Court of Appeal · Decided 29 November 2021
AnAn Group (Singapore) Pte Ltd v VTB Bank (Public Joint Stock Company)
Feedback & support[2021] SGCA 112 · Case no. Civil Appeal No 23 of 2021
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Introduction
- [7]
[7] After hearing counsel’s oral submissions on 14 October 2021, we reserved judgment. Having considered the parties’ respective positions, we dismiss CA 23.
Background and key events
Factual background
- [8]
[8] On 3 November 2017, the parties entered into a global master repurchase agreement (“GMRA”) under which AnAn would sell VTB global depository receipts (“GDRs”) of shares in EN+ Group PLC (“EN+”). AnAn would then repurchase the GDRs from VTB at a later date at pre-agreed rates. This arrangement was “in substance a loan from VTB to AnAn”: AnAn (CA) at [4].
- [9]
[9] The GMRA contained the following arbitration agreement (the “arbitration clause”; see AnAn (CA) at [7]):
- [10]
[10] Between 7 November 2017 and 6 April 2018, several events occurred which culminated in AnAn failing to restore and/or maintain sufficient collateral for the loan arrangement between the parties under the GMRA. This was an alleged breach of AnAn’s obligations under the GMRA, otherwise referred to as an event of default: see AnAn (CA) at [5]–[9]. Thus, on 12 April 2018, VTB sent a default notice to AnAn, designating 16 April 2018 as the early termination date of the GMRA. This notice alleged two events of default: AnAn (CA) at [10].
Procedural History
- [13]
[13] On 7 April 2020, a five-judge coram sitting in this court reversed the High Court’s decision. We applied the prima facie standard of review, and found that “it [was] clear that there [was] a prima facie dispute in this case that would justify allowing the appeal and restraining the winding up application presented by VTB”: AnAn (CA) at [101]. We considered it appropriate to dismiss, and not stay, CWU 183: see AnAn (CA) at [113]. AnAn was therefore not wound up.
- [16]
[16] Subsequently, Prayers 1 and 2 above were amended with the court’s leave, pursuant to an application by the Liquidators on 2 November 2020. The amended prayers are captured at [2] of the Judgment, as follows:
For convenience, we will from here on refer to these amended prayers as “Prayers 1 and 2”.
- [18]
[18] The two summonses were heard on 19 October 2020, and the Judge also considered the parties’ (and the Liquidators’) further submissions filed on 2 November 2020. The Judge issued the Judgment on 25 February 2021.
Decision below
- [19]
[19] The Judge granted Prayers 1 and 2 of SUM 3569. The Liquidators were entitled to “be paid both their reasonable remuneration and expenses out of the assets of [AnAn]”: Judgment at [7]. This included the “Handover” remuneration and disbursements. That is, for the period beginning from 7 April 2020 onwards, “[t]o the extent that the Former Liquidators were acting in accordance with [their] duties, they must be entitled to their reasonable remuneration and expenses”: Judgment at [8] and [9]. The Judge clarified that the quantum of remuneration will be subsequently determined: Judgment at [29]. The Judge also subsequently granted Prayer 3, ie, the Liquidators’ application to be released pursuant to s 276(4) of the Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed) (“Companies Act”): see Judgment at [23] and HC/ORC 2238/2021.
- [24]
[24] Finally, the Judge declined to provide a view on whether the dispute over the Liquidators’ fees would fall within the scope of the arbitration clause in the GMRA (Judgment at [27]):
SUM 77
- [25]
[25] On the eve of the present appeal, that is, on 1 October 2021, VTB filed CA/SUM 77/2021 (“SUM 77”), in which it sought to adduce fresh evidence in the form of several pleadings in XXXX Arbitration No XXX of 2020 (ARBXXX/20/XXX) (“the Arbitration”). This is the ongoing arbitration between the parties, which was commenced in 2020 following our decision in AnAn (CA).
Parties’ cases
- [27]
[27] Herein, we briefly summarise the parties’ positions. We will elaborate on the details of their arguments in the course of our analysis of the issues before us.
Appellant’s case
- [31]
[31] Thirdly, AnAn argues that the present dispute has not been resolved. That is, the court is not functus officio as regards the issue of the Liquidators’ fees. This is because the issue of who should bear these fees was not before this court in CA 174.
Respondent’s case
- [33]
[33] VTB contends that the issue of liability for the Liquidators’ fees should be determined in the Arbitration as part of AnAn’s claim for damages for breach of the arbitration clause, and not by the court in the present appeal.
- [34]
[34] Further, VTB argues that there is no basis to find it liable for the Liquidators’ fees. These should be paid out of AnAn’s assets. A petitioner is only made liable to make such payment where misconduct or an abuse of process is shown. AnAn has not proven such misconduct or abuse of process.
Preliminary clarifications
- [37]
[37] We make three important clarifications before engaging with the issues arising in the present appeal. First, the issues raised in SUM 3569 are not before this court. AnAn has limited its appeal to the Judge’s dismissal of SUM 3902. There is therefore no dispute that the Liquidators are due to be paid their reasonable remuneration and expenses. The sole question is who is to bear the Liquidators’ fees.
- [38]
[38] Second, neither side disputes that the questions at hand fall to be considered under the Companies Act, and not under the aegis of the Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act 2018 (Act 40 of 2018) (“IRDA”). That is correct, given the application of the saving and transitional provisions in the IRDA: see ss 526(1)(f) and 526(2)(a) of the IRDA. The relevant dates, namely the date of VTB’s application for the winding up of AnAn and the date of appointment of the Liquidators, fall before the date on which the IRDA came into force.
- [39]
[39] Third, we will address in this judgment the parties’ arguments on the question whether the dispute should be referred to arbitration. This is notwithstanding the fact that (a) AnAn’s Notice of Appeal does not raise the issue; (b) VTB has not filed a Notice of Appeal; and (c) the Judge declined to take a view on the arbitration issue, suggesting that no appeal could have been filed with respect to this specific point: see [24] above. However, under O 57 r 9A(5) of the ROC, a respondent need only state in its case that it desires to contend on appeal that the decision below should be varied or affirmed on other grounds not relied on by the court below. This was noted in L Capital Jones Ltd and another v Maniach Pte Ltd [2017] 1 SLR 312 at [51] and [65]:
- [40]
[40] Accordingly, it is clear that VTB need not file a formal Notice of Appeal in respect of the arbitration issue. VTB is entitled to argue that this court should decline jurisdiction, and that the dispute should instead be referred to the Arbitration. This argument seeks to affirm the Judge’s ultimate conclusion in dismissing SUM 3902.
Issues on appeal
- [41]
[41] The overarching question in this appeal is whether VTB should be made to bear the Liquidators’ fees. Flowing from this, the six issues on appeal may be distilled as follows:
(a) Whether this court should decline jurisdiction over the dispute in favour of the tribunal in the Arbitration (the “arbitral tribunal”).
(b) Whether “costs” under the SCJA includes liquidators’ remuneration and expenses.
(c) If not, whether this court nevertheless has the power to determine who should bear the Liquidators’ fees, and if so, what the source of this power is.
(d) If the court has the aforementioned power, what then is the threshold for the court’s exercise of its powers.
(f) Whether this court is functus officio in relation to the issue as to who is to bear the Liquidators’ fees.
Whether the dispute should be referred to arbitration
- [44]
[44] Based on the parties’ arguments, an apparent tension between two areas of law arises, not too dissimilar from that which arose in AnAn (CA). On the one hand, we have concerns over the arbitrability of the present dispute, which arose from the insolvency proceedings. It is indisputable that this court has jurisdiction and control over its own insolvency processes, and that consequently, as a matter of public policy, certain disputes involving insolvency matters are non-arbitrable: see Larsen Oil and Gas Pte Ltd v Petroprod Ltd (in official liquidation in the Cayman Islands and in compulsory liquidation in Singapore) [2011] 3 SLR 414 (“Larsen Oil”). The issue of the Liquidators’ fees would, at first blush, appear to fall within the scope of insolvency proceedings, because it arose from summonses filed in respect of CWU 183.
- [45]
[45] On the other hand, the present dispute also appears to fall within the scope of the broadly-worded arbitration clause in the GMRA. Under our arbitration law, the salient facts suggest that the prima facie threshold has been crossed. There appears to be some overlap between the issue before this court, and that before the arbitral tribunal. The overlap arises because the damages sought by AnAn in the Arbitration may potentially include the Liquidators’ fees. Consequently, it appears that the dispute over who should bear the Liquidators’ fees is, in some way, a dispute arising “in connection with” the GMRA (as per the arbitration clause).
- [46]
[46] In our view, the present orders that AnAn seeks in the context of the insolvency proceedings, and AnAn’s claim for damages for breach of the arbitration clause, are two distinct claims with different legal bases. We elaborate.
Different disputes with distinct legal bases
- [47]
[47] At the outset, we express our doubts over AnAn’s characterisation of the present dispute as non-arbitrable. While the issue in relation to the liability for the Liquidators’ fees arose from the winding up proceedings, this does not mean that the issue is necessarily non-arbitrable. To be precise, we are not concerned with the situation contemplated in Larsen Oil. In that decision, we stated thus (at [46]):
- [51]
[51] We emphasise that arbitration is by its nature consensual. If both parties agree that a commercial dispute over a head of damage should be referred to arbitration as a claim for breach of an arbitration agreement (as is the case at present), then in the absence of any public policy consideration or lack of powers on the part of the arbitrators to grant the relief sought, it would be incongruous to suggest that such a commercial dispute is non-arbitrable.
- [52]
[52] Both parties have expressly acknowledged that the issue of whether the Liquidators’ fees are claimable against VTB as damages for breach of the arbitration clause would fall within the scope of the Arbitration. We note that AnAn’s pleadings in the Arbitration do not specify the Liquidators’ fees as part of the damages claimed; but AnAn has expressly reserved its right to amend its pleadings to this effect. As such, it is clear that the Liquidators’ fees may eventually form the subject matter of a contractual claim in the Arbitration. In these circumstances, we see no reason to treat the dispute before the arbitral tribunal as non-arbitrable. There is no public policy consideration militating against the tribunal’s adjudication of what is in essence a contractual dispute between two commercial entities.
No risk of inconsistent pronouncements
- [58]
[58] Indeed, counsel for VTB, Ms Shobna Chandran, acknowledged during the hearing of CA 23 that AnAn would not be estopped from pursuing, as part of its claim for damages in the Arbitration, the Liquidators’ fees, because “there has been no substantive determination on these issues” before this court. She fairly recognised that these issues will be left to be determined by the arbitral tribunal.
- [59]
[59] Based on the foregoing, we see no reason to decline jurisdiction over the present dispute. The contractual dispute before the arbitral tribunal over the same subject matter but on a different legal basis does not per se oust our jurisdiction over CA 23.
Whether “costs” includes liquidators’ remuneration and expenses
The parties’ arguments
Adjudicatory and supervisory jurisdiction
- [66]
[66] As a starting point, it is common ground between AnAn and VTB that the prayers sought herein by AnAn involve an invocation of the court’s adjudicatory jurisdiction. The distinction between adjudicatory and supervisory jurisdiction was fully explored in this court’s decision in Ho Wing On Christopher and others v ECRC Land Pte Ltd (in liquidation) [2006] 4 SLR(R) 817 (“ECRC”).
- [68]
[68] Supervisory jurisdiction is quite clearly not invoked here. The court’s supervisory jurisdiction, as clarified in ECRC, arises from the Companies Act, and empowers the court to make orders as against a liquidator. The prayers sought in SUM 3902 are not against the Liquidators, but against VTB, a party to the litigation.
- [69]
[69] However, the mere fact that the court’s adjudicatory jurisdiction is being invoked against VTB does not advance AnAn’s claim against VTB in respect of the Liquidators’ fees. It remains necessary and relevant to draw a distinction between the adjudication of CA 174, and the adjudication of the present appeal.
“Costs” under the SCJA
- [77]
[77] While there exists a canon of interpretation that an identical expression used in the same statute should bear the same meaning (see Tan Cheng Bock v Attorney-General [2017] 2 SLR 850 at [58(c)(i)]), this rule does not appear to apply across primary and subsidiary legislation.
- [82]
[82] However, the NSW Act is not in pari materia with the ROC, and it is an unsuitable reference for the position under Singapore law. The relevant provisions of the NSW Act are as follows:
Critically, s 4 of the NSW Act (on the applicability of the statute) does not exclude winding up proceedings, unlike O 1 r 2(2) ROC. Accordingly, the NSWSC is not prohibited from referring to the NSW Act in determining the issue of a liquidator’s remuneration.
The court’s power to order a petitioning creditor to bear a liquidator’s fees and expenses
The source of the court’s power
The SCJA, the ROC and the Companies Act
- [91]
[91] The Companies Act provisions that appear relevant are ss 268(3), 311 and 328(1)(a):
Inherent powers
- [93]
[93] Chao Hick Tin JC (as he then was) alluded to the existence of a general power in Re Pac-Asian Services Pte Ltd [1987] SLR(R) 717 (“Re Pac-Asian”), citing Re Bridal Centre Co Pty Ltd (1985) 9 ACLR 481 at 488 (“Re Bridal Centre”). Chao JC quoted (at [13]) Kelly J in Re Bridal Centre, who stated thus:
- [96]
[96] The power, however, ought to be carefully and narrowly defined, given that it is well-recognised that “[t]he inherent power of the court under O 92 r 4 … is a wide but rarely used power”: Standard Chartered at [10]. In exercising such powers, the court must “ensure no prejudice to anyone in any way”: Standard Chartered at [10]. In addition, the power we are presently concerned with, while not statutorily excluded, would appear to interact with the statutory insolvency regimes under the Companies Act and IRDA. There is thus a need to ensure that when the court exercises such power, it will not be contrary to any aspect of these statutory regimes: see also Chan Yun Cheong at [38].
Safeguards on the court’s exercise of its power
- [99]
[99] Next, and at the risk of stating the obvious, the statutory provisions governing a liquidator’s claim for his/her remuneration must still be satisfied. That is, the regime under s 268 of the Companies Act (or s 78 of the IRDA) remains fully applicable. A liquidator is only entitled to reasonable remuneration. This, often, would form the subject matter of a separate summons filed by the liquidator.
- [101]
[101] This would safeguard the liquidator’s entitlement for his remuneration. It should not be overlooked that while a liquidator is appointed pursuant to an application by a petitioning creditor, the appointment is made by the court (see [92] above) – hence the need to provide security for his remuneration.
- [102]
[102] With the aforementioned safeguards, any litigation over liability for a liquidator’s fees can be effectively confined between the petitioner and the company. There will be no encroachment on the court’s supervisory jurisdiction over liquidators under the Companies Act and IRDA. The manner in which the present proceedings have transpired proves the point. The Liquidators’ concerns were addressed in SUM 3569, which does not form part of the present appeal. They have no interest in the present appeal. The dispute now pertains solely to determination of the liability with respect to the Liquidators’ fees as between AnAn and VTB.
The threshold for the court’s exercise of its power
The relevance of fault
- [107]
[107] There are two fundamental starting points to the present inquiry, the first being the very nature of the court’s inherent powers. These powers are indubitably wide and discretionary, and rooted in the notion of fairness; the object of the power in any case is ultimately to “express justice”: Standard Chartered at [10]. Much will accordingly turn on the facts of a given case, and whether unfairness may be discerned. As alluded to, in cases involving questions over who is to bear a liquidator’s remuneration, central to the consideration of fairness and justice would be the conduct of the parties, and whether they have acted in a manner that warrants the court’s intervention.
- [108]
[108] This is in line with the second starting point – the default position under s 311 of the Companies Act, which stipulates that the fees and expenses of the liquidator should ordinarily be paid out from the assets of the company. A claim for an indemnity against a petitioning creditor for such fees and expenses is therefore a departure from the default position. Any departure would, logically, require justification; such justification, in our view, would typically entail the company demonstrating some fault or unfair conduct on the part of the petitioner.
- [110]
[110] To recap, Chao JC in Re Pac-Asian cited Kelly J’s observations in Re Bridal Centre (see [93] above), that “[i]n many cases where the petition is dismissed, it would seem unjust that the remuneration should come out of the assets of the company” (at [13]). While the element of fault was not expressly discussed, Kelly J did mention that the factor militating in favour of making the petitioner bear the expenses is “unjust[ness]”. The relationship between fault and unjustness is clear, and we are of the view that the pronouncements in Re Pac-Asian and Re Bridal Centre some three decades ago were indeed prescient in this regard.
- [111]
[111] Teelek presents a much clearer example. The notion of fault was patent in that case. The court considered the second appellant’s oppressive conduct to be the key factor in ordering her to bear the full extent of the liquidator’s remuneration and expenses. The second appellant’s oppressive conduct manifested the fault and unfairness that called for the court’s intervention.
Whether fault must rise to the level of abuse of process
- [120]
[120] Where an abuse of process is established, the elements of unfairness and fault (on the part of the petitioner) will be patent, and this would justify the court’s exercise of the power. This is because abuse of process would involve the invocation of the court’s processes for unmeritorious or improper purposes, to the prejudice of a respondent.
- [121]
[121] That said, we hesitate to peg the minimum threshold for the exercise of the power to an abuse of process. The authorities do not appear to set the threshold at such a high level. The decisions in Re Pac-Asian, Teelek, Locker Group and Baldwin did not express the threshold to be abuse of process or malicious prosecution. While the VSC in Locker Group considered several statutory provisions on abuse of process, the ultimate findings made (see Locker Group at [60]) did not include any conclusions on abuse of process. While the VSC in Barroaghan did expressly find an abuse of process, this does not necessarily justify the imposition of a minimum threshold of abuse of process. The VSC did not suggest that a finding of abuse of process would be necessary before the court would be willing to exercise its powers against a petitioning creditor.
- [122]
[122] For similar reasons, VTB’s reliance on Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Starpicket Pty Ltd (No 2) [2013] FCA 699 (“Starpicket”) is misplaced. By VTB’s own admission, the relevant observations in Starpicket were obiter. More pertinently, the observations made by the Federal Court of Australia (“FCA”) do not support VTB’s contention (at [70]):
- [123]
[123] In summary, it is important to recognise that in situations falling below the threshold of abuse of process, much will depend on the facts of the case. It is not difficult to imagine that even absent an abuse of process, a petitioner can be meaningfully said, in certain scenarios, to have acted unfairly or to have been at “fault”; this much is clear from the cases discussed above.
Whether VTB has crossed the threshold
- [124]
[124] Based on the threshold we have articulated in the preceding section, VTB should not be made to bear the Liquidators’ fees. While VTB’s acts resulted in AnAn being wrongly wound up, VTB’s conduct was not so egregious or unfair as to warrant our intervention.
No fault or abuse of process on VTB’s part
- [125]
[125] The complexion of the proceedings below supports the conclusion that VTB did not act with fault. The picture would be different if VTB had jumped the gun in proceeding with the winding up route when the alleged debt owed by AnAn was not due at the time of the statutory demand, or if the court found that there was no debt due to VTB at all. That could possibly constitute “fault” on VTB’s part. But that was not what occurred.
- [126]
[126] Here, it was not seriously disputed that an event of default had occurred in relation to the GMRA (see [10] above). In the face of such default, VTB properly served a statutory demand on AnAn on 23 July 2018, which was left unsatisfied. On 10 August 2018, AnAn’s lawyers wrote to VTB’s lawyers; they disputed the debt and asked VTB to consider not proceeding with a winding up application, failing which they would apply for an injunction. AnAn then made an urgent application for an injunction on 13 August 2018, vide HC/SUM 3677/2018 (“SUM 3677”) in HC/OS 975/2018.
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