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Grounds publishedDecided 2 Jul 2021

Court of Appeal

Lin Jianwei v Tung Yu-Lien Margaret and another

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[2021] SGCA 67Case no. Civil Appeal No 137 of 2020 (Summonses Nos 90 of 2020 and 27 of 2021)66 paragraphs

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  1. Introduction

  2. [2] By way of a brief overview, CA/SUM 90/2020 (“SUM 90”) and CA/SUM 91/2020 (“SUM 91”) are Tung’s applications to strike out Lin’s Notices of Appeal in CA/CA 137/2020 (“CA 137”) and CA/CA 140/2020 (“CA 140”), respectively.

  3. [3] CA/OS 42/2020 (“OS 42”) is Lin’s application for leave to appeal against the decision of the High Court judge (“the Judge”) in HC/SUM 3929/2020 (“SUM 3929”) or, in the alternative, leave to appeal against the Judge’s decision in HC/SUM 1281/2020 (“SUM 1281”) and the consequent grant of an extension of time (“EOT”) in respect of such leave.

  4. [4] CA/SUM 27/2021 (“SUM 27”) is Lin’s application to adduce further evidence in respect of his appeal in CA 137.

  5. [6] We now give the detailed grounds for our decision.

  6. Facts and background

  7. [7] Lin is the Executive Director and Chairman of RTC. He owns 60% of RTC’s shares. Tung is the only other director of RTC and holds the remaining 40% of its shares. RTC did not take an active part in the Cross Applications.

  8. [9] On 11 October 2019, Lin withdrew his claims in OS 1446, leaving only Tung’s counterclaims. OS 1446 is stayed pending the outcome of HC/S 1048/2018 – a suit between Lin and Tung concerning the transfer of shares in RTC and its related companies, as well as certain sums owed between them in relation to RTC’s affairs.

  9. [10] A slew of related disputes subsequently arose between Tung and Lin, which resulted in a flurry of applications being filed in court. Unsurprisingly, the parties’ dispute in OS 1446 spawned a tangled procedural tapestry. Before laying out the chronology of these related disputes, it is helpful to provide a map of this tapestry.

  10. [11] In the course of OS 1446, Tung took issue with the fact that Lin’s then solicitors were also representing RTC in OS 1446. In her view, Lin was conflicted from appointing RTC’s lawyers and RTC had to be separately and independently represented by another set of lawyers in OS 1446. Tung thus engaged Nair & Co LLC (“N&C”) to act for RTC. In the face of Lin’s vehement objections to the same, Tung filed HC/SUM 4/2019 (“SUM 4”) seeking a declaration that only she was entitled to engage solicitors to act for and represent RTC in connection with OS 1446, and that N&C had been validly appointed.

  11. [14] In connection with this, Tung chose Joseph Tan Jude Benny LLP (“JTJB”) to act for RTC. From 11 March to 25 October 2019, Tung personally made payments totalling $458,125.16 to N&C and JTJB for their work done in, and in connection with, OS 1446 (ie, $66,531.70 to N&C and $391,593.46 to JTJB). According to Tung, she did so as she was concerned that Lin would withhold his approval for RTC to pay the fees. To prevent this from impacting the law firms, Tung paid them upfront and planned to seek reimbursement from RTC later. When Lin learned of Tung’s request for reimbursement, he wrote to RTC’s staff instructing them not to reimburse her. This is because he took the view that the fees were not fair or reasonable. On 11 February 2020, Lin wrote to Tung officially, in his capacity as the Executive Director and Chairman of RTC, informing her that the fees charged by N&C and JTJB were “unreasonable, disproportionate and/or exorbitant” and that it would be in RTC’s interests to tax their invoices. We refer, collectively, to the fees of N&C and JTJB as the “Lawyers’ Fees”.

  12. [15] On 16 March 2020, Lin filed HC/OS 320/2020 (“OS 320”) seeking leave under s 216A of the Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed) (“Companies Act”) to bring proceedings under RTC’s name for the taxation of the Lawyers’ Fees.

  13. [17] On 27 July 2020, the Judge released his ex tempore judgment in Lin Jianwei v Tung Yu-Lien Margaret and another and another matter [2020] SGHC 158 (“the First Judgment”) dismissing OS 320 and allowing SUM 1281. He held that:

  14. (a) Leave should not be granted under s 216A of the Companies Act in OS 320 as:

  15. (i) The evidence did not show that Lin was acting in good faith (see the First Judgment at [13]).

  16. (c) Lin did not take the position that he was not willing to pay the Lawyers’ Fees at all. Instead, his request was for the fees to be sent for taxation. As s 122 of the LPA precluded taxation, SUM 1281 was allowed and Tung was entitled to be reimbursed (see the First Judgment at [24]–[28]).

  17. [19] On 27 August 2020, Tung took out SUM 90 and SUM 91 to strike out CA 137 and CA 140, respectively. This was on the basis that Lin failed to obtain the requisite leave to appeal and was out of time to do so:

  18. (a) In SUM 90, Tung argued that leave to appeal was required for CA 137 because para 1(b) of the Fifth Schedule to the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed) (“SCJA”) provides that leave is required “where the only issue in the appeal relates to costs or fees for hearing dates”.

  19. For the avoidance of doubt, unless otherwise stated, the version of the SCJA that is applicable to the Cross Applications is the version immediately prior to 2 January 2021. We also refer to paras 1(b) and 1(h) of the Fifth Schedule to the SCJA as “para 1(b)” and “para 1(h)”, respectively.

  20. [20] On 11 September 2020, Lin filed SUM 3929 in OS 1446, seeking a declaration that no leave to appeal was required in respect of SUM 1281, or in the alternative, that Lin be granted an extension of time (“EOT”) to apply for leave to appeal against SUM 1281 and that the said leave be granted.

  21. [21] The Judge heard SUM 3929 on 5 October 2020 and gave his decision on 26 October 2020 in Lin Jianwei v Tung Yu-Lien Margaret and another [2020] SGHC 229 (“the Leave Judgment”). He held that:

  22. (a) Leave was required to appeal against the decision in SUM 1281 as this would be an appeal falling within para 1(b) (see the Leave Judgment at [22], [31]) and para 1(h) (see the Leave Judgment at [40]–[42]).

  23. (b) No EOT was granted to obtain leave to appeal. SUM 3929 was filed 46 calendar days after the decision in SUM 1281 (ie, a 36-day delay in seeking leave to appeal). Lin’s explanation for the delay (ie, that he honestly believed that leave to appeal was not required) was unsatisfactory and therefore rejected (see the Leave Judgment at [44], [49], [55] and [61]).

  24. (c) In any event, no leave to appeal would have been granted. There was no prima facie case of error, no question of general principle to be decided for the first time, nor any question of public importance (see the Leave Judgment at [64]–[92]).

  25. [23] Following the Judge’s decision in SUM 3929, Lin’s counsel made an oral application for leave to appeal against it. In dismissing this application, the Judge stated that:

  26. [24] Lin then filed OS 42 on 4 November 2020. Lin sought leave to appeal the Judge’s decision in the Leave Judgment to refuse to grant a declaration in SUM 3929 that Lin did not require leave to appeal against the Judge’s decision in respect of SUM 1281 in the First Judgment. In the alternative, Lin sought leave to appeal against the Judge’s decision in the First Judgment (including the requisite EOT to apply for leave).

  27. [25] On 8 March 2021, Lin filed SUM 27 for leave to adduce further evidence in respect of the substantive appeal in CA 137.

  28. [26] On 1 April 2021, we heard the parties on SUM 90, SUM 91, SUM 27 and OS 42.

  29. Issues to be determined

  30. [27] The following issues arose for our consideration in the Cross Applications:

  31. (a) SUM 90: Whether leave to appeal was necessary in respect of CA 137.

  32. (b) SUM 91: Whether leave to appeal was necessary in respect of CA 140.

  33. (c) OS 42: Whether leave to appeal against the Judge’s decision in the Leave Judgment ought to be granted.

  34. (d) SUM 27: Whether leave ought to be granted for Lin to adduce further evidence in respect of CA 137.

  35. [28] As we will explain below, OS 42 hinged on the outcome of SUM 91 as it engaged much of the same issues. Similarly, SUM 27 was contingent on Lin being allowed to continue with his putative appeal in CA 137 and thus depended entirely on the outcome of SUM 90.

  36. The parties’ submissions

  37. SUM 90

  38. (a) Whether Lin was acting in good faith.

  39. (b) Whether an application for taxation would prima facie be in the interests of RTC.

  40. SUM 91

  41. OS 42

  42. [38] Lin submitted that leave to appeal against the Judge’s decision in SUM 3929 should be granted for the following reasons:

  43. (a) There was a prima facie error of law in the Leave Judgment in relation to whether the interlocutory nature of an application can be determined with regard to its impact on a separate originating process (ie, the argument at [36] above). Lin argued that the Judge implicitly accepted that this was possible but erred in then refusing to apply this approach to Lin’s argument that SUM 1281 was not interlocutory as it would finally determine parties’ rights in OS 320. Lin also submitted that this was a question of general principle decided for the first time.

  44. (b) There were two other questions of general principle decided for the first time:

  45. (ii) Whether an appeal against an application under s 216A of the Companies Act relates to costs simply because the derivative action sought was one for taxation (see [37] above).

  46. (c) The foregoing three issues were also said to be questions of importance upon which the Court of Appeal’s decision would be advantageous.

  47. [39] In response, Tung relied essentially on the reasons she had advanced in SUM 91 to explain why the Judge had decided SUM 3929 correctly. She argued that SUM 3929 turned simply on the application of well-settled principles to the facts.

  48. [40] Lin submitted that if leave was required to appeal against SUM 1281, an EOT should be granted for seeking such leave, as the omission to obtain leave was due to a justified belief that no leave was required and an EOT would also cause no prejudice to Tung. Tung submitted that an EOT should not be granted as the delay was substantial and unjustified, and Lin’s chances of succeeding on appeal were hopeless.

  49. [41] Finally, Lin submitted that leave to appeal against SUM 1281 should be granted because:

  50. (a) There were prima facie errors of law in the decision:

  51. (ii) The Judge applied the wrong threshold for determining whether Lin litigated OS 320 and SUM 1281 in good faith.

  52. (iii) The Judge erred in applying s 122 of the LPA for the reasons raised in Questions A–C at (b) below.

  53. (b) There were four questions of general principle and/or importance:

  54. (i) Question A: Whether “payment” under s 122 of the LPA includes a situation where a director of a company makes personal payment of the company’s legal fees without express authority or the knowledge of the other director.

  55. (ii) Question B: Whether “special circumstances” under s 122 of the LPA include a situation where a director conceals the company’s legal bills from the other director.

  56. (iii) Question C: Whether “special circumstances” under s 122 of the LPA include a situation where the solicitors knew that their fees were paid personally by a company’s director.

  57. (iv) Question D: Where a director sues another director and the company and there is a counterclaim by the other director, whether there is any conflict of interest which would bar both directors from making decisions in relation to the representation of the company, such as whether to apply for taxation.

  58. [42] In response, Tung submitted that all of the matters identified by Lin involved applying the relevant law to the facts of the case, and were not questions of law, or questions of general principle or questions of importance. The question of whether OS 320 was commenced in good faith was also irrelevant to SUM 1281.

  59. Our decision

  60. SUM 90

  61. [44] To recapitulate, para 1(b) of the Fifth Schedule to the SCJA provides as follows:

  62. [45] Paragraph 1(b) is familiar territory which had been considered extensively in this court’s decision in Kosui, a case which concerned s 34(2)(b), an earlier iteration of the SCJA which is identical to para 1(b). There, the appellant, Kosui Singapore Pte Ltd (“Kosui”), applied to the High Court for leave to tax the solicitor’s bills of the respondent, Mr Thangavelu, pursuant to s 122 of the LPA as more than a year had passed since Kosui had paid Mr Thangavelu. After the High Court judge rejected Kosui’s application, Kosui filed an appeal. Mr Thangavelu subsequently applied to strike out Kosui’s Notice of Appeal on the ground that no leave had been obtained.

  63. [51] As we had pointed out to Mr Thuraisingam during the hearing, to view OS 320 in isolation from the rest of the procedural tapestry of the parties’ dispute would be tantamount to saying that Lin was seeking leave to commence a 216A derivative action for the sake of a derivative action. This was circular, senseless and, in fact, an abuse of process.

  64. [53] As for the question of whether special circumstances existed within the meaning of s 122 of the LPA, as well as Lin’s alternative position that s 122 of the LPA did not apply to CA 137, these issues did not arise as leave to appeal was not obtained in the first place.

  65. SUM 91

  66. [55] Two sub-issues arose for our consideration in SUM 91: whether leave to appeal was necessary pursuant to either para 1(h) or para 1(b) for CA 140. We answered both question in the affirmative.

  67. Whether SUM 1281 was an interlocutory application on which an interlocutory order was made

  68. [56] Paragraph 1(h) of the Fifth Schedule to the SCJA provides as follows:

  69. [58] As for the meaning of “interlocutory application”, the court held (at [26]) that:

  70. [59] The principle embodied in the first sentence quoted in the preceding paragraph was derived from this court’s earlier judgment in The “Nasco Gem” [2014] 2 SLR 63 (“The Nasco Gem”) at [16]:

  71. [60] The Nasco Gem is instructive as it makes clear that the focus is on the cause of the pending proceedings in which the application is being brought, and not the specific purpose of the application.

  72. [61] In our judgment, SUM 1281 was an interlocutory application which did not finally determine the parties’ rights in the cause of the pending proceedings in OS 1446.

  73. [63] Unsurprisingly, the outcome of SUM 1281 would not affect, let alone dispose of, the parties’ substantive rights in OS 1446. OS 1446 concerns only Tung’s counterclaim for orders and declarations that several notices of EGMs and the decisions taken at those EGMs, as well as several notices of board of directors’ meetings and the decisions taken at those meetings, were invalid and of no effect (see above at [8]). Whether or not Tung succeeded in obtaining reimbursement for the Lawyers’ Fees had no impact on the reliefs sought in OS 1446.

  74. [64] Lin’s submissions did not address the above point head on. Instead, he claimed that the focus on OS 1446 was “fallacious” given that the phrase “proceedings in which the application is being brought” might well refer to SUM 4 or OS 320, both of which he characterised as standalone applications. He submitted that SUM 1281 finally determined the parties’ rights in respect of those applications.

  75. [66] Lin acknowledged that SUM 4 “bears absolutely no relation to the ultimate issue to be determined in OS 1446”. He nonetheless sought to leverage on this to argue that because the issues to be ventilated in SUM 4 would not feature in the substantive hearing of OS 1446, SUM 4 was a “standalone application” which could easily have been presented to the court in the form of an originating summons – ie, a pending proceeding which was finally determined by the determination of SUM 1281.

  76. [67] This submission missed the point completely. The issue regarding the appointment of solicitors in SUM 4 was not brought before the court as an application that existed in and of itself. As a matter of logic, solicitors are appointed to represent a client in a dispute. It would be illogical to say that lawyers were appointed to represent parties in SUM 4 for the sole purpose of resolving a dispute on the appointment of lawyers for RTC without explaining the context in which lawyers were necessary for RTC (ie, OS 1446).

  77. [68] Second, we found it difficult to see how SUM 1281’s determination could have finally determined the parties’ rights in OS 320. While OS 320 was undoubtedly an originating process, it was not the originating process for SUM 1281.

  78. [69] Lin’s response was that the court should not take a “one-dimensional” view of the factual matrix in the Cross Applications and submitted that “where there are multiple originating processes, … what may be an interlocutory application in one may in fact have the effect of finally determining another originating process”. In his view, SUM 1281 and OS 320 were the classic example of this because “SUM 1281 is [so] intricately enmeshed with OS 320” that “whichever way [the Judge] decided in SUM 1281, it would inevitably finally determine the parties’ rights in OS 320”.

  79. Whether the only issue in CA 140 relates to costs

  80. [73] Our finding that it was necessary for Lin to obtain leave to appeal for CA 140 pursuant to para 1(h) was sufficient to dispose of SUM 91. Nonetheless, as Mr Tan confirmed before us that the main string in his bow in respect of SUM 91 was that his arguments “[we]re linked to [OS 320]”, ie, that leave to appeal was not necessary in respect of CA 140 as it did not engage para 1(b), we deal with para 1(b) in these grounds as well. This can be done briefly given that Mr Tan’s arguments on this point bore material similarities to Mr Thuraisingam’s arguments in SUM 90 (see above at [43]).

  81. (b) Second, CA 140 would involve issues relating to Tung’s misconduct and breaches of duties as a director of RTC.

  82. (c) Third, CA 140 would involve issues relating to whether Lin could invoke s 216A of the Companies Act to apply for the taxation of the Lawyers’ Fees on RTC’s behalf.

  83. Focusing on the last point, Lin argued that even though CA 140 was not an appeal against OS 320, the issues in OS 320 were still relevant to CA 140 because OS 320 was Lin’s defence to SUM 1281; if Lin were unable to pursue OS 320, it would be difficult for him to resist SUM 1281.

  84. [75] We refer to these three issues as “Anticipated Issues”.

  85. [80] In any event, if Lin was truly so concerned about what he perceived as Tung’s misconduct and breaches of fiduciary duties in respect of the Lawyers’ Fees, the proper course would have been for Lin to pursue an action in RTC’s name against Tung for breach of directors’ duties rather an action for taxation (see the Leave Judgment at [71], repeating an observation made by the Judge in the First Judgment at [20]). We go further to say that as Lin’s “position [was] that [Tung] had deliberately concealed [the Lawyers’ Fees], and only presented them to RTC long after she had already paid them”, an action for taxation would have been the most ineffectual and roundabout manner of vindicating this alleged wrong. It served only to further entangle the strands in the already messy tapestry of disputes between Lin and Tung.

  86. OS 42

  87. [81] During the hearing, we dismissed OS 42 on the basis that it engaged much of the same issues raised in SUM 91 and would necessarily fail in the light of our decision to allow SUM 91. Nonetheless, given that OS 42 was responsible for much of the procedural untidiness and legal complexity in the Cross Applications, we take some time to unravel its tangled threads.

  88. [83] To understand OS 42, it is necessary to have regard to the two main reliefs sought by Lin:

  89. [84] Prayer 1 of OS 42 was an application for leave to appeal against the Judge’s decision in SUM 3929 (as contained in the Leave Judgment), while Prayer 2 was an application for leave to appeal against the Judge’s decision in SUM 1281 (as contained in the First Judgment) including the requisite EOT to apply for leave to do so. Crucially, SUM 3929 was itself an application for a declaration that leave to appeal in respect of SUM 1281 was not necessary. OS 42 was thus an application to the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal against a decision of the Judge which concerned an application for leave to appeal against an earlier decision of the Judge.

  90. Whether leave ought to be granted for Lin to appeal against the Judge’s decision in SUM 3929

  91. [85] It is well settled that for leave to appeal to be granted, there must be:

  92. (a) a prima facie case of error;

  93. (b) a question of general principle decided for the first time; or

  94. (c) a question of importance upon which further argument and a decision of a higher tribunal would be to the public advantage

  95. (see Lee Kuan Yew v Tang Liang Hong and another [1997] 2 SLR(R) 862 at [16]).

  96. [86] In our view, there was no reason for this court to grant leave to Lin to appeal against the Judge’s decision in SUM 3929 (ie, Prayer 1 of OS 42). The Judge’s refusal to grant a declaration that Lin did not require leave to bring an appeal against the Judge’s decision in SUM 1281 (ie, that leave to appeal in respect of SUM 1281 is necessary) is entirely consistent with our decision on SUM 91 above. Further, any questions raised in the course of determining whether leave was required in respect of the Judge’s decision in SUM 1281 would already have been raised in the context of SUM 91, and as seen from our discussion of SUM 91 above, involved only the application of established principles regarding para 1(b) and para 1(h). There was thus no question of general principle or importance that warranted the grant of leave.

  97. Whether an EOT ought to be granted for Lin to apply for leave to appeal against the Judge’s decision in SUM 1281

  98. [87] As for whether Lin ought to be granted leave to appeal against the Judge’s decision in SUM 1281 (ie, Prayer 2 of OS 42), Lin must first cross the hurdle of obtaining an EOT to file for leave.

  99. [88] In our judgment, Lin was not entitled to any EOT. Lin filed SUM 3929 36 days after the deadline to do so. Lin’s sole explanation for the delay was that there was “a bona fide mistake borne out of complexity in applying the relevant legal principles to the present facts”. Lin also explained that he was apprehensive of taking out an application for a declaration that no leave to appeal was required (and had hence delayed in filing SUM 3929) as he had paid heed to the High Court’s admonishment in The “Xin Chang Shu” [2016] 3 SLR 1195 (“The Xin Chang Shu”) at [9] that an application for a declaration that leave to appeal is not required should only be made “if there is genuine uncertainty” [emphasis in original].

  100. [89] We were unable to accept this argument. A 36-day delay is not insubstantial, and in so far as Lin was arguing that his failure to file for leave was a “bona fide mistake” and hence an oversight on his part as well as of his solicitors, the law is clear that a mere assertion that that there has been an oversight is “obviously insufficient” to justify an EOT (see Lee Hsien Loong v Singapore Democratic Party and others and another suit [2008] 1 SLR(R) 757 at [22]).

  101. [90] Lin’s reference to The Xin Shu Chang in fact supported Tung’s case. If, the application of the relevant legal principles was of such complexity as Lin contended (see above at [88]), the appropriate course of action for Lin was to have expeditiously sought a declaration from the Judge that leave to appeal was not necessary, and not wait 36 days to do so. As explained by Steven Chong J (as he then was) at [9] of The Xin Chang Shu:

  102. [91] Having regard to Lin’s arguments across the tapestry of the Cross-Applications, it appeared to us that if Lin’s averments as to his apprehension in bringing an application for a declaration and his account of the facts in the lead up to SUM 3929 and OS 42 were to be taken at face-value and believed, this was a case involving “genuine uncertainty” as to whether leave to appeal was required.

  103. [92] First, in SUM 91, Lin sought to advance a position that SUM 1281 was not an interlocutory application within para 1(h) as SUM 1281 finally determined the parties’ rights in OS 320. To get around the fact that SUM 1281 had been filed in OS 1446 and not OS 320, Lin argued that it would be wrong to take a “one-dimensional” view of the factual matrix in the present case and focus only on OS 1446 as the entire tapestry was made up of multiple originating processes. Lin was unable to cite any authority for this proposition. In fact, he explicitly stated that the “[j]udgments dealing with [para 1(h)] do not deal with factual matrices such as ours”. In other words, Lin and/or his solicitors were aware that their success in arguing that leave to appeal was not necessary in respect of the Judge’s decision in SUM 1281 hinged on the court first accepting a novel proposition of law that was unsupported by the existing (and established) case law on para 1(h). There would thus have been clear uncertainty as to whether leave to appeal was required.

  104. [94] In the circumstances, if Lin had truly found that there was no uncertainty as “the present factual matrix strongly [militated] towards the conclusion that leave is not required to appeal from the [SUM 1281] Orders”, he should have applied for a declaration that leave to appeal was not required expeditiously (see The Xin Chang Shu at [9]). As the Judge eloquently put it (see the Leave Judgment at [55]):

  105. [95] Bearing the above in mind, we thus declined to grant Lin’s request for an EOT in Prayer 2 of OS 42. The delay was substantial and the reason put forth by Lin for delay was unsatisfactory.

  106. Whether leave to appeal ought to be granted to Lin

  107. [96] In any case, even if we were inclined to grant an EOT for Lin to seek leave to appeal, we would not have granted such leave.

  108. [98] The second prima facie error of law identified by Lin (see [41(a)(ii)] above) related to the Judge’s alleged finding that Lin’s conduct of both OS 320 and SUM 1281 lacked good faith. This was not a fair reflection of the Judge’s reasoning. The issue of good faith was only relevant to OS 320 since it is one of the statutory prerequisites under s 216A of the Companies Act, and it cannot therefore be said to be an error of law in relation to SUM 1281.

  109. [99] The third set of errors of law identified by Lin consisted in the questions under s 122 of the LPA which are also said to be questions of general principle being decided for the first time or questions of importance (see [41(a)(iii)] and [41(b)] above). However, these questions turn on the continued existence of OS 320, as issues under s 122 LPA can only remain relevant if the fees sought are to be taxed, and the only way taxation of the fees can be sought in the present case is if Lin obtains leave to commence a derivative action. OS 320 was, however, dismissed on a threshold question of fact – namely, the Judge’s finding that the evidence did not show that Lin was acting in good faith (see the First Judgment at [8]–[13]). There is currently no prospect of Lin being able to challenge this finding of fact given our decision to allow SUM 90. The questions with regard to s 122 of the LPA are thus academic and there is no reason to grant leave to pursue these questions.

  110. [100] We therefore found that there was no reason to grant Prayer 2 of OS 42.

  111. SUM 27

  112. [101] In SUM 27, Lin sought to adduce further evidence in respect of his substantive appeal in CA 137. This took the form of an affidavit by one Mr Teo Chee Seng dated 5 March 2021 and was meant to show that the Lawyers’ Fees were “indeed unreasonable and excessive” so as to bolster Lin’s case in CA 137.

  113. Our observations on OS 42 and SUM 3929

  114. [103] Having analysed and set out the entire procedural tapestry of Lin’s and Tung’s disputes therein, it was clear to us that OS 42 and SUM 3929 constituted egregious abuses of the process of this court.

  115. [104] OS 42 stemmed from SUM 3929 which appeared to us to be a backdoor method to circumvent and defeat Tung’s application in SUM 91 to strike out the Notice of Appeal in CA 140. SUM 3929 was filed on 11 September 2020, a mere 15 days after Tung filed SUM 91 and a day after Lin filed his affidavit (“Lin’s SUM 91 Affidavit”) in response to Tung’s account of facts in SUM 91. Pertinently, Lin’s SUM 91 Affidavit was almost identical to his supporting affidavit for SUM 3929 (“Lin’s SUM 3929 Affidavit”). This may have been explicable in respect of the common background facts leading to the parties’ disputes (see Lin’s SUM 3929 Affidavit and Lin’s SUM 91 Affidavit at paras 7–94, and in particular para 94(d) which even contains the same grammatical error). However, even the substantive sections of the affidavits, namely, the section titled “Circumstances leading to [SUM 3929]” in Lin’s SUM 3929 Affidavit at paras 95–99 and the section titled “[Tung’s] Application to strike out my Notice of Appeal filed in CA 140 is without merit” in Lin’s SUM 91 Affidavit at paras 95–101), were almost identical.

  116. [105] The fact that Lin sought leave at para 100 of his SUM 91 Affidavit to refer to the matters referred to therein for the purposes of SUM 3929 buttressed our point above. This is because it demonstrated that SUM 3929 was filed with SUM 91 in mind since, in Lin’s view, the facts which grounded his counterarguments against Tung in SUM 91 could simply be ported over to SUM 3929. While there is authority that a party is entitled to (and in fact, encouraged to) seek a declaration that leave is not required in a particular matter (see The Xin Chang Shu at [9]), “[s]uch an application should only be made if there is genuine uncertainty” [emphasis in original] and should be made expeditiously. It is not meant as a procedural weapon to stymie an opposing party’s striking out application in a bid to ex-post facto remedy one’s own mistake in failing to seek leave to appeal. SUM 3929 was thus an abuse of process of court.

  117. [106] OS 42 was couched as an application for leave to appeal against a first instance decision of the Judge on a summons in line with the two-tier system for obtaining leave to appeal under s 34(2) of the SCJA. However, as we have made clear above, OS 42 was, in substance and in effect, an application for leave to appeal against a leave to appeal decision (see above at [82]) with the ultimate aim of circumventing or regularising the jurisdictional deficit in CA 140. As a result of this, most of the issues raised in OS 42 had already been dealt with in SUM 91 and were essentially being relitigated in OS 42. This being the case, OS 42 amounted to a blatant attempt to bring an appeal against a decision of the Judge not to grant leave to appeal. This was akin to the abuse of process contemplated in The Xin Chang Shu at [49]:

  118. As we had pointed out to the parties during the hearing, the laws of civil procedure are intended to ensure the smoothness of proceedings and to facilitate efficient case management rather than to obfuscate matters. Lin’s misuse of the court’s processes have led to the opposite outcome as it has generated a garbled mess of tangled proceedings for matters which simply relate to costs. SUM 3929 and OS 42 were thus entirely ill-advised.

  119. Conclusion