Court of Appeal · Decided 20 April 2021
Nazeri bin Lajim v Public Prosecutor
Feedback & support[2021] SGCA 41 · Case no. Criminal Motion No 12 of 2021 · 32 paragraphs
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Introduction
- [1]
[1] The applicant was convicted in 2017 by the High Court on a capital charge of possessing two bundles of drugs containing not less than 33.39g of diamorphine for the purpose of trafficking. He was sentenced to the mandatory death penalty pursuant to s 33(1) of the Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed) (“MDA”). His appeal against his conviction and sentence was dismissed by the Court of Appeal in CA/CCA 42/2017 (“CCA 42/2017”) on 4 July 2018.
- [2]
[2] In this criminal motion, the applicant seeks the court’s leave pursuant to s 394H of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) (“CPC”) to file an application for review of the Court of Appeal’s decision in CCA 42/2017. Pursuant to s 394H(6)(a) of the CPC, such a leave application is to be heard by a single Justice of the Court of Appeal.
- [3]
[3] The applicant raises several grounds in support of his application, including purportedly new legal arguments based on changes in the law, allegations of inadequate legal assistance from his former defence counsel and new evidence in the form of a psychiatric report obtained after the appeal was concluded.
Background facts and procedural history
- [4]
[4] The applicant claimed trial to the following charge:
- [5]
[5] The applicant was tried jointly with one Dominic Martin Fernandez (“Dominic”). Dominic was charged with trafficking the drugs in question by delivering the two bundles to the applicant.
- [8]
[8] The mandatory death penalty was imposed on the applicant because he could not fulfil any of the requirements for alternative sentencing under s 33B of the MDA. However, Dominic fulfilled the requirements under s 33B(2) of the MDA and was sentenced to life imprisonment and 15 strokes of the cane.
The parties’ arguments
The applicant’s arguments
- [10]
[10] In this application, the applicant raises four main grounds which are summarised as follows:
(b) The applicant cites Ramesh and argues that he had intended to traffic only one bundle of drugs as he had intended to return the second bundle to his supplier.
(c) The applicant alleges that his former defence counsel at the trial and at the appeal, Mr James Masih (“Mr Masih”), provided inadequate legal assistance, thereby resulting in a miscarriage of justice.
(d) The applicant seeks to adduce a new medical report from a psychiatrist, Dr Ken Ung (“Dr Ung”), to support his claim that he would have kept 12 rather than five packets of heroin for his own consumption.
The Prosecution’s arguments
- [11]
[11] The Prosecution submits that the application should be dismissed as the applicant has not shown that there is sufficient material on which this court may conclude that there has been a miscarriage of justice in respect of the decision in CCA 42/2017. The Prosecution’s arguments in respect of each of the grounds raised by the applicant can be summarised as follows:
(b) There is no evidence to show that the applicant had intended to return any of the bundles to his supplier. Accordingly, his reliance on the bailment defence set out in Ramesh is misplaced.
(c) The applicant’s allegations of inadequate legal assistance are not based on any change in the law. Moreover, the alleged deficiencies in Mr Masih’s conduct of the applicant’s defence were not the result of egregious incompetence on Mr Masih’s part. Instead, Mr Masih had made various strategic decisions in cross-examination so as to minimise the damage caused by the applicant’s own inconsistent evidence. Further, Mr Masih’s conduct of the trial did not prejudice the applicant in any way.
(d) Dr Ung’s report is of limited utility as it was prepared some eight years after the applicant’s arrest. More importantly, Dr Ung’s report is not “compelling” material as it is devoid of reasoning and rests heavily on the veracity of the account provided by the applicant.
The applicable legal principles
- [12]
[12] For leave to be granted, the applicant must show a “legitimate basis for the exercise of the court’s power of review” (see Kreetharan s/o Kathireson v Public Prosecutor and other matters [2020] 2 SLR 1175 at [17] and Moad Fadzir bin Mustaffa v Public Prosecutor [2020] 2 SLR 1364 at [10]). Such a legitimate basis will only be disclosed if the following stringent requirements in s 394J of the CPC are met:
The Judge’s reliance on Dominic’s confession
- [13]
[13] According to the applicant, the Judge erred in relying on Dominic’s confession in his investigation statement that he was informed by the applicant that the applicant would be collecting two bundles. Under s 258(5) of the CPC then in force, when “more persons than one are being tried jointly for the same offence, and a confession made by one of such persons affecting himself and some other of such persons is proved, the court may take into consideration the confession as against the other person as well as against the person who makes the confession”. Citing Ramesh, the applicant contends that the Judge was not entitled to rely on Dominic’s confession as he and Dominic were tried for different offences.
- [15]
[15] The applicant’s legal argument is not based on a change in the law, as required under s 394J(4) of the CPC. Ramesh did not change the law on the admissibility of confessions by co-accused persons. It affirmed the proper construction of s 258(5) of the CPC. As is evident from the decision in Ramesh itself (at [62]), Ramesh simply reiterated the interpretation of s 258(5) of the CPC laid down in Lee Yuan Kwang and others v Public Prosecutor [1995] 1 SLR(R) 778. The applicant himself states in his written submissions that Ramesh “provides greater clarity and reaffirms the interpretation of s 258(5) of the CPC”.
- [17]
[17] In his statement of 19 April 2012, the applicant reiterated that he was expecting to receive two bundles of drugs from Dominic. He stated as follows:
- [21]
[21] For the foregoing reasons, the applicant’s argument in respect of the Judge’s reliance on Dominic’s confession is unmeritorious and fails to show in any way that the decision in CCA 42/2017 was demonstrably wrong (see ss 394J(5)(a) and 394J(6) of the CPC).
The applicant’s claim to be a mere bailee of one bundle of drugs
- [22]
[22] The applicant’s second contention is that he had intended to return one of the two bundles to his supplier. Relying on the bailment defence set out in Ramesh (at [110]), the applicant argues that he should only have been convicted of trafficking one bundle of drugs, not two.
- [23]
[23] At the trial, there was no evidence at all to suggest that the applicant had intended to return one of the bundles to his supplier. In his statement of 18 April 2012 and in his closing submissions at trial, the applicant stated that he had intended to call his supplier upon reaching home to clarify his receipt of the two bundles. Nothing was said about returning one bundle to his supplier.
- [24]
[24] Contrary to the applicant’s belated assertion that he was a mere bailee of one bundle of drugs, the evidence indicated clearly that he had intended to receive two bundles from Dominic. In any event, the bailment defence would make no difference to the applicant’s case because, as stated earlier, even if he had intended to traffic in only one bundle, he would still be guilty of possession of more than 15g of diamorphine for the purpose of trafficking.
The allegations of inadequate legal assistance
- [25]
[25] In Mr Ravi s/o Madasamy’s (“Mr Ravi”) affidavit filed in support of the present application, it is stated (at para 9) that “If permitted, the applicant will also argue that the defence counsel who appeared at the trial and at the appeal was incompetent or ineffective in his representation of the Applicant and this has led to a miscarriage of justice”. In his written submissions, the applicant asserts that the Judge and the Court of Appeal commented adversely on Mr Masih’s conduct of the trial and that “the Court of Appeal underlined the ‘critical failings in Nazeri’s defence’ which arose out of defence counsel’s conduct of the case”. The applicant states that the “critical failings” include:
(a) failure to comply with the rule in Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67 (“Browne v Dunn”) by neglecting to cross-examine Dominic on crucial aspects of his evidence that conflicted with the applicant’s account;
(b) failure to put to the applicant Dominic’s conflicting account and to allow the applicant to respond to it;
(c) failure to comply with the rule in Browne v Dunn by neglecting to cross-examine the investigating officer or the interpreter with regard to the applicant’s allegation that the investigating officer had told the applicant to lower the amount of heroin for his personal consumption during the recording of his statement;
(d) failure to ask the applicant to clarify the reason for the inconsistency in his testimony regarding the amount of drugs he consumed, namely, ten packets in contrast to 12 packets consumed every fortnight; and
(e) failure to adduce any medical evidence to support the applicant’s claim that he consumed a higher daily dosage of heroin than what was recorded in his statements.
- [26]
[26] It is submitted that, as a result, there was a failure at the trial “such that the integrity of the judicial proceedings itself has been impugned”. It is also submitted that this is reinforced by the fact that both the Judge and the Court of Appeal based their findings on issues connected to Mr Masih’s alleged ineffectiveness or incompetence.
- [27]
[27] The two-step approach for dealing with allegations of inadequate legal assistance was set out in Mohammad Farid bin Batra v Public Prosecutor and another appeal and other matters [2020] 1 SLR 907 (“Farid”) at [134]. The first step is to assess counsel’s conduct of the case and the second is to assess whether that conduct affected the outcome of the case, in that it resulted in a miscarriage of justice.
- [28]
[28] At the time of the applicant’s trial in the High Court, Mr Masih was a criminal defence lawyer with about 33 years of experience. He ceased practising law in December 2020. In a letter dated 19 February 2021, he made his response to the letter dated 9 February 2021 from the applicant’s present counsel’s law firm which enclosed a draft affidavit of Mr Ravi. In his response, Mr Masih stated that he accepted the comments by the Judge and the Court of Appeal regarding the shortcomings of defence counsel at the trial. He then went on to discuss some of the evidence adduced at the trial. In the concluding paragraphs of his response, Mr Masih said:
- [29]
[29] Many of us would probably acknowledge, with the benefit of hindsight and upon further reflection and discussions, that we could have done better or said something more effectively than we did or even that we overlooked certain matters. This could be in the context of a debate, a discussion, a speech, a trial or an appeal. It would have to be a very bold and brash person who dares to proclaim that he has done a perfect job each time.
- [31]
[31] In any event, assuming that the applicant has established a case of inadequate legal assistance and if Mr Masih had done what the applicant now asserts he should have done during the trial, is there a real possibility that the outcome might have been different for the applicant such that a miscarriage of justice could be said to have occurred in this case? I note that in Farid at [139], the Court of Appeal adopted the standard of “real possibility” in contrast to that of “powerful probability” used in s 394J(6)(b) of the CPC. The Court of Appeal explained that the higher threshold of “powerful probability” was warranted in that statutory provision because for a review application, there would already have been a concluded appeal which did not succeed. Unlike the situation in Farid which involved an appellant contending on appeal that his trial counsel had failed him, the present case is an application for leave to file a review application. The higher threshold should therefore apply. However, for the present discussions, I am prepared to use the lower threshold of real possibility.
- [32]
[32] The state of the evidence given by the applicant in his statements and in his oral testimony must be borne in mind. It was clear from the totality of the applicant’s evidence that he had been hopelessly inconsistent concerning the number of bundles he was supposed to receive from Dominic as well as on the issue of his rate of consumption of heroin. I have already set out the inconsistencies and the other evidence earlier.
- [33]
[33] Further, as evidenced in the notes of evidence, the applicant’s initial instructions to Mr Masih were that his statements were recorded correctly but he realised later that his “very rough estimate about his consumption habits” was not correct. Mr Masih cross-examined the CNB witnesses on that basis. It was only when the Prosecution cross-examined the applicant about the discrepancy between his statements and his oral testimony concerning his consumption rate that he alleged that the CNB officer had told him to change his statement to state a lower consumption rate. According to the applicant, he told the CNB officer during the recording of his statements that he smoked ten packets within two weeks but the CNB officer said “ten packets too much” and would not believe him. The CNB officer then told him he should change his statement and he did as instructed. The applicant conceded that he did not inform Mr Masih about this allegation against the CNB officer. This is the “new evidence” from the applicant during cross-examination that I mentioned earlier.
- [34]
[34] In the light of all the evidence adduced at the trial, there is surely no real possibility that recalling the CNB officer for further cross-examination would have made a difference to the outcome of the trial. Similarly, a less passive cross-examination of Dominic or any other witness could not possibly have changed the result. It was obvious that Mr Masih did his best to put forward the applicant’s “one bundle” defence and his drug consumption rate on the state of the evidence. Mr Masih certainly could not make such hopelessly inconsistent evidence inject reasonable doubt into the Prosecution’s case, much less build a credible defence on such evidence.
- [35]
[35] There is no requirement in law or in practice that medical evidence has to be adduced in support of an accused person’s drug consumption rate. This is not a case where the applicant had been receiving medical treatment for drug addiction close to the time of his arrest and there was readily available medical evidence relating to his drug consumption rate at the material time which Mr Masih knew about but failed to adduce at the trial.
Dr Ung’s medical report
- [36]
[36] Finally, the applicant relies on a medical report by Dr Ung in support of his claim that he would have kept 12 packets of heroin for his consumption. This is the “new evidence” that the applicant hopes to adduce and which he claims should have been called and adduced at the trial by Mr Masih.
- [39]
[39] It is clear from the report that the applicant’s account to Dr Ung was neither truthful nor accurate. The applicant’s alleged consumption pattern was rejected by the Judge and the Judge’s finding of fact was upheld by the Court of Appeal. The applicant’s professed consumption rate is also inconsistent with the medical evidence adduced at the trial which Dr Ung did not appear to be privy to. The contemporaneous medical reports indicated that the applicant was not observed to be suffering from any drug-induced psychiatric condition at the time of his arrest and that he suffered only mild to no withdrawal symptoms in the two or three days after his arrest.
- [40]
[40] In addition, the applicant’s assertion that he had the financial means to support his claimed consumption rate appears to have been accepted by Dr Ung at face value. It did not appear that the applicant informed Dr Ung that he had testified at the trial that he was “short of cash” at the material time. In any event, the Court of Appeal has ruled that the applicant’s claimed consumption rate was unbelievable given his lack of financial means which drove him to drug trafficking in the first place. It is not permissible for the applicant to revisit factual matters by merely repeating his evidence.
- [41]
[41] All relevant evidence was tested rigorously at the trial and on appeal. On the totality of the evidence adduced, the applicant’s testimony was found to be untruthful. The mere repetition of evidence by the applicant to a psychiatrist when that evidence has been rejected by the courts cannot possibly alter the fact that the evidence was found to be not credible. Dr Ung’s report also fails to take into account other evidence such as the applicant’s mention of “two bundles” in his statements and his payment of $10,450 to Dominic.
- [42]
[42] To qualify as “compelling” material within the meaning of s 394J(3)(c) of the CPC, Dr Ung’s report must be “reliable, substantial, powerfully probative, and capable of showing almost conclusively that there has been a miscarriage of justice” in the Court of Appeal’s decision in CCA 42/2017. It is clear to me that the report does not even come close to meeting any of those statutory descriptions.
Conclusion
- [43]
[43] Section 394H(7) of the CPC allows the court to dismiss a leave application summarily without setting it down for hearing. Before doing so, the court must consider the applicant’s written submissions (if any) and may, but is not required to, consider the Prosecution’s written submissions (if any): s 394H(8) of the CPC. I have considered the application, Mr Ravi’s affidavit and both the applicant’s and the Prosecution’s written submissions. For the reasons set out above, there is clearly no “sufficient material” on which it may be concluded that there has been a miscarriage of justice in CCA 42/2017. I therefore dismiss this application summarily.