Court of Appeal · Decided 2 December 2024
A debtor could not set off claims assigned to it just before the company's liquidation
DGJ v Ocean Tankers (Pte) Ltd (in liquidation) and another appeal
Feedback & support[2024] SGCA 57 · Case no. Court of Appeal / Civil Appeal No 42 of 2023
✱ The decision, in one line
Not legal advice
A debtor could not set off claims assigned to it just before the company's liquidation
Summary by laws.sg·Paragraphs [1], [2]
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Introduction
- [1]
[1] The central question in these appeals is whether a debtor of a company should be allowed to subvert the pari passu distribution regime, the key feature of an insolvent liquidation, by procuring the assignment of claims to itself in the advent of the company’s compulsory liquidation with the aim of then asserting an insolvency set-off. Matters are also complicated in this case by the unique circumstance that the attempted rescue and eventual winding up of the company engaged two distinct regimes: the first being judicial management under the Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed) (“CA”), and the second being compulsory liquidation under the Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act 2018 (2020 Rev Ed) (“IRDA”). Various arguments were advanced by the parties, inviting a broad reconsideration of the laws of assignment and insolvency.
- [2]
[2] These appeals form part of the growing number of cases related to the collapse of Hin Leong Trading (“HLT”), which feature various proceedings involving HLT’s group of companies and its trading partners amidst a scramble of interested parties seeking to improve their own positions. In the present case, a debtor of one of the HLT companies has attempted to put itself in a better position by procuring the assignment of claims against the company while it was under judicial management, with a view to asserting a set-off of the assigned claims against the debts it owed the company. The company’s liquidators seek the court’s declaration that the attempted set-off is ineffective. We agree with the liquidators and elaborate on our reasons in this judgment.
Background facts
The parties
- [3]
[3] Ocean Tankers (Pte) Ltd (“OTPL”) is a Singapore-incorporated company, the principal activities of which included ship chartering, provision of ship management services, and the manufacture and storage of petroleum lubricating oil.
- [4]
[4] The appellant in CA/CA 42/2023 (“CA 42”) and the respondent in CA/CA 43/2023 (“CA 43”), which we refer to as the “Debtor”, is a Hong Kong-based company. The Debtor is a wholly-owned subsidiary of another company, which also has a Singapore-based subsidiary which we refer to as the “Assignor”. In short, the Debtor and the Assignor have a common parent company.
The Charterparties
- [5]
[5] Between 24 March and 1 April 2020, the Debtor entered into three charterparties (collectively, the “Charterparties”) with OTPL for the charter of the three vessels.
- [6]
[6] The timing of the Charterparties appear to coincide with OTPL’s financial troubles. On 6 May 2020, OTPL applied to be placed under judicial management. It was placed under interim judicial management on 12 May 2020, and this was made absolute on 7 August 2020.
The Arbitration
- [8]
[8] On 24 September 2020, the Debtor commenced arbitration proceedings against OTPL for alleged breaches of various duties, including of confidentiality, that were contained in the Charterparties (the “Arbitration”). OTPL counterclaimed in the Arbitration for freight, demurrage, and other sums owed by the Debtor under the Charterparties (the “Counterclaims”).
- [9]
[9] In turn, the Debtor acquired, by way of two deeds of assignment (collectively, the “Assignments”), two sets of claims from the Assignor (the “Assigned Claims”). These involved two vessels referred to as “Vessel A” and “Vessel B” which were not among those covered by the Charterparties. Notice of these assignments, which were made on 20 May 2021, was served on OTPL on 21 May 2021. The Debtor thereafter took the position that the Counterclaims ought to be set off against the Assigned Claims, which it now advances in the present appeals.
Assignment of the Vessel A Claims and the Default Judgment Debt
- [10]
[10] It is apposite to set out the terms of the Assignments and what was sought to be assigned, for this potentially affects the validity of the Assignments. The first assignment (the “First Assignment”) related to the Assignor’s claims against OTPL for breach of contract, deceit, negligence, and/or breach of bailment which arose from the alleged non-delivery of 342,660 barrels of ultra-low sulphur diesel cargo, which were to have been carried on board a vessel (“Vessel A”) by way of a contract contained in or evidenced by three tanker bills of lading. We will refer to these as the “Vessel A Claims”.
- [11]
[11] The Assignor had obtained a judgment in default of defence (the “Default Judgment”) in respect of the Vessel A Claims on 17 March 2021 in the High Court of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur. Under the Default Judgment, OTPL was to pay the Assignor:
- [12]
[12] The first deed of assignment for the Vessel A Claims was made on 20 May 2021 and sets out at cl 2:
Assignment of the Vessel B Claims
- [13]
[13] The Assignor’s second assignment (the “Second Assignment”) to the Debtor was of the Assignor’s claims against OTPL involving another vessel, which we refer to as “Vessel B”. The Assignor had on 27 February 2020 entered into a contract to sell 2,100,000 barrels of gasoil to HLT (the “Original Sale Contract”). On 8 April 2020, the Assignor entered into a second sale contract (the “Second Sale Contract”) with HLT for the Assignor to purchase 458,000 barrels of gasoil 10 ppm sulphur (the “Cargo”) from HLT on an in-tank basis on board Vessel B.
- [14]
[14] On 9 April 2020, the Assignor entered into a storage agreement with OTPL (the “Storage Agreement”), under which OTPL became the demise charterer of Vessel B. Under the Storage Agreement, OTPL agreed to allocate oil storage tanks to the Assignor on board Vessel B for a certain period. The Storage Agreement contained a non-assignment clause (“NAC”), which provided:
On the same day, OTPL issued an in-tank transfer certificate (the “Document”) which evidenced the existence of the Cargo on board Vessel B and the transfer of the Cargo to the Assignor on 9 April 2020.
- [15]
[15] However, it is the Debtor’s position that there were false statements in the Document relating to the amount of petroleum products transferred onto or out of Vessel B and/or the fact of such transfer having taken place. This gave rise to two categories of claims, which will collectively be termed the “Vessel B Claims”:
(a) The first category relates to the Assignor’s cause of action against OTPL in connection with or arising from the Storage Agreement (the “Vessel B Storage Agreement Claim”). In the Arbitration, the Debtor pleaded that the Vessel B Storage Agreement Claim arose from OTPL acting in breach of an implied obligation under the Storage Agreement to not misstate the amount of petroleum products transferred onto or out of Vessel B and/or, the fact of such transfer having taken place.
(b) The second category relates to the Assignor’s causes of action against OTPL in connection with or arising from the Document (“the Vessel B Document Claim”). In the Arbitration, the Debtor pleaded that in issuing the Document, OTPL had misrepresented HLT’s transfer of the Cargo to the Assignor on Vessel B, that OTPL had conspired with HLT to misrepresent the transfer of the Cargo, and that OTPL had induced HLT to breach the Second Sale Contract.
- [16]
[16] On 20 May 2021, notwithstanding the NAC (at [14] above), a deed of assignment was executed in respect of the Vessel B Claims, which sets out at cl 2:
The Debtor’s and Assignor’s proof of debts and the applications by the JMs below
- [17]
[17] On 11 June 2021, the Debtor and the Assignor filed revised proofs of debt with the then-judicial managers (“JMs”) of OTPL, each including the Assigned Claims. The proofs of debt stated that the Debtor was the legal assignee of the Assigned Claims, and its claim was not to be double counted with the Assignor’s claim; the Assignor would only maintain its claim in the event that its assignments to the Debtor were ineffective or if the Debtor’s proof of debt for the Assigned Claims was not admitted by the JMs.
- [18]
[18] Subsequently, on 12 July 2021, the JMs applied in HC/CWU 117/2021 (“CWU 117”) for OTPL to be wound up under the IRDA. They additionally filed two applications in the General Division of the High Court, from which these appeals arise.
- [19]
[19] The first was HC/SUM 3297/2021 (“SUM 3297”) filed on 12 July 2021, under which the JMs sought a declaration that the Assignments were void and/or unenforceable against OTPL, and as against the JMs/liquidators in the event that OTPL was wound up.
- [20]
[20] The second was HC/SUM 2989/2021 (“SUM 2989”), filed on 25 June 2021, in which the JMs sought directions on two questions of law:
(b) Whether legal or independent set-off, or insolvency set-off, can be asserted by the debtor for the value of the Assigned Claims in the event the company is discharged from judicial management and wound up under the IRDA (“Question 2”).
Proceedings below
SUM 3297
- [22]
[22] In SUM 3297, the Liquidators contended that the Vessel B Claims were invalidly assigned in breach of the NAC, and more generally that the Assigned Claims were not assignable because these were bare rights of action.
- [23]
[23] On the scope of the NAC, the Debtor contended that the Vessel B Claims comprised, among other things, distinct causes of action arising from the Storage Agreement. While there were contractual causes of action arising from the Storage Agreement, the causes of action in misrepresentation arising from the Document were tortious in nature and would fall outside the scope of the NAC, which – on the Debtor’s position – only applied to assignment of contractual rights and claims. Conversely, the Liquidators argued that the NAC covered the assignment of both contractual and tortious claims, relying on the interpretive approach adopted in Burleigh House (PTC) Ltd v Irwin Mitchell LLP [2011] EWHC 834 (“Burleigh House”). The Liquidators also argued that, in any event, the Vessel B Document Claim was inextricably connected to the Storage Agreement and so fell within the scope of the NAC.
- [24]
[24] Distinguishing Burleigh House, the Judge in the General Division of the High Court (“the Judge”) found that the NAC only barred the assignment of contractual claims, and not tortious claims, having regard to the text and heading of the NAC and the other clauses in the Storage Agreement (see Re Ocean Tankers (Pte) Ltd (In Liquidation) [2023] SGHC 330 (“Judgment”) at [36]). Accordingly, the Judge found that the assignment of the Vessel B Document Claim was not barred by the NAC. Conversely, the Judge found that the Vessel B Storage Agreement Claim, being contractual, fell within the scope of the NAC. The Judge also dismissed, as irrelevant, the Liquidators’ argument that the Vessel B Document Claim was inextricably connected to the Storage Agreement (see Judgment at [37]).
- [25]
[25] As to the effect of the NAC, the Debtor submitted that even if any of the Assignments fell within the scope of the NAC, they would not be rendered void altogether but could and would take effect as equitable assignments or as a declaration of trust. The Judge rejected this and held, affirming the position of the House of Lords in Linden Gardens Trust Ltd v Lenesta Sludge Disposals Ltd [1994] 1 AC 85 (“Linden Gardens”), that an assignment in breach of a non-assignment clause is void both at law and in equity. There was also no basis for treating the assignment of the Vessel B Document Claim as a declaration of trust (see Judgment at [47]–[48]).
- [26]
[26] In respect of the Vessel B Claims, the Judge therefore found:
(a) The assignment of the Vessel B Storage Agreement Claim contravened the NAC and so was void and/or ineffective as against OTPL and the Liquidators. In any event, it was a bare right to litigate and therefore void and/or ineffective as against OTPL and the Liquidators on this ground as well (see Judgment at [81(b)]).
(b) While the assignment of the Vessel B Document Claim did not breach the NAC in the Storage Agreement, it was a champertous assignment of a bare right to litigate and therefore void and/or ineffective as against OTPL and the Liquidators (see Judgment at [81(c)]).
- [27]
[27] In respect of the Vessel A Claims (which the Judge deemed as having merged into the Default Judgment), the Liquidators contended that the assignment of rights pursuant to the Default Judgment should not be regarded as the assignment of a property right or a debt, but the assignment of a personal statutory right to assert insolvency set-off in respect of any mutual debts with OTPL. This argument was rejected by the Judge, who found it to be a valid assignment of a judgment debt (see Judgment at [54]–[58]).
SUM 2989
Question 1
- [28]
[28] In respect of SUM 2989, the Judge found it unnecessary to decide Question 1 since it was entirely premised on OTPL being in judicial management (see [20(a)] above). Since OTPL had gone into liquidation by the time SUM 2989 was heard (see [21] above), Question 1 had become moot.
Question 2
- [29]
[29] On Question 2, the Judge held that insolvency set-off could be asserted in respect of the Vessel A Claims. We outline the main elements of the Judge’s reasoning.
(1) The relevant time for determining mutuality
- [31]
[31] The Judge agreed with the Debtor because the reference to “judicial management” in s 219 of the IRDA only included judicial management under the IRDA, and not judicial management under the CA. The CA was the applicable statute at the material time. That left the date of the commencement of the winding up of OTPL under the IRDA as the only relevant time for determining mutuality. This meant that the element of mutuality was to be considered as at 12 July 2021, that being the date of the winding-up application (see Judgment at [111]–[126]).
(2) Whether there was mutuality at the relevant time
- [32]
[32] The Judge then considered whether there was mutuality between the Vessel A Claims and the Counterclaims pleaded by OTPL in the Arbitration, immediately prior to the commencement of the winding up of OPTL.
(3) Whether any of the exceptions in s 219(3) of the IRDA applied
- [34]
[34] The next issue was thus whether any of the exceptions under s 219(3) of the IRDA barred insolvency set-off from operating.
- [35]
[35] On s 219(3)(a) of the IRDA, which excluded debts not provable in judicial management or winding up from the operation of insolvency set-off, the Liquidators submitted that the Vessel A Claims were not provable under s 219(3)(a) because s 218(2) (which provides that where an insolvent company is being wound up, a debt to which a company is subject at the commencement of the winding up is provable) should be read with s 217 (which provides that where a company is wound up while in judicial management, the commencement of the winding up is deemed to be the time of the commencement of the judicial management). This would mean that provable debts would be limited to debts which OTPL was subject to at the commencement of judicial management. The Vessel A Claims, which were assigned after OTPL entered judicial management, would not be provable.
- [36]
[36] The Judge rejected this argument, having already found that “judicial management” under s 219(2) of the IRDA referred only to judicial management under the IRDA, and that this should similarly apply to s 217. The judicial management in this case took place under the CA. The relevant time for assessing provable debts was therefore the commencement of winding up under the IRDA, by which time the Vessel A Claim had been assigned (see Judgment at [140]–[142]).
(b) this also follows from the application of s 219 of the IRDA; and
(c) the Assignor, and therefore the Debtor, was aware of the (unsuccessful) application in SUM 4537 on 16 October 2020 for OTPL to be wound up, which pre-dated the Assignments (see [7] above).
- [38]
[38] The Judge rejected these arguments. In respect of the first and second arguments above (at [37(a)]—[37(b)]), the Judge reiterated that that the judicial management application filed by OTPL was governed by the CA, which provided that only notice of a winding-up application would have excluded a claim from insolvency set-off. Given that the IRDA came into operation only after OTPL was placed under judicial management, it would not be fair on the Debtor to retrospectively apply the new notice requirements in s 219(3)(b) of the IRDA (see Judgment at [143]). In respect of third argument (at [37(c)] above), the Judge found that s 219(3)(b) required notice of the application for winding up of OTPL; this was CWU 117 rather than SUM 4537, and the former was only filed on 12 July 2021. Further, SUM 4537 had been dismissed by the time of the Assignments, so there was no pending winding-up application at the material time (see Judgment at [144]–[145]).
- [39]
[39] The Judge therefore found that insolvency set-off could be asserted in respect of the Vessel A Claims. It followed that there was nothing left on which any potential legal set-off could bite. Accordingly, the Judge thought it unnecessary to consider or answer Question 2 insofar as it related to legal set-off (see Judgment at [146]).
Cases on appeal
- [40]
[40] Both parties appealed against the Judge’s decision, with the Debtor contesting in CA 42 aspects of the Judge’s decision in SUM 3297 and OTPL appealing in CA 43 against parts of the Judge’s decision in SUM 2989. In practical terms, the Debtor takes the position that it should be entitled to assert insolvency set-off in respect of all the Assigned Claims, whereas the Liquidators contend that none of the Assigned Claims should be the subject of an insolvency set-off. The parties largely repeat their positions below, and we set out their main arguments as follows.
The Liquidators’ arguments
- [41]
[41] The Liquidators contend that all the Assignments were invalid because they concerned purported assignments of bare rights of action which were void by reason of the public policy against maintenance and champerty. They argue that the exceptions to this do not apply because the Assigned Claims are not incidental or ancillary to a property right or interest and the Debtor does not have a genuine commercial interest in enforcing the Assigned Claims. The Liquidators also repeat their position in relation to the Vessel B Claims that the purported assignments of those claims were ineffective and those assignments were prohibited by the NAC which covered both contractual and tortious claims (see [23] above).
- [43]
[43] Finally, the Liquidators submit that there is a freestanding common law public policy that would render void and unenforceable a transaction that seeks to circumvent the insolvency regime. In their submission, the Debtor’s attempt to exercise insolvency set-off is contrary to this policy because it would allow the Debtor to unfairly improve its position in relation to other creditors of the company. More generally, they contend that such a practice is to be discouraged as it would encourage trafficking in claims for the purpose of circumventing the scheme of pari passu distribution.
The Debtor’s arguments
- [44]
[44] The Debtor on the other hand submits, applying the contextual approach to the interpretation of non-assignment clause, that the NAC does not proscribe the assignment of non-contractual claims, but only does so in relation to contractual rights or obligations.
- [45]
[45] The Debtor further argues that even if the NAC was breached by the assignment, this would not, in and of itself, render the assignment ineffective as between the obligor and assignee. Instead, the court should retain “remedial flexibility” to award damages, being the default remedy for contractual breaches. The Debtor says that this approach is supported by the wording of the NAC which provides that rights and obligations “shall not be assigned or novated” without the consent of OTPL “whose consent shall not be unreasonably withheld” [emphasis added]. This suggests that the NAC is not an absolute bar to an assignment.
- [46]
[46] Moreover, the Debtor submits that the Assignments were not champertous as they do not affect the administration of justice. Since the Debtor and Assignor are related, there is no difference in the ultimate control over the prosecution of the claim before or after assignment. The Assigned Claims were also quantified before they were assigned, and the Debtor has a legitimate interest in the outcome of the litigation as the Debtor and the Assignor were part of the same corporate group with a common interest. In the Debtor’s submission, a commercially realistic view would be to accept that the Debtor can rely on its interest in assisting the corporate group to optimise its assets for its global trading business. The Debtor also argues that the assignment of the Vessel B Claims was incidental to a transfer of property, namely the rights in and to the Storage Agreement.
Independent Counsel’s opinions
- [48]
[48] As these appeals raised some intricate points of law, we appointed Professors Tham Chee Ho (“Prof Tham”) and Wee Meng Seng (“Prof Wee”) to provide their views on some of the issues. At this juncture, it suffices for us to set out their arguments in brief, as we will revisit them in our analysis.
Prof Tham’s submissions
- [49]
[49] Prof Tham submits, in relation to the interpretative principles governing non-assignment clauses, that there is no special approach to be adopted and that the proper interpretation is dependent on the wording of the clause, objectively understood, in light of the relevant context. He nevertheless argues that, as with the concern underlying the generous approach to interpreting arbitration clauses laid down in Fiona Trust & Holding Corp v Privalov [2007] Bus LR 1719 (“Fiona Trust”), the concern underlying the interpretation of non-assignment clauses is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. Following from this, it was suggested that the approach taken in Burleigh House, which interpreted a non-assignment clause in a manner analogous to that taken in Fiona Trust, should not be ruled out as decisively as the Judge did.
- [50]
[50] As regards the effect of a breach of a non-assignment clause, Prof Tham submits that Linden Gardens does not stand for the proposition that an assignment in breach of such a clause would be void. He argues that the better view would be that the obligor would be free of any liability, in equity or at law, in respect of the said assignment. However, the assignment may be valid as between assignor and assignee inter se.
- [51]
[51] Finally, unlike the Judge (see [27] above), Prof Tham does not take a firm view on whether a foreign judgment, default or otherwise, triggers the doctrine of merger. In this regard, he notes that there are foreign authorities answering this question in the negative and it is not clear that the Default Judgment Debt merged with the Vessel A Claims.
Prof Wee’s submissions
- [52]
[52] The main thrust of Prof Wee’s submission is that the notion of a statutory trust should be abolished altogether, following the approach of the majority of the High Court of Australia in Commissioner of Taxation v Linter Textiles Australia Ltd (in liq) (2005) 215 ALR 1 (“Linter Textiles”). To this end, he argues that no lacuna would be left in the law by the abolition of the statutory trust in liquidation, and there is no need for this concept as the effects of winding up are sufficiently set out by statute. Relatedly, he adds that the statutory trust has little, if any, practical impact and that in any event it is too blunt a tool to serve the aims of modified universalism in the context of insolvency law.
- [53]
[53] As his secondary and alternative argument, he submits that if a statutory trust does arise in liquidation, there is no reason why it should not also arise in judicial management. In this regard, he argues that that the feature of the distribution of dividends that is present in a liquidation is not a necessary condition for the statutory trust to arise. Nevertheless, he takes the view that even if a statutory trust arises in the judicial management of a company, it does not negate mutuality for the purposes of insolvency set-off.
- [54]
[54] Prof Wee further submits that no exception to insolvency set-off would apply if any of the Assignments are valid, either under the grounds listed in s 219(3) of the IRDA or at common law. He notes, however, that allowing a debtor to set off a debt it owes to a company that is in insolvent liquidation, against a claim that the debtor acquires from a creditor of the company, is objectionable when the debtor has notice of the company’s inability to pay its debts because it would be an abuse of the insolvency set-off regime.
- [55]
[55] Lastly, Prof Wee agrees with the Judge that the operation of s 219(2) of the IRDA does not extend to a judicial management under the CA and accepted at the hearing that it was clear that the relevant date for determining mutuality for the purpose of an insolvency set-off is the date of commencement of winding up of OTPL.
Issues on appeal
- [56]
[56] By the time these appeals were heard, it was clear that two broad questions arose for our consideration. The first is whether the Assignments should be ineffective as against OTPL, and if so, on what ground. Second, if the assignments of any of the Assigned Claims are valid as against OTPL, the inquiry would then proceed to whether insolvency set-off operates in relation to the claims which have been successfully assigned.
- [57]
[57] Before turning to the analysis proper, we make some observations on these two questions and their interrelationship. On the first question:
(a) The overarching inquiry is whether the Assignments should be rendered void, unenforceable and/or ineffective against OTPL on the grounds of public policy. While the individual claims forming the Assigned Claims differ in their nature and subject, it is undisputed that the Assignments were for the common purpose of allowing the Debtor to exercise an insolvency set-off in respect of those claims and thereby circumvent the regime of pari passu distribution in OTPL’s liquidation. If the Assignments were contrary to public policy, and if this rendered all the Assignments void, unenforceable and/or ineffective against OTPL, this conclusion would be dispositive of the appeals.
(b) Further and in the alternative, it may also be relevant as a matter of public policy to consider whether the Assigned Claims are bare rights of action, which would engage the public policy against champerty and maintenance and, in that event, whether any of the established exceptions apply to validate the Assignments.
(c) Finally, the scope of the NAC, and specifically, whether it proscribes the assignment of tortious claims, and what its effect is, may be considered.
- [58]
[58] The second question, which is whether insolvency set-off avails, is only engaged if any of the Assigned Claims are effective against OTPL. If there are none, there is simply no provable debt owing by OPTL to the Debtor that can be the subject of an insolvency set-off vis-à-vis the Debtor. Conversely, if any of the Assignments are valid and effective as against OTPL, it would be germane to consider whether insolvency set-off applies to those claim(s). In answering this question, the following sub-issues would arise for determination:
(a) What the relevant date is for determining mutuality for insolvency set-off under s 219 of the IRDA where a company had been under judicial management under the CA immediately prior to liquidation under the IRDA.
(b) Whether a statutory trust arises over the assets of a company in judicial management under the CA such that mutuality between the Assigned Claims and the Counterclaims would be defeated.
(c) Whether any exception to insolvency set-off applies under s 219(3) of the IRDA or at common law.
Our decision
Whether the Assignments are ineffective against OTPL because they contravene public policy
- [59]
[59] In our judgment, the Assignments are ineffective against OTPL and there is no room at all for insolvency set-off to operate. As mentioned above at [57(a)], this finding is dispositive of the present appeals.
All assignments are liable to be struck down on public policy grounds
- [60]
[60] The law relating to assignments is undoubtedly driven by considerations of policy, which historically found expression in the rules against champerty and maintenance. Maintenance has been understood in terms of assistance or encouragement being given to a party to a litigation by a person who has neither an interest in the litigation nor any motive recognised in the law as justifying such interference. Champerty is a type of maintenance, and consists of maintaining a civil action in consideration of a promise of a share in the proceeds if successful (see POA Recovery Pte Ltd v Yau Kwok Seng and others and another appeal [2022] 1 SLR 1165 (“POA Recovery”) at [86]–[87] and Lim Lie Hoa v Ong Jane Rebecca [1997] 1 SLR(R) 775 at [23]).
- [61]
[61] As Danckwerts J observed in Martell and others v Consett Iron Co Ld [1955] Ch 363 (“Martell”), the locus classicus in the law of maintenance and champerty, the law in this area originated in response to abuses which arose in the context of English medieval society (at 375). This, however, did not prevent the law from evolving in line with modern ideas of propriety (at 384). In Giles v Thompson [1994] 1 AC 142 (“Giles”), it was observed by the House of Lords that the law in this area had not stood still but had accommodated itself to changing times (at 164). Indeed, the doctrines are said to be not immutable but rather “evolving concepts” which reflect the times (Marcus Smith & Nico Leslie, The Law of Assignment, Oxford University Press, 3rd Ed, 2018 (“Smith & Leslie”) at para 23.07).
- [62]
[62] It has also been suggested that the law of maintenance and champerty is best kept in “forward motion” by looking to its origins as a principle of public policy designed to protect the purity of justice and the interest of vulnerable litigants (see POA Recovery at [88], citing Giles at 164). Notably in this regard, Lord Mustill opined in Giles that instead of taking an unduly granular view of the transaction sought to be impugned, the nub of the question is whether there is wanton and officious intermeddling with the disputes of others where the meddler has no interest whatsoever, and where the assistance he renders to one or the other party is “without justification or excuse” (at 164). Subsequently, in Simpson v Norfolk & Norwich University Hospital NHS Trust [2012] 2 WLR 873, Moore-Bick LJ observed that the court would consider whether the assignee “does not have a sufficient interest in the subject matter of the claim to justify taking an assignment” (at [22]). These statements encapsulate the modern approach of looking to the purpose and effect of the purported assignment.
- [63]
[63] The test as it stood for some time in Singapore was expressed in the decision of the High Court in Re Vanguard Energy Pte Ltd [2015] 4 SLR 597 (“Re Vanguard”) (at [43]–[44]). The starting point was that an assignment of a bare cause of action (or the fruits of such actions) would be struck down unless:
(i) whether the assignment conflicts with existing public policy that is directed to protecting the purity of justice or the due administration of justice, and the interests of vulnerable litigants; and
(ii) the policy in favour of ensuring access to justice.
- [64]
[64] Under the framework set out in Re Vanguard, the first question is whether an assignment is of a bare cause of action, in contrast to a claim for a debt or a claim based on property rights. It is only if this is answered in the affirmative that the question of whether the assignment may conflict with the due administration of justice would then arise. However, this is potentially underinclusive because it neglects to consider public policy where what is sought to be assigned is not a bare cause of action, despite the myriad situations in which the administration of justice may be compromised or other public policy factors engaged. It also has the potential to encourage artificiality in the way claims are characterised. As one commentator has observed, the different treatment between bare causes of action, and those involving a claim for a debt or claims based on property rights, can result in litigants “window dressing” what are bare causes of action as claims to property rights (see Rachael Mulheron, The Modern Doctrines of Champerty and Maintenance (Oxford University Press, 2023) (“Modern Doctrines”) at p 179).
- [65]
[65] There are recent strands of English law appearing to respond to this concern. The first step there remains similar to our law and involves the characterisation of what is sought to be assigned (see Ndole Assets Ltd v Designer M&E Services UK Ltd [2017] EWHC 1148 (TCC) at [62]). From the judgment of Lord Roskill in the seminal decision of the House of Lords in Trendtex Trading Corporation v Credit Suisse [1981] 3 WLR 766 (“Trendtex”), a distinction is to be drawn between bare causes of action, which essentially entail the assertion of personal rights, and causes of action that are of a property right or interest or that are ancillary to a property right or interest (at 778–779). An assignment is presumptively valid in the latter context. On the other hand, if the assignment is of a bare cause of action, it is presumptively invalid and champertous unless the assignee can show a genuine commercial interest in the subject matter of the litigation, or if the assignment is of a property right or interest and the cause of action is ancillary to that right or interest (see Trendtex at 779).
- [66]
[66] However, recent English decisions have placed greater weight on the importance of public policy and have suggested that public policy considerations may operate to strike down an assignment even where the assignment is not of a bare cause of action. In Casehub Limited and Wolf Cola Limited [2017] EWHC 1169, Stuart Isaacs QC considered that the assignment in question was not of a bare cause of action, but nevertheless went on to consider separately whether there were any public policy grounds which would invalidate the assignment (at [25] and [28]). Similarly, in Farrar and another v Miller [2022] EWCA Civ 295 (“Farrar”), the Court of Appeal understood Trendtex to mean that although an assignee might have a genuine commercial interest in the assignment of a bare cause of action, the assignment may nonetheless be held to be void if it was champertous (at [22]; citing Trendtex at 779, per Lord Roskill).
- [67]
[67] This raises the question of whether there are broader concerns of public policy that underlie the consideration of the validity of assignments. We note that, in arriving at the legal framework set out at [63] above, the High Court in Re Vanguard referred to Giles and to Regina (Factortame Ltd) v Secretary of State for Transport, Local Government and the Regions (No 8) [2003] QB 381 (“Factortame”). The court observed that in both Giles and Factortame, the approach taken in the consideration of public policy was purposive in nature and as a result, it was not decisive whether the assignment was entered into for a genuine commercial interest; nor was the existence of a genuine commercial interest always necessary (at [41]). It was further noted that public policy would even include the need to ensure access to justice, referring to Factortame, as well as to Fostif Pty Ltd v Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 83 and Siegfried Adalbert Unruh v Hans-Joerg Seeberger [2007] 2 HKLRD 414 (see Re Vanguard at [42]).
- [68]
[68] In our view, the High Court in Re Vanguard was correct to recognise that there are broader public policy concerns underlying the law of assignment which go beyond the search for a genuine commercial interest. In Giles, Lord Mustill said (at 164):
- [69]
[69] A closer reading of that passage illustrates that the overarching principle underlying the law of assignment, distilled to a single question, is whether upholding the assignment would run contrary to public policy, which inevitably includes concerns about the due administration of justice. This was echoed by the Court of Appeal in Factortame (at [44]):
- [70]
[70] It follows from these passages that concerns of public policy cannot be confined to situations involving the assignment of a bare cause of action. The rule in Re Vanguard arose from the public policy against champerty and maintenance, which in turn was concerned with the policy of preserving and protecting the due administration of justice. But once this is understood, it would be illogical to suggest that the rule and the underlying concern is limited or confined to the policy against champerty and maintenance. Indeed, there is nothing in principle that insulates the law of assignment from the need to conform to wider considerations of public policy, especially those concerning the need to secure the proper administration of justice.
The new framework for challenging an assignment on grounds of public policy
- [71]
[71] It follows that any assignment is potentially liable to be struck down if it contravenes public policy, just as other contractual arrangements may be struck down for illegality (see, for example, Ochroid Trading Ltd and another v Chua Siok Lui (trading as VIE Import & Export) and another [2018] 1 SLR 363). While this would give expression to other forms of public policy, it does not abolish the rules pertaining to champerty and maintenance.
- [72]
[72] Therefore, in so far as assignments of bare causes of action are concerned, the test in Re Vanguard (see [63] above) would continue to apply with the burden of proof unchanged, albeit with modifications to the structure of the test that we outline below. A party who seeks to assert that the assignment of a bare cause of action is valid has the burden of proving that the assignment does not contravene the policy against maintenance by showing that he comes within any of the exceptions set out in Re Vanguard. It is important to note that these are exceptions because they do not undermine the policy against maintenance. By establishing that the assignee comes within the exceptions in Re Vanguard, the assignee would in effect be showing that the policy concerns underlying the prohibition against champerty and maintenance are not engaged.
- [73]
[73] However, a party may seek to impugn a purported assignment on other grounds, by first showing that there is a policy that applies, and that is likely to be contravened by the purported assignment. The analysis here follows the framework set out by the High Court in UKM v Attorney-General [2019] 3 SLR 874 (“UKM”). In short, it will be necessary in this context for such a party to satisfy the court that there is a relevant public policy consideration, that it is sufficiently clear and defined, and that it operates to circumscribe the assignment (see UKM at [110]).
- [74]
[74] To this end, it will be necessary to consider the effect and purpose of the assignment. If a purported assignment was executed with the aim of allowing a party to assert a right under a statutory regime, this forms part of the relevant context and will need to be considered in that light. The imperative in this context is to look at the substance of the transaction and not merely to its form (see Lee Pey Woan, “Form, substance and recharacterisation” in Form and Substance in the Law of Obligations (Andrew Robertson & James Goudkamp, eds) (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2019) at pp 71–93).
- [75]
[75] Where a liquidation forms the backdrop to a dispute, the courts will typically have regard to the public policy that inheres in the insolvency regime even when dealing with questions which may be primarily concerned with matters of private law. In In re Spectrum Plus Ltd (in liquidation) [2005] 2 AC 680, the House of Lords had to determine whether a debenture created a fixed charge or a floating charge. Lord Scott approached this question with reference to the legislative aim of according priority to some classes of creditors over others, and opined that the definition of a floating charge should “keep in mind the mischief that these statutory reforms were intended to meet” (at [98] and [111]). In a similar vein, Lord Walker was cognisant that the distinction between a fixed and floating charge reflected the policy aim of “ensuring that preferential creditors obtain[ed] the measure of protection which Parliament intended them to have” (at [141]).
- [76]
[76] The decision of the House of Lords in British Eagle International Air Lines Ltd v Compagnie Nationale Air France [1975] 1 WLR 758 (“British Eagle”) supports this view. The plaintiff and defendant companies were members of the International Air Transport Association (“IATA”) and were part of a clearing house arrangement, which was a mechanism for the monthly settlement of debits and credits arising from services provided. Under the regulations to which the parties were subject, they could not claim the amounts due directly from one another but could only claim from IATA the balances due to them under the arrangement. On the voluntary winding up of the plaintiff company, the liquidator claimed a sum representing the difference between the value of services rendered by the plaintiffs to the defendants and by the defendants to the plaintiffs under the clearing house arrangement. The key issue was whether the clearing house arrangement should prevail even if that would lead to a result that was inconsistent with the pari passu regime that applied in the context of insolvency. The respondents sought to rely on the clearing house arrangement and argued that this should be permitted because the dominant purpose of the arrangement was not to evade the operation of the insolvency legislation. This was rejected by the majority of the House of Lords who held that the arrangement was invalid to the extent it contravened the public policy underlying pari passu distribution under the liquidation regime, and that this was not affected by the fact that the parties might have had good business reasons for entering into the arrangement. It was therefore held to be irrelevant that it was not the dominant purpose of the arrangement to evade the operation of the insolvency legislation (at 780–781).
- [77]
[77] British Eagle was followed by our High Court in Joo Yee Construction Pte Ltd (in liquidation) v Diethelm Industries Pte Ltd and others [1990] 1 SLR(R) 171 (“Joo Yee”). The question there was whether in the event a petition for the winding up of the main contractor was presented, a contractual term that obliged the Government to pay sums it owed the main contractor directly to the subcontractors instead, to cover what they were owed by the main contractor, was binding on the liquidator of the main contractor, or whether the onset of liquidation rendered that contractual obligation inoperative. L P Thean J observed that the case turned on the “effect of such a clause on the liquidation of the [main contractor]” [emphasis added] (at [6]) and articulated the controlling principle in these terms (at [18]):
- [78]
[78] The court held that the contractual obligation in that case had the effect of distributing to the main contractor’s unsecured creditors sums of money which would otherwise have been paid to the main contractor, and which would in the latter event have formed part of the general assets of the main contractor available for distribution among all its creditors pari passu. The operation of such a contractual provision was held to infringe the policy underlying the law of insolvency providing for distribution of the insolvent’s property pari passu among its creditors. Accordingly, it was held that it did not bind the liquidator (at [21]).
The public policy against improper circumventions of the pari passu distribution regime
- [79]
[79] The public policy reflected in British Eagle and Joo Yee – that private arrangements which contravene or otherwise undermine the rule of pari passu distribution in liquidation will not be given effect – is fundamental to insolvency law. Finding its genesis in the 16th century, the pari passu rule was first established in the Statute of Bankrupts 1542 (c 4) (UK) by King Henry VIII (see Goode on Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (Kristin van Zwieten gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 5th Ed, 2018) (“Goode”) at para 7-03). This, together with the anti-deprivation rule which prevents a reduction in the net asset value of the company to the detriment of its creditors at the point of winding up, are part of the general rule that a company and its creditors cannot contract out of insolvency legislation (see also Belmont Park Investments Pty Ltd and others v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd and another (Revenue and Customs Comrs and another intervening) [2012] 1 AC 383 (“Belmont Park”) at [1], per Lord Collins of Mapesbury). So well-entrenched is the policy of safeguarding the pari passu distribution regime that it has been said that there is “no basis for any fundamental challenge” to it (see Belmont Park at [148], per Lord Mance).
- [80]
[80] The policy of pari passu distribution is fundamental to the process of liquidation, with the proof of debt process that gives effect to this being the “exclusive procedure whereby a person claiming to be a creditor of the company and wishing to recover his debt in whole or in part must … submit his claim in writing to the liquidator” (see Woon’s Corporations Law (Walter Woon gen ed) (LexisNexis Singapore, 2023) (“Woon’s Corporations Law”) at para 6353, cited in Kyen Resources Pte Ltd (in compulsory liquidation) and others v Feima International (Hongkong) Ltd (in liquidation) and another matter [2024] 1 SLR 266 (“Kyen Resources”) at [32]). At the onset of liquidation, the means by which creditors are to recover their debts changes from “a grab race in which the swiftest creditors gain satisfaction at the expense of the not-so-swift”, to a process of collective enforcement (see Kyen Resources at [32], citing Woon’s Corporations Law at para 6353 and Andrew R Keay, McPherson and Keay, the Law of Company Liquidation (Sweet & Maxwell, 5th Ed, 2021) at para 13-002).
- [81]
[81] Two features of this policy of pari passu distribution are salient. First, it does not prescribe a time at which the arrangement must have been entered into or triggered. It is “enough that the effect of the relevant contractual or other provision is to apply an asset belonging to the debtor at or following the commencement of the insolvency procedure in a non-pari passu way” [emphasis added] (see Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Football League Ltd and another [2013] 1 BCLC 285 at [65] citing Belmont Park at [14]). The second feature, as alluded to above at [76], is that it does not matter that the parties might have had good business reasons and did not direct their minds to the question of how the arrangement might be affected by or might affect insolvency proceedings (see British Eagle at 780). To this, we observe that if the policy of pari passu distribution would operate to strike down even arrangements that were not intended to put one or more of the parties in a preferential position in relation to other creditors in a liquidation, it must all the more apply to arrangements entered into with the deliberate aim of doing so.
Abuses of insolvency set-off
- [82]
[82] An exception to the pari passu rule is the insolvency set-off mechanism, on which the Debtor seeks to rely. In Kyen Resources (at [35]), the nature and effect of an insolvency set-off was illustrated as follows:
- [83]
[83] The availability of an insolvency set-off is a concession to the notion that where parties have been dealing with one another in reliance on their ability to secure payment by withholding what is due to them, it would be “unjust, on the advent of liquidation, to deprive the solvent party of his security by compelling him to pay what he owes in full and be left to prove for his own claim” (see Goode at para 9-01; and Edward Bailey & Hugo Groves, Corporate Insolvency: Law and Practice (LexisNexis, 5th Ed, 2017) at para 26.44). It is not meant to encourage parties to engage in the trafficking of debts to avail themselves of the exception and thereby rank in priority to other unsecured creditors. Therefore, it is unsurprising that the ambit of this exception is narrowly circumscribed (see Kyen Resources at [35]).
- [85]
[85] The potential that this gave rise to abuse in respect of the insolvency set-off mechanism, and the prejudice that such abuse would cause other creditors, was recognised by the authors of Lightman & Moss, The Law of Administrators and Receivers of Companies (2017, 5th Ed, Sweet & Maxwell) (“Lightman & Moss”), who explained this as follows (at para 22-029):
- [86]
[86] Prof Wee agrees that insolvency set-off is objectionable when a debtor acquires a claim from a creditor of the company in circumstances where the debtor is aware of the company’s inability to pay its debts, for two reasons. The first, as noted by Lightman & Moss, is that the debtors’ debt to the company would be discharged by the full-face value of the debt it purchases from the creditor, causing the company’s assets to be diminished to a greater degree than it would otherwise be but for the assignment. This unfairly prejudices the other unsecured creditors. The other reason is that in so far as the creditor assigns its debt to a debtor (who intends to apply it by way of an insolvency set-off) at a price which is more than what the creditor would otherwise receive in dividends from the company, it would have circumvented the pari passu rule and received more than it would otherwise have done so. This unfairly benefits the creditor.
The Assignments are ineffective against the Liquidators for subverting the policy of pari passu distribution
- [87]
[87] It follows that the outcome of these appeals would not only affect the Debtor and OTPL, but the general class of unsecured creditors at large. It would, in our judgment, be not only appropriate but necessary that we take into account the interests of those unsecured creditors as a whole because they are the very class of persons in whose favour the pari passu regime is meant to operate. This is nothing new or unusual: see Joo Yee, British Eagle, as well as Ong Boon Chuan v Tong Guan Food Products Pte Ltd (in compulsory liquidation) and another [2022] SGHC 181 (at [23]). These decisions also demonstrate that the policy in favour of pari passu distribution is one which is not merely a consideration in such cases, but a dominant and operative concern that is part of the very fabric of the liquidation process – a point alluded to in Kyen Resources (at [32]–[35]).
- [88]
[88] Counsel for the Debtor, Mr Lok Vi Ming SC (“Mr Lok”), did not deny that the Assignments were carried out with the aim of gaining a tactical advantage over other unsecured creditors. While Mr Lok referred to this as an “optimisation” of their liabilities, in our judgment, it was nothing more than an abuse of the insolvency set-off process in an effort to steal a march on the other unsecured creditors. As we observed at the hearing, the Assignments were executed in anticipation of OTPL’s liquidation, and it was never suggested by the Debtor that they were, at the time of the Assignments, under the impression that OTPL was going to survive. Quite plainly, the Assignments were for the purpose of asserting an insolvency set-off when OTPL went into liquidation. This is a quintessential example of impermissible debt trafficking of the sort we have referred to earlier (at [84] above).
- [90]
[90] Mr Joseph Lee (“Mr Lee”), co-counsel for the Debtor, submitted that not giving effect to the Assignments in the present case would have wider ramifications on the market for distressed debts. However, we think that this is overstated. Our decision in these appeals would not prevent the trading of debts in the typical situation where a creditor sells its debt to another, preferring to take a fraction of its nominal value at once instead of waiting for the liquidation process to conclude and for the ultimate distribution to be effected. Such a transaction would be between two parties, the assignor and assignee, and would in no way affect the position of the insolvent company. The right acquired by the assignee is the same right to prove in the insolvency that the assignee had. Hence, there is no question of subverting the pari passu regime or any other policy concern. And a party that purchases the distressed debt in such circumstances does not do so for the purpose of asserting an insolvency set-off, but to obtain what it hopes and anticipates will be a better return when the assets of the company are liquidated and its proceeds distributed to the general body of unsecured creditors on a pari passu basis.
- [91]
[91] For this reason, we do not think this in any way raises any countervailing policy reason which might militate against holding the Assignments to be void and unenforceable. And this is sufficient for us to dispose of the appeals in favour of the Liquidators.
Whether the Vessel A Claims have merged into the Default Judgment
- [92]
[92] That said, however, as full arguments were raised in respect of a number of issues, we think it helpful to outline our views on some of the remaining issues in this case, beginning with the doctrine of merger.
- [93]
[93] Under Singapore law, when a judgment has been given on a cause of action, the doctrine of merger operates to merge the cause of action with the judgment of the court such that the cause of action ceases to have an independent existence (see the decision of this court in Michael Vaz Lorrain v Singapore Rifle Association [2020] 2 SLR 808 at [14]–[15]). Before the Judge, it was common ground that the Vessel A Claims standing on their own constituted bare rights of action that were not assignable as such; but also that those rights in any case had merged with the Default Judgment and this was where the parties joined issue below.
- [95]
[95] Prof Tham (with whom the Liquidators were aligned) submitted that no merger of the Vessel A Claims with the Default Judgment would have occurred because the doctrine of merger does not extend to judgments emanating from a foreign court: J. M. Lyon & Co v Meyer & Goldenberg [1893] 1 SSLR 19; Malaysia Credit Finance Bhd v Chen Huat Lai [1991] 2 SLR(R) 300 (“Malaysia Credit Finance”). Prof Tham suggested that it might be “arguable” that, by virtue of the Choice of Courts Agreements Act 2016 (2020 Rev Ed) (“CCAA”), the Reciprocal Enforcement of Commonwealth Judgments Act (Cap 164, 1985 Rev Ed) (“RECJA”) and the Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act 1959 (“REFJA”), a cause of action might merge with a foreign judgment where that foreign judgment is registered and/or enforced under those pieces of legislation, but this was not the case here.
- [96]
[96] We express the preliminary view that the position in Malaysia Credit Finance is correct and note that this is in line with the English common law position (see Carl-Zeiss-Stiftung v Rayner and Keeler Ltd and Others (No 2) [1966] 2 All ER 536 (“Carl-Zeiss-Stiftung”) at 561 and 567; and Black v Yates [1991] 3 WLR 90 at 102). It follows that the Vessel A Claims did not merge into the Default Judgment.
- [97]
[97] It seems to us that the Liquidators appear to have thought that the failure of the Vessel A Claims to merge with the Default Judgment would result in the Default Judgment not being enforceable or recognised as a debt. That is not correct. The validity of the Default Judgment as a debt is a separate matter from the question of whether a foreign default judgment and its underlying cause of action merges. In relation to the former question, we have noted our rejection of the Liquidators’ argument that the Default Judgment was invalidly obtained by virtue of the operation of s 227D(4)(c) of the CA (at [94] above). Therefore, the only practical consequence of merger not having occurred would be that the validity of the assignment of the Default Judgment would have to be considered separately from the Vessel A Claims, with the approach to the latter being the same as the approach towards the Vessel B Claims – that is, whether the Assignments were champertous and/or otherwise contrary to public policy.
Whether the Assigned Claims offend the law of maintenance and champerty
The appropriate framework for assessing whether an assignment is champertous
- [98]
[98] We take this opportunity to consider the appropriate framework for assessing whether an assignment is champertous. As we have noted, a bare right to litigate is generally not assignable, because if it is found to be champertous, it would generally be void and unenforceable (see the decision of the Privy Council in Massai Aviation Services and another v Attorney General and another [2007] UKPC 12 at [12]). The three exceptions to this were set out in Re Vanguard (at [43]): an assignment of a bare cause of action (or the fruits of such actions) will not be struck down: (a) if it is incidental to a transfer of property; (b) if the assignee has a legitimate interest in the outcome of the litigation; or (c) if there is no realistic possibility that the administration of justice may suffer as a result of the assignment. These are noted as being disjunctive exceptions, in that an assignment of a bare cause of action would not be struck down as long as any one of these exceptions was satisfied.
The Default Judgment
- [100]
[100] Under the framework described above (at [99]), we do not think that the assignment of the Default Judgment would be rendered void by operation of the law of champerty and maintenance.
- [102]
[102] In our view, the Judge was correct to characterise the Default Judgment as a species of debt (see Crooks v Newdigate Properties Ltd and others [2009] EWCA Civ 283 at [22]). Assignment of such a debt is treated as a transfer of property; any action brought to enforce the right to that debt is part and parcel of the assignee’s ownership of the debt, and thus not champertous provided that it does not adversely impact the administration of justice (see Re Oasis Merchandising Services Ltd [1997] 2 WLR 764 at 769; and Camdex Intl Ltd v Bank of Zambia [1998] QB 22 (“Camdex”) at 32).
- [103]
[103] We also note that the fact there has been no formal application for recognition or enforcement of the Default Judgment in Singapore is no bar to its provability for the purpose of insolvency set-off, so long as “the demand is capable of being liquidated, or ascertained with precision at the time of pleading” (see Axel Johnson Petroleum AB v MG Mineral Group AG [1992] 1 WLR 270 at 272). In short, a debt may be regarded as liquidated and capable of being set-off even if further litigation may be required (see Rory Derham, Derham on the Law of Set-Off (Oxford University Press, 4th Ed, 2010) at para 2.15). On the present facts, once we accept that the Default Judgment was a debt, it was capable of being assigned without falling foul of the policy against champerty and maintenance. However, as noted in our analysis at [59]–[90], the assignments in this case were invalidated by reason of offending the broader policy in favour of pari passu distribution in an insolvency setting.
The Assigned Claims
- [104]
[104] As for the Assigned Claims, we touch on three main issues: (a) whether the Debtor had a genuine commercial interest in taking the Assignments by reason of its relationship with the Assignor; (b) whether the assignment of the Vessel B Claims contravened the NAC; and (c) whether the Vessel B Claims were incapable of being set off against OTPL because the latter’s assets became subject to a trust upon the onset of insolvency.
Whether the Debtor had a genuine commercial interest in the Assigned Claims
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