Court of Appeal · Decided 13 April 2021
Tecnomar & Associates Pte Ltd v SBM Offshore NV
Feedback & support[2021] SGCA 36 · Case no. Civil Appeal No 152 of 2020 · 16 paragraphs
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Introduction
- [2]
[2] The appellant is a private company incorporated in Singapore, in the business of marine and offshore engineering consultancy. The respondent is a publicly listed company incorporated in the Netherlands, in the business of providing systems and services to the offshore oil and gas industry. The respondent is the holding company of the “SBM Offshore” group of companies.
Procedural history leading up to the present appeal
- [3]
[3] On 10 September 2019, the appellant commenced Suit No 897 of 2019 (the “Suit”) against the respondent. The Suit concerned a straightforward claim for breach of contract that the appellant alleges it had entered into with the respondent to provide decontamination, cleaning and preparation services for a vessel known as the “Yetagun FSO” (the “Vessel”) for “Green Ship” recycling. The appellant’s case is that a valid and binding contract had been concluded by way of (a) a quotation that its representative, Mr Paul Hopkins (“Mr Hopkins”), had sent to the respondent (representing the offer) on 10 April 2018 (the “10 April Quote”); and (b) the respondent’s subsequent reply (representing the acceptance) on 17 April 2018 (the “17 April Email”) that was sent by a Units Operation Manager for the Vessel, Ms Carolina Fonzar dos Santos (“Ms Fonzar”). The respondent’s case is that it did not conclude any such contract with the appellant and that the contract had instead been concluded between the appellant and its subsidiary, an entity known as South East Shipping Co Ltd (“SES”), the owner of the Vessel.
- [4]
[4] On 10 October 2019, the appellant filed Summons No 5063 of 2019 in the Suit, seeking leave to serve the Writ of Summons (the “Writ”) and Statement of Claim (the “SOC”) out of jurisdiction in the Netherlands (the “Leave Application”). The Leave Application was made pursuant to O 11 r 1 of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) (the “ROC”). In essence, the factual premise underlying the appellant’s Leave Application is that it had concluded a valid and enforceable contract with the respondent, such contract having been offered, accepted and formed in Singapore.
- [6]
[6] On 30 October 2019, the appellant duly served the Writ and SOC on the respondent at its registered office in the Netherlands.
- [7]
[7] On 4 November 2019, the respondent entered appearance in the Suit.
- [10]
[10] On 25 August 2020, the High Court Judge (the “Judge”) dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the AR’s decision and subsequently issued his clear and comprehensive grounds of decision in Tecnomar & Associates Pte Ltd v SBM Offshore NV [2020] SGHC 249 (the “Judgment”). The appellant then filed the present appeal against the Judge’s decision.
Our decision
- [11]
[11] The issues that lie to be determined in this appeal are hence:
(a) whether there was material non-disclosure in the appellant’s Leave Application; and
Was there material non-disclosure in the Leave Application?
- [12]
[12] The nature of the Leave Application being an ex parte application, the appellant was subject to a duty of full and frank disclosure. This is a duty that is owed to the Court and is driven by the need for the Court to satisfy itself that the case is a proper one for service out of jurisdiction. Such a duty invariably extends to facts that may go towards rebutting the applicant’s claim (Manharlal Trikamdas Mody and another v Sumikin Bussan International (HK) Ltd [2014] 3 SLR 1161 at [78]).
- [13]
[13] At the outset of the appeal hearing, counsel for the appellant, Mr Peter Gabriel, readily acknowledged that there was material non-disclosure in the appellant’s Leave Application but sought to argue, albeit unconvincingly, that such non-disclosure was not deliberate. This was consistent with the appellant’s concession before the Judge below (see Judgment at [2] and [122]). In its Case, the appellant sought to rely on an alleged admission made by the respondent’s representative Mr Thomas Chapman (“Mr Chapman”), to contend that there was indeed such a contract concluded between the appellant and the respondent, on the terms of the 10 April Quote. In support of its argument, the appellant cites para 43(b) of Mr Chapman’s third affidavit dated 19 June 2020, in which he stated that it “cannot be said that the [respondent] failed ‘to amend agreement [sic] to take the appropriate remedial action’”. The appellant argues that in denying that it had failed to amend the “agreement” (and thus had not acted in breach), the respondent had implicitly admitted to having contracted with the respondent. In our judgment, this argument is misguided.
- [15]
[15] In our view, we have no hesitation in finding that there was in fact material non-disclosure by the appellant in its Leave Application. It bears repeating that the duty of full and frank disclosure requires a party to furnish information which is relevant to the opponent’s case. The party may well disagree with the opponent’s case but it remains obligatory, and indeed incumbent on it, to candidly disclose all such information. Only then may a Court be able to properly deliberate, with the benefit of the holistic evidence placed before it. It is perplexing to us how the appellant could credibly contend otherwise. The appellant’s affidavit filed in support of its Leave Application was bereft of the relevant details. It purported to briefly explain the background of the contract and the alleged breaches, and the only exhibits attached were (a) the Writ and SOC; (b) the 10 April Quote and the 17 April Email; and (c) an extract from the respondent’s annual report of 2018. None of these documents contained any reference to SES or alluded to any hint that the appellant had not contracted with the respondent but with SES instead.
- [17]
[17] Very tellingly, in the Notice of Arbitration, the appellant brought claims against the respondent and SES under the same contract. In adding SES to the aborted arbitration, at the very minimum, the appellant had asserted a contractual claim against SES. Yet, the appellant in applying for leave for service outside jurisdiction in respect of the same contractual claim, completely omitted any reference to SES notwithstanding its own acknowledgment that SES was potentially a party to the contract. This makes the non-disclosure all the more egregious.
- [18]
[18] In our judgment, it is thus clear that the appellant had not fulfilled its duty of full and frank disclosure in the Leave Application. This was a textbook case of non-disclosure. But that was not all. It was also a paradigmatic case of deliberate and systematic non-disclosure, aimed at omitting any trace of SES whatsoever. This was not a case of mere inadvertence in which only one or two documents referring to SES were omitted. Quite the contrary. There was a complete and conspicuous absence of any reference to SES at all. Further, the references in the appellant’s SOC purportedly made to the respondent were in actual fact, references to SES (see Judgment at [115]). This can hardly be said to have just been an oversight. We agree with the Judge’s conclusion that this was “not just non-disclosure but also misrepresentation; and all of this was deliberate” (Judgment at [126]). In short, this was a case of wilful suppression of material facts.
Did the appellant have a good arguable case?
- [23]
[23] After the issuance of the PO, the parties acted on the basis that the PO would form the governing contractual document and, further, that SES, as the owner of the Vessel, was the contracting party: (a) Mr Hopkins not only confirmed receipt of the PO by clicking on an acknowledgment link contained in the 18 April Email but further “confirmed accordingly” the instructions contained in the same email which attached the PO; (b) the appellant issued invoices to SES pursuant to the PO; and (c) SES consequently paid the sums owing to the appellant under those invoices. Moreover, as the Judge pointed out, the documentary evidence simply did not support the appellant’s case that the parties had contemplated the formation of a contract by an exchange of correspondence (Judgment at [54]–[55]). The PO, which contained a set of Terms and Conditions, also included an entire agreement clause by way of cl 37 that stated, “[t]he contents of this PO … supersedes any and all prior representations and agreements between the [parties] relating to the subject matter contained herein”. This makes irrelevant all the prior correspondence between the parties leading up to the PO. In our judgment, this puts a conclusive end to the matter.
- [24]
[24] Finally, it is perhaps relevant to mention that the Suit was triggered by the sale of the Vessel. When the appellant discovered the sale, its reaction is very revealing. Mr Hopkins sent an email on 28 August 2018 stating that “the change of ownership does not absolve SES of accrued liability”. Evidently, the appellant recognised that it had contracted with SES which was the reason why it claimed that it could look to SES for the “accrued liability”.
Costs
- [27]
[27] The conduct of the appellant throughout the course of the proceedings was shocking, troubling and unreasonable, to say the least. It was simply antithetical to the rationale underlying the duty of full and frank disclosure in an ex parte application, which is to allow the Court to come to a considered conclusion notwithstanding the strictures of having to hear only one party. To date, the appellant has yet to proffer any satisfactory explanation for the non-disclosure, apart from a perfunctory assertion that it was not deliberate. But for the reasons already highlighted above at [18], we are satisfied that it was in fact deliberate. It is also noteworthy that the appellant was not forthcoming in conceding that there was such material non-disclosure (see Judgment at [117]) and the eventual acknowledgement of such non-disclosure emerged only at the end of the hearing before the Judge (see Judgment at [122]). Such conduct was incontrovertibly beyond the pale.
- [31]
[31] It appeared to us that the lawyers advising the appellant were privy to the non-disclosure. Given the gravity of the deliberate nature of the non-disclosure, we invited both Mr Gabriel and his colleague, Mr Manoj Nandwani (who was apparently the lawyer who handled the Leave Application) to offer an explanation that the non-disclosure was not deliberate notwithstanding the findings here and below. Mr Nandwani sought to justify the merits of his understanding that the appellant had an arguable case against the respondent. We say no more other than to observe that he was unable to offer any explanation as to why the entirety of the evidence in relation to the respondent’s defence was suppressed from the Court. This was the gravamen of the appellant’s non-disclosure. We are concerned that the appellant’s lawyers might be responsible for the non-disclosure, the full extent of which, if any, will be addressed separately.