Court of Appeal · Decided 5 May 2021
CDM & anor v CDP
Feedback & support[2021] SGCA 45 · Case no. Civil Appeal No 53 of 2020 · 46 paragraphs
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Introduction
- [1]
[1] It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal is, for the most part, defined by the pleadings filed in the arbitration. The arbitral process, generally speaking, commences with a Notice of Arbitration setting out the nature and scope of the dispute. This would typically be followed by the Statement of Claim shortly after the constitution of the tribunal. While the Notice of Arbitration and the Statement of Claim lay out the dispute from the claimant’s perspective, it would be incorrect to treat them as exhaustively defining the jurisdiction of the tribunal.
- [2]
[2] Whether the scope of the dispute and hence the jurisdiction of the tribunal extends beyond the matters referred to in the Notice of Arbitration and the Statement of Claim must depend on the subsequent pleadings. Indeed, this was precisely brought to the fore by the arbitration between the parties to this appeal (the “Arbitration”). While the respondent, which was the claimant in the Arbitration, had not raised arguments in relation to the “second launch” of a vessel, the appellants, in anticipation that the point might subsequently be raised, referred to the “second launch” and expressly denied it in their Defence and Counterclaim. Thereafter, the issue in relation to the “second launch” was featured in the subsequent pleadings, the agreed list of issues (“ALOI”), the evidence in the Arbitration, and the parties’ respective submissions.
- [3]
[3] Proceeding on the flawed premise that the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal (the “Tribunal”) was somehow defined only by the Notice of Arbitration and the Statement of Claim, the appellants applied to set aside the arbitral award on, inter alia, the basis that the Tribunal had acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it ruled on the “second launch” in favour of the respondent. The appellants might have had a case had they not introduced the “second launch” in their pleadings such that the “second launch” featured prominently in the proceedings thereafter. In that way, ironically, it was the appellants’ own pleadings which vested jurisdiction on the Tribunal to rule on the “second launch”. The mere fact that the respondent’s principal case in the Arbitration was not based on the “second launch” is a non-sequitur. As long as the issue of the “second launch” was properly before the Tribunal, that would suffice to confer jurisdiction on it.
Background
- [5]
[5] The facts have already been eloquently set out in the decision of the Judge below (the “Judge”), and we do not propose to repeat them in any great detail. Briefly, the appellants and the respondent entered into the following agreements on 9 June 2013:
(a) A contract (“the Contract”) between the first appellant and the respondent where the respondent agreed to design, build, launch, equip, commission, test, complete, sell, and deliver to the first appellant a Self-Erected Tender Rig and a Derrick Equipment Set (collectively, the “Hull”); and
(b) A company guarantee by the second appellant in favour of the respondent in respect of the Contract (the “Guarantee”).
- [6]
[6] After having entered into the Contract, the parties entered into a number of addenda to the contract. Addendum No. 2 was entered into on 24 September 2014. Of central importance to the present appeal is Article 6(d) of Addendum No. 2, which varied the payment term in the Contract such that 10% of the total contract sum (the “Fourth Instalment”) would become payable upon “launching and receipt of [the] invoice issued by the [builder, ie, the respondent]”. A further stipulation in Addendum No. 2 provided that “launching [was] subject to prior approval by the [ship classification society], [the first appellant], and [the respondent] collectively”.
- [7]
[7] On 20 January 2015, the respondent purported to launch the Hull into the water for the purposes of Art 6(d) of Addendum No. 2. That same day, the first appellant’s project manager emailed the respondent stating, inter alia, that it “[did] not consider the floating as launching”. Following the disputed launch on 20 January, various meetings involving the parties’ representatives were held on 21 January, 7 April, and 28 April 2015 (collectively, the “Construction and Progress Meetings”). The purpose of the Construction and Progress Meetings was, among other things, to iron out and update various outstanding items or deficiencies in the construction of the Hull that the first appellant required the respondent to remedy. It was the respondent’s position that by 28 April 2015, all outstanding issues and/or deficiencies in relation to the Hull had been resolved.
- [8]
[8] On 3 May 2015, the Hull was launched (the “second launch”). On 5 May 2015, the respondent demanded payment of the Fourth Instalment. As payment continued to be withheld, the respondent issued a default notice on 3 August 2016 pursuant to the terms of the Guarantee requesting that the appellants pay the Fourth Instalment. As payment was still not forthcoming, the respondent commenced the Arbitration against the appellants. The Notice of Arbitration was filed on 26 September 2016. Following the usual exchange of pleadings, an oral hearing took place between 21 and 25 May 2018, where both sides called factual and expert witnesses. Thereafter, detailed written closing and reply submissions were exchanged.
- [9]
[9] The central issue in question at the Arbitration was, for present purposes, whether the respondent (the claimant in the Arbitration) was entitled to the Fourth Instalment. The Tribunal found that the respondent, first appellant, and the relevant ship classification society had collectively given their approval for the launch of the Hull, with the first appellant having given its approval on 28 April 2015 for the second launch on 3 May 2015. The Tribunal found that the minutes of the Construction and Progress Meetings that took place on 7 and 28 April 2015 recorded that the respondent had resolved all the remaining items which the first appellant required the respondent to remedy before the Hull was considered to be in “[l]aunching condition”. The Tribunal also found that the minutes recorded the first appellant’s clear acceptance that the outstanding requirements had been met. By its acceptance that the outstanding issues had been resolved, the Tribunal found that the first appellant had also given its approval for the second launch. Even if the minutes did not show that the first appellant had given its express approval for the second launch of the Hull, the Tribunal was prepared to conclude that the first appellant ought to be treated as having approved it.
- [11]
[11] The appellants then applied to set aside the part of the Award relating to the respondent’s claim for the Fourth Instalment under the Contract. The grounds the appellants relied on were twofold.
- [12]
[12] First, relying on Article 34(2)(a)(iii) of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (“the Model Law”) as set out in the First Schedule to the International Arbitration Act (Cap 143A, 2002 Rev Ed) (the “IAA”), the appellants argued that the Award had been made in excess of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction:
(a) The appellants submitted that the Tribunal had exceeded its jurisdiction in finding that the first appellant had, on 28 April 2015, approved the second launch of the Hull, thereby fulfilling the condition precedent that the respondent needed to satisfy prior to the second launch on 3 May 2015.
(b) It was also contended by the appellants that the Tribunal had transposed approval which had been given for the second launch in May 2015 retrospectively as consent for the earlier launch on 20 January 2015.
- [13]
[13] Second, the appellants alleged that the Award had been made in breach of the right to present their case, in violation of Article 34(2)(a)(ii) of the Model Law and/or in breach of the rules of natural justice, in violation of s 24(b) of the IAA:
(a) The appellants complained that the Tribunal had acted in breach of natural justice by deviating from the parties’ pleaded cases when it determined that the Hull had been properly launched in the second launch, and that the respondent had thus satisfied the conditions for payment of the Fourth Instalment.
(b) The appellants also asserted that the Tribunal had acted in breach of natural justice by “disallowing the cross-examination of the [respondent’s] expert witness regarding the Contract … contrary to his Witness Statement and Responsive Report”.
- [14]
[14] The Judge dismissed all of the appellants’ attempts to impugn the Award in their entirety, finding that they were not borne out by the record from the Arbitration. Dissatisfied, the appellants appealed.
- [15]
[15] On appeal, the appellants abandoned most of their arguments below. Instead, the appellants’ remaining submissions were twofold:
(a) First, that the Tribunal had acted in excess of its jurisdiction in finding that there had been the requisite approval in April 2015 for the second launch of the Hull in May 2015. Accordingly, the Tribunal had also exceeded its jurisdiction in finding that the Fourth Instalment had fallen due.
(b) Second, that the Tribunal had acted in breach of natural justice and the appellants’ rights to be heard because the ground that the Tribunal had relied on, ie that approval had been given for the second launch, was not in issue in the Arbitration. Accordingly, the appellants had been denied the opportunity to present their case on that issue.
Analysis
- [16]
[16] At the outset, it is essential to bear in mind that while the appellants relied on (a) an excess of jurisdiction and/or (b) a breach of natural justice to justify setting aside the impugned segments of the Award, the factual matrix for both grounds was in fact identical. Put another way, the breach of natural justice alleged by the appellants required the Tribunal to have exceeded its jurisdiction, because the appellants accept that if they had the opportunity to engage the issues which had in fact been placed before the Tribunal, it would follow that the Tribunal could not have acted in breach of natural justice. Thus, as was conceded by the appellants’ counsel before us, the appellants failing to establish that the Tribunal had acted in excess of its jurisdiction would necessarily be fatal to their breach of natural justice argument.
- [17]
[17] We turned therefore to consider the question of whether the Tribunal had acted in excess of its jurisdiction in finding that the second launch had been approved by the parties and provided a basis for the Fourth Instalment to fall due. The law in this regard is fairly well-established. In PT Asuransi Jasa Indonesia (Persero) v Dexia Bank SA [2007] 1 SLR(R) 597 at [40] and [44], this Court set out a two-step inquiry on an application to set aside an award under Art 34(2)(a)(iii) of the Model Law for excess of jurisdiction:
(a) First, the Court must identify what matters were within the scope of submission to the arbitral tribunal; and
(b) Second, whether the arbitral award involved such matters, or whether it involved a “new difference … outside the scope of the submission to arbitration and accordingly … irrelevant to the issues requiring determination”.
Did the Tribunal act in excess of its jurisdiction?
- [18]
[18] The question of what matters were within the scope of the parties’ submission to arbitration was answerable by reference to five sources: the parties’ pleadings, ALOI, opening statements, evidence adduced, and closing submissions at the Arbitration. Having reference to those sources, it was clear beyond peradventure that the issue as to whether the parties had approved the second launch such that the Fourth Instalment became payable was squarely before the Tribunal. There was thus no basis to contend that the Tribunal had exceeded its jurisdiction in making that finding. We considered the five sources in turn.
The Pleadings
- [19]
[19] In determining the scope of a party’s submission to arbitration, the pleadings filed in the arbitration provide a convenient way to define the jurisdiction of the tribunal: PT Prima International Development v Kempinski Hotels SA and other appeals [2012] 4 SLR 98 (“PT Prima”) at [33].
- [20]
[20] The appellants argued that the Statement of Claim and Notice of Arbitration did not make any reference to the second launch as providing a basis for the Fourth Instalment becoming payable. Accordingly, it was contended that the Tribunal’s reliance on the events of May 2015 concerning the second launch constituted reliance on unpleaded material. This was simply mistaken. The jurisdiction of a tribunal in deciding the dispute was not framed only by the Statement of Claim and Notice of Arbitration. There is ample authority for this fundamental proposition:
(a) In PT Prima at [34], this Court observed that:
There was no suggestion that the “pleadings” referred only to the Notice of Arbitration and Statement of Claim. Moreover, the reference to the pleaded case “of each party” makes clear that the Defence and other such pleadings must also be included in determining the issues raised in the dispute.
(b) Similarly, the High Court noted in JVL Agro Industries Ltd v Agritrade International Pte Ltd [2016] 4 SLR 768 at [150] that:
Again, there was absolutely nothing to suggest that the reference to “pleadings” ought to be construed narrowly to only the Notice of Arbitration and Statement of Claim. No authority was cited by the appellants to that effect.
- [21]
[21] On the facts, it was not in contention that the initial claim (based on the Notice of Arbitration and Statement of Claim) in the Arbitration was “premised on [the first] launch of 20 January [2015]”, and did not make reference to the second launch in May 2015. However, ironically and presumably in anticipation of the respondent’s full case, the Statement of Defence and Counterclaim expressly addressed the issue of whether the first appellant had granted its approval on 28 April 2015 for the second launch. Of particular note is the repeated reference to the second launch on 3 May 2015, and the appellants’ attempts to deny that approval for launch had been granted at all, rather than merely in relation to the January launch:
- [22]
[22] In the respondent’s Reply and Defence to the Counterclaim (“RDCC”), the respondent unambiguously joined issue over whether the first appellant had granted approval before the second launch on 3 May 2015:
It was clear from the RDCC that the respondent itself argued that, by 28 April 2015, all outstanding issues relating to the launch of [the Hull] had been resolved such that the second launch in May 2015 would trigger payment of the Fourth Instalment.
- [23]
[23] In their Rejoinder to the RDCC, the appellants continued to take issue with this precise point. The appellants’ Rejoinder was telling in three aspects:
(a) First, the segment of the Rejoinder from [68] to [76] was headed:
The heading above is telling in that it refers to “all” the launches of the Hull, indicating the appellants’ recognition that there was in fact more than one launch, ie the first launch in January and the second launch in May.
(b) Second, [76] of the Rejoinder illustrated that the appellants were fully aware of and were responding to the respondent’s case that there was a second launch scheduled for May, and that the May launch (for which it was uncertain whether it “would be successful”) followed from the appellant’s approvals in the Construction and Progress Meetings:
Not only does this extract reflect the appellants’ acknowledgment of the respondent’s case concerning the second launch, it demonstrates that the appellants joined issue over the validity (or otherwise) of that second launch.
(c) Third, [77] of the Rejoinder made clear that:
The appellants alleged that the repudiation of the Contract had occurred on 27 October 2016, and it is clear from the reference to that date that the appellants were specifically arguing that even after the second launch, the conditions precedent for payment of the Fourth Instalment had still not been satisfied. It thus cannot be said that the appellants were in any way not engaged on the issue of whether the alleged approval by the first appellant on 28 April 2015, and the second launch on 3 May 2015, sufficed to trigger the payment obligation for the Fourth Instalment.
- [24]
[24] In sum, the pleadings made clear that the respondent was relying on the approval granted by the first appellant on 28 April 2015, and that the appellants were denying that approval had ever been granted by the first appellant, whether in January 2015, or in the lead-up to May 2015, or ever. Similarly, the respondent was relying on both the first launch in January and the second launch in May, while the appellants argued that approval had not been granted for any launches up to the repudiation on 27 October 2016. It thus cannot be said that the question of whether the first appellant had approved the launch of the Hull after the first launch in January 2015 was not in issue, nor can it viably be contended that the Tribunal had exceeded its jurisdiction.
The Agreed List of Issues
- [25]
[25] Given how extensively it was canvassed in the parties’ pleadings, it is unsurprising that the question of whether the second launch had been approved by the parties such that the Fourth Instalment became payable featured in the parties’ ALOI. The parties’ ALOI took the form of broad overarching questions, under which the parties’ headline claims relating to those questions were briefly summarised.
- [26]
[26] The second issue in the ALOI is particularly instructive as to what was placed in issue before the Tribunal:
2. Did [CDP] satisfy the conditions necessary for payment of US$13.9 million pursuant to Article 6(d) of the Contracts Addendum No. 2?
2(a) [CDP] takes the position that [CDP] satisfied the conditions necessary for payment of US$13.9 million because:
(i) […]
(b) The [appellants] take the position that [CDP] did not satisfy the conditions necessary for payment of US$13.9 million because:
[…]
(iii) CDP], [CDM] and the Classification Society had not collectively approved the launch of [the Hull]. In particular, [CDP] had not obtained [CDM]’s approval for the launch of [the Hull] …;
(iv) [CDP] did not launch [the Hull] on 20 January 2015, or 3 May 2015, or at all. …
- [27]
[27] This was made even clearer under the third issue in the ALOI:
- [28]
[28] Based on the ALOI, both (a) whether the Hull was launched on 20 January 2015 or on 3 May 2015; and (b) whether prior to each of these launch dates, the first appellant’s approval had been obtained, had been identified and agreed by both parties as issues for the Tribunal’s determination. Therefore, the Tribunal’s finding that the first appellant had, on 28 April 2015, approved the second launch cannot be said to have been made in excess of jurisdiction.
- [29]
[29] Granted, the respondent had itself, in response to issue 2 of the ALOI (see above at [26]), indicated that it was relying on the launch of the Hull on 20 January 2015. However, this could hardly be said to be decisive, and was in many senses unsurprising given that the respondent’s case pertaining to the approval for the second launch was its secondary case. The respondent’s primary case, as the appellants themselves recognised, was that the Hull had been properly launched in January 2015. The mere fact that the full panoply of the respondent’s alternative and secondary case had not been reflected in the very brief and limited outlines in the ALOI cannot be taken to undo the fact that extensive reference had been made in relation to the second launch and the grant of approval in April 2015 in the parties’ pleadings.
The Parties’ Opening Statements
- [30]
[30] Our conclusion above that the parties had in fact joined issue over the approval granted on 28 April 2015 for the second launch on 3 May 2015 was buttressed by the extensive arguments concerning these developments in the parties’ opening statements. In the respondent’s opening statement (as the claimant in the Arbitration), it was expressly averred that:
- [31]
[31] By contrast, the appellants expressly argued in their opening statement (as the defendants in the Arbitration), that “the [respondent] did not launch [the Hull] on 20 January 2015, or at all”, and that:
It is readily apparent that the appellants sought to (a) deny that agreement to launch was of “contractual significance” in triggering the Fourth Instalment, and that in any event (b) no such agreement had arisen as of 28 April 2015 for the second launch on 3 May 2015.
- [32]
[32] Given the foregoing, it simply does not lie in the appellants’ mouths to claim that the question of whether the parties had agreed to the second launch in May 2015 was not in issue before the Tribunal. In any event, and perhaps decisively, counsel for the appellants accepted, at the oral hearing before the Judge, that by the time the respondent had filed its opening statement in the Arbitration, the respondent had made known its position, ie that an agreement or understanding had been reached on 28 April 2015 for the second launch on 3 May 2015. The relevant extract of the transcript is as follows:
Court: Mr Singh, do you accept that at least by the time the [respondent’s] Opening Statement had been filed, the point about the vessel being launched on 20 Jan and if not by 5 May (being the date of the invoice following the launch on 3 May 2015) and that there was agreement from [the first appellant] for that subsequent launch was raised in the [respondent’s] Opening Statement?
[Counsel for the appellants]: Yes, they do say it.
This exchange entirely puts paid to the notion that the second launch in May 2015 fell outside the scope of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction and took the appellants by surprise. On the contrary, the appellants knew the case they had to meet – which was the case the Tribunal eventually accepted as the basis for its decision – at the latest by the filing of the respondent’s opening statement.
The Evidence Adduced by the Parties
- [33]
[33] Following on from the parties’ opening statements, it is scarcely surprising that the evidence adduced by the parties at the Arbitration also engaged with the question of whether approval had been granted for the second launch in May 2015 such that the payment obligation for the Fourth Instalment was triggered.
- [34]
[34] In the second witness statement of Mr [AA], the respondent’s Project Manager, dated 19 December 2017, he made the following statements from [60] to [65]:
The references at [63] to the second launch on 3 May 2015, and at [64] to approval having been granted on 28 April 2015 as all outstanding matters had been resolved, were particularly revealing.
- [35]
[35] It was not only the respondent’s witness who engaged with the grant of approval on 28 April 2015 and the second launch on 3 May 2015. Rather, the appellants’ witnesses were also alive to that issue. In the second witness statement of Mr [CC], a director of both appellants, dated 9 February 2018, Mr [CC] made the following points:
The references not only to the second launch on 3 May 2015, but also to the alleged approval on 28 April 2015, are difficult to reconcile with the appellants’ contrary assertion that those precise issues had not been placed before the Tribunal.
- [36]
[36] Beyond the contrasting positions set out in the relevant witness statements, the appellants’ Mr [CC] was specifically cross-examined on the 28 April 2015 Construction and Progress Meeting. The relevant extract of the transcript reads:
This extract powerfully demonstrates that cross-examination on the issues of (a) the alleged grant of approval on 28 April 2015; (b) the second launch on 3 May 2015; and (c) the Fourth Instalment falling due by virtue of Article 6(d) of the Contract Addendum No. 2 did in fact take place. It was thus simply indefensible for the appellants to contend, given the totality of the evidence, that none of those points were in issue or even live throughout the Arbitration.
The Parties’ Closing Submissions
- [37]
[37] The appellants’ closing submissions made it all the more apparent that the second launch, and whether the requisite approvals had been procured, was in issue in the Arbitration:
- [38]
[38] The respondent’s closing submissions directly clashed with the appellants’ submissions above on the points emphasised, as follows:
- [39]
[39] Even in the reply submissions before the Tribunal, the parties adopted diametrically opposed positions, joining issue over (a) whether there had been approval as of the 28 April 2015 meeting; and (b) whether that approval, coupled with the second launch in May 2015, sufficed to trigger payment of the Fourth Instalment. In the respondent’s reply closing submissions, it argued that:
Tellingly, the appellants did in fact acknowledge, at [88] of their Appellants’ Case, that this extract did cover the basis upon which the Tribunal eventually made its key findings. The appellants’ only argument in response was that “it was far too late for the [respondent] to be raising a new point in submission … which was neither pleaded nor foreshadowed”. Setting aside the fact that the pleadings, ALOI, opening statements, and evidence adduced illustrate that it cannot viably be said that the arguments over the second launch were “neither pleaded nor foreshadowed”, the appellants did not raise any jurisdictional objections whatsoever about the respondent’s reply closing submissions. The appellants’ silence in this regard was deafening.
- [40]
[40] This absence of any jurisdictional objections was perhaps unsurprising given the appellants’ own reply closing submissions at [52]:
In a single sentence, the appellants succinctly and, ironically given their case, summed up the entire basis upon which the Tribunal eventually decided this issue. For the appellants to claim that these points had not been raised over the course of the Arbitration flies in the face of reality.
The appellants’ arguments on the Tribunal’s alleged excess of jurisdiction
- [41]
[41] In support of their assertion that the Tribunal had exceeded its jurisdiction in considering whether approval had been granted for the second launch of the Hull in May 2015, the appellants made three arguments. First, it was contended that the Tribunal had erred in finding that the Hull had been “launched”, as was required in Contract Addendum No. 2, as the Hull had only been “floated” or “undocked and later docked again”. Second, the appellants argued that the respondent’s only alternative argument made at the Arbitration, apart from the respondent’s primary case that the Hull had been launched in January 2015, was one arising out of estoppel. On this argument, any reference to the second launch in May 2015 pertained only to the context of estoppel, and did not provide a basis for the Tribunal to make its finding that the obligation to pay the Fourth Instalment had been triggered. Third, the appellants claimed that even if there had been reference made to the second launch and approval for the second launch, such reference was not the “crux” or “focus” of the parties’ cases in the Arbitration.
- [42]
[42] With respect, we did not find any of these arguments persuasive. Turning to the appellants’ first argument, it is trite that a Court determining an application to set aside an arbitral award on the basis of an alleged excess of jurisdiction is not concerned with the merits of the dispute, but only with the process. The correctness or otherwise of the tribunal’s decision is not in issue. Rather, the key question lies in determining the ambit of the tribunal’s jurisdiction. As Judith Prakash J (as she then was) observed in Sui Southern Gas Co Ltd v Habibullah Coastal Power Co (Pte) Ltd [2010] 3 SLR 1 (“Sui Southern Gas”) at [37]:
- [43]
[43] As for the appellants’ second argument, that the only alternative case pursued by the respondent in the Arbitration was one of estoppel, this was simply untrue. As is evident from the extracts above, the second launch was squarely before the Tribunal and issue had been joined by both parties on it. Moreover, the respondent’s arguments on estoppel were in an altogether different and separate segment of the relevant pleadings. Perhaps this fact is best manifested by the appellants’ counsel’s own acknowledgment (see [32] above) that the respondent’s case on the second launch had become clear from the respondent’s opening statement in the Arbitration, and the respondent’s reply closing submissions in the Arbitration (see [39] above), which unequivocally distinguished between the respondent’s alternative submission that launch had in any event occurred by May 2015, and the respondent’s further alternative case on estoppel.
- [44]
[44] The appellants’ third argument is similarly untenable. The fact that a party to arbitration has formed the view that the tribunal had decided the dispute on a matter which it perceived as not being the “focus” or “crux” of the dispute is not a basis for asserting that the tribunal had acted in excess of jurisdiction. Put simply, whether or not a particular facet of a dispute is identified by a party as being the nub of a dispute may come down to the competence and ability of counsel to sift through material and identify the central issues. Moreover, even the best-intentioned and most able counsel may find themselves blinkered in focusing only on areas which they and their clients deem to be the most significant. Accordingly, a tribunal deciding a dispute based on an issue which is allegedly not the “crux” or “focus” of the proceedings is neither here nor there so long as that issue does in fact fall within the scope of parties’ submission to arbitration.
- [45]
[45] As was observed in Triulzi Cesare SRL v Xinyi Group (Glass) Co Ltd [2015] 1 SLR 114 at [51] in the context of the requirement for parties to have the opportunity to present their cases, such a requirement does not shield a party from its own failures or strategic choices not to utilise the opportunity afforded. Further, and again in the context of the requirement for parties to have the opportunity to present their cases, the English High Court in Terna Bahrain Holding Company WLL v Al Shamsi & ors [2012] EWHC 3283 (Comm) made clear at [106] that a tribunal does not act unfairly in deciding a case on a point which was not emphasised by the party raising it, or which is not the subject matter of any great exposition. Provided the issue is raised, however briefly, the opposing party can avail itself of the opportunity it has to address the issue at whatever length and in whatever detail it so decides. We see no reason why this reasoning should not also apply where an award is challenged for excess of jurisdiction – if an issue has been submitted to the tribunal for adjudication, the fact that parties might not have made extensive submissions on it does not somehow remove that issue from the tribunal’s jurisdiction.
- [46]
[46] On the facts of this case, the extracts from the pleadings, ALOI, opening statements, evidence adduced, and closing submissions all speak with one voice in establishing that the issues upon which the Tribunal based its decision were categorically within the ambit of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. The appellants’ arguments were thus uniformly rejected.
Did the Tribunal act in breach of natural justice?
- [47]
[47] Given our conclusion that the Tribunal had not exceeded its jurisdiction, and the appellants’ own acknowledgment that the breach of natural justice alleged was entirely dependent on the Tribunal having in fact exceeded its jurisdiction (see [16] above), there was no need to consider the breach of natural justice alleged by the appellants in any detail. That argument was rendered unsustainable and fell in limine given that the appellants had ample opportunity to address the second launch, and did in fact do so.
Costs
(a) First, at [67], Reyes J opined that a person who obtains an award in his favour pursuant to an arbitration agreement should be entitled to expect that a court will enforce the award as a matter of course. Hence, applications by an award debtor to appeal against or set aside an arbitral award should be regarded as exceptional events, and where such applications are unsuccessful, indemnity costs should be warranted, absent special circumstances.
(b) Second, an unmeritorious challenge against an award was said (at [69]) to be incompatible with the award debtor’s duty to assist the court in the just, cost-effective, and efficient resolution of a dispute.
(c) Third, the award debtor should bear the full costs consequences of bringing an unsuccessful application, and the award creditor should not be made to incur costs arising from the losing party’s attempt to challenge the award, particularly when the award creditor had already won at arbitration. To illustrate this third point, Reyes J explained at [70] that “[i]f the losing party is only made to pay costs on a conventional party-and-party basis, the winning party would in effect be subsidising the losing party’s abortive attempt to frustrate enforcement of a valid award”, and would be out of pocket for the remaining amount.
- [51]
[51] A v R was approved by the Hong Kong Court of Appeal in Gao Haiyan and another v Keeneye Holdings Ltd and another [2012] HKCU 226 at [13]. The Hong Kong Court of Appeal also adopted the reasons set out by Reyes J. A v R was also subsequently applied in Chimbusco at [10].
Conclusion