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Grounds publishedDecided 3 Jul 2020

Court of Appeal

Ivanishvili, Bidzina and others v Credit Suisse Trust Ltd

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[2020] SGCA 62Case no. Civil Appeal No 26 of 2019 and Summons No 71 of 2019

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] The first appellant, Mr Bidzina Ivanishvili (“Mr Ivanishvili”), holds dual nationality in France and Georgia. In 2005, he settled part of his personal wealth on the Mandalay Trust, a discretionary trust domiciled in Singapore. The trustee is the respondent, Credit Suisse Trust Ltd (“the Trustee”), a Singapore trust company. The beneficiaries of the Mandalay Trust are Mr Ivanishvili and the other appellants, his wife and children. The assets of the Mandalay Trust were managed and invested by the Geneva branch of Credit Suisse AG (“the Bank”), a bank incorporated and headquartered in Switzerland and having a branch in Singapore. The Bank and the Trustee operate independently, although they have the same ultimate holding company, Credit Suisse Group AG.

  3. [2] Towards the end of 2015, the appellants discovered that the Mandalay Trust had suffered tremendous losses which they allege had been hidden from them. The Bank subsequently filed a criminal complaint in Geneva against its employee, Mr Patrice Lescaudron (“Mr Lescaudron”), who was the portfolio manager of the Mandalay Trust at the time. Mr Lescaudron admitted to various forms of misconduct in relation to the Mandalay Trust, including the misappropriation of trust assets, and was eventually convicted in Switzerland on charges of embezzlement, misappropriation and forgery.

  4. [3] On 25 August 2017, the appellants commenced HC/S 790/2017 (“Suit 790”) in Singapore against the Bank and the Trustee. The appellants sought to make the Bank and the Trustee liable for, inter alia, the loss sustained by the Mandalay Trust. Both the Bank and the Trustee applied to stay Suit 790 on the ground that Switzerland was the more appropriate forum. An Assistant Registrar (“the AR”) granted their applications. The appellants’ appeals against the decision to stay Suit 790 were dismissed by the High Court Judge (“the Judge”) for the reasons given in Ivanishvili, Bidzina and others v Credit Suisse AG and another [2019] SGHC 6 (“the Judgment”). The appellants then filed further appeals to this court. Subsequently, however, the appellants withdrew their appeal against the stay in respect of their action against the Bank. Further, on 21 June 2019, they discontinued the proceedings in Suit 790 against the Bank, leaving the Trustee as the sole defendant. The appellants continued to pursue their appeal against the stay of Suit 790 in respect of the Trustee. To this end, they applied in CA/SUM 71/2019 (“SUM 71”) to amend their Statement of Claim so as to reflect the ambit of their new case, which was against the Trustee only, limited to alleged breaches of the Trustee’s duties in relation to the Mandalay Trust.

  5. [4] It is not seriously disputed that SUM 71 constitutes part of a broader recalibration by the appellants of their claims in Suit 790 so as to improve their chances of persuading this court to overturn the stay of the action. By proceeding only against the Trustee, the appellants seek to present their claims as being fundamentally rooted in Singapore, strengthening their case that Singapore is the appropriate forum. There are therefore two key issues in the present appeal: first, whether the appellants’ amendments in SUM 71 are permissible; and second, whether Singapore is the appropriate forum for Suit 790 on the basis of the claims as the appellants now wish to frame them.

  6. Background

  7. The parties and their relationships

  8. [5] Mr Ivanishvili became a customer of the Bank in Switzerland in 2004. It is his case that sometime in December 2004, the Bank’s representatives approached him with an offer to provide private wealth management services to him and his family. The Bank’s advice was that he should set up a trust to be administered by the Trustee in Singapore. Mr Ivanishvili accepted this advice. The Mandalay Trust was then established by the Trustee pursuant to a declaration of trust dated 7 March 2005. The trust deed of the Mandalay Trust (“the Trust Deed”) contained a clause providing for the trust to be governed by Singapore law, and for the Singapore courts to be its forum of administration (“cl 2(a)”).

  9. [6] In March 2005, Mr Ivanishvili settled some US$1.1bn on the Mandalay Trust. Half of this sum was held in an account (“the Soothsayer account”) with the Bank’s Singapore branch in the name of a Bahamian company, Soothsayer Ltd (“Soothsayer”), and the other half was held in accounts (“the Meadowsweet accounts”) with the Bank’s Geneva branch in the name of a BVI company, Meadowsweet Assets Ltd (“Meadowsweet”). Both these companies were wholly owned and controlled by the Trustee. The sums held in the Soothsayer account were gradually repatriated by Mr Ivanishvili to accounts at the Bank in Switzerland. The Soothsayer account was closed in 2014.

  10. [7] The Trustee delegated its asset management and investment powers under the Mandalay Trust to the Bank pursuant to discretionary portfolio management agreements with Soothsayer and Meadowsweet. The Bank therefore managed the assets in the Mandalay Trust (“the Trust assets”) and provided investment reports detailing their performance to the Trustee (“the Investment Reports”). It is also undisputed that the Bank performed these tasks primarily at its Geneva branch. Mr Ivanishvili’s relationship manager at the Bank was, initially, Ms Daria Mihaesco (“Ms Mihaesco”). Mr Lescaudron took over as the relationship manager in August 2006.

  11. [8] Mr Ivanishvili frequently communicated directly with Mr Lescaudron on the management of the Trust assets, either personally or through his representative Mr George Bachiashvili (“Mr Bachiashvili”). Pursuant to cl 10(b) of the Trust Deed, Mr Ivanishvili had the right to choose an investment manager to make decisions in relation to the investment of the Trust assets. Initially, Mr Ivanishvili appointed himself as investment manager. Subsequently, in December 2013, he also appointed Mr Bachiashvili as investment manager.

  12. [9] Besides the Mandalay Trust, Mr Ivanishvili’s relationship with the Bank and its associates also extended to numerous other accounts and offshore structures, many of which have also given rise to disputes:

  13. (a) Mr Ivanishvili held accounts with the Bank in his own name, as well as in the name of Wellminstone SA, a BVI company of which he was the ultimate beneficial owner (“the Wellminstone accounts”).

  14. (b) An account was held with the Bank by Sandcay Investment Limited (“Sandcay”), under the Green Vals Trust. Mr Ivanishvili transferred assets of more than US$210m to this account in early 2015. The beneficiaries of the Green Vals Trust are the appellants. The current trustee of the Green Vals Trust is Credit Suisse Trust Limited (New Zealand), a subsidiary of Credit Suisse Trust AG.

  15. (c) An account with Credit Suisse Life (Bermuda) Ltd (“CS Life”) held investments made on a premium of US$480m paid for a life insurance policy obtained by Meadowsweet, as well as another life insurance policy obtained by Sandcay (“the CS Life policies”).

  16. [10] On 5 July 2013, the Trustee amended the Trust Deed by way of a Deed of Amendment and Restatement (“the Amended Trust Deed”). The validity of the Amended Trust Deed is one of the issues in Suit 790.

  17. The discovery of Mr Lescaudron’s wrongdoing

  18. [11] According to Mr Ivanishvili, Mr Lescaudron sent him and Mr Bachiashvili regular reports summarising the performance of Mr Ivanishvili’s investments, including the Trust assets, together with spreadsheets setting out the current value of each of Mr Ivanishvili’s accounts (“the Direct Reports”). The Direct Reports were distinct from the Investment Reports from the Bank, which were made available to the Trustee.

  19. [12] In September and October 2015, the Bank made margin calls totalling US$45.89m on the accounts within the Mandalay Trust. Following one of the margin calls, another representative of the Bank sent Mr Ivanishvili copies of some of the Investment Reports. Mr Ivanishvili claims that this was the first time he had seen these Investment Reports, and having compared them with the Direct Reports from Mr Lescaudron, he realised that the value of the Trust assets as reported by Mr Lescaudron was very different from the reality. According to Mr Ivanishvili, the Investment Reports showed that from 31 December 2014 to 25 September 2015 the value of the Trust assets had declined from US$697.68m to US$437.8m; on the other hand, the Direct Reports from Mr Lescaudron in this period showed an upward trend in the value of the Trust assets.

  20. [13] The other accounts with the Bank which belonged to Mr Ivanishvili had also suffered similar previously undisclosed losses. In this regard, on 2 April 2015, Mr Lescaudron sent a presentation on behalf of the Bank to Mr Bachiashvili (“the Presentation”), stating that the Bank held a total of US$1.04bn in all the trusts set up by Mr Ivanishvili, including US$439m in the Mandalay Trust, when according to Mr Ivanishvili’s calculations the true value of the Trust assets at the time would have been around US$326.9m. Mr Ivanishvili alleged that the incorrect figures from the Presentation were then repeated to him by representatives of the Trustee at discussions and meetings in the subsequent months. According to Mr Ivanishvili, as a result of these representations by the Bank and the Trustee, he was persuaded to transfer further assets from other banks to be managed and invested by the Bank.

  21. The foreign proceedings

  22. Criminal proceedings in Switzerland

  23. Civil proceedings in Switzerland, New Zealand and Bermuda

  24. [16] The appellants have not filed any civil suit against the Bank or the Trustee in Switzerland, nor did Mr Ivanishvili file any civil claim in the criminal proceedings against Mr Lescaudron. The appellants have told us that they are willing to confirm that they will not bring any proceedings in Switzerland (either in their own names or on behalf of Meadowsweet or Soothsayer) against the Bank in respect of losses caused to the Mandalay Trust until the conclusion of Suit 790 (other than protective steps to guard against the expiry of limitation periods).

  25. [17] The appellants commenced a claim in New Zealand against the Bank and the current and former trustees of the Green Vals Trust on 7 August 2017, in respect of the losses suffered by that trust. The New Zealand High Court held that Switzerland was the appropriate forum for the case to be tried. The appellants say that they have decided not to appeal against the decision of the New Zealand High Court.

  26. [18] The appellants, Meadowsweet and Sandcay commenced a claim in Bermuda against CS Life on 17 August 2017 in respect of the losses suffered by the CS Life policies as a result of CS Life’s conduct. These proceedings have not been stayed. Although the CS Life policy obtained by Meadowsweet is a part of the Mandalay Trust and therefore also the subject of Suit 790, the appellants have undertaken to give credit in Suit 790 for any recovery obtained in Bermuda, and not to seek double recovery.

  27. The proceedings in Singapore and the decision below

  28. [19] The existing Statement of Claim in Suit 790 is framed against both the Bank and the Trustee.

  29. (a) Against the Trustee, the appellants alleged that:

  30. (i) The Trustee failed to review or monitor the management of the Trust assets, and also committed other breaches of its duties of skill and care in its stewardship of the Mandalay Trust.

  31. (ii) The Trustee acted ultra vires by executing the Amended Trust Deed for improper reasons.

  32. (iii) By repeating and not correcting the incorrect figures in the Presentation (see [13] above), the Trustee had made negligent misrepresentations to Mr Ivanishvili.

  33. (b) Against the Bank, the appellants alleged that:

  34. (i) The Bank failed to act honestly and in good faith in relation to the Mandalay Trust, or in compliance with the Trust Deed and the Trustees Act (Cap 337, 2005 Rev Ed), by allowing various acts of wrongdoing, acting for its own benefit, and failing to make appropriate investment decisions.

  35. (ii) The Bank breached its duty of care in tort to the appellants.

  36. (iii) The Bank made fraudulent misrepresentations to Mr Ivanishvili regarding the value of the Mandalay Trust.

  37. [20] Neither the Bank nor the Trustee filed a defence in Suit 790. Instead, they each filed an application for a stay of the proceedings. As we have noted, the AR granted the stay on the basis that Switzerland was the more appropriate forum and this decision was upheld by the Judge on appeal.

  38. [21] The first issue considered by the Judge was whether the Bank and the Trustee had accepted the exclusive jurisdiction of the Singapore courts in respect of disputes with the appellants. She held that forum administration clauses like cl 2(a) were relevant for some kinds of disputes arising out of the trust, but did not serve as an exclusive jurisdiction clause for all disputes relating to the trust (the Judgment at [28] and [43]–[44]). This was particularly true of the disputes in Suit 790 between the appellants and the Bank – cl 2(a) could not in any way be said to bind the Bank, and the allegations in the Statement of Claim went beyond the Mandalay Trust and included Mr Ivanishvili’s personal accounts and the Wellminstone accounts (the Judgment at [44]–[46]). In this connection, the Judge pointed out that there was a different contractual exclusive jurisdiction clause which was binding as between Mr Ivanishvili and the Bank, stipulating Geneva as the exclusive forum, but this was likewise not dispositive as the other appellants were not privy to this clause (the Judgment at [47]–[54]).

  39. The present appeal

  40. [24] Since the decision of the Judge, the case has undergone a sea-change: the appellants have decided to pursue Suit 790 against the Trustee alone, and have irrevocably discontinued their claim against the Bank. The appellants therefore only pursue their appeal against the Judge’s decision to stay proceedings against the Trustee.

  41. [25] The appellants also brought SUM 71, applying to amend the Statement of Claim to reflect their new focus in Suit 790. Beyond reflecting the discontinuance of the claims against the Bank, the amended Statement of Claim sought to be introduced by SUM 71 (“the amended SOC”) also discards the claim against the Trustee for negligent misrepresentation (see [19(a)(iii)] above). The appellants further explain that the amended SOC updates the pleadings to reflect developments since the Statement of Claim was served, and to improve its clarity. Since the merits of SUM 71 are closely tied to the merits of the substantive appeal, we directed that SUM 71 be heard together with the substantive appeal.

  42. The appellants’ submissions

  43. [27] Turning to the substantive appeal, the appellants submit that cl 2(a) is an exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of the Singapore courts and governs the present dispute, such that strong cause is needed for a stay. In the alternative, even if it is a non-exclusive jurisdiction clause, the same conclusion would follow since Singapore was still the forum named in the clause. The appellants submit that the Trustee has not shown strong cause for a stay. In the alternative, even if cl 2(a) is not applicable such that the Spiliada test applies, the connecting factors of governing law, the connections of the parties and events, the location of the evidence, and the shape of the litigation all point in favour of Singapore being forum conveniens.

  44. The Trustee’s submissions

  45. [28] The Trustee submits that SUM 71 is futile and should be dismissed because the appeal would still be without merit even if it were allowed. It further contends that SUM 71 is an abuse of process because it fundamentally changes the appellants’ position maintained before the AR and the Judge, and constitutes an impermissible attempt to circumvent the high threshold for appellate intervention. The Trustee also observes that the appellants’ amended SOC involves a reformulation of some of the claims which have been retained, contrary to the appellants’ characterisation of these claims as being unchanged.

  46. [29] As for the substantive appeal, the Trustee submits that cl 2(a) simply provides for the Singapore courts to be the forum for the administration of the Mandalay Trust; hostile litigation in relation to the trust is not within its scope. The Trustee argues that even if cl 2(a) is a jurisdiction clause, on its true construction it would be a non-exclusive jurisdiction clause to which the “strong cause” test would not apply. The Trustee submits that under the Spiliada test, the connecting factors point in favour of Switzerland as the clearly more appropriate forum: what is relevant is that the material events took place in Switzerland, that crucial witnesses and documents would only be available in Switzerland, that the shape of the litigation points to Switzerland, and that there is a risk of fragmentation of proceedings if proceedings continue in Singapore. In the alternative, the Trustee argues that even if the “strong cause” test applies, the stay would still be justified because only a trial in Switzerland would allow it a fair chance at establishing its defence.

  47. The further affidavits

  48. [30] The outline of the parties’ arguments set out above suggests that if SUM 71 were allowed, the appeal would turn on two key issues: the effect of cl 2(a), and the availability of evidence if the dispute were to be tried in Singapore as opposed to in Switzerland. At the initial hearing of the appeal on 22 October 2019 (“the first hearing”), it became clear to us that the Trustee’s case as conceived at that point revolved primarily around the impermissibility of SUM 71. If, however, we allowed SUM 71 and went on to consider the merits of the substantive appeal on the basis of the amended SOC, the Trustee appeared to take the position that it would not state precisely what evidence it would need for its defence which was unavailable in Singapore. Dr Stanley Lai SC (“Dr Lai”), who appeared for the Trustee at the first hearing, submitted that the Trustee was not required to do so, as it was not obliged to disclose its defence at this early stage.

  49. [32] Pursuant to our directions, the Trustee filed an affidavit dated 2 December 2019 (“the Trustee’s affidavit”) and the appellants filed a reply affidavit on 20 December 2019 (“the appellants’ reply affidavit”). We heard oral submissions from the parties on these affidavits on 27 February 2020 (“the second hearing”).

  50. [33] In substance, the Trustee’s affidavit sets out potential defences it would run in relation to the claims in the amended SOC, linking these to the potential witnesses and documents which, for the most part, had already been identified in the cause papers filed at first instance. The appellants’ reply affidavit likewise consists primarily of submissions, seeking to rebut the Trustee’s contentions as to the necessity and non-availability of specific witnesses and documents. We discuss these affidavits in greater detail below, when we turn to consider the availability of evidence.

  51. Whether the amendment of the Statement of Claim should be allowed

  52. [35] It is therefore clear that there can be no contention that the contents of the amended SOC are themselves objectionable in so far as the amended SOC seeks to dissect the dispute, as it was originally conceived, in such a way as to reduce the significance of any connecting factors to Switzerland in favour of connecting factors pointing towards Singapore. Although the Trustee does not advance any argument to the contrary per se, this is an important starting point for our analysis of SUM 71. To the extent that the Trustee seeks to cast the amended SOC as an attempt to present a “blinkered perspective” of the true dispute, or to “rely selectively” on the findings of the Judge, these are not relevant considerations.

  53. [36] In the present case, a further significant consideration is that SUM 71 essentially seeks to recast the pleadings to reflect the discontinuance of the claims against the Bank. The notice of discontinuance of Suit 790 against the Bank was filed by the appellants on 21 June 2019. By virtue of O 21 r 2(1) of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed), service of this notice on the Bank effected the discontinuance of the action without the leave of the court being required, since no defence had then been filed. No complaint was made against this step, nor can one be. As this court held in Rex International Holding Ltd and another v Gulf Hibiscus Ltd [2019] 2 SLR 682 (“Gulf Hibiscus (No 2)”) at [9]:

  54. [37] To the extent that the amendment of the Statement of Claim is required to reflect the result of the discontinuance of the action against the Bank, we find it difficult, prima facie, to see any reason to prevent such an amendment from being made. Since the discontinuance of the action is a fait accompli, refusing to allow the necessary amendments to be made to the Statement of Claim would only serve to impede our analysis of the issues. There is also nothing objectionable to amendments being made to the pleadings to reflect developments since the commencement of Suit 790. This leaves to be considered two categories of amendments in the amended SOC: the discarding of the negligent misrepresentation claim against the Trustee and what the Trustee characterises as reformulations of some of the claims against it to remove certain references to the Bank.

  55. [38] As to the discarding of the negligent misrepresentation claim, the Trustee points out that this claim has been reformulated as a claim for breach of trust for the Trustee’s failure to account accurately to the appellants for the value of the Trust assets. Other claims the Trustee points to as having been reformulated include the deletion of the claim that the Trustee had failed to exercise skill and care in delegating its asset management powers to the Bank, despite the fact that the Bank’s regulatory and compliance function was inadequate. However, other limbs of the claim that the Trustee had failed to exercise skill and care in delegating its powers to the Bank still remain in the amended SOC – such as the Trustee’s alleged failure to take into account the ‘D’ rating obtained by Mr Lescaudron’s team during an internal audit by the Bank. In truth, these amendments are relatively minor tweaks in the overall scheme of the amended SOC, which is clearly aimed at the redirection of Suit 790 away from the alleged wrongdoing of the Bank and towards the alleged wrongdoing of the Trustee. The greater part of this redirection is the removal of the claims against the Bank, consequent to the discontinuance of the action against the Bank; but another part is the removal of other pleadings which the appellants may consider to unduly implicate matters which transpired in Switzerland.

  56. [41] In Gulf Hibiscus Ltd v Rex International Holding Ltd and another [2017] SGHC 210 (“Gulf Hibiscus (No 1)”), the High Court applied this test to a situation closely analogous to the present one. In that case, the plaintiff sought to amend its pleadings on appeal from an Assistant Registrar’s decision by dropping parts of its pleaded case, so as to avoid a stay of the proceedings in favour of arbitration. The court allowed the amendments, holding that they did not amount to an attempt to revisit a decided matter (at [44]). The court also pointed out that since there had been no trial or evidential hearing, there was no prejudice in the form of requiring testimony to be run through again. It is notable that in Gulf Hibiscus (No 1), the Assistant Registrar had specifically asked the plaintiff whether it wished to amend its pleadings; the application to do so before the High Court was therefore particularly belated, but this was not found to be a ground on which to reject the amendments (at [46] and [48]). The correctness of the principles pertaining to the amendment of pleadings applied in Gulf Hibiscus (No 1) was not doubted when this court subsequently had the opportunity to deal with this litigation in Gulf Hibiscus (No 2) ([36] supra).

  57. [42] The appellants further rely on the decision of the Court of Appeal of England and Wales in Islington London Borough Council v Uckac and another [2006] 1 WLR 1303 (“Uckac”). In Uckac, the plaintiff local authority brought proceedings for the repossession of premises from a tenant on the basis that the tenancy had been granted due to reliance on fraudulent misrepresentations. The claim was dismissed at first instance on the basis of a ruling on preliminary issues which held, inter alia, that the statutory regime precluded the rescission of the tenancy. Before the appellate court, the plaintiff sought to amend its particulars of claim to plead in the alternative that the grant of the tenancy was null and void ab initio (see Uckac at [36]). This was effectively an attempt to bypass the issue on which the first instance judge had ruled against the plaintiff by amending the pleadings to bring a claim on a different basis. The appellate court upheld the ruling on preliminary issues but allowed the amendment of the pleadings. The court was not impressed by the submission that the amendment application should have been made in the lower court (at [38]). Instead, it held that to require the plaintiff to start afresh in those circumstances would merely cause additional expense and delay (at [39]).

  58. [44] On the other hand, the Trustee seeks to rely on the decision of the Court of Appeal of England and Wales in Sharab v Al-Saud [2009] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 160 (“Sharab”). In Sharab, the appellant resisted an application for leave for service out of jurisdiction on the basis that the matter should be heard in Libya instead. It was only after the hearing of the appeal that the appellant informed the appellate court, by way of e-mail, that he undertook to submit to the jurisdiction of the Libyan courts (see Sharab at [45]). The court declined to accept this undertaking on the basis that the appellant should not be allowed to “reverse, so late in the day, a tactical position deliberately adopted for the purposes of the proceedings below and the appeal” [emphasis added] (at [52(iv)]). In Rappo, Tania v Accent Delight International Ltd and another and another appeal [2017] 2 SLR 265 (“Rappo”) at [100], this court discussed Sharab and made it clear that the case did not stand for the broad proposition that such an undertaking could not be given on appeal; instead, it was the lateness of the manoeuvre in the particular circumstances of Sharab that caused the court to reject the undertaking – not least the fact that the appeal had already been heard. Sharab therefore does not help the Trustee.

  59. [48] In our judgment, the amended SOC serves to allow the real issues before us in the present appeal to be properly tried – namely, the application of the law on natural forum and choice of jurisdiction to Suit 790 following the discontinuance of the claims against the Bank. SUM 71 must be allowed and so we proceed on the basis that the amended SOC constitutes the pleadings in Suit 790.

  60. Whether Suit 790 should be stayed

  61. [49] The substantive appeal turns, as we have mentioned above, on two key issues: first, the effect of cl 2(a), and whether it amounts to an exclusive jurisdiction clause applying to the claims in Suit 790 based on the amended SOC; and second, whether there was evidence that was important for the Trustee’s defence which would be available in proceedings in Switzerland but not in Singapore. These issues correspond to the two threads of the analysis that the court must undertake in the present case: first, the applicable test for granting the stay – whether the applicant must show strong cause, or merely that there is a more appropriate forum under the Spiliada test; and second, the application of the relevant test, which would require a consideration of the factors particular to the present case.

  62. Whether cl 2(a) amounts to an exclusive jurisdiction clause applying to the claims in Suit 790

  63. [50] While the focus of the arguments was on cl 2(a), it is important for the task of construction to examine clauses as a whole and in context. We therefore set out cl 2 of the Trust Deed in full below:

  64. “Proper Law” is in turn defined in cl 1(i) of the Trust Deed (“cl 1(i)”) as follows:

  65. The corresponding provisions in the Amended Trust Deed are in identical terms to those set out above.

  66. [51] It would be noted that cl 2 deals with two situations. The first sub-clause, cl 2(a), prescribes the initial proper law of the Mandalay Trust upon establishment as the law of Singapore and the Singapore courts as the “forum for the administration” of the trust. Then, cl 2(b) grants the Trustee the power to change the proper law at its discretion and provides that if it does so, the courts of the jurisdiction of the new proper law would become the “forum for the administration” of the trust. It is apparent from the case authorities that we discuss below that this type of clause giving a trustee power to change the proper law of a trust and the forum for administration is fairly commonly found in trust documents drafted in major Commonwealth jurisdictions providing trust services to wealthy individuals. It is the “forum for the administration” portion of the clause that we are particularly concerned with here.

  67. [52] Not surprisingly, there have been several cases across the Commonwealth where the courts have been called upon to determine the meaning of the term “forum for the administration” in trust deed clauses similar to cl 2 here. We will call them “forum for administration clauses” for convenience, although the language and structure of such clauses are not uniform. Numerous authorities were cited by the parties both before us and to the Judge: see the Judgment at [32]–[41]. They reveal that two closely related questions are raised by a forum for administration clause: first, whether the clause is intended to confer jurisdiction on a court (whether exclusively or otherwise); and second, the scope of the clause and therefore the kinds of disputes it applies to. On one end of the spectrum, some forum for administration clauses have been interpreted as not being concerned with the jurisdiction of the courts at all, but instead as merely referring to the place where the affairs of the trust are to be run: see, eg, Crociani and others v Crociani and others (Princess Camilla de Bourbon des Deux Siciles intervening) 17 ITELR 624 (“Crociani (PC)”) at [19]. On the other end, other forum for administration clauses have been found to function as exclusive jurisdiction clauses applicable both to questions regarding the administration of the trust and to contentious disputes relating to the trust: see, eg, Re a Trust 16 ITELR 195 (“Re a Trust”) at [66] and [68].

  68. [53] We reiterate, however, that forum for administration clauses are not uniform: they differ in both language and structure. There is no special rule of construction that applies to the interpretation of such clauses, and everything must therefore depend on how the particular clause is framed and the context in which it appears: see Koonmen v Bender and others 6 ITELR 568 (“Koonmen”) at [45]; and Re a Trust at [60].

  69. [54] This point is well-illustrated by the 2014 decision of the Privy Council (on appeal from Jersey) in Crociani (PC). The trust deed in this case had two relevant provisions (see Crociani (PC) at [7]). Clause 15 provided:

  70. Clause 12 provided that new trustees could be appointed upon the original trustees’ resignation, upon which:

  71. [55] At the time the trust was established in 1987, there were two lay trustees and a Bahamian professional trust company. Thereafter, there were a number of changes of the professional trustee and, in consequence, to the proper law of the trust. In January 1992 a Jersey company was appointed as professional trustee and the proper law became the law of Jersey. In 1999, a Guernsey trustee was appointed and the proper law became that of Guernsey. In 2007, another Jersey company became the trustee and the proper law went back to being Jersey law. In February 2012, both the lay and professional trustees (“the 2007 trustees”) purported to retire and appoint a professional trustee in Mauritius in their stead. Some beneficiaries of the trust subsequently brought proceedings in Jersey alleging breaches of trust by the 2007 trustees and challenging the validity of the appointment of the Mauritian trustee.

  72. [56] The defendants contended that as a result of the appointment of the Mauritian trustee, cl 12 conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the courts of Mauritius. The Jersey courts disagreed and held that they had jurisdiction (see Edoarda Crociani and others v Cristiana Crociani and others [2014] JCA 089 (“Crociani (JCA)”)). The defendants then appealed to the Privy Council. In Crociani (PC) the Privy Council held cl 12 not to be a jurisdiction clause at all. Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury, giving the decision of the court, acknowledged that the expression “forum of administration” could refer to the court which is to enforce the trust, but declined to hold that this expression had such a well-established technical significance that it necessarily held this meaning (at [17]). An equally plausible meaning of the term “forum” was that it referred to “a place for any purpose”, and the term “administration” could simply refer to the running of the trust (at [18]).

  73. [57] Lord Neuberger gave a number of reasons in favour of this broader understanding of “forum”: first, it was used in that sense in at least one contemporaneous precedent; second, there were other references to “courts” in the trust deed, and no other reference to “forum” (at [18]); and third, the fact that cl 12 stipulated for the “said country” to “become the forum for the administration of the trusts” was notable, because if the intention were to designate the courts of that country as the forum of administration, then it could be expected that the draftsman would have referred specifically to the courts of the “said country” (at [20]). Lord Neuberger also observed an oddity caused by interpreting the portions of cl 12 excerpted above as a jurisdiction clause: another part of cl 12 allowed the new trustees to reinstate the original governing law of the trust, but there was no provision to allow the original forum for administration to likewise be reinstated (at [21]). On the other hand, it was reasonable for cl 12 to stipulate the place for the running of the trust – for example, to clarify its tax status (at [19]).

  74. [58] Clause 2(a) in the present case, on the other hand, notably refers specifically to “the Courts … of Singapore” [emphasis added] being the forum for the administration of the Mandalay Trust (see [50] above). The Judge did not consider this point to be decisive. She held that Lord Neuberger’s reasoning about the specification of the courts of a country being the forum for administration, which we have referred to above, was merely a comment about the lack of this specification in the trust deed at hand; it was not meant to say that the presence of such a reference would necessarily constitute the forum for administration clause an exclusive jurisdiction clause (the Judgment at [35]).

  75. [59] It is no doubt correct that the court in Crociani (PC) eschewed any special significance being placed on particular phraseology, but this does not mean that the use of certain words cannot be given their ordinary significance. On the contrary, the specific reference to the courts of Singapore in cl 2(a) immediately distinguishes the present case from Crociani (PC), since it is implausible to read cl 2(a) to be stipulating the courts of Singapore as the place where the Mandalay Trust was to be run on a day-to-day basis. It more likely means that the courts of Singapore will, at the least, be the appropriate forum to go to when court assistance is required for the running of the Mandalay Trust. At the same time, none of the features which were considered to point away from the forum for administration clause being a jurisdiction clause in Crociani (PC) exists in the Trust Deed in the present case. In Crociani (PC) both cl 12 and cl 15 referred to a country being the “forum for the administration”. There was no reference to “courts” at all, whereas in both parts of cl 2 here the reference to “forum for the administration” is tied up with a reference to the courts. Under cl 2(b), when the governing law changes, the relevant court changes too, to the courts of the jurisdiction of the proper law. This parallel change makes sense in that the courts of a particular jurisdiction are the best placed to interpret the laws of that jurisdiction as they apply to the affairs of a trust governed by those laws. In our view, the intention of the draftsman in indicating the courts of the jurisdiction of the proper law to be the forum for administration, was to make crystal clear that if any legal question arose in the running of the Mandalay Trust, that question should be resolved by the courts of the jurisdiction of the proper law at the time the question arose.

  76. [60] As such, we have no hesitation in concluding that on the proper construction of cl 2, one of the functions of both cll 2(a) and 2(b) is to be a jurisdiction clause. The next question is whether as a jurisdiction clause, cl 2(a), or cl 2(b) for that matter, operates solely in relation to matters which relate to the administration of the trust – for example, matters of interpretation of the trust deed or the trustee’s powers – or applies also to disputes between the trustee and beneficiaries. We now turn to consider the relevant authorities on this issue.

  77. [61] We start with the 2002 decision of the Jersey Court of Appeal in Koonmen ([53] supra). There, the plaintiff had brought a claim in Jersey against a number of defendants for, inter alia, breach of trust. Two of the defendants applied to set aside service of the proceedings on them out of jurisdiction, and two other defendants applied for a stay of the proceedings on the grounds of forum non conveniens. The relevant issue before the court on both applications was whether the more appropriate forum was Jersey, or Anguilla, which was also the jurisdiction of the governing law and of the trustee’s incorporation (see Koonmen at [32]). The trust deed contained the following provisions (see Koonmen at [44]):

  78. (a) Clause 1(i)(k), which provided:

  79. (b) Clause 2, which provided:

  80. (c) Clause 14, which provided the trustees with the power to change the governing law of the trust, with the consequence that upon such change, under cl 14(i)(b) “The forum for the administration thereof shall thenceforth be the courts of that state or territory”.

  81. [62] The Jersey Court of Appeal granted both applications, reversing the decision of the first instance court. Its principal basis for doing so was that the court below had failed to appreciate the significance of cl 2 of the trust deed as stipulating Anguilla as the forum for the resolution of disputes relating to the trust (see Koonmen at [43] and [58]). It held that if a clause in a deed provided for an agreed choice of forum, the court would override that agreed choice of forum only in exceptional cases (at [49] and [61]). Rokison JA, delivering the judgment of the court, recognised that the effect of such provisions in a trust deed was a matter of construction, with no special rule of construction applicable (at [45]). In the construction exercise, he looked at the trust deed as a whole and construed cl 2 in the light of cll 1(i)(k) and 14 (at [47]). Rokison JA found the language of cl 1(i)(k) “somewhat confusing”, as “[t]he concept of a reference to the exclusive jurisdiction of a system of law is obscure” (at [46]). However, he considered that it was most likely intended to refer to the jurisdiction of the relevant court, particularly in the light of the reference in cl 2 to the forum for the administration of the trust. Although the court in Koonmen did not expressly consider the scope of the conferral of jurisdiction, it clearly considered it to extend to the claims in the proceedings, including the breach of trust claims against the current trustee.

  82. [63] The appellants further rely on the decision of the Supreme Court of British Columbia in its 2003 decision in Green and another v Jernigan and others 6 ITELR 330 (“Green”). However, in Green, in addition to a forum for administration clause which referred to “the Island of Nevis”, the trust deed also contained a governing law clause which ended by stating that the parties “submit to the jurisdiction of the High Court of St. Christopher and Nevis … in respect of all disputes which may arise in respect of this deed” (see Green at [34]–[35]). Given the clarity of the submission to jurisdiction in respect of “all disputes”, it is not surprising that the court held that the trust deed conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the courts of Nevis, although the court also held that the reference to “forum for the administration” of the trust was intended as an exclusive jurisdiction clause (at [40]–[41]). We therefore do not consider Green to be of much assistance in the present case.

  83. [64] Koonmen, meanwhile, has been the subject of forceful criticism. Prof Paul Matthews (“Prof Matthews”), in an article entitled “What is a trust jurisdiction clause?” (2003) Jersey Law Review 232 (“Matthews”), took issue with the analysis in Koonmen of the terms “exclusive jurisdiction” (in cl 1(i)(k)) and “forum for … administration” (in cl 2). In relation to the former, Prof Matthews suggested that “exclusive jurisdiction” was more plausibly a clarification of the governing law (at para 20):

  84. [65] We note that a similar view was subsequently taken by the Privy Council in Crociani (PC). Discussing the provision in cl 12 for the trust deed, upon a change in the trustees, to be subject to the “exclusive jurisdiction” of the new country where the trust was to be administered, Lord Neuberger held that this was intended to stipulate that the same law governed all issues concerning the trust deed (at [23]). This was a meaningful precaution because it avoided the risk of dépeçage – by which different aspects of a trust could become subject to different governing laws (see Crociani (PC) at [23]–[24]).

  85. [66] As for the forum for administration clause in Koonmen, Prof Matthews took the view that this referred to matters which fell within the scope of an administration action (Matthews at paras 21–22):

  86. [67] The analysis in Matthews has proven influential in subsequent case law. In the 2009 decision of the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands in Helmsman Ltd and another v Bank of New York Trust Company (Cayman) Ltd 13 ITELR 177 (“Helmsman”), Henderson J considered that there was “much to be said” (at [10]) for Prof Matthews’s analysis, and suggested that it was probably correct (at [14]). Helmsman involved a trust deed with the following forum for administration clause (see Helmsman at [3]):

  87. [68] Ultimately, however, Henderson J did not consider it necessary to conclusively decide this issue, as the forum for administration of the trust had been changed by the trustees under the relevant provisions to the Cayman Islands one day before the writ in the action was issued, and there could not therefore be said to be a jurisdiction clause in favour of the English courts in any event (at [13]–[15]).

  88. [69] The analysis in Matthews was likewise relied upon by the Jersey Court of Appeal when it heard Crociani (JCA) ([56] supra), the decision that subsequently went on appeal to the Privy Council (see [54] above). The Jersey Court of Appeal found that cl 12 of the trust deed (which we have set out at [54] above) only had the effect of facilitating changes in the governing law of the trust (at [95]). In doing so, the court rejected two contentions on the construction of cl 12 advanced by the appellants: that the reference to “forum for the administration” made the Mauritian courts the only forum in which disputes between the trustees and the beneficiaries could be resolved after the appointment of the Mauritian trustee, and that the reference to “exclusive jurisdiction” also had the same effect (see Crociani (JCA) at [65]). On both fronts, the Jersey Court of Appeal expressly disapproved the reasoning in Koonmen, which had been decided 12 years earlier by the same court, along similar lines as those set out in Matthews (Crociani (JCA) at [79]–[83]):

  89. (a) The court held that “forum for the administration” ought to be understood in the light of the boundary between “matters of administration” and “hostile claims” that has long existed (at [92]).

  90. (b) The court provided numerous reasons why, in context, “exclusive jurisdiction” should be read as referring to the governing law and not matters of jurisdiction. For present purposes, the most salient are (at [66]):

  91. [70] On the other hand, a different conclusion was reached by the Supreme Court of Bermuda in its 2012 decision in Re a Trust ([52] supra). In this case, cl 18.1 of the trust deed provided (see Re a Trust at [47]):

  92. [71] The settlor of the trust sought, inter alia, an injunction against one of the beneficiaries (“D9”) in respect of his threat to bring proceedings outside Bermuda to compel the trustee to disclose information about the trust assets. The trustee supported the injunction, on the basis that cl 18.1 was an exclusive jurisdiction clause. It is worth noting that D9 appeared not to have contested this point at the hearing, although he did so in written submissions (see Re a Trust at [48]).

  93. [72] Kawaley CJ considered the case law, including Koonmen, Green ([63] supra) and Helmsman, as well as Matthews, before turning to decide the case on the basis of the particular language of the trust deed (at [60]). He held that the “mandatory language” of cl 18.1, and the combination of the selection of Bermudian law as the governing law and Bermuda as the forum for administration “naturally suggest[s] exclusivity”, placing emphasis on the use of the word “shall” in cl 18.1 (at [62]). Kawaley CJ went on to say, at [64]:

  94. [73] Having therefore disagreed with the view that the term “forum for the administration” signified those non-contentious actions which fell within the scope of an administration action, Kawaley CJ had to consider the proper scope of cl 18.1. He took the view that obvious examples of claims not falling within such a clause included claims brought by trustees against strangers to the trust to recover trust property and “other claims which clearly have no connection with the administration of the trust” (at [67]). In contrast, Kawaley CJ rejected the submission that cl 18.1 did not encompass a claim for breach of trust (at [68]). Instead, he suggested that “[t]he better view is that a modern draftsman using the term[] ‘administration’ in a trust forum clause does not have in mind now rare administration actions”, but is instead “merely seeking to signify the administration of a trust in a general sense by the domiciliary courts of the trust” (at [69]). It should be noted, however, that Kawaley CJ’s view that a breach of trust fell within the scope of a “forum for administration” clause was obiter, since Re a Trust concerned an application for the disclosure of information relating to the trust, which clearly seeks the exercise of the court’s inherent jurisdiction to supervise the administration of trusts (Re a Trust at [69]–[70]).

  95. [74] A final point which is worth mentioning is the ambit of the administration action. According to Prof Matthews, an administration action could not historically be used to commence hostile trust litigation, such as claims for breach of trust (see Matthews at para 22, quoted at [66] above). On the other hand, in Lynton Tucker, Nicholas le Poidevin and James Brightwell, Lewin on Trusts (Sweet & Maxwell, 19th Ed, 2015) at para 11–055, the authors take the contrary view, saying that the scope of an administration action “has always extended to remedying a breach of trust”.

  96. [75] We do not consider it necessary in the present case to conclusively determine the scope of an administration action, either historically, or in our current law. In our judgment, there is no legal rule limiting the meaning of the phrase “forum for [the] administration” to an administration action in the traditional sense. As pointed out by Lord Neuberger, this language has no established technical significance (see Crociani (PC) at [17], discussed at [56] above). Neither the view that the phrase refers to the place of administration of the trust (taken in Crociani (PC), Crociani (JCA) and Helmsman), nor the view that it refers to the court’s administration of the trust (taken in Koonmen, Green and Re a Trust), turns necessarily on the presence or absence of a connection between “forum for the administration” and the administration action.

  97. [76] In the final analysis, we are persuaded by the Crociani line of cases and Prof Matthew’s reasoning that the term “forum for the administration” is intended to refer to the court or jurisdiction which would settle questions arising in the day to day administration of the trust, and to denote the supervisory and authorising court for actions the trustee might need to take which were not specifically covered by the trust deed or where its terms were ambiguous. Even the addition of a specific reference to “courts” in such a forum for administration clause as in the present case does not change its essential character. In our judgment, such clauses are not intended to function as exclusive jurisdiction clauses for the settlement of disputes between trustees and beneficiaries. We are cognisant that cll 1(i) and 2 of the Trust Deed governing the Mandalay Trust are in their structure and method of expression much more similar to the equivalent clauses considered in Koonmen than to those in the Crociani litigation. However, we prefer the reasoning in the Crociani cases, which is no less applicable to the present case since the broader context and purpose of the trust arrangements there is the same as in the present case.

  98. [77] In construing cl 2 of the Trust Deed, it is to us significant that the main purpose of trust deeds of its ilk is to set out the framework of the trust and in particular to delineate the responsibilities and rights of the trustee for the time being in its management. It is usually the trustee who drafts the trust deed (and practically always in the case of professional trustees) and specifies the terms on which it is willing to undertake the onerous duties of a trustee. The trustee will therefore be careful to specify the law under which those obligations are to be carried out. It is likely that in considering the choice of law the trustee will be guided by the system of law that it is most familiar with and that generally governs the way it carries out its business as a trustee: it needs to know what the law prescribes as its duties. In making the choice, the trustee will, accordingly, be focussing on the running of the trust rather than on potential disputes with beneficiaries over future breaches of trust. By way of parenthesis, the evidence in the present case suggests that Mr Ivanishvili had little or no involvement in the selection of Singapore as the original domicile for the Mandalay Trust.

  99. [78] In the settlement of a trust there is little of the negotiation between parties with different interests that ordinarily takes place in pre-contractual discussions. Whilst there will be a settlor who may have some input, generally the beneficiaries have no say at all in the setting up of the trust. Indeed, in many cases the beneficiaries do not even exist at the time of the settlement of the trust. The trust deed is not a contract between two parties with obligations on both sides – rather, it is a unilateral undertaking by the trustee, and in our view this difference must play a part when we consider whether the intention of the drafters was to impose a mandatory jurisdiction clause for the resolution of contentious disputes regarding allegations of breach of trust.

  100. [80] For the reasons given above, we hold that the appellants cannot rely on cl 2(a) to subject the Trustee to the jurisdiction of the courts of Singapore as the only courts to determine their claims as set out in the amended SOC. Instead, the issue of where the dispute should properly be tried will have to be determined by the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

  101. The connecting factors analysis

  102. [81] In the light of our conclusion on the nature of cl 2(a), the Spiliada test governs the application for the stay of Suit 790. As this court explained in Rickshaw Investments ([34] supra) at [14], the first stage of the test is whether there is some other available forum which is more appropriate for the case to be tried, and if the court concludes that there is a more appropriate forum, a stay will ordinarily be granted unless under the second stage of the test the court finds that there are circumstances by reason of which justice requires that a stay should nonetheless not be granted.

  103. [82] In particular, at the first stage, the burden is on the applicant for the stay to show that there is another forum which is “clearly or distinctly more appropriate” than Singapore (see CIMB Bank Bhd v Dresdner Kleinwort Ltd [2008] 4 SLR(R) 543 (“Dresdner Klienwort”) at [26]). At this stage, the court considers the connecting factors that link the dispute with the competing jurisdictions. As this court explained in Rappo ([44] supra) at [71], the connecting factors typically considered include:

  104. [83] Furthermore, as Rappo goes on to explain, the court should be astute to consider which factors are likely to be material to the fair determination of the dispute, and it should ascribe greater weight to those, based on the circumstances of the case. “For instance, in disputes involving well-heeled parties who have a high degree of mobility … the current domicile of the parties may be of little legal significance” (Rappo at [71]). This observation applies equally to the present case.

  105. The availability of witnesses

  106. [85] To properly appreciate the significance of this connecting factor in the present case, it is necessary for us to start by considering what evidence would likely be needed in relation to the claims maintained in the amended SOC, which are all against the Trustee for breach of trust. We begin by outlining the claims briefly. It is alleged that:

  107. (a) The Trustee breached its duties of skill and care in delegating the management of the Trust assets to the Bank:

  108. (b) The Trustee failed to notice and/or prevent, in relation to the Trust assets:

  109. (c) The Trustee failed to properly review or monitor the investment of the Trust assets by the Bank and/or by CS Life, contrary to s 41M of the Trustees Act, by:

  110. (d) The Trustee failed to account accurately to the appellants for the value of the Trust assets, such as by not correcting the Presentation, and failed to alert them to the significant diminution in value of the Trust assets.

  111. (e) The Trustee acted ultra vires and for improper purposes by executing the Amended Trust Deed.

  112. [86] When analysing the claims, the focus should not lie mainly on the evidence the plaintiffs (the appellants in the present case) need to establish their allegations. Since it is the plaintiffs who wish to pursue their claims in Singapore, the court in entertaining the defendant’s application for a stay would not usually be overly concerned with the availability of evidence for the plaintiff’s case. It is instead the potential prejudice to the defendant in running its defence that is likely to be significant for the purposes of this analysis. It was for this reason that we invited Dr Lai to consider whether the Trustee ought to file an affidavit to explain precisely how it would be hampered in its defence in Singapore.

  113. [87] As Lord Neuberger aptly put it in VTB Capital plc v Nutritek International Corpn and others [2013] 2 AC 337 (“VTB Capital”) (in a passage endorsed by Lord Mance at [73], Lord Clarke of Stone-cum-Ebony at [228], and Lord Reed at [240]; see also [36] and [39] per Lord Mance):

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