against the weight of the evidence. The trial judge had the benefit of hearing and observing the witnesses over the course of a lengthy trial, and carefully considered the evidence in coming to his findings and set out his reasons for those findings in a comprehensive judgment.

  80. [63] The hurdle that Mr Sim had to surmount was therefore to show that the Judge’s findings and inferences were against the weight of the evidence. To this end, Mr Daniel relied primarily on the evidence that the Sims gave at trial to support the arguments as to Mr Sim’s limited scope of knowledge.

  81. [64] In our judgment, the Judge was entitled to draw the inferences that he did. The Judge had considered Mr Sim’s evidence, and weighed this evidence against all the other evidence before him. We consider that nothing in Mr Daniel’s arguments seriously challenged the correctness of the Judge’s findings and the findings therefore ought to stand.

  82. Mr Sim’s interests in the Corporate Defendants

  83. [65] Mr Sim’s other main challenge against the Judge’s decision is to point to the fact that there was no evidence indicating that he personally had any interests in the Corporate Defendants to which opportunities had been diverted, except OSPC, and thus could not be said to have breached the no-conflict rule in that he had not favoured his own interests over the Winsta Group’s interests. To this end, Mr Daniel placed special emphasis on the Judge’s findings in the Judgment at [145] where the Judge observed that there was “no direct evidence that [Mr Sim] [had] an interest in and/or controlled any of the remaining corporate defendants, ie, ATAS, Uni-House, [Unihouse@Evans], JMJ Hotpot, ICS Catering, and I-Masters”. The Judge also elaborated that there was “also no evidence upon which [he could] infer any such interest or control”, with the mere fact that Mr Sim was “the patriarch of the Sim Family” being “insufficient to support such an inference”. Mr Daniel pointed out that the Judge himself was acknowledging the absence of evidence to support an inference as to Mr Sim’s personal interests in the Corporate Defendants, but the Judge then appeared to have contradicted himself in the Judgment at [148], when he found that in view of the relationship between Mr Sim and his daughters, Mr Sim “would be regarded as having personal interests in the [Corporate Defendants] and in Devonshire as well”.

  84. [66] There is an apparent tension between the Judge’s findings at [145] and [148], where the Judge observed on the one hand that there was no evidence to support a finding that Mr Sim had personal interests in the Corporate Defendants, but then gravitated to the opposite view and concluded that “in view of their relationships”, ie, Mr Sim’s relationship with his daughters, Mr Sim would be deemed to have such a personal interest. We consider, however, that this tension is more apparent than real. The key to resolving this tension is to consider the Judge’s findings in sequence, especially after due consideration of his findings at [147] of the Judgment which we have referred to at [61] above.

  85. [67] In our view, the Judge’s findings at [147] of the Judgment demonstrate how the Sims operated as a tight-knit family unit in their business dealings. The Sim sisters would inform their father about their business dealings and consult him on them, or seek his advice. On occasion, they would also seek his approval for important decisions. Indeed, that the Sim sisters should operate in this way, giving deference to their father and requiring his approval to take important decisions, reflects how Mr Sim essentially founded the Winsta Group and was the prime actor in its expansion. Although the Sim sisters eventually came to take on greater and more involved roles in disparate parts of the business, it is evident that they respected Mr Sim’s business acumen and did not forget that it was Mr Sim who had placed them in the positions of power and authority in these businesses. This led the Judge to infer – rightly, in our view – that the Sim sisters would not have acted to the detriment of their father without his knowledge. More importantly, they led the Judge to correctly infer that Mr Sim had, on a balance of probabilities, personal interests in the Corporate Defendants to which business opportunities that rightly belonged to the Winsta Group had been diverted. Mr Sim was a shareholder in Winsta Holding and its managing director; it was natural to infer that he would not have wanted or allowed the benefits he derived from that interest to be damaged, unless he was obtaining a benefit or advantage from having the opportunities diverted elsewhere instead. Given the close-knit relations between Mr Sim and his daughters, and his daughters’ interests in and control of the Corporate Defendants, it was open to the Judge to infer that Mr Sim was probably benefiting in some way from the Corporate Defendants taking advantage of the business activities instead of leaving these opportunities to the Winsta Group instead. Thus, the Judge was right to infer that Mr Sim likely had personal interests in the Corporate Defendants, which entailed that he had preferred those interests over his fiduciary duty to the Winsta Group when he knew of the business opportunities being diverted away from the Winsta Group but did nothing to stop that.

  86. [68] If it were necessary, we would also observe that the Judge’s finding that Mr Sim had breached his fiduciary duty to the Winsta Group could also be justified on the alternative basis that he had breached the no-conflict rule in preferring the interests of a third party when he had come to know of his daughters’ actions but took no action to stop them. The no-conflict rule is typically framed in terms of the fiduciary preferring his personal interests over those of his principals (see, for example, the High Court decision of Nordic International Ltd v Morten Innhaug [2017] 3 SLR 957 at [53]), which might suggest a binary opposition of interests between the fiduciary’s own interests, and his principal’s interests. But this is usually because the cases in which this particular formulation of the rule is applied involve allegations of the fiduciary in question preferring his own interests, as opposed to some other interests.

  87. [69] The true statement of principle, however, is not so narrow. In other cases, the High Court has contemplated the possibility of breach of the no-conflict rule where the errant fiduciary prefers not his own interests, but rather the interests of a third party, over the interests of his principal. For example, in the High Court decision of Sinwa SS (HK) Co Ltd v Morten Innhaug [2010] 4 SLR 1, Andrew Ang J observed (at [32]) that “the ‘no conflict’ rule is a prophylactic principle aimed at avoiding the risk that the director might prefer his personal or a third party’s interests over those of the company” [emphasis added]. Similarly, the statement of general principle given by Millett LJ in the English Court of Appeal decision of Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew [1998] Ch 1 (“Mothew”) at 18A–18C describes one of the core duties of a fiduciary as not acting for his benefit or the benefit of a third party without informed consent:

  88. [70] The academic commentaries, too, suggest that a breach of fiduciary duty can occur where the fiduciary prefers a third party’s interests over those of the principal. The authors of Walter Woon on Company Law (Tan Cheng Han SC, gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 3rd Rev Ed, 2009) observe at paras 8.40 and 8.43, in relation to the duty to avoid conflicts of interest, as follows:

  89. [71] It is inherent in the nature of this core fiduciary duty that the fiduciary places the interest of the beneficiary above all other interests. The no-conflict rule is fundamentally concerned with securing the utmost protection of the beneficiary. Hence, it is wholly unsurprising that the rule does not depend on whether the preferred interests are those of the fiduciary or those of a third party. The prevention of any personal gain by the fiduciary himself is only a corollary of the fundamental concern.

  90. [72] Here, even if the Judge was wrong to infer that Mr Sim had personal interests in the Corporate Defendants or Devonshire, we think that he was nevertheless right to infer that Mr Sim, in essentially turning a blind eye to his daughters’ breaches of fiduciary duty and failing to disclose the same to the Winsta Group or to take any action to stop his daughters, had preferred the interests of third parties, namely, the Corporate Defendants and his daughters. This would have been sufficient, in and of itself, to justify the finding that Mr Sim had breached the no-conflict rule.

  91. [73] Because there is no reason nor basis for us to interfere with the Judge’s factual findings as regards Mr Sim’s liability for breach of fiduciary duty, we agree with the Judge on this point and Mr Sim’s appeal fails.

  92. The quantum of equitable compensation and costs payable by Mr Sim

  93. [74] The Judge found Mr Sim jointly and severally liable to M Development for the diversion of the Illuminaire and Scotts Square opportunities (see the Judgment at [250]–[251]).

  94. [76] These objections can be dealt with summarily. Our first observation is that none of the Defendants below had engaged an expert to value the compensation payable. This represents a significant impediment to Mr Sim’s case, because we observed, in Saeng-Un Udom v Public Prosecutor [2001] 2 SLR(R) 1 at [26], that a “court should not, when confronted with expert evidence which is unopposed and appears not to be obviously lacking in defensibility, reject it nevertheless and prefer to draw its own inferences”.

  95. [78] In summary, we see no reason to interfere with the Judge’s findings on the amount of equitable compensation payable in relation to the diversion of the Illuminaire and Scotts Square opportunities.

  96. CA 220

  97. [84] CA 220 is the appeal by Winsta Holding and M Development against the Judge’s finding that, despite the many breaches of fiduciary duty by the Sims, causation was only established in respect of the diversion of the Illuminaire and Scotts Square opportunities to OSPC and ATAS. The Judge had rejected the application of the rule in Brickenden ([7] supra), and had considered that the onus lay on the Winsta Companies to prove but-for causation of loss. In CA 220, the Winsta Companies vigorously contend that the Judge was wrong to reject Brickenden. Their case is that fiduciaries, such as the Sims in their capacity of company directors of Winsta Holding and the various Winsta Subsidiaries, should be deterred from breaching their fiduciary duties. A strict application of Brickenden achieves this by recognising that if the breach is material to the event that led to the loss, the defaulting fiduciary should not be allowed to argue that even if he had not breached his duty, some other factor would have caused the same loss. Brickenden reminds the court not to speculate as to what the many possible causes of the loss might have been in coming to a view as to what might have been “but for” causes; instead, so long as the fiduciary’s breach of duty was material to the loss, that is sufficient to establish causation.

  98. [85] As the short summary in the preceding paragraph illustrates, the central issue in CA 220 concerns the appropriate principles of causation (if any) to be adopted in the remedy of equitable compensation for breaches of fiduciary duty. The law in this area is unsettled and difficult. We will therefore examine the appropriate legal principles to be adopted in this area of the law, before turning to consider how those principles are to be applied to the facts of this case.

  99. Preliminary observations and relevant concepts in the field

  100. (A) Introduction

  101. [86] It might, however, be useful at this juncture to make some preliminary observations which will not only unpack the possible pitfalls that ought to be avoided in analysing this particular issue but will hopefully also point the way towards the resolution of legal conundrums that have resulted in the spilling of much academic ink. However, before proceeding to do so, it would be apposite to outline – in its bare essence – the difficult legal issue itself.

  102. [87] From a remedial perspective, the three categories of breach enunciated by Tipping J in the New Zealand Court of Appeal decision of Bank of New Zealand v New Zealand Guardian Trust Co Ltd [1999] 1 NZLR 664 (“Bank of New Zealand”) at 687 (and approved of by Ribeiro PJ in the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal decision of Thomas Alexej Hall v Libertarian Investments Ltd (2013) 16 HKCFAR 681 (“Libertarian Investments”) at [75]) are illuminating:

  103. The present case concerns a breach of the second kind of duty in the trichotomy of breaches presented by Tipping J. The issue that arises is the role (if any) that causation plays in the granting of the appropriate remedy in the case of a breach of the second kind of duty not involving any damage to or loss of property in the custody of the fiduciary (ie, a non-custodial breach of fiduciary duty).

  104. (B) An overview of the various approaches towards the role of causation adopted by Singapore High Court decisions where there is a non-custodial breach of fiduciary duty

  105. [88] The common issue that arises with regard to a breach of fiduciary duty, whether custodial or non-custodial, is whether causation is required to be proved and, if so, how it is to be proved. In so far as non-custodial breaches of fiduciary duty are concerned, different approaches have been adopted by various local High Court decisions. It will suffice for the purposes of the present overview to note that there are at least three possible approaches to the role of causation in ascertaining whether or not a remedy ought to be awarded to the plaintiff.

  106. [89] The first (which we refer to hereafter as “Approach 1”) – which is frequently attributed to a strict reading of the Privy Council decision of Brickenden ([7] supra) – is that causation is not relevant once a breach of fiduciary duty has been established. In particular, a defendant would not be permitted to argue that it is not responsible for the damage which the plaintiff has suffered as that damage would have occurred in any event and that the defendant had therefore not caused the damage in question. The underlying rationale for such a strict (indeed, prophylactic) approach centres on the need to deter breaches of fiduciary duty.

  107. [90] By way of a brief aside, judges and academics have interpreted Brickenden differently: some have read it as a principle relating solely to rescission and not compensatory awards (see Hobhouse LJ (as he then was) in the English Court of Appeal decision of Swindle and others v Harrison and another [1997] 4 All ER 705 (“Swindle”), at [190] below), some have taken it to be a principle relating only to the breach of fiduciary duty (see Mummery LJ in Swindle at [188] below), some have stated that the rule is an application of a “material” causation test approaching strict liability (see Joshua Getzler, “Equitable Compensation and the Regulation of Fiduciary Relationships” in Restitution and Equity Volume One, Resulting Trusts and Equitable Compensation (Peter Birks & Francis Rose eds) (Mansfield Press, 2000) ch 13 (“Getzler”) at p 239), and some have opined that the rule was mainly about excluding ready resort to contributory negligence as a defence (see Getzler at p 240, citing PD Finn, “Good Faith and Non-Disclosure” in Essays on Torts (PD Finn ed) (Lawbook Co, 1989) at pp 166–170). Although Approach 1 could be justified by way of the doctrine of rescission, as a learned writer has, in our view, quite correctly pointed out, this would be “a very strained interpretation of what Lord Thankerton said in Brickenden” (see Matthew Conaglen, “Brickenden” in Equitable Compensation and Disgorgement of Profit (Simone Degeling & Jason NE Varuhas eds) (Hart Publishing, 2017) ch 6 (“Conaglen on Brickenden”) at p 119). The other suggested readings are likewise strained.

  108. [91] The second (which we refer to hereafter as “Approach 2”) – which is in complete contrast to the first, and which is attributed to the House of Lords decision in Target Holdings ([52] supra) and (more recently) the UK Supreme Court decision of AIB ([52] supra) – is that the plaintiff must always establish “but for” causation.

  109. [92] The third (which we refer to hereafter as “Approach 3”) is a kind of hybrid approach which, whilst not eschewing the requirement of causation (which is wholly endorsed under Approach 2), nevertheless attempts to give effect to the underlying rationale under Approach 1 by reversing the burden of proof inasmuch as the defendant will have to prove that the damage suffered by the plaintiff would have occurred in any event.

  110. [93] We will assess each of these approaches in due course before arriving at a decision as to which approach ought to be adopted in the Singapore context. We should also add that the actual legal issues are – as we shall see below – obviously far more complex than the mere sketch or outline which we have just presented. For example, under Approach 3, the court has to decide whether the reversal is of the legal burden or the evidential burden.

  111. [94] We should mention that the concept of causation is itself a logical construct. By this, we mean that, as a matter of pure logic, every effect must have a cause or a series of causes. Put another way, the concept of causation is a universal one that is simultaneously an integral part of the fabric of the law. Viewed in this light (and in so far as non-custodial breaches of fiduciary duty are concerned), Approach 1 becomes immediately less persuasive. However, it does not necessarily follow, then, that Approach 2 must apply – at least not in an unmodified form. Nevertheless, Approach 2 does remain preferable to Approach 1 inasmuch as it embodies the concept of causation. In this regard, Approach 3 attempts to achieve a balance between Approach 1 on the one hand and Approach 2 on the other.

  112. [95] We would also venture to suggest that underlying the approaches may – in some instances at least – be what is emblematic of a particular approach towards the common law on the one hand and equity on the other (or, more to the point, as embodying a clear preference for one over the other). As we shall attempt to demonstrate, the best approach is – as far as it is possible – to integrate both these seminal branches of the law as opposed to preferring one over the other. Rendering explicit subjective (and often, it should be said, subconscious) bias towards one approach rather than the other is also helpful in dissolving any possible bias as this is, in our view, a first step as well as a prerequisite to developing the aforementioned integrated approach. And it is to the issues just mentioned that our attention now turns.

  113. (C) Common law and (not versus) equity

  114. [98] Indeed, an integrated as well as holistic approach is also reflected in the following observations in a very perceptive article by Prof Charles Mitchell, whose observations also impact (as we shall see) on other issues (Charles Mitchell, “Equitable Compensation for Breach of Fiduciary Duty” (2013) 66 Current Legal Problems 307 (“Mitchell”) at pp 326–327):

  115. (D) Breach of trust distinguished from breach of fiduciary duty

  116. [99] We begin first by considering the position of a trustee, and the important distinction that exists between his or her stewardship duty and his or her fiduciary duty. Although this case is not concerned with a breach of trust, an understanding of this distinction is relevant to understanding the distinction between a custodial breach and a non-custodial breach of fiduciary duty, which we will elaborate in the next section.

  117. [100] It is fundamental to the law of trusts that trustees owe a duty to their beneficiaries to administer trust property in accordance with the terms of the trust. Trustees owe a custodial stewardship duty and a management stewardship duty. Breach of the former duty occurs where the trustee misapplies trust assets. The trustee commits a different breach when he breaches his management stewardship duty; it occurs where he fails to administer the trust fund in accordance with his equitable duties, such as when he administers the trust negligently, in breach of his equitable duty of care. Using the trichotomy of breaches Tipping J elucidated (see [87] above), a breach of the custodial stewardship duty is the first kind of breach (ie, a breach leading directly to damage to or loss of the trust property), and a breach of the management stewardship duty is likely to be the third kind of breach (ie, a breach involving a lack of appropriate skill or care).

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