Court of Appeal · Decided 17 September 2020
Ilechukwu Uchechukwu Chukwudi v Public Prosecutor
Feedback & support[2020] SGCA 90 · Case no. Criminal Motion No 4 of 2017
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Introduction
- [1]
[1] In this application, Ilechukwu Uchechukwu Chukwudi (“the Applicant”) seeks to set aside his conviction by the Court of Appeal in Public Prosecutor v Ilechukwu Uchechukwu Chukwudi [2015] SGCA 33. The Applicant was charged with trafficking of not less than 1,963.3g of methamphetamine that was found in a black trolley bag which he had brought from Nigeria into Singapore and had handed over to one Hamidah Binte Awang (“Hamidah”). The trafficking charge under s 5(1)(a) of the Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed) (“MDA”) reads as follows:
- [2]
[2] At the end of a joint trial of the Applicant and Hamidah, the trial judge (“the Judge”) acquitted the Applicant but convicted Hamidah on a separate charge. The Prosecution appealed against the Judge’s decision acquitting the Applicant. The Court of Appeal reversed the acquittal and convicted the Applicant on the trafficking charge. Pivotal to the decision of the Court of Appeal were the numerous lies and omissions made by the Applicant in his statements to the Central Narcotics Bureau (CNB), for which there did not appear at the time to be any innocent explanation.
Facts
- [4]
[4] The Applicant arrived in Singapore from Lagos, Nigeria, on 13 November 2011. According to the Applicant, he ran a business selling second-hand electronic goods in Nigeria and the purpose of the visit to Singapore was to purchase used laptops for sale back home. As part of this plan, the Applicant was introduced by a childhood friend by the name of Izuchukwu to one Kingsley, who purportedly had relevant business contacts in Singapore who could assist the Applicant.
- [5]
[5] At the trial, the Applicant told the court that on 12 November 2012, the day of his departure from Nigeria, he only took a black laptop bag to the airport in Lagos. There, he met Izuchukwu and Kingsley. Kingsley handed to the Applicant a black luggage trolley bag (“the Black Luggage”) which he requested the Applicant to pass on to a contact in Singapore, who in turn would help the Applicant with his sourcing of second-hand electronic goods. The Applicant was informed that the Black Luggage contained clothes belonging to the said contact. On inspection, the Applicant found only clothes in the Black Luggage and nothing seemed amiss. The Applicant’s evidence was that the Black Luggage underwent a physical check and X-ray scan at the airport in Lagos. It was subsequently checked in by the airline for the flight to Singapore. All of foregoing took place without any incident.
- [6]
[6] On his arrival in Singapore on 13 November 2011, the Applicant proceeded to the immigration checkpoint at Changi Airport, and he was detained for questioning. During this time, the Applicant received several SMS messages from a Nigerian number asking whether he had cleared immigration and about his location. The Applicant’s evidence was that the messages were from Izuchukwu, who worked as a travel agent and had helped the Applicant with his travel arrangements to Singapore. One of the messages was “Have u seen him?” and “[phone number redacted] call him plz”. The Applicant’s evidence was that those messages referred to another Nigerian national who Izuchukwu had also arranged a visa for, and who was supposed to be at the airport with the Applicant. Eventually, the Applicant did meet another Nigerian national by the name of Adili and they were placed in the same room by the authorities. Another message from Izuchukwu asked the Applicant to inform the checkpoint authorities to contact “ESP” if there were any issues. ESP refers to ESP Lines (S) Pte Ltd, a Singapore freight forwarding company which had assisted in making the arrangements for the Applicant and Adili to visit Singapore.
- [7]
[7] After the Applicant cleared immigration, he collected the Black Luggage from the baggage claim counter. The Black Luggage was then subjected to both an X-ray scan and physical check, which again yielded nothing. Thereafter, the Applicant left the airport with both the Black Luggage and his laptop bag.
- [8]
[8] The Applicant proceeded to take a taxi to Kim Tian Hotel in Geylang, where he was supposed to stay. On his arrival however, Kingsley called the Applicant and told him to go to Hotel 81 in Chinatown (“Hotel 81”) instead. The Applicant complied. CCTV footage at Hotel 81 showed that the Applicant arrived there at about 8.36 pm. After speaking to the receptionist in the lobby, the Applicant realised that he did not have enough Singapore dollars to pay for his stay at the hotel. He deposited the Black Luggage at the hotel lobby and went out to look for a moneychanger. The CCTV footage showed that he returned about 12 minutes later. The Applicant then paid for one night’s stay at the hotel because he was supposed to meet Kingsley’s contact for the sourcing of used electronic goods the next day.
- [9]
[9] That same night, the Applicant received a call from Kingsley’s contact informing him that a woman would collect the Black Luggage from him. This led to a meeting between the Applicant and Hamidah at Clarke Quay. The CCTV footage showed that the Applicant left Hotel 81 with the Black Luggage at around 10.16 pm. The Applicant took a taxi from the hotel and alighted at a bus stop in Clarke Quay. As Hamidah had difficulty locating the Applicant, the Applicant approached a Caucasian male who was standing near the bus stop, to ask him to give directions to Hamidah over the phone. The Applicant’s evidence is that when he walked towards the Caucasian male, he left the Black Luggage at the interior of the bus stop.
- [10]
[10] When Hamidah finally arrived at the bus stop, she alighted from her car and introduced herself to the Applicant. According to the Applicant, Hamidah introduced herself as “Maria”. After handing over the Black Luggage to Hamidah, the latter invited the Applicant to get into the car. They chatted and upon Hamidah’s inquiry, the Applicant told Hamidah that he had not eaten anything since his arrival in Singapore. Hence, Hamidah offered to take the Applicant to an African restaurant and he agreed. As it turned out, the restaurant was closed and Hamidah offered the Applicant some drinks from the boot of her car instead. Sometime during their journey in the car, the Applicant accidentally dropped his mobile phone into Hamidah’s drink. Eventually, Hamidah dropped the Applicant off at a taxi stand in Clarke Quay and he returned to Hotel 81. The CCTV footage at Hotel 81 showed him going up to his room without the Black Luggage at 11.34 pm.
- [11]
[11] At around 11.55 pm on 13 November 2011, Hamidah was stopped at the Woodlands Checkpoint. The Black Luggage was retrieved from her car and was cut open at the sides. The controlled drugs in question, which were found to contain not less than 1963.3g of methamphetamine, were recovered from the Black Luggage. Hamidah was arrested. The next morning, on 14 November 2011, the Applicant was arrested in his room at Hotel 81.
- [12]
[12] Various statements were obtained from the Applicant: the statement recorded at 1pm on 14 November 2011 shortly after his arrest (“the First Statement”); the cautioned statement recorded at 9.41pm on 14 November 2011 (“the Cautioned Statement”); and the long statements taken between 21 and 24 November 2011 (“the Long Statements”). As alluded to above at [2], the Applicant told a series of lies and omitted material facts in his statements to the CNB. The lies and omissions will be examined in greater detail later in this judgment. For present purposes, it suffices to note that in all his statements, the Applicant denied bringing the Black Luggage into Singapore, denied meeting Hamidah to pass her the same bag at Clarke Quay and did not mention Kingsley.
HC (Acquittal)
- [13]
[13] At the joint trial of the Applicant and Hamidah, the key issue identified by the Judge was whether the Applicant and the co-accused person Hamidah, had knowledge of the drugs concealed in the Black Luggage. The Applicant’s main case was that he had come to Singapore for business and had been asked to deliver the Black Luggage on behalf of Kingsley to a business contact he was supposed to meet. Given the various checks which the Black Luggage had undergone at the Nigerian airport, he had no reason to suspect that the Black Luggage contained illicit drugs. Furthermore, the Applicant argued that it was not inexplicable for him to take a defensive stance after he was arrested and charged with an offence that carried the death penalty.
- [14]
[14] The Applicant was acquitted of the charge against him in Public Prosecutor v Hamidah Binte Awang and another [2015] SGHC 4 (hereinafter, “HC (Acquittal)”). The Judge had, at [48], accepted the Applicant’s testimony that he came to Singapore to purchase electronic goods for his business. This was corroborated by the US$5,000 the Applicant brought into Singapore as well as by the evidence of one Mr Kervinn Leng (“Kervinn”), a director of ESP who had been informed by his Lagos office that the Applicant was a trader coming to Singapore and had arranged a Singapore visa for the Applicant. Moreover, the Judge found that the Applicant’s conduct was generally inconsistent with knowledge of the drugs. Amongst other things, the Applicant had appeared, from the CCTV footage at Changi Airport, to be composed and he had collected the Black Luggage despite the delay at immigration (at [52]); the Applicant had left the Black Luggage unattended at the lobby of Hotel 81 when he left to exchange money (HC (Acquittal) at [54]); and the Applicant had essentially gone for a joyride with Hamidah after handing the Black Luggage to the latter (at [60]).
- [15]
[15] In respect of the First Statement, the Applicant’s explanation in HC (Acquittal) was that: (a) he did not lie when he said he only brought one piece of luggage into Singapore because he had not considered his laptop bag to be a piece of luggage; and (b) alternatively, he lied because he had been told by the CNB officers that there had been an arrest on the night of 13 November 2011 and two packets of drugs were recovered from the Black Luggage. The Judge rejected the first explanation (at [64]). However, the Judge found that he could not rule out the possibilities that the Applicant lied in his statements because he had learnt that there was an arrest the night before and drugs were found in the Black Luggage and/or that he was arrested for drug trafficking and had hence decided that the “best way forward” was to lie about the Black Luggage (at [66]).
- [16]
[16] In respect of the Cautioned Statement and the Long Statements, the Applicant explained at trial that he lied or omitted information because he had not been informed of the full facts surrounding his arrest and, having heard that the trafficking charge carried the death penalty, he decided that the safest course of action was a complete denial. While the Judge found that the Applicant had been overly defensive, he did not think this unequivocally showed that the Applicant knew about the drugs in the Black Luggage before he was arrested (at [67]). This was especially so given the Applicant’s conduct before arrest, which as explained above at [14], was considered inconsistent with a knowledge of the drugs. Notably, the Judge also observed that the Applicant considered himself a victim of circumstances and viewed the investigating officer, one ASP Deng Kaile (“ASP Deng”), with absolute suspicion, which could have contributed to the Applicant’s decision to deny everything relating to the Black Luggage and Hamidah. Thus, the lies could equally be explained by the Applicant’s realisation after he was arrested that there had been drugs in the Black Luggage.
- [17]
[17] The Judge thus found that the Applicant’s evidence at trial was generally credible and was more consistent with a person with no knowledge of drugs in the Black Luggage (HC (Acquittal) at [69]). The Judge noted that the drugs “were so well hidden that [the Applicant] could not have known about it unless he was told of it” (at [70]). The Applicant’s explanation for his lies “was not unreasonable given the situation he found himself, including the fact that he was in a foreign land for the first time”. In the circumstances, the Judge found that the Applicant had rebutted the presumption of knowledge under s 18(2) of the MDA on the balance of probabilities and hence he acquitted the Applicant.
CA (Conviction)
- [18]
[18] The Prosecution appealed against the decision in HC (Acquittal). The key issue before the Court of Appeal in Public Prosecutor v Ilechukwu Uchechukwu Chukwudi [2015] SGCA 33 (hereinafter, “CA (Conviction)”) was whether the Applicant had rebutted the presumption under s 18(2) of the MDA. The court considered the key dispute to be the probative effect of the various lies and omissions made by the Applicant in his statements as follows (at [33]):
- [19]
[19] In respect of the First Statement, the court agreed with the Judge’s rejection of the Applicant’s defence that he had not lied because he did not consider the laptop bag to be a piece of luggage (at [35]). However, the court also rejected the Applicant’s alternative case that he had lied because he had been told by the CNB officers that there was an arrest the previous night and that drugs were found in the Black Luggage (at [36]). The court found that the evidential basis for this was scant notwithstanding the Judge’s apparent acceptance of its possibility. In any event, the Applicant had testified at trial that the first time he had any inkling that the charge against him was related to the Black Luggage was when his counsel visited him. This took place after the First Statement had been recorded. Hence, the Applicant’s alternative explanation was patently inconsistent with his own evidence (at [43]). Nonetheless, the court remarked that, taken in isolation, it is possible that the Applicant lied in the First Statement even though he did not know before he was arrested that the Black Luggage contained drugs (at [45] and [54]). What troubled the court was that the Applicant’s lies persisted in his subsequent statements.
- [20]
[20] In respect of the lies and omissions in the Cautioned Statement, the Applicant rehashed his explanations in HC (Acquittal). In the main, his evidence was that he was “full of confusion”, ASP Deng had not been specific about the circumstances of the offence and that he could not “open [his] heart … because [he] was in high tension”. In CA (Conviction), the court rejected these explanations (at [51]). The charge and caution had been read to the Applicant and he must have understood the nature and consequences of the charge as well as any failure in disclosing material information relating to his defence. In fact, the Applicant had specifically admitted at trial that he understood the caution.
- [21]
[21] Apart from the complete absence of any reference to Kingsley, the main lies and omissions identified in the Applicant’s Long Statements were (CA (Conviction) at [55]):
(a) The Applicant said he only carried one bag into Singapore, which was the laptop bag found in his room in Hotel 81. He said he only checked in the laptop bag at the airport in Lagos. He claimed that the bag he left in the Hotel 81 lobby was the same laptop bag.
(b) He said he did not go to the Clarke Quay area.
(c) He claimed he accidentally dropped his mobile phone into the toilet bowl in his room in Hotel 81.
(d) He claimed he did not know and had never seen Hamidah or Adili before his arrest when shown photos of each of them.
- [22]
[22] The court considered that the Applicant’s failure to mention Kingsley was a material one which justified the drawing of an adverse inference (CA (Conviction) at [58]). There was no good reason for the Applicant’s omission since he could have mentioned Kingsley without saying anything incriminating about the Black Luggage. The court further found that the Judge erred in finding that the Applicant’s overly defensive behaviour did not show unequivocally that he must have known about the drugs in the Black Luggage before he was arrested. The burden of proof was on the Applicant to prove his lack of knowledge by rebutting the presumption in the MDA.
- [23]
[23] In the circumstances, the court considered that the Applicant’s lies were more consistent with his having had knowledge of the drugs before his arrest. In accordance with the principles set out in Regina v Lucas (Ruth) [1981] QB 720 (“Lucas”), these lies could be used as corroborative evidence of guilt, even though the Prosecution did not need to rely on the lies (at [59]–[60]). It was clear that the Applicant’s lies were deliberate, material and shown to be false by independent evidence. The essential question was whether the Applicant’s lies stemmed from a realisation of guilt and a fear of the truth. In this regard, the court concluded at [61] that:
- [24]
[24] In addition, the court highlighted that even if lies were not regarded as corroborative evidence of guilt, they could nevertheless be relevant for evaluating the Applicant’s creditworthiness. On the facts, the Applicant’s disclosure of material and exculpatory facts for the first time at trial rendered his testimony less credible (at [63]).
- [25]
[25] The court in CA (Conviction) considered that even putting aside the Applicant’s lies and omissions, various aspects of his evidence were also difficult to believe. They can be summarised as follows:
(a) There was little objective evidence for the Applicant’s narrative that he came to Singapore for business. It was, at best, weakly corroborated by the evidence of Kervinn, who had never spoken with the Applicant directly before his arrival in Singapore (at [67]). Furthermore, since Kervinn was the one who applied for the Applicant’s entry visa into Singapore, one could not seriously expect a person intent on trafficking drugs to disclose the true purpose of his visit. The US$5,000 which the Applicant brought into Singapore was also a rather small amount for a trader in electronic goods (at [68]).
(b) There were various suspicious circumstances surrounding the entire trip (at [70]–[78]). For example, even though it was the Applicant’s first overseas trip, and purportedly a business trip, the Applicant left for Singapore without obtaining any contact details from Kingsley. It was also difficult to believe that the Applicant would have meekly agreed to Kingsley’s request to pass the Black Luggage to an unknown contact. In the court’s view, the Applicant’s behaviour was completely nonchalant and any reasonably prudent person would have enquired further. Furthermore, the court also considered the Applicant’s willingness to follow Kingsley’s instructions to change from the Kim Tian Hotel to Hotel 81 without any reservation and the numerous text messages received from Izuchukwu whilst the Applicant was at Changi Airport to be unusual.
- [26]
[26] Finally, the court also disagreed with certain points which the Judge took to indicate the Applicant’s lack of knowledge of the drugs.
- [27]
[27] First, the court took issue with the Judge’s assessment of the Applicant’s conduct at Changi Airport and at Hotel 81. The Judge had highlighted that the Applicant claimed the Black Luggage despite the hiccup at immigration, and that the Applicant was content to leave the Black Luggage at the lobby of Hotel 81 for 12 minutes. Both of these events were taken by the Judge to indicate a lack of knowledge of the drugs in question on the Applicant’s part. In the court’s view however, the Judge’s assessments of the two events were too narrow and in a sense inconsistent, and they did not necessarily indicate a lack of knowledge (at [80]–[81]). This was because abandoning the Black Luggage at the airport carried with it the threat of reprisal by those who entrusted the drugs to him, whilst insisting on taking the Black Luggage with him when he was going out of the hotel to exchange money could have aroused suspicion especially since the hotel lobby was a relatively safe place for temporary stowage.
- [28]
[28] Second, while the court agreed with the Judge that the Applicant’s conduct in going for a ride with Hamidah was unusual, it did not consider it to be so dispositive (at [82]). It could equally be said that it was strange for Hamidah herself to have invited the Applicant for a ride. In fact, Hamidah had given evidence that the Applicant had appeared nervous. Hence, properly viewed, the Applicant’s behaviour appeared to be an aberration from the totality of the evidence.
- [29]
[29] For the above reasons, the threshold for appellate intervention was crossed even though the appeal turned primarily on questions of fact. The court’s observations in this regard bear quoting as they succinctly set out the very context in which the present application is raised before us:
- [30]
[30] Therefore, having particular regard to the Applicant’s lies and omissions, the Court of Appeal concluded that the Judge’s decision in HC (Acquittal) was against the weight of evidence and convicted the Applicant on the trafficking charge.
CA (Reopening)
- [31]
[31] Following the decision in CA (Conviction), the matter was remitted to the Judge for sentencing. As explained at length in Ilechukwu Uchechukwu Chukwudi v Public Prosecutor [2017] 2 SLR 741 (hereinafter, “CA (Reopening)”), fresh and material evidence had arisen in the form of the psychiatric report by Dr Sarkar. As mentioned, Dr Sarkar opined that the Applicant was suffering from PTSD, that his symptoms were triggered after he was told by the CNB officers that he was facing the death penalty and that the PTSD might have caused the Applicant to lie in his statements (CA (Reopening) at [20]).
- [32]
[32] Applying in the main the principles laid out in Kho Jabing v Public Prosecutor [2016] 3 SLR 135 (“Kho Jabing”), the question before the court was whether there was sufficient material on which the court could say that there may have been a miscarriage of justice in CA (Conviction) such that the concluded appeal should be reopened. We highlight the following remarks made by the court (Kho Jabing at [50] affirmed in CA (Reopening) at [14]):
- [33]
[33] After examining Dr Sarkar’s evidence in the context of the decision in CA (Conviction), the court in CA (Reopening) was satisfied that Dr Sarkar’s report was sufficient material that was both new and compelling (at [23]–[43]). Dr Sarkar’s report also raised a “powerful probability” that the decision in CA (Conviction) was demonstrably wrong (at [45]). Given the exceptional circumstances of the case, the application to reopen the Applicant’s conviction was allowed, though no finding was made as to whether the Applicant indeed suffered from PTSD or how he was affected by it during the statement-taking process (at [50]).
- [34]
[34] The matter was then remitted to the Judge to adduce further evidence and make the relevant findings based on the following terms of reference (at [50]):
(a) whether the Applicant was suffering from PTSD;
(b) the typical effects of PTSD on a sufferer; and
(c) if the Applicant was indeed suffering from PTSD:
(i) the period of time during which PTSD affected him;
(ii) the effects of PTSD on him during that period; and
(iii) the extent to which PTSD affected him when he gave his statements to the CNB.
Following which, as we stated in CA (Reopening) at [51], the Court of Appeal would review its decision in CA (Conviction).
HC (Remitted) – an overview
- [35]
[35] At the remitted hearing, a total of four experts were called (three by the Applicant and one by the Prosecution) and hot-tubbed. At the end of the remitted hearing (but before closing submissions), the Applicant applied in Criminal Motion No 22 of 2018 to revise the original terms of reference (set out in [34] above), arguing that the amendment was justified by the evidence which had been given by the four experts. The court allowed the application in part. The Judge was instead requested to make findings based on the following terms (with the amendments underlined):
(a) whether the Applicant was suffering from PTSD;
(b) the typical effects of PTSD on a sufferer;
(c) if the Applicant was indeed suffering from PTSD:
(i) the period of time during which PTSD affected him;
(ii) the effects of PTSD on him during that period; and
(iii) the extent to which PTSD affected him when he gave his statements to the CNB; and
(d) if the Applicant was not suffering from PTSD, whether he was suffering from post-traumatic stress symptoms (“PTSS”). If he was suffering from PTSS:
(i) the precise symptoms should be identified;
(ii) the period of time during which PTSD affected him;
(iii) the effects of PTSS on him during that period; and
(iv) the extent to which PTSS affected him when he gave his statement to the CNB.
(the “revised Terms of Reference”).
- [36]
[36] After an examination of the experts’ evidence, the Judge made his findings based on the revised Terms of Reference, which are set out in Public Prosecutor v Hamidah Binte Awang and another [2019] SGHC 161 (hereinafter, “HC (Remitted)”). His main findings may be summarised as follows:
(a) The Applicant suffered from PTSD as a child after witnessing the Wukari massacre when he was about five years old and continued to suffer from it until some indefinite time before he arrived in Singapore on 13 November 2011 (HC (Remitted) at [113]).
(b) However, the Applicant was not suffering from PTSD after his arrest on 14 November 2011 when the various statements were taken (HC (Remitted) at [129]). This was mainly because neither the arrest nor the Applicant being informed that the charge attracted the death penalty was sufficient to constitute a traumatic event.
(c) The Applicant suffered from various PTSS during the statement-taking process that took place after he was arrested in November 2011.
- [37]
[37] Though the Judge was of the view that the Applicant failed to prove his claims as to the extent to which the various PTSS affected him when he was making those statements, the Judge, nevertheless, made the following notable observation at [193]:
This is an important observation, which we will return to in due course.
- [38]
[38] Apart from the medical evidence adduced from the experts, the Prosecution also called Adili as a witness primarily for the purpose of showing that the Applicant’s “Kingsley story” was false. This would have the consequential effect of undermining the reliability of Dr Sarkar’s expert opinion in so far as it may show that the Applicant lied to him in the course of their interviews. However, for reasons which the Judge had indicated at HC (Remitted) at [51]–[52], he found that he could not take Adili’s evidence on this issue into account.
The parties’ cases
The Applicant’s case
- [40]
[40] In his written submissions, counsel for the Applicant again sought leave to remit the matter to the Judge to answer the specific question of whether an innocent explanation for the Applicant’s lies and omissions is possible. This was on the same footing as CM 10/2019. Though this point was not pressed before us, we decline to grant such leave since this Court is the proper forum for reviewing the merits of CA (Conviction) as alluded to above. In any event, counsel for the Applicant submitted before us that the decision in CA (Conviction) was a miscarriage of justice and this Court should set aside that decision and substitute it with a discharge amounting to an acquittal. Three main points have been advanced which can be outlined as follows.
- [41]
[41] First, the Applicant endorses the Judge’s findings in HC (Remitted), ie, that: (a) as a result of the Wukari massacre in his childhood he suffered from PTSD that lasted from the age of five until some indefinite date before he arrived in Singapore on 13 November 2011; and (b) he suffered from various PTSS during the taking of the statements. Notably, the Applicant concedes that he is “unable to prove (solely on the basis of the medical evidence and without reference to the wider issue of the Applicant’s guilt or innocence) that, on the balance of probabilities, the various PTSS caused him to lie” [emphasis added].
- [42]
[42] Importantly however, the Applicant emphasises the Judge’s observation at [193] that despite the absence of a proven causal link between the PTSS and the lies, there was a possibility that the Applicant lied because “he believed that lying would get him out of the traumatic predicament that he was in, ie, that lying would be a means to ‘protect’ oneself”. Separately, the Applicant experienced, during the recording of the Long Statements, “persistent and negative belief[s] about others”, a type of PTSS, which caused him to display persistent paranoia towards ASP Deng (HC (Remitted) at [199]).
- [43]
[43] Second, the Applicant submits that his lies and omissions were not so-called Lucas lies as had been found in CA (Conviction) because they did not necessarily indicate a consciousness of guilt. Rather, there were two overlapping innocent explanations for them:
(a) First, the “Overly Defensive Explanation” (ie, he was fearful for his life) as first alluded to by the Judge in HC (Acquittal).
(i) It was possible that he lied in the First Statement because he “realised (whether he was told or otherwise) that there was an arrest on the night before and a luggage with two packets of drugs were found and/or that he was arrested for drug trafficking, and decided that the best way forward was to lie about the Black Luggage” (HC (Acquittal) at [66]).
(ii) It was also possible that he continued to lie in his Cautioned and Long Statements because he viewed ASP Deng with “absolute suspicion” and was “not informed about the full facts surrounding his arrest”, which made him decide, however imprudently, that the “safest course of action was to deny everything that was not in his possession” when he learnt that the offence carried the death penalty (HC (Acquittal) at [67]).
- [44]
[44] In support of the two innocent explanations, the Applicant highlights that the Judge’s findings of PTSS in HC (Remitted) in 2019 are strikingly consistent with the evidence previously adduced, particularly his evidence in HC (Acquittal) when there was no inkling whatsoever of PTSD being a live issue.
- [45]
[45] Third, the Applicant submits that he is a credible witness despite his lies, because there are innocent explanations for his conduct as delineated above. Moreover, Adili’s evidence which was adduced to contradict the Applicant’s version of events was rejected by the Judge for good reasons.
- [46]
[46] In the light of the new medical evidence adduced at HC (Remitted), the findings of the Judge at first instance in HC (Acquittal) cannot be said to be wrong or against the weight of evidence. It follows that the decision in HC (Acquittal) should be upheld instead of being overturned.
The Prosecution’s case
- [47]
[47] The Prosecution submits that the decision in CA (Conviction) should be upheld. Its primary case can be summarised as follows:
(a) The Judge correctly found that the Applicant did not suffer from PTSD when he lied in his statements to the CNB given that Criterion A in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition published by the American Psychiatric Association (the “DSM-5 PTSD Criteria”), ie, some form of exposure to actual or threatened death, serious injury or sexual violence, was not satisfied (see [58] below).
(b) In any event, it was not shown how the PTSD had caused the Applicant to lie in his statements. The Judge also rightly found that the Applicant had failed to show if and how any of the PTSS would cause him to lie.
(c) The “only reasonably conceivable explanation” for the Applicant’s lies and omissions in his statements was his knowledge that the Black Luggage contained drugs.
Thus, in the Prosecution’s view, the Applicant has not rebutted the presumption of possession under s 18(1) of the MDA.
- [48]
[48] Furthermore, as an alternative submission, the Prosecution takes issue with two other aspects of the Judge’s findings. First, it argues that there was no proper basis for the finding that the Applicant was affected by specific PTSS. This is primarily because there was no Criterion A traumatic event to which the specific PTSS could be associated with, as is required under the DSM-5 PTSD Criteria. Second, there are certain defects with the Judge’s finding on childhood PTSD.
- [49]
[49] We should also mention that upon consideration of the parties’ submissions, we invited further submissions on two specific points. The first relates to the distinction between PTSD and PTSS and the second concerns the incidence of the burden of proof as to whether the Applicant’s lies were motivated by a realisation of guilt, ie, Lucas lies. We will return to these points a little later.
Issues to be determined
- [50]
[50] Having found in CA (Reopening) that there was sufficient material on which the court might find that there was a miscarriage of justice, the question before us now is whether the decision in CA (Conviction) is in fact demonstrably wrong. Therefore, at the heart of this application is whether, in the light of the fresh evidence concerning the Applicant’s PTSD and PTSS and the Judge’s findings in HC (Remitted), the Applicant can be said to have rebutted the presumption of possession under s 18(1) of the MDA.
- [51]
[51] Central to that overarching question is how the Applicant’s PTSD and/or PTSS could have anything to do with his lies and omissions – specifically whether either condition could provide an innocent explanation for the lies and omissions. In this regard, it bears emphasising that the court in CA (Conviction) explained that what “tipped the scales” were the Applicant’s numerous lies and omissions, “for which there is no innocent explanation” (at [88]). Indeed, the Judge himself reiterated the same question at the conclusion of his decision without answering it because it was outside the revised Terms of Reference (HC (Remitted) at [208]). Accordingly, we will now evaluate the Judge’s findings in HC (Remitted) in some detail.
- [52]
[52] In the light of the revised Terms of Reference, the decision in HC (Remitted) is comprehensive. For the present purpose, however, an examination of the following three aspects would suffice:
(a) Was the Judge correct to find that the Applicant suffered from PTSD during his childhood?
(b) Was the Judge correct to find that the Applicant did not experience a traumatic event in 2011 for the purpose of Criterion A of the DSM-5 PTSD Criteria?
(c) Was the Judge correct to find that the Applicant suffered from PTSS in 2011 and if so, how were they connected to his lies and omissions?
While the critical aspect of the case concerns the third issue, it is necessary for us to proceed with our analysis sequentially given the cumulative nature of the evidence and discussion.
- [53]
[53] Given the length of the judgment in HC (Remitted), we think it would be expedient and help in better understanding, if we first indicate our answers to the three questions. We agree with the Judge that the Applicant suffered from PTSD during his childhood as a result of the Wukari massacre. However, we differ from the Judge on the second question and would proceed to answer the third question, which the Judge hesitated to do because of the revised Terms of Reference. We find that having regard in particular to the “sensitisation effect” operating on the Applicant in 2011, as shall be explained in detail below, the Applicant’s arrest and his being informed of the death penalty associated with the trafficking charge were sufficient to satisfy Criterion A of the DSM-5 PTSD Criteria. We agree with the Judge that the Applicant was in 2011 suffering from PTSS and find that there is a rational and credible connection between the Applicant’s PTSS and the lies and omissions in his statements.
Our analysis
Preliminary issues
- [54]
[54] We begin by briefly addressing two preliminary issues. The first relates to the approach which this court ought to adopt when undertaking the review of the decision in CA (Conviction). Should this court look at the entire case de novo without regard to the decision already made in CA (Conviction)? This question is distinct from the question as to the test or standard which must be met before a concluded criminal appeal should be re-opened, which test was set out in Kho Jabing at [77] and applied in CA (Reopening). We have passed that point. The present motion is to review the Court of Appeal’s decision in CA (Conviction), to determine whether that decision is still correct – particularly, whether in light of the evidence adduced in HC (Remitted), the decision in HC (Acquittal) should be reversed. In other words, assuming the fresh evidence had been before the court when it was considering CA (Conviction), would it have drawn the same inferences and arrived at the same conclusion?
- [55]
[55] We would also add that this approach is consistent with the following analysis enunciated in CA (Reopening) at [45]–[46]:
- [56]
[56] The second preliminary issue relates to the applicable presumption under the MDA. Before us, the parties agreed that the relevant presumption is that under s 18(1) of the MDA, notwithstanding that the case in HC (Acquittal) and CA (Conviction) had proceeded on the basis that the presumption of knowledge under s 18(2) applied. We agree with the parties that this is the correct position in the light of this court’s pronouncements in Adili Chibuike Ejike v Public Prosecutor [2019] 2 SLR 254 (“Adili”) and will say nothing further on this point.
DSM-5 PTSD Criteria
- [57]
[57] The Applicant called three experts below: Dr Sarkar, Dr Ken Ung (“Dr Ung”) and Dr Mundasa Winslow (“Dr Winslow”). The Prosecution called Dr Christopher Cheok (“Dr Cheok”). The expert evidence was adduced by way of a hot-tubbing session. All four experts agreed that the DSM-5 PTSD Criteria were applicable to the present case (HC (Remitted) at [36]). While there was some dispute before the Judge in respect of the specific tools used by the experts to assess the DSM-5 PTSD Criteria, this was not a significant point of contention and was not pursued before us in this application.
- [58]
[58] Under the DSM-5 PTSD Criteria for adults, eight criteria must be satisfied before a positive diagnosis of PTSD would be made:
- [60]
[60] All four experts also agreed that PTSD is an episodic and not a continuous psychiatric disorder (HC (Remitted) at [45]), although there appeared to be some ambiguity as to what exactly this meant. Dr Sarkar, Dr Ung and Dr Winslow submitted that the Applicant had a “lifetime diagnosis” of PTSD, which was taken to be synonymous with the word “episodic”. More importantly, it was also agreed by all the experts that if the Applicant was found to have suffered from PTSD in his childhood, the threshold for assessing Criterion A of the DSM-5 PTSD Criteria (ie, an immediate threat to life) subsequently would be lowered (HC (Remitted) at [30]). In other words, a past diagnosis of PTSD produces a “sensitisation effect” which would place the Applicant “at a higher risk of developing subsequent PTSD” (HC Remitted at [46] and [118]). This is a consequential effect of some significance, which we shall return to in due course.
Whether the Applicant suffered from PTSD as a child
- [61]
[61] We turn then to the Judge’s findings proper. The Judge found that the Applicant suffered from PTSD as a child around the age of five, after witnessing the Wukari massacre. The Judge’s extensive analysis of the DSM-5 PTSD Criteria during the Applicant’s childhood is set out in HC (Remitted) at [62]–[114] and we do not propose to rehash the same points here. Before us, the parties did not dispute this finding save in relation to two particular respects which can be briefly addressed.
- [62]
[62] First, the Prosecution argues that the Judge arrived at the diagnosis from a piecemeal agglomeration of the expert evidence, which is impermissible. If only a single expert’s evidence had been relied on (as the Prosecution submits should be the case), it would have been clear that the DSM-5 PTSD Criteria would not be fulfilled. This issue was raised before the Judge below and he agreed that the Applicant was not entitled to construct his own “piecemeal” diagnosis of PTSD from the evidence of the various experts (HC (Remitted) at [55(c)] and [60]). The Prosecution argues that the Judge himself nevertheless went on to rely on a combination of Dr Sarkar’s and Dr Ung’s evidence.
- [63]
[63] We need not be detained by this argument, which we consider to be an untenable one. There is no issue with the Judge’s method of relying on the body of evidence gleaned from all the experts to arrive at his conclusion that the DSM-5 PTSD Criteria was satisfied during the Applicant’s childhood. As a matter of logic and common sense, we see no reason why the court should constrain itself by examining each expert’s evidence in isolation. In a case where the medical evidence is contested, the eminently sensible approach is for the court to have regard to the entire corpus of evidence. The Prosecution’s criticism is also at odds with the nature of the hot-tubbing exercise conducted below. To the extent that the Judge rejected the Applicant’s attempts at a “piecemeal” diagnosis, the Judge obviously did not consider his holistic consideration of all the expert evidence to be piecemeal or in any way internally inconsistent. We agree with the Judge’s approach.
- [64]
[64] Second, the Prosecution also argues that there was no evidence supporting the Judge’s finding of Criterion E5, ie, problems with concentration being satisfied. Criterion E states that the marked alteration in arousal or reactivity must be “associated with the traumatic event(s), beginning and worsening” thereafter. There is no suggestion that the problems with concentration must only be or exclusively linked to the Wukari massacre. The Judge expressly considered Dr Cheok’s suggestion that the Applicant’s poor concentration might be attributable to his hunger and poverty instead of the Wukari massacre (at [90]). He found that Dr Cheok’s view was inconsistent with the Applicant’s preference for sports (as Dr Ung himself had noted) and the prolonged period over which this symptom was observed (HC (Remitted) at [92]). On balance, the Judge was satisfied that Criterion E5 was made out and we agree.
- [65]
[65] For the above reasons, the Judge’s findings in respect of the Applicant’s childhood PTSD are sound and we can find no basis for interfering with them.
Whether the Applicant suffered from PTSD or PTSS during the statement-taking process
- [66]
[66] As we highlighted earlier (at [60]), all the experts agreed that a past diagnosis of PTSD produces a “sensitisation effect” which would place the Applicant “at a higher risk of developing subsequent PTSD”: HC (Remitted) at [46] and [118]. Analytically, this means that since the Applicant was found to have suffered from PTSD as a child, Criterion A of the DSM-5 PTSD Criteria may be satisfied in relation to a subsequent episode of PTSD even if the new traumatic event does not meet the strict threshold of an immediate threat to life.
- [67]
[67] For ease of reference, we reproduce Criterion A here:
- [68]
[68] Based on the Applicant’s submissions below, there were two points in time at which he could have suffered a Criterion A traumatic event in 2011: (a) at or around the time of his arrest; and/or (b) at or around the time the Applicant was informed of the death penalty during the recording of the Cautioned Statement (HC (Remitted) at [121]). The Judge, however, found that the Applicant did not experience a Criterion A traumatic event at either point of time.
- [69]
[69] In respect of the Applicant’s arrest, the Judge noted that Dr Sarkar only adopted the position that the arrest was a traumatic event at the remitted hearing after he learnt of the testimony given by the Applicant during the hearing for HC (Acquittal). Thus, the Judge found at [124] that:
While the Judge had acknowledged the sensitisation effect in the section preceding the quoted paragraph (at [118]–[120]), it is not entirely clear to us why he decided that Criterion A was not satisfied. A possible explanation is that while he did in the preceding paragraphs refer to the “sensitisation effect”, for some unknown reason thereafter he overlooked that aspect. This can be seen from the fact that in HC (Remitted) at [124], the Judge talked about the Applicant not perceiving the arrest as “an event which exposed him to ‘actual or threatened death, serious injury or sexual violence’ as required by Criterion A. He should not have been applying the strict Criterion A test but an attenuated version of that test. He did not discuss how Criterion A should be applied to the 2011 events in the light of the “sensitisation effect”. We will be returning to this question in greater detail later (at [84] below).
- [70]
[70] In respect of the charge, Dr Ung and Dr Sarkar had suggested that Criterion A might be satisfied because the Applicant was informed that he could suffer the death penalty if convicted of the trafficking charge. However, in the Judge’s view, because none of the Applicant’s experts explained how being verbally informed of that constituted a Criterion A event of the requisite degree of trauma, he decided that the Applicant had not satisfied the criterion (HC (Remitted) at [128]).
- [71]
[71] In the circumstances, given that Criterion A was not satisfied, the Judge concluded that the Applicant did not suffer from a fresh episode of PTSD in relation to the events in 2011 (HC (Remitted) at [129]). Nevertheless, the Judge, in accordance with the revised Terms of Reference, proceeded to consider whether the Applicant did suffer from PTSS.
PTSD and PTSS
- [72]
[72] Before we examine the Judge’s findings on PTSS proper, it is important to first clarify the distinction between PTSD and PTSS, and its effect on the Applicant.
- [73]
[73] Towards the end of the remitted hearing before the Judge, it became apparent from the flow of expert evidence that the original Terms of Reference, which focused only on PTSD, could be an overly parochial and pedantic approach. Those terms were inclined towards a binary, all-or-nothing analysis – whereby either the Applicant had PTSD or he did not. If, on the DSM-5 PTSD Criteria, the Applicant was determined not to have PTSD, prima facie, that would be the end of the inquiry. The Judge, rightly in our view, thought that the focus on PTSD was overly simplistic as something short of PTSD would still be relevant in addressing the key question that had been posed by the court in CA (Conviction) – whether there was any innocent explanation for the Applicant’s lies and omissions. On this basis, the Judge allowed the expert evidence in relation to PTSS. It was in this context that the Applicant later applied for a revision of the original Terms of Reference to allow the Judge to make the relevant findings on PTSS as well (see [35] above).
- [74]
[74] As alluded to earlier, we invited parties to address us in their further submissions on how the distinction between PTSD and PTSS might affect the legal analysis. The issue here is whether a diagnosis of PTSD or PTSS, as the case may be, could assist in understanding and determining whether the Applicant could have lied for innocent reasons.
- [75]
[75] On the one hand, counsel for the Applicant emphasised that the existence of PTSS entails a clinically significant disturbance of the mind by the relevant symptoms even if they do not rise to the level of a psychiatric disorder. This means that where a person is found to have suffered from PTSS, the absence of a finding of PTSD does not necessarily suggest that the lies uttered by the person are Lucas lies (ie, lies motivated by a realisation of guilt) or that they affected his credibility. What is crucial is the effect which each specific PTSS had on the Applicant. In this regard, the Judge had opined in HC (Remitted) at [193] that it was “not inconceivable” that someone with the traumatic past like the Applicant could have lied in an attempt to escape the traumatic predicament that he was in.
- [76]
[76] The Applicant points out that innocent people may tell lies for a variety of reasons, including a fear that the truth will not be believed. As such, lies told by persons under the suspicion of having committed a crime, without more, may have limited probative value for purposes of inferring guilt. Accordingly, if ordinary reactions to stress can provide an innocent explanation for a deliberate lie, a fortiori, certain PTSS such as “intense psychological distress” and a “persistent negative emotional state” should surely afford a person suffering from those PTSS a similar innocent explanation.
- [77]
[77] On the other hand, the Prosecution submitted that PTSS, unlike PTSD, is not a recognised psychiatric disorder. Instead, PTSS refers to the symptoms listed under Criteria B to E of the DSM-5 PTSD Criteria, which are linked to an index Criterion A traumatic event. It cautioned against lowering the bar to accepting symptoms which may be nothing more than a “normal psychological reaction”. Nevertheless, the Prosecution accepts that if there was sound medical opinion supporting the findings that the Applicant suffered PTSS at the time he gave his statements to the CNB and that the PTSS caused his lies and omissions, then it could be said that the Applicant had innocent reasons for his lies and omissions. However, this was not the case. As the Applicant himself accepts, the experts’ evidence was not sufficient to prove on a balance of probabilities that the various PTSS did cause the Applicant to lie. The Judge’s observation at [193] of HC (Remitted) that it was “not inconceivable” that the Applicant lied because of his traumatic past and the traumatic circumstances he found himself in also does not assist the Applicant because it was merely a general observation and not a factual finding.
- [78]
[78] As would be apparent from the above, the parties differ on the effects of PTSD and PTSS. In our judgment, a finding of PTSD or PTSS may have the same legal effect, which is that it may provide an innocent explanation for the Applicant’s lies in his statements to the CNB. This is a substance over form approach that accords with the fact-intensive nature of the essential question arising out of CA (Conviction). This also comports with the revised Terms of Reference which allowed findings on both PTSD and PTSS. The court must, in the final analysis, scrutinise the effects of the PTSD and/or PTSS as the case may be, as stipulated in the revised Terms of Reference (see [35(d)] above).
- [79]
[79] The Prosecution has suggested that some of the PTSS found to have been experienced by the Applicant are indistinguishable from normal psychological reactions that would ordinarily be experienced by healthy persons placed in similar circumstances. In a loose sense, that could well be the case. This submission was also raised before the Judge but was rejected (HC (Remitted) at [184]). There is a fundamental epistemic difference between the normal psychological responses of “fear and stress” and the PTSS experienced by the Applicant as assessed by the experts, however similar they may appear outwardly to the untrained eye. For the avoidance of doubt, we wish to state categorically that we do not accept the Applicant’s suggestion that if ordinary reactions to stress can supply an innocent explanation for a deliberate lie, certain PTSS such as “intense psychological distress” would a fortiori be capable of furnishing an innocent explanation. In our view, that comparison is somewhat invidious. The former would rarely, if ever, be a reasoned basis for justifying or explaining away an accused person’s lies in his statements. Indeed, that was a key premise for the decision in CA (Conviction).
- [80]
[80] Contrary to the Prosecution’s suggestion, we also do not think our present approach in the instant case undermines the principles governing s 33B(3)(b) of the MDA, which affords the court a discretion to pass a sentence of life imprisonment in lieu of the death penalty when offenders suffer from a recognised and proven psychiatric condition. In Nagaenthran a/l K Dharmalingam v Public Prosecutor and another appeal [2019] 2 SLR 216 (“Nagaenthran”) at [31], this court held that the abnormality of mind under s 33B(3)(b) of the MDA must arise from an established psychiatric condition. The reasoning employed in Nagaenthran was based on the specific statutory provision and Parliament’s express intention to limit the exception to individuals suffering from a recognised and proven psychiatric condition. That inquiry takes place at an ex post stage after the accused person has been convicted of a charge under the MDA. Whether a person suffers from an abnormality of mind such that he can avail himself of the statutory exception to the death penalty is a narrow and binary inquiry. In contrast, the foundational inquiry here is a logically anterior one – simply put, it is solely to determine whether the lies and omissions in the Applicant’s statements could be due to PTSD or PTSS and thus whether the Applicant’s conviction in CA (Conviction) is unsafe.
The PTSS
- [81]
[81] We turn next to the Judge’s analysis of the Applicant’s PTSS. In summary, the Judge found that the Applicant suffered from the following PTSS during the statement-taking process:
(a) When the First Statement was recorded, the Applicant was suffering from intense psychological distress (Criterion B4): HC (Remitted) at [148].
(b) When the Cautioned Statement was recorded, the Applicant was suffering from dissociative reactions (Criterion B3) and intense or prolonged psychological distress (Criterion B4): HC (Remitted) at [154] and [158].
(c) When the Long Statements were recorded, the Applicant was suffering from intense and prolonged psychological distress (Criterion B4), a persistent and negative belief about others (Criterion D2), and a persistent negative emotional state (Criterion D4): HC (Remitted) at [172], [175] and [178].
(1) Criterion A
- [82]
[82] The threshold issue raised by the Prosecution is that the PTSS must be associated with a Criterion A traumatic event. According to the Prosecution, since the Judge had declined to find the arrest or the notification of the death penalty as satisfying Criterion A (see [71] above), the findings on PTSS are erroneous.
- [83]
[83] We agree with the Prosecution that PTSS must refer to the specific symptoms listed in the DSM-5 PTSD Criteria. It is clear from the DSM-5 PTSD Criteria that they explicitly refer to a predicate Criterion A traumatic event. It is true that the Judge did not explicitly address what constituted the predicate Criterion A event in his analysis and findings of the various PTSS. Moreover, as indicated earlier at [69], and with respect, it is not entirely clear if the Judge gave due regard to the operation of the sensitisation effect arising from the Applicant’s childhood PTSD when considering whether Criterion A was satisfied.
- [84]
[84] We note that when evaluating Criterion A in the context of whether the Applicant was suffering from PTSD in 2011, the Judge did preface his analysis of Criterion A by acknowledging the sensitisation effect (HC (Remitted) at [118]–[120]). As we already explained earlier (at [60]), it was common ground between the parties that, in the light of the diagnosis of PTSD during the Applicant’s childhood, there was a sensitisation effect that would lower the threshold for Criterion A when a subsequent event should occur as in 2011. For example, Dr Ung testified that “even an innocuous trigger could retrigger his PTSD experience”. Consonant with this, Dr Ung noted in his explanation of the typical effects of PTSD that “the ‘false alarms’ triggered by various stimuli related to the original trauma (at times the relationship may be subtle) [go] on for far too long and in much greater intensity than would be expected”. Dr Sarkar also took the position that the trauma needed to “retrigger an episode in someone…[already having]…intense fear about something, with PTSD … does not have to be life-threatening”. Despite this, the Judge did not give a real explanation as to why the arrest of the Applicant or his being informed of the death penalty would not satisfy the attenuated Criterion A event (HC (Remitted) at [122]–[128]). In fairness to the Judge, we recognise that the evidence adduced before him was contested in a number of respects, and we turn to that now.
- [85]
[85] At the hearing of HC (Remitted), Dr Sarkar appeared to be alone in suggesting that the arrest itself constituted the traumatic event under Criterion A as the Judge noted at [123]. Dr Sarkar testified that a person who was sensitised because of the Wukari massacre might perceive being arrested as a threat to life. In doing so, he emphasised that whether an event is life-threatening should be assessed from the Applicant’s subjective perspective. Dr Sarkar highlighted the fact that the Applicant had described his arrest using words such as “war”, “control” and “chaos” during the hearing of HC (Acquittal), and this suggested that the arrest was sufficiently traumatic in the circumstances to satisfy Criterion A. Admittedly, this was a shift from Dr Sarkar’s initial position as set out in his report, which was that the Applicant suffered a fresh episode of PTSD in 2011 after becoming aware of the death penalty. In this regard, Dr Sarkar explained that he was only made aware of the Applicant’s testimony in HC (Acquittal) after he had completed his report.
- [86]
[86] Dr Ung and Dr Winslow took the view that the Applicant being informed of the charge and the prospect of the death penalty was what triggered an episode of PTSD and/or PTSS. It was conceded by the Applicant during the hearing in HC (Remitted), that he was only informed of the death penalty when he was charged and not at the point of arrest (at [122]). Dr Ung states in his report that “both the stress of facing a capital charge and being told that he may face the death penalty” resulted in the Applicant “re-experiencing previous traumatic memories and suffering a recurrence of PTSD”. Dr Winslow testified that if a person had a history of trauma or “almost dying”, as was the Applicant’s case, and was then told that he might be sentenced to death, this would constitute an immediate, life-threatening event.
- [87]
[87] Dr Cheok’s evidence was that none of the events of November 2011 satisfied Criterion A though his evidence appeared equivocal at times. On the one hand, he seemed to suggest that for the Applicant to have suffered from a fresh episode of PTSD in 2011, all the DSM-5 PTSD Criteria, including a life-threatening Criterion A event, would have to be met afresh. Dr Cheok appeared to say that if the “trigger” is not something which is life-threatening, this would not fulfil the criteria for PTSD. On the other hand, Dr Cheok also agreed that with the “sensitisation effect”, it is possible that the reading of the charge was sufficient to constitute “trauma”. This is seen in the following exchange:
- [88]
[88] In sum, while there is unanimous agreement among the experts on the relevance of the sensitisation effect vis-à-vis the assessment of the Applicant’s condition in 2011, what is less clear is the extent to which Criterion A might be attenuated. It seems to us that this inherent variability of the sensitisation effect accounts for the divergence between the experts as to whether, and which of the events in 2011, might satisfy the attenuated Criterion A. Nonetheless, save for Dr Cheok, the three remaining experts considered that either the Applicant’s arrest or his being informed of the death penalty if found convicted of the charge, would be a sufficiently traumatic event in the circumstances.
- [89]
[89] Having proper regard to the sensitisation effect, we find that both the Applicant’s arrest and his being informed of the death penalty were sufficient separately to constitute Criterion A events. This is all the more so if they were to be viewed collectively. Let us elaborate.
(A) The arrest
- [90]
[90] We begin with the Applicant’s evidence about his arrest given during his evidence-in-chief in HC (Acquittal), which was well before Dr Sarkar came onto the scene with his views on PTSD. The following exchange between the Applicant and his counsel, which was relied on by Dr Sarkar, is significant and bears quoting:
- [91]
[91] As Dr Sarkar highlighted, it is apparent from the Applicant’s testimony, in particular, his use of emotive or affective language, that the Applicant found the arrest to be highly traumatic. While the Applicant’s evidence would not ordinarily be remarkable, we consider that his childhood diagnosis of PTSD and the concomitant sensitisation effect, coupled with the reference to the word “war”, all point to the fact that at that moment he had a flashback of what he witnessed in Wukari. We agree with the Judge and Dr Sarkar that the Applicant’s account displays a degree of negativity which is unusual and persistent (HC (Remitted) at [178]). This testimony, we must re-emphasise, was given in 2014 before the Applicant’s PTSD or PTSS was put in issue. We therefore consider it to be credible and material evidence. Significantly also, the Applicant’s account of how the arrest took place was not refuted or contested at trial. During cross-examination by the Prosecution in HC (Acquittal), the evidence shows that Applicant essentially repeated the same account quoted above.
- [92]
[92] Dr Sarkar opined that the Applicant’s above testimony in HC (Acquittal) was indicative of “classic post-traumatic stress”. His evidence bears quoting at some length:
- [93]
[93] Dr Sarkar further explained that:
- [94]
[94] We accept Dr Sarkar’s evidence that, having regard to the sensitisation effect, the Applicant’s arrest would be sufficient to satisfy Criterion A and that there is some degree of similarity between the Applicant’s arrest and the Wukari massacre.
- [95]
[95] As a general observation, while we do not go so far as to say that the entire discipline of psychiatry is premised on subjective experience as suggested by Dr Sarkar (and perhaps he did not intend to convey that), we acknowledge that one of the ineluctable features of this branch of medical science, at least in so far as the present case is concerned, is that there remains a significant subjective and discretionary element to the diagnostic process. To that extent, psychiatrists no doubt have the challenging task of objectively reconstructing a patient’s subjective mental state, as they must in providing expert evidence in legal proceedings. In the final analysis, the diagnostic process is a holistic exercise of clinical judgment based on the DSM-5 PTSD Criteria applied in the context of specific facts, medical history and circumstances of each individual patient. This is not to suggest that the court will not scrutinise the cogency of the medical evidence. The court regularly engages in the difficult task of sieving and analysing all the evidence, including the oft-contested medical evidence. In doing so, the court carefully considers, inter alia, the cogency and limits of the medical evidence complemented by, where appropriate, an understanding of human experience and common sense. We cannot overemphasise the fact that here we are dealing with a person who as a child developed PTSD as a result of the Wukari massacre, and bearing in mind the sensitisation effect, his subjective perspective and reaction to any particular stressful situation will necessarily be different, and might even appear irrational, to a normal person who is not so affected.
- [96]
[96] In the present case, though it is agreed between the four experts that the sensitisation effect is an accepted phenomenon documented in the scientific literature, we note that the DSM-5 PTSD Criteria is silent on it. Nonetheless, the general notion of sensitivity is adverted to, as follows:
- [97]
[97] Moreover, the following diagnostic features stipulated in the DSM-5 PTSD Criteria (which do not appear to take into account the sensitisation effect) are striking and worth noting:
- [98]
[98] The Applicant’s account of the arrest has been outlined above. It is uncontroverted that upon opening the door to his hotel room following the knock he heard, the Applicant was swiftly and forcefully restrained by police officers before being handcuffed. All of this was taking place, as Dr Sarkar noted, on foreign soil where the Applicant had arrived for the first time (see also, HC (Acquittal) at [70]). While there is certainly no suggestion that the CNB officers involved in the arrest physically assaulted the Applicant, we do not consider the arrest to be categorically different from the examples cited in the DSM-5 PTSD Criteria above. In the case of the Wukari massacre, there was an immediate threat to the Applicant’s life as he witnessed others being murdered before him. While the two events obviously differ in terms of gravity, both the arrest and the Wukari massacre presented a real and proximate threat to the Applicant’s life or liberty. To that extent, we agree with Dr Sarkar that there are similarities between the two events. In the circumstances, we consider it more probable than not that the arrest would have constituted a traumatic event, having due regard to the sensitisation effect operating on the Applicant.
- [99]
[99] As against this, the Prosecution highlighted in its submissions below, other evidence which in its view, militated against the suggestion that the arrest was a traumatic event for the Applicant.
- [100]
[100] First, at the hearing for HC (Remitted), the Applicant had agreed that there was no reason for him to fear for his life at the time of the First Statement. The relevant exchange in cross-examination of the Applicant during HC (Remitted) is as follows:
- [101]
[101] To our minds, the Applicant’s apparent concession is of little consequence. It is evident that the specific context of the cross-examination quoted above concerned the question of whether there was a rational basis for the Applicant’s distress since he had not been informed of the charge (or death penalty) at that point. There is an appreciable difference, particularly when the sensitisation effect is borne in mind, between agreeing that one does not fear and one has no rational basis for fear. We do not consider the Applicant’s concession inconsistent with a finding that the arrest was a distressing event that satisfied the attenuated Criterion A. More importantly perhaps, it appears that the Applicant was not asked in cross-examination whether the arrest itself caused him to fear for his life. The above exchange highlighted by the Prosecution understandably focused on what an ordinary rational person would feel in similar circumstances. In our assessment however, that disregards the Applicant’s unusually negative account of the arrest as quoted earlier. We consider that evidence to be credible and thus, we do not think much weight can or should be given to Applicant’s ostensible concession here.
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