Court of Appeal · Decided 13 May 2020
Suying Design Pte Ltd v Ng Kian Huan Edmund and other appeals
Feedback & support[2020] SGCA 46 · Case no. Civil Appeal No 71 of 2019
✱ What happened, in plain English
There is no plain-English summary of this judgment yet.
Ask about this judgment →Grounds of decision
Official text from eLitigation
Introduction
- [1]
[1] These appeals arise out of the decision of the High Court Judge (“the Judge”) in HC/S 867/2015 (“Suit 867”). They revolve around the Judge’s finding that a claim of oppression under s 216 of the Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed) had been made out. The appeals turn, on the one hand, on detailed factual issues, and on the other hand, on the propriety of the claim under s 216.
- [2]
[2] The parties in Suit 867 were all involved in the interior design business. The plaintiff in Suit 867 was Mr Ng Kian Huan, Edmund (“Mr Ng”). He was the sole shareholder and director of Metropolitan Office Experimental Pte Ltd (“MOX”). The third defendant in Suit 867 was Ms Tan Teow Feng Patty (“Ms Tan”). She has run Suying Design Pte Ltd (“SDPL”), the second defendant in Suit 867, since its incorporation in 1999. The first defendant in Suit 867 was Suying Metropolitan Studio Pte Ltd (“SMSPL”), a company incorporated on 20 February 2012 by, inter alia, Ms Tan and Mr Ng, who were made directors of SMSPL. At its incorporation, SMSPL’s shareholders were:
(a) Ms Tan, who held 40% of SMSPL’s shares;
(b) Mr Ng, who held 35%;
(c) Ms Anita Chiu (“Ms Chiu”), who held 20%; and
(d) Mr Lim Chai Boon (“Mr Lim”), who held 5%.
Mr Lim’s 5% shareholding underwent a series of transfers, and was eventually transferred to Ms Martinez Gejane Siman (“Ms Martinez”). The remainder of SMSPL’s shares have not changed hands since its incorporation.
- [4]
[4] Ms Tan and SMSPL also brought numerous counterclaims against Mr Ng, MOX, and Mr Ng’s wife, Ms Chong Chin Fong (“Ms Chong”, also known as Jazz), in Suit 867. In the Judgment, the Judge found Mr Ng liable for a number of these counterclaims based on various causes of action, including negligence and diversion of corporate opportunities. However, there is no appeal in respect of any of the counterclaims. Therefore, although our decision in the present appeals has a bearing on one of the counterclaims (see [99] below), there is no basis for us to disturb the Judge’s rulings in the counterclaims.
Events leading to the commencement of Suit 867
- [5]
[5] It is common ground between Mr Ng and Ms Tan that the two of them, together with Ms Chiu and Mr Lim, decided to set up a new company. Consequently, SMSPL was incorporated on 20 February 2012. It is also not disputed that with the incorporation of SMSPL, all new business from the date of SMSPL’s incorporation, whether emanating from Ms Tan or Mr Ng, would be routed to SMSPL as the contracting and performing party. Existing staff of SDPL and MOX would effectively join SMSPL.
- [6]
[6] In March 2015, Ms Tan informed Mr Ng that she would retire in June 2015, and that SMSPL would be left to Mr Ng and Ms Martinez to run (see the Judgment at [12]). Ms Tan’s retirement was not new; it was an event envisaged prior to the incorporation of SMSPL. However, on 13 July 2015, Mr Ng informed Ms Tan and Ms Chiu that he intended to leave SMSPL. According to Mr Ng, he did so for three reasons: (i) he realised that Ms Tan had no genuine intention of leaving SMSPL; (ii) there was a “rift” between himself and Ms Tan due to their different working styles; and (iii) he wanted more time for personal commitments. Later that day, Mr Ng, Ms Tan and Ms Martinez met and agreed to close down the company; they agreed to meet again in October 2015 for this purpose (see the Judgment at [13]).
- [7]
[7] On 15 July 2015, Ms Tan withdrew a total of $1,164,580 from SMSPL’s bank account using 23 cheques for $50,000 each and one cheque for $14,580 (see the Judgment at [14]). According to Ms Tan, this was her gratuity and adjusted pay for January to June 2015 (“the Gratuity Payments”). She signed these cheques herself as only sums above $50,000 required two signatures. Ms Tan returned an amount of $492,580 on 27 July 2015, which she claimed was an accidental excess payment. The Gratuity Payments therefore ultimately totalled $672,000.
- [8]
[8] After Mr Ng had been removed as a signatory of SMSPL’s bank account on 29 July 2015, Ms Tan signed off on nine debit notes from SDPL to SMSPL (“the Debit Notes”) (see the Judgment at [16]–[17]). Ms Tan determined that the net amount due from SMSPL to SDPL under these Debit Notes was $1,642,510.99, and effected payment of this amount. According to Ms Tan, these were repayments of loans made by SDPL to SMSPL. Mr Ng disputed the propriety of all the above payments in Suit 867.
- [9]
[9] Next, there were a number of events relating to the corporate affairs of SMSPL that took place after Mr Ng announced his decision to resign. On 12 August 2015, SMSPL issued notice of an extraordinary general meeting (“EGM”) for the ratification of the amounts under the Debit Notes as consultancy fees (see the Judgment at [18]).
- [11]
[11] We digress for a moment to explain the parties’ disagreement over the treatment of invoices issued by SDPL and MOX after 20 February 2012 (“the post-incorporation invoices”) that eventually became a focus of Mr Ng’s complaint of oppression at trial below. With the differing versions of what Mr Ng and Ms Tan had orally agreed to on the treatment of the post-incorporation invoices in the trial below, the parties, for brevity and simplicity, called this particular dispute the “Oral Agreement”. Thus, all references to the Oral Agreement in the parties’ respective written submissions have to be understood in the context described here. Specifically, their disagreement lies in how sums paid pursuant to the post-incorporation invoices for SDPL and MOX’s projects which were in existence prior to this date (ie, pre-incorporation) were to be dealt with. However, Ms Tan’s treatment of post-incorporation invoices was not specifically raised as one of Mr Ng’s complaints of oppression at the time Suit 867 was commenced, as we will discuss in the next paragraph.
- [12]
[12] Based on Mr Ng’s case at trial, his version of the Oral Agreement (“Mr Ng’s Version”) is that all receivables were to be transferred to SMSPL after deducting expenses incurred by MOX and SDPL for their respective projects (see the Judgment at [9]). The version of the Oral Agreement maintained by Ms Tan (“Ms Tan’s Version”) is that MOX and SDPL would retain their receivables but would reimburse SMSPL for the use of SMSPL’s resources in completing these projects. To be clear, Mr Ng did not specifically raise his version of the Oral Agreement and Ms Tan’s non-observance of the same as constituting oppressive conduct before he sued. Instead, it was pleaded for the first time in the Statement of Claim filed on 9 September 2015.
Events post Writ of Summons
- [13]
[13] On 9 October 2015, Mr Ng filed an application in HC/OS 921/2015 (“OS 921”) to inspect the accounts and records of SMSPL in his capacity as a director of the company. A directors’ meeting was held on 17 December 2015 in Mr Ng’s absence and an EGM was fixed on 8 January 2016 to remove Mr Ng as director. Mr Ng obtained an interim injunction before the EGM to preserve his capacity as a director to proceed with OS 921. Mr Ng’s application in OS 921 was subsequently granted on 25 January 2016.
- [14]
[14] Mr Ng’s last day of work at SMSPL was 12 October 2015, and he indicated then that he would transfer a number of SMSPL’s projects to MOX. This was possible as SMSPL was by then in the process of ceasing operations. SMSPL ceased operations in April 2016. Mr Ng remained a director of SMSPL until 5 April 2017.
The proceedings and the decision below
Mr Ng’s case at the trial
- [15]
[15] As Mr Ng’s counsel made clear at the trial, it was not Mr Ng’s case that he resigned from SMSPL because of any oppression. Instead, Mr Ng’s case was that after he resigned, Ms Tan decided to siphon money away from SMSPL and to obstruct Mr Ng in various other ways. The siphoning of money was alleged to have taken the form of the Debit Notes and the Gratuity Payments. Although Mr Ng therefore accepts that he resigned from SMSPL for personal reasons and not because of oppression, his case is that he discovered after his resignation that, all along, there had been oppressive acts by Ms Tan in the form of Ms Tan failing to transfer receivables that were due from SDPL to SMSPL. These receivables were the subject of Annexes A, B, C1 and C2 of the Statement of Claim.
Derivative action under s 216A Companies Act
- [18]
[18] Fifteen days into the trial, on 17 April 2018, Mr Ng filed HC/OS 441/2018 (“OS 441”) for leave to commence a derivative action, and to consolidate the new action with Suit 867. The pleadings in Suit 867 were adopted for the purposes of OS 441. The Judge said that it would not be practical to make the orders sought given the advanced stage of proceedings in Suit 867. He thus adjourned further consideration of OS 441 until after his decision in Suit 867 was given.
The Judge’s decision
- [19]
[19] First, the Judge found in favour of Mr Ng’s Version of the Oral Agreement on the totality of the evidence. We set out the limbs of the Judge’s reasoning in brief here, and discuss them in fuller detail at [45]–[98] below.
(a) The Judge considered Ms Tan’s Version to be unbelievable in the light of the absence of any tracking by SMSPL of its resources used by SDPL and MOX, which absence made it impossible for SMSPL to keep track of the reimbursements due to it (the Judgment at [27]–[31]).
(b) The Judge further found it telling that although Ms Tan had sent Mr Ng an email on 8 August 2015 after Mr Ng’s resignation, setting out other aspects of the SMSPL’s incorporation at length, she had not mentioned her version of the Oral Agreement (the Judgment at [73]–[74]).
(c) The Judge found Mr Ng’s Version plausible despite the fact that SDPL’s unbilled fees were much greater than MOX’s, by virtue of the fact that Ms Tan wanted to retire and wanted someone to take over the “Suying” name from SDPL (the Judgment at [71]). The Judge also preferred the evidence of Mr Ng and his former associate, Mr Seah Chin Kwang (“Mr Seah”), in favour of Mr Ng’s Version, over that of Ms Tan and that of Ms Chiu and Mr Lim, who supported Ms Tan’s Version (the Judgment at [75]).
(d) The Judge found that the transfers to SMSPL between 2012 and 2015 on balance supported Mr Ng’s Version. The Judge’s findings on the individual sets of transfers are as follows:
(i) It was undisputed that SMSPL had repaid $203,430.71 to SDPL in April 2012 (“the $203k”) in respect of payments SDPL had made on its behalf in February and March 2012 (see the Judgment at [46]). These payments were made by SDPL because SMSPL did not have a bank account at the time (see the Judgment at [125(d)]).
(ii) Transfers of $600,000 from SDPL to SMSPL in August and September 2012 (“the $600k”) were loans from SDPL, and not transfers of receivables pursuant to Mr Ng’s Version (the Judgment at [50]–[55]).
(iii) The purpose of the transfer of $100,000 from MOX to SMSPL in October 2012 (“the $100k”) could not be determined (the Judgment at [36]).
(iv) A transfer of $162,193.93 from Ode to Art in February 2013, which was Ms Chong’s business, to SMSPL (“the $162k”) was effectively a loan from SDPL to SMSPL, and not a transfer of receivables pursuant to Mr Ng’s Version (the Judgment at [70]).
(v) Transfers of $719,652.02 from SDPL to SMSPL from April 2013 to December 2014 (“the $719k”) were transfers of receivables pursuant to Mr Ng’s Version, and not, as Ms Tan claimed, “project-linked loans” (the Judgment at [61]–[66]).
(vi) Transfers of $148,500 from MOX to SMSPL from August 2013 to July 2014 (“the $148k”) were transfers of receivables pursuant to Mr Ng’s Version and not reimbursements pursuant to Ms Tan’s Version (the Judgment at [37]–[40]).
- [20]
[20] Mr Ng alleged that various wrongs were committed against him, and these formed the basis of his claim in minority oppression. Here, we set out the Judge’s decision on the alleged wrongs. We discuss them in fuller detail at [104]–[139] below.
(a) Mr Ng was wrongfully prevented from accessing SMSPL’s financial documents (the Judgment at [100]–[105]).
(b) Ms Tan had wrongly characterised the $200,000 SMSPL paid to Mr Ng in 2012 as a loan, when it was in fact a director’s fee, and therefore had no basis to demand that he repay it (the Judgment at [112]–[119]).
(c) Mr Ng was entitled to $265,000 from SMSPL as the balance of his director’s fee for 2013, and Ms Tan had no basis to cause SMSPL to refuse to pay it (the Judgment at [120]–[122]).
(d) Ms Tan did not act in good faith when she demanded that Mr Ng return dividends paid to him by SMSPL in 2012 and 2013, as the grounds for her view that there were insufficient profits for these dividends were not justified (the Judgment at [126]–[136]).
(e) SMSPL had no basis to withhold Mr Ng’s pro-rated salary for October 2015 up to his last day of work at SMSPL, ie, 12 October 2015 (the Judgment at [140]).
(f) Ms Tan had wrongfully excluded Mr Ng from decision-making in relation to SMSPL’s affairs after he ceased to be an employee in October 2015 (the Judgment at [142]–[146]).
(g) The Gratuity Payments were wrongful as the alleged gratuity and pay adjustment were never agreed upon (the Judgment at [83]–[88]).
(h) Since Mr Ng’s Version of the Oral Agreement was found to be true, a total of $1,320,586.67 under Annex A of the Statement of Claim (fees from SDPL’s pre-incorporation projects) and a total of $1,582,176.89 under Annex B of the Statement of Claim (fees from SDPL’s post-incorporation projects) should have been paid to SMSPL (see the Judgment at [203(h)]–[203(i)]).
(i) The Debit Notes included repayments of the $600k and the $162k, which the Judge had found were justified as these were loans from SDPL. The remainder of the sum reflected in the Debit Notes accounted for receivables transferred to SMSPL by SDPL under the Oral Agreement, including the $719k, and their repayment to SDPL was therefore wrongful (the Judgment at [93]–[98]).
(j) Since Mr Ng’s Version was accepted, the Judge also rejected Ms Tan’s assertion that there were “project-linked loans”. Ms Tan had therefore wrongfully caused SMSPL to write off $194,290.08 which was owed to it by SDPL in purported repayment of the “project-linked loans” (the Judgment at [192]).
(k) Sums of $1,388 and $48,333.72 were inadvertently mistakenly billed to SMSPL, and should be repaid by SDPL (the Judgment at [186], [189]). Another sum of $39,276 was accrued to Ms Tan’s director’s account with SMSPL by mistake (the Judgment at [188]).
(l) SMSPL paid $169,507.67 for SDPL’s income tax and GST with Mr Ng’s approval. This was therefore not wrongful, but must nevertheless be repaid by SDPL (the Judgment at [191]).
(m) The Judge rejected the remainder of the alleged wrongs, and there is no appeal in relation to them.
- [21]
[21] The Judge divided the wrongs he found to have been established into two categories: first, (a)–(f) above were personal wrongs against Mr Ng (“the personal wrongs”), and second, (g)–(j) above were claims with overlapping features of corporate and personal wrongs (“the overlap claims”) (see the Judgment at [212]–[213]). Items (k) and (l) above were not found by the Judge to be wrongful, although the sums in question had to be repaid.
- [22]
[22] The Judge held that on the basis of the Court of Appeal’s reasoning in Ho Yew Kong v Sakae Holdings Ltd and another appeal and other matters [2018] SLR 333 (“Sakae Holdings”), Mr Ng’s reliance on the overlap claims with features of corporate wrongs was not an abuse of process (see the Judgment at [214]–[215]). The Judge reasoned that the injury Mr Ng sought to vindicate was that to his investment in SMSPL. The overlap claims concerned Ms Tan’s misappropriation of moneys belonging to SMSPL, which were transferred either to herself or to SDPL. These were breaches of Mr Ng’s legitimate expectation as a shareholder of SMSPL, that funds would not be siphoned away, and had a direct impact on his interests.
The issues in these appeals
- [24]
[24] In CA 71, SDPL primarily challenges the Judge’s findings on the correct version of the Oral Agreement, including the nature of the transfers of $719k and $100k. The challenge to the Oral Agreement by implication also challenges the Judge’s findings on the overlap claims, with the exception of the Gratuity Payments. Meanwhile, Ms Tan’s appeal in CA 72 is focused on challenging the Judge’s findings in relation to the personal wrongs she had committed against Mr Ng, as well as the Gratuity Payments. However, Ms Tan and SDPL’s positions in the appeals are fully aligned. As such, when we refer to Ms Tan’s position, this will generally also reflect the position of SDPL. They also challenge certain of the Judge’s specific orders which they say involved double-counting or other inadvertent errors. Finally, they submit that the overlap claims are in fact corporate wrongs that are not actionable in a claim for minority oppression, and that Mr Ng had no locus standi to obtain the restitutionary orders against SDPL. SMSPL was not before us in these appeals, although we note that its position was similarly aligned with Ms Tan’s and SDPL’s before the Judge.
- [25]
[25] As we indicated above, the central question to be determined in these appeals is whether Mr Ng has established his case of minority oppression. We will examine the personal and overlapping wrongs by first considering the alleged wrongs which occurred prior to 13 July 2015, and then those which occurred post-13 July 2015. The date 13 July 2015 is when Mr Ng announced his resignation from SMSPL and asked Ms Tan to buy his shares. As we explain at [42] below, the parties agreed later that day to cease business and dissolve the company (ie, wind up the company).
- [26]
[26] The following questions therefore arise for determination:
(a) in respect of conduct before 13 July 2015, what the Oral Agreement was between the parties;
(b) in respect of conduct after 13 July 2015, whether the wrongs alleged by Mr Ng have been established; and
(c) whether the wrongs (pre- and post-13 July 2015) which are established were oppressive under s 216 of the Companies Act.
The law on oppression
- [28]
[28] We will begin by first reviewing the relevant principles on oppression, which formed the basis for substantially the entirety of Mr Ng’s claims in Suit 867 (see [3] above).
- [29]
[29] In our recent judgment in Ascend Field Pte Ltd and others v Tee Wee Sien and another appeal [2020] SGCA 14 (“Ascend Field”), we set out the legal principles which apply to a claim made under s 216 of the Companies Act:
- [30]
[30] It is well-established that s 216 of the Companies Act should not be used to vindicate wrongs which are in substance wrongs committed against a company, and which are thus corporate rather than personal in nature. This is essential in preventing improper circumvention of the proper plaintiff rule in Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461. The proper plaintiff rule provides that the proper plaintiff to seek redress for a wrong done to a company is prima facie the company itself. The corollary of this is the no reflective loss principle. Where the minority shareholder’s loss is merely a reflection of the loss suffered by the company which would be made good if the company were able to and did enforce its rights, the proper party to recover that loss is the company and not the shareholder (Sakae Holdings at [85], [86] and [91]–[93], citing Ng Kek Wee v Sim City Technology Ltd [2014] 4 SLR 723 (“Ng Kek Wee”) at [61] and [70]). The nature of the loss relied on is of vital importance since it would follow as a matter of logical argument that most corporate wrongs would have some ill-effects on the interests of the shareholders of the company and its creditors (see Ng Kek Wee at [65]). To elaborate, the damage that the wrongdoer inflicts on a company may affect its ability to pay dividends to its members or return their capital in winding up, or its ability to pay its employees and other creditors, and perhaps diminish the price at which members can sell their shares. Ordinarily, these ill-effects are put right when the company recovers what is due to it from the wrongdoer. It is thus not sufficient to simply claim, for example, that the misappropriation of the company’s assets has resulted in a decrease in the value of the shares held by a minority shareholder. Misappropriation of the company’s assets is by its very nature unlawful and would reduce the assets of the company. Unless there is evidence to the contrary, the “injury” to the minority shareholder in that situation is merely a reflection of the loss to the company. A similar point is alluded to in Margaret Chew, Minority Shareholders’ Rights and Remedies (LexisNexis, 3rd Ed, 2017) (“Margaret Chew”) at paras 4.119 and 4.120:
- [31]
[31] Generally speaking, a director’s breach of his fiduciary duties is a corporate wrong done to the company, and the proper plaintiff in such cases would prima facie be the company itself: Ascend Field at [35]. Not only does the no reflective loss principle ensure that the wrongdoer can only be sued once for the same loss, in the context of s 216, the proper plaintiff rule is critical for one further reason. Even if the remedies can be crafted such that there is no double recovery and the plaintiff shareholder does not recover at the expense of the company, its creditors or its other shareholders, it remains that the legislative scheme in the Companies Act makes clear that s 216 and s 216A are ultimately intended to have distinct spheres of application, with different substantive and procedural requirements. Accordingly, this court remarked in Ng Kek Wee at [65] that it would be an abuse of process to allow an essentially corporate wrong to be pursued under s 216.
- [32]
[32] That said, this court has also held that there can be cases where what appears to be a corporate wrong can plausibly also be a personal wrong. This court acknowledged in Ng Kek Wee at [62] and [66] that there may be grey areas in which the distinction between personal complaints of oppression and complaints of wrongs against a company may be unclear (see also Sakae Holdings at [86]). Ultimately, how the wrong is to be categorised depends on the facts of each case. As the nature of the complaint and the appropriate relief are different in the two statutory regimes, the central inquiry for the court hearing a s 216 claim is whether the plaintiff shareholder is relying on unlawful conduct and conduct that constitutes commercial unfairness to found his claim of oppression. Even where the very same facts may found a derivative action or an action from oppression, the evidence will be examined critically to ensure that there is no blurring of the two different statutory regimes. In this regard, the obiter remarks of this court in Ng Kek Wee at [69] are a helpful guide:
- [33]
[33] Recently, in Sakae Holdings at [116], we set out an analytical framework to ascertain whether it is an abuse of process for a particular claim to be brought under s 216, as follows (see Ascend Field at [38]):
- [34]
[34] It is clear that the framework we set out in Sakae Holdings did not in any way limit or diminish the importance of the proper plaintiff rule. Rather, it remains a prerequisite, even where “overlapping” wrongs are concerned, that a distinct injury must be suffered by the shareholder. The injury to the minority shareholder thus cannot merely reflect the injury suffered by the company. It must further be shown that the distinct injury amounts to commercial unfairness against the plaintiff as a member of the company. Commercial unfairness should be assessed against the behaviour the shareholder is entitled to expect or rely on, whether this expectation arises from a formal document or an informal understanding, such as the alleged Oral Agreement in the present case: see Ascend Field at [29]; Hans Tjio, Pearlie Koh and Lee Pey Woon, Corporate Law (Academy Publishing, 2015) (“Hans Tjio”) at para 11.052. The Judge had regard to the framework in Sakae Holdings in concluding that it was not an abuse of process for Mr Ng to pursue his claims, including the overlap claims, under s 216. As we explain below from [108], with respect, we disagree.
- [36]
[36] It is well-established that recourse to s 216 is not available where a minority shareholder simply wishes to leave and take his investment in the company with him; he is not entitled to start an action under s 216 for the purpose of enabling him to sell his shares without a discount to reflect his minority holding. However, if the minority shareholder is nonetheless able to establish some conduct on which an oppression action may be grounded, and so long as he retains his shareholding, as matter of principle, he should be entitled to rely on s 216, which is designed for the protection of members of companies. It is in that capacity that members of companies seek its protection, not as directors or employees. At the same time, the fact that the minority shareholder seeks to withdraw from the company for reasons other than oppression remains a useful cross-check, given its significant probative value. It may, for example, show that the alleged oppression was not as systemic or wide-ranging, or even that the minority shareholder has brought the s 216 claim for ancillary purposes. As in all cases, the court should ask whether there is evidence of commercially unfair conduct affecting the minority shareholder’s interests as a shareholder that would serve to ground an action under s 216.
Whether minority oppression can be established
Preliminary points
- [38]
[38] We note at the outset that the Judge’s finding of oppression was critical for at least two reasons. First, if oppression had not been established, Mr Ng would not have standing to bring claims which rightly belonged to SMSPL without recourse to some other cause of action – such as s 216A of the Companies Act.
- [39]
[39] Second and more fundamentally, where there is no finding of minority oppression, Mr Ng’s only means of withdrawing his investment in SMSPL, short of a voluntary agreement to buy-out his shares, would have been to wind up the company. Mr Ng’s decision to exit SMSPL ended the underlying purpose of their collaboration. Closing down SMSPL was a course of action which he and Ms Tan had agreed to take back in July 2015. We will now elaborate.
- [40]
[40] In private companies, disputes amongst shareholders are common. A disenchanted shareholder who wishes to unlock the monetary value of his shareholding has three options, as we explained in Liew Kit Fah and others v Koh Keng Chew and others [2020] 1 SLR 275 (“Liew Kit Fah”) at [58]. We observed in Liew Kit Fah at [60] that:
Mr Ng’s announcement of his intention to leave SMSPL
- [43]
[43] While the minority in a small private company might be more susceptible to exploitative conduct by the majority because there are no obvious legal remedies spelt out in the memorandum and articles of association and the shares may be difficult to dispose of (see Over & Over ([29] supra) at [83]), it is evident that this alone would not suffice for a s 216 action. In the present case, as stated, Mr Ng had no means of exiting the company under its articles of association. While he might have been able to sell his shares to a third party, Article 20 of SMSPL’s Articles of Association imposes a restriction on such transfers. Article 20 states that “no transfer of shares is to be made except to a person approved by the directors of the company.” Any attempt to sell his shares would therefore have been subject to the directors’ approval. Even so, s 216 is not satisfied merely or primarily because a minority shareholder wishes, for his own personal reasons, to leave the company but has no other means to do so. The lynchpin of a s 216 claim is still a finding of oppression.
- [44]
[44] It is therefore vital for us to consider whether the wrongs alleged by Mr Ng provide a sufficient basis (both legal and factual) on which to find minority oppression. Put another way, having regard to Mr Ng’s unilateral withdrawal from the company, Mr Ng as a minority shareholder must show something more than the unlawfulness of Ms Tan’s conduct in the conduct of the corporate affairs of SMSPL. Mr Ng must also show that there has been injury to his interests as a shareholder which does not merely reflect that suffered by the company, SMSPL.
Pre-13 July 2015 conduct
- [45]
[45] We begin by examining the Oral Agreement as explained at [11] above. The alleged breaches of the Oral Agreement are a central aspect of the alleged wrongs that form the basis of the oppression claim at the heart of Suit 867. Bearing in mind the principle that a member of a company will not ordinarily be entitled to complain of oppression unless there has been some breach of the terms on which he agreed that the affairs of the company should be conducted, as we mentioned at [33] above, the Oral Agreement, if established, would be a critical yardstick against which commercial unfairness could be measured. Indeed, all of the overlap claims, other than the Gratuity Payments, turn on whether there was an Oral Agreement at all and which version of the Oral Agreement is to be accepted.
- [46]
[46] Unfortunately, there is no direct documentary evidence of the Oral Agreement. As we will see, the lack of reliable documentary evidence is a problem that bedevils these proceedings. As such, resort has been had to two kinds of considerations in determining the true Oral Agreement. First, there are arguments about the likelihood or truthfulness of Mr Ng or Ms Tan’s Versions as a whole – for example, which version makes more commercial sense. Second, there are the specific transfers made to SMSPL. The question is whether each set of transfers is more consistent with Mr Ng’s Version or Ms Tan’s Version. On the other hand, a decision on the true Oral Agreement would also in turn colour the analysis of the individual sets of transfers, since those transfers would have been made in the light of the true Oral Agreement. We bear this interconnectedness in mind when analysing the Oral Agreement.
- [47]
[47] The parties do not offer any third possibility – on their cases, it is either Mr Ng’s Version or Ms Tan’s Version that governs the business relationship between the parties. However, given the considerable difficulties with the evidence in the present case, and despite the Judge’s conclusion, we ultimately find it impossible to exclude the possibility that the truth is neither that presented by Mr Ng nor by Ms Tan. We return to this issue at [93]–[97] below.
The consistency of Mr Ng’s case
- [48]
[48] We start with a point which SDPL complains was not addressed by the Judge. SDPL submits that Mr Ng’s case underwent two significant and unexplained shifts: first, there was a shift from his pleaded case, that the Oral Agreement envisaged the transfer of all receivables, to his case at trial, that it entailed the transfer of net receivables (which is the version of the Oral Agreement we have termed “Mr Ng’s Version”: see [12] above) (“the first shift”); second, while Mr Ng’s pleaded case was that all post-incorporation invoices constituted receivables transferrable under the Oral Agreement, during the trial Mr Ng arbitrarily withdrew from the ambit of his action those SDPL invoices that were paid shortly after SMSPL’s incorporation (on 20 February 2012) on the basis that such invoices were likely for work done pre-incorporation (“the second shift”). SDPL’s submission is that these shifts undermined the credibility of Mr Ng’s Version.
- [49]
[49] Mr Ng submits that the first shift did not take place; his case all along entailed a transfer of net receivables. In our view, this is simply an implausible reading of Mr Ng’s pleadings, which asserted that the Oral Agreement envisaged that:
Mr Ng also brought claims against SDPL for furniture, fitting and equipment (“FF&E”) expenses incurred by SMSPL on SDPL’s behalf. These claims were enumerated in his Statement of Claim at Annexes E, H1 and H2. The Statement of Claim therefore implied that SDPL should have borne its own FF&E expenses even while transferring all its receivables to SMSPL. This was clearly an unsustainable arrangement from SDPL’s perspective, since it would be left with no revenue with which to fund its expenses, and would eventually become insolvent. Mr Ng’s Version in its eventual form, entailing the transfer of net receivables, only emerged on the first day of trial, during his cross-examination. Further, it was only on the 15th day of trial that Mr Tan confirmed that Annex E was simply Mr Ng’s “alternative case” in case he did not succeed on the Oral Agreement. That there was a shift in Mr Ng’s case in relation to the Oral Agreement from his pleadings to the trial cannot be denied. This goes to the credibility and hence veracity of Mr Ng’s Version.
- [51]
[51] There is another nuance to the framing of Mr Ng’s pleaded case. His Statement of Claim asserts that the Oral Agreement was “[e]ssentially” to “combine both companies, namely MOX and [SDPL], into one, i.e. [SMSPL]” [emphasis added]. Although Ms Tan and SDPL deny that there was any plan to merge the businesses, former SMSPL employees Mr Cabigas Joseph Francis Perez and Mr Seah gave evidence that no practical distinction was drawn between MOX, SDPL and SMSPL after the latter’s incorporation. This evidence was not challenged in cross-examination. In fact, when Mr Seah tendered his letter of resignation, long before any dispute had broken out, he made reference to “the merger” of MOX and SDPL. The practical treatment of MOX, SDPL and SMSPL as a combined business is potentially significant because, as Mr Owen Hawkes, Mr Ng’s accounting expert, suggested, it was possible that the parties paid attention only to the revenue aspect of their business arrangements, without giving much thought to the expenses. It was inevitable that the expenses of such a business would have to be settled on the basis of some informal understanding or ad hoc arrangement, or MOX and SDPL would become insolvent. On the other hand, there is some force in the argument advanced by counsel for SDPL, Mr William Ong (“Mr Ong”), that SDPL has other shareholders whose interests have to be borne in mind when evaluating the veracity of Mr Ng’s Version. Indeed, Ms Tan’s shareholding in SDPL is only 30%, with the remaining shares held by Ms Tan’s son, sister, and brother-in-law. Mr Ong’s contention is part and parcel of the argument that Mr Ng’s Version made no commercial sense.
- [52]
[52] Although we accept SDPL’s contention that the first shift did take place, that alone does not conclusively debunk Mr Ng’s Version, though it casts some doubt on its credibility.
- [53]
[53] As for the alleged second shift, the Judge gave this complaint short shrift during the trial. The Judge said that it was Mr Ng’s prerogative to maintain his pleaded case while also withdrawing certain claims which were close to the date of SMSPL’s incorporation. Further, the Judge accepted Mr Ng’s explanation that there had been no conscious consideration of how such borderline invoices would be treated (see the Judgment at [26]). Thus, the second shift was not a real change in Mr Ng’s case. Nevertheless, we find some force in SDPL’s argument that such a strict and potentially arbitrary line based on the date of the invoice makes Mr Ng’s Version inherently less plausible. We go on to discuss this issue of plausibility next.
The plausibility of the two versions
- [54]
[54] We first consider the plausibility of Mr Ng’s Version. SDPL strenuously contended that Mr Ng’s Version made no commercial sense for Ms Tan. The evidence was that over a period of about six months in 2012, SDPL had revenues of about $2.82m, while over a similar period of about eight months in 2012, MOX had revenues of about $451,000. SDPL argued that such a large disparity in MOX and SDPL’s revenues made it implausible that Ms Tan would have agreed to share these revenues in the proportion of the parties’ shareholdings in SMSPL. That Mr Ng’s Version lacked commercial sense is also borne out by the fact that no due diligence on the finances of MOX or SDPL was done prior to incorporation.
- [55]
[55] SDPL’s submission in relation to the alleged second shift in Mr Ng’s case is related to this point. As SDPL’s counsel submitted at the hearing before us, Mr Ng’s Version generates unfairness because an invoice could be issued post-incorporation even though almost all the work could have been done pre-incorporation. This would disadvantage Ms Tan and SDPL, given the much larger amount of revenue SDPL was generating. We agree that this unduly advantaged Mr Ng.
- [56]
[56] Although the Judge found that Ms Tan knew “that SDPL’s unbilled fees exceeded MOX’s” (the Judgment at [72]), this hardly speaks to the magnitude of the difference between the degrees of success of the two companies. Ms Tan’s own evidence was that prior to SMSPL’s incorporation, all that she knew was that Mr Ng had told her MOX’s annual revenue ranged between $550,000 and $750,000, against overheads of about $420,000 to $456,000. These relatively broad estimates, in the absence of supporting documentation, did not paint a clear picture of MOX’s likely prospects or profitability. As such, accepting Mr Ng’s Version would mean that Ms Tan agreed to give up a significant proportion of SDPL’s future income without knowing how much income from MOX she would have the benefit of in return.
- [57]
[57] On the other hand, the Judge was of the view that Ms Tan would be willing to agree to Mr Ng’s Version because she “was planning her retirement and intended that [Mr Ng] would take over the running of SMSPL and preserve the ‘Suying’ name” (the Judgment at [71]). Ms Tan’s evidence was also that she hoped to “enjoy future passive income” from SMSPL even after she retired. Mr Ng further submitted that Ms Tan went into business with him in the hopes of starting an interior design practice that could hold itself out as having architectural expertise or as having the services of an architect. For the purposes of an article in “Cubes” magazine which described SMSPL as “blur[ring] the boundaries between architecture and interior design”, Ms Tan had sent an email in which she said that SDPL and MOX did complementary work, and they therefore agreed without any hesitation to a collaboration. We accept that these were amongst the reasons for Ms Tan’s decision to start SMSPL with Mr Ng. But these attractions alone are not sufficient. The likely magnitude of the monetary benefit to Mr Ng arising from the transfer of post-incorporation invoiced receivables compared to that to Ms Tan, and the lack of due diligence, give us pause.
- [58]
[58] Ms Tan’s Version of the Oral Agreement, which we turn to next, is equally not without significant difficulties.
- [59]
[59] In finding against Ms Tan’s Version, the Judge placed significant weight on the fact that SMSPL did not track the use of its manpower by SDPL and MOX (see the Judgment at [27]–[30]). SDPL submits that this was because the parties operated on an “honour system” for reimbursements. Her evidence is that SDPL made “project-linked loans” to SMSPL consisting of the entirety of the receivables earned under certain invoices for SDPL projects which used SMSPL’s resources; the reimbursements for the use of these resources would be effected by a deduction of the relevant sums when these loans were repaid to SDPL (see the Judgment at [58]). If this were true, the serious difficulty with this testimony is that Ms Tan actively delayed the process of making these reimbursements. According to Ms Tan, after Mr Ng’s resignation, she caused SMSPL to repay the loans given by SDPL via the Debit Notes, but only after deducting $230,000 to account for SDPL’s use of SMSPL’s manpower (see the Judgment at [89], [91]). The Judge assessed Ms Tan’s best efforts at estimating the amount owed to SMSPL for use of its manpower as having “bordered on being arbitrary” (the Judgment at [30]). In short, Ms Tan could not abide by her version of the Oral Agreement even if she wanted to, because she delayed the making of reimbursements for years even while keeping no records that could shed light on how much these reimbursements ought to be. Ms Tan’s difficulty lies in the absence of proper records to effect accurate reimbursements. Indeed, it has not been suggested that there existed any proper formula by which such reimbursements were to be made to SMSPL. This implies either that the parties never discussed the issue of reimbursements, or that they were prepared to accept an arbitrary approach.
- [60]
[60] Further, Mr Ng estimated that SMSPL’s non-manpower overheads accounted for between 40% and 60% of all its expenses. Ms Tan appeared to accept as much in cross-examination. However, Ms Tan’s case is that reimbursements were made only for use of SMSPL’s manpower (see the Judgment at [31]). As Mr Ng submits, it is unclear why the parties would have agreed to reimburse SMSPL for the use of its resources, and yet omit to take into account approximately half of these resources, by failing to include the use of non-manpower resources in the Oral Agreement. However, this is the effect of Ms Tan’s Version.
- [61]
[61] In our judgment, there are gaps in either party’s case. Considerations of plausibility therefore cannot determine which version of the Oral Agreement is true.
Other considerations
- [62]
[62] We now turn to address the other factors pertaining to the Oral Agreement as a whole. First, after Mr Ng resigned, Ms Tan sent him what the Judge described as a “confrontational email” on 8 August 2015 (see the Judgment at [73]). This lengthy email started with a description of the agreement between SMSPL’s shareholders as to its paid-up capital and their expectations on the turnover Mr Ng was to bring into the company, and ended with a section titled “Company Accounts”, which stated, inter alia, that SDPL had provided SMSPL with approximately $800,000 to $1,000,000 in loans to date, which had now been repaid. The Judge placed weight on Ms Tan’s failure to refer to her version of the Oral Agreement and the reimbursements for the use of SMSPL’s resources thereunder in this email (the Judgment at [74]). In our judgment, these omissions are not probative of the veracity of Ms Ng’s Version. This email is stated to be Ms Tan’s response to Mr Ng’s email dated 28 July 2015, in which Mr Ng raised the issue of handover arrangements and sought SMSPL’s accounts. Moreover, as we have observed at [12] above, up to that point Mr Ng had not specifically raised the Oral Agreement or any issue arising therefrom. Thus, there was nothing that compelled Ms Tan to set out her version of the Oral Agreement in her 8 August 2015 reply.
- [63]
[63] As for the purported $800,000 to $1,000,000 in loans, we observe that the amount Ms Tan withdrew by way of the Debit Notes shortly before sending this email was more than $1.6m (see [8] above). Ms Tan’s email therefore appears to significantly understate the amount of the loans compared to her case at the trial, which was that the Debit Notes constituted repayments of loans. We will return to this point starting from [66] below.
- [64]
[64] Second, SDPL submits that the Judge failed to consider Mr Ng’s proposal to Ms Tan for her to buy 40% of MOX’s shares for $240,000 after SMSPL’s incorporation. SDPL argues that if Mr Ng’s Version were true, and MOX had to transfer all its receivables to SMSPL post-incorporation, its shares would have no value, and there would be no reason for Mr Ng to make this proposal. Mr Ng, on the other hand, submits, rhetorically in our view, that this proposal was part of a larger plan for a share swap between himself and Ms Tan, which was meant to be a symbolic transaction reflecting the merger of SDPL and SMSPL. We do not find Mr Ng’s share proposal to be of much help to either party, not least because the stance seems to us to be purely argumentative rather than constituting objective evidence in support of either version. Ultimately, no sale or swap of the shares took place.
- [65]
[65] Third, SDPL submits that Ms Tan’s Version should be preferred because it was corroborated by Ms Chiu and Mr Lim, who were the only other persons who would have been present when the Oral Agreement was reached. On the other hand, the only witness to corroborate Mr Ng’s Version was Mr Seah, a former associate of Mr Ng who had no first-hand knowledge of the Oral Agreement. Ultimately, the Judge placed very little weight on the credibility of the witnesses. Instead, all he said was that the conflicting evidence of all the witnesses, including Mr Ng and Ms Tan, had to be considered against the totality of the evidence (the Judgment at [75]). We do not see any reason to place greater reliance on the conflicting oral testimony of those witnesses than the Judge did, especially considering that he had the benefit of seeing the witnesses testify. Instead, we turn to the specific transfers between MOX and SDPL on the one hand and SMSPL on the other, and consider whether the circumstances of each transfer support either version of the Oral Agreement.
The transfers to SMSPL
- [66]
[66] The parties each argue that the transfers to SMSPL were made for purposes consistent with their version of the Oral Agreement. We summarise the transfers, which we have set out at [19(d)] above, in the following table:
(1) The $203k
- [67]
[67] The $203k, which was undisputedly in the nature of advances made because SMSPL had no bank account at the time, illustrates a central point in the present case. To obtain repayment of these advances, SDPL issued two invoices to SMSPL both for “Administrative Fee[s]”, even though that was not what they were. These invoices included GST, even though GST need not be paid on such transactions. This shows the poor grasp SMSPL and SDPL’s staff had of their accounts, and their adoption of incorrect practices and inaccurate documentation surrounding transfers of money. As the Judge found, SMSPL’s accounts “were in a state of mess” (the Judgment at [50]), and its bookkeeper was “somewhat muddleheaded” (the Judgment at [182]). SDPL also had the same bookkeeper. The fact that the documentary evidence is so unsatisfactory and unreliable in the present case poses a significant problem in establishing the truth behind the numerous disputed facts.
(2) The $600k
- [68]
[68] These were sums of $176,000 and $424,000 transferred from SDPL to SMSPL in August and September 2012 respectively, which the Judge found to be loans (see the Judgment at [45]–[55]). Mr Ng contends, however, that these were transfers of receivables.
- [69]
[69] In our view, the most compelling piece of evidence in support of these sums being loans is the WhatsApp messages between Mr Ng and Ms Tan before 13 July 2015. It is common ground that there was a meeting on 8 June 2015 at which Mr Ng and Ms Tan had discussed the issue of loans from SDPL to SMSPL, and that the outstanding loans were estimated at $800,000. According to Ms Tan, this referred to the outstanding loans from 2012 only. On 1 July 2015, Ms Tan sent a WhatsApp message to Mr Ng and Ms Martinez stating the “[g]ood news” that the relevant amount owed was only about $600,000. To this, Mr Ng replied “[t]hank you so much” (see the Judgment at [53]). Mr Ng’s only explanation of this message is that it was an expression of gratitude to Ms Tan for taking the time to check, and not an acknowledgement of the loans. Like the Judge, we find his explanation unpersuasive. Since Mr Ng’s position all along has been that SMSPL had never needed loans, there is no reason for Mr Ng to have simply accepted the figure of $600,000 without protest. This strongly indicates that Mr Ng accepted that SMSPL took such loans from SDPL.
- [70]
[70] We are also unable to agree with Mr Ng’s submission that Ms Tan had no basis to think that SMSPL was short of funds and required the $600k in loans. According to Ms Tan, she paid close attention to SMSPL’s cash flow (see [80] below); in August and September 2012, when the $600k was transferred, SMSPL’s net cash flow had been significantly negative for every single preceding month since its incorporation. It would therefore have been obvious to Ms Tan that SMSPL needed funds. Indeed, Mr Ng himself accepted that Ms Tan had told him in August 2012 that SMSPL’s bank balance was low (see the Judgment at [54]).
- [71]
[71] The conclusion that the $600k were loans is further supported by SDPL’s list of expenses for August and September 2012, which recorded the $600k as “payout[s] to Suying Metropolitan to cover expenses” [emphasis added] (see the Judgment at [51]). This is language clearly suggestive of the payments being loans. The Judge also relied on a number of handwritten notes to the same effect (see the Judgment at [49] and [51]). Mr Ng contends that these were fabrications. We do not think any reliance needs to be placed on these handwritten notes, given the other evidence we have outlined above. We therefore uphold the Judge’s findings that the $600k were loans from SDPL to SMSPL.
(3) The $100k
- [72]
[72] This is a single transfer from MOX to SMSPL in October 2012 pursuant to an SMSPL invoice describing the amount as a “Design Consultancy Fee”. The Judge was unable to determine the purpose of this transfer (see the Judgment at [36]). Mr Ng contends that this $100k was a transfer of receivables, while Ms Tan contends that it was a reimbursement for the use of SMSPL’s resources, in the form of MOX’s former employees who were on SMSPL’s payroll, but were still working on MOX projects.
- [73]
[73] In our view, the evidence clearly points towards the $100k being a reimbursement from MOX to SMSPL. This is shown, first of all, by an email from Twopoint, MOX’s bookkeeper, to Mr Ng on 21 August 2012. The email stated that Twopoint would advise Mr Ng “on the amount owing to [SMSPL] for expenses (i.e. salaries) paid on behalf”. The only reasonable reading of this sentence is that Twopoint believed that MOX owed SMSPL money for salaries SMSPL paid on MOX’s behalf. If this impression was wrong, Mr Ng did not correct it.
- [74]
[74] We also accept the explanation given by SDPL’s counsel of the treatment of the $100k in MOX’s accounts. It is clear to us from MOX’s general ledger that the $100k was paid in satisfaction of debts recorded in the general ledger as being owed to SMSPL for various salaries in 2012, totalling $104,535.11. After the payment of the $100k, the remaining balance of $4,535.11 was transferred to Mr Ng’s director’s account in the general ledger. In the absence of any credible explanation, these records reflect that the $100k was a reimbursement to SMSPL for salaries paid by SMSPL. Although Mr Ng was in sole control of MOX’s accounts, Mr Tan conceded that Mr Ng had no explanation for these records.
- [75]
[75] On the other hand, the only positive evidence that this $100k could have been a transfer of receivables is the fact that on SMSPL’s list of incoming funds, this transfer was linked to the names of two of MOX’s pre-incorporation projects (see the Judgment at [33]). However, Mr Ng concedes that the sum of $100k did not correspond to any fees received on the invoices for these projects, nor was there any other evidence linking the $100k to these projects. In the circumstances, the weight of the evidence shows that the $100k was a reimbursement from MOX to SMSPL for salaries paid by SMSPL for MOX’s former employees who had moved over to SMSPL. The one-off nature of this transfer accords with Ms Tan’s case that it was made only because she had complained to Mr Ng that “most, if not all” of these employees’ time was spent on MOX projects alone. We therefore overturn the Judge’s finding on the $100k, and find that it was a reimbursement from MOX to SMSPL.
(4) The $162k
- [76]
[76] This is a transfer of $162,193.93 from Ode to Art (the business run by Ms Chong, Mr Ng’s wife) to SMSPL in February 2013, which the Judge found to be a loan from SDPL to SMSPL (see the Judgment at [70]).
- [77]
[77] This amount reflected, in Singapore dollars, a sum SDPL’s branch in Shanghai (“SD (Shanghai)”) had paid in Chinese yuan to various artists in China on Ode to Art’s behalf (see the Judgment at [68]). The Judge accepted Ms Tan’s account that she had arranged for Ode to Art to repay this sum in Singapore dollars to SMSPL instead, because SMSPL was in need of funds (see the Judgment at [69]). Mr Ng contends, on the other hand, that this sum was paid to SMSPL as a means of effecting the payment of receivables collected by SD (Shanghai) pursuant to his version of the Oral Agreement. We agree with the Judge that Mr Ng has failed to discharge his burden of proof, as he is ultimately unable to draw any link between income from specific SD (Shanghai) projects and this $162k. In the absence of any proof to the contrary, the natural inference to draw when Ode to Art made repayment to SMSPL for a loan which Ode to Art owed to SDPL was that this transfer amounted to a loan from SDPL to SMSPL. We therefore affirm the Judge’s finding that the $162k was effectively a loan from SDPL to SMSPL.
(5) The $719k
- [78]
[78] These are sums totalling $719,652.02 which SDPL transferred SMSPL in April, July and September 2013 and December 2014 (see the Judgment at [56]–[57]). They were paid pursuant to ten invoices relating to a number of SDPL’s pre-incorporation projects, which described the sums as “consultancy fee[s]”. The Judge found the $719k to be transfers of receivables from SDPL to SMSPL pursuant to Mr Ng’s Version (see the Judgment at [67]).
- [80]
[80] We begin with Ms Tan’s explanation that she maintained a cash buffer for SMSPL. Such a suggestion is plausible since a cash buffer is intended to take care of cash flow problems and emergency expenses, and is a part and parcel of good business management. However, Ms Tan’s evidence on her implementation of this cash buffer raises some doubts as to whether the practice of a cash buffer existed in SMSPL or, if it did, whether it was arbitrary. In her AEIC, Ms Tan stated that she maintained the cash buffer by deducting cash set aside for FF&E expenses from SMSPL’s bank balance. This was no longer Ms Tan’s position when she took the stand at the trial: she then claimed that she never looked at SMSPL’s bank statements or its general ledger; instead, she only managed its cash buffer by looking at its incoming cheque listing and its list of expenses. Ms Tan’s accounts in her AEIC and at trial are clearly contradictory. On appeal, SDPL has adopted Ms Tan’s account at trial. These variations undermine Ms Tan’s claim to having maintained a cash buffer.
- [81]
[81] It was Ms Tan’s case at the trial and SDPL’s case on appeal that the transfers of the $719k occurred on the basis of Ms Tan’s assessment of when SMSPL was short of cash. However, the Judge observed that these transfers were made on a “back-to-back” basis – ie, their timing was determined by when SDPL received payment on the relevant invoices (see the Judgment at [62]). This naturally pointed towards them being a simple transfer of receivables; if they were in fact “project-linked loans” made pursuant to close attention to SMSPL’s cash buffer, this would require there to be an interesting coincidence between SMSPL’s need for funds and SDPL receiving payment on invoices.
- [82]
[82] On the other hand, we note that SMSPL’s financial records suggested that it had a negative cash flow in the majority of the months for which it was in operation, if the transfers from SDPL and MOX are excluded. This suggests that it was not implausible for someone monitoring SMSPL’s cash flow to come to the conclusion that SMSPL needed cash most of the time. Elsewhere in Ms Tan’s AEIC, she also suggested that the transfers of the $719k were made so as to be punctual in paying SMSPL what it was due (ie, the reimbursements for the use of its resources); these “project-linked loans”, according to this evidence from Ms Tan, were a way of complying with her version of the Oral Agreement and maintaining SMSPL’s cash buffer at the same time. This would go some way towards explaining the timing of these “project-linked loans”. However, this was again a slightly different account from the cash buffer as initially described in the very same AEIC (see [80] above), since Ms Tan now seemed to be suggesting that “project-linked loans” were not transferred in response to the fluctuations in the cash buffer, but merely in view of the general need to maintain SMSPL’s cash flow.
- [83]
[83] The waters are further muddied by the evidence of Ms Tan’s accounting expert, Mr Abdul Gafoor (“Mr Gafoor”). Mr Gafoor had assumed in his analysis that SMSPL operated on a three-month cash buffer and a two-month buffer for FF&E expenses. As the Judge pointed out (see the Judgment at [63]), it is not clear where the two-month FF&E buffer came from. Although Ms Tan made reference to the need to set cash aside for FF&E expenses in her evidence, she did not state that she worked on the basis of a two-month FF&E buffer. There was therefore a mismatch between the basis on which Mr Gafoor analysed whether SMSPL had sufficient cash or needed loans, and what Ms Tan would actually have had in mind when undertaking this exercise based on her own evidence. This limited the helpfulness of Mr Gafoor’s analysis. Instead, it became yet another variation of Ms Tan’s purported cash buffer, on top of the slightly different accounts given by Ms Tan at various points in her affidavit evidence and at the trial.
- [84]
[84] The Judge further found that there were various other sources of funding for SMSPL, which Ms Tan could easily have tapped on instead of making loans to SMSPL (see the Judgment at [64]–[65]). With respect, we consider the availability of these other sources of funding to have been overstated.
(a) First, we disagree with the Judge that SMSPL had a ready source of funding available from the amounts due to it from SD (Shanghai). Ms Tan’s evidence was that the balance of funds in SD (Shanghai)’s account might be needed for SD (Shanghai)’s future expenses. This would have provided a valid reason for SD (Shanghai) not to remit them to SMSPL.
(b) Second, the Judge relied upon the availability of $1,066,087.13 collected by SDPL in its capacity as “contract administrator” for SMSPL’s projects. However, nothing near this sum would have been available at the material times. Instead, the vast majority of this approximately $1.07m was collected by SDPL only after most of the $719k had been transferred to SMSPL. On the other hand, even if only a much smaller sum had been collected by SDPL at the material times when Ms Tan made “project-linked loans” to SMSPL, the question nevertheless arises as to why Ms Tan did not transfer that smaller sum to SMSPL instead. As Ms Tan herself points out, $61,632 had been received by SDPL in its capacity as contract administrator in August 2013. This was just before SDPL made a purported “project-linked loan” of $49,980 to SMSPL in September 2013. Ms Tan conceded that she could not explain why a supposed loan of $49,980 was made to SMSPL instead of simply transferring SMSPL the $61,632 in SDPL’s possession at the time that rightfully belonged to SMSPL.
(c) Third, we do not agree with the Judge that SMSPL had no cash flow difficulties at the time of the transfers of the $719k simply because it had made certain other payments: in particular, the Judge relied on the fact that SMSPL had paid $154,707.65 towards SDPL’s income tax in November 2013 and $14,800.02 towards SDPL’s GST liabilities in January 2014, and loaned Ms Tan $70,433.55 towards a purchase of property in May 2013 (see the Judgment at [66]). SMSPL’s income tax and GST payments were not strong pieces of evidence, since none of the transfers within the $719k were made close to the time of these payments. They do not therefore suggest that there was no need for the “project-linked loans” at the time they were actually made. As for the loan to Ms Tan, she explained that she was out of cheques at the time and repaid the loan just over a week later, once she received a new chequebook. This is likewise not a significant piece of evidence to show that SMSPL did not require the $719k to aid its cash flow.
- [85]
[85] We turn to SDPL’s submission that the $719k could not have been transfers of receivables because they amounted to the gross receivables received, without deducting SDPL’s expenses. This can be illustrated with reference to two of the transfers amongst the $719k: a total of $170,130 transferred to SMSPL in July 2013 in relation to SDPL’s Riversails project (see the Judgment at [56]). This represented the entire sums received by SDPL under two of the invoices for the Riversails project. SDPL points out that it bore FF&E expenses of at least $570,000 for the Riversails project, out of a total contract value of $1.03m. The transfer of the $170,130, being gross receivables, therefore did not conform to Mr Ng’s Version, which was for the transfer of net receivables. However, this is again an inconclusive piece of evidence. Since the rest of the receivables for the Riversails project were evidently never transferred to SMSPL, it is impossible to say whether this transfer of $170,130 was a back-to-back “project-linked loan” as Ms Tan contends, or partial compliance with Mr Ng’s Version, taking into account the fact that other receivables from the project had not been transferred.
The judgment continues past this page. Read the rest at eLitigation.