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Grounds publishedDecided 27 Mar 2024

Court of Appeal

Foo Kian Beng v OP3 International Pte Ltd (in liquidation)

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[2024] SGCA 10Case no. Court of Appeal / Civil Appeal No 47 of 2022

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Grounds of decision

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] A company, being an inanimate legal person, acts through its agents. The board of directors is typically the directing mind of a company. However, this can give rise to difficulties where the personal interest of a director is not aligned with the interests of the company as a whole, which would reflect the interests of others, including the shareholders who hold the primary economic interest in the company, and even those of other stakeholders such as creditors and employees. To address this, the law imposes on directors a fiduciary duty to always act in the best interests of the company. As a result, even though the separation between the “ownership” and “management” of the company’s assets creates the risk that directors may pursue their private interests at the expense of the company, the directors are always obliged to take corporate decisions with the best interests of the company in mind.

  3. [2] How then are the best interests of a company to be understood? The evaluation of a company’s best interests does not admit of a single and unchanging answer. When a company is financially healthy, the interests of creditors are, in the usual course, sufficiently protected, and directors may be entitled to treat the interests of shareholders as a sufficient proxy for those of the company. On the other hand, the interests of the creditors will come to the fore when the company is insolvent because, at that point, the directors are effectively trading and running the company’s business with the creditors’ money (see Liquidators of Progen Engineering Pte Ltd v Progen Holdings Ltd [2010] 4 SLR 1089 (“Progen”) at [52]). Any outflows at that point eat into the estate that is available to meet the claims of the creditors. As the present appeal demonstrates, the difficulty lies in delineating the point in time at which the interests of creditors should assume significance and even pre-eminence in the mind of the directors. The UK Supreme Court recently set forth its views on this issue in BTI 2014 LLC v Sequana SA and others [2022] UKSC 25 (“Sequana”). We have the opportunity to do the same in this appeal.

  4. [3] Alongside this principal issue, several other legal and evidential issues arise before us. In the main, they concern the liability of the appellant, Mr Foo Kian Beng (“Mr Foo”), the sole director and shareholder of the respondent company, OP3 International Pte Ltd (“OP3”), for authorising the payment of a dividend and the repayment of a loan to himself at a time when the company was facing a suit arising from the defective design and construction of a drainage system at one of its clients’ premises. In OP3 International Pte Ltd (in liquidation) v Foo Kian Beng [2022] SGHC 225 (“Judgment”), the company was found by the High Court judge (“Judge”) to be in a financially parlous state at the time of the payments to Mr Foo. The Judge found that Mr Foo was obliged in these circumstances to consider the interests of OP3’s creditors as part of his fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the company at the time he authorised those payments to himself, and that he breached that duty because there was no legitimate reason for him to have paid himself in preference to the claims of other creditors. Dissatisfied, Mr Foo appeals against the Judge’s findings.

  5. [4] Having considered the parties’ submissions, we dismiss the appeal. We now provide our reasons and begin by recounting the salient facts. In this judgment, for convenience, we refer to the director’s duty to consider the interests of creditors in certain circumstances as the “Creditor Duty” even though it is an integral part of his duty to act in the best interests of the company. We stress that there is, strictly speaking, no distinct duty that directors owe to creditors or any duty separate from the directors’ fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the company (see Progen at [52]).

  6. Background

  7. The parties

  8. [5] The appellant, Mr Foo, was at all material times the sole director and shareholder of OP3.

  9. Suit 498

  10. [7] Suit 498 arose from a contract OP3 entered into with Smile Inc Dental Surgeons Pte Ltd (“Smile Inc”) on 19 July 2013 to provide fitting out works at one of Smile Inc’s clinics (“Clinic”) in consideration for the sum of $158,010 (“Contract”). Under the terms of the Contract, Smile Inc was obliged to pay 50% of the said sum to OP3 upon execution of the Contract, with the balance payable upon completion of the works (“Balance Sum”). The date of completion was contractually agreed to be 11 September 2013 (see Smile Inc Dental Surgeons Pte Ltd v OP3 International Pte Ltd [2017] SGHC 246 (“Smile Inc Dental Surgeons”) at [30]).

  11. [8] OP3 completed the fitting out works on or about 31 October 2013 and handed the Clinic over to Smile Inc on the same date (Smile Inc Dental Surgeons at [31]–[32]). This was more than a month after the contractual date of completion.

  12. [9] A few months later, on 9 January 2014, Smile Inc discovered mould growing on the walls of the Clinic (Smile Inc Dental Surgeons at [43]). After conducting further investigations, on 17 January 2024, Smile Inc discovered that the mould was the result of a flood in the Clinic (“First Flood”) and, on the same day, notified OP3 of it. Smile Inc believed that the First Flood was caused by OP3’s defective fitting out works.

  13. [10] Upon learning of the First Flood, OP3 undertook rectification works at the Clinic. OP3 assessed that water from the Clinic’s sinks and spittoons was not draining properly and that, as a result, the flooding occurred at the Clinic’s drainage sump area. OP3 therefore installed a panel near the drainage sump area to enable the staff of Smile Inc to access the area and clear any debris that might have accumulated there, as the debris was thought to contribute to the risk of flooding. OP3 separately engaged a contractor to check for any leakages from the sump and water pipes at the Clinic, and tests conducted on 20 and 21 February 2014 revealed that there were no such leaks. OP3 handed the Clinic back to Smile Inc on 8 March 2014 (Smile Inc Dental Surgeons at [44]).

  14. [11] On 21 July 2014, Smile Inc discovered mould growth on the walls of the Clinic for the second time (Smile Inc Dental Surgeons at [45]). This followed a second flood (“Second Flood”) in the Clinic which again originated at the Clinic’s drainage sump area. Ms Grace Chong (“Ms Chong”), Smile Inc’s Managing Director, notified Mr Foo of the Second Flood on 22 July 2014.

  15. [12] On 23 July 2014, Mr Foo visited the Clinic to investigate the circumstances surrounding the Second Flood. There was little evidence of the nature and extent of the investigations that he claimed to have carried out that day. We return to the significance of this point later (see [141] below). What is clear is that Smile Inc did not permit OP3 to carry out further rectification works, and engaged a third party to resolve its water leakage issues associated with the Second Flood. Mr Foo, however, did engage a second contractor, AXN Engineering Pte Ltd, to conduct further hydrostatic tests on the Clinic’s water pipes on 28 and 29 August 2014, and these tests again affirmed that there were no leaks in these pipes.

  16. [14] Smile Inc subsequently commenced Suit 498 against OP3, alleging, among other things, that OP3’s failure to exercise a reasonable standard of care, skill, and diligence in designing and executing the fitting out works had caused it to suffer damages in the sum of $1,807,626. It served the writ of summons and statement of claim on OP3 on 25 May 2015.

  17. [15] OP3 was represented by Mr Vijai Parwani (“Mr Parwani”) of Parwani Law LLC (“Parwani Law”) in Suit 498. Of relevance to the present appeal is the fact that Mr Parwani had advised Mr Foo by an e-mail dated 15 December 2015 that OP3 had a strong defence to Smile Inc’s claim in Suit 498 (“Parwani’s E-mail”). This advice, however, significantly predated the trial of Suit 498 which commenced on 31 January 2017, and it was bereft of details.

  18. [16] In its defence, OP3 pleaded that its delay in completing the fitting out works was caused by Smile Inc having made multiple revisions to the design drawings. It also claimed that flooding had occurred at the Clinic through no fault of its own. Rather, the Clinic’s operations generated debris which clogged the floor grating covering the drainage pipe for water to be discharged out of the Clinic. It further claimed that Smile Inc failed to carry out regular maintenance of the floor grating even after OP3 specifically installed an access panel allowing Smile Inc to do so after the First Flood (Smile Inc Dental Surgeons at [13]).

  19. [17] To bolster its defence, OP3 engaged an independent expert, Mr Chee Yan Pong (“Mr Chee”), on 22 March 2016 to provide his opinion as to the cause of the First and Second Floods. Mr Chee prepared a report dated 21 September 2016 (“Mr Chee’s Report”) setting out his views on this issue. We deal with the relevant strands of his evidence where appropriate.

  20. [18] On 5 October 2017, Chan Seng Onn J (as he then was) rendered his decision on liability in Suit 498 (see Smile Inc Dental Surgeons). His findings were as follows:

  21. (a) OP3 was late in completing the fitting out works and bore the responsibility for this delay. Whereas the Contract required OP3 to complete the fitting out works by 11 September 2013, OP3 only handed the Clinic over to Smile Inc on 31 October 2013. Even then, there were still some 36 incomplete and outstanding items of work (Smile Inc Dental Surgeons at [30]–[31]). This delay could not be attributed to Smile Inc having earlier revised certain design drawings (Smile Inc Dental Surgeons at [36]–[41]).

  22. (b) OP3’s fitting out works were defective and this was the principal cause of the First and Second Floods. Pertinently, OP3 positioned the discharge outlets of nine wastewater discharge pipes above a floor grating. By so doing, it turned the floor grating into a sieve for the wastewater, prevented dirt contained in the water from being discharged, and this clogged the floor grating (Smile Inc Dental Surgeons at [100]–[101]). Additionally, OP3 designed and constructed a raised area contained by a bund, where the outlets of the discharge pipes terminated above the floor grating, such that any water that accumulated outside the raised bund could not flow back into the bunded area to be drained away. This design conduced to frequent clogging and flooding, electrical outages, and mould growth (Smile Inc Dental Surgeons at [110]–[111]).

  23. (c) OP3 successfully proved its counterclaims for payment in respect of certain variation works it had performed pursuant to the Contract and for payment of the Balance Sum (Smile Inc Dental Surgeons at [131]–[157]).

  24. [19] Chan J rendered his decision on damages on 11 November 2019. Accounting for OP3’s successful counterclaims, Chan J found OP3 liable to Smile Inc for the sum of $534,189.19 (Smile Inc Dental Surgeons Pte Ltd v OP3 International Pte Ltd [2020] 3 SLR 1234 at [122]). OP3 did not appeal against Chan J’s decision in Suit 498.

  25. Dividends and other payments paid by OP3 to Mr Foo between 2015 and 2017

  26. [20] Between 2015 and 2017, and whilst Suit 498 was ongoing, Mr Foo caused OP3 to pay him dividends and repay him loans that he had earlier extended to the company. The details of these transactions, which we collectively refer to as the “Payments”, are set out in the table below:

  27. Declaration and payment of dividends to Mr Foo

  28. S/N

  29. Date of the director’s resolution authorising the payment of the dividend

  30. Date the dividend was paid to Mr Foo

  31. Amount ($)

  32. 1

  33. [10] December 2015

  34. [11] December 2015

  35. 1,200,000

  36. 2

  37. [10] December 2015

  38. [11] December 2015

  39. 700,000

  40. 3

  41. [8] July 2016

  42. [13] July 2016

  43. 400,000

  44. 4

  45. [27] December 2016

  46. Disputed

  47. 500,000

  48. Subtotal

  49. 2,800,000

  50. Repayment of moneys Mr Foo had earlier loaned to OP3

  51. S/N

  52. Date of payment

  53. Amount ($)

  54. 5

  55. [11] December 2015

  56. 138,352

  57. 6

  58. 2017

  59. 682,394

  60. Subtotal

  61. 820,746

  62. Total

  63. 3,620,746

  64. [21] It is undisputed that OP3 paid Mr Foo dividends of $400,000 (S/N 3 in the table above) (“July 2016 Dividend”) on 13 July 2016, but this transaction was erroneously recorded in OP3’s financial statement for the year ending 31 December 2015. Pausing here, we observe that Mr Foo relies on this error to support his claim that the dividends of $500,000 OP3 recorded as having been paid to Mr Foo on 27 December 2016 (S/N 4 in the table above) (“Disputed Dividend”) was, in fact, only paid to him as part of the sum of $682,394 he received from OP3 in 2017 (S/N 6 in the table above) (“Disputed Payment”). Where appropriate, we refer to the Disputed Dividend and the Disputed Payment collectively as the “Disputed Transactions”.

  65. [22] We also highlight here Mr Foo’s claim to have verified with Mr Wong King Kheng (“Mr Wong”), an auditor OP3 previously engaged to prepare its financial accounts, that it was permissible for Mr Foo to make the Payments before he did so.

  66. OP3’s subsequent liquidation

  67. Suit 152

  68. [24] On 10 February 2021, OP3’s liquidator commenced HC/S 152/2021 (“Suit 152”), an action in OP3’s name against Mr Foo.

  69. OP3’s claim

  70. [25] By Suit 152, OP3 sought to recover sums equivalent to the Payments from Mr Foo on the principal basis that in authorising these Payments to himself, Mr Foo acted in breach of his director’s duty to act in the best interests of the company under the common law and/or his duty to act honestly under s 157(1) of the Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed) (“CA”). Whilst OP3’s claims in this regard were premised on both the director’s common law duty to act in good faith in the best interests of the company and s 157(1) of the CA, we observe that nothing turns on this distinction as the duty under s 157(1) of the CA to “act honestly” enshrines in statute the director’s common law duty that we have described (see BIT Baltic Investment & Trading Pte Ltd (in compulsory liquidation) v Wee See Boon [2023] 1 SLR 1648 at [35], citing Ho Yew Kong v Sakae Holdings Ltd and other appeals and other matters [2018] 2 SLR 333 (“Ho Yew Kong”) at [134]).

  71. [26] Central to OP3’s case in Suit 152 was its claim that a director is under a duty to consider the interests of the creditors as part of his duty to act in the best interests of the company at a time when the company is “financially parlous”. Further, OP3 contended that this describes a state of affairs that is less dire than being on “the verge of insolvency”.

  72. [27] OP3 further alleged that it was insolvent or, at the very least, in a financially parlous position (as it understood the term) at the time Mr Foo authorised the Payments for the following reasons:

  73. (a) Suit 498 gave rise to a contingent liability that was reasonably likely to materialise from the date of the First Flood. Judged objectively, OP3 was late in completing the fitting out works at the Clinic and its defective design of the works was also the root cause of the First Flood.

  74. (b) This contingent liability ought to have been contemporaneously valued at either $1,542,206 or $534,189. OP3 derived the first figure from the sum Smile Inc sought in its statement of claim in Suit 498 ($1,807,626), and by subtracting from this a sum of $265,420 pertaining to a claim for loss of management time and effort that Smile Inc conceded was weak. As for the latter figure ($534,189), this was the quantum of damages Chan J eventually awarded to Smile Inc on 11 November 2019, rounded to the nearest dollar (see [19] above). If even the lower quantum of contingent liability had been accounted for, this would have rendered OP3 cash flow insolvent as at 31 December 2015, close to balance sheet insolvent in 2015, and balance sheet insolvent in 2016 and 2017.

  75. [28] In the circumstances, it was said that Mr Foo was obliged to consider the interests of creditors as part of his duty as a director to act in the best interests of the company when he authorised the Payments. However, he failed to do so and by authorising the Payments to himself, he breached that duty, and specifically its subset, the Creditor Duty.

  76. Mr Foo’s defence

  77. [29] Mr Foo disagreed with OP3’s characterisation of the point in time at which the Creditor Duty is first engaged. To Mr Foo, a director is only obliged to consider the interests of creditors as part of his fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the company when the company is in fact insolvent or, at least, is on the verge of insolvency, and these are financial states that are more dire than when a company may be said to be in a financially parlous position.

  78. [30] On this basis, Mr Foo submitted that OP3 was neither insolvent nor on the verge of insolvency when he authorised the Payments. Apart from the fact that OP3 was balance sheet and cash flow solvent as at 31 December 2015, Mr Foo claimed that OP3’s contingent liability in Suit 498 need not have been accounted for as this liability was not one that, at least as far as Mr Foo was concerned at the material time, was reasonably likely to materialise. This was so for the following reasons:

  79. (a) Mr Foo genuinely believed that OP3 had a strong defence to Smile Inc’s claim in Suit 498 in light of Parwani’s E-mail. Indeed, to underscore the probative value of Parwani’s E-mail, Mr Foo adduced, in Suit 152, a letter from Mr Parwani dated 20 January 2022 (“Parwani’s Letter”) stating that he had advised Mr Foo on 22 August 2014 and 25 May 2015 that Smile Inc’s claim in Suit 498 was unmeritorious. We observe, however, that Mr Parwani did not testify in support of Mr Foo in Suit 498 and shall return to this point later.

  80. (b) Mr Foo considered that the First Flood had arisen from Smile Inc’s failure to clear the drainage sump area of debris. In the wake of the First Flood, OP3 had installed an access panel which would have enabled Smile Inc to do so and had also impressed upon Smile Inc the importance of regular maintenance of its drainage system (see [10] above).

  81. (c) OP3 conducted two sets of hydrostatic tests which confirmed that there were no defects in the drainage pipes OP3 installed at the Clinic (see [10] and [12] above).

  82. (d) Before making the Payments to himself, Mr Foo confirmed with Mr Wong that it was proper for him to do so (see [22] above).

  83. [31] Mr Foo accordingly contended that there was no basis for him as a director to account for OP3’s contingent liability in Suit 498 when assessing the company’s solvency at the time the Payments were made to him. Further, on the basis of his claim that the Disputed Dividend had been paid as part of and was included in the Disputed Payment, and was not a separate payment, Mr Foo argued that OP3 was solvent at the material time, and he was thus under no duty to consider the interests of creditors when he authorised the Payments to himself.

  84. [32] As a fallback, Mr Foo submitted that even if he were obliged to consider the interests of creditors in authorising the Payments, he had complied with this duty by obtaining legal advice from Parwani Law, consulting Mr Wong on the propriety of paying dividends to himself, engaging third parties to conduct the water pressure tests at the Clinic, and retaining substantial amounts of money in OP3 before declaring and paying the dividends to himself.

  85. [33] Finally, in the further alternative, Mr Foo submitted that if he had breached the Creditor Duty, he had acted honestly and reasonably and ought therefore to be absolved of liability under s 391 of the CA.

  86. The Judge’s decision

  87. [34] The Judge found in favour of OP3 that the Creditor Duty is first engaged when a company is “financially parlous” and that this is a state of affairs less severe than being “on the verge of insolvency” (Judgment at [28]). In her view, various strands of reasoning in Progen, Parakou Investment Holdings Pte Ltd and another v Parakou Shipping Pte Ltd (in liquidation) and other appeals [2018] 1 SLR 271 (“Parakou Shipping (CA)”), and Diablo Fortune Inc v Duncan, Cameron Lindsay and another [2018] 2 SLR 129 affirmed the relevance and materiality of the Creditor Duty once a company is in a “financially parlous” state and these further suggested that there was clear water between the meaning of the terms “parlous financial position” and the “verge of insolvency” (Judgment at [29]–[30]).

  88. [35] Notwithstanding this, the Judge observed that the two terms were ultimately “of limited utility in shedding light on when the [Creditor Duty arises]”. She considered it more instructive to engage in a broad and practical assessment of the financial health of the company to determine whether the Creditor Duty had arisen and the extent to which a director was obliged to consider the interests of creditors, in line with this court’s analysis of the issue in Dynasty Line Ltd (in liquidation) v Sukamto Sia [2014] 3 SLR 277 (“Dynasty Line”) (Judgment at [33]–[34]).

  89. [36] On the facts of the case, the Judge found that OP3’s potential liability in Suit 498 was reasonably likely to materialise when Smile Inc served the statement of claim on OP3 on 25 May 2015. Based on the facts and circumstances known to Mr Foo at this date, he could not reasonably have believed that OP3 would not face any liability in Suit 498. Pertinently, whilst Mr Foo claimed that the First Flood was caused by Smile Inc’s failure to clear the drainage sump area of debris, he knew at all times that Smile Inc was unable to do so because OP3 had overlooked the need to install an access panel at the Clinic (Judgment at [55]). Mr Foo also conceded that he did not know for certain what the root cause of the Second Flood was (Judgment at [56]).

  90. [37] In the Judge’s view, the legal advice that Parwani Law provided Mr Foo on the merits of Smile Inc’s claim in Suit 498 did not take Mr Foo very far. Parwani’s Letter was inadmissible hearsay (see [30(a)] above). Parwani’s E-mail was admittedly sent to Mr Foo in 2015 but shed no light on the context in which Mr Parwani had advised Mr Foo that OP3 had a strong defence to Smile Inc’s claim. Nor was it clear what the basis was for concluding that OP3 had a strong defence to the claim. In the circumstances, there was little to suggest that Mr Foo was justified in relying on the legal advice he received from Parwani Law (Judgment at [67], [75]).

  91. [38] The Judge also considered but declined to attribute weight to Mr Chee’s Report and Mr Wong’s advice. Mr Chee’s Report pertained to the merits of Suit 498, rather than to the propriety of Mr Foo authorising the Payments to himself in the face of the said suit. As for Mr Wong’s advice, this was premised on the erroneous assumption that there was no need for Mr Foo to have made any provision for OP3’s potential liability in Suit 498 in OP3’s accounts. Furthermore, Mr Wong was not then engaged by OP3 as its auditor and had been consulted by Mr Foo on an informal basis (Judgment at [117]).

  92. [39] The Judge next held that the value to be ascribed to Suit 498 as a contingent liability ranged between $441,000 and $514,500 (Judgment at [89]). She derived these figures by starting with the full sum Smile Inc sought in Suit 498 ($1,807,626) and deducting $265,420 (representing Smile Inc’s claim for loss of management time and effort that Smile Inc accepted was without basis) as well as the Balance Sum from this full sum (Judgment at [85]). This resulted in a figure of $1,470,000. The Judge then considered it reasonable for Mr Foo to have applied a discount of between 60% and 65% to the working sum of $1,470,000 on account of the legal advice he received, and a further discount of about 5% in view of Smile Inc having inflated the sum it claimed from OP3 in its statement of claim compared with its letter of demand (see [13]–[14] above) (Judgment at [86]–[87]).

  93. [40] The Judge found that accounting for this quantum of contingent liability would not have caused OP3 to be insolvent or in a financially parlous state as at 31 December 2015 (Judgment at [93]–[99]). There was also insufficient evidence to show that OP3 was insolvent or in a financially parlous state in July 2016 when it paid Mr Foo the July 2016 Dividend (Judgment at [104]–[105]). The Judge therefore held that the Creditor Duty had not been engaged at these times, and there was nothing objectionable in OP3 paying Mr Foo the sums it paid him in 2015 or the July 2016 Dividend (Judgment at [114]–[115], [119]).

  94. [41] That said, OP3’s contingent liability to Smile Inc in Suit 498 rendered it balance sheet insolvent as at 31 December 2016 and 31 December 2017, such that Mr Foo was obliged to consider the interests of creditors in making decisions for OP3 at these times (Judgment at [100]–[105]). The Judge found that Mr Foo failed to do so, in breach of the Creditor Duty, when he authorised the payment of the Disputed Dividend and Disputed Payment – which were distinct transactions (Judgment at [120]–[124]) – to himself in December 2016 and in 2017 respectively. In the Judge’s view, this was the natural inference to be drawn from the fact that these transactions singularly benefited Mr Foo at the expense of OP3’s creditors.

  95. [42] Finally, the Judge declined to relieve Mr Foo of liability under s 391 of the CA. She considered it significant that Mr Foo had only sought legal advice on the merits of Suit 498 and not on the propriety of the Payments (Judgment at [135]–[136]). In the result, Mr Foo was found to be liable to OP3 for a sum of $1,182,394, which is the sum of the Disputed Transactions.

  96. CA/CA 47/2022

  97. [43] In CA/CA 47/2022, Mr Foo appeals against the Judge’s findings that: (a) OP3 paid him the Disputed Dividend in December 2016 as distinct from the Disputed Payment it paid him in January 2017; and (b) he had breached the Creditor Duty by authorising the payment of the Disputed Transactions to himself.

  98. Mr Foo’s case

  99. [44] On appeal, Mr Foo raises two legal arguments that he did not raise before the Judge. First, he contends that OP3 lacks standing to claim the repayment of the Disputed Dividend from him. According to Mr Foo, OP3’s claim for repayment of the Disputed Dividend is in substance a claim that Mr Foo had caused OP3 to pay him a dividend when it had insufficient profits, in breach of s 403(1) of the CA. He contends that such a claim had to be brought by OP3’s creditors or its liquidator suing on behalf of these creditors, but Suit 152 had been commenced by OP3’s liquidator on behalf of the company.

  100. [45] Secondly, Mr Foo submits that he cannot be held liable for authorising the payment of the Disputed Transactions to himself. By its claim that Mr Foo had acted in breach of the Creditor Duty in doing so, OP3 is in substance seeking to unwind unfair preferences that OP3 had granted to an associated party. The statutory limitation period of two years for unwinding such transactions under the statutes in force at the time had lapsed by the time OP3 brought Suit 152. As Mr Foo put it, allowing OP3 to pursue a claim for breach of the Creditor Duty in these circumstances would undermine the statutory insolvency regime governing unfair preferences.

  101. [46] Apart from these two points, Mr Foo largely rehashes the submissions he raised before the Judge. He asserts that the Creditor Duty only arises when a company is insolvent or bordering on insolvency, and not any earlier. It follows that the Judge erred in finding that the Creditor Duty is engaged when a company is in a “financially parlous position, which is a state of affairs that is less severe than … being on the verge of insolvency”. In support of this submission, Mr Foo relies on the UK Supreme Court’s decision in Sequana, which was rendered after the Judge had given her decision in Suit 152 and the reasoning of which we will set out in more detail later, as appropriate.

  102. [47] Mr Foo also reiterates that: (a) the Disputed Dividend was paid to him as part of the Disputed Payment; (b) OP3 was neither insolvent nor bordering on insolvency at the time the Disputed Transactions were made because Suit 498 was not a contingent liability that was reasonably likely to materialise; (c) he was consequently under no duty to consider the interests of OP3’s creditors when he authorised the Disputed Transactions; (d) he had, in any event, complied with the Creditor Duty should it be found to have been engaged at the time he authorised the Disputed Transactions; and (e) he ought to be relieved of liability under s 391 of the CA if we find that he had acted in breach of the Creditor Duty.

  103. OP3’s case

  104. [48] In response, OP3 refutes the suggestion that it lacked standing in Suit 152. Its claim in Suit 152 rests not on s 403(1) of the CA but rather on Mr Foo’s breach of the Creditor Duty.

  105. [49] On OP3’s case, there is also no reason why the expiration of the statutory clawback period for unfair preferences should bar a liquidator from bringing a claim for breach of the Creditor Duty against Mr Foo. These are two distinct causes of action that can coexist harmoniously.

  106. [50] Turning to the crux of the dispute, namely whether Mr Foo had breached the Creditor Duty by authorising the payment of the Disputed Transactions to himself, OP3 broadly aligns itself with the Judge’s reasoning as summarised at [36]–[42] above. It urges us to affirm the Judge’s findings that: (a) the Disputed Dividend and the Disputed Payment were paid to Mr Foo as distinct transactions; (b) OP3 ought to have accounted for its liability in Suit 498 as a contingent liability on 25 May 2017; (c) this contingent liability ought to be valued at between $441,000 and $514,500; (d) OP3 was, in the result, insolvent and the Creditor Duty was engaged at the time Mr Foo authorised the Disputed Transactions; and (e) Mr Foo breached this duty by authorising those transactions.

  107. The Independent Counsel’s submissions

  108. [51] In view of the UK Supreme Court’s detailed analysis of the nature and scope of the Creditor Duty in Sequana as well as the legal issues raised on appeal by Mr Foo (see [44]–[45] above), we appointed Mr Lee Eng Beng SC (“Mr Lee”) as Independent Counsel to assist us in navigating these issues. We are deeply grateful to Mr Lee for the customary rigor of his research and analysis, and the clarity with which he put his submissions to us.

  109. [52] In the main, we invited Mr Lee to address us on: (a) the circumstances in which a director’s fiduciary duty to act in the interests of the company would be understood as specifically encompassing the interests of the company’s creditors; (b) the tests or factors a court should consider in determining whether the Creditor Duty has been triggered in a particular case; (c) the nature and content of the Creditor Duty; and (d) the relationship between the Creditor Duty on the one hand, and the statutory regime governing unfair preferences and s 403(1) of the CA on the other. We engage with Mr Lee’s submissions in detail where appropriate and provide a brief overview of the positions he advanced at this stage.

  110. [53] In brief, Mr Lee submits that the issue of whether the Creditor Duty has arisen overlaps substantially with and is intrinsically linked to the question of breach, such that it is not meaningful to consider the two sequentially. Rather, in so far as both issues are directed at “whether the directors have failed to give proper regard to creditors’ interests”, the court should examine, under a single composite inquiry, “whether the creditors’ interests have been exposed to risk or prejudice of a nature and extent sufficient to justify the imposition of the Creditor Duty” and whether a director has complied with this duty. The analysis should begin “with the act, decision or transaction in question”, with certain transactions, such as the payment of dividends or the repayment of shareholders’ loans, weighing heavily against the directors because the shareholders are the predominant, if not exclusive, beneficiaries of these transactions.

  111. [54] Allied to this, Mr Lee suggests that the Creditor Duty should be reconceptualised as a duty which exists “regardless of the state of the solvency of the company”. Mr Lee argues that “it does not seem right that directors have no duty to have proper regard to creditors’ interests as long as the company is not insolvent” since “creditors’ interests can quite conceivably be prejudiced by actions taken by a company prior to actual insolvency, for instance, where they are unreasonably risky, affect the overall stability or financial performance of the company or involve transactions or have effects surfacing over a period of time”.

  112. [55] On the content of the Creditor Duty, Mr Lee suggests that the duty at its core requires directors “to have proper regard to creditors’ interests when exercising their decision-making power over the affairs of the company”. This is largely a matter of subjective commercial judgment for directors, but the weight that directors should accord to the interests of creditors must correspond to the risk or prejudice to which creditors are exposed as a result of the disputed act. Mr Lee also aligns himself with the suggestion in Sequana that the interests of shareholders drop out of the picture and the company’s interests may be treated as equivalent to those of the creditors alone where an insolvent liquidation or administration is unavoidable.

  113. [56] Turning to the relationship between the Creditor Duty and s 403(1) of the CA, Mr Lee submits that the two operate symbiotically. Notably, even as s 403(1) of the CA requires dividends to be paid out of the profits of a company, the accounting definition of profits prevails in this context such that it is possible for dividends to be paid in compliance with s 403(1) of the CA even at a time when the company is, in fact, in a financially precarious position. The Creditor Duty fills this gap by requiring directors to adopt a holistic view of the company’s financial position before authorising the payment of any dividends.

  114. [57] Lastly, in Mr Lee’s view, there is no inconsistency between the Creditor Duty and the unfair preference statutory provisions. Any overlap between the two regimes does not smooth over differences in their purpose, substance, and operation. Indeed, the Creditor Duty complements the unfair preference provisions by providing the company with an alternative or additional avenue of relief where the unfair preference provisions may prove ineffective or inadequate. This may be so where the person against whom relief is sought is insolvent or otherwise unable to comply with the orders made by the court under the statutory provisions governing unfair preferences.

  115. Issues before this court

  116. [58] In the light of the parties’ submissions, the following issues arise for our determination:

  117. (a) First, when is the Creditor Duty first engaged? Although the disagreement between the parties centred on whether the Creditor Duty arises when a company is on the “verge of insolvency” or at some earlier stage, we take the opportunity to clarify more generally, the nature, scope, and content of the Creditor Duty. This seems timely in view of the UK Supreme Court’s detailed consideration of these aspects of the Creditor Duty in Sequana and, as will be evident, the fact that local case law contains several differing descriptions of the circumstances that trigger the Creditor Duty, notwithstanding uniform acceptance of its underlying rationale.

  118. (b) Second, whether OP3 lacks standing to claim the repayment of the Disputed Dividend from Mr Foo. This issue turns in large part on the relationship between the Creditor Duty and s 403(1) of the CA in circumstances where the alleged breach of the Creditor Duty arises from the payment of a dividend.

  119. (c) Third, whether OP3 was legally prohibited from bringing a claim against Mr Foo for breach of the Creditor Duty because the Disputed Transactions were, in substance, unfair preferences and the prevailing statutory clawback period for unwinding such transactions had lapsed by the time OP3 brought Suit 152.

  120. (d) Fourth, whether the Creditor Duty was engaged at the time Mr Foo authorised the Disputed Transactions. This involves the resolution of several evidential sub-issues, namely:

  121. (i) Whether the Disputed Dividend was paid to Mr Foo as part of the Disputed Payment.

  122. (ii) Whether OP3’s contingent liability in Suit 498 was reasonably likely to materialise and if so, the value that should reasonably have been ascribed by Mr Foo in his capacity as a director to the contingent liability that was encompassed in Suit 498.

  123. (e) Fifth, if the Creditor Duty was engaged at the relevant times, whether Mr Foo breached this duty by authorising the payment of the Disputed Transactions to himself.

  124. (f) Finally, if Mr Foo breached the Creditor Duty, whether he ought to be relieved of liability under s 391 of the CA.

  125. The nature, scope, and content of the Creditor Duty

  126. Preliminary observations

  127. [59] We begin with some preliminary observations on the nature of the Creditor Duty. The principles we canvass in this section are not novel, but they shed important light on the contours and operation of the duty and bear restating.

  128. [60] First, we reiterate that the Creditor Duty is a fiduciary duty that directors owe to the company. This duty is not one that directors owe directly to creditors (Progen at [52]) and creditors therefore cannot sue directors for breach of the Creditor Duty (see Sequana at [11], [77] and [267]). Rather, the proper plaintiff in an action for breach of the Creditor Duty is presumptively the company (see Ascend Field Pte Ltd and others v Tee Wee Sien and another appeal [2020] 1 SLR 771 at [35]), and any financial award resulting from a successful action for breach of the duty inures for the benefit of the company, though it may in practical terms be subsequently distributable among the company’s creditors (see Sequana at [267], per Lady Arden).

  129. [61] Pausing here, we note that there has been some uncertainty surrounding the circumstances in which a company may bring a claim for breach of the Creditor Duty against a director. This arises in large part from the High Court’s recent decision in Voltas Limited v Ng Theng Swee and another [2023] SGHC 245 (“Voltas”). In Voltas, the High Court drew upon the observations of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Kinsela v Russell Kinsela Pty Ltd (In Liq) (1986) 10 ACLR 395 (“Kinsela”) at 730 as well as some pronouncements in Progen to suggest that “liquidation is a condition precedent to the relevance of the [Creditor Duty] in an action that is premised on its breach” and “any action premised on the breach of [the Creditor Duty] is only relevant where the company in question has entered into liquidation.” [emphasis in original] (Voltas at [36]–[37]).

  130. [62] The question of whether liquidation operates as a condition precedent to the bringing of an action for breach of the Creditor Duty does not squarely arise in the present case since OP3 was indisputably in liquidation proceedings at the time it commenced Suit 152 against Mr Foo (see [23]–[24] above). We are also mindful that the High Court’s decision in Voltas is the subject of a pending appeal. That said, we consider it appropriate to express some provisional views on the correctness of the High Court’s conceptualisation of the Creditor Duty in Voltas in view of its relevance to the present analysis of the nature of the duty. We stress that our views in this regard are provisional and that nothing that we say here about the High Court’s analysis of the Creditor Duty in Voltas has any necessary bearing on the merits of the appeal against that decision.

  131. [63] In our view, Voltas correctly recognises the practical reality that a company does not commonly bring a claim for breach of the Creditor Duty against a director when it has yet to enter into liquidation proceedings. During this period, the directors who are subsequently accused of having acted in breach of the Creditor Duty will usually have remained in charge of taking decisions for the company and will have had no incentive to authorise legal action being taken for breaches of the Creditor Duty against themselves.

  132. [64] However, we are not presently convinced that only a company in liquidation may bring a claim against a director for breach of the Creditor Duty. Whilst the High Court in Voltas substantiated its view on the relevance of liquidation as a condition precedent to a claim for breach of the Creditor Duty by reference to certain extracts from Kinsela and Progen, which we reproduce below, we are hesitant to read as much into these pronouncements:

  133. [65] Kinsela and Progen both concerned companies in liquidation (see Kinsela at 396 and 398; Progen at [1]). Hence, the question of whether and how a claim for breach of the Creditor Duty could be mounted if the company was not in liquidation simply did not arise in either case. Kinsela was principally concerned with whether a company had the power or capacity to enter into certain transactions and whether the shareholders of a company had the power to absolve the directors from liability for acting in breach of the Creditor Duty (see Kinsela at 399–404). Similarly, the dispute in Progen centred on whether certain transactions constituted unfair preferences, and this court drew upon certain breaches of the Creditor Duty committed by the relevant directors in support of its conclusion that the statutory presumption of the desire to prefer had not been rebutted (Progen at [47] and [53]).

  134. [66] In line with this, a close reading of Kinsela and Progen suggests that the respective courts did not hold that any action for breach of the Creditor Duty could only be brought when the company is in liquidation. At 402–403 of Kinsela, Street CJ endorsed Cooke J’s remarks in Nicholson v Permakraft (NZ) Ltd (in liq) [1985] 3 ACLC 453 at 457–460 that “creditors are entitled to consideration … if the company is insolvent, or near insolvent, or of doubtful solvency, or if a contemplated payment or other course of action would jeopardize its solvency” and that these principles “relate[d] to actions by the company against the director, whether or not in truth brought by the liquidator.” [emphasis added]. Read in this light, it appears to us that at 401 of Kinsela, Street CJ was merely recognising that, as a practical matter, it will ordinarily be through the liquidation process that claims for breach of the Creditor Duty are vindicated. As for Progen, the extract that the High Court in Voltas had placed weight on, when read in the broader context of [52] of that decision, seems to us to have emphasised that creditors do not have standing to directly bring a claim against directors for breach of the Creditor Duty.

  135. [67] We also note that the UK Supreme Court in Sequana did not adopt such a narrow conception of the circumstances in which an action for breach of the Creditor Duty may be brought against a director. Lord Reed held at [101] that whereas the UK statutory provisions on unfair preferences can only provide a remedy if there are insolvency proceedings, no such limitation applies to the Creditor Duty. Lady Arden similarly observed at [269] of Sequana that the Creditor Duty is enforceable at all times prior to liquidation of the company and by shareholders if necessary, by way of a derivative action, with such shareholder action being said to provide a clear line of corporate responsibility and accountability during what may be a critical period for the company.

  136. [68] All that said, we leave open the question of the precise circumstances in which a claim for breach of the Creditor Duty may be brought against a director for consideration on a future occasion, where it is necessary to resolve that question.

  137. [69] Second, and flowing from the fact that the Creditor Duty is a duty that directors owe to the company, the Creditor Duty is best understood in terms that in certain circumstances, that duty modifies how the company’s interests ought to be understood when a director considers his duty to act in the best interests of the company. The Creditor Duty essentially underscores the fact that the interests of creditors acquire discrete significance and require separate consideration at a certain stage in a company’s life cycle, for reasons that we shall turn to shortly.

  138. [71] A corollary of this is that it remains possible for a director to breach his duty to act in the best interests of the company at a time the company is solvent by undertaking acts that unjustifiably prejudice the interests of creditors. This is most obvious where a director acts with the intent of defrauding creditors. While such a director may not be obliged to accord significant weight to the interests of creditors in taking decisions for the company given the company’s financial health, acting in complete disregard of creditor interests or acting in a way that is directly adverse to those interests will nevertheless evidence a failure to act in the best interests of the company.

  139. [72] This brings us to the third preliminary point, namely the rationale that underlies the Creditor Duty. This lies in the shift in who may be said to be the main economic stakeholder of the company as the company approaches insolvency (see Sequana at [86], per Lord Reed) and the asymmetry in corporate governance. To take each point in turn, whereas shareholders are the primary bearers of the risk of loss arising from the manner in which directors exercise their powers when the company is solvent (see [70] above), creditors displace them from this position when the company is insolvent because an insolvent company effectively trades and conducts its business with its creditors’ money (see Progen at [52]). And even as creditors bear the risks of continued corporate trading in such a situation, they generally have no control over the conduct of the company’s business (see Sequana at [263], per Lady Arden). There is consequently a need to constrain directors from externalising the risks of continued trading onto creditors, bearing in mind that shareholders usually have nothing to lose and everything to gain, and creditors, contrastingly, have everything to lose and nothing to gain by the continued trading of a company which is on the cusp of insolvency (see Progen at [52]; Sequana at [57], per Lord Reed, and at [238], per Lord Hodge). In essence, the law responds to the misalignment of incentives between those running the company and those bearing the consequences of actions undertaken by a financially distressed company by enjoining directors of such firms to take corporate decisions with the interests of creditors in mind (see Aurelio Gurrea-Martinez, “Towards an optimal model of directors’ duties in the zone of insolvency: an economic and comparative approach” (2021) 21(2) Journal of Corporate Law Studies 365 (“Towards an optimal model of directors’ duties”) at 367–369).

  140. [73] Fourthly, we agree with Lord Reed and Lady Arden that creditors ought to be understood as a class for the purpose of the Creditor Duty (see Sequana at [48] and [256]). Even as the respective positions of individual creditors may differ, it is sensible to consider the interests of creditors as a body where the Creditor Duty is at issue because the identities of the company’s creditors constantly change so long as debts continue to be incurred and discharged by the company (see Sequana at [48], per Lord Reed). In our judgment, treating the interests of the creditors as a class is also consistent with the underlying aim of the Creditor Duty in that the duty seeks to redress the fact that the risks of continued trading of the company has shifted from the shoulders of one stakeholder (namely, the shareholders) to another (namely, the creditors) (see [72] above). We add that creditors who may have been unfairly prejudiced vis-à-vis other creditors by actions undertaken by directors may potentially have a remedy under the statutory unfair preference regime, albeit that this is contingent on the company entering into judicial management or winding up and the judicial manager or liquidator making an application under s 225 of the Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act 2018 (2020 Rev Ed) (“IRDA”).

  141. [74] Fifthly, in an action for breach of the Creditor Duty, the relevant question is whether the director exercised his discretion in good faith in what he considered (and not what the court considers) to be in the best interests of the company, as understood with reference to the financial state of the company prevailing at the material time. Although the duty is a subjective one in that sense, the court will assess a director’s claim objectively, by asking whether the view the director claims to have formed was one that is credible or was reasonably open to him, given the information available at the time (see Sequana at [299], per Lady Arden). In so doing, the court may very well draw an inference that a director was not acting honestly where the transaction is objectively not one in the interests of the company (see Goh Chan Peng and others v Beyonics Technology Ltd and another and another appeal [2017] 2 SLR 592 (“Goh Chan Peng”) at [35]–[36]).

  142. [75] We make two related observations in this regard. First, in as much as the court is examining the business judgment of a director, it will be slow to interfere with commercial decisions made honestly but which, on hindsight, were financially detrimental to a company (Goh Chan Peng at [35]). Directors undertake corporate decisions based on information then available to them and it is not the role of the court to censure directors who, in good faith, have made commercial decisions which turn out to be incorrect (see Vita Health Laboratories Pte Ltd and others v Pang Meng Sang [2004] 4 SLR(R) 162 at [17]). Second, because directors do not operate with the benefit of hindsight, this is an area of law where clarity and practicality must be prioritised. Directors need clear standards to guide them, and the law must be developed with this recognition in mind (see Sequana at [87], per Lord Reed).

  143. [76] Finally, it must be remembered that the Creditor Duty is just one of a panoply of duties that a director is subject to. For instance, a director is also subject to a duty to act with reasonable diligence in the discharge of his office (see s 157(1) of the CA). This encapsulates the director’s common law duty to exercise due care, skill, and diligence (Ho Yew Kong at [134]) and the court will, when faced with a claim for breach of either duty, assess whether the director had fallen foul of the objective standard of care and diligence expected of a director (Lim Weng Kee v Public Prosecutor [2002] 2 SLR(R) 848 at [28]).

  144. [77] The significance of this point is as follows. Because an action for breach of the Creditor Duty focuses on the subjective intentions of a director in committing a company to a certain course of action, it is theoretically possible, though perhaps uncommon, for a director to have honestly believed that he had acted in the best interests of the company and be found to have complied with the Creditor Duty even though his actions are found to fall below the objective standard of care and diligence expected of a director. In these circumstances, it remains open to a company to allege that the director had acted in breach of the duty of care and diligence he owes to it. The short point is that compliance with the Creditor Duty does not immunise a director from breaches of other directors’ duties which may be engaged on the same set of facts.

  145. [78] With these preliminary points stated, we now turn to consider when the Creditor Duty is first engaged and the substance of the duty. As evident from the parties’ submissions, there was some confusion over these aspects of the Creditor Duty. We therefore take the opportunity to restate the law, having regard to Sequana, the salient facts and reasoning of which we now set out.

  146. The decision in Sequana

  147. [79] Sequana concerned the company, AWA. In May 2009, AWA’s directors caused AWA to distribute a dividend of €135m (“May Dividend”) to its parent company, Sequana SA (“Sequana”), which extinguished by way of set-off almost the whole of a slightly larger debt which Sequana owed to AWA. The May Dividend was paid out when AWA was solvent on both a balance sheet and cash flow basis. AWA, however, had long-term pollution-related contingent liabilities of a very uncertain amount which, together with an uncertainty as to the value of one class of its assets, gave rise to a real risk, although not a probability, that AWA might become insolvent at an uncertain date in the future. In the event, AWA went into insolvent administration almost ten years later, in October 2018. BTI 2014 LLC (“BTI”), the appellant and assignee of AWA’s claims, thereafter sought to recover an amount equivalent to the May Dividend from AWA’s directors on the basis that they had breached the Creditor Duty by authorising the payment of the May Dividend (see Sequana at [115], per Lord Briggs).

  148. [80] As the May Dividend was paid out almost ten years before AWA entered insolvent administration, BTI’s case that AWA’s directors had acted in breach of the Creditor Duty hinged on the duty arising when a company merely faced a real and not remote risk of insolvency. This formulation of when the Creditor Duty arose was rejected as too nascent by the UK High Court and the Court of Appeal. In the judgment of the Court of Appeal, the Creditor Duty did not arise until a company was insolvent, on the brink of insolvency or probably headed for insolvency. A real risk of insolvency, however real, was insufficient unless it amounted to a probability (see Sequana at [116], per Lord Briggs). On appeal, the UK Supreme Court affirmed that the Creditor Duty was not engaged at the time the May Dividend was paid out to Sequana and dismissed BTI’s appeal on this basis. The broad strokes of its reasoning may be summarised as follows.

  149. [81] The court affirmed that the director’s duty to act in the best interests of the company may, in certain circumstances, enjoin a director to have regard to the interests of creditors (per Lord Reed at [76], Lady Arden at [252]–[277]). However, in so far as the basis of the Creditor Duty is a shift in the economic interests of the company as the company nears insolvency or becomes insolvent (per Lord Reed at [45] and [59], Lord Hodge at [246]; see also [72] above), this shift will not be found to have occurred when a company merely faces even a real and not remote risk of insolvency (per Lord Reed at [83], Lord Briggs at [199], Lord Hodge at [247], Lady Arden at [250] and [306]). As long as a company is financially stable, its shareholders will have the predominant economic interest in the manner in which its affairs are managed, and their interests will normally be aligned with those of its creditors (per Lord Reed at [83], Lord Hodge at [246]). After all, most creditors are voluntary and are able to take precautions against corporate risk (such as, by way of a demand for security), armed with such public information about the financial position of the company as the law makes available or the company chooses to provide. It is furthermore inherent in the law’s encouragement of risk-taking and commercial enterprise under limited liability that creditors of limited companies will get hurt from time to time (per Lord Briggs at [164]).

  150. [82] Given these conclusions, it was strictly unnecessary for the UK Supreme Court to determine: (a) the meaning of “insolvency” for the purpose of the Creditor Duty; (b) whether any other trigger earlier than insolvency suffices to engage the Creditor Duty; and (c) the substance of the Creditor Duty (per Lord Reed at [78], [83]–[84] and [88], Lord Briggs at [118] and [199], Lady Arden at [302], [307]–[308]). Nevertheless, members of the court took the opportunity to set out their provisional views on these matters. We are cognisant that these views may diverge at the margins but set out in broad strokes some key propositions which we consider relevant to our present analysis.

  151. [83] On the meaning of “insolvency” for the purpose of the Creditor Duty, Lord Reed and Lady Arden were inclined to the view that the term could aptly be understood in accordance with the cash flow or balance sheet insolvency tests (per Lord Reed at [88], Lady Arden at [307]–[308]). Lady Arden added that these tests must nevertheless be applied with a degree of flexibility appropriate to the rationale and context of the Creditor Duty. To that end, while directors should have regard to the company’s liabilities which they foresee will arise in the reasonably near future, there also has to be some minor latitude so that prompt payment is not always thought to be insisted on (per Lady Arden at [308]).

  152. [84] As for whether any other trigger earlier than actual insolvency would suffice to engage the Creditor Duty, the court was inclined to answer this in the affirmative. In so far as the rationale for treating the company’s interests as involving the creditors’ interests is not based on the fact of insolvency but the shift in the economic interests in the company and consequently, the risk of loss arising from the manner in which the directors exercise their powers, this shift would typically be discernible before the company is formally insolvent (per Lord Reed at [86] and [88]). The formulation preferred by the majority of the coram broadly focused on whether a company was “bordering on insolvency” or faced a probability of an insolvent liquidation or administration (per Lord Reed at [86] and [88], Lord Briggs at [203], Lord Hodge at [247], Lady Arden at [279]).

  153. [85] Turning to the substance of the Creditor Duty, the majority held that prior to the time at which insolvent liquidation or administration becomes unavoidable, the Creditor Duty is a duty to consider the interests of creditors, to accord them appropriate weight, and to balance them against shareholders’ interests where they may conflict (per Lord Reed at [81], Lord Briggs at [176], Lord Hodge at [238]). There was no reason to treat the interests of creditors as paramount at this stage when insolvency might not materialise and the financial difficulties may not be either permanent or fatal to the long-term success of the company (per Lord Reed at [50], Lord Briggs at [175]). Rather, as a general rule, the more parlous the state of the company, the more the interests of the creditors will predominate, and the greater the weight which directors should accord to their interests as against those of the shareholders (per Lord Reed at [81]). Ultimately, however, directors are exercising their commercial judgment about the benefits and risks of a transaction or course of action, and a reasonable decision by them in an attempt to rescue the company’s business in the interests of both its shareholders and creditors would not occasion a breach of the duty (per Lord Hodge at [238]).

  154. [86] Following from the above, it is only where an insolvent liquidation or administration becomes unavoidable that shareholders cease to have any interest in the company and their interests can be left out of account in the context of the Creditor Duty (per Lord Reed at [50] and [80], Lord Hodge at [247], Lady Arden at [291], [302] and [311]).

  155. Analysis

  156. [87] Against this backdrop, we observe that our own case law to date has not adopted uniform language in describing when the Creditor Duty is first engaged. Some pronouncements suggesting that directors are obliged to have regard to the interests of creditors in taking corporate decisions when “the company is, or [is] perilously close to being, insolvent” (Progen at [52]) sit alongside others that suggest that they are so obliged when the company is “in a parlous financial position” (Lim Oon Kuin and others v Ocean Tankers (Pte) Ltd (interim judicial managers appointed) [2022] 1 SLR 434 at [11]) or is “of doubtful solvency” (Dynasty Line at [32]). This has, unfortunately, resulted in some uncertainty as to the temporal scope of the Creditor Duty, as evidenced by the real difficulty the Judge faced in delineating the line between a “parlous financial state” and the “verge of insolvency”, and in articulating what being in a “parlous financial state” entails (Judgment at [29]–[31]).

  157. [88] That the point in time at which the Creditor Duty is first engaged has admitted of varying descriptions does not appear to be an issue unique to our jurisdiction. Looking beyond our shores, the thorough review of the English and Commonwealth authorities conducted by the Court of Appeal in Sequana was likewise observed to have revealed that there is not to be found in the authorities any clear guidance as to when the Creditor Duty is first engaged (see Sequana at [179], per Lord Briggs).

  158. [89] At the same time, it is important to recognise that our case law has spoken with one voice on the underlying rationale for the Creditor Duty, namely, the need to constrain directors from externalising the risks of continued trading of financially distressed companies onto creditors, and its analysis in this regard is entirely consistent with the UK Supreme Court’s analysis of the same issue in Sequana (see [72] and [81] above). The doctrinal basis for the Creditor Duty provides a foundation for us to clarify the trigger and operation of the Creditor Duty, and is one of the key reasons we are unable to accept Mr Lee’s invitation to reconceptualise the Creditor Duty as: (a) involving a single composite inquiry under which the court examines “whether the creditors’ interests have been exposed to risk or prejudice of a nature and extent sufficient to justify the imposition of the Creditor Duty” and whether the relevant director has complied with this duty; and (b) a duty which persists “regardless of the state of the solvency of the company (see [53]–[54] above).

  159. [90] The basis of Mr Lee’s former suggestion is a concern that the traditional two-stage inquiry of first ascertaining whether the Creditor Duty has arisen and thereafter considering the issue of breach insufficiently accommodates situations where a director suddenly and significantly imperils the financial stability of a hitherto healthy company. If the issue of whether the Creditor Duty has arisen is to be considered prior to and distinct from the issue of breach, a court may be inclined to conclude that the Creditor Duty is not engaged in such a scenario because the relevant course of action was undertaken whilst the company was financially healthy. This was said to unjustly immunise a director, who might have recklessly endangered the financial health of a company, from liability for breach of the Creditor Duty.

  160. [91] We do not consider this potential issue to warrant a reconceptualisation of the Creditor Duty in the terms suggested by Mr Lee. The issue of a director who causes a financially healthy company to suffer distress by committing it to a particular course of action is adequately addressed by accounting for the impact of the proposed transaction on the company’s financial state. If the proposed transaction sufficiently imperils the financial health of the company, the Creditor Duty will be found to be engaged, and the court will evaluate whether the director had acted in the best interests of the company in entering into such a transaction. Indeed, in Dynasty Line, we observed that the Creditor Duty would be engaged where certain directors had caused the company to enter into the relevant transactions when they knew or must have known that the company “was insolvent or of doubtful solvency or would become so as a result of entering into these transactions” [emphasis added] (see Dynasty Line at [32]).

  161. [92] At the hearing before us, Mr Lee also expressed the concern that a court which is constrained to examine the financial state of a company in isolation may potentially lose sight of the distinction between corporate transactions that are entered into to benefit directors or shareholders (at the expense of creditors) and those which directors authorise in good faith in the best interests of the company. In our view, this concern is adequately addressed at the second stage of the conventional analysis under which the court examines the subjective intentions of the relevant director with reference to the nature of the contemplated transaction. We will elaborate on this later.

  162. [93] Fundamentally, we see value in maintaining the doctrinal distinction between the issue of whether the Creditor Duty has arisen and the issue of whether a director has acted in breach of this duty, and in dealing with these two issues sequentially. For one, the two inquiries differ in nature. When the court examines the financial state of a company, it is essentially assessing where the economic interests of the company lie. As the company approaches a state where it “is effectively trading and running the company’s business with the creditors’ money” (Progen at [52]), the directors will come under an increasing obligation to consider the interests of creditors discretely for the reasons described above. Whether a director subjectively believed that his acts were performed in the best interests of the company is, however, a qualitatively distinct inquiry. The court’s focus here is on the subjective bona fides of the director and whether he exercised his directorial powers with the interests of the company in mind or for some other legally objectionable reason.

  163. [94] Indeed, it is because the two inquiries serve different analytical functions that they embody different standards. In determining whether the Creditor Duty is engaged, a court objectively examines a company’s solvency at the time the material transactions were entered into. It considers the surrounding circumstances of the case, including the claims, debts, liabilities and obligations of a company (Dynasty Line at [33]–[34]). When ascertaining whether the director had acted in breach of the Creditor Duty, however, the court examines whether the director subjectively believed he had acted in the best interests of the company. In as much as the court is, at this latter stage, scrutinising the business judgment of a director, it will not substitute its own decisions in place of those made by directors in the honest and reasonable belief that they were for the best interests of the company, even if those decisions turned out subsequently to be wrong ones (see ECRC Land Pte Ltd (in liquidation) v Ho Wing On Christopher and others [2004] 1 SLR(R) 105 at [49]).

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