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Grounds publishedDecided 15 Dec 2021

Court of Appeal

Miao Weiguo v Tendcare Medical Group Holdings Pte Ltd (formerly known as Tian Jian Hua Xia Medical Group Holdings Pte Ltd) (in judicial management) and another

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[2021] SGCA 116Case no. Civil Appeal No 28 of 2021

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] This is an appeal against the decision of the High Court judge (“the Judge”) in Tendcare Medical Group Holdings Pte Ltd (formerly known as Tian Jian Hua Xia Medical Group Holdings Pte Ltd) (in judicial management) and another v Gong Ruizhong and others [2021] SGHC 80 (“the Judgment”), which held, inter alia, that the appellant, Mr Miao Weiguo (“Mr Miao”), was liable for a total sum of US$6m in respect of two transfers of US$2m and US$4m each, on the basis that he had dishonestly assisted Mr Gong Ruizhong (“Mr Gong”), the director of the first respondent, Tendcare Medical Group Holdings Pte Ltd (“Tendcare”), which is presently under judicial management, in breaching duties owed to Tendcare.

  3. [3] It is apposite to note at the outset of this judgment that underlying the legal issue just set out are fundamental differences as to the approach this court should adopt in relation to the reflective loss principle. Broadly speaking, there is a tension between two possible rationales for the reflective loss principle – one being rooted in the more specific sphere of company law and the other centring around the prevention of double recovery. The majority decision in Marex is based on the former rationale (holding that where there is a diminution in the value of a shareholding or in distributions to shareholders that is merely the result of a loss suffered by the company arising from a wrong committed by the defendant, the proper plaintiff to bring a claim is the company and not the shareholder, because the law does not recognise the said diminution as loss suffered by the shareholders personally), while the minority decision is based on the latter rationale, which it then takes to the logical conclusion that the reflective loss principle does not exist as a principle of law. To pre-empt our analysis below slightly, the approach in Townsing attempted to bridge these two rationales but, as the differing approaches taken in Marex reveal, this was an attempt which we respectfully consider to be ultimately unsustainable and should no longer be followed.

  4. [4] In deciding which approach should be adopted, we will need to consider not only (competing) arguments of principle and policy but also the historical context from which the reflective loss principle emerged. In so far as this last-mentioned point is concerned, the reflective loss principle is of relatively recent vintage and may be traced to the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd and others (No 2) [1982] Ch 204 (“Prudential”). It is, in our view, of note even at this early juncture that the reflective loss principle first laid down in Prudential was clearly rooted in the specific sphere of company law. It is also significant that subsequent cases, including Townsing, whilst purporting to elaborate upon the reflective loss principle, introduced a new (and more general) element centring on the prevention of double recovery – thus raising the issue as to whether or not this elaboration was correct or was conflating two incommensurable elements with the result of diluting or undermining the effect, as well as purpose, of the reflective loss principle itself.

  5. [5] As is immediately apparent, the legal issue facing this court raises fundamental questions. It might therefore conduce towards clarity if we state our conclusion right at the outset.

  6. [6] In summary, we are of the view that the reflective loss principle is one that relates to the specific sphere of company law and we therefore endorse the majority decision in Marex. To the extent that it is undergirded by principle, inasmuch as it has a specific purpose and rationale, the reflective loss principle is one that ought to be retained and we therefore do not agree with the minority decision in Marex. It follows that the approach in Townsing (which was, in fact, rendered by way of obiter dicta) is no longer the law in Singapore. In our respectful view, the court in Townsing, inadvertently perhaps, conflated a specific principle of company law with the general principle proscribing double recovery – resulting in the dilution or undermining of what was an otherwise clear and specific rule that had a clear and coherent rationale in the context of company law.

  7. [7] We would also observe that our endorsement of the majority decision in Marex by no means ignores the general principle against double recovery. Indeed, as we shall elaborate upon below, courts in every jurisdiction would probably have legal mechanisms that would prevent double recovery. This proscription is in essence a clear and commonsensical principle that is rooted in fairness and that would be apparent to even a layperson. It is also important to note that the general principle against double recovery operates not only in relation to company law but also across the entire spectrum of the law in general. We note further that it is impossible, given the myriad of possible factual matrices that can give rise to double recovery, to set out a general normative principle that would enable courts to prevent double recovery. It is very much an exercise that takes place on a descriptive and factual basis. Looked at in this light, it is not surprising that the minority decision in Marex, being based on the principle against double recovery, endorsed the same generally and, to this end, dispensed with the specific reflective loss principle. From one perspective, it was correct that the minority in Marex did not (as was the case in Townsing) incorrectly conflate the general principle against double recovery with the specific reflective loss principle under company law. That having been said, it was respectfully a step backward to have dispensed with the reflective loss principle that serves a clear purpose and function. This may well be, again respectfully, a situation where the legal baby was inadvertently thrown out together with the bathwater. Indeed, we will elaborate upon this weakness in the minority decision in Marex below.

  8. [9] I would add that I was in fact on the coram of Townsing. However, as I observed in a concurring judgment in Iskandar bin Rahmat v Law Society of Singapore [2021] 1 SLR 874 (at [96]):

  9. This is eminently one such situation to which the above observations wholly apply.

  10. [10] Before turning to our analysis and decision on the issue of reflective loss, however, it is important to remember that this issue has arisen within a specific factual matrix. It is Mr Miao’s case that the Judge’s factual findings were incorrect, and that the claims against him have no foundation. Even though Mr Miao argues that the reflective loss principle would apply to prevent the respondents’ claims against him regardless of our views on the facts, it is appropriate for us to begin by considering his factual arguments first, not least because we ultimately disagree with Mr Miao’s views on the reflective loss principle. The discussion of the factual issues will clarify the nature and scope of Tendcare’s claims against Mr Miao. In truth, the reflective loss principle is really relevant only if Tendcare has a cause of action against Mr Miao in the first place.

  11. [11] So much by way of a brief introduction. We turn, first, to the factual background and decision of the court below.

  12. Facts

  13. The parties

  14. [12] The first respondent, Tendcare, is a Singapore-incorporated investment holding company, which owned and operated hospitals and other medical-related business through direct and indirect subsidiaries incorporated in Hong Kong and the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”). We follow the Judge in referring to Tendcare and its subsidiaries as the “Tian Jian Group”. Tendcare was placed under judicial management on 11 September 2017, with the second respondent, Mr Yit Chee Wah (“Mr Yit”), appointed as judicial manager.

  15. [13] As the claims by Tendcare and Mr Yit centre on allegations against the first defendant, Mr Gong, and the seventh defendant (and appellant), Mr Miao, we set out the parties as they are related to each of these two individuals.

  16. [14] On the one hand were the parties related to Mr Gong. Tendcare had been incorporated by Mr Gong who, at the material time, held the majority of shares in Tendcare beneficially through a wholly-owned holding company, Gongs Global Investment Development Holdings Limited (“Gongs Global”). Mr Gong is also the sole director and shareholder of the second defendant, Hua Xia Tian Jian Pte Ltd (“HXTJ”), a Singapore-incorporated company. The 11th and 12th defendants are Mr Gong’s wife (“Ms Wang”) and daughter (“Ms Gong”) respectively. Another company, which was not a party to the suit, but was closely related to Tendcare, is its wholly-owned subsidiary, Tian Jian Hua Xia Medical Group (HK) Limited (“TJHK”). TJHK has since been wound up.

  17. [15] On the other hand were the parties related to Mr Miao, a Singapore citizen. He is the sole director and shareholder of (a) the eighth defendant, Hui Xiang Group Pte Ltd (“HXG”), a Singapore-incorporated company; and (b) the tenth defendant, Qian Hui Capital Limited (“QHC”), a Hong Kong-incorporated company. QHC was wound up in Hong Kong in October 2020 upon the application of TJHK’s liquidators. Mr Miao is also the sole director of the ninth defendant, Hui Xiang Group (HK) Limited (“HXG HK”), a Hong Kong-incorporated company which (until 31 March 2015) was wholly owned by HXG. Since that date, its owner has been Imperium Mining Company (incorporated in the Cayman Islands and of which Mr Miao is the sole director).

  18. Background to the dispute

  19. [17] The dispute at trial centred on the events surrounding Tendcare’s intended initial public offering (“the Tendcare IPO”) which ultimately did not take place. On appeal, the central issue concerns Mr Miao’s alleged dishonest assistance of Mr Gong’s transfer of funds out of the Tian Jian Group, which took place in the context of these broader events. It follows that the arguments raised by Mr Miao are relatively circumscribed and touch on only a few key factual points. Further, as there is no cross-appeal by Tendcare and Mr Yit against the Judge’s finding that Mr Miao was not liable for fraudulent trading, many of the other facts discussed by the Judge are no longer relevant to the appeal. For the purposes of our judgment, we set out the facts and findings only as they are relevant to the case against Mr Miao, whether directly or as a necessary part of the context.

  20. Various agreements relating to the preparations for the Tendcare IPO

  21. [18] In September 2013, HXG – of which Mr Miao is the sole director and shareholder – became involved in the Tendcare IPO by way of a memorandum of understanding with Beijing Tianjian Huaxia Medical Investment Management Co Ltd (“BJTJ”). Mr Ryan Gwee Yuan Kerr (“Mr Gwee”), the Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) of HXG from 2011 to December 2014, signed on behalf of HXG. Mr Gong signed on behalf of BJTJ as BJTJ’s legal representative and chairman. HXG was to engage two advisers to assist in the pre-IPO restructuring, fundraising and preparations, in return for a retainer, a success fee, and a shareholding in Tendcare to be transferred to Mr Miao, Mr Gwee, and a legal adviser, Mr Sim Mong Teck (“Mr Sim”). These terms were elaborated upon in a Letter of Engagement between HXG and BJTJ. Following this, work began on the Tendcare IPO.

  22. [19] Subsequently, a share purchase agreement (“SPA”) was entered into between companies that were owned by Mr Gwee and Mr Sim (Luxe Heritage Capital Management Limited and NYC Investments Limited, respectively) and Tendcare (“the NYC/Luxe SPA”). Further, Mr Gong, Mr Gwee and Mr Sim entered into a Memorandum of Understanding in 2014 (“the 2014 MOU”) in respect of the NYC/Luxe SPA. It suffices to note here that the NYC/Luxe SPA and the 2014 MOU formed a central part of the respondents’ case on fraudulent trading. A dispute subsequently arose between Mr Miao, Mr Gwee and Mr Sim arising out of the NYC/Luxe SPA and other agreements.

  23. Pre-IPO restructuring

  24. [21] As a result of the preparations for its IPO, Tendcare became the ultimate holding company of the Tian Jian Group. Until 29 June 2017 (when various steps were apparently taken to divest the Tian Jian Group of its various operating units (see the Judgment at [14])), the corporate structure was as follows:

  25. (a) Tendcare held 100% of the shares in TJHK;

  26. (b) TJHK held 100% of the shares of Shanxi Tian Jian Hua Xia Business Trading Co Ltd (“Shanxi TJHX WFOE”);

  27. (c) Shanxi TJHX WFOE held 100% of the shares of BJTJ; and

  28. (d) BJTJ held the equity in all operating units of the Tian Jian Group in the PRC.

  29. Raising of funds from investors and creditors

  30. [22] In the course of the preparation for the Tendcare IPO, pre-IPO funds were raised from various investors and creditors. We summarise the results of these fund-raising efforts in the following table:

  31. Transfers of pre-IPO funds

  32. [23] A key factual plank of the respondents’ case against the defendants below centred on the movement of the pre-IPO funds into and then out of the Tian Jian Group. As the Judge observed, the transfers out of the Tian Jian Group can be grouped into three categories: (a) transfers from Tendcare to HXTJ (“the HXTJ Transfers”); (b) transfers from Tendcare to QHC through TJHK (“the Tendcare-TJHK-QHC Transfers”); and (c) transfers from Tendcare to HXG HK (“the HXG HK Transfers”). These were referred to by the Judge as the “Disputed Transfers”, and they totalled US$45.29m and S$500,000. It is the Tendcare-TJHK-QHC Transfers which form the basis of the claim against Mr Miao.

  33. [24] The details of the Tendcare-TJHK-QHC Transfers are as follows:

  34. (a) On 11 March 2015, US$2m was transferred from Tendcare’s bank account to TJHK’s bank account bearing an account number ending in 2247 (“TJHK 2247”). On 15 April 2015, US$2m was transferred from another of TJHK’s bank accounts, this one bearing an account number ending in 2220 (“TJHK 2220”), to QHC’s bank account. We refer to this sequence of events broadly as the “US$2m Transfer”.

  35. (b) On 22 September 2015, US$4m was transferred from Tendcare’s bank account to TJHK 2220. On 23 September 2015, US$4m was transferred from TJHK 2220 to QHC’s bank account. We refer to this sequence of events broadly as the “US$4m Transfer”.

  36. [25] In so far as the latter sum of US$4m was concerned, on 24 September 2015, HK$21,395,293.50 (the equivalent of US$2,765,000) was transferred from QHC to Mr Miao’s personal bank account, and then paid from Mr Miao’s account to one Asia Hausse Capital Limited (“Asia Hausse”) by cheque. On the same day, US$1m was transferred from QHC to Hongjia International Holdings Co Ltd (“Hongjia”). Asia Hausse is a company incorporated in the British Virgin Islands and controlled by Mr Hanford Cheung Ho Fat (“Mr Cheung”), of MCL Capital Limited (“MCL”), one of the two advisers who had been engaged to assist in the preparations for the Tendcare IPO. Further, Mr Cheung had become CEO of QHC in around December 2014.

  37. [26] It is now not disputed that the sums transferred to Asia Hausse and Hongjia eventually made their way to Mr Gong’s bank accounts (see also the Judgment at [145]). A diagram of the relevant transfers relating to Mr Miao can be found in Annex 1 to this judgment.

  38. The parties’ cases below

  39. [27] The claims against Mr Miao for dishonest assistance must be understood firstly in the context of the respondents’ broader claim that the Tendcare IPO was part of a scheme of fraudulent trading perpetrated by Mr Gong and Mr Miao (see the Judgment at [29]). In gist, the respondents claimed that they had used the NYC/Luxe SPA to set a false “price floor” to induce investors to subscribe for shares at an inflated price, and had fraudulently caused Tendcare to incur debts to MMIII and OCA.

  40. [28] Although the scope of the appeal is narrower than the scope of the claims brought at trial, we set out all of the claims brought by Tendcare and Mr Yit briefly in the table below for context, and elaborate on only the pleadings as they relate to the claim against Mr Gong for breaches of fiduciary duties, and against Mr Miao for dishonestly assisting those breaches.

  41. [29] For a better understanding of Tendcare’s pleadings, it may be noted that it had divided the transfers into three categories: (a) the “Fraudulent Transfers” were the transfers from Tendcare to HXTJ, as well as the transfers to TJHK and then onto QHC; (b) the “Subsequent Fraudulent Transfers” were the transfers onwards from HXTJ and QHC to Asia Hausse and its related entities, as well as to the eventual destination of the funds; and (c) the “Fraudulent HXG Transfers” were the transfers from Tendcare to HXG HK.

  42. [30] Tendcare pleaded that Mr Gong had breached the fiduciary and statutory duties he owed to it by making or procuring the Fraudulent Transfers, the Subsequent Fraudulent Transfers and the Fraudulent HXG Transfers (ie, the Disputed Transfers as defined above). Tendcare alleged that this amounted to stealing and misappropriating moneys from Tendcare, and that the transfers were not arms-length transactions, but were “made or procured to be made by [Mr] Gong and [Mr] Miao to or for the benefit of [Mr] Gong or to entities owned or ultimately controlled by himself, [Mr] Gong’s family and/or [Mr] Miao”.

  43. [31] As for Mr Miao’s involvement, the following was pleaded by Tendcare:

  44. We note here that, strictly speaking, the pleaded claim against Mr Miao for dishonest assistance in relation to the Tendcare-TJHK-QHC Transfers only pertained to the Subsequent Fraudulent Transfers, ie, from QHC onwards, rather than for the Fraudulent Transfers themselves, ie, the transfers from Tendcare to QHC via TJHK. However, no issue has been taken on the pleadings either below or on appeal, and we proceed as the Judge did to analyse the claim against Mr Miao as dishonest assistance for the Tendcare-TJHK-QHC Transfers.

  45. [32] In his defence, Mr Miao pleaded that the Tendcare-TJHK-QHC Transfers were made pursuant to two loan agreements: (a) one dated 14 April 2015 (with a loan extension on 14 June 2015) for the sum of US$2m at 7% interest per annum to be repaid by 13 June 2016 (the “US$2m QHC Loan”); and (b) one dated 22 September 2015 for US$4m at 7% interest per annum to be repaid by 21 September 2016 (the “US$4m QHC Loan”). He claimed that the latter loan arrangement was conceived by Mr Cheung and one Mr Eric Sin (“Mr Sin”) to get funds to Mr Gong in the PRC for the latter to purchase hospitals in the country. As such, after QHC received the US$4m, US$1m was transferred to Hongjia, and US$2,765,000 was transferred to Mr Miao’s bank account and then to Asia Hausse. In addition, Mr Miao pleaded that any loss was suffered by TJHK and not Tendcare. Further, or in the alternative, Tendcare and Mr Yit were precluded from recovery against the seventh to tenth defendants as any loss was reflective of the loss suffered by TJHK or allowing them to recover may result in multiple recovery due to claims that could be brought against TJHK.

  46. Decision below

  47. [33] We begin by summarising the Judge’s key findings in respect of all of the claims in the suit below, before turning to the Judge’s findings as they relate to Mr Gong’s breaches of fiduciary duties in relation to the Tendcare-TJHK-QHC Transfers and Mr Miao’s alleged dishonest assistance of these breaches. We emphasise the Judge’s findings on liability in bold in the table below.

  48. [34] The Judge found that Mr Gong was liable for fraudulent trading (see the Judgment at [73]–[81]), but that Mr Miao was not involved in or aware of this scheme, and did not know about the Disputed Transfers apart from the Tendcare-TJHK-QHC Transfers (see the Judgment at [105]). As for Mr Gong’s breaches of director’s duties, the Judge found that Mr Gong did owe the duties pleaded by the respondents (see the Judgment at [142]), and that those duties were breached.

  49. (a) First, the Judge found that the HXTJ Transfers represented a “misapplication of Tendcare’s funds”, and therefore were “custodial breaches of Mr Gong’s fiduciary duties” (see the Judgment at [144]).

  50. (b) Second, the Judge found that the Tendcare-TJHK-QHC Transfers, ie, a scheme of transferring the US$6m from Tendcare to QHC via TJHK, and ultimately to Mr Gong’s personal bank account, “amounted to dealing with the funds in a manner inconsistent with Tendcare’s interests”, and Mr Gong was therefore in breach of his fiduciary duties. In this regard, the Judge repeated his view stated in the Judgment at [101] that he did not accept the explanation for the transfers offered by Mr Miao, finding that the funds were ultimately transferred to Mr Gong’s personal bank account and that there was no satisfactory explanation concerning how they were dealt with thereafter (see the Judgment at [145]).

  51. (c) Third, however, as the HXG HK Transfers were part payment of success fees owed to HXG HK, they were legitimate payments and Mr Gong did not breach his duties in causing them to be made (see the Judgment at [146]).

  52. [35] As for the claim in dishonest assistance, the Judge found Mr Miao liable for dishonest assistance. He reiterated his view stated at [101] and [145] of the Judgment that he did not accept Mr Miao’s explanation for why the sham loan agreements were used to transfer money (noting that Mr Miao had agreed to employ such “irregular means” of transferring funds). The Judge also did not accept the purported purpose for which the funds were remitted to the PRC, as the moneys ended up in Mr Gong’s personal bank account, and their subsequent use was opaque. These facts called into question “the bona fides of the transactions and indeed also of Mr Miao”. The Judge found that Mr Miao had facilitated Mr Gong’s breaches of fiduciary duties. Mr Miao knew that the funds were not being remitted for the purpose of the Tian Jian Group’s business or the Tendcare IPO, or, at the very least, he was reckless. Mr Miao’s knowledge was attributable to QHC, and hence, both Mr Miao and QHC were liable for dishonest assistance in relation to the Tendcare-TJHK-QHC Transfers (see the Judgment at [154]). As there was no evidence that Mr Miao or QHC were involved in the HXTJ Transfers, however, the other claims for dishonest assistance against these parties were dismissed (see the Judgment at [155]).

  53. [36] Therefore, the Judge found that Mr Gong, Mr Miao and QHC were jointly and severally liable for the Tendcare-TJHK-QHC Transfers. The Judge then noted that the sum of US$4m in relation to the US$4m Transfer fell within both the proceeds of the loan provided by OCA (see S/N 4 at [22] above; relevant to liability for fraudulent trading) and the Tendcare-TJHK-QHC Transfers (relevant to liability for breach of director’s duties and dishonest assistance). To address this, the Judge deducted US$4m from both Mr Gong and HXTJ’s liability for fraudulent trading, as well as Mr Gong’s, Mr Miao’s, and QHC’s liability for the Tendcare-TJHK-QHC Transfers, and instead made Mr Gong, HXTJ, Mr Miao and QHC jointly and severally liable for US$4m (see the Judgment at [166]). Therefore, relevant to Mr Miao are the following orders viz, that:

  54. (a) Mr Gong, Mr Miao and QHC were jointly and severally liable for the sum of US$2m; and

  55. (b) Mr Gong, HXTJ, Mr Miao and QHC were jointly and severally liable for the sum of US$4m.

  56. Parties’ cases on appeal

  57. Appellant’s case

  58. [37] At the outset of his case, Mr Miao observes that the Judge did not distinguish between the US$2m Transfer and the US$4m Transfer. Mr Miao first argues that the Judge had erred in finding that Mr Gong was in breach of his fiduciary duties in respect of the US$2m Transfer, as the respondents had not established their pleaded case that the US$2m transferred was in fact from Tendcare or the pre-IPO funds. Further, and in any event, Mr Miao argues that the Judge had erred in finding that Mr Miao had accepted that the US$2m QHC Loan was a sham, and hence had erred in his conclusion that Mr Miao had dishonestly assisted Mr Gong.

  59. [38] Mr Miao also submits that the Judge had erred in finding that Mr Miao and QHC had dishonestly assisted Mr Gong in respect of the US$4m Transfer. The Judge had erred in not accepting Mr Miao’s unchallenged evidence on the purpose of the transfer of the US$4m. Mr Miao relied on Mr Cheung who had told him about the need for funds to purchase hospitals in the PRC, and the US$4m QHC Loan was the means to that end. There was no reason why Mr Miao would do anything to jeopardise the Tendcare IPO given that he would stand to gain substantially from a successful IPO. This is consistent with the fact that Mr Miao did not retain any part of the US$4m.

  60. [39] Mr Miao further submits that the Judge had failed to consider his argument below that the respondents should not be allowed to recover moneys that were channelled through or incurred by Tendcare’s direct and indirect subsidiaries due to the reflective loss principle. We set out Mr Miao’s arguments on reflective loss in more detail when we turn to consider that principle.

  61. Respondents’ case

  62. [40] The respondents first take the position that the reflective loss principle does not apply, and that there is no concern about double recovery. In essence, they argue that the claim by Tendcare was for its own cause of action and for its own loss. Once again, we set out the arguments in more detail when we address this particular question of law.

  63. [41] On the substantive merits of the claims, the respondents argue that the evidence is sufficient to justify the Judge’s decision, and also highlight a number of grounds additional to those relied on by the Judge. In relation to the US$2m Transfer, they submit that Mr Miao’s objection that they have not established that this sum of money was derived from Tendcare or the pre-IPO funds is incorrect – the claim against Mr Gong and Mr Miao is not a proprietary claim to recover assets, but a claim that Mr Gong had acted against Tendcare’s best interests, in particular, by procuring the further transfer out of TJHK to QHC, and this also amounted to a breach of fiduciary duties owed to Tendcare. An inference can be drawn that the US$2m paid from Tendcare to TJHK was related to the subsequent transfer of the same sum from TJHK to QHC.

  64. [42] The respondents accept that the Judge had erred in finding that Mr Miao had admitted that the US$2m QHC Loan was a sham. However, this was a “simple slip”. The Judge did not ultimately believe Mr Miao’s argument that this was a genuine loan. Mr Miao was also unable to explain why the loan was needed and there were inconsistencies in his evidence that reflected poorly on his credibility. If it was not a genuine loan, then it followed that Mr Miao had “guilty knowledge that the funds he had received were the fruits of [Mr] Gong’s breach of duties”. Mr Miao’s conduct “fell far short of the ordinary standards of honesty”.

  65. [43] In relation to the US$4m Transfer, the respondents first point out that Mr Miao was in fact challenged on his evidence concerning the purpose of the transfer. Further, the facts and Mr Miao’s admissions establish that Mr Miao must have known that he was assisting Mr Gong in his wrongdoing. Indeed, the respondents submit that Mr Miao was not a credible witness in his attempts to exonerate himself.

  66. Issues to be determined

  67. [44] Based on the parties’ arguments, there are two key issues before this court:

  68. (a) First, did the Judge err in finding Mr Miao liable for dishonest assistance in relation to the US$2m and US$4m Transfers? Specifically, this raises the following issues:

  69. (i) In relation to the US$2m Transfer,

  70. (A) whether Mr Gong had breached his fiduciary duties owed to Tendcare; and

  71. (B) if so, whether Mr Miao was dishonest in assisting Mr Gong in the breach of those fiduciary duties.

  72. (ii) In relation to the US$4m Transfer, whether Mr Miao was dishonest in assisting Mr Gong in the breach of his fiduciary duties.

  73. (b) Second, if not, are the respondents prevented from claiming against Mr Miao on the basis of the reflective loss principle?

  74. Dishonest assistance

  75. Applicable law

  76. [45] The elements of the cause of action for dishonest assistance are not in dispute. As the Judge rightly identified, there are four elements to this cause of action: (a) the existence of a trust or fiduciary obligation; (b) a breach of trust or a fiduciary obligation; (c) assistance was rendered for the breach; and (d) the assistance was dishonest (see the High Court decision of Banque Nationale de Paris v Hew Keong Chan Gary and others [2000] 3 SLR(R) 686 (“BNP”) at [136]). As this court observed in George Raymond Zage III and another v Ho Chi Kwong and another [2010] 2 SLR 589 (“Zage”) at [22]:

  77. [46] As Judith Prakash J (as she then was) elaborated in the High Court decision of M+W Singapore Pte Ltd v Leow Tet Sin and another [2015] 2 SLR 271 (“M+W”) at [42], the analysis is a two-stage one: (a) first, what did the defendant know of the transaction; and (b) second, does participation in the transaction with this knowledge offend ordinary standards of honesty? The former is a subjective analysis, while the latter is objective. In our view, this distinction between the two stages is helpful – often, the question of dishonesty when taken in the abstract can cloud the inquiry as to what the defendant actually knew about the transaction. It is important to begin with the facts about what a person knew about a particular transaction before turning to evaluate whether the person was dishonest in proceeding to participate in that transaction.

  78. The US$2m Transfer

  79. [47] It is not disputed that Mr Gong owed fiduciary duties to Tendcare. On appeal, the parties join issue as to whether there was in fact a breach of those fiduciary duties in respect of the US$2m Transfer, and whether any assistance for the breach was dishonest.

  80. Did Mr Gong breach his fiduciary duties owed to Tendcare?

  81. [48] Mr Miao takes the position that (a) the respondents’ pleaded case is limited to Mr Gong causing Tendcare to transfer the pre-IPO funds raised from the investors out of the Tian Jian Group; but (b) the respondents cannot establish that the US$2m transferred from TJHK to QHC originated from Tendcare or the pre-IPO funds; and (c) as such, the respondents cannot establish that Mr Gong had breached his fiduciary duties owed to Tendcare.

  82. [49] This argument is based on the fact that the transfer from Tendcare to TJHK relied on by the respondents was in fact to a different bank account than the one from which the US$2m was paid from TJHK to QHC. As we observed above at [24], the US$2m was first transferred from Tendcare’s bank account to TJHK 2247 on 11 March 2015, and only later, on 15 April 2015, was US$2m transferred from TJHK 2220 to QHC’s bank account. These facts are not disputed by the respondents.

  83. [50] It is true that the respondents’ pleaded case was that the funds transferred out of Tendcare were “from and traceable to the moneys paid into it by the Investors”, and that the pleaded case turns on whether Mr Gong breached fiduciary duties owed specifically to Tendcare, and not any other company. Notwithstanding this, however, Mr Miao’s objections are not sustainable. We agree with the respondents that their case is not one that requires a strict application of the rules relating to tracing in law or in equity as the claim is not a proprietary claim over the sum of US$2m.

  84. [51] The relevant claim against Mr Gong is one for breach of fiduciary duties in procuring transfers of money out of Tendcare. The first leg of the transfer, from Tendcare to TJHK 2247, amounted to such a breach of duty. The respondents’ claim is that the second leg of the transfer, from TJHK 2220 to QHC, was also a breach of duty owed to Tendcare as it was contrary to Tendcare’s interests, not only continuing Mr Gong’s misappropriation in the first leg but also preventing Tendcare from recovering the misappropriated sum.

  85. [52] In this regard, we must clarify Tendcare’s case. Counsel for the respondents, Mr Lee Eng Beng SC (“Mr Lee”), argued before us that their case was that the whole scheme of transferring funds out of Tendcare, which would include both the first and second legs referred to above, was a breach of fiduciary duty owed by Mr Gong to Tendcare. This is a plausible characterisation of Tendcare’s case as against Mr Gong. But we must pay attention to how the respondents themselves have characterised their case against Mr Miao – the respondents’ own argument is that Mr Miao’s assistance in this scheme was restricted to the second leg of transfer from TJHK to QHC. As the respondents summarise at para 40 of their Respondents’ Case:

  86. Elsewhere, the respondents also state the gist of Tendcare’s complaint as follows:

  87. [53] We find that this characterisation of Tendcare’s case is more accurate when it comes to Mr Miao’s involvement. Indeed, no argument has been (and, in our view, can be) made to show how Mr Miao had assisted in the first leg of the US$2m Transfer from Tendcare to TJHK. It is telling that the respondents’ original pleaded case was in fact that Mr Miao was liable in knowing receipt for the Tendcare-TJHK-QHC Transfers (see [31] above), suggesting that, on its view of the facts, Mr Miao’s involvement was limited to latter part of the US$2m Transfer. These extracts from the respondents’ arguments show, and we accept, that Mr Miao’s assistance was rendered in terms of helping Mr Gong take the US$2m out of Tendcare’s reach. Hence, in this instance, our attention should be focused on the second leg of the transfer.

  88. [54] With that clarification in mind, we consider that Mr Gong’s breach of duty in relation to the second leg of the US$2m Transfer does not require that the US$2m transferred from TJHK 2220 to QHC’s bank account be identical to or traceable in law or equity to the US$2m transferred into TJHK 2247, since no proprietary claim is being asserted over this sum. The respondents rightly note that it becomes a question of fact whether the two transactions are linked in such a way as to ground a finding of breach of fiduciary duties, since the issue is whether Mr Gong, as director of Tendcare, had acted in such a manner as to breach those duties.

  89. [55] On the facts, the Judge was satisfied that the US$2m transferred in the first leg from Tendcare to TJHK and the sum transferred in the second leg from TJHK to QHC could be so linked (see the Judgment at [26(b)] and [145]). This is an entirely reasonable inference given: (a) the exact sums of money transferred; and (b) the timing of the transfers (the first being on 11 March 2015 and the second being on 15 April 2015), which were not so far apart as to render the link tenuous. On the contrary, apart from the objections based on the two separate bank accounts, there is no evidence to suggest that this inference should not be drawn. This finding is not against the weight of evidence and we would not disturb the Judge’s finding in this regard. It follows that Mr Miao’s argument that the respondents have not established Mr Gong’s breach of duty to Tendcare in relation to the second leg of the US$2m Transfer does not succeed.

  90. Dishonest assistance

  91. [56] Mr Miao then invites us to hold that the Judge erred in concluding that he was dishonest in assisting Mr Gong in the latter’s breaches of fiduciary duties. As noted above at [46], we deal with this in two steps: (a) first, determining what Mr Miao knew about the transaction; and (b) second, determining if Mr Miao’s participation in the transaction with this knowledge offended ordinary standards of honesty.

  92. [57] It is common ground that the Judge was mistaken in his view that Mr Miao had conceded that (a) the US$2m QHC Loan was a sham; and (b) that his case was that this sum of money was intended to be used for the purchase of hospitals in the PRC. We agree that the Judge had conflated the US$2m and the US$4m Transfers, and in that regard, did not, with respect, apply his mind to the specific facts relating to the US$2m Transfer. This court is therefore faced with the task of assessing the case on the US$2m Transfer for itself based on the relevant facts.

  93. (1) What did Mr Miao know?

  94. [58] In the first place, the Judge’s findings concerning Mr Miao’s involvement in the fraudulent trading scheme are important, as it was the respondents’ primary case that Mr Gong and Mr Miao were both carrying on the fraudulent trading scheme outlined at [27] above. The respondents’ pleaded case had assumed that Mr Miao was involved at all times with Mr Gong’s fraudulent trading scheme, meaning that Mr Miao would also be fixed with knowledge of the source of the moneys QHC had received and the purposes for which the moneys were being transferred. Indeed, this was the focus at trial, and the respondents initially sought to rely on many of the factors that went towards the allegations of fraudulent trading to support their argument that Mr Miao had also dishonestly assisted in Mr Gong’s breaches of fiduciary duties. The Judge, however, was not convinced that Mr Miao was a party to the fraudulent trading scheme. In the light of this finding, the exact scope of the Judge’s findings becomes important in assessing the respondents’ claim of dishonest assistance.

  95. [59] In our view, the following findings that the Judge made, which are not the subject of any cross-appeal by the respondents, are significant:

  96. (a) The respondents were unable to “point to any instance where any of the Disputed Transfers were retained by Mr Miao” except for the HXG HK Transfers (see the Judgment at [85]).

  97. (b) The respondents did not put forward cogent evidence to show that Mr Miao was aware of the scheme of fraudulent trading, or that the Disputed Transfers were not applied for their intended purpose, except for the Tendcare-TJHK-QHC Transfers (see the Judgment at [90]). The evidence was that Mr Miao was not kept apprised of important matters in relation to the Tendcare IPO, in particular, in relation to the NYC/Luxe SPA (see the Judgment at [91]).

  98. (c) Mr Miao’s falling out with Mr Gwee and Mr Sim (see [19] above) did not indicate that he was a participant in the fraudulent trading, but the more reasonable inference was that he was motivated by “opportunistic self-interest” (see the Judgment at [93]). The Post-Termination Agreements were not “tools to siphon monies to Mr Miao” (see the Judgment at [95]). Mr Miao had sufficiently explained how the Tendcare IPO would be profitable for HXG (see the Judgment at [98]).

  99. (d) Mere involvement in the Disputed Transfers was not sufficient to ground a finding of liability for fraudulent trading. Mr Miao had to know that the Disputed Transfers were not meant for the business of the Tian Jian Group or the expenses for the Tendcare IPO, but this was not established (see the Judgment at [100]). There were, however, questions raised by the Tendcare-TJHK-QHC Transfers (see [84] below).

  100. (e) The Judge found that the HXG HK Transfers were in fact part payment of a success fee that HXG HK was entitled to (see the Judgment at [104]).

  101. [60] The respondents’ arguments on appeal are framed primarily around showing that Mr Miao’s case concerning the US$2m QHC Loan could not be believed, that there was no proper purpose for the loan, and that, as it was not a genuine loan, it “follow[s] that [Mr] Miao had guilty knowledge that the funds he had received were the fruits of [Mr] Gong’s breach of duties”. We turn to assess the specific aspects of Mr Miao’s knowledge that are in dispute, namely, his belief as to the genuineness of the US$2m QHC Loan, and his knowledge of the source of the funds and the uses to which the funds could properly be put.

  102. (A) Did Mr Miao believe that the US$2m QHC Loan was a genuine loan?

  103. [61] In analysing this issue, we begin with the factors that most strongly support Mr Miao’s claim that he believed that the US$2m QHC Loan was genuine.

  104. [62] First, Mr Miao testified that the US$2m was needed for QHC’s operations and expenses. This is consistent with the fact that the respondents have not been able to follow this money into the hands of Mr Gong or his associates – the money was not transferred out of QHC after it was transferred in on 15 April 2015. At the same time, as the Judge noted, there is no evidence that QHC or Mr Miao “retained” any money (see the Judgment at [85]). It follows that the money must have been spent rather than kept to Mr Miao’s advantage.

  105. [63] Second, to emphasise this point, the US$2m Transfer differed from all of the other Disputed Transfers in significant respects. First, as noted above, the money was not transferred out of QHC to any of the Asia Hausse entities and/or the entities related to Mr Gong. Second, unlike for the other Disputed Transfers, Mr Cheung was not involved, and he has given no evidence about the US$2m Transfer. Indeed, Mr Cheung’s own evidence was that he approached Mr Miao only in September 2015 with the proposal for QHC’s and Mr Miao’s accounts to be used to transfer payments from Tendcare to Mr Gong’s personal bank account. There is therefore no evidence that Mr Miao had been approached to help Mr Gong to transfer money out of the Tian Jian Group as of April 2015, when the US$2m QHC Loan was entered into.

  106. [64] Third, the loan documentation itself suggests that there was an actual loan. Although this has not been highlighted by parties, it is telling that the loan documentation consisted of an initial loan agreement dated 14 April 2015 which provided that the loan was to be repaid by 14 June 2015, with a subsequent loan extension agreement dated 14 June 2015, by which the loan was extended for one more year, with a maturity date of 13 June 2016. It is not clear what purpose this latter agreement would have served if the loan agreement was not genuine, since nothing in the respondents’ case would suggest that there is any significance about the period from 14 June 2015 to 13 June 2016 covered by the loan extension agreement.

  107. [65] The respondents’ primary issue with the alleged US$2m QHC Loan lies with the difficulties arising from Mr Miao’s own evidence. However, we find that these apparent difficulties are ambivalent and that they can be otherwise explained, or do not lead to the inference sought by the respondents. In any event, the burden lies on the respondents to establish the facts on which they base their case of dishonesty, and we do not ultimately find that they have discharged this burden.

  108. [66] First, the respondents take issue with Mr Miao’s explanation for the loan at para 48 of his affidavit of evidence-in-chief (“AEIC”), which we quote in full here:

  109. The respondents highlight two aspects of this evidence. First, they take issue with Mr Miao’s evidence in cross-examination relating to the “balance sum” of US$2.86m referred to in para 48, arguing that Mr Miao gave inconsistent evidence as to whether the US$2.86m was owed at the time of the US$2m QHC Loan. Second, they argue that it made no sense for TJHK to loan US$2m to QHC, and for QHC to take that loan, when QHC believed that it was owed money by Mr Gong and his companies.

  110. [67] In relation to the “balance sum”, we find that the apparent confusion over the US$2.86m referred to in para 48 of Mr Miao’s AEIC can be explained. Mr Miao clarified during cross-examination that he did not believe that Mr Gong and his companies owed HXG a balance sum of US$2.86m at the time of the US$2m QHC Loan. As Mr Miao noted in cross-examination, the US$2.86m in truth referred to the success fees payable on the total of the pre-IPO funds raised and the statement in the AEIC may have been a drafting mistake. The sum of US$2.86m was arrived at by way of the following calculation: (a) the total sum raised from the pre-IPO investors was around US$130m; (b) 5.5% of the pre-IPO funds was around US$7.15m; (c) HXG HK had received a total of US$4.29m on 27 February 2015 and 10 April 2015; and (d) this left the balance of US$2.86m. However, this was based on the total pre-IPO funds raised, whereas not all of the pre-IPO funds would have been raised by the time that the US$2m QHC Loan was entered into.

  111. [68] In our view, Mr Miao was correct to say under cross-examination that para 48 of his AEIC was incorrect or misleading, and that the US$2.86m was the balance owed at a later date. Indeed, this is corroborated by the respondents’ own submission at para 63 of the Respondents’ Case. The respondents rightly note that the calculation referred to above, based on US$130m of pre-IPO funds, must have included around US$20m that was raised from OCA in September 2015, months after the US$2m QHC Loan was entered into in April 2015. Hence, at the time of the US$2m QHC Loan, the success fees would only have amounted to around US$6.05m (5.5% of US$110m), and the balance owing to HXG at the time would have been US$1.76m, not US$2.86m. The respondents’ argument here, which we consider correct on the facts, in fact supports Mr Miao’s evidence at trial that para 48 of this AEIC was incorrect and had confused the US$2.86m balance due at the end of the process with the balance that was due at around the time of the US$2m QHC Loan. We therefore conclude that this alleged problem with Mr Miao’s evidence does not diminish his credibility, and certainly does not support the respondents’ case.

  112. [69] We turn to the respondents’ argument that Mr Miao’s evidence on the loan contradicted his own evidence that Mr Gong and his companies faced cash flow problems. The respondents argue that if Mr Miao believed that Mr Gong and his companies owed money to Mr Miao’s companies at the time and had cash flow problems, then it made little sense for Mr Miao to take a loan from TJHK, one of Mr Gong’s companies, and even less sense for the loan to carry a 7% interest rate. While we acknowledge that this raises some questions about the US$2m QHC Loan, we are unable to accord it as much weight as the respondents urge us to.

  113. [70] As noted above, after Mr Miao’s correction of his evidence, the state of affairs was that Mr Gong’s companies owed around US$1.76m as the balance of the success fees at around the time of the US$2m QHC Loan. This is consistent with Mr Miao’s apparent view that the money that Mr Gong owed “was very little … [i]t was not a lot,” at least relative to the other sums of money involved in this case. Given this clarification, the loan arrangement becomes more plausible. If Mr Gong and his companies owed Mr Miao and his companies US$1.76m at the time, it was not inconsistent for QHC to then take a loan of US$2m from TJHK, as that was more than what QHC would have been entitled to at the time. As for the alleged cash flow problems faced by Mr Gong that Mr Miao alluded to at para 48 of his AEIC, Mr Miao also clarified at trial that the cash flow problems had been somewhat alleviated by the time the loan was extended. Viewed in this light, we do not find the respondents’ arguments so convincing as to justify a finding that Mr Miao did not believe that the US$2m QHC Loan was genuine.

  114. [71] Second, the respondents argue that Mr Miao had no proper explanation for the use of the loan. Although he referred to operations and expenses, Mr Miao testified that he could not recall exactly what the money was used for. The respondents suggest that if there had been a legitimate reason for the loan, Mr Miao would have been able to testify as to the specific use of the money. However, we do not think that the respondents’ argument can be taken that far. Mr Miao’s evidence was that the sums were used for operations and expenses. The nature of that kind of expenditure is such that it is entirely plausible for Mr Miao, who was the director and shareholder but not in charge of the operations of QHC, to be unable to specify the exact outlays years after the fact.

  115. [72] For completeness, we make clear that, contrary to Mr Miao’s arguments, we do not rely on the facts relating to the successful winding up petition brought against QHC in Hong Kong by TJHK’s liquidators based, at least in part, on the US$2m QHC Loan. Even if the winding-up petition was brought by the liquidators on the basis that the US$2m QHC Loan was genuine, this is equivocal given that the success of the petition would have depended on what arguments were put forward by QHC in those proceedings. Further, the liquidators of TJHK may not have been privy to the facts underlying the loan. Those facts are, in our view, neutral, and do not persuade us one way or the other on this issue.

  116. [73] At the hearing before us, after we had questioned Mr Lee on the various weaknesses in the respondents’ claim concerning the US$2m Transfer, he attempted to put forward an alternative case that even if the US$2m QHC Loan was genuine, that would still amount to dishonest assistance of Mr Gong’s breach of fiduciary duties, because the loan would have been for an improper purpose. We are unable to accept this argument. First, this was not the respondents’ pleaded case. Mr Lee referred us to the particulars in para 25(b) of the Statement of Claim (Amendment No 2), specifically at sub-para (a)(iiiB), the last line of which reads: “There was no proper or legitimate basis whatsoever for a loan to be extended to [QHC]”. However, this strikes us as simply being an element of the respondents’ primary case that the US$2m QHC Loan and US$4m QHC Loan were shams, rather than being an alternative basis upon which to find a breach of Mr Gong’s fiduciary duties and Mr Miao’s dishonest assistance of the same. Indeed, this specific pleading was in support of the more general point that Mr Gong and Mr Miao had “orchestrated or perpetrated … the fraudulent transfer and theft of”, inter alia, the US$2m, a description which does not accurately describe a breach of duty on the basis that a genuine loan was extended for an improper purpose. Second, as we will observe in more detail below at [79], it was never put to Mr Miao that he was dishonestly assisting Mr Gong by entering into a genuine loan agreement which was nevertheless not for a proper purpose, when assessed from Tendcare’s perspective.

  117. [74] For the foregoing reasons, we find that even if parts of the US$2m Transfer may raise questions, the respondents have not shown, on a balance of probabilities, that Mr Miao knew or believed that the US$2m QHC Loan was not a genuine loan agreement.

  118. (B) Knowledge of the source of the funds and the proper use of the funds

  119. [75] The next substantial area of dispute concerns Mr Miao’s knowledge of the source of the US$2m and the proper use of Tendcare’s funds. The respondents appear to accept Mr Miao’s contention that there is no evidence that he knew that the US$2m was derived from Tendcare or the pre-IPO funds, as their response is to say that this contention is not necessary. We think this is an appropriate concession to make. There is no evidence that Mr Miao knew of the transfer of US$2m from Tendcare to TJHK on 11 March 2015 (ie, the first leg of the Tendcare-TJHK-QHC Transfer). Although it cannot be disputed that Mr Miao knew that Tendcare was raising funds for the IPO, and that TJHK was also involved in the fund raising process, the inference cannot be made that Mr Miao knew specifically that the sums of money that QHC received were linked to the pre-IPO funds. Such an inference would be justified only if the respondents could show that Tendcare and TJHK had no other sources of funds and that Mr Miao knew this to be the case.

  120. [76] The respondents instead argue that: (a) Mr Miao knew that Tendcare and TJHK were both controlled by Mr Gong; (b) he knew that the purpose of Tendcare and TJHK was to raise funds for the investment in Tendcare’s medical business and that lending money to QHC was inconsistent with that purpose; and (c) Mr Miao could have found out more from Mr Cheung but he did not do so. We can accept point (a) as a matter of fact. The other two points, however, are more problematic.

  121. [77] Point (c) is difficult to accept because, as we observed at [63] above, there is no evidence that Mr Cheung was in fact involved in the US$2m Transfer. Indeed, Mr Cheung did not give any evidence concerning this transfer whether in his AEIC or his testimony at trial. This is not surprising given that the US$2m was not ultimately transferred out of QHC to any of the companies in which Mr Cheung was involved.

  122. [78] Point (b) requires us to make the inferential leap that because Mr Miao knew that the purpose of Tendcare’s and TJHK’s existence was to raise funds for the investment in the medical business, Mr Miao would have known that lending money to QHC was inconsistent with that purpose. We see no reason why we should make this leap. The loan was a commercial agreement under which QHC would have to pay interest for the use of the borrowed funds. Further, while Tendcare and TJHK were in the process of raising funds, the respondents have not shown that they were not allowed to enter into other arrangements or that Mr Miao knew about any such restrictions.

  123. [79] Indeed, in the cross-examination of Mr Joshua James Taylor (the person in charge of investigations on behalf of Mr Yit, the judicial manager), counsel for Mr Miao, Mr Andrew Chan (“Mr Chan”), who also appeared before us, highlighted para 1.1(c) of the ordinary share subscription agreement with Easom that suggested that Tendcare was allowed to use a certain percentage of the funds for “general corporate purposes”. Further, apart from putting it to Mr Miao that the transfers were for Mr Gong’s personal benefit, Mr Lee did not put the case on the lower footing that Mr Miao knew that the loan was generally inconsistent with the purpose of the Tendcare IPO. This is a sufficiently different point, on which Mr Miao may have had a specific explanation as to whether the loan was inconsistent with the purpose for which the pre-IPO funds were raised, such that it should have been put to him in cross-examination as a matter of fairness (see the decision of this court in Sudha Natrajan v The Bank of East Asia Ltd [2017] 1 SLR 141 (“Sudha Natrajan”) at [48]). Therefore, we are not satisfied that we should draw the inference that Mr Miao knew that the US$2m QHC Loan was derived from the pre-IPO funds and that the loan was inconsistent with the purpose for which the funds were raised.

  124. (2) Did participation in the transaction with the said knowledge offend ordinary standards of honesty?

  125. [80] Based on the above, Mr Miao’s position in relation to the transaction can be summarised as follows: (a) he did not know generally about the fraudulent trading scheme and was not involved in any of the other Disputed Transfers at that time; (b) it has not been shown that Mr Miao did not believe that the US$2m QHC Loan was genuine; and (c) although he knew that Tendcare and TJHK were controlled by Mr Gong, and that funds were raised for the Tendcare IPO, the respondents have not established that he knew that the loan would be inconsistent with the Tendcare IPO or the proper use of those funds. Given the state of Mr Miao’s knowledge, it is not possible to conclude that his participation in the transaction would offend ordinary standards of honesty.

  126. [81] We therefore conclude that the case against Mr Miao for dishonest assistance in relation to the US$2m Transfer is not made out, and reverse the Judge’s finding of liability in relation to this particular sum.

  127. The US$4m Transfer

  128. [82] The dispute in relation to the US$4m Transfer turns on Mr Miao’s knowledge of the purpose of the transfer of this sum into QHC’s account and then, in respect of one part, to Hongjia directly, and in respect of the other part, to Mr Miao and subsequently to Asia Hausse. Mr Miao’s case is that he had relied on Mr Cheung, and believed that the moneys were being transferred into the PRC so that Tendcare could purchase hospitals there. The respondents, on the other hand, argue that Mr Miao knew that the moneys were going to Mr Gong.

  129. [83] At the outset, we clarify that the nature of the respondents’ case against Mr Miao appears to be the same for the US$4m as it was for the US$2m, in that the focus is on Mr Miao’s dishonest assistance of Mr Gong’s breach of duties in transferring funds out of TJHK, ie, the second leg of transfers out of TJHK to QHC and beyond, rather than the first leg of transfers from Tendcare to TJHK (see [52]–[53] above and para 40 of the Respondents’ Case). In our view, this must follow from the fact that there is no evidence at all that Mr Miao had assisted in the first leg of the transfer from Tendcare to TJHK. The case against Mr Miao should be circumscribed according to the actual scope of his assistance.

  130. [84] The Judge had found that Mr Miao had accepted that the US$4m QHC Loan was a sham “in that [it did] not represent genuine loans from TJHK to QHC”. Mr Miao did not adequately explain why a sham loan agreement was necessary to circumvent fund transfer restrictions in the PRC for the purchase of hospitals there. Tendcare had raised funds for the purpose of, inter alia, the Tian Jian Group’s business in the PRC, and so arrangements would likely have already been put in place to remit funds legitimately. As HXG was involved in the Tendcare IPO, it, and by extension, Mr Miao as its owner and controller, would at the very least have been able to ascertain if there were any such arrangements in place before agreeing to the US$4m QHC Loan. The Judge concluded that “given that sham loan agreements were being used, Mr Miao must have known that the Tendcare-THJK-QHC Transfers were not for the business of the Tian Jian Group or the expenses of the Tendcare IPO. At the very least, he was reckless as regards the purpose for which the transfers were made. This was prima facie evidence of dishonesty” (see the Judgment at [101]). The Judge repeated essentially the same reasoning at [145] and [154] of the Judgment.

  131. [85] As above, we proceed to analyse, first, what Mr Miao knew, and second, whether his participation in the transaction with that knowledge offended ordinary standards of honesty.

  132. What did Mr Miao know?

  133. [86] It is common ground that Mr Miao did not consider the US$4m QHC Loan to be a “genuine loan agreement”. Mr Miao also conceded that by the time he had given approval for the transfer of US$2.765m out of his bank account to Asia Hausee, he knew that the transaction was part of the US$4m Transfer from TJHK, that the transfer was to Asia Hausse, and that Asia Hausse was under Mr Cheung’s control and was not part of the Tian Jian Group. The dispute essentially turns on whether Mr Miao knew that the transfer of US$4m to QHC and then to Hongjia and Asia Hausse, was ultimately for Mr Gong’s benefit, or whether Mr Miao should be believed when he claims that he thought that the transfers were for the purchase of hospitals in the PRC.

  134. [87] There were essentially two aspects of Mr Miao’s explanation that the Judge found difficulty with. The first pertained to the alleged use of the loan agreement to circumvent fund transfer restrictions in the PRC. The second pertained to the alleged purpose of purchasing hospitals in the PRC. We deal with each in turn.

  135. [88] In the first place, the Judge found Mr Miao’s explanation incredible on the basis that there would likely have been proper channels for transferring funds into the PRC other than relying on such a sham loan agreement (see the Judgment at [101]). Mr Miao argues that it was incumbent on Mr Cheung, the respondents’ witness, to give evidence as to why the sham loan agreement was needed to circumvent the restrictions, and whether any arrangements had been made to legitimately remit funds into the PRC. Further, the Judge had erred in finding that Mr Miao would have been privy to any such arrangements.

  136. [89] We are of the view that Mr Miao’s arguments miss the point. The Judge was entitled to conclude that it was likely that proper arrangements would have been put in place for the transfer of funds into the PRC, given the involvement of advisers and the fact that at least some of the pre-IPO funds were raised for the purpose of transactions in the PRC. If the transactions were legitimate and for the purposes of the Tendcare IPO, those arrangements should have been used. This inference is amply supported by the available evidence concerning the conditions on the use of pre-IPO funds raised from the various investors: (a) Easom had specified that the “Business Plan” was to include the development and expansion of a number of hospitals in the PRC; (b) MMIII had specified that the loan to TJHK was to be on-lent to Shanxi TJHX WFOE for the conversion of two hospitals to limited liability companies, for the Tian Jian Group’s capital expenditure, and to acquire hospitals for the Tian Jian Group; and (c) OCA had specified that the proceeds from the subscription of convertible notes were to be used, inter alia, for the acquisition or cooperation with a hospital in Beijing or with other hospitals within Greater China. If these conditions were attached to the use of these funds that were raised, it is a very plausible inference that there would have been legitimate arrangements made for funds to be transferred into the PRC for these purposes.

  137. [90] The question then is what Mr Miao would have known about these arrangements. Although he left much of the work to others like Mr Gwee, Mr Sim, and, later, Mr Cheung, Mr Miao was involved in the preparations for the Tendcare IPO. For example, in his AEIC, Mr Miao stated that he made “at least two trips to China” to help Mr Gong, and one of those trips involved meeting Mr Ma Xiaowei, the investment manager of OCA which eventually extended a loan to Tendcare. HXG was involved throughout with the IPO process. Further, although the Judge also found at [91] of the Judgment that Mr Miao was kept in the dark about important matters relating to the Tendcare IPO, a careful perusal of that paragraph and its context shows that the Judge’s emphasis was on the alleged arrangements relating to the fraudulent trading scheme, not more generally as to the Tendcare IPO. We consider that the Judge’s inference that Mr Miao would have known or could have found out about any such arrangements is not against the weight of evidence. This was an inference of fact that the Judge was entitled to make based on investment arrangements and HXG’s involvement in the Tendcare IPO, and the Judge cannot be said to have erred in relying on this inference in his assessment of Mr Miao’s defence.

  138. [91] While Mr Miao pointed us to Mr Cheung’s evidence that fund transfer restrictions may be one reason why various companies were used to effect transfers into the PRC, and that “there are always certain companies that [they] would use for the transfer,” that evidence must be read in context. The Judge’s inference was that legitimate transfers of funds into the PRC would have been effected through the proper channels, while Mr Cheung’s evidence was given in relation to transfers that were, in large part, established to have been for Mr Gong’s personal purposes and not the legitimate purposes of the Tendcare IPO. Indeed, Mr Cheung testified that the transfers he was involved in were not for the purposes of the Tendcare IPO. Mr Cheung’s evidence in this regard is therefore of limited relevance to assessing the Judge’s inference as to the arrangements for legitimate transfers.

  139. [92] Mr Miao then takes issue with the second plank of the Judge’s reasoning, in which the Judge disbelieved Mr Miao’s claim that he believed the transfer was for the purpose of purchasing hospitals in the PRC. Mr Miao’s evidence in his AEIC concerning the purpose of the transfer was as follows:

  140. [93] In cross-examination, Mr Miao’s evidence was that Mr Cheung and Mr Sin had approached him telling him that Mr Gong “urgently required the sum of money to be transferred to China for the purchase of hospitals”. Mr Miao testified that he did not know what fund transfer restrictions were in place, and he agreed that he “basically relied” on what he alleged Mr Cheung had told him. In essence, Mr Miao’s case is that he believed that the transfers were for the purpose of purchasing hospitals because he was told this by Mr Cheung and Mr Sin.

  141. [94] On appeal, Mr Miao has argued that his evidence concerning the purpose of the transfer (and, hence, his belief as to that purpose) was not challenged by the respondents. We disagree. Mr Lee had in fact challenged Mr Miao’s evidence by putting it to him that as at 22 September 2015 (the date of the loan agreement for the US$4m QHC Loan), he “knew that Mr Gong was taking out or misappropriating money from Tendcare” and that the transfers were for Mr Gong’s personal benefit. Further, it was put to Mr Miao that he caused QHC to enter into the US$4m QHC Loan “with the knowledge and intention that it would help Mr Gong achieve his purpose”, which Mr Lee clarified as referring to “Mr Gong’s taking of money from Tendcare for his own personal benefit”. Later, in summing up his case, Mr Lee also put to Mr Miao that he knew that he was providing assistance to Mr Gong “on the transfer of funds out of the Tendcare Group for the personal benefit of Mr Gong and [himself]”. It is clear that the respondents did not accept Mr Miao’s explanation that the US$4m Transfer was for the purpose of purchasing hospitals in preparation for the Tendcare IPO – Mr Miao’s account was directly contradictory to the case put to him that the transfer was for Mr Gong’s and his personal benefit.

  142. [95] Given that Mr Miao’s case is that he was told of the purpose of the transfer by Mr Cheung and Mr Sin, their evidence would be particularly important for assessing Mr Miao’s account. As Mr Sin did not give evidence, Mr Cheung’s evidence is of central importance here.

  143. [96] The most relevant part of Mr Cheung’s evidence was introduced as an amendment to his AEIC at trial, which included the following two paragraphs:

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