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Grounds publishedDecided 6 Jul 2020

Court of Appeal

ED&F Man Capital Markets Ltd v Straits (Singapore) Pte Ltd

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[2020] SGCA 64Case no. Civil Appeal No 132 of 201966 paragraphs

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] Discovery is a critical process in any court proceeding. It fulfils the function of discovering the truth between the parties so that justice can be served. Typically, discovery is provided in aid of an action which is before the court and the issues in the action would define the scope and ambit of the discovery.

  3. [3] This appeal can be traced to an unsuccessful application for pre-action discovery and interrogatories by the appellant. In resisting the application, the respondent filed several affidavits to explain why the application should be dismissed. Various documents which formed part of the documents sought by the appellant were exhibited in the affidavits.

  4. [4] Despite failing in its application for pre-action discovery, the appellant nonetheless proceeded to use the disclosed documents in aid of its joinder application to add the respondent to proceedings commenced against other parties in the United Kingdom (“the UK proceedings”).

  5. [6] We agree with the Judge below that the appellant should be enjoined from using the disclosed documents in the UK proceedings, though our reasons differ from the Judge in some respects. At the end of the hearing, we dismissed the appeal and we now provide our detailed grounds.

  6. Material facts

  7. [7] The appellant, ED&F Man Capital Markets Limited, is a company registered in England. It is the financial services division of ED&F Man Holdings Limited, and operates a global brokerage and financial services business in a range of products which include commodities. The respondent, Straits (Singapore) Pte Ltd is a company registered in Singapore and is a subsidiary company of Straits Financial Group Pte Ltd. It provides structured trade finance, physical inventory monetisation and risk management services, and finances exchange-grade commodities such as nickel and zinc products.

  8. [8] In 2016, the appellant entered into repurchasing agreements with two Hong Kong companies, Come Harvest and Mega Wealth (collectively, “the Companies”). Under these agreements, the Companies sold nickel products (“the Commodities”) to the appellant but retained the option of repurchasing the Commodities at a fixed price by a set date. If the option was not exercised by that date, the appellant would be entitled to take possession of the Commodities. The Commodities were stored in warehouses that issued receipts for products in their custody. Possession of a duly-endorsed, original warehouse receipt entitled the holder to obtain possession of the goods identified in the receipt.

  9. [9] Pursuant to the repurchasing agreements, the Companies handed what appeared to be original warehouse receipts for the Commodities to the appellant. The receipts reflected the respondent’s endorsements which suggested that the respondent had sold the Commodities to the Companies, who in turn on-sold them to the appellant. The appellant and the respondent did not have any direct contractual relationship or business dealings with each other.

  10. [10] In January 2017, the appellant discovered that the warehouse receipts in its possession had been forged. Believing itself to be the victim of fraud, the appellant’s solicitors contacted the respondent for its assistance and sought, inter alia, documents and records relating to the respondent’s ownership of the Commodities and its relationship with the Companies. The respondent’s solicitors responded to state that the respondent had never handed the original warehouse receipts to the Companies, the receipts had always been in its possession, and it remained the owner of the Commodities. Furthermore, the respondent stated that it was not in a position to provide the appellant with the information and documents requested. Further correspondence was exchanged, but the respondent maintained its stance and did not provide any further information.

  11. [11] On 17 May 2017, the appellant filed Originating Summons No 533 of 2017 (“OS 533”) for pre-action discovery and interrogatories against the respondent pursuant to O 24 r 6 and O 26A r 1 of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed). It raised potential causes of action against the respondent in the torts of conspiracy by unlawful means and dishonest assistance, and it also sought information from the respondent on the identities of the actual wrongdoers (ie, “Norwich Pharmacal relief”, as established in Norwich Pharmacal Co v Customs and Excise Commissioners [1974] AC 133).

  12. [12] In the course of resisting OS 533, the respondent filed 12 affidavits deposed by its employees, solicitors and an expert witness. These affidavits and their exhibited documents (“the disclosed documents”) form the core of the present dispute. The first affidavit (“He’s 1st Affidavit”) filed on behalf of the respondent contained the following reservation:

  13. [13] He’s 1st affidavit also annexed copies of some documents sought in OS 533, specifically, the original warehouse receipts and the invoices issued by the warehouse to the respondent. The affidavit also provided most of the information which the appellant had sought in its application for pre-action interrogatories, such as details of the respondent’s transactions with the Companies.

  14. [14] On 21 December 2017, while the hearing of OS 533 was pending, the appellant commenced an action against the Companies in the UK. This was pursuant to a clause in the repurchasing agreements between the appellant and the Companies that provided for the exclusive jurisdiction of the English courts. The appellant claimed damages against the Companies for deceit and/or unjust enrichment. The papers were served on the Companies in Hong Kong in January 2018.

  15. [15] At a hearing on 7 March 2018, the appellant’s counsel informed the court of the existence of the UK proceedings. Initially, the appellant confirmed through its counsel that it would file an affidavit to provide an update of the UK proceedings, but, at a later hearing, changed its position and decided not to file an affidavit. In fact, at the hearing of OS 533 before the assistant registrar (“the AR”), the appellant took the position that the UK proceedings were “strictly irrelevant” to OS 533 because they involved different parties and different causes of action. At the AR’s directions, the appellant eventually filed a short affidavit, though that merely annexed the claim form it had filed against the Companies.

  16. [16] OS 533 was dismissed by the AR on 13 August 2018. The AR found that the potential claims the appellant alleged against the respondent in conspiracy and dishonest assistance were speculative and it had not even alleged that the respondent was complicit in the fraud. As for its application for Norwich Pharmacal relief, the appellant had already identified the main wrongdoers (ie, the Companies) and had commenced proceedings against them in the UK. The AR also highlighted the “width and intrusiveness” of the documents and information sought, and observed that the appellant had been resistant to disclosing the existence of the UK proceedings to the court. She found its conduct in this regard “somewhat troubling”.

  17. [17] The appellant appealed against the AR’s decision. On 17 September 2018, while the appeal was pending before the Singapore courts, the appellant applied to the High Court of England and Wales to join the respondent in the UK proceedings, stating that it intended to plead causes of action in deceit, unlawful means conspiracy, constructive trust and knowing receipt against the respondent. In this joinder application, the appellant relied on information contained in the disclosed documents. The joinder application was granted ex parte on 23 November 2018.

  18. Decision below

  19. [19] The Judge enjoined the appellant from adducing or relying on the disclosed documents in any foreign proceedings but declined to grant the anti-suit injunction: ED&F Man Capital Markets Ltd v Straits (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2019] SGHC 203 (“GD”) at [1]. The appeal before us concerns only the injunction against the use of the disclosed documents.

  20. [21] The respondent relied in the alternative on the Riddick principle. The Riddick principle applied only to documents disclosed under compulsion of court process, and it did not apply where documents had been voluntarily disclosed or used in open court: GD at [26] and [27]. In assessing voluntariness, the respondent to a pre-action disclosure application should be treated differently. It did not merely risk default if it chose not to respond. Instead, if it failed to resist the application, there would be a serious intrusion into the privacy of a non-party. Given the intrusive nature of pre-action disclosure, the public interest in protecting the respondent’s privacy and confidentiality featured more heavily: GD at [32]. The respondent’s reliance on the disclosed documents in OS 533 did not amount to voluntary disclosure as the documents and information had been exhibited and deposed to resist OS 533. Much time and energy was saved by including those documents for the court to examine itself, and it would be unfortunate to restrain a party from choosing the best course of action out of a fear that they would open the door to unintended use: GD at [33]. The respondent’s repeated references to “voluntary” disclosure in the hearings before the AR were in the context of demonstrating its cooperation and compliance; it did not show that the respondent was giving up the documents and information for all uses: GD at [34].

  21. [23] The appellant also relied on the open justice exception to the Riddick principle articulated in Foo Jong Long Dennis v Ang Yee Lim and another [2015] 2 SLR 578, where the High Court stated that the principle ceased to apply to a document disclosed during discovery in a prior suit once it had been used in open court: GD at [39]. The present case fell within a limited exception to the open court exception to the Riddick principle. Considering the balance to be struck between the administration of justice and the right to privacy and confidentiality in the context of pre-action disclosure, applying the open court exception would unduly hamper the respondent’s ability to resist an intrusion into its privacy and confidentiality prior to the commencement of the action: GD at [44].

  22. [24] By the present appeal, the appellant appealed against the Judge’s grant of the injunction.

  23. Summonses Nos 31 and 46 of 2020

  24. [25] The appellant also filed two applications to adduce further evidence for this appeal. Summons No 31 of 2020 was an application to adduce, inter alia, the decisions of the High Court of Justice and Court of Appeal of England and Wales (“the English courts”) dismissing the respondent’s jurisdictional challenge in the UK proceedings, while Summons No 46 of 2020 was an application to adduce correspondence exchanged between the parties’ English solicitors on the effect of the injunction in relation to the conduct of the UK proceedings. We dismissed both applications at the hearing as the evidence sought to be admitted was not relevant to the appeal.

  25. [27] As the decisions of the English courts were reached after the decision of the Judge below, the test to admit the further evidence was whether it had a perceptible impact on the decision being appealed such that it was in the interest of justice that it should be admitted (Yeo Chong Lin v Tay Ang Choo Nancy and another appeal [2011] 2 SLR 1157 at [13]). This is a lower threshold of relevance than the test in Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489, which requires that the evidence would have had an important influence on the result of the case (see AnAn Group (Singapore) Pte Ltd v VTB Bank (Public Joint Stock Co) [2019] 2 SLR 341 at [21]). Yet even on this lower threshold, the evidence was not relevant. The question before us concerned the scope of pre-action disclosure in Singapore. As we observe below (see [34]), the purpose of the pre-action disclosure regime is to enable the applicant to bring a substantive claim before a court in Singapore and not the “correct” court. The fact that the substantive action was now properly before the English courts is not a factor in our consideration of whether there has been an abuse of the process as regards the appellant’s use of the disclosed documents under Singapore law. Having said that, the decisions of the English courts are matters of public record which this court can always take cognisance of as we have done at [44] below.

  26. Our decision

  27. Sui generis nature of pre-action disclosure

  28. [30] Pre-action disclosure, which encompasses both pre-action discovery and interrogatories, is unique by its very nature. First, unlike other interlocutory applications, an application for pre-action disclosure does not require a pleaded cause of action. When proceedings have commenced, the court is in a better position to determine the relevance of an application for discovery by reference to the issues raised in the pleadings (see Dorsey ([20] supra) at [49]), but it does not have a similar reference point in an application for pre-action disclosure. There is, however, a requirement to provide some provisional views of the cause of action which is being contemplated. The Rules of Court stipulate that, if practicable, the applicant should refer to pleadings served or intended to be served in the claim to show how the documents or information sought will be relevant (see O 24 r 6(3)(b) and O 26A r 1(3)(b)). The clearer the cause of action that an applicant is able to put before the court, the easier it will be for the court to ascertain the relevance and necessity of pre-action disclosure (Dorsey at [47]).

  29. Scope and purpose of pre-action disclosure

  30. [35] Under the statutory regime, all documents and information disclosed in the course of any pre-action disclosure can only be used in furtherance of commencing proceedings in a Singapore court. As the Judge highlighted, pre-action disclosure is an intrusive and compulsive process: GD at [21]. For that reason, the court will not permit the procedure to be employed for any collateral purpose that suggest the commencement of proceedings in Singapore is not the key consideration that underpins the relevant application (Dorsey at [47]).

  31. [36] We agree with the Judge that in spite of this territorial limitation on the scope of pre-action disclosure, it does not follow that an applicant for pre-action disclosure must commit to commence the action in Singapore and there is no such positive obligation in the statutory language: see GD at [21]. As such, an applicant for pre-action disclosure must establish credible evidence of a Singapore nexus but does not have to prove that Singapore is the most appropriate forum in which to commence a substantive action (Intas Pharmaceuticals Ltd v DealStreetAsia Pte Ltd [2017] 4 SLR 684 at [59]). We accepted the appellant’s argument that there will inevitably be circumstances where, post-disclosure, another forum might emerge as a more appropriate one. An applicant for pre-action disclosure is free to commence proceedings in any other appropriate jurisdiction but if he elects to do so, he would not be permitted to use the documents and information he obtained in the course of the pre-action disclosure application. If the applicant decides to use the documents and information, he can only do so for the purposes of substantive proceedings in Singapore.

  32. The use of the documents in the UK proceedings was an abuse of process

  33. [37] As we recently observed in AnAn Group (Singapore) Pte Ltd v VTB Bank (Public Joint Stock Co) [2020] 1 SLR 1158 at [98], citing our earlier decision in JTrust Asia Pte Ltd v Group Lease Holdings Pte Ltd and others [2018] 2 SLR 159 (“JTrust”) at [99], the concept of abuse of process pervades the whole law of civil procedure. It informs the exercise of the court’s procedural powers (Lim Geok Lin Andy v Yap Jin Meng Bryan and another appeal [2017] 2 SLR 760 at [39]) and is a control mechanism “essentially targeted at addressing abusive conduct” (Vinmar Overseas (Singapore) Pte Ltd v PTT International Trading Pte Ltd [2018] 2 SLR 1271 (“Vinmar”) at [129]).

  34. [38] As this court observed in Gabriel Peter & Partners (suing as a firm) v Wee Chong Jin and others [1997] 3 SLR(R) 649 at [22], the categories of conduct that may constitute an abuse of process are not closed:

  35. [39] A party who commences proceedings for the predominant purpose of achieving something other than what the legal process was designed to achieve (ie, a collateral purpose) is someone who has abused the process of the court (Lee Tat Development Pte Ltd v Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No 301 [2018] 2 SLR 866 at [136]). A collateral purpose might be the use of the court as a platform to broadcast the plaintiff’s vilification of the defendants (see Lonrho plc v Fayed (No 5) [1993] 1 WLR 1489) or, in the context of an application for Mareva relief, to oppress the defendant’s financial interests (JTrust at [101]).

  36. [40] In this appeal, the question we considered was whether the use of the disclosed documents in the UK proceedings amounted to a collateral purpose. Mr Pillai argued that the purpose of pre-action disclosure was to enable the applicant to commence substantive proceedings, and the commencement of proceedings in the UK therefore cannot be said to be an ulterior or alien purpose. We rejected this argument. As explained earlier (see [34] above), the sole purpose of pre-action disclosure is to facilitate the commencement of proceedings in Singapore. An application for documents or information to commence proceedings in a foreign jurisdiction would have been dismissed without hesitation based on the statutory language and this court’s decision in Dorsey (supra [20]). It would be an abuse of the pre-action disclosure regime and contrary to its purpose if an application was commenced to obtain documents in aid of foreign proceedings.

  37. [42] Counsel for the respondent, Mr Toh Kian Sing SC (“Mr Toh”), submitted that the act of commencing an application for pre-action disclosure amounted to a representation or an undertaking to the court that the applicant would only commence proceedings in Singapore, if at all. We did not think an application for pre-action disclosure should be construed in this manner. There is a measure of artificiality in imputing a specific intention to an applicant for pre-action disclosure when in reality, it is part and parcel of the obligation imposed on all parties to legal proceedings not to abuse the court’s processes. It is sufficient to recognise that the sole purpose of pre-action disclosure is to obtain information to commence proceedings in Singapore, and the use of the information elsewhere, including the UK proceedings, would be for a collateral purpose and therefore an abuse of process.

  38. [43] Although this holding would be sufficient to dispose of the appeal, we also found on the facts of this case that there was an additional basis to ground our finding of abuse of process, ie, that the appellant did not have any genuine intention to commence proceedings against the respondent in Singapore when it filed OS 533.

  39. [44] We recognise that the English courts appeared to have accepted that the appellant did hold a provisional intention to commence proceedings against the respondent in Singapore prior to August 2018, when the appellant applied to join the respondent in the UK proceedings (see ED&F Man Capital Markets Limited v Come Harvest Holdings Limited and others [2019] EWHC 1661 (Comm) at [45]–[47] and ED&F Man Capital Markets Ltd v Straits (Singapore) Pte Limited [2019] EWCA Civ 2073 at [18]–[19]). However, that observation was made in the context of the appellant’s submission that while it had held that provisional intention, it was entitled to change its mind and pursue the claim against the respondent in the UK proceedings instead. This submission was in aid of its case that England was the most appropriate forum notwithstanding its initial intention to commence proceedings against the respondent in Singapore. In other words, the observation by the English courts was not made in the context of any argument by the respondent that the appellant never held such an intention in the first place or that there was no likely prospect of the appellant commencing the action against the respondent in Singapore when OS 533 was filed. That argument was simply not before the English courts. Instead, the focus of the parties’ submissions before the English courts was whether the appellant was entitled to change its minds as regards the forum to sue the respondent.

  40. [45] Unlike the UK proceedings, the issue as to whether the appellant had held a genuine intention to commence proceedings against the respondent in Singapore when OS 533 was filed is directly relevant to this court as any application for pre-action disclosure can only proceed on the premise of contemplated proceedings in Singapore. Hence, it was imperative for this court to undertake a detailed analysis of the evidence with reference to the contemplated causes of action against the respondent. For the reasons set out below, we arrived at a different view from the English courts.

  41. No likely prospect of subsequent proceedings in Singapore

  42. [46] The appellant claimed that it had originally held the intention to commence proceedings in Singapore and then changed its mind when the Companies became contactable. We did not think this was borne out by the facts before us. Instead, it appeared that at the time of filing OS 533, the appellant did not genuinely contemplate commencing an action against the respondent in Singapore even if the application had been successful. Had the appellant genuinely contemplated proceedings in Singapore, it would first have to consider the viability of any claim against the respondent in Singapore based on the information that was available to it at the time.

  43. [47] As we stated above (at [30]), in an application for pre-action disclosure, the applicant is required to indicate what potential causes of action it may pursue against the respondent. What were the possible actions which the appellant contemplated when it filed OS 533? The appellant had no claim in contract because the parties did not have any contractual relationship with each other. The only conceivable causes of action would have been in tort. Before the AR, the appellant raised the torts of conspiracy and dishonest assistance and at one hearing it may have raised a potential cause of action in knowing receipt. At the hearing before us, Mr Pillai also raised the tort of deceit or misrepresentation. However, the new alleged claims in deceit and misrepresentation would appear to be plainly unsustainable as the parties did not have any interaction prior to January 2017. Mr Pillai conceded that there could not have been a viable claim in deceit or misrepresentation as there were no direct dealings between the parties.

  44. [48] The Companies were the middlemen in the transactions involving the Commodities and the appellant had always acknowledged that any contemplated action would involve the Companies. The discovery and interrogatories it sought in OS 533 largely concerned the relationship between the respondent and the Companies, such as transfer documents and correspondence. In its affidavits filed in support of OS 533, the appellant stated that pre-action disclosure was necessary to identify if the Companies were involved or complicit in a potential fraud. As the AR noted, the appellant did not even allege that the respondent had been complicit in the fraud or had been dishonest. In fact, in a later affidavit filed to explain its conduct of the UK proceedings, the appellant took the position that it “has always been of the view that [the Companies] may have been involved in the forgery of warehouse receipts and/or the potential fraud” and it filed OS 533 to answer questions about how the forgery or fraud had been perpetrated and whether third parties were involved.

  45. [49] The appellant had never expressly indicated that it intended to bring an action solely against the respondent in Singapore. This is only logical since any contemplated tortious claim against the respondent in Singapore should include the main protagonists, the Companies. While there is no rule that every alleged conspirator must be sued for an action in conspiracy to succeed, if the party omitted from the suit is a protagonist, the plaintiff may find it difficult to prove its case as a matter of evidence (JTrust Asia Pte Ltd v Group Lease Holdings Pte Ltd and others [2020] SGCA 54 at [88]). It was not disputed that the Companies would be the main wrongdoers in any action for fraud or conspiracy, and so the exclusion of the Companies from an action against the respondent would be fatal to any claim in conspiracy. Indeed, this was corroborated by the appellant’s commencement of the UK proceedings against the Companies.

  46. [50] As for knowing receipt, while we accepted that such a claim could be brought against the respondent alone without the Companies (see Relfo Ltd (in liquidation) v Bhimji Velji Jadva Varsani [2008] 4 SLR(R) 657 (“Relfo Ltd”) at [51]), there was simply no factual assertion or evidential substratum to support any such claim before us.

  47. (a) that the appellant’s assets had been disposed of in breach of trust and/or fiduciary duty;

  48. (b) that the respondent had beneficially received assets which were traceable as representing the assets of the appellant that had been wrongfully disposed of; and

  49. (c) that the respondent had knowledge that the assets that it had received were traceable to a breach of trust or fiduciary duty such that it would make it unconscionable for the respondent to retain the benefit of the assets.

  50. [52] It is thus crucial that there must be some material to the effect that the respondent had received assets which are traceable to the assets of the appellant. However, there was no such assertion raised by the appellant against the respondent. In short, there was simply no material before us to support a claim in knowing receipt, ie, it was a non-starter. Perhaps this might explain why the claim in knowing receipt was raised only in passing.

  51. [53] In our view, the appellant did not and could not have contemplated commencing proceedings in Singapore solely against the respondent. This is because any claim against the respondent would necessarily include the Companies and a claim against them in Singapore would be confronted by the exclusive jurisdiction clauses in the contracts governing the repurchasing agreements:

  52. [54] In Vinmar ([37] supra), this court held that where there is an exclusive jurisdiction clause in a contract, the court would lean in favour of granting a stay of proceedings so as to give effect to the parties’ agreement to bring all disputes within the scope of that agreement to the agreed forum (at [114]). A stay would only be refused if the party resisting the stay could demonstrate strong cause (at [112]). It is not disputed that any claims the appellant might have against the Companies are governed by the exclusive jurisdiction clauses. Had the appellant brought claims against the respondent and the Companies in Singapore, in all likelihood, the Companies would have been able to obtain a stay.

  53. [55] Since there was no realistic prospect of the appellant commencing action solely against the respondent in Singapore, the inference is that OS 533 was filed to obtain documents and information in aid of the UK proceedings. This inference is substantiated by the following sequence of events.

  54. [56] OS 533 was filed on 17 May 2017. The appellant claimed that at that time, it held the provisional intention to commence suit against the respondent in Singapore because the Companies were not contactable. This is plainly untenable.

  55. [58] It was material because the nature of pre-action disclosure is sensitive to the identity of the forum where the action is to be brought (see [40] above). The existence of the UK proceedings was clearly material and relevant in the exercise of the court’s discretion, in so far as it could demonstrate that the appellant had no genuine intention to commence an action in Singapore, and that OS 533 was thus brought for the collateral purpose of obtaining documents in support of foreign proceedings. For the reasons stated above, had the court’s attention been drawn to this fact, it would have concluded that no action against the respondent in Singapore could have been contemplated by the appellant and that would have been another ground on which to dismiss the application.

  56. [59] In proceeding with OS 533, the appellant had implicitly represented to the court that it still intended to commence proceedings against the respondent in Singapore despite knowing that this was not the case or at the very least no longer the case. It informed the AR that the UK proceedings only involved the Companies and not the respondent, highlighted that the causes of action did not involve conspiracy, and stated that it might not be able to obtain discovery against the respondent in the UK. By painting the UK proceedings as separate and unrelated to OS 533, it represented that it would pursue an action against the respondent in Singapore only.

  57. [60] OS 533 was fixed for three separate days of hearing in part because the appellant’s initial refusal to elaborate on the UK proceedings in an affidavit led to an adjournment. By the third and final hearing on 13 August 2018 when the AR gave her decision, the Companies had already filed their defence in the UK proceedings. That should have alerted the appellant to the fact that the action would be fought in the UK and it should have disclosed this information to the AR. Instead, the AR was under the impression that the Companies had yet to file their defence despite numerous extensions of time.

  58. [61] It was fallacious for the appellant to claim that no representation was made when it commenced OS 533 because a pre-action disclosure application could have revealed another forum which was more appropriate for the action. The appellant knew well before OS 533 was filed that its claim against the Companies was subject to the exclusive jurisdiction clauses. The contracts were in its possession and had been annexed to its affidavits in support of OS 533. Besides, the appellant did not demonstrate how the disclosed documents aided the appellant to decide that the claim against the respondent should be brought in the UK instead of Singapore. This assertion, in our view, was a contrived afterthought in an attempt to justify the improper use of the disclosed documents.

  59. [62] In light of the above, it appeared to us that, from the outset of the pre-action disclosure application, the appellant did not genuinely contemplate proceeding against the respondent in Singapore. We add that this finding is consistent with the AR’s finding that the appellant’s claims against the respondent in conspiracy and dishonest assistance were “speculative” (see [16] above). It would have been apparent to the appellant that any action would have to include the Companies and would thus have to be commenced before the English courts. Not only did it fail to disclose this information in court, it implicitly represented to the court that it would not commence proceedings against the respondent in the UK so that it could continue with its pre-action disclosure application.

  60. [63] The application for pre-action disclosure was an attempt to obtain documents and information to assist the appellant in the UK proceedings. That is not the purpose of the pre-action disclosure regime and the use of the disclosed documents in the UK proceedings therefore amounted to an abuse of process and could not be permitted to continue.

  61. The rationale and ambit of the Riddick principle

  62. [64] Given our decision that the injunction should be maintained on grounds of abuse of process, it is not strictly necessary to address the respondent’s alternative argument that use of the documents should also be enjoined under the Riddick principle, but we address it for completeness.

  63. [66] The Riddick principle states that a party who discloses a document in discovery in an action under compulsion is entitled to the protection of the court against any use of the document otherwise than in that action (Hong Lam Marine Pte Ltd and another v Koh Chye Heng [1998] 3 SLR(R) 526 (“Hong Lam Marine”) at [14]; Beckkett Pte Ltd v Deutsche Bank AG [2005] 3 SLR(R) 555 at [14]). The principle derives its name from the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Riddick v Thames Board Mills Ltd [1974] 1 QB 881 (“Riddick”). In articulating the rationale for the principle, Lord Denning MR observed that the court was balancing the public interest in discovering the truth and maintaining the disclosing party’s privacy and confidentiality (at 895–896):

  64. [67] As Hobhouse J elaborated in Prudential Assurance ([22] supra) at 765:

  65. [68] As these cases demonstrate, the Riddick principle is not engaged simply because information has been disclosed in the course of court proceedings. The critical factor is the element of compulsion that accompanies the discovery (see also Hong Lam Marine at [19] and [21], Derby & Co Ltd & Others v Weldon & Others The Times (20 October 1988) (“Derby”) at 5–6). It does not apply to disclosure that is voluntary and we elaborate on voluntariness below (see [82]).

  66. [72] We should add, as we have explained in some detail above, that the mere fact that the appellant’s use of the disclosed documents in the UK proceedings was not in breach of the Riddick principle does not mean that it was not an abuse of process. As we stated earlier, abuse of process is a broad concept that permeates all of civil procedure.

  67. [73] In fact, as we explained at the hearing, the Riddick principle is essentially an expression of the doctrine of abuse of process. Riddick involved an action for libel brought by Mr Riddick after he had been dismissed by his former employer on the basis of a memorandum. The memorandum had been disclosed in discovery in Mr Riddick’s previous unsuccessful suit against the employer for wrongful arrest and false imprisonment. One of the defences put forth by the employer was that the use of the memorandum in the libel action was an abuse of process of the court (at 902C). In identifying what became known as the Riddick principle, Lord Denning MR held that the courts should not allow any party to use documents disclosed under compulsion “for any ulterior or alien purpose” (at 896D). As we set out above, the commencement of litigation for a collateral purpose is an instance where the court will find an abuse of process.

  68. [74] The notion that the Riddick principle is a subset of the doctrine of abuse of process is evident in the judgment of Stephenson LJ in Riddick (at 902F–‍903A):

  69. [75] Similarly, Waller LJ observed (at 912C):

  70. [76] The restriction was conceived as an expression of the obligation to prevent collateral or alien use of the process of the court. In that regard, we agree with the Judge that the justification of the Riddick principle as an implied undertaking to the court not to use documents obtained by compulsion for an ulterior purpose does not reflect the actual basis for the restriction: see GD at [25]. The Judge opined that it would be preferable to confront potential abuses of the court process directly and characterise the restriction as an obligation imposed by the court to protect against an abuse of process, but was of the view that he was bound by other decisions of this court to utilise the formulation of an implied undertaking: GD at [25]. While in the present context we see little difference in substance between an obligation imposed by the court and an implied undertaking to the court, we agree that the court should confront abuses of process directly rather than impute specific intentions to parties. In this context, it has been demonstrated that the sole purpose of pre-action disclosure is to obtain information to commence proceedings in Singapore, and the use of the information elsewhere, including the UK proceedings, would be for a collateral purpose and therefore an abuse of process (see [42] above). In our view, this can provide the premise to establish an abuse of process without extending the Riddick principle.

  71. [78] The documents in Prudential Assurance were witness statements and an expert report that had been served by the plaintiffs on the defendant prior to trial pursuant to the relevant English rules of court. As the matter was settled before trial, the witnesses never testified and the documents were not used in open court. The defendant subsequently participated in separate proceedings in Texas and sought to use those documents, but the plaintiffs objected. Hobhouse J held that the Riddick principle did not apply because there was no compulsion (see [67] above), but observed (at 770):

  72. [79] Hobhouse J then examined the relevant English rules of court. While the rule governing expert reports stated that the recipient was entitled to use the expert report in unqualified terms, the rule that governed witness statements provided that where a party serving the statement did not call the witness to whose evidence it relates, no other party may use the statement in evidence at trial. Therefore, expert reports could be used in other actions but witness statements remained privileged (at 773).

  73. [80] To the extent that Hobhouse J referred to the existence of a duty deriving from the circumstances of the case and the relevant rules of court (at 770B), we believe he was essentially relying on the broad concept of abuse of process. The inference from the rule governing witness statements was that the statements would be served on the other party so that it may be put in evidence at the trial if the witness was called to give evidence (at 773E). Apart from the trial, “the receiving party and his solicitor may not use the material nor allow it to be used for any purpose other than the proper conduct of that action on behalf of the receiving party and may not use it or allow it to be used for any collateral or ulterior purpose” (at 773F). The purpose of the witness statement was for its use at that same trial and, as there was no trial, the statements should not have been used for the collateral purpose of an action elsewhere. While we accept that the decision in Prudential Assurance was another expression of the doctrine of abuse of process, we do not think it is necessary to ground our decision on an obligation analogous to that under the Riddick principle. In our judgment, it would suffice to rely on the broad doctrine of abuse of process without needing to extend the Riddick principle or to recognise an obligation analogous to it.

  74. Involuntary disclosure in relation to pre-action disclosure

  75. [84] Mr Pillai cited the English decision of Derby ([68] supra), which concerned documents disclosed by the respondents to resist an application by the Salomon Group for a Mareva injunction. The respondents’ affidavits attempted to show that the Salomon Group did not have a good arguable case and that the respondents were unlikely to dissipate their assets. A third party subsequently obtained a subpoena against the Salomon Group to produce these affidavits in proceedings in New York. The respondents resisted this and submitted that there was an implied obligation on the Salomon Group not to disclose those documents based on the Riddick principle. Sir Nicholas Browne-Wilkinson VC rejected that submission (at 5–6):

  76. [85] He then explained why he found that the disclosure of the affidavits had been done voluntarily and the Riddick principle did not apply (Derby at 6):

  77. [86] Mr Pillai submitted that Derby was authority for the proposition that affidavits filed to resist an application would be treated as having been filed voluntarily. As the specific issue in Derby was strictly not before us, it is not necessary for this court to express any concluded view as to whether documents disclosed to resist an application for a Mareva injunction in one action could be used for another unrelated action. Nonetheless, we did not think that Derby assisted the appellant’s argument. In our view, the context of pre-action disclosure matters. The entire purpose of the application was to obtain discovery and interrogatories. The disclosed documents contained some of the documents and all of the information that the appellant had requested in OS 533. In this context, we could not accept the submission that the disclosed documents were thrust upon the appellant voluntarily when the appellant had initiated court proceedings precisely to obtain them.

  78. [88] As for the respondent’s description of its own actions as “voluntary” in the course of proceedings before the AR, we agree with the Judge that this was in the context of demonstrating its cooperativeness with the court process: GD at [34]. Certainly, the respondent’s willingness to disclose some information was of assistance to the AR in reaching her decision in OS 533.

  79. [91] An express reservation of rights also formed part of the basis of this court’s decision in BNX v BOE ([69] supra), which involved BNX’s application to adduce documents that it had obtained in a separate suit with a third party, A.

  80. The open justice exception

  81. [94] The Judge also considered the open justice principle: GD at [44]. In light of our decision, it was not necessary to examine whether the open justice principle operates as an exception to the Riddick principle.

  82. Conclusion