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Grounds publishedDecided 14 Aug 2020

Court of Appeal

Lim Suk Ling Priscilla and another v Amber Compounding Pharmacy Pte Ltd and another and another appeal and another matter

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[2020] SGCA 76Case no. Civil Appeal No 226 of 2019

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  1. Introduction

  2. [3] This appeal has provided this court with the timely opportunity to revisit some of its earlier decisions on the relevant considerations in granting such leave. On this occasion, we have the benefit of leading decisions on this issue from several Commonwealth jurisdictions. In this judgment, given that the purpose of the application is to facilitate the reporting of alleged criminal offences, it will be particularly relevant to examine how the privilege against self-incrimination will feature in the exercise of the court’s discretion and whether the motive of the applicant is relevant in the ultimate analysis.

  3. Facts

  4. The parties

  5. [4] Amber Compounding Pharmacy Pte Ltd and Amber Laboratories Pte Ltd (collectively, “Amber”) are in the specialized trade of compounding medical and pharmaceutical products, which involves preparing personalized medications for patients based on prescriptions. Lim Suk Ling Priscilla (“Lim”) worked for Amber before setting up UrbanRx Compounding Pharmacy Pte Ltd (“UrbanRx”), a company which is in the same business as Amber.

  6. The search orders

  7. [5] On 14 February 2018, Amber commenced the present action against Lim and UrbanRx (collectively, “the defendants”), claiming, among other things, that they had misappropriated Amber’s confidential information and trade secrets for the purposes of benefitting UrbanRx’s business. The alleged information which had been misappropriated included lists of Amber’s patients, clients, prices, stocks, vendors, and standard operating procedures. Such lists, it was alleged, were specific to Amber’s operations, and constituted sensitive information that had to be strictly guarded.

  8. [6] To support its claim against the defendants, on 15 March 2018, Amber applied ex parte for search orders against the defendants. The events surrounding the execution of the search orders are highly relevant in informing the parties’ understanding on the specific ambit and purpose of the search orders, and it will thus be useful to set them out in some detail.

  9. [7] The purpose of the search orders was to retrieve the confidential information which had been purportedly misappropriated by the defendants before it was deleted by the defendants. Such information could then be used in support of Amber’s action against the defendants.

  10. [9] Pursuant to its submissions, Amber sought, as against both defendants, the disclosure of the following items:

  11. (a) all e-mail correspondence on the defendants’ email accounts (“item (a)”);

  12. (b) all electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other data processing devices which could process, store, communicate data, such as computers, mobile phones, thumb drives and other electronic items (“item (b)”); and

  13. (c) all documents, plans, drawings, notes, memoranda, and power point slides (whether in soft or physical copy) relating to the trade secrets and/or confidential and/or proprietary information of Amber (“item (c)”).

  14. [10] As against UrbanRx alone, Amber further sought the disclosure of:

  15. (a) samples of all products marketed by UrbanRx and sold by UrbanRx to the public (“item (d)”); and

  16. (b) samples of all products marketed by UrbanRx and sold by UrbanRx to clinics that were customers of UrbanRx (“item (e)”).

  17. [11] On 3 April 2018, the High Court Judge (“the Judge”) granted the search orders with respect to items (a), (b) and (c). As regards items (d) and (e), the Judge noted those items were “in relation to [UrbanRx’s] property and not [Amber’s] property, and ha[d]nothing to do with preservation of [Amber’s] property”. Accordingly, the Judge did not grant leave to search for and seize items (d) and (e).

  18. [13] Both search orders were executed on 17 April 2018, in the presence of Lim and a supervising solicitor. In total, more than 100,000 documents were seized pursuant to the search orders.

  19. The setting-aside application and Listing Exercise

  20. [14] About a month after the execution of the search orders, on 10 May 2018, the defendants filed HC/SUM 2169/2018 to set aside the search orders (“the setting-aside application”). In the application, the defendants prayed, inter alia, for the discharge of the search orders, for Amber to return all items seized pursuant to the said orders, and for Amber to destroy all duplicates, copies and/or imaging of all items made during the searches. To support the application, the defendants alleged that: (a) there were irregularities in the execution of the search orders as the solicitors who had supervised the search did not advise the defendants of their right to refuse entry to “anyone who could gain commercially from anything he might read or see on the premises”; (b) Amber had not returned the originals of all the seized documents within two days of their removal, in breach of Paragraph 2 of Schedule 4 of the search orders; and (c) the ambit of the search orders was too wide, as it gave Amber “carte blanche to all documents belonging/relating” to the defendants.

  21. [15] The Judge first heard the setting-aside application at a Judge Pre-Trial Conference (“JPTC”) on 23 May 2018. During the hearing, the Judge fixed the timelines for the filing of affidavits and submissions in relation to the setting-aside application. She also directed the parties to sort out the seized documents that clearly belonged to either Amber or the defendants.

  22. [16] On 31 May 2018, solicitors for both parties provided their signed express undertakings not to hand over the seized documents to their respective clients “and/or any other 3rd party and/or any other solicitors”.

  23. [17] On 4 June 2018, the parties appeared before the Judge again, and Amber’s then-counsel informed the court that solicitors’ undertakings had been provided to each other not to release any of the documents to any other parties. Both Amber’s and the defendants’ counsel agreed that documents which belonged to the other party ought to be returned to that party. However, the defendants’ counsel, Mr George Pereira, reserved the defendants’ position that Amber was not entitled to take whatever documents it wanted.

  24. [19] The parties returned before the Judge on 18 July 2018. Instead of dealing with the setting-aside application proper, the Judge directed, based on their agreement that the documents would be returned to their rightful owners, that the parties were to carry out a “Listing Exercise”, whereby:

  25. (a) Amber was to determine the ownership of the documents based on 32 search terms by 8 August 2018. The list of these documents was to be provided to the defendants by 22 August 2018.

  26. (b) Based on that list, both counsel were to agree on which documents belonged to Amber and the defendants respectively. Any disputed documents would be listed separately.

  27. (c) All documents which indubitably belonged to Amber or the defendants were to be returned to the respective owners and deleted/destroyed by the other party, who was not to keep the document in any form. This was to be done by 12 September 2018.

  28. (d) Any documents in the disputed list would be returned to the defendants’ counsel only. They were not to be kept in any form by any party. This was to be done by 17 September 2018.

  29. [21] The Listing Exercise was however not completed by 16 November 2018.

  30. Leave application

  31. [22] As it transpired, while Amber was conducting the Listing Exercise, it had apparently formed the opinion that certain documents (“the Documents”) were probative of various criminal offences:

  32. (a) First, the defendants had falsely claimed that four local persons were employees of UrbanRx to inflate UrbanRx’s foreign worker entitlement for the purpose of obtaining an S-Pass for a foreign employee, one Jose Marc Alinio (“Marc”). Further, Lim had purportedly hired her sister, Lydia Lim (“Lydia”), as another foreign employee, without a valid work permit. These constituted offences under the Employment of Foreign Manpower Act (Cap 91A, 2009 Rev Ed) (“EFMA”).

  33. (b) Second, Lim was responsible for an incident whereby staple bullets were found in Amber Pharmacy’s products (the “staple saga”), and this constituted an offence of mischief under s 425 of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed) (“Penal Code”).

  34. (c) Third, Lim had instructed or made arrangements with Marc while he was in the employ of Amber Pharmacy to siphon Amber Pharmacy’s business to UrbanRx. This was an offence under s 6(b) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (Cap 241, 1993 Rev Ed) (“PCA”), which states that it is an offence for any person to corruptly give or agree to give any gratification to any agent as an inducement or reward for doing any act in relation to his principal’s business.

  35. (d) Fourth, Lim had inserted her personal thumb drive into a computer belonging to Amber without authorisation and downloaded many documents, some of which were seized under the search orders, and this constituted an offence under s 3(1) of the Computer Misuse Act (Cap 50A, 2007 Rev Ed) (“CMA”).

  36. [23] Spurred by the view that “serious criminal offences” had been committed by the defendants, and allegedly out of civic-mindedness, Amber’s representative, Sudesh Samuel, made reports to the Singapore Police Force, Ministry of Manpower, and the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (collectively, “the authorities”), disclosing ten of the Documents or excerpts of them in the process. These reports were allegedly made “in or around the 3rd Quarter of 2018.” It is not clear whether the reports were made with or without legal advice, though we observe that it is likely that some legal input must have been provided in identifying the above offences.

  37. [24] On 14 December 2018, after the reports were made, Lee & Lee was appointed to take over the conduct of the matter from Amber’s previous solicitors.

  38. [25] On 23 January 2019, at a pre-trial conference (“PTC”) before the senior assistant registrar (“SAR”), Lee & Lee explained that Amber’s persistent failure to comply with the timelines set by the Judge for the Listing Exercise was due to “the sheer number of documents involved”. No mention whatsoever was made about the use of certain documents for the reports to the authorities.

  39. [26] In the meantime, on 25 January 2019, Lee & Lee wrote to the defendants’ solicitors to seek their consent for an extension of time for the Listing Exercise to be completed by 5 April 2019. Again, no mention whatsoever was made that various documents belonging to the defendants had been used in making reports to the authorities without leave of court. The impression given by Amber was that it was still endeavouring to sort out the ownership of the seized documents, so as to comply with the Judge’s direction to return the defendants’ documents.

  40. [27] Subsequently, on 29 January 2019, Amber took out the present leave application (HC/SUM 484/2019) ex parte seeking, among other orders, prospective and retrospective leave to use the Documents for the purpose of making reports to the authorities. According to Amber, having recently instructed Lee & Lee, it was “informed and advised that it would be best – indeed, necessary … to seek leave” of court to use the Documents in support of the reports given, or further reports to be made.

  41. [28] As the leave application was taken out ex parte, the defendants did not have notice of the extraneous purpose which Amber had used, and was seeking to use, the Documents for. Without such knowledge, on 31 January 2019, the defendants agreed to the extension of time sought by Amber to comply with the Listing Exercise. Based on the defendants’ agreement, on 8 February 2019, the Judge granted Amber an extension of time to comply with the terms of the Listing Exercise by April 2019.

  42. [29] After the extension of time was obtained, and because the Judge had directed, on 8 February 2019, that Amber serve the summons for leave and the supporting affidavit on the defendants, Amber served the papers on the defendants on 12 February 2019. This was when the defendants first came to know that Amber had used, and intended to use, the Documents for the extraneous purpose of making criminal reports to the authorities. Prior to that, the impression which Amber had given to the court and to the defendants was that it was taking time to comply with the Listing Exercise (which only required the parties to determine the ownership of the seized documents) because of “the sheer number of documents involved”.

  43. The Judge’s decision

  44. [31] The Judge recognised that leave of court was required before a party could be released from the Riddick undertaking. Surveying the various approaches in the Commonwealth, she concluded that a “balancing exercise”, whereby the court takes into account factors such as the nature and severity of the potential offence, the cogency of the evidence sought to be disclosed with respect to the potential offences, and the prejudice that might be occasioned to the respondent by the disclosure, was to be adopted (GD at [31]).

  45. [32] Applying the test to the facts, she held that the Documents pertaining to the EFMA offences could be disclosed, as the nature of the offences was serious, deterrence against such offences was required, and the materials sought to be disclosed were cogent evidence of the offences. There was also no adequate civil remedy, and the prospect of criminal investigation would not without more amount to injustice to the defendants (GD at [35]–[38]). The Judge was also unable to conclude that Amber had been motivated by an improper purpose, or that it had acted out of malice in seeking leave for the relevant disclosures (GD at [41]). The Judge found that the privilege against self-incrimination had been waived, as the defendants failed to assert it at the time of the search orders, or thereafter when the setting-aside application was made (GD at [59]–[61]). For much the same reasons, retrospective leave was also granted for the EFMA documents (GD at [66]).

  46. [33] However, leave was refused for the Documents which related to the other offences, as the evidence in this regard was insufficiently cogent, and there were also adequate civil remedies available for Amber to pursue (GD at [46]–‍[54]).

  47. [34] Thus, Amber was granted leave (and retrospective leave) to disclose 23 of the 32 Documents (GD at [70]). Leave was denied for the remaining nine documents, which pertained to the alleged Penal Code, PCA and CMA offences.

  48. The parties’ submissions on appeal

  49. [35] Both parties appealed against the Judge’s decision. As both appeals relate to the same issue as to whether leave ought to be granted vis-à-vis the Documents, the appeals will be referred to collectively, as an “appeal”.

  50. [36] In their submissions, the defendants raised the preliminary issue that the Judge ought not to have heard Amber’s leave application as it was (and remains) in contempt of court. Furthermore, even if there were cogent and persuasive reasons for leave to be granted, the real risk of investigation and prosecution which the defendants could suffer ought to have barred Amber from being released from its Riddick undertaking (see Beckkett Pte Ltd v Deutsche Bank AG [2005] 3 SLR(R) 555 (“Beckkett”) at [19]). The same result would have been reached by the balancing exercise, as Amber had been motivated by the improper purpose to disrupt the defendants’ business and to bring to bear pressure on the defendants to settle the suit. The prejudice which the defendants would suffer was also relevant, and the Documents were not cogent evidence of the alleged offences.

  51. [38] As regards the substantive appeal, Mr Afzal Ali (“Mr Ali”), Amber’s newly appointed counsel who had taken over conduct from Lee & Lee, proffered a two-step test, under which leave would be granted if (a) there was prima facie evidence of criminal conduct in the documents sought to be disclosed; and (b) the court was satisfied that the person applying for leave is not acting for an improper purpose (eg, acting out of spite or malice). Applying this test, leave ought to be granted for all the Documents, as there was prima facie evidence of criminal wrongdoing, and Amber was not motivated by any improper purpose. Alternatively, applying the balancing approach, the Documents constituted cogent evidence of the offences, which are serious, and the potential harm that could have been caused to Amber warranted further investigation. The availability of civil remedies did not lessen the public interest in investigating and prosecuting such acts. The privilege against self-incrimination had also been waived, as it was not timeously asserted. Hence, leave ought to have been granted for all the Documents.

  52. The issues on appeal

  53. [39] Flowing from the parties’ submissions, the issues that arise on appeal are:

  54. (a) whether this court ought to hear Amber in this appeal, given the allegations of contempt levied by the defendants;

  55. (c) applying the test set out in (b), which, if any, of the Documents may be disclosed; and

  56. (d) finally, whether Amber should be granted retrospective leave for the Documents which have already been disclosed to the authorities.

  57. Preliminary issue

  58. [41] Similarly, in the present case, the preliminary objection was not raised before the Judge below, when Amber was already allegedly in contempt of the court’s orders. Hence, it would not be “fair or just to deny [Amber] a hearing” on appeal (Lee v Tang at [12]). This is especially so as the arguments that the defendants are relying on in their preliminary objection are essentially similar to the arguments that will be ventilated in the committal proceedings, which is pending and due to be heard after the present summons for leave is disposed of. It would thus be premature for this court to deny Amber its right to be heard on the premise of such arguments.

  59. Test for disclosure of documents

  60. [42] Turning to the main issue on the appropriate test for determining whether leave ought to be granted to Amber to disclose the Documents to the authorities, this court held in Beckkett (([36] supra) at [18]) that “a discovering party should only be released from its implied undertaking on the discovered documents in special or exceptional circumstances which warrant overriding the public interest in encouraging full disclosure” [emphasis added].

  61. [44] The dispute therefore centres on the appropriate test to be applied before such release may be granted.

  62. The balancing of interests test

  63. [45] As the Judge observed after her extensive review of the relevant decisions in England, Australia, Canada and Hong Kong, the weight of the authorities in the Commonwealth demonstrates that, in determining whether a party ought to be granted leave to be released from its Riddick undertaking, a balancing of interests test is to be adopted (see GD at [21]–[31]).

  64. [46] Under this balancing of interests approach, the court will be required to engage in a multifactorial balancing exercise, and leave will only be granted if, in all the circumstances of the case, the interests advanced for the extraneous use of the disclosed documents outweigh the interests that are protected by the Riddick undertaking (see, for England: ACL Netherlands BV and others v Michael Richard Lynch and another [2019] EWHC 249 (Ch) (“ACL Netherlands”) at [49], O Ltd v Z [2005] EWHC 238 (Ch) (“O Ltd v Z”) at [72]–‍[81] and Marlwood Commercial Inc v Kozeny and others and another matter [2004] 3 All ER 648 (“Marlwood”) at [45]–[46]; for Canada: Suzette F Juman also known as Suzette McKenzie v Jade Kathleen Ledenko Doucette, by her litigation guardian [2008] 1 SCR 157 (“Doucette (SC)”) at [33]; for Hong Kong: Secretary for Justice v Florence Tsang Chiu Wing & ors [2014] 6 HKC 285 (“Florence Tsang”) at [23], Re NDT (BVI) Trading Limited [2009] HKCU 1593 (“Re NDT”) at [6]–[7] and Unicredit Bank Austria AG v Dragon Wise Trading Ltd [2013] HKCU 331 at [8]; for Australia: Bailey v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [1995] 1 Qd R 476 (“Bailey”) at 486 and Ambridge Investments Pty Ltd v Baker (No 3) [2010] VSC 545 at [33]–[35]).

  65. [47] The injustice (or lack thereof) to the disclosing party and the privileges which may be asserted are relevant factors which would feature in the balancing exercise (Marlwood at [46]; Doucette (SC) at [33]; Florence Tsang at [23] and [29]; O Ltd v Z at [37] and [75]–[81]), though as explained at [72] below, the weight to be accorded to such factors is necessarily fact-specific.

  66. A “crimes exception”?

  67. [48] Against the weight of the authorities, Mr Ali submits that the court ought not to engage in a multifactorial balancing exercise to determine if the public interest in the investigation of potential crimes is sufficiently compelling to justify a release from the Riddick undertaking. Instead, under Mr Ali’s proposed two-step test, leave ought to be granted if (a) there is prima facie evidence of criminal conduct in the documents sought to be disclosed; and (b) the court is satisfied that the person applying for leave is not acting for an improper purpose (eg, acting out of spite or malice). Mr Ali further submits that a multifactorial balancing approach would be “unprincipled as it arrogates to the Court a function constitutionally vested in the Attorney-General”.

  68. [49] In support, Mr Ali relies on the House of Lords’ decision in Rank Film Distributors Ltd and others v Video Information Centre (a firm) and others [1982] AC 380 (“Rank Film”), where Lord Fraser of Tullybelton remarked (at 447) that:

  69. [50] Taken at face value, his Lordship’s observations may be construed as suggesting that the implied undertaking would inevitably be lifted where the disclosure is for the purpose of initiating or furthering a criminal prosecution. This has been referred to as the “crimes exception”. However, as seen by the emphasised portions of Lord Fraser’s quote, his Lordship was in any case referring to serious offences only, and even then, the earlier use of “might” suggests that the public interest in favour of disclosure may not always override the public interest in the administration of justice.

  70. [51] Nonetheless, inasmuch as Lord Fraser’s dictum may be viewed as authority for a broad-based crimes exception, Mr Ali submits that such an exception would not be overly expansive, as it could be subject to the qualification that the person applying for leave is not acting for an improper motive. This safeguard accords with the approach of the Court of Appeal for British Columbia in Doucette (litigation guardian of) v Wee Watch Day Care Systems Inc [2006] BCJ No 1176 (“Doucette (CA)”), where Kirkpatrick JA (with whom Newbury and Low JJA agreed) concluded that “the [implied] undertaking in the action cannot form a shield from the detection and prosecution of crimes in which the public has an overriding interest” (at [48]). In her view (at [56]),

  71. [52] We do not accept Mr Ali’s submission. As the Supreme Court of Canada observed in Doucette (SC) ([46] supra) at [49], the good faith of the applicant is not directly relevant to the court’s rationale for granting relief against the Riddick undertaking:

  72. [53] Hence, the focus is on the balance to be struck between the competing interests, not on the motives of the applicant per se without considering the other factors. In other words, it is essential to situate the motive of the applicant in the specific context of each case.

  73. [54] More importantly, a broad-based “crimes exception” assumes that every evidence of criminal conduct deserves equal treatment. However, “evidence relating to a crime may vary from mere suspicion to blatant admissions, from peripheral clues to direct evidence, from minor offences to the most heinous” (Doucette (SC) at [43], citing the decision of the first instance judge in Doucette (litigation guardian of) v Wee Watch Day Care Systems Inc [2005] BCJ No 589 at [27]). The Supreme Court then observed that “[t]his difficulty is compounded by the fact that parties to civil litigation are often quick to see the supposed criminality in what their opponents are up to, or at least to appreciate the tactical advantage that threats to go to the police may achieve” (Doucette (SC) at [43]).

  74. [55] Similar observations were made in the Australian case of Bailey ([46] supra). After considering Lord Fraser’s observations in Rank Film ( [49] supra), the judge remarked (Bailey at 486):

  75. [56] Also, in Reebok ([43] supra), Chan Sek Keong J (as he then was) declined to adopt a broad-brushed approach towards the use of documents in aid of criminal proceedings, holding (at [36]):

  76. [57] Hence, notwithstanding the force of Mr Ali’s argument to adopt the practical simplicity of a broad-based “crimes exception”, we reject such an approach. Instead, “each case must turn on its own individual facts”, and a party ought not to be released from its Riddick undertaking unless “special circumstances” can be shown (Crest Homes ([43] supra) at 860). As seen by the authorities that have followed Crest Homes, this entails a careful balancing of the competing interests. For completeness, we should add that we do not agree with Mr Ali’s submission that the adoption of a multifactorial balancing exercise would interfere with the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. A balancing of competing interests undertaken by the court is to protect its own processes from abuse. That is well within the remit of the court and has nothing to do with the exercise of prosecutorial discretion which remains vested in the Attorney-General.

  77. Clarifying the Beckkett conditions

  78. [58] In this vein, we would like to take the opportunity to clarify this court’s decision in Beckkett ([36] supra) where we held that a party seeking leave to be released from its Riddick undertaking has to demonstrate (a) cogent and persuasive reasons; and (b) that no prejudice or injustice would result to the other party by such disclosure (Beckkett at [19]). These twin requirements have been termed the Beckkett conditions and are conjunctive. Hence, even if cogent and persuasive reasons can be shown, any prejudice or injustice to the party who had provided disclosure would typically tilt the scales back in favour of denying leave, as was aptly demonstrated on the facts in Beckkett.

  79. [59] In that case, the appellant (“Beckkett”) had obtained pre-action discovery against Deutsche Bank AG (“DB”). From the discovery, it emerged that the bank had sold its pledged shares to a third party (“DSM”). Beckkett (who was the owner of the pledged shares) subsequently commenced a Singapore action against the bank and the third party, claiming that the pledged shares had been sold at a gross undervalue. While the Singapore action was taking its course, Beckkett received information that DSM was planning to sell the shares that it had bought from DB. Seeking to restrain the sale, Beckkett sought leave to use the documents which it had obtained during pre-action discovery in the Singapore action to apply for an injunction in Indonesia. This court upheld the High Court Judge’s decision to deny leave to Beckkett to use the documents (at [42]):

  80. [60] It seems to us that the Beckett conditions could be construed to mean that regardless of the cogency and persuasiveness of the reasons proffered by Beckkett in favour of disclosure, it was the court’s view that leave would not be granted for the sole reason that the prospect of criminal prosecution against DB amounted to prejudice to the disclosing party, DB. In other words, prejudice to the disclosing party appeared to operate as an overriding factor against the grant of leave.

  81. [61] Having reviewed the authorities above, which weigh heavily in favour of a balancing of interests approach, we find the Beckkett conditions to be inconsistent with both precedents and principle. We elaborate.

  82. (1) The Beckkett conditions are inconsistent with precedents

  83. [62] In Reebok ([43] supra), the plaintiff sought, inter alia, leave to send certain pairs of shoes which it had seized from the defendant in Singapore proceedings to Taiwan, so as to assist criminal proceedings against the alleged manufacturers of the shoes. Considering that the potential penal consequences that could befall the alleged manufacturer was not entirely out of proportion and/or cruel or unusual, the judge adjourned the application to allow the plaintiff to adduce evidence to satisfy him that the criminal charges against the purported manufacturer indeed concerned the manufacture of the said shoes (Reebok at [36]–[37] and [41]). This demonstrates that prejudice, while relevant, is not necessarily an overriding factor that would invariably prevent the lifting of the Riddick undertaking.

  84. [63] Such an approach, which accords due weight, but not necessarily overriding weight, to the factor of prejudice, has similarly been adopted in other jurisdictions. For example, in Smith v Jones [1999] 1 SCR 455 (“Smith v Jones”), the Supreme Court of Canada held that the prejudice which could be suffered by the accused person upon the release of privileged communications with his psychiatrist was outweighed by the “clear and imminent threat of serious bodily harm to an identifiable group” (at [84]).

  85. [65] In Bailey ([46] supra), the Australian court also found that while the defendants could suffer the prejudice of being subject to criminal investigation and prosecution in the event that the disclosed documents were handed to the authorities, “the public interest in investigating the possibility of any criminal activity… outweighs the public interest in requiring strict adherence to the plaintiff’s [Riddick] undertaking” (at 490).

  86. (2) The Beckkett conditions are inconsistent with principle

  87. [66] It should be observed that the Riddick undertaking is not intended to prevent prejudice to the disclosing party per se. Rather, its object is to promote openness in discovery while simultaneously protecting the disclosing party’s right to privacy (see Process Development Ltd v Hogg [1996] FSR 45 at 51 and BNX v BOE and another appeal [2018] 2 SLR 215 at [64]). It is these twin objects that inevitably feature in the court’s consideration in any application to release a party from its Riddick undertaking, and the factor of prejudice is not invariably a factor to be given weight, let alone overriding weight.

  88. [68] Hence, following the approach adopted in the decisions above, we find that prejudice is but a factor which may be accorded relevance, and the appropriate weight to be given to it would depend on the entire circumstances of each case (Bailey ([46] supra) at 488, and ACL Netherlands ([46] supra) at [49], citing AG v May ([64] supra)).

  89. The applicable test

  90. [69] The general tenor of the authorities demonstrates that a balancing exercise is to be conducted in determining whether the circumstances are such as to justify lifting the Riddick undertaking. Under this balancing approach, while the Beckkett conditions appear to give prejudice overriding weight as a matter of course, other decisions in Singapore and several other jurisdictions demonstrate that prejudice is but a factor amongst others, with the appropriate weight dependent on the specific circumstances of each case. A consideration of the rationale underpinning the Riddick undertaking supports such an approach.

  91. [70] Surveying the authorities, the following are non-exhaustive factors which may be considered in determining whether the circumstances warrant the release of the Riddick undertaking.

  92. [71] On the one hand, the following factors have been raised in favour of lifting the undertaking:

  93. (a) Countervailing legislative policy: Legislative policy may provide countervailing considerations to support the lifting of the Riddick undertaking (see Doucette (SC) ([46] supra) at [39]). For example, ss 175 and 176 of the Penal Code provide that whoever, being legally bound “to produce or deliver up any document or electronic record” or “to give notice or to furnish information on any subject” to a public servant, but who intentionally omits to do so, shall be punished with imprisonment for up to a month, a fine of up to $1,500, or with both. In such situations, it is an offence in itself not to provide the relevant document or information to the authorities, notwithstanding that the relevant document or information may be subject to the Riddick undertaking. The prospect of the disclosing party being in contravention of the law by adhering to the Riddick undertaking is a weighty factor in favour of the lifting the undertaking. However, the weight to be placed on this factor may be overridden, for example, if the prejudice to the disclosing party would be entirely disproportionate with the offence(s) disclosed, or if the party seeking to be released from the undertaking is acting with grossly improper purposes, under the guise of complying with its legal obligations (see [71(c)] and [72(b)] below).

  94. (b) Support of related proceedings: The disclosed documents may also be used in support of related civil or criminal proceedings, whether domestic or foreign (see Crest Homes ([43] supra), Marlwood ([46] supra), Bailey ([46] supra) and Reebok ([43] supra). This is because there is a “strong countervailing public interest in ensuring that all relevant evidence which may be required … [is] before the court” (Microsoft Corp and others v SM Summit Holdings Ltd and another [1999] 3 SLR(R) 1017 (“Microsoft Corp (HC)”) at [35]). In this respect, the identity of the parties and the nature of the related proceedings is relevant (Crest Homes at 860; Reebok at [32]). Hence, in Crest Homes, where the related proceedings involved the same parties and as it was “purely adventitious that there happened to be two actions”, the court was satisfied that releasing the plaintiff from its undertaking would not “detract from the solemnity and importance of the [Riddick] undertaking” (Crest Homes at 860–861; see also Sybron Corporation and another v Barclays Bank Plc [1985] 1 Ch 299 at 326–328). Documents obtained on discovery may also be utilised to discredit a witness’ contradictory testimony in a separate action (Re NDT ([46] supra) at [11]–[13]), as “[a]n undertaking implied by the court … to make civil litigation more effective should not permit a witness to play games with the administration of justice” by tailoring his evidence to suit his needs in each particular proceeding (Doucette (SC) at [41]).

  95. (c) Investigation and prosecution of criminal offence(s): Another public interest in favour of release may be the location and prosecution of criminal offence(s). In determining the weight to be given to this interest, the Court may consider, among others: (a) whether civil remedies are available; (b) the cogency of the evidence to be adduced in support of the offence; (c) the body or authority to which the documents will be disclosed to; (d) the seriousness of the crime reported; and (e) the proportionality of the potential penal sanctions (Reebok at [36]; Bailey at 488; O Ltd v Z ([46] supra) at [76]–[77]; Prime Finance Pty Limited and ors v Randall and ors [2009] NSWSC 361 at [39]). In relation to (e), it has been observed that the court would not allow the use of disclosed information or documents against another party in support of criminal proceedings abroad “if, for example, the punishment for an offence involving an infringement of intellectual property rights may be imprisonment for life, or worse, or some other form of cruel or unusual punishment” (Reebok at [36]). When considering the weight to be accorded to this factor, the privilege against self-incrimination, if timeously asserted, would also feature prominently in the balancing exercise (see [72(c)] below).

  96. (d) Public safety concerns raised by the disclosed documents, such as concerns of paedophilia (O Ltd v Z) or a plan to commit heinous crimes against an identifiable person or group or persons (Smith v Jones ([63] supra)) may warrant a lifting of the undertaking, especially if there is a threat of “immediate and serious danger” (Doucette (SC) at [40]). This factor is closely tied to and may overlap with factor (c).

  97. (e) International comity: Concerns of international comity may also be relevant. For instance, in Marlwood ([46] supra), the claimants brought civil proceedings in the English High Court against the defendants, complaining of fraudulent misrepresentation. In the course of the English proceedings, the defendants disclosed certain documents. In the meantime, criminal investigations into the affairs of the first defendant were being carried out by the District Attorney of New York, who sought the assistance of the United Kingdom’s Secretary of State. Pursuant to the request, a notice was served on the claimants’ solicitors to produce copies of documents disclosed by the defendants to the claimants in the course of the English proceedings. The English Court of Appeal granted leave to the claimants to release the disclosed documents. In the court’s view, the public interest in the investigation of fraud, coupled with the public interest in mutual international assistance, which were interests that were reflected in English legislations, took precedence over the “ general concern of the courts to control the collateral use of compulsorily disclosed documents” (Marlwood at [46] and [52]).

  98. [72] The factors in favour of granting leave are then to be balanced against the interests sought to be protected by the Riddick undertaking, namely the public interest in encouraging full disclosure and the disclosing party’s privacy interests (Crest Homes ([43] supra) at 861; ACL Netherlands ([46] supra) at [53]; Bailey at 488). Other factors which may militate against the grant of leave include:

  99. (a) Injustice or prejudice to the disclosing party (Beckkett ([36] supra) at [42]; Crest Homes at 860; Doucette (SC) at [33]). However, where no irremediable prejudice is demonstrated, this factor may be accorded little weight. Hence, in AG v May ([64] supra) at 1010, the English court lifted the Riddick undertaking as there was no suggestion of any specific prejudice to the first defendant otherwise than in relation to its privilege against self-incrimination, which the court was satisfied could be fully protected in the Gibraltar criminal proceedings (see also Bailey at 490–491).

  100. (b) Improper purpose for which leave is sought: While “[i]nformants are valued for what they can tell [and] not for their worthy motives” (Doucette (SC) at [49]), the court nonetheless has a general concern to control the collateral use of disclosed documents (Marlwood at [47] and [52]). This bears relation to the concept of abuse of process, which “pervades the whole law of civil (and criminal) procedure”, and by which the court ascertains “whether the proceedings in question constitute an ‘improper use of its machinery’” (JTrust Asia Pte Ltd v Group Lease Holdings Pte Ltd and others [2018] 2 SLR 159 at [99], citing Gabriel Peter & Partners v Wee Chong Jin [1997] 3 SLR(R) 649 at [22]; see also Microsoft Corp and others v SM Summit Holdings Ltd and another and other appeals [1999] 3 SLR(R) 465 (“Microsoft Corp (CA)”) at [36]). Hence, where relevant, the court may also consider whether the application has been brought for some personal advantage or improper purpose (North East Equity Pty Ltd v Goldenwest Equities Pty Ltd [2008] WASC 190 at [44]). For example, in 755568 Ontario Ltd v Linchris Homes Ltd [1990] 1 OR (3d) 649 at [15], the court dismissed an application to release documents covered by the Riddick undertaking to the police, as a reasonable inference was that the applicant was hoping that the police could help uncover additional information that would assist the applicant’s action, or that the police investigations would pressure the other party into offering to settle the matter.

  101. (c) Privilege against self-incrimination: It is also relevant to consider whether the disclosing party may rely on the privilege against self-incrimination, and whether such privilege has been waived in the circumstances. Certain authorities suggest that the proper assertion of a privilege is necessarily overriding (see O Ltd v Z ([46] supra) at [50] and [53] and Florence Tsang ([46] supra) at [29]). Both Amber and the defendants also accept that the privilege against self-incrimination would suffice to bar the Riddick undertaking from being lifted so long as it is timeously and properly asserted. While we accept that the privilege against self-incrimination is necessarily a weighty factor that is not to be easily displaced, it is our view that the better approach is for the privilege to be regarded as a factor to be given significant, but not necessarily overriding, weight. This accords with our observations relating to prejudice at [62]–[68] above, viz, that no one factor should be given overriding weight under the balancing approach, and that the appropriate weight to be given to any factor is, at end, fact-specific.

  102. [73] We pause here to make a few observations about the appropriate weight to be given to privileges in the balancing exercise. On the facts of the present case, only the privilege against self-incrimination is engaged. The cases of Beckkett, O Ltd v Z, Smith v Jones and AG v May show that the privilege against self-incrimination is often relevant in determining whether documents disclosed during discovery may be utilised for extraneous purposes, such as for the facilitation of criminal investigations.

  103. [74] However, in applications by a party to be released from the Riddick undertaking, the privilege against self-incrimination is not the only privilege which may be asserted. This is illustrated by the case of Florence Tsang, where legal professional privilege was successfully asserted in resisting an application to release a discovering party from the Riddick undertaking. In that case, the husband and wife were engaged in matrimonial proceedings following the breakdown of their marriage. During the course of the matrimonial proceedings, the husband and his father executed certain documents, purporting to transfer the interest in certain assets from the husband to his father, thus depleting the pool of matrimonial assets. The wife applied to set aside the dispositions by the husband. In aid of her application, she obtained orders for discovery, which were resisted by the husband and his father on the ground of legal professional privilege. Saunders J rejected the arguments on privilege, as legal professional privilege “cannot include the case of communications, criminal in themselves, or intended to further any criminal purpose” (“the Cox and Railton rule”) (Florence Tsang at [9]). The wife thus came into possession of the privileged documents.

  104. [75] After the privileged documents were disclosed to the wife, the Secretary of Justice (“SJ”) applied to the court for the wife to be released from her Riddick undertaking so that the Director of Public Prosecutions (“DPP”) could access the privileged documents for criminal investigation purposes. The Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal rejected the SJ’s application. In the court’s view, while it was common ground that legal professional privilege could not be asserted as against the wife given Saunders J’s decision (Florence Tsang at [21]), this did not necessitate that the privilege could not be asserted by the husband as against the SJ and the DPP (Florence Tsang at [31]). Given that the issue of the husband’s right to assert the privilege against the SJ and the DPP was a live one which had not been determined by the court, it was inappropriate to side-step the determination of that issue by releasing the wife from her Riddick undertaking (Florence Tsang at [31]). This was especially so as legal professional privilege is a “fundamental right” that is constitutionally guaranteed by Art 35 of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China (1990), which provides that “Hong Kong residents shall have the right to confidential legal advice…” (Florence Tsang at [27]–[28]). Hence, while an exercise of balancing competing interests was required in deciding whether someone should be released from the Riddick undertaking, “it is well established that ‘[legal professional privilege] does not involve such a balancing of interests. It is absolute and is based not merely upon the general right to privacy but also upon the right of access to justice’” (Florence Tsang at [29], citing Regina (Morgan Grenfell & Co Ltd) v Special Commissioner of Income Tax and another [2003] 1 AC 563 at [16]). Accordingly, the public interest in facilitating the reporting of crime and in the proper investigation of suspected crime could not override the legal professional privilege which was asserted by the husband against the SJ and DPP. The appropriate recourse was for the SJ and DPP to bring the privileged documents within the Cox and Railton rule, as the wife had done (Florence Tsang at [34]).

  105. [76] We accept that different considerations apply to different forms of privileges. However, we note that, unlike in Hong Kong, legal professional privilege is not constitutionally guaranteed in Singapore. That said, it is enshrined in statute (s 128 of the Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed) (“Evidence Act”)), and “has been firmly entrenched as part of the common law system of justice for centuries” (Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (Publ), Singapore Branch v Asia Pacific Breweries (Singapore) Pte Ltd and other appeals [2007] 2 SLR(R) 367 at [23]). We also observe that legal professional privilege is not absolute, and it may be waived by the client (although waiver is not to be easily implied) (ARX v Comptroller of Income Tax [2016] 5 SLR 590 at [51] and [68]–[69]), or overridden where the allegedly privileged communication was “made in furtherance of any illegal purpose”, or if it concerns “any fact … showing that any crime or fraud has been committed since the commencement of [the lawyer’s] employment” (s 128(2) of the Evidence Act). Nonetheless, as the point of the appropriate weight to be accorded to other privileges, such as legal professional privilege, does not arise in the present case, we leave this issue to be properly considered when the point arises squarely before this court in a future case.

  106. Leave to release Amber from its Riddick undertaking

  107. [77] Returning to the facts of the case, we note that the Documents relate in essence to four distinct sets of offences, namely the EFMA, Penal Code, PCA and CMA offences.

  108. Privilege against self-incrimination

  109. [78] In our view, the weightiest factor against the release of the Riddick undertaking is the defendants’ privilege against self-incrimination.

  110. [79] For a party to rely on the privilege against self-incrimination, the risk of self-incrimination must be “reasonable, rather than fanciful” [emphasis added] (Beckkett ([36] supra) at [32], citing Sociedade Nacional de Combustiveis de Angola UEE v Lundqvist [1991] 2 QB 310 at 324). To demonstrate that the risk of self-incrimination is reasonable, the party asserting the privilege is required to tender evidence to show that the privilege is being asserted bona fide, and the mere assertion by a party that he may or will incriminate himself is insufficient (Expanded Metal Manufacturing Pte Ltd and another v Expanded Metal Co Ltd [1995] 1 SLR(R) 57 at [33]).

  111. [80] Nonetheless, even if appropriately asserted, the privilege against self-incrimination may be found to have been waived by the disclosing party. For example, in Nikkomann Co Pte Ltd and others v Yulean Trading Pte Ltd [1992] 2 SLR(R) 328 (“Nikkomann”), the first appellant and respondent entered into a joint venture, whereby the first appellant would be responsible for the marketing and reselling of timber and related products, while the respondent would provide financial assistance, and receive 30% of the profit on the transactions in turn. Thereafter, it was represented to the respondent that the first appellant had entered into a contract for sale of sawn timber. On this basis, the respondent furnished two letters of credit. However, despite multiple discussions and convoluted explanations from the first appellant and its representatives (collectively, “the appellants”), the respondent never received any payment on the sale of the timber, and a cheque that was given by the first appellant was dishonoured on presentation. On that basis, the respondent sought several interim orders against the appellants, including search orders. The search orders sought to determine the whereabouts of the alleged timber goods, and their proceeds, if any. The appellants complied with the search orders without objection, and, in the course of inspecting the documents that were obtained pursuant to the orders, the respondent discovered that the entire lot of timber had in fact been on-sold to a buyer, and that the first appellant had received the proceeds of the sale.

  112. [81] The appellants sought a discharge of the search orders, arguing that their compliance with the orders would infringe their privilege against self-incrimination. Rejecting this argument, this court held that the appellants’ right to assert the privilege had been waived (at [65]):

  113. [82] The Judge considered the present case to be materially similar to that of Nikkomann, and she found that the appropriate time for the defendants to assert the privilege was at the time of the search or, at the latest, after they had engaged lawyers to set aside the search orders. By asserting the privilege on 11 March 2019, which was almost a year after the search orders were executed, the defendants had waived their privilege against self-incrimination (GD at [59]–‍[61]). With respect, we do not agree.

  114. [83] In Nikkomann, the search orders were clearly for the specific purpose of ascertaining the whereabouts of the subject goods and their sale proceeds, if any. The appellants complied with the search orders without objection. As it turned out, the documents obtained revealed that, contrary to the representations made to the respondent, the goods had already been sold, and the first appellant had already received the proceeds of the sale. It was only at that time that the appellants sought to assert the privilege, which was roundly rejected by this court as having been waived. In our view, this was unsurprising, as the very documents that had been voluntarily handed over pursuant to the search orders turned out to be the incriminating documents. Hence, the proper time to assert the privilege against self-incrimination was rightly at the time of the search orders.

  115. [84] In this case, the circumstances giving rise to the right to assert the privilege only arose sometime after 12 February 2019, when the defendants received notice of the present summons, and thus understood, for the first time, that Amber intended to use the Documents for criminal investigation purposes.

  116. [85] Prior to that, upon being served with the search orders, the defendants could not reasonably have been expected to assert the privilege against self-incrimination. Even though the search orders contained express provisions for the defendants to obtain legal advice and to vary or discharge the search orders, they also contained express undertakings by Amber to the effect that the seized documents would not be used for extraneous purposes, or handed over to third parties. Such third parties would include the authorities.

  117. [86] Furthermore, the documents sought under the search orders were expansive, and they included all e-mail correspondence on the defendants’ email accounts, all data storage devices, including computers, mobile phones and thumb drives of the defendants, and all documents, plans, drawings, notes, memoranda, and power point slides relating to Amber’s trade secrets or proprietary information. Pursuant to such expansive search terms, more than 100,000 documents were seized from the defendants.

  118. [87] Had the defendants attempted to assert their privilege against self-incrimination at the time of the searches, such an assertion would have been dismissed as “fanciful”, rather than “reasonable”, as they would have had to assert their privilege in a vacuum, vis-à-vis all the documents, which were in excess of 100,000 in number. Given the expansive volume of documents and the common understanding between the parties on the scope and purpose of the search orders, it would be entirely unreasonable to expect the defendants to identify the specific documents over which the privilege was to be asserted. After all, it was both the direction of the Judge and the common understanding of the parties that the defendants’ documents would be returned to the defendants. Apart from being a blanket and untargetted assertion, any assertion of the privilege would have been particularly fanciful as Amber had, prior to obtaining the search orders, given assurances to the court that the seized documents would be utilised “purely and solely for the purpose of obtaining further evidence that is necessary to [Amber’s] case without risking the [defendants’] destruction of the said evidence” [emphasis added]. Under those circumstances, there was simply no occasion for the defendants to entertain the necessity of asserting their privilege against self-incrimination writ large, much less for the Documents which Amber is seeking leave to disclose to the authorities.

  119. [88] After the search orders were executed, the defendants took out the setting-aside application. The Judge did not deal directly with the application, and she instead directed the parties to carry out the Listing Exercise, so that all documents which belonged to the defendants, or which ownership was disputed, would be returned to the defendants or their solicitors, and would not be kept in any form by Amber. Had the Listing Exercise been complied with as directed, there would have been no possibility of Amber using the defendants’ documents to support any reports to the authorities, as Amber would not retain possession of any such documents in the first place.

  120. [89] Yet, Amber failed to comply with the Listing Exercise on multiple occasions. Even so, it repeatedly represented to the defendants and the court that this was simply due to the voluminous number of documents that were the subject of the exercise. In fact, as late as on 23 January 2019, at the PTC before the SAR, Amber’s solicitors, Lee & Lee, continued to represent to the court and the defendants’ solicitors that it fully intended to comply with the Listing Exercise, and that any delays were due simply to the sheer number of documents involved. There was no indication that such delays were caused by Amber having taken the liberty of reviewing the substance of the defendants’ documents to determine if they disclosed any potential offences on the defendants’ part.

  121. [90] However, six days after the PTC before the SAR, on 29 January 2019, Amber took out the present application, ex parte, for leave. As it turned out, unbeknownst to the defendants, Amber had already disclosed WhatsApp chat logs which belonged to the defendants to the authorities. The defendants were clearly unaware of such extraneous use of the seized documents, as their solicitors agreed to a further extension of time to comply with the Listing Exercise on 31 January 2019. It was only on 12 February 2019, when the defendants were served with the present summons and the supporting affidavit, that they first became aware of Amber’s intention to use the Documents for the extraneous purpose of supporting its reports to the authorities. Shortly thereafter, on 11 March 2019, in their first affidavit filed in response to the present summons for leave, the defendants made clear that they “have never waived their privilege against self-incrimination.”

  122. [91] In our judgment, it is clear from the above sequence of events that the defendants had been led by Amber to form the impression that the seized documents belonging to the defendants would be returned upon completion of the Listing Exercise and as a corollary, would not be used for any extraneous purpose, such as to assist in unsolicited criminal investigations. Once the defendants gained notice of the extraneous purpose for which Amber was seeking to utilise the Documents, it became apparent to them, for the first time, that there was a reasonable, rather than fanciful, risk that they could be incriminated by the Documents which they had handed over to Amber pursuant to the search orders. Given the reasonable risk, the defendants then timeously asserted the privilege against self-incrimination in the first affidavit which they filed in response to the summons for leave. Save in exceptional circumstances, such timeous and proper assertion of the privilege is a factor to be given significant weight in the balancing exercise. Indeed, Mr Ali went further, and accepted that the privilege, if timeously asserted, would operate as an absolute bar against the granting of leave to Amber.

  123. Improper purpose

  124. [92] We are also satisfied on the evidence before us that Amber’s application was motivated by an improper purpose. This would weigh as a significant factor against the lifting of the Riddick undertaking.

  125. [93] As we have recounted above, Amber had given multiple express undertakings, both to the defendants and the court, that the seized documents would not be used for extraneous purposes, or disclosed to third parties. The last of such express undertakings was given on 4 June 2018, when Amber’s then-counsel informed the Judge that “[Amber’s] and [Lim’s] counsel have also given solicitor undertakings to each other not to release any of the documents to any other parties.” At that same hearing, Amber’s counsel also agreed to return the defendants’ documents to them.

  126. [95] In our view, considering that Amber was legally represented prior to Lee & Lee’s appointment, and that its previous solicitors had given express undertakings to the court and to the defendants’ solicitors not to disclose the documents to other parties, Amber’s purported belated discovery of the need to seek leave of court does not withstand scrutiny. This is especially so since the terms of the Judge’s directions did not even require Amber to review the substance of the seized documents – rather, the Judge simply required Amber to utilise search terms to determine the ownership of those documents. Consistent with the limited nature of such an exercise, Amber was initially given only about two months to comply with the Judge’s directions, notwithstanding that the task involved more than 100,000 documents. In view of the clear directions and the limited time provided for compliance, there was no reason for Amber to conduct a substantive review of the documents, much less to disclose certain documents to the authorities. In so doing, it deliberately went beyond the Judge’s orders. In fact, it was in direct breach of its express undertakings.

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