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Grounds publishedDecided 28 May 2020

Court of Appeal

Leiman, Ricardo and another v Noble Resources Ltd and another

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[2020] SGCA 52Case no. Civil Appeal No 153 of 2018

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Grounds of decision

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] This appeal arises out of Suit No 393 of 2012 (“Suit 393”), an action commenced by Mr Ricardo Leiman (“Mr Leiman”) and Rothschild Trust Guernsey Limited (“Rothschild Trust”) against Mr Leiman’s former employer, Noble Resources Ltd (“NRL”), and its parent company, Noble Group Ltd (“NGL”). Suit 393 primarily concerned Mr Leiman’s post-resignation entitlements under an agreement that he entered into with NRL to deal with the terms of his departure from the Noble group of companies (“Noble”). The appellants claimed, among other things, that the respondents wrongfully denied Mr Leiman his entitlements under the agreement, based on a determination by NGL’s Remuneration and Options Committee (“R&O Committee”) that he had acted to Noble’s detriment. The appellants challenged both the substance of that determination and the process by which it had been made.

  3. [2] The High Court judge (“the Judge”) who heard the matter dismissed the appellants’ claims: see Leiman, Ricardo and another v Noble Resources Ltd and another [2018] SGHC 166 (the “Judgment”). He reviewed the R&O Committee’s exercise of its discretion not to award Mr Leiman his entitlements and found that this discretion had been correctly exercised because Mr Leiman had breached his contractual non-competition and confidentiality obligations. He also rejected the appellants’ argument that Mr Leiman was entitled to but had not been accorded due process by the Committee. However, notwithstanding his finding that Mr Leiman had breached some of his contractual obligations as well as his duty of fidelity, the Judge dismissed NRL’s counterclaim against Mr Leiman because, in his view, there was no basis for NRL to recover the payments it had made to Mr Leiman under the relevant contracts between the parties.

  4. [3] This appeal raises issues pertaining to the proper construction of contracts in the context of terms that vest decision-making powers in a contractually designated entity and the extent to which a court may review the exercise of those powers when a decision made by that entity is challenged. We will address these and some other points in this judgment.

  5. The material facts

  6. [4] Most of the relevant facts have been set out at [3] to [50] of the Judgment. We therefore recount the facts only to the extent necessary.

  7. The parties

  8. [6] The first appellant, Mr Leiman, is a Dutch national. He was employed by NRL on 31 March 2006 as the Chief Operating Officer of NGL. The terms of his employment are set out in an employment agreement dated 6 December 2005 between him and NRL (the “Employment Agreement”). He was promoted and appointed the Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) of NGL on 1 January 2010, and was also appointed an Executive Director of NGL from 1 April 2009 to 1 December 2011.

  9. [7] Mr Leiman was awarded NGL share options and shares and paid discretionary annual bonuses during his employment by Noble. He assigned his shares and share options to the Adelaide Trust, a trust that he established. The second appellant, Rothschild Trust, administers the Adelaide Trust as trustee.

  10. [8] Although Mr Leiman was formally employed by NRL, which was the Noble entity that employed Hong Kong-based staff, he was responsible for Noble’s global operations. The award of his benefits under the Employment Agreement was, for all practical purposes, determined by NGL’s R&O Committee. At the material time from November 2011 to May 2012, the R&O Committee comprised Mr Richard Samuel Elman (“Mr Elman”), Mr Edward Walter Rubin (“Mr Rubin”) and Mr Robert Chan Tze Leung (“Mr Chan”). Mr Elman was the Chairman of NGL, and Mr Rubin and Mr Chan were independent directors of NGL at the time. The R&O Committee was also assisted by Mr Jeffrey Mark Alam (“Mr Alam”), NGL’s Group General Counsel and a director of NRL, who oversaw the legal affairs of Noble. Mr Leiman also sat on the R&O Committee prior to his resignation.

  11. Background to the dispute

  12. The terms on which NGL shares and share options were granted to Mr Leiman

  13. [9] The NGL share options that are the subject of the present appeal were issued to Mr Leiman pursuant to the Noble Group Share Option Scheme 2004 (“the Share Option Rules”). 44,818,182 share options had yet to be exercised at the time Mr Leiman resigned. These share options were assigned to and held by the Adelaide Trust on the following terms:

  14. [10] Under cl 8.3(a) of the Share Option Rules, any unexercised share options held by Mr Leiman would lapse if he ceased to be employed by NRL. Clause 8.3(a) states:

  15. However, as noted earlier, the parties entered into an agreement in anticipation of Mr Leiman’s resignation from NRL. We will turn to this shortly to consider its significance in the light of the other agreements that Mr Leiman was party to, and that also made provision for the vesting, divesting or exercise of his employment-related benefits.

  16. [11] Mr Leiman was also issued NGL shares pursuant to Noble’s Annual Incentive Plan (revised 10 September 2008) (“AIP”). The AIP is an incentive remuneration programme under which common stock is issued to Noble employees, but held by a discretionary trust established by NGL for a stipulated period (“the Restricted Period”), during which time it cannot be transferred or assigned except in the event of the employee’s death. Of the shares awarded to Mr Leiman under the AIP, those that are in issue in this appeal consist of: (a) 17,276,013 shares which had already been allotted at the material time, and which Mr Leiman had in turn assigned to the Adelaide Trust; and (b) 5,652,421 shares which were awarded by way of a letter dated 4 May 2011 (“the 4 May 2011 letter”), and whose allotment was pending shareholder approval. The dates on which these shares were awarded to Mr Leiman and the dates on which the trading restrictions on them were to have been lifted are as follows:

  17. (a) In respect of the 17,276,013 shares:

  18. (b) In respect of the 5,652,421 shares:

  19. [12] Unlike share options issued under the Share Option Rules, which would generally lapse upon the employee concerned ceasing to be in Noble’s employment, an employee who had been awarded shares under the AIP would generally retain the right to have them distributed to him after the trading restrictions were lifted, even if this was after he had left Noble. Such an employee would also be able to trade them. The exceptions were if his employment had been terminated for cause, if he had engaged in activity inimical or contrary to NGL’s interests, or if he, within six months of his resignation, entered into competition with NGL. The relevant paragraphs of the AIP state:

  20. The terms under which the 5,652,421 shares were awarded to Mr Leiman by way of the 4 May 2011 letter were identical to those in the AIP, apart from the fact that references to the “Company” in the AIP were changed to “the Noble Group” in the 4 May 2011 letter.

  21. Mr Leiman’s resignation and the parties’ entry into the Settlement Agreement

  22. [13] Mr Leiman and Mr Elman got into some disagreements sometime in the middle of 2011. Mr Leiman expressed concern that Noble was adopting questionable accounting and corporate governance practices. Mr Elman, on the other hand, had concerns regarding Mr Leiman’s integrity and suitability to continue as NGL’s CEO, citing some decisions that Mr Leiman had allegedly made capriciously and his failure to comply with Noble’s internal protocols.

  23. [14] The parties began to plan for Mr Leiman’s exit from Noble sometime in late 2011. This was done by e-mail and in the course of some conversations.

  24. [15] On 24 or 25 October 2011, Mr Elman informed Mr Alam that he had decided that Mr Leiman should leave Noble and that his resignation would be effective from 1 December 2011. Mr Elman instructed Mr Alam to prepare an agreement on that basis. Although this agreement was, in essence, a separation agreement, it was referred to before us as a “settlement agreement”, and for convenience, we adopt the same convention since it signifies the parties’ intent to avoid Mr Leiman’s exit turning contentious. Mr Alam understood that Mr Elman intended, through the settlement agreement, to ensure that Mr Leiman would preserve his entitlements under the Employment Agreement that would otherwise be automatically lost upon termination. Mr Leiman also wished to be hired in an advisory capacity for a term of a year until December 2012, and Mr Elman was open to this.

  25. [16] Mr Alam and Mr Leiman negotiated the terms of the agreement from around 25 October 2011 until 31 October 2011. Mr Alam sought input from Mr Elman during these negotiations.

  26. [17] The agreement was signed by Mr Leiman on 1 November 2011 and by Mr Elman, on NRL’s behalf, on 2 November 2011 (“the Settlement Agreement”). It was dated 9 November 2011.

  27. [18] On 8 November 2011, Mr Alam sent Mr Leiman a draft of the agreement pursuant to which he would provide advisory services to NRL. Mr Elman, on behalf of NRL, and Mr Leiman subsequently signed this agreement, which too was dated 9 November 2011 (“the Advisory Agreement”).

  28. The terms of the Settlement Agreement

  29. [19] The Settlement Agreement set out the terms on which Mr Leiman was to resign from NRL. The preamble expressly stated that NRL and Mr Leiman had mutually agreed that his employment would cease on 1 December 2011 (“the Effective Date”). We set out the preamble below for reference:

  30. [20] Under the Settlement Agreement, on the Effective Date, Mr Leiman would resign from his employment with NRL and from all the other positions that he held as an officer or member of Noble’s board (cl 1). NRL would pay him his base salary through the Effective Date and for six months thereafter (cl 2), and would allow him severance payments and benefits (cl 3). Provision was also made for:

  31. (a) Mr Leiman’s continued non-competition obligations (cl 4);

  32. (b) NRL’s assumption of responsibility for all obligations under the lease of Mr Leiman’s apartment in Hong Kong after the termination of the Advisory Agreement (cl 5);

  33. (c) NRL’s payment of Mr Leiman’s relocation expenses after the termination of the Advisory Agreement (cl 6);

  34. (d) Mr Leiman’s retention of his existing mobile phone number until 1 December 2012 (cl 7);

  35. (e) NRL’s payment of medical and dental plans for Mr Leiman and his family until 1 December 2012 (cl 8);

  36. (f) the grant of secretarial support for Mr Leiman while the Advisory Agreement remained in force (cl 9);

  37. (g) an entire agreement clause (cl 10);

  38. (h) the non-assignability of the Settlement Agreement (cl 11); and

  39. (i) choice of law (Singapore law) and jurisdiction (non-exclusive jurisdiction of the Singapore courts) (cl 12).

  40. [21] We highlight cl 3 of the Settlement Agreement, which set out the terms of Mr Leiman’s post-resignation entitlements. The proper interpretation and effect of cl 3, and in particular, cll 3(a), 3(c) and 3(d), are in dispute in this appeal. Clause 3 reads:

  41. [22] It will be recalled that Mr Leiman had been granted 44,818,182 NGL share options under the Share Option Rules. As we set out in the table at [9] above, 37,090,910 of these share options had vested in him by the time of the Settlement Agreement, while 7,727,272 share options were due to vest in him on 2 April 2012. It is not disputed that all of these share options were covered by cl 3(c), and we refer to them hereafter as the “Share Options”.

  42. [23] Turning to the NGL shares that had been awarded to Mr Leiman under the AIP, at the time of the Settlement Agreement, some of these shares were held by NGL’s discretionary trust and were subject to trading restrictions (see [11] above). Clause 3(d) specifically referenced the 17,276,013 shares which Mr Leiman had assigned to the Adelaide Trust (referred to hereafter as the “Shares”), and was silent as to the 5,652,421 shares which had been awarded to him by way of the 4 May 2011 letter and whose allotment was pending shareholder approval.

  43. [24] Clause 4 of the Settlement Agreement extended the non-competition obligations in Mr Leiman’s Employment Agreement to the Advisory Agreement. These obligations were to be in place for as long as the Advisory Agreement remained in force, or for nine months from 1 December 2011, whichever was longer.

  44. [25] The references in cll 3(a) and 4 of the Settlement Agreement to Mr Leiman’s obligations of non-competition and confidentiality under the Employment Agreement pertain to his obligations under cll 6 and 7 of the Employment Agreement, which are as follows:

  45. The terms of the Advisory Agreement

  46. [26] The Advisory Agreement set out the terms under which NRL would appoint Mr Leiman to provide advisory services relating to commodities supply chain management, and was to take effect on 1 December 2011 (preamble; cl 1). The Advisory Agreement was to be in force for a minimum term of nine months, renewable upon mutual agreement between NRL and Mr Leiman (cl 7).

  47. [27] Clause 3 of the Advisory Agreement imposed the following non-competition obligation on Mr Leiman:

  48. The confidentiality obligation under cl 4 of the Advisory Agreement was identical to that under cl 6 of the Employment Agreement (see above at [25]).

  49. The events after the signing of the Settlement Agreement and the Advisory Agreement

  50. [28] In accordance with the terms of the Settlement Agreement, Mr Leiman ceased to be the CEO of NGL on 1 December 2011.

  51. [29] Unbeknownst to Mr Leiman, Noble had hired a private investigator (“the PI”) in November 2011 to monitor his activities. The PI’s reports to Noble revealed that Mr Leiman had met with current and former Noble employees between late 2011 and early 2012. The PI also found e-mail printouts in Mr Leiman’s garbage bin outside his home in England, disclosing e-mail correspondence with Mr Alexander Vinokurov (“Mr Vinokurov”), the President and CEO of Summa Capital. Summa Capital is part of the Summa group of companies, which is one of Noble’s business and strategic partners. In particular, in an e-mail dated 16 February 2012, Mr Leiman told Mr Vinokurov that he had spent two days in Brazil with the CEO and partners of BTG Pactual, a Brazilian financial investment management company. Mr Leiman explained that BTG Pactual had a strong presence in Brazil and was expanding into Latin America, and was ready to move quickly on his “business plan”. He added that he had told BTG Pactual that Summa Capital would be “a great potential partner to build this into the new Glencore”. He ended the e-mail by requesting that Mr Vinokurov confirm their meeting plans. It was not disputed that the reference to Glencore related to Glencore plc, a global commodities trading company.

  52. [30] On 21 and 22 December 2011, Mr Peter Koenig (“Mr Koenig”), a Senior Trust Manager at Rothschild Trust (Switzerland) Ltd, a company related to Rothschild Trust, informed NGL that Mr Leiman intended to exercise some of his NGL Share Options and to sell the shares obtained from that exercise. Mr Koenig requested the use of what was referred to as the Collins Stewart cashless facility to carry out the simultaneous exercise of the Share Options and sale of the resultant shares, such that Mr Leiman would not have to make a cash payment when carrying out the transaction. Mr Alam testified that Mr Koenig was referring to a cashless facility under which Noble permitted its employees to be “forward[ed] … cash to pay up … shares to get them issued”. Mr Alam replied by e-mail on NGL’s behalf on 29 December 2011, stating that Mr Leiman could not sell the shares obtained from the proposed exercise of the Share Options as he was a significant employee shareholder, in accordance with a policy that applied to all significant employee shareholders. He also conveyed that “Management” had recommended that Mr Leiman was not to use the Collins Stewart cashless facility or any other similar facility until further notice, as doing so was not in the best interests of Noble or its shareholders. Mr Alam later stated in an e-mail on 1 February 2012 that a separate “share dealing blackout” generally imposed on Noble employees prior to the announcement of Noble’s quarterly results would be lifted on 28 February 2012, after which Mr Leiman would be given approval to sell up to five million shares.

  53. [31] In February 2012, Mr Alam, acting on Noble’s behalf, engaged Wolfe Associates, a boutique consulting firm, to conduct an investigation into Mr Leiman’s dealings with Mr Ferdinando Carlier and Mr Ozeias Silva de Oliveira (collectively, “Messrs Carlier and Ozeias”). Mr Leiman had been involved in hiring them in 2006 to run one of Noble’s sugar mills in Brazil. Noble had earlier engaged Wolfe Associates in 2008 to investigate the relationship between Mr Leiman and Messrs Carlier and Ozeias. Although some red flags were raised at the time, it did not appear that any action was taken by Noble.

  54. [32] Mr Koenig informed Mr Alam on 23 February 2012 that Rothschild Trust wished to exercise five million of Mr Leiman’s Share Options and to sell the shares obtained from such exercise, and requested the use of the Collins Stewart cashless facility to carry out the transaction. On 28 February 2012, Mr Alam e-mailed Mr Leiman to state that this cashless facility was not available for his use. Mr Koenig then e-mailed NGL on 29 February 2012 to state that Rothschild Trust wished to exercise five million of Mr Leiman’s Share Options without using this cashless facility. Mr Alam informed the R&O Committee of the e-mail on the same day, and sent the Committee a preliminary report that Wolfe Associates had provided him on 23 February 2012 (“the 2012 Wolfe Report”) as well as copies of Mr Leiman’s e-mails to Summa Capital that the PI had obtained. The 2012 Wolfe Report set out Wolfe Associates’ preliminary findings on, among other things, the alleged fraudulent mismanagement of a company in Brazil by Messrs Carlier and Ozeias and other legal proceedings against them, and Mr Leiman’s involvement in their hiring notwithstanding his knowledge of various allegations against them.

  55. The R&O Committee’s meetings

  56. [33] The R&O Committee convened on 1 March 2012. All three members, Mr Elman, Mr Rubin and Mr Chan, were present. Mr Alam attended part of the meeting. The R&O Committee reviewed the 2012 Wolfe Report and copies of Mr Leiman’s e-mails with Summa Capital, and unanimously resolved to refuse to approve the exercise of five million of Mr Leiman’s Share Options. Mr Alam informed Rothschild Trust of this decision on the same day.

  57. [34] Rothschild Trust protested the R&O Committee’s 1 March 2012 decision in a letter dated 7 March 2012. Rothschild Trust subsequently wrote asking for details of the information upon which the decision had been based, but Mr Alam did not provide these details. We discuss the contents of the parties’ correspondence in further detail below.

  58. [35] The R&O Committee reconvened on 27 March 2012 and reaffirmed its 1 March 2012 decision. On the same day, Mr Alam informed Rothschild Trust, by way of a memorandum attached to an e-mail sent to Mr Koenig, that the Committee’s 1 March 2012 decision would stand. Mr Alam explained that Mr Leiman’s right to exercise the Share Options was “conditional on [his] not ‘acting in any way to the detriment of Noble prior to exercise’”. The R&O Committee considered that this condition had not been satisfied as Mr Leiman had breached his non-competition and confidentiality obligations, and had appointed certain persons to run Noble’s sugar and ethanol mills in Brazil from 2006 even though they were not qualified to manage the business and might have participated in “fraudulent conduct at a previous employer”.

  59. The events following the R&O Committee’s decisions

  60. [36] On 3 April 2012, Mr Koenig wrote to Mr Alam to inquire if Mr Leiman was entitled to the 11,098,782 Shares and the 7,727,272 Share Options that were to vest on 31 March 2012 and 2 April 2012 respectively (see above at [9] and [11(a)]). Mr Alam replied on 10 April 2012, stating that the R&O Committee had determined that “the conditions for [the] exercise of the [Share O]ptions had not been satisfied” as “Mr. Leiman had acted to the detriment of Noble”. These conditions also applied to the vesting of the 11,098,782 Shares that Mr Koenig referred to, which therefore would not be transferred to Rothschild Trust. Further, Mr Leiman would have no entitlement to the Shares and the accrued dividends under cl 3(d) of the Settlement Agreement.

  61. [37] Mr Alam sent a further letter to Rothschild Trust on 26 April 2012 clarifying that the R&O Committee also did not approve the vesting of the 5,652,421 shares that had been awarded to Mr Leiman under the AIP by way of the 4 May 2011 letter. This was because the Committee considered that “Mr Leiman ha[d] acted or engaged ‘in activity or conduct which [was] inimical or contrary to or against the interests of [Noble]’”. On 3 May 2012, Mr Alam e-mailed Mr Leiman to state that the R&O Committee had confirmed that he was not awarded a discretionary bonus for 2011 (“the 2011 Bonus”).

  62. Summary of the arguments below

  63. [38] Mr Leiman commenced Suit 393 against NRL on 11 May 2012. Rothschild Trust and NGL were later added to the suit.

  64. [39] The appellants sought a declaration that the R&O Committee’s decisions pertaining to Mr Leiman’s benefits were invalid. They argued that the R&O Committee had failed to accord Mr Leiman due process and was not entitled to rely on his past alleged misconduct to make out its case that he had acted to Noble’s detriment for the purposes of cll 3(c) and 3(d) of the Settlement Agreement. The respondents had also not shown what detriment they had suffered. Accordingly, Mr Leiman was entitled to exercise the Share Options, to sell the Shares and be paid dividends accruing from the Shares, and to be considered for and paid the 2011 Bonus.

  65. [40] The appellants submitted that while cl 3(d) of the Settlement Agreement expressly mentioned only the 17,276,013 Shares awarded under the AIP that Mr Leiman had assigned to the Adelaide Trust (see [23] above), it was meant to cover all the NGL shares that had been awarded to him under the AIP, including the 5,652,421 shares awarded by way of the 4 May 2011 letter (see [11(b)] above). While this suggests that the Settlement Agreement did not reflect the final terms agreed by the parties, we note that no claim was made for rectification. The appellants submitted, in the alternative, that Mr Leiman was entitled to the 5,652,421 shares under the terms of the AIP. Further, NRL was not entitled to rely on cl 3(c) of the Settlement Agreement to forfeit Mr Leiman’s vested Share Options as cl 3(c) was a penalty clause.

  66. [41] The appellants also prayed for damages against both respondents for conspiracy by unlawful means, wrongful inducement of breach of contract and unlawful interference or causing loss by unlawful means.

  67. [42] NRL counterclaimed against Mr Leiman for breach of his duty of good faith and fidelity under an implied term of the Settlement Agreement and the Advisory Agreement. Mr Leiman, it was alleged, had also breached his fiduciary duty to act in good faith by soliciting Noble’s employees, engaging in competition with Noble and misusing Noble’s confidential information. NRL further submitted that Mr Leiman was subject to an implied term under the Settlement Agreement and the Advisory Agreement that he would comply with his duties under the Employment Agreement. NRL sought an account from and repayment by Mr Leiman of all the payments he had received under the Settlement Agreement and the Advisory Agreement. It also claimed damages from Mr Leiman in its pleaded case, although it did not ultimately pursue such relief in its closing submissions at the trial.

  68. The decision below

  69. [43] The Judge held that the R&O Committee’s decisions of 1 and 27 March 2012 were valid. The R&O Committee had not failed to accord Mr Leiman due process. It was not required to inform Mr Leiman of the allegations made against him, or to give him an opportunity to be heard. Mr Leiman would have been aware that no such opportunity would be given because he had himself sat on the R&O Committee for two years. There was also no evidence that the Committee had prejudged the matter or acted arbitrarily, capriciously or in bad faith: Judgment at [116] and [120]–[122].

  70. [44] The R&O Committee had exercised its contractual discretion in good faith and rationally. The Committee’s findings that Mr Leiman had acted to the detriment of Noble were valid as he had breached his non-competition and confidentiality obligations. Mr Leiman’s acts of competition against Noble were evidenced by his e-mail to Summa Capital on 16 February 2012. He had used confidential information that Summa Capital was interested in moving into the commodities sector, which he obtained from Noble’s internal e-mail discussions, to craft his pitch to Summa Capital. There was, however, little evidence to support a conclusion that he had breached his non-solicitation obligation: Judgment at [133], [138], [152]–[153], [159] and [162]–[163].

  71. [45] Although Mr Leiman had made false representations in relation to Noble’s hiring of Messrs Carlier and Ozeias in 2006, Noble subsequently indicated that it did not consider this to be a serious breach. The condition in cl 3(d) of the Settlement Agreement that Mr Leiman “does not act in any way to the detriment of Noble” also did not apply retrospectively to cover detrimental acts prior to the parties’ entry into the Settlement Agreement: Judgment at [185] and [187]–[189].

  72. [46] Clause 3(c) of the Settlement Agreement stipulated a secondary obligation, but it was not a penalty clause as it conferred on Mr Leiman rights that he would not otherwise have had, on the condition that he not act to the detriment of Noble, as determined by the R&O Committee: Judgment at [211] and [213].

  73. [47] The 5,652,421 shares that were not expressly mentioned in cl 3(d) of the Settlement Agreement were not covered by the Settlement Agreement: Judgment at [220]. In any event, given Mr Leiman’s improper acts of competition, those shares were validly forfeited pursuant to cl 5 of the AIP, which provided for the forfeiture of shares issued under the AIP if the employee concerned engaged in activity or conduct “inimical or contrary to or against the interests of [Noble]”: Judgment at [230]–[231].

  74. [48] Under cl 3(e) of the Settlement Agreement, Noble had to consider Mr Leiman’s entitlement to the 2011 Bonus in a rational and bona fide manner. This had been done. Either Noble’s poor performance in 2011 or Mr Leiman’s misdeeds was sufficient basis to deny him the 2011 Bonus: Judgment at [254]–[257].

  75. [49] As the R&O Committee’s decisions were valid, the appellants’ claims in conspiracy by unlawful means, wrongful inducement of breach of contract and unlawful interference were dismissed: Judgment at [264]–[265], [268] and [270].

  76. [50] As regards NRL’s counterclaim, the Settlement Agreement and the Advisory Agreement did not contain an implied term requiring Mr Leiman to comply with his duties under the Employment Agreement: Judgment at [282]. Although Mr Leiman had breached his non-competition and confidentiality obligations as well as his duty of fidelity, NRL was not entitled to recover the payments it had made to him under the Advisory Agreement and the Settlement Agreement: Judgment at [284]. There was also no basis for awarding NRL any damages for Mr Leiman’s breaches as NRL did not pursue a claim for such relief in its closing submissions, and there was, in any event, no evidence as to its losses: Judgment at [276]–[277] and [280].

  77. The parties’ cases on appeal

  78. The appellants’ case

  79. [51] The appellants submit that Mr Leiman did not breach his contractual obligations and his duty of fidelity, and had not caused any actual harm or damage to Noble. There was, accordingly, no basis for the R&O Committee to find that he had acted to Noble’s detriment and was therefore disentitled from the Share Options and the Shares provided for under cll 3(c) and 3(d) of the Settlement Agreement, and no grounds for the forfeiture under cl 5 of the AIP of his right to the 5,652,421 shares that were not covered by cl 3(d) of the Settlement Agreement. Further, the reference in cll 3(c) and 3(d) to the R&O Committee making a final determination “in the event of any dispute” must mean that Mr Leiman was to be informed of the allegations against him and given a chance to make representations before the Committee decided to forfeit his Share Options and Shares. The appellants contend that regardless of whether or not the R&O Committee’s determination that Mr Leiman had acted to Noble’s detriment is valid, cl 3(c) is an unenforceable penalty clause in so far as it provides for the forfeiture of vested Share Options.

  80. [52] The appellants repeat their submissions below in relation to the 2011 Bonus under cl 3(e) of the Settlement Agreement and their economic tort claims. As the R&O Committee’s decisions of 1 and 27 March 2012 are, in their view, invalid, they ask for judgment to be entered for the monetary value of the Share Options, the Shares and the 2011 Bonus, or, alternatively, for interlocutory judgment to be entered, with damages to be assessed.

  81. NRL’s case

  82. The issues to be determined

  83. [54] We consider that there are six issues to be addressed in this appeal:

  84. (a) the interpretation of cl 3 of the Settlement Agreement;

  85. (b) whether cl 3(c) of the Settlement Agreement imposed a penalty and is therefore unenforceable for being a penalty clause;

  86. (c) whether the R&O Committee was required under cll 3(c) and 3(d) of the Settlement Agreement to take certain procedural steps before deciding that Mr Leiman had acted to Noble’s detriment;

  87. (d) whether Mr Leiman was entitled to the 2011 Bonus under cl 3(e) of the Settlement Agreement and the 5,652,421 shares awarded under the AIP that were not covered by the Settlement Agreement;

  88. (e) whether the Judge erred in dismissing the appellants’ economic tort claims; and

  89. (f) the remedies that the appellants are entitled to, if any.

  90. Issue 1: The interpretation of cl 3 of the Settlement Agreement

  91. [55] We begin with the parties’ submissions on the interpretation of cl 3 of the Settlement Agreement, which has been reproduced above at [21].

  92. The parties’ submissions

  93. [56] NRL submitted at the hearing that cl 3 of the Settlement Agreement should be read as establishing a “two track” regime that distinguishes between two categories of disputes that are to be decided by separate dispute resolution forums. As its counsel, Mr Davinder Singh SC (“Mr Singh”), explained:

  94. (a) Clause 3(a) provides that Mr Leiman shall be entitled to receive “the payments and benefits provided for in this Section 3 and the schedule [meaning the payment schedule set out in Exhibit A to the Settlement Agreement] … only if he complies with his ongoing non-competition and confidentiality obligations under the provisions of the Employment Agreement and this Settlement Agreement”. Whether Mr Leiman had complied with these contractual obligations was a legal question to be decided by the court, and not the R&O Committee. If the court were to determine that Mr Leiman had not complied with either or both of the obligations mentioned in cl 3(a), he would not be entitled to the payments and benefits under cll 3(b)–3(e). These clauses pertained to, respectively, his annual remuneration under the Advisory Agreement, the NGL Share Options that had vested as well as those that had yet to vest in him, the 17,276,013 Shares and the 2011 Bonus.

  95. (b) The “final determination” referred to in cll 3(c) and 3(d) related to the separate non-legal question of whether Mr Leiman had acted in any way to the detriment of Noble. This entailed a wider commercial inquiry that was to be determined by the R&O Committee, a commercial decision-making body comprised of commercial people.

  96. [57] Mr Singh contended that although the question of whether Mr Leiman had complied with his contractual obligations of non-competition and confidentiality (which was to be determined by the court) was separate from the question of whether he had acted to Noble’s detriment (which was to be determined by the R&O Committee), even if the court were to find that he had complied with his contractual obligations, it was still open to the R&O Committee to determine that he had acted to Noble’s detriment by (for instance) engaging in competitive acts, which determination would in turn disentitle him from the Share Options and the Shares provided for under cll 3(c) and 3(d). In view of this submission by Mr Singh, it appears that on NRL’s interpretation of cl 3, there were two independent means by which Mr Leiman could be deprived of his right to the Share Options and the Shares under cll 3(c) and 3(d):

  97. (a) first, where the court found, pursuant to cl 3(a), that he had failed to comply with his confidentiality and non-competition obligations under the Employment Agreement and the Settlement Agreement; and

  98. (b) second, where the R&O Committee made a determination, pursuant to cll 3(c) and 3(d), that he had acted to the detriment of Noble.

  99. [58] On their part, the appellants contend that it is open to the court to decide on Mr Leiman’s entitlements under cll 3(c) and 3(d) of the Settlement Agreement in place of the R&O Committee. Counsel for the appellants, Mr Andre Francis Maniam SC (“Mr Maniam”), submitted that the question of “detriment” under cll 3(c) and 3(d) mirrored the question of whether Mr Leiman had complied with his contractual obligations under the Employment Agreement and the Settlement Agreement. As a result, while the R&O Committee had the primary jurisdiction under cll 3(c) and 3(d) to determine whether Mr Leiman had acted to Noble’s detriment, its decisions were not immune from being reversed or annulled by the court. This could happen in a number of ways. First, because the question of “detriment” really concerned whether Mr Leiman had breached the non-competition and confidentiality obligations that bound him, it was implausible that if the court reached a conclusion on these issues that was contrary to the findings of the R&O Committee, the latter would nonetheless prevail. Second, any decision of the R&O Committee would be reviewable by the court, at least on due process and rationality grounds. Mr Maniam further submitted that if the court did set aside the R&O Committee’s decision on those grounds, it could then itself determine whether Mr Leiman had acted to the detriment of Noble. After all, the court had all the requisite information before it: the High Court had considered the same evidence in respect of NRL’s counterclaim for Mr Leiman’s alleged breach of (among other things) his contractual non-solicitation, non-competition and confidentiality obligations and his duty of fidelity.

  100. Our decision

  101. [59] The principles of contractual interpretation are well-established (CIFG Special Assets Capital I Ltd (formerly known as Diamond Kendall Ltd) v Ong Puay Koon and others and another appeal [2018] 1 SLR 170 at [19]):

  102. (a) The starting point is that the court looks to the text that the parties have used: Lucky Realty Co Pte Ltd v HSBC Trustee (Singapore) Ltd [2016] 1 SLR 1069 at [2].

  103. (b) The court may have regard to the relevant context as long as the relevant contextual points are clear, obvious and known to both parties: Zurich Insurance (Singapore) Pte Ltd v B-Gold Interior Design & Construction Pte Ltd [2008] 3 SLR(R) 1029 at [125], [128] and [129].

  104. (c) The court has regard to the relevant context because it then places itself in “the best possible position to ascertain the parties’ objective intentions by interpreting the expressions used by the parties in the [contract] in their proper context”: Sembcorp Marine Ltd v PPL Holdings Pte Ltd and another and another appeal [2013] 4 SLR 193 at [72].

  105. (d) In general, the meaning ascribed to the terms of the contract must be one which the expressions used by the parties can reasonably bear: Yap Son On v Ding Pei Zhen [2017] 1 SLR 219 at [31].

  106. [60] In addition, the exercise of ascertaining what the parties objectively intended is to be rooted, broadly speaking, in the context of the contractual purpose. Due consideration ought therefore to be given to the commercial purpose of the transaction or provision, and, more narrowly, to why a particular obligation was undertaken: MCH International Pte Ltd and others v YG Group Pte Ltd and others and other appeals [2019] 2 SLR 837 (“MCH International Pte Ltd”) at [22] and [26].

  107. [61] Before we turn to apply these principles to the facts of this case, we reiterate that the parties do not dispute that any question of Mr Leiman’s compliance with his contractual non-competition and confidentiality obligations would be a legal question that is to be determined by the court. The real issues between them relate to: (a) the scope of the R&O Committee’s jurisdiction; (b) the meaning of “detriment” for the purposes of cll 3(c) and 3(d) of the Settlement Agreement, and in particular, whether it is coextensive with or encompasses considerations of Mr Leiman’s breach of contract; and (c) the interface between the scope of the R&O Committee’s powers and those of the court.

  108. [62] We begin by considering the true construction of cl 3 of the Settlement Agreement, and in this regard, it is helpful to set out the context in which this agreement is to be considered. As we alluded to above at [15], cll 3(c) and 3(d) are critical clauses in the Settlement Agreement that preserve Mr Leiman’s interests in the Share Options and the Shares. We explain in the next section of this judgment, to which this is more directly relevant, that Mr Leiman agreed to subject his entitlement to the Share Options and the Shares under cll 3(c) and 3(d) to the determination of the R&O Committee in the event of a dispute, in the context of a compromise with Noble. Pursuant to that compromise, he was granted some rights that he would not otherwise have had or been entitled to exercise. On Noble’s part, its entry into the Settlement Agreement (through NRL) allowed it to end NRL’s employment relationship with Mr Leiman without terminating him for cause, thereby avoiding potential legal disputes with him and preserving business confidence in the respondents. Seen from this perspective, the Settlement Agreement was a mutually beneficial arrangement between Mr Leiman and NRL that regulated Mr Leiman’s post-resignation conduct and relationship with Noble.

  109. [63] This is the context in which the terms of the Settlement Agreement are to be construed.

  110. [64] Applying the principles we have set out above, we broadly agree with NRL that cl 3 of the Settlement Agreement should be interpreted as establishing a “two track” regime. In our judgment, cl 3(a) encompasses all the benefits and payments contemplated under cll 3(a)–3(e) and purports to condition them upon Mr Leiman’s compliance with his contractual non-competition and confidentiality obligations. Any dispute as to whether or not Mr Leiman was in such compliance is a matter solely for the court. This much was, in effect, accepted by both parties, and, in our view, with good reason. We will elaborate on this shortly. But the short point is that absent very clear language suggesting otherwise, where parties subject rights to the fulfilment of a legal requirement, the question of whether that requirement has or has not been met is a quintessentially legal question and, hence, typically to be resolved by a body tasked with making legal determinations. Clauses 3(c) and 3(d), on the other hand, deal with the entirely separate commercial question of whether Mr Leiman had acted to Noble’s commercial detriment, and this was to be determined by the R&O Committee. We elaborate on our reasons for adopting this interpretation.

  111. [65] We take the contractual language as the starting point. As stated in cl 3(a), Mr Leiman is “entitled to receive the payments and benefits provided for in this Section 3 and the [payment] schedule [set out in Exhibit A to the Settlement Agreement] but only if he complies with his ongoing non-competition and confidentiality obligations under the provisions of the Employment Agreement and this Settlement Agreement”. We agree with Mr Singh’s submission at the hearing that “the payments and benefits provided for in [cl] 3” refer to the entitlements specifically provided for under cll 3(b)–3(e). Clauses 3(b) and 3(e) deal with the payments that might be due to Mr Leiman: cl 3(b) sets out his annual remuneration under the Advisory Agreement, and cl 3(e) provides for his entitlement to be considered for the 2011 Bonus. We should add that cl 3(a) also refers to other “payments” under the payment schedule listed in Exhibit A to the Settlement Agreement (“Exhibit A”). This payment schedule sets out various categories of Mr Leiman’s “Final Due Payments” from NRL, including his salary for 2011, the monetary value of his accrued untaken annual leave and reimbursement for expenses, although it did not include specific figures for each of these categories of payments and was not signed by NRL. Clauses 3(c) and 3(d) deal with Mr Leiman’s benefits, namely, the Share Options and the 17,276,013 Shares. The plain language of cl 3(a) encompasses Mr Leiman’s severance entitlements generally and conditions his receipt of them on his compliance with specific contractual obligations (as set out above at [24] and [25]).

  112. [66] On this interpretation, Mr Leiman’s rights to the Share Options and the Shares that were dealt with under cll 3(c) and 3(d) were made subject to two conditions: the condition in cl 3(a) that Mr Leiman comply with his contractual non-competition and confidentiality obligations, and the additional condition in cll 3(c) and 3(d) that he not act to Noble’s detriment. As regards the latter condition, cl 3(c) states that Mr Leiman shall be entitled to exercise the Share Options “provided that prior to exercise he has not acted in any way to the detriment of Noble”. Clause 3(d) similarly states that the 17,276,013 Shares and all accrued dividends will vest in Mr Leiman and become free of transfer restrictions in accordance with their terms of grant “provided [Mr Leiman] does not act in any way to the detriment of Noble”. In both cases, “the Remuneration and Options Committee of Noble” shall make a final determination in the event of any dispute.

  113. [67] We deal first with the interpretation of the word “detriment” in cll 3(c) and 3(d) of the Settlement Agreement. The Judge found, as a matter of common sense and plain reading, that the requirement that Mr Leiman “not act in any way to the detriment of Noble” did not need proof of actual detriment to Noble, as long as Mr Leiman had acted against Noble’s business interests: Judgment at [126]. Although the preamble to the Settlement Agreement defines “Noble” as NRL, the parties accept in their submissions that the R&O Committee’s task under cll 3(c) and 3(d) was to consider whether detriment had been caused to Noble generally, and not just NRL specifically. We agree with this interpretation, especially given that “Noble” is also used in cll 3(c) and 3(d) to refer to NGL when describing the R&O Committee, which comprised NGL’s directors. We also agree with the Judge that the focus of the Committee’s inquiry should be on Noble’s business interests. However, we depart from his view in relation to the natural and ordinary meaning of “detriment”, which must, in our judgment, refer to some negative consequence to Noble arising from Mr Leiman’s conduct.

  114. [68] It should be noted that the operative words in cll 3(c) and 3(d) require that Mr Leiman must not have “act[ed] … to the detriment” of Noble. This suggests that the relevant inquiry must be directed to whether he had done anything that was in fact detrimental or harmful to Noble. Put simply, it seems difficult to see how it can be said that Mr Leiman had acted to the detriment of Noble absent any actual detriment to Noble. It follows, in our judgment, that any determination that Mr Leiman had so acted must involve some particularisation of actual loss, harm or damage to Noble that can fairly be said to be a consequence of the relevant acts by Mr Leiman. This coheres better with the text of the provision, and any other view, including that which the Judge took and which NRL advanced before us, would mean that Mr Leiman could lose the right to his benefits if he did something that was theoretically capable of being in some way harmful to Noble, even if it was not in fact so. We find this unconvincing and wholly improbable, having regard to the context in which the parties entered into the Settlement Agreement (see [62] above). That context rested on a mutually beneficial arrangement to bring about a smooth and amicable parting of the ways. Such an objective called for commercially sensible arrangements that duly protected both sides. We find it impossible to conceive that Mr Leiman would have given up whatever rights he already had at the time of the Settlement Agreement, in the expectation that he would have more time to exercise those rights and possibly gain more entitlements, as we elaborate on below, while running the risk of losing them all on the most slender of grounds for saying that he had acted to the detriment of Noble. In the circumstances, we agree with the appellants that the R&O Committee was only entitled to find that Mr Leiman had acted “to the detriment of Noble” if it found that his actions had some actual adverse consequence on Noble’s business interests.

  115. [69] Another issue that arises in the interpretation of cll 3(c) and 3(d) relates to when the acts of Mr Leiman that are alleged to have been detrimental to Noble must have taken place. The Judge found that on a plain reading, cll 3(c) and 3(d) were not intended to cover detrimental acts occurring prior to the parties’ entry into the Settlement Agreement. He reasoned that there were no express terms to this effect, and that such an interpretation was not one that a reasonable person with knowledge of the circumstances would come to. Furthermore, the tense used in cl 3(d) (“provided [Mr Leiman] does not act in any way to the detriment of Noble” [emphasis added]) suggested that the condition was meant to apply prospectively. While a different tense was used in cl 3(c) (“provided that prior to [the] exercise [of the Share Options] he has not acted in any way to the detriment of Noble”), this was by reference to the stipulated exercise date of the Share Options, and there was no indication that the parties intended the conditions governing Mr Leiman’s entitlement to the Shares and the Share Options to be different: Judgment at [187]–[190].

  116. [70] The Judge’s interpretation in this regard was not challenged by the parties, and we think rightly so. We agree that the “detriment” referred to in cll 3(c) and 3(d) must relate only to conduct taking place after the parties’ entry into the Settlement Agreement. This interpretation is in line with Mr Leiman’s and NRL’s purpose in entering into this agreement, which was to regulate Mr Leiman’s post-resignation conduct and relationship with Noble in a mutually beneficial way. Furthermore, the preamble to the Settlement Agreement (reproduced at [19] above) references Mr Leiman’s prior arrangements with Noble (through NRL) and expressly provides that his relationship with Noble would be solely determined by the terms of the Settlement Agreement thereafter:

  117. [71] In our judgment, it would not be consistent with the forward-looking nature of the Settlement Agreement for the R&O Committee to be empowered to take past detrimental acts into consideration under cll 3(c) and 3(d).

  118. [72] We turn now to the appellants’ submission that Mr Leiman would only be found to have acted to Noble’s detriment if he was in breach of the contractual obligations specified in cl 3(a): see [58] above. With respect, there is nothing in the contractual language to limit the R&O Committee’s remit in such a way. We also consider this to be untenable, having regard to the internal context of cl 3. First, it would be counterintuitive for the parties to have left the identical issue of Mr Leiman’s compliance with his contractual obligations to be dealt with by two separate bodies. It is also unclear why they would have wanted such an outcome. Second, we consider that the parties would have repeated the qualification in cl 3(a), namely, that Mr Leiman’s entitlement to the benefits provided for in cll 3(c) and 3(d) was subject to his compliance with his contractual obligations, if they had intended the “detriment” considered by the R&O Committee to be coextensive with breaches of those same obligations, instead of framing it in distinct terms in cll 3(c) and 3(d). For these reasons, we prefer NRL’s interpretation of cl 3 in so far as it espouses a “two track” regime under this clause, with the court to determine, for the purposes of cl 3(a), whether Mr Leiman had complied with his contractual obligations, and the R&O Committee to determine, for the purposes of cll 3(c) and 3(d), whether he had acted to the detriment of Noble.

  119. [73] This brings into focus the interface between each of the “tracks” established under cl 3, meaning the determination by the court in relation to cl 3(a) and that by the R&O Committee in relation to cll 3(c) and 3(d). On this issue, we do not agree with NRL to the extent that its interpretation of cl 3 envisages the R&O Committee being entitled to consider, regardless of any finding that might already have been made by the court, whether Mr Leiman had complied with his contractual obligations in assessing whether he had acted to the “detriment” of Noble: see [57] above. Such an interpretation ignores the fact that the R&O Committee, being a body of commercial people, is not prima facie suited to make determinations of a legal nature. In line with this, both Mr Leiman and Mr Elman testified that the Committee’s role is to review all matters concerning the terms of engagement, compensation and general remuneration for senior executives of Noble. This role plainly would not have involved the resolution of potentially complex legal questions, and we do not see why it would change in the present context, especially when, as we have already noted, cl 3(a) dealt with precisely those types of questions. This, and the fact that the Committee comprises senior executives and directors of NGL, point towards the correct interpretation being that the Committee was tasked to make commercial, non-legal determinations.

  120. [74] NRL seemed to us to share this view at certain points in its submissions. For instance, Mr Singh submitted that the R&O Committee, in considering whether Mr Leiman had engaged in competitive behaviour, was not expected or required to apply the relevant legal tests. Thus, he said, it would not have to consider whether the conduct in question was merely “preparatory” to anticipated future competition or constituted actual competitive activity: Smile Inc Dental Surgeons Pte Ltd v Lui Andrew Stewart [2012] 4 SLR 308 (“Smile Inc”) at [67]. Mr Singh submitted that the Committee would only be expected to decide whether the conduct in question was detrimental to Noble, but he nonetheless characterised this as an instance where the issues before the court and those before the Committee would essentially be the same.

  121. [75] In our judgment, Mr Singh’s example in fact serves to demonstrate why the two inquiries are not the same. The R&O Committee in that example would consider from a commercial perspective whether or not what Mr Leiman had done was detrimental to Noble. In considering that, the Committee would not be concerned with whether or not there had been a breach of contract by Mr Leiman, or with the fine legal lines drawn between conduct that was merely preparatory to future competitive conduct and that which had gone sufficiently far down the road to constitute actual competitive conduct. While the court would consider Mr Leiman’s conduct in terms of the legal question of whether he had breached his contractual obligations, the R&O Committee would assess his conduct in terms of the non-legal question of whether he had acted to the commercial detriment of Noble. These are self-evidently quite different inquiries even if they might concern what, in broad terms, is the same factual terrain. Plainly, commercial detriment can follow upon conduct that does not involve a breach of contract, and it is not necessarily the case that every breach of a contractual obligation will give rise to commercial detriment.

  122. [77] Second, it does not appear objectively plausible that a legal determination by the court should be interpreted as being open to annulment by the determination of a body of commercial people. We reiterate that the commercial purpose of the Settlement Agreement was to achieve a mutually beneficial cessation of the employment relationship between NRL and Mr Leiman. It is unlikely then that Mr Leiman would have assented to the possibility of the court’s legal determination being annulled by the R&O Committee, which, after all, was a Committee consisting of NGL’s senior personnel.

  123. [78] Third, and most fundamentally, the R&O Committee’s task was never to determine the appropriate remedies in law for any breach of contract by Mr Leiman. If Mr Leiman were found by a court to have breached his contractual obligations, it would be the court’s task to ensure that NRL was adequately compensated for the loss of its bargain with Mr Leiman through the grant of appropriate remedies: PH Hydraulics & Engineering Pte Ltd v Airtrust (Hong Kong) Ltd and another appeal [2017] 2 SLR 129 at [71]. It was open to NRL to sue Mr Leiman in a court of law for breach of his obligations under the Employment Agreement and the Settlement Agreement. Indeed, NRL availed itself of this course of action when it brought a counterclaim in Suit 393 in respect of Mr Leiman’s alleged breach of (among other things) his contractual non-solicitation, non-competition and confidentiality obligations and claimed damages for such breach in its pleaded case, although it did not ultimately pursue such relief in its closing submissions at the trial (see [42] above). By contrast, the R&O Committee was concerned only with Mr Leiman’s Noble-related severance entitlements. The deprivation of these entitlements would not be a recognised remedy for a purported breach of contract. Equally, the courts would not generally countenance the deprivation of a party’s contractual entitlements because of its breach of contract. To the extent that the parties agree by contract to impose such a consequence upon a contract-breaker, this would engage the rule against penalty clauses, which we consider in the next section of our judgment.

  124. [79] Having regard to the foregoing, we are satisfied that any finding by the R&O Committee that Mr Leiman had acted to the detriment of Noble for the purposes of cll 3(c) and 3(d) could not validly rest on a purported determination that he had breached his contractual obligations. Rather, in ascertaining whether Mr Leiman had acted to Noble’s detriment and, in turn, whether he had lost his entitlement to the Share Options and the Shares provided for under these two clauses, the Committee was required to consider whether he had engaged in any conduct that was commercially detrimental to Noble. Such detriment had to comprise actual harm or detriment to Noble, and had to be based on Mr Leiman’s conduct after the parties’ entry into the Settlement Agreement. Having set out our position on the interpretation of cl 3, the next question is whether cl 3, either as a whole or in part, falls afoul of the rule against penalties. It is to this that we now turn.

  125. Issue 2: Whether the disputed clauses were void for being penalty clauses

  126. The parties’ submissions

  127. [80] The appellants submit that regardless of whether or not the R&O Committee’s finding under cl 3(c) of the Settlement Agreement that Mr Leiman had acted to Noble’s detriment is valid, cl 3(c) is an unenforceable penalty clause in so far as it purports to forfeit the 37,090,910 unexercised Share Options that had vested in Mr Leiman as at 22 December 2010 (see above at [9]). The appellants do not make the same submission in respect of the 7,727,272 Share Options that were to vest only on 2 April 2012 or the 17,276,013 Shares mentioned in cl 3(d). This difference in position arises because the appellants appear to proceed on the premise that the rule against penalty clauses applies only to provisions that purport to impose penal sanctions by divesting a party of its entitlement to claim vested rights and benefits, and not to provisions that impose conditions for the vesting of rights and benefits.

  128. [81] The Judge ruled against the appellants on this issue. He held that cl 8.3(a) of the Share Option Rules provided that Mr Leiman’s unexercised share options would “immediately lapse” once he ceased to be in Noble’s full-time employment, and cl 8.4 provided that he would be deemed to have ceased to be a full-time employee on the date he tendered his notice of resignation or cessation. Although the Settlement Agreement stated that Mr Leiman ceased to be employed by NRL on 1 December 2011, he was not entitled to the Share Options at the time he entered into the Settlement Agreement on 9 November 2011 (Judgment at [26] and [207]) because he had resigned on or before that date (Judgment at [210]). Clause 3(c) of the Settlement Agreement therefore had the effect of “conferring upon Mr Leiman additional benefits which he otherwise would not have had … subject to the condition that [he] did not act in a way detrimental to Noble (as determined by the R&O Committee)”: Judgment at [211]. In any event, to the extent that cl 3(c) stipulated a secondary obligation, the Judge considered that the “forfeiture” of the Share Options was “not ‘extravagant and unconscionable’”. Applying the test laid down by the UK Supreme Court in Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2016] AC 1172 (“Cavendish”), he held that cl 3(c) did not impose on Mr Leiman a detriment that was out of proportion to Noble’s legitimate interest in ensuring that he did not compete against it or otherwise act to its detriment, and was not unenforceable for being a penalty clause: Judgment at [212]–[214]. In the alternative, even if Cavendish were not applicable in Singapore, cl 3(c) was not void for being a penalty clause on the facts: Judgment at [215].

  129. [82] The appellants submit that the Judge erred in finding that Mr Leiman was not entitled to the Share Options at the time he entered into the Settlement Agreement. Clause 1 of the Settlement Agreement provided that Mr Leiman would resign on 1 December 2011. Clause 10 of the Settlement Agreement was an entire agreement clause which provided that the Settlement Agreement “sets forth the entire agreement of [NRL] and [Mr Leiman] with respect to the subject matter [therein]”. Mr Leiman had not given notice of his resignation within the meaning of cl 8.4 of the Share Option Rules. His right to the vested but unexercised Share Options therefore had not lapsed when he entered into the Settlement Agreement. The appellants contend that their understanding of this state of affairs was reinforced by Mr Alam’s e-mail to Mr Leiman on 26 October 2011 stating that Noble would “honour its legal obligations on [his] vested [share] options, insofar as they [were] vested on or before [his] last date of employment, which [was] 1st December, 2011”.

  130. [83] The appellants submit, on this basis, that cl 3(c) purports to forfeit Mr Leiman’s accrued rights if he were found to have acted to Noble’s detriment, and it is therefore a penalty clause regardless of whether the court applies the traditional test laid down by the House of Lords in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Company, Limited v New Garage and Motor Company, Limited [1915] AC 79 (“Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre”) or the test more recently propounded in Cavendish.

  131. [84] NRL defends the Judge’s reasoning on the basis that the minutes of an NGL board meeting held on 9 November 2011 recorded that Mr Leiman submitted his resignation on that date. The effect of such resignation was that all of Mr Leiman’s unexercised Share Options lapsed on 9 November 2011 unless the R&O Committee in its sole discretion decided otherwise (as permitted under cl 8.3(a) of the Share Option Rules). The R&O Committee subsequently decided at a meeting on 29 November 2011 that Mr Leiman would be permitted to exercise the Share Options under cl 3(c) of the Settlement Agreement on the condition that he exercised them on or before 2 April 2013 and did not act to the detriment of Noble prior to the date of exercise. The effect of cl 3(c) was to confer on Mr Leiman additional rights that he would not otherwise have had, on those conditions. In the circumstances, cl 3(c) did not attract the penalty doctrine. In any event, cl 3(c) was commercially justifiable and was not penal.

  132. Our decision

  133. [85] We first set out the position in respect of the Share Options and the Shares that Mr Leiman was entitled to before and after his entry into the Settlement Agreement on 9 November 2011, as this forms the context in which cl 3 of the Settlement Agreement is to be interpreted.

  134. [86] In relation to the Share Options, Mr Leiman was entitled under cl 8.1 of the Share Option Rules to exercise any vested share options during their relevant option periods, which extended to the tenth year after the grant of the options. At the time of the Settlement Agreement, Mr Leiman was entitled to exercise 37,090,910 vested Share Options, but was not yet entitled to exercise 7,727,272 Share Options that were to vest only on 2 April 2012 (see [9] above). Under cl 8.3(a) of the Share Option Rules, all of Mr Leiman’s unexercised share options would immediately lapse upon his ceasing to be in the full-time employment of NRL.

  135. [87] As for the shares awarded to Mr Leiman under the AIP, at the time of the Settlement Agreement, neither the 17,276,013 Shares mentioned in cl 3(d) nor the 5,652,421 shares awarded by way of the 4 May 2011 letter (see [11] above) had had their trading restrictions lifted. The trading restrictions on a tranche of 11,098,782 Shares were scheduled to be lifted on 31 March 2012 at the earliest. But unlike the Share Options, Mr Leiman’s entitlement to the shares awarded under the AIP was not contingent on his continued employment with NRL. Under the relevant clauses of the AIP (reproduced above at [12]), his right to the shares would only be forfeited if: (a) he was terminated for cause (cl 4); (b) he acted in a way or engaged in activity or conduct which was inimical or contrary to or against the interests of NGL (cl 5); or (c) he resigned as an employee of NGL and within six months of his resignation agreed to take up or took up employment with, or agreed to act or acted as a consultant, agent or advisor to a competing company (cl 6). The change of his employment status from that of an employee to that of an “advisor” did not constitute a cessation of employment (cl 3).

  136. [88] We observed earlier at [15] and [62] above that the parties entered into the Settlement Agreement with a view that each side would benefit from the arrangement. As Mr Alam testified, Noble’s intention was to ensure that Mr Leiman was treated “fairly” and “[given] … more than he was entitled to”, so that Noble could avoid legal disputes with him if possible. It was in this context that the parties entered into a bespoke arrangement, namely, the Settlement Agreement, to regulate the terms of Mr Leiman’s departure from Noble and deal with his vested and contingent rights at the time. In our judgment, provision was therefore made in the Settlement Agreement to cover his entitlement to the Share Options and the Shares, in addition to other outstanding matters and all the consequences of his exit. We also consider that the parties’ intention that the Settlement Agreement was to be exhaustive of Mr Leiman’s Noble-related rights is reinforced by the correspondence between him and Mr Alam leading up to the signing of the Settlement Agreement.

  137. [89] On 25 October 2011, Mr Alam sent a draft settlement agreement to Mr Leiman by e-mail. Mr Leiman replied by e-mail on 26 October 2011 at 12.19am suggesting that the draft agreement be amended, and made certain requests that were eventually covered by the other clauses in the Settlement Agreement (see above at [20]). These included his requests that NRL: (a) appoint him as an advisor; (b) take over his lease obligations in Hong Kong from December 2012 onwards and pay his relocation expenses; and (c) pay him “a pro rata bonus for 2011”. As regards his share options and shares, he suggested that Noble accelerate the vesting of his 2012 and 2013 share options and shares to 2011, and requested that he be free to exercise those share options up to five years after his last day with Noble. In addition, he requested that “the wording of the unvested shares … match the contract under which they were given”. He ended the e-mail by stating that he had “served Noble for nearly 6 years and [Noble’s accommodation of his requests] would show a great gesture of gratitude from Noble”.

  138. [90] Mr Alam replied on 26 October 2011 at 4.16pm, informing Mr Leiman that Noble would “honour its legal obligations on [his] vested [share] options, insofar as they [were] vested on or before [his] last date of employment, which [was] 1st December, 2011”. Mr Alam also noted that Mr Leiman’s shares would vest “as per their terms of grant provided that [he] continue to be a ‘good leaver’”. Mr Leiman replied at 4.53pm agreeing to this condition on the shares, but objecting to Mr Alam’s position on the status of his unvested share options:

  139. [91] Mr Leiman subsequently suggested in an e-mail sent at 5.40pm on 26 October 2011 that he be allowed to “keep the [share options] vesting in 6 months [meaning in April 2012] as well as the ones already vested and that [he] carry them for 9 months”, as he would otherwise “have to dump them [meaning the shares obtained from exercising the vested share options] in the market in a very short period from post results until [D]ecember 1st”. Mr Alam explained at the trial that “post results” referred to the posting of Noble’s company results on around 9 November 2011.

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