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Grounds publishedDecided 16 Apr 2020

Court of Appeal

BWG v BW F

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[2020] SGCA 36Case no. Civil Appeal No 12 of 2019

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] This appeal was heard together with Civil Appeal No 174 of 2018. Both appeals involved the same legal issue: what is the standard of review when a dispute that is subject to an arbitration arises in relation to a debt which forms the basis of a winding-up application? This court’s decision on this issue is set out in full in AnAn Group (Singapore) Pte Ltd v VTB Bank (Public Joint Stock Company) [2020] SGCA 33 (“VTB Bank”). In short, we held that when a court is faced with either a disputed debt or a cross-claim that is subject to an arbitration agreement, the prima facie standard of review should apply, such that the winding-up proceedings will be stayed or dismissed so long as (a) there is a valid arbitration agreement between the parties; and (b) the dispute falls within the scope of that arbitration agreement, provided that the dispute is not being raised by the debtor in abuse of the court’s process (VTB Bank at [56]). We also held that the doctrine of abuse of process is an appropriate measure to check against possible abuses of the prima facie standard. We stressed that in determining whether there has been an abuse of process, the court must be wary not to engage in the merits of the parties’ dispute, as the court is not the proper forum to adjudicate the dispute between the parties which is subject to arbitration (VTB Bank at [100]).

  3. [2] In transactions involving the sale of commodities, back-to-back contracts or a string of contracts are commonplace. Quite often, the physical supplier or the original seller might not know the identity of the ultimate receiver or buyer. Between these two parties there would typically be a chain of intermediaries whose sole interest is to earn some commission or a modest price differential. If the transaction goes smoothly, everyone down the line will be paid. Serious difficulties will, however, be encountered in the event of a default by one of the parties in the string of contracts. Parties who are intermediaries would by definition be both sellers and buyers albeit to different parties and would quite often find themselves “between the devil and the deep blue sea”. Vis-à-vis their buyer, they could adopt one position while vis-à-vis their seller, they may well adopt a different and somewhat inconsistent position.

  4. [3] This was precisely the quandary faced by the respondent in the present case. It is difficult for an intermediary such as the respondent to anticipate how the litigation involving separate parties would eventually pan out. In the meantime, such an intermediary would be expected to take steps to best protect their own interest and in the process, may find themselves adopting inconsistent positions as against different parties in the chain.

  5. [4] This appeal thus raises an interesting question as to whether the enforcement of a settlement agreement, in separate proceedings against a third party, which is premised on claims mirroring those faced by the debtor in a winding-up context, constitutes an adoption of inconsistent positions as against the creditor such as to amount to an abuse of process. The ultimate purpose of this inquiry is to determine whether the court should restrain the commencement of a winding-up application against the debtor.

  6. [5] This judgment will also examine the scope and nature of the abuse of process doctrine when it is invoked to prevent a defendant from raising an inconsistent defence. This is particularly germane when there are competing policy imperatives in play. Should a court prevent a defendant from raising the defence of illegality on the basis of abuse of process if the effect of doing so would enable the claimant to enforce an illegal claim? In our view, as abuse of process is a discretionary doctrine, its application must necessarily be premised on a proper balancing exercise to prevent the greater risk of injustice.

  7. Facts

  8. Contracts

  9. [6] There was a string of contracts involving X, the appellant, and the respondent, which concerned the sale and purchase of the same cargo of crude oil (“the Cargo”). The first contract was between X and the appellant, with X as the seller and the appellant as the buyer (“the X-appellant contract”). The second contract was between the appellant and the respondent, with the respondent as the buyer (the appellant-respondent contract”). As it turned out, there was another contract downstream between the respondent as the seller and X as the buyer (“the respondent-X contract”). Thus, in this string of contracts, X was both the ultimate seller and the ultimate buyer of the Cargo.

  10. [7] The timelines for payment under the three contracts bear highlighting as they have a material bearing on the true purpose behind the string of contracts. First, the appellant would pay X, by way of a letter of credit, within 30 days upon tender of a notice of readiness (“the NOR”) at the discharge port. Then, X would pay the respondent within 89 days of the tender of the NOR. Lastly, the respondent was obliged to pay the appellant within 90 days of the tender of the NOR. Under these timelines, X was to pay the respondent before the respondent was due to pay the appellant, despite the fact that the respondent was due to receive the Cargo from the appellant prior to its purported delivery to X.

  11. [8] We also draw attention to the different prices of the Cargo under the various contracts in the chain. In the X-appellant contract, the Cargo was sold for US$29,945,600. In the appellant-respondent contract, the respondent was obliged to pay the appellant a sum of US$30,245,600 while in the respondent-X contract, X was obliged to pay the respondent a sum of US$30,253,600. Therefore, under this string of contracts, the respondent would make a modest gain of US$8,000 while the appellant stood to gain around US$300,000.

  12. [9] Based on the above timelines, the respondent was due to pay the appellant by 11 July 2018. However, the respondent did not make payment by this date because its position was that it was obliged to pay the appellant only upon being paid by X. There is no dispute that X failed to pay the respondent by 10 July 2018, as required under the respondent-X contract.

  13. Negotiations

  14. [10] The respondent’s failure to pay the appellant by 11 July 2018 was preceded and followed by a number of discussions involving representatives of the respondent, the appellant and X.

  15. [11] On 2 July 2018, Shi (an oil trader with X) and two senior employees of X (Muda and Machida) requested to meet Anh, the Deputy Director (Head of Training) of the respondent, who was partially involved in arranging the deal with the respondent and X. Anh was informed by Shi that X would not be able to make payment to the respondent for the Cargo by 10 July 2018.

  16. [12] Anh agreed to meet X’s representatives on 3 July 2018. The meeting was attended by Anh, Thanh (the respondent’s finance manager), Machida and X’s Chief Operation Officer, Jun. There appears to have been some discussion on an “alternative” payment plan by X to the respondent. A second meeting also took place on 3 July 2018, but this time involving Chew, a trader in the appellant’s Singapore office, with Machida and Jun.

  17. [13] On 4 July 2018, a further meeting took place between Anh and Chew. It appears that it was during this meeting that the respondent first became aware that the appellant had initially bought the Cargo from X, and that the appellant had procured its bank, UBS, to issue a letter of credit to X. In other words, it was during this meeting that the respondent found out that X was both the ultimate buyer and the ultimate seller of the Cargo. In a second meeting on 4 July 2018, the respondent’s representatives again met with X’s representatives together with Chew of the appellant. According to Chew, all the parties had discussed payment by way of instalments by X to the respondent. These sums would in turn be paid by the respondent to the appellant.

  18. [14] Pursuant to these discussions, on 12 July 2018, the respondent entered into a settlement agreement with X for the unpaid sum of US$30,253,600 (“the Settlement Agreement”). It is worth reiterating that the appellant was privy to the specific discussions leading up to the Settlement Agreement. In particular, Chew was present during the meeting on 4 July 2018 when representatives of X and representatives of the respondent discussed the plan to make delayed payment by way of instalments. Indeed, as we mention below at [20], Chew would later acknowledge that he received a copy of the “payment proposal” by X on 6 July 2018.

  19. [15] In essence, the Settlement Agreement required X to pay the outstanding sum over four instalments from 10 August to 9 November 2018. The Settlement Agreement also contained an undertaking for Sit, the Chief Executive Officer of X, to execute a personal guarantee for the outstanding sums under the Settlement Agreement. Under the Settlement Agreement, the first payment fell due on 10 August 2018. X, however, only made part-payment of US$50,000 each on 17 and 30 August 2018, and thereafter failed to make payment of the remaining sums.

  20. [16] What should be emphasised is that, during these discussions, the respondent appeared to accept that it should pay the appellant, but only after it was paid by X under the respondent-X contract. On 3 May 2018, a WhatsApp exchange took place between Shi and Anh, and Shi informed Anh as follows:

  21. [17] Thereafter, on 3 July 2018, one day before Anh’s meeting with Chew, Shi again informed Anh that the respondent was to pay the appellant only after it was paid by X. The WhatsApp conversation between Anh and Shi reads as follows:

  22. [18] Consistent with what he was informed of by Shi, Anh told Chew, during their discussion on 4 July 2018, that the respondent would pay the appellant if and when it received payment from X. On 5 July 2018, Chew sent Anh an e-mail asking him to “confirm that the payment shall be paid on [the] due date”.

  23. [19] On 6 July 2018, Anh responded to Chew as follows:

  24. [20] Presumably, the reference to “Wednesday’s meeting between all three parties” [emphasis added] was to the second meeting that took place on 4 July 2018. Chew acknowledged that Anh had e-mailed him a copy of the “payment proposal” received by the respondent from X. Significantly, the appellant did not dispute the contents of the respondent’s e-mail of 6 July 2018 – specifically that the appellant had agreed to accept the rescheduled payments after payment by X to the respondent.

  25. [21] On 9 July 2018, the appellant sent a reminder to the respondent that payment was due on 11 July 2018. Having failed to receive payment by 11 July 2018, a second reminder was sent by the appellant on 12 July 2018. On 12 July 2018, Anh replied to the appellant by an e-mail which reads as follows:

  26. [22] Faced with these demands for payment by the appellant, and having not received payment from X on 10 July 2018, the respondent entered into the Settlement Agreement with X on 12 July 2018.

  27. Procedural history

  28. [23] Having failed to receive full payment of the first instalment due under the Settlement Agreement on 10 August 2018, the respondent was not in a position to make payment of the sums claimed by the appellant under the appellant-respondent contract. It is undisputed that the respondent did not make any payment under the appellant-respondent contract.

  29. [24] On 13 August 2018, the appellant served a statutory demand under s 254(2)(a) of the Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed) on the respondent. It is significant that the appellant’s statutory demand was made after X failed to pay the respondent the first instalment due under the Settlement Agreement on 10 August 2018. On 20 August 2018, the respondent’s solicitors responded by way of letter, disputing the claim. In the letter, the respondent’s solicitors refuted the appellant’s assertion of a debt, stating, among other things, that “the transaction was on a ‘pay to be paid’ basis”. In other words, “[the respondent] would only pay [the appellant] after they received payment from [X]” [emphasis added]. The respondents also took the position that the appellant-respondent contract was “a sham and unenforceable”, because it was “part of a circuitous arrangement between [X] and [the appellant]”.

  30. [25] Further, the respondent’s solicitors requested that the appellant withdraw the statutory demand, since the appellant-respondent contract contained the following arbitration clause:

  31. [26] The appellant’s solicitors replied on 28 August 2018, rejecting the request. On 3 September 2018, the respondent took out HC/OS 1086/2018 to set aside the statutory demand and to restrain the appellant’s pending winding-up proceedings.

  32. The respondent’s proceedings against X and Sit

  33. [27] In reaction to the appellant’s proceedings against the respondent for US$30,245,600, the respondent commenced proceedings against X for non-payment of the outstanding sums under the Settlement Agreement.

  34. [28] On 30 August 2018, the respondent likewise served a statutory demand on X. X failed to pay the sums due under the Settlement Agreement. Thereafter, on 1 November 2018, the respondent commenced HC/CWU 260/2018 (“CWU 260”) against X.

  35. [29] On 13 December 2018, X applied by way of HC/OS 1539/2018 (“OS 1539”) for a moratorium on proceedings against it. An affidavit filed by a representative of X in support of OS 1539 revealed that X was facing significant debts of approximately US$870m. The moratorium was granted and was subsequently extended until 30 January 2020. At the same time, X sought more time to restructure its debts for the wider corporate group of which X was part. In the meantime, CWU 260 has been stayed since 14 December 2018, pending the outcome of OS 1539.

  36. Decision below

  37. [31] Applying the prima facie standard of review, the High Court Judge below (“the Judge”) held at [22] that the debt was disputed and such dispute fell within the arbitration agreement. For the reasons stated in VTB Bank ([1] supra), we agree with her adoption of this standard of review.

  38. [32] Further, the Judge considered that there had been no admission by the respondent as regards both the liability and quantum of the claim. The Judge went on to consider whether, apart from admission of the debt, there was any other possibility of abuse of process. In this regard, the appellant had relied on four doctrines: (a) waiver by election; (b) approbation and reprobation; (c) the lack of clean hands (in equity); and (d) abuse of process. The Judge rejected all four grounds.

  39. [33] Satisfied that there was at least a prima facie dispute and that the respondent had not admitted to the debt, nor had there been any abuse of process, the Judge granted the respondent an injunction to restrain the appellant from taking out winding-up proceedings.

  40. Parties’ cases on appeal

  41. [34] In this appeal, the appellant contends that the respondent had made an admission as to its liability to pay the sum due under the appellant-respondent contract. Relatedly, the appellant submits that the respondent had acted inconsistently by taking out proceedings against X pursuant to the Settlement Agreement as well as pursuing Sit to bankruptcy, while at the same time relying on three of its four defences (“Price Defences”). According to the appellant, adopting such inconsistent positions amounts to an abuse of process. In response, the respondent seeks to affirm the Judge’s decision in applying the prima facie standard of review. Further, it relies on four defences to support its position that, in the event the court applies the higher triable issue standard of review, there are nonetheless triable issues.

  42. [35] We briefly describe the four defences raised by the respondent as they are relevant irrespective of the applicable standard of review.

  43. [36] First, the respondent asserts that the appellant failed to comply with cl 8.1 of the appellant-respondent contract. Under this clause, payment was to be made against the presentation of the seller’s commercial invoice and the “usual shipping documents”. The “usual shipping documents” are defined under cl 8.1 as “copies of non-negotiable bills of lading plus certificates of quantity, quality and origin (or equivalent documents) issued at the loading terminal”. In this regard, it is common ground that no certificates of quantity, quality and origin were ever provided by the appellant to the respondent (“the non-receipt of documents defence”).

  44. [37] Second, the appellant never passed title or delivered the Cargo to the respondent. Thus, the respondent contends that the appellant’s claim for the price of the Cargo cannot succeed (“the title defence”).

  45. [38] Third, the entire transaction involving X, the appellant and the respondent was a sham or tainted by illegality, rendering it unenforceable. In sum, stale documents that did not represent any real cargo were used to create the false impression of a genuine sale and purchase of goods, although the sale of the Cargo between X and the appellant was in truth a disguised loan. Therefore, the respondent contends that UBS was wrongfully induced to effect payment under the letter of credit upon the provision of such false documents. In particular, the respondent argues that while the letter of credit extended by UBS required X to present original bills of lading, the X-appellant contract only required X to provide “copy” documents to the appellant, and false documents were indeed used. The appellant-respondent contract was also aimed at deceiving the third-party bank, and was similarly tainted by illegality and therefore unenforceable. The fact that UBS was ultimately repaid by the appellant made no difference as both the appellant and X had structured the entire transaction with the intention of deceiving UBS into purportedly financing a sham sale transaction (“the illegality defence”).

  46. [39] We refer to the above three defences – the non-receipt of documents defence, the title defence and the illegality defence – collectively as the “Price Defences”. The reason why we have grouped these three defences collectively as the “Price Defences” – leaving out the fourth defence which is separately described below as the “the pay when paid defence” – is that the appellant’s argument as regards the inconsistent position adopted by the respondent only pertains to the Price Defences. As explained at [56] and [57] below, this distinction has a material bearing on the outcome of the appeal.

  47. [40] Fourth, the respondent claims that it is only obliged to pay the appellant after it has been paid by X, as there was an “unwritten understanding” or “side agreement” to that effect. This understanding is borne out by the meetings between the three parties as well as the exchange of correspondence. The respondent’s position is that it was only an intermediary in the entire string of contracts, and it did not assume any contractual or credit risks relating to the transaction. Its role was merely to facilitate the transmission of documents and payments between the appellant and X. For this reason, the string of contracts was deliberately structured in such a manner as to provide for the respondent to receive payment from X before payment was due from the respondent to the appellant. Consistent with the respondent’s limited role, it was to receive merely a token commission of US$8,000 from the transaction. From the respondent’s perspective, as Shi (an employee of X) had coordinated the deal between the appellant and the respondent, Shi must have been authorised by the appellant to negotiate the terms of the appellant-respondent contract on behalf of the appellant (“the pay when paid defence”).

  48. Our decision

  49. [42] Nonetheless, for completeness, we consider whether any of the Price Defences raised by the respondent constitute an abuse of process such as to prevent the respondent from relying on those defences in the arbitration for the purpose of seeking an injunction against the appellant.

  50. Preliminary finding on the true nature of the entire transaction

  51. [43] Before delving into the issue of whether there was an abuse of process on the part of the respondent in relation to the Price Defences, we first state our preliminary finding on the true nature of the entire transaction involving X, the appellant and the respondent. In brief, we agree with the respondent that the X-appellant contract does not appear to be a bona fide transaction for the sale of goods but was instead a disguised loan arrangement between the two parties.

  52. [44] The evidence shows that it was Shi, an employee of X, who had introduced the appellant to the respondent. Anh was first approached by Shi on 10 April 2018. Both of them had been introduced by Li, a senior manager of a Chinese state-owned oil trading company. It appears that all of the negotiations leading to the appellant-respondent contract as well the respondent-X contract were facilitated through Shi, an employee of X. This is evidenced by various WhatsApp conversations between Shi and Anh. Between 11 April 2018 and 19 April 2018, Shi sent Anh details of the intended deal between the appellant and the respondent, as well as information on a potential deal between the respondent and a sub-purchaser of the Cargo. In the circumstances, the appellant must have known that Shi was arranging the appellant-respondent contract on behalf of the appellant. These details were referred to as “deal recap drafts” and included, among other things, the volume of crude oil, the sale price, the delivery window and the payment timeline for the agreement. Initially, the plan was for the respondent to on-sell the Cargo to an entity known as “Arc”. However, the buyer was later changed to X. These conversations between Shi and Anh also reveal that Shi was in contact with the appellant. It is therefore clear that X must have known, through Shi, that it would be the eventual buyer of the Cargo from the respondent following the deal between the appellant and the respondent.

  53. [45] Apart from the fact that it was an employee of X who had facilitated the transaction between the appellant and the respondent, there were several other aspects of the transaction which appear consistent with a disguised loan arrangement.

  54. [46] For instance, there is no evidence that the appellant had ever traded with the respondent prior to this transaction. Nevertheless, the appellant appeared not to have any difficulty in transacting with the respondent to sell the Cargo valued in excess of US$30m without any form of security from the respondent. In a typical transaction, where a seller sells cargo to a buyer, it would generally withhold the bill of lading so that the buyer would not be able to take delivery and title does not pass unless either security for payment is provided or payment is received. Indeed, no explanation was provided by the appellant as to why it was prepared to deliver the Cargo of considerable value without taking any form of security from the respondent.

  55. [47] In addition, the documents used to facilitate the entire transaction appear highly suspicious. The only indication that the Cargo had been purportedly delivered to the respondent was an “update” from the vessel master forwarded to the respondent in an e-mail. The vessel master’s update stated that discharging was completed on 24 April 2018 at 6.48pm. It is, however, not entirely clear from the vessel master’s update whether the discharge involved the same Cargo. It is especially significant that the vessel master’s update completely omits any mention of the appellant, the respondent or X.

  56. [48] More suspiciously, the tendered NOR was addressed to two entities known as “Haiyuan” and “Petrobras” as the receiver and charterer respectively. Conspicuously, X, the appellant and the respondent were not named in the NOR. Chew’s explanation was that nothing was amiss because the NOR would not have expressly identified all the cargo receivers in respect of a charter, and it was market practice for a NOR to refer only to one of the intended cargo receivers. While that may well be true, there was still no explanation for the specific involvement of Haiyuan and Petrobras in the string of contracts without any mention of any of the three parties in the string of contracts.

  57. [49] Finally, the material terms of the X-appellant, appellant-respondent and respondent-X contracts, when read together, are consistent with a loan arrangement. The substance of the contracts was that X would receive the funds from the appellant under the letter of credit issued by UBS with the Cargo as ostensible security for the payment. At the end of the string of transactions, the Cargo would be returned to X, and a larger sum of funds would be paid to the appellant. The amount that the appellant stood to gain was about US$300,000 in the span of 60 days, which works out to an annualised interest rate of about 6.3%.

  58. [50] Given the above, we are of the view that the transaction between X and the appellant does not appear to be a genuine transaction for the sale of goods, but appears to be a disguised loan arrangement instead. It would also appear that appellant was privy to this arrangement, it being the party dealing directly with X and procuring UBS to issue X a letter of credit on the presentation of original bills of lading, but tendering an NOR that did not reflect either the respondent or appellant as parties delivering or receiving the Cargo. As the purported creditor in the disguised loan transaction, it is self-evident that the appellant must have known the true nature of the transaction. It also appears to us that the appellant had secured the letter of credit from UBS on a false premise.

  59. [51] What then is the impact of this assessment on the merits of this appeal? Specifically, how would these preliminary observations have a bearing on the question of abuse of process in relation to the Price Defences raised by the respondent?

  60. Abuse of process

  61. [52] In Jtrust Asia Pte Ltd v Group Lease Holdings Pte Ltd and others [2018] 2 SLR 159, this court cited with approval Lord Sumption’s statement in Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd v Zodiac Seats UK Ltd (formerly Contour Aerospace Ltd) [2014] AC 160 at [25], that “abuse of process is a concept which informs the exercise of the court’s procedural powers”. This court further explained that abuse of process is a concept by which the court ascertains whether the proceedings in question constitute an “improper use of its machinery” (at [99]). In Gabriel Peter & Partners (suing as a firm) v Wee Chong Jin and others [1997] 3 SLR(R) 649 at [22] (albeit in the context of O 18 r 19(1)(d) of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) (“ROC”)), this court also observed that abuse of process imports considerations of public policy and the interests of justice, and signifies that the process of the court must be used bona fide.

  62. [53] We also highlight that abuse of process is ultimately exercised at the court’s discretion, which depends on all the interests and circumstances of the case. As this court observed in Lim Geok Lin Andy v Yap Jin Meng Bryan and another appeal [2017] 2 SLR 760 at [38] and [44] (albeit in the context of a particular type of abuse of process known as the “Henderson rule”, ie, that a litigant may not make a case in litigation which might have been, but was not, made in previous litigation, as doing so may amount to an abuse of process):

  63. [54] The learned authors of Singapore Civil Procedure 2020, vol 1 (Chua Lee Ming gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 10th Ed, 2020) made an observation at para 18/19/14 (in the context of O 18 r 19(1)(d) of the ROC), “The categories of conduct rendering a claim … an abuse of process are not closed but depend on all the relevant circumstances and for this purpose considerations of public policy and the interests of justice may be very material”. In sum, the doctrine of abuse of process has been developed to permit the courts to police their own processes and guard against abuse. This may entail balancing considerations of public policy and the interests of justice.

  64. [55] In VTB Bank ([1] supra at [97]–[99]), we explained that the doctrine of abuse of process can be applied as a control mechanism against possible abuses of a lower standard of review. We highlighted that the abuse of process doctrine coheres better with the whole law of civil procedure, including stay applications based on exclusive jurisdiction clauses (as in Vinmar Overseas (Singapore) Pte Ltd v PTT International Trading Pte Ltd [2018] 2 SLR 1271 and applications under s 6 of the International Arbitration Act (Cap 143A, 2002 Rev Ed). We also noted that abuse of process manifests itself in a multitude of different scenarios (VTB Bank at [99]). A paradigm example of abuse is where a debtor had previously admitted that it owes the debt, but subsequently disputes the debt. In the absence of a clear and convincing reason for the change of position, the court should generally refuse an application for stay of the winding-up proceedings (VTB Bank at [94]).

  65. [57] It would therefore be evident that in considering whether a debtor has taken inconsistent positions, the court is required to take a granular approach and consider each defence separately not for the purposes of the merits but to determine whether there was any abuse of process. Where, for instance, a debtor raises multiple defences, some of these might well not involve taking an inconsistent position. Raising these defences would thus not amount to abuse of the court’s process. In such a situation, the debtor may still be able to obtain relief as there are some defences that would satisfy the prima facie standard of review.

  66. [58] In this regard, we emphasise that here a party’s inconsistent positions are analysed under the doctrine of abuse of process, which as we noted at [53] above, is a discretionary jurisdiction, and may involve considerations of public policy. Hence, by reason of policy considerations and in exceptional circumstances, the court may decline to hold that a party is in abuse of process despite the party’s inconsistent conduct if there is a risk of even greater injustice in barring that party from taking such an inconsistent position.

  67. Parties’ submissions on the abuse of process

  68. [59] We now turn to the issue of whether the respondent had acted inconsistently such that it would be an abuse of the court’s process for it to invoke the prima facie standard of review to restrain the winding up application.

  69. [60] Briefly summarised, the appellant contends that the respondent had acted inconsistently in bringing winding-up proceedings against X and bankruptcy proceedings against Sit on the one hand, and advancing the Price Defences against the appellant on the other, such that the respondent’s conduct amounted to an abuse of process. In particular, the respondent denies that it received delivery and/or good title to the Cargo and claims that its contract with the appellant is unenforceable for illegality, but it also sought the Court’s assistance in a winding-up application (ie, CWU 260) for a default of payment against its downstream buyer, X, for the same Cargo, and brought bankruptcy proceedings against Sit for the same sum. In this regard, the appellant submits that it was clearly within the respondent’s knowledge, at the very latest by August 2018 (ie, before it commenced the winding-up proceedings against X and bankruptcy proceedings against Sit) whether it had actually received delivery of the Cargo.

  70. [61] According to the respondent, there is no inconsistency between bringing claims against X and Sit pursuant to the Settlement Agreement and personal guarantee respectively and resisting the appellant’s claim for the price of the Cargo. This is because the claims against X and Sit under the Settlement Agreement and Sit’s personal guarantee respectively are separate from the underlying claim giving rise to it (ie, under the respondent-X contract). In addition, the respondent submits that the appellant’s allegation that it had acted inconsistently failed to take into account the respondent’s position all along that it was nothing more than an intermediary in the entire transaction. This point was also made by Mr Tan Chuan Bing Kendall, counsel for the respondent, who explained that steps were taken against X and Sit so that the respondent would receive payment from X or Sit and be in a position to discharge its liability to the appellant.

  71. Has the respondent adopted inconsistent positions?

  72. Applicable principles on settlement agreements

  73. [62] In determining whether the respondent’s claims against X and Sit are inconsistent with the Price Defences raised against the appellant, it is relevant to have regard to the general principles relating to a settlement agreement or compromise, in particular the relationship between the validity of the underlying claim and the validity of the settlement.

  74. [63] In Projection Pte Ltd v The Tai Ping Insurance Co Ltd [2001] 1 SLR(R) 798 at [26], this court endorsed the following passage from the decision of the Privy Council in Jayawickreme and another v Amarasuriya (since deceased) [1918] AC 869 at 873:

  75. [64] Hence, a settlement agreement may be valid even if the underlying claim (which was compromised) is invalid, so long as the plaintiff bona fide believed in the validity of the underlying claim. As stated in Foskett on Compromise (David Foskett gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 8th Ed, 2015) (“Foskett on Compromise”) at para 2-19:

  76. [65] The same principle applies in cases where the compromised underlying claim is invalid for reasons of illegality. In the English Court of Appeal case of Binder v Alachouzos [1972] 2 QB 151 (“Binder”), the defendant had borrowed £65,000 from the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s associates. The defendant refused to repay the debt on grounds that the sums claimed were in respect of unlawful moneylending transactions and were therefore irrecoverable. Prior to commencement of the trial, parties reached a compromise agreement by which the defendant agreed to pay the plaintiff a settlement sum of £86,565. As Lord Denning held (at 158), a bona fide agreement of compromise, with fair and reasonable terms, is binding and enforceable, and will not be tainted by the illegality of the underlying transaction. The compromise agreement was held to be bona fide because there was a genuine dispute as to whether the plaintiff was an unlawful moneylender. Lord Denning acknowledged that there were two competing considerations – preventing evasion of the Moneylenders Act on the one hand, and enforcing bona fide compromise agreements on the other. With respect to the former consideration, it was noted that the Moneylenders Acts were for the protection of borrowers, and the court would not allow a moneylender to use a compromise as a means of getting around the Moneylenders Acts. However, if parties could never compromise in such a situation, then every case would have to go to court for final determination and consideration, which could not be right. Hence, it was held that as long as the compromise contained reasonable terms and was entered into in good faith, it should be enforced. Lord Roskill agreed, and further noted that the plaintiff had provided valuable consideration in the form of a promise not to pursue the dispute over the factual issue of whether the transactions were unlawful moneylending transactions; the compromise was therefore enforceable (at 160).

  77. [66] Binder was recently upheld and applied in FPH Law (a firm) v Martyn Robert Brown (T/A Integrum Law) [2018] EWCA Civ 1629 (“FPH Law”) at [46]. The Court of Appeal in FPH Law noted that an example of a compromise which lacked bona fides is where one party knows that the underlying transaction is invalid, and yet negotiates the compromise (which assumes the contrary) (at [40]).

  78. [67] One rationale for this proposition is that there is a lack of consideration in such a situation. Where it is known to the party (who forbears to pursue his claim in the settlement agreement) that his claim is in fact baseless, such as where it would be void for illegality, then there is no consideration for the compromise, and the settlement agreement may be liable to be set aside: Hyams v Coombes (1912) 28 TLR 413 and Burrell & Son v Leven (1926) 42 TLR 407, affirmed in Poteliakhoff v Teakle [1938] 2 KB 816 at 822. Similarly, in Foskett on Compromise at para 4–74, it is stated that where the compromise is of a dispute on a contract which is indisputably illegal, the compromise itself is illegal and unenforceable. This is because the consideration for the compromise (the forbearance to sue on an illegal contract) is illegal, as it is clear that the claim is unfounded.

  79. [68] Another rationale is grounded in public policy and prevention of abuse. As stated in Chitty on Contracts (Hugh Beale gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 33nd Ed, 2018) (“Chitty”), at para 4-051:

  80. [69] The case of Binder ([65] supra) was discussed in Chitty at para 16–040, in its discussion on compromises of illegal contracts. Therein, it is asserted that the norm is that the compromise, like the illegal underlying contract, is not enforceable:

  81. [71] However, the crux of the issue here is not the validity of the Settlement Agreement per se but its subsequent enforcement. We appreciate, of course, that the Settlement Agreement is distinct from the contract that gave rise to the underlying claim which was thereafter compromised. We are also cognisant that the Settlement Agreement may be valid notwithstanding deficiencies in the underlying claim, so long as the respondent bona fide believed in the validity of the claim at the time it was entered into. We are, however, not concerned with those issues of validity. Instead, the question is whether, in raising the Price Defences against the appellant’s claim under the appellant-respondent contract, the respondent has acted inconsistently vis-à-vis its enforcement of the Settlement Agreement against X and if so, whether such inconsistent conduct amounts to an abuse of process. Put differently, is it permissible for the respondent to, on the one hand, enforce the Settlement Agreement against X while, on the other hand, in these proceedings, maintain that: (a) the underlying appellant-respondent contract is illegal and unenforceable; (b) that no Cargo was ever delivered; and (c) that the requisite documents had not been delivered from the appellant to the respondent?

  82. [72] This distinction is critical because it appears that while the Settlement Agreement was validly entered into at the time it was concluded, by the time of its enforcement against X and Sit, the respondent might have been aware that the underlying respondent-X contract and/or the appellant-respondent contract were both arguably sham contracts. The crucial question is thus whether enforcing a Settlement Agreement, which the respondent believed was validly entered into, is an abuse of process because at the time of enforcement, it had reason to believe that the underlying transaction was somehow tainted by some illegality.

  83. Title defence

  84. [73] We preface our analysis by expressing our view on when the respondent first became aware that no Cargo was actually delivered from the appellant to the respondent. The earliest possible date that the respondent could have found out that the Cargo was not actually delivered was 30 April 2018, when the vessel master’s update was forwarded via e-mail to the respondent. In our view, however, it is clear that the respondent did not suspect that anything was amiss from the vessel update alone, given that it continued to negotiate with representatives of X and the appellant up until July 2018 in an attempt to secure payment from X so that it could make payment under the appellant-respondent contract. We accept the respondent’s claim that it had found out about the non-delivery of Cargo around August 2018, in light of the respondent’s solicitors’ letter to Clyde & Co LLP, the appellant’s English solicitors, dated 8 August 2018, which states:

  85. [74] Further, on 2 November 2018, Li filed an affidavit on behalf of the respondent stating that Haiyuan – which was addressed as the “Receiver” of the Cargo on the NOR – had purchased the Cargo from Petrobras. This is consistent with the respondent’s claim that it had found out around August 2018 that no Cargo was delivered under the appellant-respondent contract.

  86. [76] However, this argument plainly ignores the undeniable fact that the proceedings against X and Sit were under the Settlement Agreement, and not based on the underlying agreement (ie, the respondent-X contract). In this regard, although the Settlement Agreement was undeniably premised on the underlying agreement, it is in law a separate cause of action. The respondent was therefore not strictly relying on the respondent-X contract as a basis of the debt owed by X when the respondent commenced proceedings against X and Sit. Under the Settlement Agreement, there was no question of any cargo due for delivery or passing of title to the Cargo. We are therefore not satisfied that there was any such inconsistency in relation to the title defence as alleged by the appellant.

  87. Non-receipt of documents defence

  88. [77] Under cl 8.1 of the appellant-respondent contract, payment was to be made against the seller’s presentation of the seller’s commercial invoice and the “usual shipping documents”. There is no dispute that the appellant did not comply with cl 8.1. However, the appellant claimed that, as between the appellant and the respondent, and as between the respondent and X, the very same documents were involved. Thus, if the respondent claims in these proceedings that it had never received the documents from the appellant, then it follows that it could not have passed on those same documents to X.

  89. [78] While the appellant is not wrong to highlight this point, in our view, it does not follow that the respondent had acted inconsistently in this regard. In enforcing the Settlement Agreement against X, the respondent did not have to, and indeed did not, take any position on the appellant’s compliance with cl 8.1 (ie, whether it had received the requisite documents from the appellant). This is because the respondent’s own non-compliance under cl 8.1 (ie, the respondent’s failure to deliver the requisite documents to X) would at best be a defence that X could have raised against the respondent’s claim. It would also have been open to X to waive strict compliance with cl 8.1 of the respondent-X contract to require the respondent to produce the requisite documents. The respondent could therefore legitimately maintain a claim, and compromise it, against X despite the fact that it had never delivered the requisite documents under cl 8.1 to X. We should add that this was precisely the quandary which we had highlighted at [3] above. When the respondent commenced the proceedings against X and/or Sit, it was not aware (and could not have been aware) of what position X and/or Sit would adopt in response to the respondent’s claims. The fact that X and/or Sit did not subsequently take steps to raise these defences which the respondent was entitled to raise vis-à-vis the appellant cannot be used to somehow preclude the respondent from raising them as against the appellant.

  90. [79] Seen in this light, therefore, it is not inconsistent for the respondent to seek to enforce the Settlement Agreement against X, while at the same time accepting that it had not fully complied with the terms of cl 8.1 – that would be a dispute that could be compromised by the Settlement Agreement. To put the point in a different way, in enforcing the Settlement Agreement, the respondent never represented that it had delivered the requisite documents under cl 8.1 to X. That position is not inconsistent with its position here – that it never received the requisite documents from the appellant. The difference is simply that the respondent here is seeking to enforce strict compliance with the terms of cl 8.1 as against the appellant in accordance with its strict contractual rights under the appellant-respondent contract. The mere fact that X might well have waived strict compliance of the documents vis-à-vis the respondent does not mean that the respondent is somehow precluded from insisting on strict compliance vis-à-vis the appellant.

  91. Illegality defence

  92. [80] We have already expressed our preliminary view on the true nature of the transaction, ie, that it does not appear to be a genuine transaction for the sale of goods but seems to be a disguised loan arrangement instead, and that the appellant was privy to this arrangement, having procured a letter of credit from UBS on the basis of a genuine transaction for the sale of cargo (see [43]–[50] above). We should also make clear that we express no conclusive views on whether there was any illegal or fraudulent conduct, or whether the transaction was in fact tainted by illegality. We need not come to any firm landing on this point as this is a matter properly reserved for the arbitration. This raises the further question of whether the appellant should be entitled to invoke the doctrine of abuse of process to prevent the respondent from raising the illegality defence.

  93. [81] We first consider whether the respondent had, in fact, acted inconsistently by raising the illegality defence as against the appellant despite enforcing the Settlement Agreement against X, and pursuing Sit to bankruptcy. In this regard, the appellant’s submission on appeal, despite not asserting on affidavit that the respondent knew of the illegality at the time it entered into the Settlement Agreement, is that the respondent should have known of the illegality by April 2018, when it was given the opportunity to inspect certain shipping documents received then.

  94. [82] In our judgment, the respondent appears to have acted inconsistently vis-à-vis Sit by pursuing him to bankruptcy, and against X under the Settlement Agreement. We explain by setting out the key events and what the respondent knew of the illegality at each stage.

  95. [83] On 4 July 2018, Anh found out about the circuitous nature of the transaction, with the appellant having paid X by procuring a letter of credit from a bank. Anh does not appear to have known at this time from whom the letter of credit had been obtained. Nor was he aware of the terms of the letter of credit. In other words, at this point, there is no evidence that respondent knew that the appellant-respondent contract was illegal in the sense that the appellant and X had structured the entire transaction with the intention of deceiving UBS into purportedly financing a sham sale transaction on 4 July 2018.

  96. [84] At the time Anh filed his 1st affidavit, on 3 September 2018, he asserted that Li had informed him of her belief that the entire transaction was conducted using “copies” borrowed from a genuine sale from an unrelated transaction. There is, however, nothing in Anh’s 1st affidavit which shows that the respondent actually knew for certain that the documents were “copies” from an unrelated transaction. Instead, the respondent’s position, certainly at this stage, was that Anh’s “strong belief … could be proven correct through further investigations and/or disclosure in the course of [future] arbitration proceedings”.

  97. [85] On 8 November 2018, when the respondent filed Anh’s 5th affidavit, Anh claimed that since the filing of his 1st affidavit, the respondent had conducted further investigations into the transaction. Having conducted some investigations, Anh formed the following preliminary view on the nature of the transaction:

  98. [86] The respondent also knew by this time that the appellant did not comply with the terms of the letter of credit issued by UBS. As further stated in Anh’s 5th affidavit:

  99. [87] By this stage, when Anh’s 5th affidavit was filed, the respondent (through Anh) certainly knew that X and the appellant were using copy documents from the Haiyuan-Petrobras transaction. The respondent also knew that the purpose of the transaction was so that X could obtain financing from the appellant. The illegality described in Anh’s 5th affidavit, however, pertains to the appellant’s unlawful acquisition of the transactional documents. There was no specific averment that the appellant had deceived the bank using these documents.

  100. [88] On 26 November 2018 in its written submissions to the Judge, the respondent argued that the transaction might have been entered into with the unlawful intention of deceiving the bank:

  101. [89] Bearing in mind the above events, we turn to address the state of the respondent’s knowledge at the time of the proceedings it brought against X and Sit.

  102. [90] As a preliminary matter, we disagree with the appellant’s submission that the respondent knew of the illegality by April 2018. More specifically, the respondent’s illegality defence relates to the appellant deceiving UBS into purportedly financing a sham sale transaction on the basis that there was a genuine sale of cargo (see above at [38]). While the respondent may have seen the shipping documents in April 2018, it is common ground that it did not know of the existence of UBS until, at the very earliest, after the meeting on 4 July 2018 when it found out about the circuitous nature of the transaction. Furthermore, the appellant did not accept, throughout these proceedings, that it had deceived UBS into financing the transaction. In the circumstances, the respondent could not possibly have known that the appellant had deceived UBS into financing a sham transaction by April 2018.

  103. [93] However, for the reasons set out below, we explain that, even if the respondent’s actions against Sit were inconsistent with the illegality defence, it would nonetheless be inappropriate to prevent the respondent from relying on the illegality defence on the basis of the abuse of process doctrine. In this regard, we reiterate our holding above at [53] that the doctrine of abuse of process is ultimately a discretionary one. In exercising its abuse of process jurisdiction, the court must balance the competing factors and determine which position carries the greater risk of injustice. In our judgment, the following factors are germane to this balancing exercise.

  104. [94] First, the evidence shows that the respondent was not the typical litigant seeking to profit from an illegal transaction after mounting inconsistent positions. Our preliminary view is that the respondent was itself a victim of the deception practised on UBS. There is no contrary evidence showing that the respondent engineered or even knew of the true nature of the transaction when it was first contemplated. Nor did the appellant contend that the respondent knew of the facts giving rise to the illegality at the time the respondent entered into the transaction. Furthermore, as an intermediary, the respondent stood to gain only a modest commission of US$8,000 in respect of cargo valued in excess of US$30m.

  105. [97] Lastly, and crucially, if the appellant’s argument were taken to its logical conclusion, and the illegality defence were disallowed, the appellant would be free to enforce its claim which is potentially based on an illegal contract. Although the respondent was the plaintiff below (as the party seeking injunctive relief), the party seeking to enforce the appellant-respondent contract is ultimately the appellant. In other words, in seeking to prevent the respondent from obtaining an injunction, the appellant is attempting to enforce the potentially illegal appellant-respondent contract, despite being privy to the alleged fraud on UBS. If the illegality defence had been the respondent’s only defence and the respondent is denied from raising it, the consequence would be that the appellant would be free to enforce a potentially illegal contract without the illegality defence being explored at all. The fact that the respondent is able to raise other defences does not, in our view, alter the analysis.

  106. [98] Thus, in deciding whether the respondent should be permitted to rely on the illegality defence, the court is faced with a clear clash between two policy imperatives: on the one hand, there is a policy to prevent a party from relying on inconsistent positions (on the application of the abuse of process doctrine); and on the other hand, there is the principle that the court cannot and will not lend its aid to enforce an illegal contract or a fraudulent dealing. The latter principle originates from Lord Manfield CJ’s decision in Holmann v Johnson (1775) 1 Cowp 341 at 343:

  107. [99] In our judgment, given the four factors described at [94]–[97] above, it is clear that the risk of injustice would be indubitably greater should the respondent be barred from raising the illegality defence. Even if we were satisfied that there might have been inconsistent conduct displayed by the respondent, the exceptional circumstances of this case must be considered. On a consideration of all the circumstances, we hold that the respondent should not be precluded from taking inconsistent positions and relying on the illegality defence, as there is a risk of an even greater injustice otherwise.

  108. Doctrines of approbation and reprobation and waiver by election

  109. [100] Although we have clarified above that inconsistent positions are dealt with under the doctrine of abuse of process, the parties made extensive submissions on the doctrines of approbation and reprobation and of waiver by election. We believe it will be useful to express some views on their scope and applicability.

  110. [101] At a general level, these doctrines prohibit a party from raising a new position that is inconsistent with some prior position. However, the facts of this appeal are unique and give rise to a further question: do these doctrines apply when seemingly inconsistent positions are taken in different proceedings against different parties in respect of different contracts? In the specific context of this appeal, is the respondent precluded from raising the Price Defences as against the appellant despite having allegedly adopted an inconsistent position against X and Sit under a different albeit related contract, ie, the Settlement Agreement?

  111. Approbation and reprobation

  112. [102] The foundation of the doctrine of approbation and reprobation is that the person against whom it is applied has accepted a benefit from the matter he reprobates (Evans v Bartlam [1937] AC 473 per Lord Russell of Killowen at 483). The doctrine of approbation and reprobation has also been referred to as a principle of equity that a person “who accepts a benefit under an instrument must adopt it in its entirety giving full effect to its provisions and, if necessary, renouncing any other rights which are inconsistent with it” (Piers Feltham, Daniel Hochberg & Tom Leech, Spencer Bower: Estoppel by Representation (LexisNexis UK, 4th Ed, 2004) (“Estoppel by Representation”) at para XIII.1.10). We endorse Belinda Ang Saw Ean J’s description of the doctrine in Treasure Valley Group Ltd v Saputra Teddy and another (Ultramarine Holdings Ltd, Intervener) [2006] 1 SLR(R) 358 (“Treasure Valley”) at [31]:

  113. [103] A wider form of the doctrine has been applied in the United Kingdom to encompass situations where parties assert inconsistent positions against the same party in different proceedings. In Express Newspapers Plc v News (UK) Ltd and others [1990] 1 WLR 1320 (“Express Newspapers”), a plaintiff brought an action for breach of copyright. The plaintiff newspaper had published an article, based on an exclusive interview, and the defendant later published a report of the same story in its newspaper. Sometime later the reverse occurred. The defendant published a story, based also on an exclusive interview, and the plaintiff published a similar story thereafter. Consequently, the defendant brought a counterclaim to the plaintiff’s action – the counterclaim was in form the mirror image of the plaintiff’s claim. The plaintiff later obtained summary judgment on its claim against the defendant. The defendant in response sought summary judgment on its counterclaim, but the plaintiff objected. The court, after considering the plaintiff’s defence, took the view that there was some merit in it (at 1329C):

  114. [104] Nonetheless, the court noted that the plaintiff could not adopt inconsistent attitudes. The plaintiff had obtained summary judgment in relation to the first incident on facts, which in the court’s view, were “legally indistinguishable from the facts” of the defendant’s counterclaim (at 1329D). Consequently, if the defences put forward by the plaintiff in relation to the defendant’s counterclaim were good defences, they were equally good defences to the plaintiff’s claim against the defendant. The court went on to observe (at 1329F–H):

  115. [105] The court held that for the plaintiff to claim that there was an implied licence when it copied the defendant’s article was a “wholly inconsistent position” (at 1330A). The plaintiff was not entitled to put forward two inconsistent cases, and summary judgment was thus granted on the defendant’s counterclaim.

  116. [106] The wider principle as described in Express Newspapers has become an established feature of English and Scots law. In England, Express Newspapers was affirmed and applied by the English Court of Appeal in Union Music Ltd and another v Watson and another [2002] EWCA Civ 680. Robert Walker LJ (as he then was) observed that Express Newspapers was a “decision on the unusual, and fairly extreme, facts of the case, but it embodies a general principle”. He went on to note that the principle was “so general and so hard to argue with as a general proposition that it needs careful handling” (at [28]). In Redding Park Development Company Limited v Falkirk Council [2011] CSOH 202 at [54], the Outer House of the Scottish Court of Session accepted that while the doctrine of approbation and reprobation was initially developed in the field of trusts, wills and succession, it now applies more widely to the context of inconsistent positions taken across proceedings. Most recently, the English High Court decision of Twinsectra Ltd, Haysport Properties Ltd v Lloyds Bank plc [2018] EWHC 672 (Ch) (“Twinsectra”) at [87] affirmed the principle.

  117. [110] The appellant also relies on Oakwell Engineering Ltd v Energy Power Systems Ltd [2003] SGHC 241 (“Oakwell”). In Oakwell, the defendants had acquired certain rights in a joint venture project under a settlement agreement with the plaintiff. These rights were then sold to a third party, the VBC Group, under an agreement dated 10 August 2000 (“the 10 August 2000 Agreement”). Subsequently, the defendants commenced arbitration proceedings against the VBC Group. In the proceedings before the court, the defendants argued that the settlement agreement had been frustrated in law. Lai Kew Chai J observed as follows (at [101]):

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