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Grounds publishedDecided 29 Jan 2021

Court of Appeal

CBB v Law Society of Singapore

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[2021] SGCA 6Case no. Civil Appeal No 43 of 202013 paragraphs

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] The appellant complained to the respondent in respect of a lawyer (“Mr L”) and, in particular, Mr L’s conduct in assisting the appellant’s mother to establish a trust and to carry out certain work. That work was relevant to mental capacity proceedings that culminated in our decision in Re BKR [2015] 4 SLR 81 (“Re BKR”). Because certain aspects of the appellant’s complaint pertained to matters that arose more than six years prior to the date of the complaint, by virtue of s 85(4A) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed) (“LPA”), the Council of the Law Society (“the Council”) was required to seek the leave of court under s 85(4C)(a) of the LPA before it acted on the complaint. The Council decided that it would not seek such leave and provided two reasons for that decision not to seek leave, namely that (a) the complaint was made by the appellant in his personal capacity and not as a client; and (b) the events in the complaint were time-barred.

  3. Facts

  4. The parties’ cases

  5. Whether a mandatory order should be granted directing the Council to apply for leave pursuant to s 85(4C)(a) of the LPA

  6. [7] It is clear, and this much was not disputed, that where a court finds that the process by which a decision was reached was defective under any of the traditional grounds of judicial review, it will not generally mandate the performance of the administrator’s duty in a particular manner. Otherwise, by doing so it would, in truth, be a decision of the court rather than that of the designated decision-maker and that might undermine not only the separation of powers, but also the sacrosanct principle that the court, in judicial review proceedings, reviews an administrator’s decision-making process rather than the merits of the decision: City Development Ltd v Chief Assessor [2008] 4 SLR(R) 150 at [9] and Borissik Svetlana v Urban Redevelopment Authority [2009] 4 SLR(R) 92 (“Borissik”) at [42]–[43]. We affirm the wisdom of the observation set out in R v Justices of Kingston (1902) 86 LTD 589 (“Justices of Kingston”) (applied in Re San Development Co’s Application [1971-1973] SLR(R) 203 (“Re San Development”) at [15] and Borissik at [21]), that:

  7. The position in Singapore

  8. [11] However, the cases also show that the rule is not inflexible. In C v Comptroller of Income Tax [1965-1967] SLR(R) 626 (“C v Comptroller”), the Comptroller of Income Tax (“the Comptroller”) assessed the applicant’s tax, a decision which the applicant appealed against but nevertheless complied with. On appeal, the Income Tax Board of Review held that the Comptroller had overcharged the applicant. The applicant requested a refund, but the Comptroller appealed against the Board’s decision and imposed as a condition for refund a requirement that the applicant’s solicitors retain the sum in their client’s account pending the determination of the appeal. Section 93(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance (Cap 166, 1955 Rev Ed) (“ITO”) stated that “[i]f it is proved to the satisfaction of the Comptroller that any person for any year of assessment has paid tax … such person shall be entitled to have the amount so paid in excess refunded”, while s 93(3) of the ITO stated that “[t]he Comptroller shall certify any amount repayable under this section and shall cause repayment to be made forthwith”. Buttrose J in the Federal Court held that the requirements of s 93(1) had been satisfied and that s 93(3) of the ITO was therefore engaged: at [26]. He considered that in these circumstances, the Comptroller had a statutory obligation to perform the duty to refund the overpayment and a mandamus in specific terms was the only effective and expeditious remedy open: at [38].

  9. The position in the UK

  10. [14] The position in the UK is somewhat less clear. In R v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Ex parte Lonrho Plc [1989] 1 WLR 525 (“Lonrho”), one company sought to acquire a majority stake in another, and the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry in 1985 declared, prior to the completion of the acquisition, that he would not refer the acquisition to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (“MMC”). Two years later in 1987, the Secretary of State appointed inspectors under s 432(2) of the Companies Act 1985 (c 6) (UK) to investigate the affairs of the acquiror. After receiving the report compiled by the inspectors, the Secretary of State submitted the report to the Serious Fraud Office in 1988. Pursuant to s 64(4)(b) of the Fair Trading Act 1973 (c 41) (UK), the Secretary of State had the power to refer the matter to the MMC in the light of new material facts. Although the Secretary of State accepted that there were new material facts disclosed in the report, he declined, on the advice of the Director General of Fair Trading, to refer the matter to the MMC. The Divisional Court issued mandamus compelling the reference to the MMC on grounds that the decision not to refer the matter was ultra vires. This was reversed by the Court of Appeal and that decision was then affirmed by the House of Lords. Notably, the House of Lords held that the court was not entitled to “convert [a] discretion into a duty and [ignore] the expertise of the Director of Fair Trading”: at 538.

  11. The position in Australia

  12. Analysis

  13. [20] First, the court considers whether there is available in the public domain objective evidence particularly salient to the determination of the merits of a decision. In particular, a court will be more inclined to compel a decision-maker to take certain steps where the evidence relevant to the merits of the decision have already been determined by an independent tribunal or court of law. For example, in Lim Chor Pee (HC) ([13] supra), a factor bearing on the grant of the mandamus directing the Disciplinary Committee to hear and investigate all the relevant charges was the Attorney-General’s provision of information regarding the respondent’s criminal conviction and records. Similarly, in C v Comptroller ([11] supra), relevant for the purpose of granting a mandamus in specific terms was the fact that the Income Tax Board had already rendered its decision regarding the Comptroller’s act of overcharging. Where many of the salient and necessary facts relevant to the merits have been disclosed in the public domain, the court will be concerned not to act in disregard of what is already commonly known and worse, thereby to condone any apparent iniquity.

  14. [21] Second, the court assesses whether the policy content of the decision, if any, warrants a greater degree of deference accorded to another branch of government possessing the appropriate institutional competence. Of course, the court will not abdicate its duty to consider matters of justice and legality. As we observed in Tan Seet Eng v Attorney-General and another matter [2016] 1 SLR 779 at [93], “courts and judges are not the best-equipped to scrutinise decisions which are laden with issues of policy or security or which call for polycentric political considerations”. It was on this basis that the House of Lords in Lonrho ([14] supra) at 538 refused to grant mandamus to refer the matter and held that the court below was not entitled to “[ignore] the expertise of the Director of Fair Trading”.

  15. Application

  16. [28] First, the appellant’s complaint in respect of Mr L arose out of proceedings that had reached the Court of Appeal. As we noted at [4] above, facts pertaining to Mr L’s involvement in setting up the trust and effecting the transfer of assets belonging to the appellant’s mother were set out in Re BKR ([1] supra). There was ample basis for assessing the potential gravity of the conduct that was the subject of the complaint. It was not evident that the Council had regard to our decision in Re BKR when coming to its decision not to apply for leave to refer.

  17. [29] Second, the policy content of the Council’s decision pursuant to s 85(4C)(a) of the LPA – the discipline of lawyers – is a matter of public interest entirely within the aegis and expertise of the court. Indeed, the discipline of lawyers is ultimately under the control of the court. Public confidence in our system of justice rests on the trust reposed in the integrity of the court’s officers. The respondent undoubtedly plays an integral role in maintaining the standards of the profession, but the court exercises ultimate responsibility for the discipline of lawyers and it presides over the disciplinary process. Issues of deference to executive discretion therefore do not bear much weight in this context.

  18. [32] Fifth, having regard to the proper construction, nature and purpose of s 85(4C)(a) of the LPA, we could not identify – and the respondent did not put to us – any other alternative way in which the Council might carry out its duty. Where Parliament confers a discretion on an authority, it is taken to do so “with the intention that it should be used to promote the policy and objects of the Act … [as] determined by construing the Act as a whole”: Padfield ([15] supra) at 1030. The purpose of s 85(4C)(a) of the LPA is clearly to permit even complaints made well after the relevant conduct in question, to be investigated in suitable instances. When seen in context, the purpose of the provision could be said to derive from s 38(1)(a) of the LPA, which is “… to maintain and improve the standards of conduct … of the legal profession in Singapore”.

  19. [33] While s 85(4C)(a) of the LPA grants the Council a measure of flexibility in determining whether such a complaint ought to be advanced, we were amply satisfied that this discretion is one that had to be exercised with due regard to certain relevant factors. The appropriate analogy may be drawn from other statutes conferring a discretion to grant extensions of time: see Lim Hong Kheng v PP [2006] 3 SLR(R) 358 at [27] and Hau Khee Wee v Chua Kian Tong [1985-1986] SLR(R) 1075 at [14]. In our judgment, the relevant factors that a decision-maker ought to take into account when deciding whether to refer a complaint to the Chairman pursuant to s 85(4C)(a) of the LPA are: (a) the length of the delay; (b) the prejudice occasioned by the delay; (c) the explanation put forward for the delay; and (d) the prospects of the complaint. Both the appellant and the respondent broadly agreed that these were the relevant considerations.

  20. [34] Having regard to these four factors, we were unable to see how the Council could arrive at any other decision apart from bringing the relevant application for permission to move the complaint forward. While we accepted that most of Mr L’s impugned conduct had taken place approximately seven years before the complaint was filed, no prejudice was occasioned by the delay. It was not suggested that any particular difficulties of obtaining evidence would arise; nor could we see how such difficulties could arise given the litigation that has already taken place.

  21. [36] With respect to the prospects of the complaint, the appellant argued that Mr L’s impugned conduct was of a serious and egregious nature. The appellant asserted that, while advising the appellant’s mother to set up the trust, Mr L did not disclose that he was a director of the corporate trustee’s holding company responsible for setting up the trust. The appellant also relied on our judgment in Re BKR, where we had held that the appellant’s mother lacked the mental capacity at the material time and acted in a manner that “would cause an objective and reasonable observer to ask whether she might lack decision making capacity”: at Re BKR at [6]. According to the appellant, it is evident from the judgment that Mr L: (a) was present when the appellant’s mother signed a power of attorney in her youngest daughter’s favour; (b) was present when the appellant’s mother gave the bank a nonsensical instruction to purchase more renminbi products; (c) spoke on her behalf during meetings with banks; and (d) drafted a letter that was inconsistent with her true intentions as subsequently communicated to the bank in person. Receipts relevant to claims of overcharging were also disclosed in an affidavit filed by the appellant. Although this was not the appropriate point to examine the merits of the case, we were amply satisfied that the appellant’s complaint is not bound to fail and that it warrants further inquiry.

  22. [37] In these circumstances, we were satisfied that this was an exceptional case where we could see no other way in which the Council’s discretion could properly be exercised. We therefore allowed the appeal and directed the Council to make the requisite application pursuant to s 85(4C)(a) of the LPA seeking the leave of the court to refer the matter notwithstanding the delay.

  23. Whether the learned Judge’s exercise of discretion for costs should be disturbed and costs awarded against the respondent

  24. Conclusion