Court of Appeal · Decided 30 November 2023
Lum Ooi Lin v Hyflux Ltd (in compulsory liquidation) and others
Feedback & support[2023] SGCA 43 · Case no. Court of Appeal / Civil Appeal No 30 of 2023 · 21 paragraphs
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Introduction
Background facts
- [3]
[3] The appellant is Ms Lum Ooi Lin (“Ms Lum”). The respondents in this appeal are three companies – Hyflux Ltd, Hydrochem (S) Pte Ltd and Tuaspring Pte Ltd – and the joint and several liquidators of Hyflux Ltd and Hydrochem (S) Pte Ltd, Mr Cosimo Borrelli and Mr Patrick Bance.
- [5]
[5] On 14 February 2023, SAR Ng made the following orders:
- [8]
[8] On 28 June 2023, Ms Lum filed an appeal against the whole of the decision in RA 42 in AD/CA 64/2023 (“AD 64”). On 25 August 2023, AD 64 was transferred to the Court of Appeal on the Court of Appeal’s own motion pursuant to s 29D(1)(a) read with s 29D(2)(a) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (2020 Rev Ed) (“SCJA 1969”). AD 64 was renumbered as CA 30.
- [9]
[9] Ms Lum is represented by Davinder Singh Chambers LLC (“DSC”) while the respondents are represented by Tan Kok Quan Partnership (“TKQP”).
The decision below
- [11]
[11] For simplicity, the Judge synthesised the four principles into two principles to adopt as the legal framework governing the court’s exercise of discretion when determining the adequacy of the form of security that is offered. We refer to the synthesised principles as the “Mode Principles”. They are (RA 42 Judgment at [12]):
(c) Third, there was little to no risk of the Omni Related Companies not honouring the Omni Undertaking due to the substantial reputational damage they would suffer in not doing so.
(d) Fourth, Ms Lum would be able to enforce the Omni Undertaking easily, as she would have immediate recourse against Omni Bridgeway (Singapore) Pte Ltd which is based in Singapore. Even if she had to bring proceedings against Omni Bridgeway Limited in Australia, Singapore judgments can be enforced in Australia with relative ease and the Omni Undertaking provided that Omni Bridgeway Limited would not seek to set aside any Australian court judgment or seek security for costs in any proceedings by Ms Lum to enforce the Omni Undertaking there.
(e) Finally, the Omni Undertaking also required the Omni Related Companies to notify Ms Lum if the litigation funding agreement was terminated and to meet any adverse costs orders made during the term of the funding agreement up to parties’ agreed quantum for the security for costs.
- [13]
[13] The Judge therefore allowed the respondents’ appeal in RA 42 (RA 42 Judgment at [50]).
Preliminary issue of the scope of the appeal
- [15]
[15] We will deal with the scope of the permission to appeal and the further question as to whether a party’s arguments on appeal may exceed the scope of the questions framed by the Appellate Division granting permission to appeal in two parts:
Construction of the Appellate Division’s order
Possibility of this court granting permission to raise issues outside the scope of the Appellate Division’s order
- [21]
[21] However, having regard to the conclusions reached earlier, it is not necessary to address this related question and this court’s jurisdiction. In any case, DSC has not explained why this court should go beyond the Appellate Division’s limitation of the questions on appeal by adding a further issue/question, namely whether the law was correctly applied. We say no more on this matter.
Principles guiding the court’s exercise of discretion to determine the form of SFC
- [25]
[25] We now elaborate on the court’s discretion under the Rules of Court and discuss in detail the parties’ submissions on the Mode Principles.
The court’s wide discretion to determine the form of SFC
- [27]
[27] For completeness, we note that in the ROC 2021, O 9 r 12(1) provides that:
- [28]
[28] It should also be noted that under O 9 r 12(3), it is permissible for defendants to apply for SFC from non-party litigation funders.
- [29]
[29] Pertinently, O 9 r 12(1) of the ROC 2021 does not expressly provide for any specific form in which security is to be provided (see Singapore Rules of Court: A Practice Guide (Chua Lee Ming and Paul Quan eds, 2023) at para 09.034). In our view, the court’s discretion to determine the form of SFC under the present ROC 2021 remains as wide as it was under O 23 r 2 of the ROC 2014.
How the court’s discretion should be exercised
Parties’ submissions
Conventional modes of security should not be favoured
- [35]
[35] In our view, DSC’s proposed approach is incorrect. We do not agree with DSC’s emphasis on conventional modes of SFC as the default starting point such that other forms of SFC should be regarded as exceptions to them.
- [37]
[37] Further, the cases which DSC has relied on in support of Ms Lum’s position that conventional modes of security should be the starting point do not actually assist nor validate that approach. DSC has relied primarily on the cases of Infinity Distribution Ltd (in administration) v The Khan Partnership LLP [2021] EWCA Civ 565 (“Infinity”); In the matter of Pioneer Energy Holdings Pty Limited [2013] NSWSC 1366 (“Pioneer”); and Nylex Corporation Pty Ltd v Basell Australia Pty Ltd [2009] VSC 97 (“Nylex”).
- [39]
[39] As such, we do not see any basis for prioritising conventional modes of security over alternative forms.
The Mode Principles
- [40]
[40] In light of our conclusion that there are no default forms of SFC, there is no real basis for Ms Lum’s call for the Judge’s synthesis of principles from DIF III to be rejected. DSC submits that its reading of English and Australian cases supports Ms Lum’s position (see below at [41]–[43]) and that DIF III is an outlier. We disagree. Contrary to DSC’s view, Australian and English jurisprudence is actually aligned with DIF III in saying that any proposed security, regardless of form, should be considered by way of an evidential assessment of the facts and circumstances of the case. We explain below.
- [41]
[41] The principles in DIF III have been expressly endorsed in Australian cases, including where SFC was sought to be provided in the form of undertakings by a litigation funder (see especially Iddles & Anor v Fonterra Australia Pty Ltd & Ors [2021] VSC 609 (“Iddles”) at [25]–[26], where the court allowed SFC to be furnished by way of an undertaking by the plaintiff’s litigation funder coupled with a payment into court for the purposes of enforcement if needed; see also Trailer Trash Franchise Systems Pty Ltd and Dale Cooney v GM Fascia & Gutter Pty Ltd [2017] VSCA 293 (“Trailer Trash”) at [57]; Re Tiaro Coal Ltd (in liq) [2018] NSWSC 746 at [22] and [49]).
- [42]
[42] Moreover, we agree with the Judge’s observations (at [14], [16] and [29]–[30] of the RA 42 Judgment) that English law does not differentiate between conventional and non-conventional modes of SFC when it comes to the determination of whether a certain form of SFC should be allowed. In coming to this view, the Judge considered the authorities discussed in DSC’s written submissions (namely, Rosengrens Ltd v Safe Deposit Centres Ltd [1984] 1 WLR 1334 (EWCA); Versloot Dredging BV v HDI Gerling Industrie Vesicherung AG [2013] EWHC 658 (Comm) at [10]–[15]). The Judge said that these cases stand for the proposition that the court will not insist on a fixed form of SFC and that the central consideration is whether the security is “adequate”. We agree with his analysis.
- [43]
[43] DSC also argues that the cases of Trailer Trash and AP (UK) Ltd v West Midlands Fire and Civil Defence Authority [2001] EWCA Civ 1917 (“AP (UK)”) support the proposition that DIF III should be treated with caution given the risk of satellite litigation arising from the form of security proposed. The end point of DSC’s argument is that the party furnishing security must first explain why one of the conventional modes is prejudicial, as ordering one of the conventional modes would mitigate the risk of satellite litigation. However, we agree with the Judge that while the risk of satellite litigation is a factor that the court should take into account, it does not necessarily follow that all non-conventional modes of security would increase the risk of satellite litigation (RA 42 Judgment at [25]). Further, as the Judge highlighted (at [26] of the RA 42 Judgment), the fact that it is generally easier to satisfy the court that a liquid form of security is adequate due to its “inherent advantages or historical usage” does not mean that non-conventional modes of security can never be adequate. The adequacy of any form of security is necessarily case-specific.
- [45]
[45] Finally, although the Mode Principles guide the court in the exercise of its discretion, it is important to consider each case on its facts. Whether the form of security offered is acceptable and adequate is a fact-sensitive matter. The consideration of whether a party is unable to or would be disadvantaged if required to put up conventional modes of SFC is only one of the various factual circumstances that the court will take into consideration when determining the adequacy of the proffered security.
- [46]
[46] In this regard, we also affirm the Judge’s interpretation of the case of Global Finance Group Pty Ltd (in liq) v Marsden Partners (a firm) [2004] WASC 52 (“Global Finance”), which was relied on by DSC both below and in the present appeal to suggest that undertakings by litigation funders should be subject to especial scrutiny. The Judge found that each case would turn on its particular facts and that Global Finance did not stand for any broader principle beyond that SFC in the form of a funder’s undertaking was inadequate on the particular facts of that case (RA 42 Judgment at [36]).
Conclusion