Court of Appeal · Decided 23 November 2021
Iskandar bin Rahmat v Law Society of Singapore
Feedback & support[2021] SGCA 107 · Case no. Civil Appeal No 9 of 2020
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Introduction
- [1]
[1] This case arose from a complaint of professional misconduct made to the Law Society of Singapore (the “Law Society”) in respect of six lawyers who represented the appellant, Iskandar bin Rahmat (the “Appellant”), when he was on trial on charges of committing a double murder.
- [3]
[3] Following his unsuccessful appeal, the Appellant filed a complaint (the “Complaint”) with the Law Society against the team of lawyers who had represented him during the High Court trial (the “Defence Team”). An Inquiry Committee (the “IC”) was appointed under the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed) (“LPA”) to consider the Complaint. After considering the allegations made by the Appellant and the responses of the Defence Team, the IC issued a report recommending that the Complaint be dismissed (the “IC Report”). The IC Report was considered by the Council of the Law Society (the “Council”), who then determined that no formal investigation by a Disciplinary Tribunal (“DT”) was necessary. The Complaint was dismissed accordingly.
- [5]
[5] The Appellant filed an appeal against the Judgment. At this point, the matter took a detour when the Law Society took out an application to strike out the appeal. The ground of the striking out application was that this court did not have the jurisdiction to hear an appeal against a decision of a judge in disciplinary proceedings under the LPA. A five-judge coram disagreed with the Law Society, holding in Iskandar bin Rahmat v Law Society of Singapore [2021] 1 SLR 874 (“Iskandar Jurisdiction”) that this court was vested with the requisite jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
- [6]
[6] That decision then resulted in the present substantive appeal being brought before us. Having heard the parties’ submissions on 5 July 2021, we dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Judge’s decision.
- [7]
[7] These are our full reasons for dismissing the Appellant’s appeal against the Judgment.
Background
- [8]
[8] To properly understand the Appellant’s complaints against the Defence Team, it is necessary to return to the background facts leading up to the Appellant’s conviction for murder. These facts were covered comprehensively in Iskandar HC at [3]–[18], and we only set out those that are necessary for an understanding of the allegations in the Complaint.
- [9]
[9] The Appellant was employed by the Singapore Police Force from March 1999 and rose to the rank of senior staff sergeant. In July 2013, the Appellant was in financial difficulties being indebted to the Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation (“OCBC bank”) in the sum of $61,599.66. OCBC bank had taken out bankruptcy proceedings against him and served the application on the Appellant at his workplace. The Appellant offered an out-of-court settlement of full payment of $50,000, which the bank accepted; at the time, however, the Appellant had less than $400. These financial troubles had also spilled over to his work: he had been charged for being “financially embarrassed”, which carried the potential consequence of dismissal.
- [10]
[10] This state of affairs led the Appellant to devise a plan to rob the first victim, Mr Tan Boon Sin (“D1”). D1 was a businessman who had lodged police reports about missing cash and gold coins from his safe deposit box. The Appellant was initially the duty investigation officer for the case, and he learnt that there was still a substantial amount of cash in the box. The Appellant came up with an elaborate plan to steal from D1 so as to be able to pay off his debts.
- [11]
[11] On 10 July 2013, the Appellant met D1 near the location of the safe deposit box. D1 entered the premises and opened the box. He put a dummy camera supplied by the Appellant into the safe deposit box thinking it would help identify the thief. D1 removed the remaining cash from the box and placed it in an orange bag that the Appellant had brought with him. On the pretext of escorting D1 safely home, the Appellant accompanied D1 home in D1’s car.
- [12]
[12] According to the Appellant, when D1’s car arrived outside the house, the Appellant observed that he had opened the outer gates using a remote control at the driver’s seat. The car entered and parked at the porch. D1 then carried the orange bag into the house and placed it near the staircase leading up to the second level. When D1 attempted to close the gates, the Appellant requested that the gates be kept open as his “partner” (a fictitious character) would be arriving.
- [14]
[14] The Appellant did not deny these acts of killing D1 and D2. What he denied was having the intention to do so. In particular, he relied on two exceptions under s 300 of the Penal Code, namely, the right of private defence and sudden fight: Iskandar HC at [44]. In essence, he maintained that his plan had been to rob, not to kill, and he had inflicted those injuries upon D1 and D2 only because they had attempted to assault him. If the Appellant had succeeded in either of those defences, the charges of murder would have been rebutted and he would, instead, have been convicted of culpable homicide under s 299 of the Penal Code, an offence which does not carry the death penalty.
- [15]
[15] In relation to D1, the Appellant’s version of events was that, after pretending to communicate on his fake “walkie-talkie”, he had informed D1 that someone had opened the safe deposit box and that they had to return to CISCO with the orange bag. D1 then walked to the kitchen and used the corded telephone there. After doing so, D1 emerged from the kitchen, telling the Appellant that the camera in the box did not contain batteries and accusing the Appellant of cheating him. D1 then assaulted the Appellant with a knife.
- [16]
[16] This explanation was rejected by both the trial court and this court. In particular, it was held that there was no reasonable explanation as to how D1 could have discovered the Appellant’s ruse or that the dummy camera was a fake. In fact, the “only reasonable inference” from the events summarised above at [11] was that D1 had trusted the Appellant: Iskandar CA at [35] and [37]. Similarly, there was no explanation as to why D1 would turn violent and attack the Appellant with a knife. In this court’s view, it was “simply unbelievable” that D1 would have become so enraged as to attack the Appellant; D1 was also a 67-year-old man with a chronic knee problem, and it would have been a simple matter to have waited for his son or called the police. This court also referred to the evidence of D1’s wife, Mdm Ong Ah Tang, who testified that D1 was not a violent person: Iskandar CA at [43]. With no alternative case put forward by the Appellant, and since he had admitted that he intended to and did cause the injuries to D1, it was held that the Appellant had had the requisite intention to cause death: Iskandar CA at [45]. He had also failed to establish a case in relation to the defences of sudden fight and private defence under s 300 of the Penal Code.
- [17]
[17] In relation to D2, the Appellant averred that as he was lowering D1’s body on to the floor, D2 appeared in the doorway of the house. D2 then shouted “Pa!” and charged at the Appellant with clenched fists, swinging his right fist, which the Appellant blocked. The Appellant intended to retaliate by punching D2 with his right hand but, failing to realise that the knife was still in his hand, ended up stabbing D2. As D2 continued to punch and pull at the Appellant, the latter ended up stabbing D2 further due to his wild swings. The Appellant’s overall claim was that all he wanted to do was to get D2 away from him so that he could escape.
The complaint
Complaint to the Law Society
(a) Mr Shashi Nathan, Ms Tania Chin and Mr Jeremy Pereira of KhattarWong LLP;
(b) Mr A P M Ferlin Jayatissa and Ms N Sudha Nair of LexCompass LLC; and
(c) Mr Rajan Supramaniam of Hilborne Law LLC.
- [20]
[20] The first complaint dated 14 February 2018 alleged that in conducting the Appellant’s defence the Defence Team had failed to comply with his instructions. This initial complaint was followed by two letters, dated 5 April 2018 and 7 May 2018. The term “Complaint” used in this judgment refers collectively to all three documents submitted by the Appellant to the Law Society. All in all, the Appellant averred that the Defence Team had failed in numerous aspects in the conduct of his defence. The IC noted that the Appellant had levelled nine allegations against the Defence Team and dealt with these points individually. When the Appellant applied to the High Court, the Judge sorted the individual allegations into three categories. The Appellant adopted this grouping for the purpose of this appeal. The categories were as follows:
(a) Exhibits:
(i) Failure to provide full set of photographs of the crime scene after the committal hearing.
(ii) Failure to study the photographs properly to verify the amount of cash recovered from a bag placed in the store-room.
(iii) Failure to raise the issue of a baton found in D1’s car.
(b) Witnesses:
(i) Failure to follow the agreed plan stated in the Case for the Defence an in particular, failure to call the Appellant’s family members as Defence witnesses at trial.
(ii) Dispensation of various witnesses from attendance at trial.
(iii) Failure to appoint a defence psychiatrist.
(iv) Failure to appoint a defence pathologist.
(c) Instructions:
(i) Failure to carry out instructions which the Appellant had written in a bundle used for committal proceedings.
(ii) Failure to make amendments to the Opening Address for the Defence.
When the individual allegations are considered as a whole, it can be seen that the Appellant was asserting that his defence had not been properly conducted by the Defence Team and that he had been prejudiced thereby. The Law Society put it higher: it submitted that the Complaint, if true, went far beyond negligence. The Appellant’s case was that the Defence Team acted improperly, incompetently, deliberately and dishonestly and thereby compromised his defence, disobeyed his instructions, kept him in the dark, with disastrous consequences resulting in his conviction and death sentence. That was the most serious allegation which, if true, could cast doubt on the correctness of his conviction.
- [22]
[22] The IC issued its report on 7 February 2019. All four members agreed that it was not necessary to have a formal investigation into the Complaint by a DT, and that the Complaint should be dismissed. The Council dismissed the Complaint thereafter, and the Appellant was informed of its decision by a letter dated 20 March 2019.
Application to the High Court
- [24]
[24] The Judge dismissed the application. The grounds canvassed by the Judge will be covered in greater detail below, but the reasons are summarised as follows:
The inquiry process and the recourse to court
- [25]
[25] In the Iskandar Jurisdiction judgment at [20]–[22], this Court set out the disciplinary framework for regulated legal practitioners (a category that all members of the Defence Team fall into) as set out in the LPA. It is not necessary to repeat that in detail here. In summary, the disciplinary process which takes place under the LPA is a three-staged one. First, there is the inquiry stage. Then, if cause of sufficient gravity is found by the IC, the formal investigation stage by a DT is initiated. Finally, there is the hearing before the Court of Three Judges which decides whether and, if so, how an erring solicitor should be disciplined (see also Subbiah Pillai v Wong Meng Meng and others [2001] 2 SLR(R) 556 (“Subbiah Pillai”) at [18]). The IC is part of the first stage. It is constituted to inquire into complaints which have been submitted to the Law Society and which are not obviously frivolous, vexatious, misconceived or lacking in substance (Iskandar Jurisdiction at [21]).
- [26]
[26] In the case of Loh Der Ming Andrew v Law Society of Singapore [2018] 3 SLR 837 (“Loh HC”), Woo Bih Li J (as he then was) noted at [44] that the role of the IC is inquisitorial and informal. As such, the investigative burden borne by the IC is not an onerous one. As the Judge observed, “it only needs to determine if there is a prima facie case of ethical breach or other misconduct by a lawyer that warrants formal investigation and consideration by a DT” (the Judgment at [82]). This view appears to have been derived from the discussion in Whitehouse Holdings Pte Ltd v Law Society of Singapore [1994] 2 SLR(R) 485 (“Whitehouse Holdings”) where this court said at [38]:
- [27]
[27] Loh HC also drew important principles regarding this process from Subbiah Pillai. As stated in Loh HC at [68] and [69]:
- [28]
[28] It would appear from the above, which we respectfully agree with, that the IC is a fact-finding organ intended to sieve out cases of insufficient gravity to be sent onto the second stage. Where the lawyer’s explanation seems to accord with the known facts and the common-sense view of things, the IC may accept that explanation. But where there are disputed facts on which no light can be shed, the IC ought not to make a decision believing or disbelieving the lawyer. Rather the IC should properly recommend that the case be referred to the DT. However, the IC should only make this recommendation if the complaints, taken at face value, are of sufficient gravity.
- [29]
[29] Whilst the role of the IC is inquisitorial rather than adversarial or adjudicative, this does not mean that principles of natural justice do not apply to its proceedings. They do but in a way that is suitable to the nature of the proceedings. While fairness is always required, the rigorous regime appropriate to the conduct of trials does not have to be carried over to informal investigations like those carried out by the IC. As this court observed in Subbiah Pillai at [57] and [58]:
- [30]
[30] When the IC completes its investigation, there are a number of courses that it might take depending on the conclusion that it has come to. First, under s 86(5) of the LPA, where it is satisfied that there are no grounds for disciplinary action, it has to report to the Council accordingly and state its reasons for its decision. On the other hand, if it is of the opinion that the solicitor complained against should be called upon to answer any allegation made against him, the IC must take a number of steps under s 86(6) to give him a chance to give his explanation before it makes its report. According to s 86(7), the report of the IC must deal with the question of the necessity or otherwise of a formal investigation by the DT. If a formal investigation is deemed necessary, the IC has to recommend to the Council the charges to be preferred against the lawyer; but if is of the view that no formal investigation is required, then the IC must recommend lower sanctions or that the complaint be dismissed.
- [31]
[31] In this case, of course, the recommendation was that the Complaint be dismissed. The Council accepted the recommendation but that did not close the door for the Appellant because s 96(1) of the LPA allows a complainant who is dissatisfied with such a result to apply to a Judge to review the dismissal.
- [32]
[32] The powers of the Judge hearing such an application are stated in s 96(4) of the LPA as follows:
- [33]
[33] How the judge should proceed when deciding which of the orders permitted under s 96(4) should be made in the case before him has been considered in case law. In Wong Juan Swee v Law Society of Singapore [1993] 1 SLR(R) 429 (at [14]), the High Court noted:
- [34]
[34] Whilst the High Court’s expression of the law as cited above was approved in Whitehouse Holdings (at [44]), we would caution that it should be remembered that, strictly speaking, the IC does not make any findings of fact or law. Nor is it acting as an adjudicative body. It is therefore not quite correct to describe the application to a Judge under s 96 of the LPA as an appeal. The Judge’s role is to review the determination. In doing so the Judge takes cognisance that any determination made by the IC is only as to whether there is, on the face of the matter being investigated, material supporting charges for possible misconduct which will have to be formally investigated. It is correct, however, that that decision must be based on the evidence provided to the IC. Therefore, the Judge should not disturb the decision of the IC unless the court is satisfied that the evidence before the IC did not support the conclusion it reached or that the IC misunderstood the evidence or that there was some exceptional circumstance justifying disagreeing with the IC’s conclusion and the Council’s acceptance of the same. While it is not possible at this stage to delineate the limits of what may qualify as an exceptional circumstance, we would observe that one such circumstance would be if it appeared from the IC’s report that it considered there was no cause for formal investigation because it wrongly categorised the conduct complained about as not capable of constituting misconduct attracting a sanction.
- [35]
[35] Similarly, if the matter goes up on appeal after the judge has made his or her decision, as was the case here, the role of this court is to undertake the same type of analysis into the decisions of the IC and the judge as was taken by the judge in the High Court. It is not this court’s role to make findings but rather it has to consider whether the material presented before the IC justified the conclusions that it and the judge reached.
- [36]
[36] Of course, the whole exercise, starting with the investigation of the IC and ending with the analysis of this court, is not done in a vacuum. Each of the bodies considering the matter must do so with an understanding of what type of conduct on the part of a regulated legal practitioner would call for disciplinary action. It might therefore be helpful for us to summarise the position in this regard so far as pertains to conduct of the nature comprised in the Complaint.
Conduct deserving of sanction
- [37]
[37] Section 83(2) of the LPA sets out in sub-paras (a) to (k) the various types of conduct that the LPA proscribes. A solicitor found to be guilty of any conduct falling within those sub-paragraphs will be liable to one or more of the sanctions set out in s 83(1). For present purposes, the relevant portions of ss 83(1) and (2) are as follows:
- [38]
[38] The sub-paragraphs of s 83(2) that we have highlighted above are the ones that could potentially be applicable to the Complaint in the present case. These sub-paragraphs describe more than one type of conduct and we therefore break them down further to focus on the individual categories that bear most connection to the conduct complained about here. Thus, for present purposes we would emphasise that between them, sub-paras (b) and (h) cover:
(a) fraud;
(b) grossly improper conduct;
(c) a breach of professional rules that amounts to improper conduct or practice as an advocate or solicitor; and
(d) misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor.
In our judgment, the third and fourth grounds above overlap to a considerable extent. We refer to these two grounds cumulatively as “misconduct”. The key inquiry for both grounds is whether a lawyer, by virtue of his conduct, is unfit to act as an advocate and solicitor. This, of course, is an extremely broad inquiry that encompasses a variety of situations. We elaborate below on what the various grounds cover.
Fraud
- [39]
[39] We begin with the first, and most straightforward, category: that of fraud. Here, the test in Derry v Peek (1889) 14 App Cas 337 is applied; that is, fraud is proved when a false representation has been made (a) knowingly; (b) without belief in its truth; or (c) recklessly, without caring whether it is true or false: Law Society of Singapore v Udeh Kumar s/o Sethuraju and another matter [2017] 4 SLR 1369 at [34]–[36]; Bachoo Mohan Singh v Public Prosecutor and another matter [2010] 4 SLR 137 at [114].
Grossly improper conduct
- [40]
[40] Fraud is then to be distinguished from the second category within sub-para (b), that is grossly improper conduct. In Re Lim Kiap Khee; Law Society of Singapore v Lim Kiap Khee [2001] 2 SLR(R) 398 (“Lim Kiap Khee”) at [19] the Court of Three Judges held that deceit or an intention to deceive would not be necessary for a finding of grossly improper conduct. Instead, the inquiry is whether the conduct is “dishonourable to the solicitor concerned as a man and dishonourable to his profession”: See also Law Society of Singapore v Ezekiel Peter Latimer [2019] 4 SLR 1427 (“Ezekiel Peter Latimer”) at [37]; Re Marshall David; Law Society of Singapore v Marshall David Saul [1971–1973] SLR(R) 554 (“Re Marshall David”) at [23].
- [42]
[42] In Law Society of Singapore v Wong Sin Yee [2018] 5 SLR 1261 (“Wong Sin Yee”), the court found (at [45]) that by posing questions in cross-examination of a victim of alleged molest that were “indecent, scandalous and calculated to insult or annoy”, the respondent solicitor’s conduct was “disgraceful and a clear abuse of the privileges of cross-examination that are entrusted to an advocate”. He had therefore “cross[ed] the line and reached the level of egregiousness” under s 83(2)(b) of the LPA.
Misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor
- [43]
[43] Misconduct under the LPA is a broader “catch-all” provision where the conduct is deemed unacceptable but does not fall within any of the other enumerated grounds: Wong Sin Yee at [24]; Ng Chee Sing at [40]; Law Society of Singapore v Arjan Chotrani Bisham [2001] 1 SLR(R) 231 at [35]. Such misconduct can be founded upon the solicitor’s professional and/or personal conduct: Ng Chee Sing at [40], citing Khushvinder Singh Chopra.
- [44]
[44] The standard applied here is therefore less strict as compared to the other two grounds, and it only need be shown that a solicitor is guilty of “such conduct as would render him unfit to remain as a member of an honourable profession”: Ng Chee Sing at [40], relying on In re Weare, a Solicitor; In re The Solicitors Act, 1888 [1893] 2 QB 439. The practical guide is whether reasonable people, on hearing what the solicitor had done, would have said without hesitation that as a solicitor he should not have done it: Wong Sin Yee at [24]. This standard, however, is fixed by the court and not by peer judgment: Ng Chee Sing at [42].
- [45]
[45] It bears mention that, where a solicitor is found liable for misconduct under s 83(2)(b) of the LPA, liability under s 83(2)(h) usually also follows on the basis of the logic that the greater encompasses the lesser. Such was the case, for instance, in Ezekiel Peter Latimer, Ng Chee Sing, Wong Sin Yee and Law Society of Singapore v Chiong Chin May Selena [2013] SGHC 5 (“Selena Chiong”). Indeed, as the Court of Three Judges observed in Lim Kiap Khee at [21]:
- [46]
[46] The present case involves two broad examples of situations that could be classified as misconduct, namely: (1) negligence or want of skill; and (2) acting without the requisite authority. While each of these is determined by independent inquiries and principles, it must be emphasised that sanctions will only be imposed where the conduct rises to the level of misconduct unbefitting of an advocate and solicitor.
Acts of negligence or want of skill
- [47]
[47] Turning first to the situation where a solicitor acts negligently, it should come as no surprise that simple negligence or want of skill per se is insufficient to amount to due cause under s 83 of the LPA. This is consistent with the observations made by Lord Esher in In re G. Mayor Cooke (1889) 5 TLR 407 (“In re G. Mayor Cooke”) (cited also in Lim Kiap Khee at [15]):
In re G. Mayor Cooke is also significant as the latter portion of the quote above is the origin for the test for “grossly improper conduct”.
- [48]
[48] This test was affirmed in Singapore in Ezekiel Peter Latimer. In that case, the respondent solicitor was engaged to represent both an Indian national (“Sunil”) and Sunil’s employer (“Dipti”). Sunil was charged with making a false declaration in his application for work permit (the “AWP”), and Dipti had countersigned the AWP resulting in her being charged as well. Sunil had instructed the respondent that he was unaware at the time he signed the AWP that the salary declared was false and that he was deceived by Dipti into believing that his salary was as stated in the AWP. The respondent opted not to convey Sunil’s instructions in his representation to the Attorney-General’s Chambers. Instead, he indicated that Sunil had asked Dipti about the discrepancy and had accepted Dipti’s explanation. The following portions of the findings of the Court of Three Judges are highly relevant:
- [49]
[49] Observations to that effect were also made by the same court in Law Society of Singapore v Tan See Leh Jonathan [2020] 5 SLR 418 (“Jonathan Tan”). In that case, the respondent solicitor employed a paralegal to work for him, one Mr Colin Craig Lowell Phan Siang Loong (“Colin Phan”). Colin Phan informed the respondent that he had been unable to renew his practising certificate and hence was an unauthorised person under s 32(2) of the LPA. Despite this, the respondent allowed Colin Phan to send five e-mails representing himself to be an advocate and solicitor. The respondent and Colin Phan also entered into an agreement to share approximately 50% of the respondent’s fees for legal work performed. The court found that his conduct fell within ss 83(2)(b) and 83(2)(h) of the LPA, warranting sanction, and observed at [11] as follows:
- [50]
[50] Thus, the case law makes it clear that simple negligence or want of skill would not be sufficient to amount to due cause (see also the related observations in Law Society of Singapore v Quan Chee Seng Michael [2003] SGHC 140 (“Michael Quan”) at [24].
- [51]
[51] What does amount to due cause when a lawyer has been negligent or has not applied the requisite degree of skill, however, is less clear. To begin with, the general proposition that negligence may constitute misconduct is found in Lim Kiap Khee at [19]–[20]:
- [52]
[52] Examples of negligence or want of skill amounting to due cause for sanction can be found in several cases. First, in Selena Chiong, the respondent solicitor represented one Heng Siew Lee (“Heng”) in the latter’s proposed divorce proceedings. Heng subsequently lodged a complaint against the respondent, alleging that the respondent had not diligently handled the matter on her behalf. The particular complaints were that the respondent had: (1) not duly updated Heng about the case’s progress; (2) not duly explained all letters and notices received; (3) not given appropriate advice; and (4) acted without authority. The Law Society argued, as an alternative, that the respondent’s conduct was negligent to the extent that it was “inexcusable” and “such as to be regarded as deplorable by [her] professional colleagues”. Relying on Lim Kiap Khee, the Law Society argued that Chiong was unfit to remain as a member of an honourable profession under s 83(2)(h) of the LPA. As the Court of Three Judges noted at [18]:
- [53]
[53] The Court found that the Law Society had not established the fourth charge in that case. In relation to the first three charges, however, the Court agreed with that the Disciplinary Tribunal’s finding of guilt, but varied the findings, such that the first and second charges fell within s 83(2)(h) instead of s 83(2)(b) of the LPA. The reasons for this are worth setting out in full, as follows:
- [54]
[54] While the submissions of the Law Society took the position that the respondent had been negligent, the Court did not adopt that language. However, the Court described the conduct impugned in the first and second charges as “neglect in handling the divorce” and as smacking more of “incompetence, disorganisation or lack of care”. It concluded that this conduct was appropriately regarded as misconduct within the meaning of s 83(2)(h) (at [26]), and thereby gave a clear example of how neglecting a matter could rise to the level of a want of skill that justified sanction.
- [55]
[55] Secondly, in Law Society of Singapore v K Jayakumar Naidu [2012] 4 SLR 1232 (“Naidu”), the respondent was approached by one Hay Boo Seng (“HBS”) to prepare a power of attorney authorising him to act in the sale of a flat for his brother Hay Choo Soon (“HCS”), as the latter was bedridden. Thereafter, HBS sold the flat and took a loan secured on the sale proceeds of the flat, purportedly for HCS’ medical bills. The respondent was warned that HCS did not know about the sale of the flat or the loan and had not understood the implications of the power of attorney. A deed of revocation of the power of attorney and a letter of authority providing for the sale proceeds of the flat to be paid to another lawyer for safekeeping were subsequently executed by HCS. The respondent did not comply with the documents. Through pressure exerted by HBS and arrangements made involving HCS, the sale proceeds were eventually misappropriated by HBS. The fourth charge against the respondent was to the effect that he had acted “deliberately, negligently, or otherwise” [emphasis added], and was to be liable under ss 83(2)(b) or 83(2)(h) of the LPA. On this fourth charge, the Court of Three Judges found that respondent guilty of misconduct within the meaning of s 83(2)(h) of the LPA: at [77].
- [56]
[56] More generally in Naidu, however, the Court consistently referred to a standard of what a “reasonably competent lawyer” would have done in the circumstances as the “central inquiry” in the case: at [16], [39], [43], [51] and [72]. In its analysis on due cause, the Court observed as follows:
- [57]
[57] Thirdly, the observations in Law Society of Singapore v Yap Bock Heng Christopher [2014] 4 SLR 877 (“Christopher Yap”) are also worth pointing out. In that case, the respondent solicitor improperly obtained a loan from his client. When the loan was due, he tried to avoid contact and threatened to claim legal fees for prior work done. For the two charges against him, the court suspended him for two years and three years respectively. In determining whether a monetary penalty would have been appropriate, the Court observed as follows:
- [58]
[58] Drawing the threads together, two points bear clarification. First, that a high degree of negligence or incompetence or want of skill would suffice to show due cause requiring sanctions to be imposed. The appropriate standard to be applied is that laid down in the case of In re A Solicitor [1972] 2 All ER 811, as cited in Law Society of Singapore v Chiong Chin May Selena [2005] 4 SLR(R) 320 as follows:
This standard of conduct that is “inexcusable and is such as to be regarded as deplorable by the fellows in the profession” was also relied upon in Lim Kiap Khee at [20] and in Re Cashin Howard [1989] 2 SLR(R) 82 at [34].
- [59]
[59] Secondly, such negligence or want of skill can be founded on a cumulative account of matters, taking into account the entire factual backdrop. This follows, in particular, from Selena Chiong at [24] and Naidu at [79]. Most recently, Valerie Thean J stated in Lee Wei Ling and another v Law Society of Singapore [2021] SGHC 87 as follows:
- [60]
[60] Any discussion of whether a particular action was negligent or displayed a culpable want of skill will of course be shaped by the context in which it occurred. In this connection it is highly relevant that the allegations in the Complaint related to the conduct of a trial. It has long been recognised that due to the dynamic nature of a trial where decisions have often to be taken in a short space of time and may be prompted by the court, a charge of negligence can be hard to maintain. As observed in Ridehalgh v Horsefield [1994] Ch 205 at p 326:
- [61]
[61] Similarly, in the House of Lords decision of Arthur J S Hall & Co (a firm) v Simons [2002] 1 AC 615 at 682 (per Lord Steyn):
Acting without authority
- [62]
[62] On acting without authority, the case referred to is again Selena Chiong. In that case, because of the framing of the charge, the Court of Three Judges found that the elements that needed to be proven were that: (1) the client, Heng, had unequivocally revoked her instructions for the respondent or the respondent’s firm to act on her behalf; (2) the respondent was aware of the unequivocal revocation of her authority; and (3) the respondent continued to act despite such knowledge of the revocation of her authority to act. The Court found that the evidence did not support a finding that the respondent was conscious that Heng had revoked the authority to act on her behalf.
- [63]
[63] A more specific instance of a solicitor acting outside the scope of authority granted is found in Michael Quan. In that case, the respondent solicitor was charged with making cash payments from a client’s account without the necessary authority, in contravention of rr 7(1) and 8 of the Legal Profession (Solicitors’ Accounts) Rules (1999 Rev Ed). The Court of Three Judges found that it was unlikely that the client had authorised such withdrawals and the solicitor was thus in breach of the rules.
- [64]
[64] These cases are more straightforward, as the focus is on determining what the scope of authority granted to the lawyer was, and then whether the lawyer had acted beyond the scope of such authority. There is, however, an alternative way in which the various situations could be approached. Selena Chiong, Michael Quan and Fong Maun Yee concerned the situation where the authority to make certain decisions lay within the remit or control of the client. The Appellant’s case here raises a more nuanced question of whether the lawyers should have acted in a certain manner. On this view, a lawyer can be said to have acted without authority in deciding not to make an argument requested by the client.
- [65]
[65] In such cases, however, it is also clear that the authority to make the decision does not lie solely with the client. It is also incumbent on the lawyer to exercise his/her own judgment in evaluating the case. Going back to In re G. Mayor Cooke, Lord Esher also observed as follows:
- [66]
[66] The passage by Lord Esher demonstrates the tensions that are faced by a lawyer. Indeed, while one is not to sit as judge of a client’s case, where an argument is simply untenable in the light of the evidence a lawyer would be in breach of duty in insisting on running the argument, nevertheless. This duty is owed not only to the client, but also to the court. It is therefore incumbent on the lawyer to continually assess the merits of the case and not to run frivolous arguments. This principle has been relied on frequently in the case law (see for example Zhou Tong and others v Public Prosecutor [2010] 4 SLR 534 at [19]–[21] and Lock Han Chng Jonathan (Jonathan Luo Han Cheng) v Goh Jessiline [2008] 2 SLR(R) 455 at [45]–[46]).
- [67]
[67] On either approach taken to acting without authority, we emphasise that it is only in egregious situations that a lawyer should face sanctions. Further, as a matter of conceptual placement, acting without authority could fall within both ss 83(2)(b) (eg, in Ezekiel Peter Latimer) and 83(2)(h) of the LPA.
The arguments before this Court
Broad observations
- [68]
[68] Before us, the Appellant essentially sought to resurrect the same nine allegations against the Defence Team as he did before the IC and before the Judge. Some attempt was made at an overarching case, with the Appellant further categorising his grounds of appeal as follows:
(a) There was a breach of the fair hearing rule, as the IC had employed reasoning not relied upon by the Defence Team, in effect denying the Appellant the opportunity to refute or address those reasons.
(b) The IC and the Judge had adopted a “hindsight approach”, namely that the findings implicitly imported a requirement of causation into the assessment of liability for professional misconduct.
(c) The IC and the Judge had “plainly erred” in the appreciation of evidence before them, in particular, as the objective evidence corroborated the Appellant’s account and not the Defence Team’s.
- [70]
[70] We should also state that the arguments that there had been breaches of natural justice by the IC were misplaced. We reiterate the discussion at [29] above on the application of natural justice to the investigations carried out by the IC. These are informal and not adversarial. The IC must consider the particulars of any complaint submitted to it and, if it thinks there may be a possibility of misconduct, it has to ask the solicitor complained against to respond to the complaint. Thereafter, how the IC proceeds is up to it – it can ask for a further comment from the complainant, but it is not obliged to do so. Further if the IC considers the complaint to be baseless, for whatever reason, it does not need to give the complainant that reason and ask for a response before coming to a determination. It is sufficient for the IC to report to the Council as required by the LPA. If the complainant is dissatisfied with the reasoning of the IC or the Council, the remedy is to be found in s 96 of the LPA as we have stated previously. We thus found no merit in the Appellant’s assertions that there had been a breach of natural justice affecting his case.
- [71]
[71] Judging by the nature of the allegations before the IC, the Judge, and now us, they fell under the general rubric of misconduct as discussed above. No dishonesty or deceit was alleged by the Appellant, so fraud was out of the picture. While the IC did not enunciate what categories of wrongful conduct it was considering in relation to the individual allegations, three of its members are solicitors themselves and therefore could be expected to be aware of the kinds of conduct that could potentially fall under ss 83(2)(b) and (h). From the IC Report, it is evident that the IC’s approach was to consider the credibility of the allegations and whether it was reasonable in the circumstances for the Defence Team to have acted as it did. The IC concentrated on establishing the facts and since it considered that the facts did not substantiate, or were not capable of substantiating, any serious shortcoming, it rejected the Complaint in its totality. If it had considered that a prima facie case had been made out on one or more of the Appellant’s allegations it would have had to then consider the implications of that decision, ie, for example, whether any mishandling of the defence or any negligence established amounted to misconduct or whether any failure to carry out the Appellant’s instructions was of sufficient gravity to be referred to a DT.
- [72]
[72] In [20] above, we set out the allegations in the Complaint in the categories assigned to them by the Judge. In our view, they should be reclassified by reference to their legal implications by which we mean which type of breach of duty they were actually directed at establishing. As we have discussed above, the appropriate breach categories in this case are (a) negligence or want of skill, and (b) acting beyond the scope of authority. Using these categories, we would reclassify the allegations as follows:
(a) Negligence or want of skill
(i) Failing to provide the full set of photographs;
(ii) Not studying the photographs;
(iii) Failing to study the Appellant’s notes; and
(iv) Failing to amend the Opening Statement.
(b) Acting beyond the scope of authority
(i) Failing to raise the issue of the baton;
(ii) Failing to call the members of the Appellant’s family as witnesses:
(iii) Agreeing to dispense with a large number of witnesses;
(iv) Failing to appoint a psychiatrist; and
(v) Failing to call an expert pathologist.
- [73]
[73] We will take these categories in turn and explain why we agreed with the IC and the Judge that none of the allegations made showed, even on a prima facie basis, that the Defence Team had misconducted itself when defending the Appellant.
Category 1: Negligence or want of skill
(1) Failure to provide all the photographs
- [74]
[74] The Appellant’s first allegation here was that the Defence Team had failed to provide him with all the photographs of the crime scene after the committal hearing and that, when he complained, a member of the Defence Team had informed him that there were too many photographs to be provided.
- [75]
[75] The Defence Team conceded that they had not shown the Appellant the full set of photographs but denied telling him that they could not furnish the photographs. They asserted that the relevant photographs (out of a full set of 700) had been included in the Agreed Bundle that was given to the Appellant, and that they had discussed these with the Appellant. The Defence Team furnished the IC with copies of the photographs from the Agreed Bundle. The Appellant’s rejoinder was that he had been given the Agreed Bundle, but without photographs. Subsequently he said that only a limited number of photographs (from pages 796 to 804 of the Agreed Bundle) had been supplied to him.
(A) The views of the IC and the Judge
- [76]
[76] The IC did not accept the Appellant’s allegation. It did not make sense that he would have been given only some but not all of the photographs in the Agreed Bundle. It noted that what happened at the scene was the crux of the criminal trial and therefore it would have been odd for the photographs of the scene not to have been available to the Appellant when he gave his instructions to the Defence Team.
- [77]
[77] Before the Judge, the Appellant argued that the IC had erred in its appreciation of the facts. He claimed he had not received the photographs in the Agreed Bundle, save for pages 796 to 804. The page numbers given by the Defence Team were incorrect as he had checked the pages in the Record of Proceedings (“ROP”). Further, it was unacceptable that only “relevant” photographs were shown to the trial court as all had to be shown. Additionally, even if relevant photographs had been provided to the court, the Defence Team had breached their duties to provide him with all documents, as legal practitioners are a client’s agent (citing Law Society of Singapore v Tan Phuay Khiang [2007] 3 SLR(R) 477 at [42]): the Judgment at [29].
- [78]
[78] The Judge held that the IC’s determination was justified, and the Appellant’s assertion wholly lacked substantiation. There was no evidence that the photographs had been wilfully withheld from the Appellant, nor any evidence of a request on his part to see the entire set of photographs. Instead, the Defence Team had taken a practical decision in view of the sheer number of photographs, and included only the relevant ones, as is common in criminal trials. It was also observed that the Appellant’s argument that the page numbers did not match his ROP was not cogent as the page numbering of the ROP used on appeal would differ from that used at trial.
(B) The appeal and our decision
- [79]
[79] Before us, the Appellant argued that the Judge had erred in her findings because:
(a) The Defence Team had clearly acknowledged that the Appellant had requested to see the entire set of photographs, as seen from their written explanation to the IC dated 10 September 2018.
(b) The Defence Team had no evidence to show that they had provided the Appellant with the “relevant” photographs as no attendance notes or acknowledgment receipts from the prison to that effect were presented.
(c) The Judge had failed to address the point that the relevant photographs did not contain those of the baton, the cash and valuables, and the sketch of footprints at the exterior of the house. Without these, the Appellant had been deprived of the opportunity to make informed decisions that he might be able to pursue at his trial.
- [80]
[80] On the Appellant’s contention that the Judge had erred in thinking that there was no evidence of a request to see the entire set of 700 photographs, the evidence is unclear in this regard. In the Defence Team’s letter of 10 September 2018 that the Appellant pointed to, the team had stated that:
- [81]
[81] From this alone, it did appear that the Appellant may have asked to see the entire set of 700 photographs. That, however, was not entirely clear from the evidence. In the Appellant’s own submissions before the Judge, he had stated as follows:
- [82]
[82] The Appellant’s claim was therefore that the scene photographs had not been provided to him at the time. It was not the case that he had made a specific request to see all the photographs. This substantiated the Judge’s point that “nor is there any evidence of a request his part to see the entire set of 700 photographs”: the Judgment at [30].
- [83]
[83] Even going on the assumption that the Appellant had asked to see all the photographs, there was no evidence that the Defence Team’s failure to do so was unprofessional or wilful. We agreed with the Judge’s broader reasoning here being that the Defence Team had shown the Appellant the relevant photographs; this was found to be sufficient, as a matter of practicality, due to the sheer number of photographs.
- [84]
[84] The Appellant’s contention, that the Defence Team had no evidence to show that they provided him with the relevant photographs, must similarly be rejected. The Defence Team’s explanation was that the relevant photographs were in the Agreed Bundle, to which the Appellant had access. The Defence Team had forwarded the pages of the Agreed Bundle containing the photographs with their Further Written explanations to the IC dated 20 November 2018. Both the IC and the Judge accepted that the Agreed Bundle furnished to the Appellant must have contained all the relevant photographs. We agreed as well that this was the only logical conclusion that could be drawn from the facts: the Judgment at [30]. The Agreed Bundle which the Appellant received could not have contained only some of the relevant photographs.
- [85]
[85] The Appellant also contended that the Judge had failed to address the point of prejudice that arose from the absence of specific photographs of the baton, the cash and valuables, and the sketch of footprints at the exterior of the house. We did not accept this argument. The simple point was that the Judge did not have to address each and every point as she had found that the relevant photographs had been provided and that the Appellant’s “assertion wholly lacked substantiation” in this regard. Addressing the underlying issue head-on, however, several points should be noted. First, the sketch of footprints at the exterior of the house was indeed present in the Agreed Bundle. Secondly, there was no evidence that the Appellant would have adopted a different strategy at trial had he been provided with these additional photographs. In fact, the Appellant was aware that a baton had been seized from the driver’s seat in the car and had informed the Defence Team to raise the issue. Thirdly, the IC made the point that scene reconstruction was the crux of the criminal trial and that it would have been “extremely odd” for the scene photos to not have been made available to the Appellant. This point spoke for itself. Further, at no point in the trial had the Appellant raised the issue that the photographs had not been provided to him.
(2) Failure to conscientiously study the photographs
- [86]
[86] The second allegation in relation to the photographs was that the Defence Team did not conscientiously study the photographs to ascertain the amount of money that was contained in the orange bag. That was an allegation of want of care and skill. The Appellant claimed that there was approximately $700,000 in cash in the bag and that the prospect of loss of this substantial sum would have so enraged D1 that he had attacked the Appellant to save the money: the Judgment at [31]. The Appellant also claimed in his submissions before the IC that alongside the $700,000 in cash, there was an assortment of “bars, coins, necklaces, bracelets and rings, etc”, that would raise the value of items to close to $1m. This point, however, was not raised in subsequent proceedings.
(A) The views of the IC and the Judge
- [87]
[87] The IC concluded that it was clear at a glance from the photographs that a large sum was involved, and the Defence Team could not be criticised for not counting each note in the photographs. Furthermore, when the matter went to the Court of Appeal, the court was informed that the sum was more than $600,000: the Judgment at [33].
- [88]
[88] Before the Judge, the Appellant contended that: (1) the Defence Team had failed to discharge its duties conscientiously and did not know the case well enough; (2) the Defence Team should not be allowed to speculate as to the possible weight of the argument raised that the sum would have led D1 to attack him; (3) the Defence Team had been dishonest in its explanation that the argument would not have been material when it stated that there was no fact to suggest that D1 had uncovered the Appellant’s ruse; and (4) there were no attendance notes to show that the photographs had been discussed with him: the Judgment at [34].
- [89]
[89] The Judge rejected the Appellant’s arguments, holding that exactly how much money had been in the orange bag was of no relevance to the decisions in Iskandar HC and Iskandar CA, and hence there had been no need to count the notes. It had been accepted in both courts that there was a large sum of money in the bag. Even then, the Appellant’s version that he had been attacked by D1 was rejected on the basis of factors other than the sum of money involved: the Judgment at [35].
(B) The appeal and our decision
- [91]
[91] According to the Appellant, the Judge had also erred, as she appeared to be suggesting that the Defence Team had not been guilty of professional misconduct because it would not have made a difference to the Appellant’s case on appeal. This was reminiscent of a “but-for” test in assessing whether causation had been established.
- [93]
[93] At the outset, we broadly agree with the point made by the Appellant – that an IC or a judge, in assessing a lawyer’s conduct of a case, should not do so solely by reference to the eventual success or failure of the case. The assessment of the correctness of the litigation decision has to be made with regard to circumstances at the time that that decision was made. In this case, however, the attack mounted on the Judge’s reasoning was unwarranted. It is clear, in our view, that the Judge had not relied solely on the fact that the Appellant’s case eventually failed in court. Instead, the Judge was broadly affirming the IC’s decision. On this point, the IC found that they could not “say that [the Defence Team] had not acted conscientiously, for not having counted, one by one, each and every currency note in the photographs” and it was “obvious from these photographs that a large sum of money was involved, without having to count every note in the photographs”. In reaching this conclusion the IC took into consideration the Defence Team’s explanation that “even if such a sum existed, it would be highly speculative … and there was no other fact to suggest that [D1] had realised that he was being duped by [the Appellant]”. The Judge had agreed with the IC’s decision on this, and the core of her reasoning was (the Judgment at [35]):
- [94]
[94] The other reasons, namely (1) that the Court of Appeal had rejected the argument that D1 had attacked the Appellant; and (2) the reasoning of the Court of Appeal had turned on factors other than the sum of money involved, were then used to buttress the Judge’s conclusion.
- [95]
[95] In any case, however, we agreed with the Judge’s (and the IC’s) reasoning here. It would have been a futile exercise for the Defence Team to have gone through the photographs to count each and every note in question. It was obvious that both the trial and appeal courts had been cognisant of the large sum of money involved, having been informed that it was “in excess of $600,000” or that it was “an enormous sum of money in excess of $600,000”: Iskandar CA at [5] and [7]. That determination put paid to the remainder of the Appellant’s arguments here. It was not logical for him to claim that D1 would have only attacked him if the amount involved was nearly $700,000 and would have not done so if the amount involved was only something in excess of $600,000. There was no basis for such a claim. In any event, the fact remained that the Defence Team had raised the argument that D1 had attempted to violently assault the Appellant.
(3) Failure to carry out the instructions given in the notes
- [96]
[96] The background to this allegation was that the Appellant had handed the Defence Team a sheaf of papers on 20 October 2015, that constituted his notes on the bundle used for his committal proceedings. He referred to the bundle as the “P1 Bundle”. The bundle contained written notes on 52 witnesses, notes on the case theories of the Prosecution and Defence, documentary evidence, general observations and remarks. We refer to these notes collectively as “the Defence Notes”. The Appellant’s complaint was that the Defence Team had failed to carry out the instructions in the Defence Notes: the Judgment at [70]. He also informed the IC that he was never told that the points he penned were being abandoned and why they were being abandoned.
- [97]
[97] The Defence Team’s position was that the Defence Notes were not firm instructions but were points that they were being asked to consider for possible incorporation into the case. The notes were also prepared before the agreement to dispense with the evidence of a significant number of witnesses had been arrived at. Hence, after that agreement, the Defence Notes no longer had any relevance in relation to the excluded evidence. The other points were considered and incorporated, where relevant, into their cross-examination of various witnesses and into their arguments.
(A) The views of the IC and the Judge
- [98]
[98] The IC found the Defence Team’s explanation persuasive and credible. In particular, the Defence Notes included questions such as “use this to our advantage?” and “report is very vague but he can refute my statements?” and could not have contained firm instructions.
- [99]
[99] The Judge found no basis to depart from the IC’s position. The Defence Notes would have been given at a very early stage of the process and it was the responsibility of counsel to update their client and initiate further discussion. Many of the Defence Notes were framed as points that the Appellant was inviting the Defence Team to consider, or potential issues that could be raised in the course of trial. They would have been superseded by events and new instructions would have arisen: the Judgment at [73]. Further, a perusal of the Defence Notes showed that the Defence Team had taken on board many of the points and acted consistently with the points raised. For example, the Appellant’s account of how he had been attacked was written in the Defence Notes and came across in his evidence and was considered by the High Court and the Court of Appeal: the Judgment at [73].
(B) The appeal and our decision
- [100]
[100] The arguments raised before the Judge were replicated in this appeal. We agreed with the Judge that the Defence Team had not acted negligently in relation to the Defence Notes. Broadly, it was in our view, accurate to characterise the notes as suggestions that he wanted the team to consider, rather than firm instructions. This was evident from the fact that more often than not, the Appellant simply raised questions in the Defence Notes. Some examples are reproduced as follows:
- [101]
[101] Additionally, we agreed with the Judge’s observation that the Defence Notes were made by the Appellant at an early stage in the proceedings. The subsequent developments in the case being run, including the narrowing down of the issues, simply would not have been considered by the Appellant at the time that he wrote them.
(4) Failure to amend the Opening Statement
- [102]
[102] The Appellant argued that the Defence Team did not comply with his instructions to amend the Opening Address for the Defence. He had told them that the Opening Address focussed too much on obtaining a reduction of the charges from s 300(a) of the Penal Code to s 300(c) thereof, and insufficiently on bringing the facts within s 299 of the Penal Code instead: the Judgment at [74]. Ultimately, however, it was the unamended version of the Opening Statement that was used in court, and he only received a copy of the amended version later.
- [103]
[103] The Defence Team’s explanation was that the various versions of the Opening Address did not differ in substance, only in form. The position taken consistently was that the primary defences were under s 300 of the Penal Code, and, in the alternative, that the appropriate charge was under s 300(c) of the Penal Code. It was admitted that the Appellant had not been happy with the original version of the Opening Statement and that the amended version was not tendered to the trial court. Mr Nathan did, however, clarify the Defence position orally in court: the Judgment at [75].
(A) The views of the IC and the Judge
- [104]
[104] The IC analysed the Opening Address as filed and noted that it made reference to Exceptions 2 and 4, which if successfully established, would have brought the offences under s 299 of the Penal Code. There was also reference to s 300(c). The Opening Address was worded in a confusing manner, but any confusion that resulted was resolved in the oral exchanges in open court when Mr Nathan confirmed that the defences of sudden fight and the right of private defence were being relied on. This position was repeated in two documents produced later, the Supplementary Case for the Defence filed in court on 16 October 2016 and a letter to the Prosecution of the same date. That the Appellant’s case was clear to the trial judge was also evident from Iskandar HC.
- [105]
[105] The Judge held that the IC was entitled to come to the conclusion it had arrived at on this issue. It was clear that all parties were aware that Exceptions 2 and 4 would involve a reduction of the charges and that the reference to s 300(c) of the Penal Code was an alternative: the Judgment at [78].
(B) The appeal and our decision
- [106]
[106] The strongest argument raised by the Appellant of conduct that can properly be classified as negligence relates to the Defence Team’s failure to amend the written Opening Address but, in our view, what happened at the time showed decisively that this failure did not amount to gross negligence deserving of sanction. The filed version of the Opening Address was not one that the Appellant had ultimately desired – this was a point that the Defence Team conceded before the IC and the Judge. The crux of the Appellant’s complaint, however, was that there was insufficient focus on the reduction to s 299 of the Penal Code in the version of the Opening Address eventually relied on. In our view that point had no substance. In the Notes of Arguments dated 19 October 2015, private defence and sudden fight were recorded as matters relied on before the reduction to s 300(c) of the Penal Code was mentioned. This understanding is also borne out in the following exchange from the transcript from 30 October 2015, between the Court, Mr Lau Wing Yam on behalf of the Prosecution, and Mr Nathan:
Category 2: Acting beyond the scope of authority
- [108]
[108] The remainder of the issues then fell into the broad question whether the Defence Team had acted beyond the scope of authority by failing to run the case as the Appellant wished. In our view, none of these five issues pointed towards any misconduct whatsoever. We discuss them in turn.
(1) Failure to raise the baton issue
- [109]
[109] Police investigations revealed that a baton had been placed under the driver’s seat in D1’s car. The Appellant alleged that he had instructed the Defence Team to raise the issue of the baton, but this was not done: the Judgment at [36]. He considered that the presence of the baton would help prove that D1 was a violent man.
- [110]
[110] The Defence Team’s explanation to the IC was that the Appellant had brought the issue up with Mr Jayatissa at one of the breaks during the trial although there was no attendance note of this. Mr Jayatissa then discussed the issue with Mr Nathan and they took the view that the mere fact of a baton having been found was insufficient to show that D1 was a violent person nor proof that he would use the weapon in a fight. Both counsel spoke to the Appellant in the dock and conveyed their views to him. The Appellant acknowledged those views and did not bring up the issue again.
- [111]
[111] The Appellant disputed this in his oral address to the IC and referred to his notes to the Defence Team where he had written “… baton under seat of SGM143. Proof that TBS (the 1st deceased) can be violent?”
(A) The views of the IC and the Judge
- [112]
[112] The IC accepted the Defence Team’s explanation, finding that there was “consonance” between the explanation and the documentary evidence. The Defence Notes were handed to the Defence Team on the first day of trial and were matters for them to consider and take a position on, which they had done.
- [113]
[113] Before the Judge, the Appellant argued that the IC had erred in placing so much weight on the question mark in the Defence Notes after his mention of the baton because that was not the only instance when he had communicated this point to the Defence Team. He had also done so at interviews before the trial and in discussions during the trial.
- [114]
[114] The Judge found no reason to disturb the IC’s conclusion. The primary ground for the IC’s conclusion was that the Defence Team’s explanation was to be preferred, and it was reasonable to conclude that they had explained the matter to the Appellant who accepted their advice. The question mark supported the fact that there had been discussion between the Appellant and the Defence Team.
(B) The appeal and our decision
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