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Grounds publishedDecided 4 Dec 2024
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Court of Appeal

Each charge led to its own penalty order, matching the gratification in that charge

Chang Peng Hong Clarence v Public Prosecutor

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[2024] SGCA 58Case no. Court of Appeal / Criminal Reference No 1 of 202440 paragraphs

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Each charge led to its own penalty order, matching the gratification in that charge

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] The applicant in CA/CRF 1/2024 (“CRF 1”), Mr Chang Peng Hong Clarence (“Mr Chang”), referred the following question of law to the Court of Appeal (the “Question”) after permission was granted by the Court of Appeal for him to do so:

  3. [2] Initially, in CA/CM 20/2023, Mr Chang filed an application for permission to refer three questions of law of purported public interest to the Court of Appeal pursuant to s 397(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (2020 Rev Ed) (the “CPC”). The original three questions included the Question here. On 23 January 2024, we refused permission summarily for two of the questions and granted permission for the Question only.

  4. [3] Pursuant to s 397(3E) of the CPC, Mr Chang filed a subsequent application to amend one of the two questions for which permission was refused. This application was disallowed on 20 March 2024.

  5. Facts

  6. [5] The facts are set out in the High Court’s judgment in Chang Peng Hong Clarence v Public Prosecutor and other appeals [2023] SGHC 225 (the “GD”). Mr Chang first met Mr Koh Seng Lee (“Mr Koh”) in 1997. Their relationship was not purely commercial. They were friends and their families went on holidays together.

  7. [6] Mr Chang joined BP as a Marine Support Executive in July 1997. He was promoted to Marine Trading Manager in November 1999 and then to Regional Operating Unit, Manager Fuels, in April 2003. In 2009, Mr Chang was designated Regional Marine Manager Fuels of the Global Residues Unit and his team covered oil trades in the Eastern Hemisphere.

  8. [7] Mr Koh was the sole shareholder and executive director of Pacific Prime Trading Pte Ltd (“PPT”). PPT was in the business of wholesale and retail of trade of mineral fuels and lubricants. PPT was BP’s trading counterparty between 2001 and 2015.

  9. [8] Between 31 July 2006 and 26 July 2010, over 19 transactions, Mr Koh transferred a total of US$3.95m from his HSBC Hong Kong bank account to Mr Chang’s HSBC Hong Kong bank account. Mr Koh also transferred an aggregate of S$525,000 to Mindchamps City Square (“Mindchamps”) from September 2009. Mindchamps was incorporated in September 2009 with Mr Koh and Mr Chang’s wife as directors and equal shareholders. Mr Koh was paid $182,500 by Mindchamps between November 2014 and February 2015.

  10. [10] Mr Chang appealed against his conviction and sentence. The Prosecution cross-appealed against the sentence imposed on Mr Chang. In the General Division of the High Court, Justice Vincent Hoong (the “Judge”) upheld Mr Chang’s conviction for 19 charges and acquitted him on one s 6(a) charge: GD at [96] and [107]. The Judge allowed the Prosecution’s appeal against sentence and increased Mr Chang’s aggregate sentence to 80 months’ imprisonment: GD at [129].

  11. Proceedings in the High Court

  12. Prosecution’s submissions in the High Court

  13. [17] Imposing in-default imprisonment terms on the basis of one penalty for each charge would also be consistent with s 319(1)(e). This provision allows the court to impose in-default sentences even where the total term of imprisonment would exceed the statutory maximum sentence that a court may impose for a single offence pursuant to s 303 of the CPC, provided the total term of imprisonment does not exceed the limits prescribed by s 306 of the CPC (which would be 20 years’ imprisonment in this case).

  14. [18] Finally, the Prosecution submitted that such an approach would also facilitate the pro-rating of the global in-default imprisonment term in the event of part-payment being made for the penalty orders.

  15. Mr Chang’s submissions in the High Court

  16. [19] Mr Chang relied on the language in s 13(2) of the PCA, which states that “[w]here a person charged with 2 or more offences … is convicted of one or some of those offences, and the other outstanding offences are taken into consideration … the court may increase the penalty mentioned in subsection (1) …”. The language used in s 13(2) suggests that the penalty imposed under s 13(1) is a global one that may be increased when there are charges taken into consideration (“TIC”) for sentencing. Mr Chang also submitted that the Prosecution’s approach – to reflect the TIC charges by only increasing one of the penalty orders – posed difficulties in that it was unclear why only one penalty should be increased because of the TIC charges.

  17. The Judge’s decision

  18. (a) First, the phrase “[where] a court convicts any person of an offence” would refer to each charge for a PCA offence. Where an offender faces more than one charge for a PCA offence, s 13(1) calls for the court to impose the number of penalty orders corresponding to the number of charges for the PCA offences (“First Interpretation”).

  19. [27] Finally, the court should take a last look at the aggregate sentence to ensure that the in-default imprisonment term is not crushing overall. However, the application of the totality principle for penalty orders should be on a much less intrusive basis compared to in-default sentences imposed for fines: GD at [167]–[171].

  20. CA/CM 20/2023

  21. The parties’ cases in the Court of Appeal

  22. Mr Chang’s Case

  23. [35] Similarly, it was submitted that the Judge’s interpretation was unsatisfactory because it left the number of penalty orders completely arbitrary. Mr Chang further submitted that the rationale behind the Judge’s interpretation was inconsistent with the underlying purpose of s 13(1) of the PCA in that the provision does not aim to enforce disgorgement but instead seeks to deter the commission of offences under the PCA. The Prosecution’s and the Judge’s interpretations also potentially circumvented the statutory limit of 30 months’ imprisonment on in-default imprisonment terms for penalty orders, as set out in s 319(1)(d) of the CPC. This risked violating the proportionality principle.

  24. Prosecution’s Case

  25. [38] Further, there have been cases where sentencing courts imposed multiple penalty orders. Imposing multiple penalty orders would lead to more equitable in-default sentences. The current sentencing practice with respect to in-default imprisonment terms for penalty orders under s 13(1) of the PCA lacked internal consistency and serving the in-default terms was a far more lucrative option for offenders who received large amounts of gratification as compared to offenders who received smaller amounts. In contrast, imposing multiple penalty orders would incentivise the disgorgement of ill-gotten gains.

  26. [40] The Prosecution argued that the Judge’s reasoning was flawed. While the number of individual in-default imprisonment terms would vary depending on the number of charges preferred against an offender, it did not necessarily follow that the aggregate in-default imprisonment term would vary. Adopting the Prosecution’s interpretation would be consistent with the sentencing approach for fines and facilitate the development of effective precedents.

  27. [41] The Prosecution also submitted that the Judge’s reference to other statutory provisions such as s 5 of the POA and s 305(1) of the CPC was inapposite. First, those provisions specify the imposition of singular orders. Second, those provisions provide for alternative sentences while s 13(1) of the PCA provides for additional orders. Third, the legislative intention behind the provisions are different – s 13 of the PCA is intended to disgorge while the other two provisions are intended to provide rehabilitative programmes for young offenders.

  28. [42] On the appropriate framework for calibrating the in-default imprisonment terms for penalties, the Prosecution submitted that if the Judge’s interpretation is accepted, then the Judge’s approach to calibrating the in-default imprisonment terms should be adopted. However, if the Prosecution’s interpretation is adopted, then the appropriate framework ought to be as follows:

  29. (a) First, the court should calculate the in-default terms for the individual charges. In so calibrating, the court must ensure the in-default term will deter the offender from opting not to pay the penalty. The court should consider:

  30. (i) The quantum of gratification stated in the charge.

  31. (ii) The personal circumstances of the offender (including the offender’s financial condition and his ability to pay the penalty).

  32. (iii) Other relevant facts such as the offender’s last known salary and whether the offender was compelled to dissipate the gratification he received rather than retain it).

  33. (c) Third, the court should ensure that the global sentence is not crushing and ensure that the total sentences do not exceed the limit prescribed by s 306(4) of the CPC (ie, 20 years’ imprisonment). The totality principle may apply on a much less intrusive basis compared to in-default sentences for fines but the court should still be mindful that the total default imprisonment term is not crushing. At this stage, the court should also consider whether the total default term will incentivise disgorgement. If it does not, the totality principle can have a boosting effect and lead to an increase in the in-default sentences to prevent the evasion of payment.

  34. [43] Applying its proposed framework, the Prosecution submitted that the following penalty orders should be made with the accompanying in-default imprisonment terms for this case:

  35. Charge

  36. Quantum of penalty

  37. Adjusted proposed in-default sentence (in weeks)

  38. 1

  39. 473,310

  40. 56

  41. 2

  42. 556,290

  43. 66

  44. 3

  45. 461,820

  46. 55

  47. 4

  48. 153,040

  49. 18

  50. 5

  51. 151,630

  52. 18

  53. 6

  54. 535,290

  55. 63

  56. 7

  57. 302,940

  58. 36

  59. 8

  60. 295,700

  61. 35

  62. 9

  63. 288,520

  64. 34

  65. 10

  66. 210,750

  67. 25

  68. 11

  69. 272,320

  70. 32

  71. 12

  72. 282,080

  73. 33

  74. 13

  75. 296,200

  76. 35

  77. 14

  78. 305,820

  79. 36

  80. 15

  81. 227,130

  82. 27

  83. 16

  84. 147,360

  85. 17

  86. 17

  87. 433,950

  88. 52

  89. 18

  90. 278,740

  91. 33

  92. 19

  93. 204,705

  94. 24

  95. Global in-default sentence

  96. [695] weeks (about 13 years and four months)

  97. [45] The Prosecution submitted that the maximum sentence of 20 years (in the event of default of payment of the penalty orders) is justified on three grounds. First, it would be an effective deterrent against non-payment of the penalty orders. Second, the daily value is still higher than the average daily value of about $799 for default imprisonment terms imposed for large fines. Third, the total sentence is not crushing because Mr Chang has the means to pay the full amount of the penalty orders.

  98. Issues to be determined

  99. [47] Three issues arose for our determination:

  100. (b) Second, whether, and if so, how, the in-default imprisonment term should be recalibrated here if the Question is answered in the affirmative (“Issue 2”).

  101. (c) Third, whether the doctrine of prospective overruling should apply in this case (“Issue 3”).

  102. Issue 1: whether a court may impose multiple penalty orders under the PCA

  103. The proper interpretation of s 13 of the PCA

  104. [48] Section 13 of the PCA provides as follows:

  105. [50] The legislative purpose of s 13(1) of the PCA is to prevent corrupt recipients from retaining their ill-gotten gains. The Court of Appeal’s statements in Public Prosecutor v Takaaki Masui and another and other matters [2022] 1 SLR 1033 (“Takaaki Masui”) at [91]–[93] are relevant here:

  106. [51] The court’s statements in Takaaki Masui accord with the comments made by Mr E.W. Barker during the second reading of the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Bill on 22 December 1981, when s 13(2) was introduced into the PCA (Singapore Parl Debates; Vol 41, Sitting No 6; Col 319; 22 December 1981 (E.W. Barker, Minister for Law)):

  107. [53] As the maximum term of imprisonment for an offence under ss 5(a) or 6(a) is five years (or 60 months), the maximum term of in-default imprisonment would be one half of this maximum, which is 30 months.

  108. [55] We also disagreed with Mr Chang’s reliance on other statutory provisions that use broadly similar language. Mr Chang referred to s 5 of the POA and ss 305(1) and 359(3) of the CPC. These provisions state:

  109. Appropriate framework for calibrating in-default imprisonment terms

  110. [62] In proposing its framework for calibrating the in-default imprisonment terms, the Prosecution used the daily value in money terms for each day of in-default imprisonment as a starting point. For instance, in a case where the in-default imprisonment term was 100 days and the amount of gratification received was $100,000, the daily value for each day of in-default imprisonment would be $1,000. The Prosecution studied a sample of 45 previous cases involving penalty orders and in-default imprisonment and derived an average daily value of about $1,200.

  111. [63] As a working guide and starting point, we adopted the value of $1,000 for each day of in-default imprisonment. This amount of $1,000 bears some correlation to the overall average of $1,200 worked out by the Prosecution and the round figure is easier for the purpose of computation. The result of this simple mathematical exercise could then be enhanced (if the result appears too lenient to incentivise payment of the penalty) or ameliorated (if it appears too harsh in the event of a genuine inability to pay) when the court looks at the overall term of in-default imprisonment on account of the totality principle. Similarly, the final term of in-default imprisonment could be adjusted to comply with the applicable statutory limits.

  112. [64] If there are TIC charges (none in the present case), the court may add the penalty for those TIC charges to any of the charges that the Prosecution proceeded with and which the offender was convicted on. This exercise is again subject to the statutory overall limit of 20 years’ imprisonment and to the statutory limit of 30 months’ imprisonment for each charge. The court may consider the amounts of gratification in the TIC charges globally and add them to any charge that the offender was convicted on. Alternatively, the court may add the amount in one or more TIC charges to one or more charges that the offender was convicted on. The intention in whichever permutation is adopted is that it must fulfil the legislative purpose of causing the disgorgement of all gratifications received corruptly.

  113. (a) First, as a starting point, the court calculates the period of in-default imprisonment for non-payment of the amount of gratification in each charge by using the daily value of $1,000 for each day of in-default imprisonment.

  114. (b) Second, the court ensures that the individual in-default imprisonment terms comply with the statutory limitation imposed by s 319(1)(d) of the CPC for each charge (ie, 30 months’ imprisonment).

  115. (c) Third, the court ensures that the aggregate of the in-default imprisonment terms complies with the statutory limitation on the overall imprisonment term at one trial set out in s 319(1)(e), read with ss 303 and 306 of the CPC (ie, 20 years’ imprisonment for the District Court). Here, the court has to include the terms of imprisonment already imposed as punishment for the offences.

  116. (d) Fourth, if there are TIC charges involving the receipt of gratification, the court adds the amounts in one or more TIC charges to the amounts in one or more of the charges that the offender was convicted on pursuant to s 13(2) of the PCA. In doing so, the court should add the amounts in the TIC charges to those charges in which the in-default imprisonment terms do not breach the statutory limit of 30 months as stated in (b) above. This enables the court to impose an in-default imprisonment term for the amounts in the TIC charges.

  117. (e) Finally, utilising the totality principle and bearing in mind that in-default imprisonment terms run consecutively, the court considers whether the aggregate of the in-default imprisonment terms will be sufficient to disincentivise the offender from non-payment of the total penalty. Here, the court may refine the in-default imprisonment terms for the individual charges and may consider whether the offender has the financial means to pay the penalty.

  118. Issue 2: what the recalibrated in-default imprisonment term should be

  119. [67] In the light of our answer to the Question and using the framework set out above, we recalibrated the in-default imprisonment term in the following manner.

  120. [68] First, we calculated the tentative in-default imprisonment term for each of the 19 charges that Mr Chang was convicted on using the daily value of $1,000. The tentative number of days of in-default imprisonment for each charge is set out in the right column below:

  121. Charge

  122. Amount of gratification/penalty

  123. Tentative in-default imprisonment (in days)

  124. 1

  125. 473,310

  126. 473

  127. 2

  128. 556,290

  129. 556

  130. 3

  131. 461,820

  132. 461

  133. 4

  134. 153,040

  135. 153

  136. 5

  137. 151,630

  138. 151

  139. 6

  140. 535,290

  141. 535

  142. 7

  143. 302,940

  144. 302

  145. 8

  146. 295,700

  147. 295

  148. 9

  149. 288,520

  150. 288

  151. 10

  152. 210,750

  153. 210

  154. 11

  155. 272,320

  156. 272

  157. 12

  158. 282,080

  159. 282

  160. 13

  161. 296,200

  162. 296

  163. 14

  164. 305,820

  165. 305

  166. 15

  167. 227,130

  168. 227

  169. 16

  170. 147,360

  171. 147

  172. 17

  173. 433,950

  174. 433

  175. 18

  176. 278,740

  177. 278

  178. 19

  179. 204,705

  180. 204

  181. Global tentative in-default imprisonment

  182. 5,868 days (about 196 months)

  183. [69] In our oral judgment in court, we used the global amount of gratification of $5,877,595 to arrive at a tentative 5,877 days of in-default imprisonment. As will become apparent, the difference of nine days between this and the figure above of 5,868 days is inconsequential.

  184. [70] There were no TIC charges in this case. None of the tentative in-default imprisonment terms in the 19 charges exceeded the maximum in-default imprisonment term of 30 months (or 900 days) for each charge: see s 319(1)(d) of the CPC.

  185. [71] The statutory limit on the maximum sentence is 20 years’ or 240 months’ imprisonment. The Judge imposed a total of 80 months’ imprisonment and that was not the subject of this reference to the Court of Appeal. This meant that the total in-default imprisonment term here was limited to 160 months (240 months minus 80 months). The tentative aggregate in-default imprisonment term of 196 months exceeded this limit by 36 months.

  186. Issue 3: whether the doctrine of prospective overruling should apply

  187. Applicable law

  188. [73] The doctrine of prospective overruling applies only in an exceptional case: Adri Anton Kalangie v Public Prosecutor [2018] 2 SLR 557 (“Adri Anton Kalangie”) at [39]–[40]. The principles to determine whether the doctrine of prospective overruling applies were summarised by the Court of Appeal in Adri Anton Kalangie at [70]:

  189. (a) In determining whether the doctrine should be invoked, the central inquiry is whether the departure from the ordinary retroactivity of the judgment is necessary to avoid serious and demonstrable injustice to the parties at hand or to the administration of justice. In this regard, the following factors identified in Public Prosecutor v Hue An Li [2014] 4 SLR 661 (“Hue An Li”) at [124] are relevant:

  190. (i) the extent to which the pre-existing legal principle or position was entrenched;

  191. (ii) the extent of the change to the legal principle;

  192. (iii) the extent to which the change in the legal principle was foreseeable; and

  193. (iv) the extent of reliance on the legal principle.

  194. No one factor is preponderant over any other, and no one factor is necessary before the doctrine can be invoked in a particular case.

  195. (b) The onus of establishing that there are grounds to exercise such discretion and limit the retroactive effect of a judgment is ordinarily on whoever seeks the court’s exercise of that discretion.

  196. (c) If the doctrine of prospective overruling is invoked, this should be explicitly stated and the precise effect of the doctrine should, if appropriate, be explained. As a general rule, judicial pronouncements are presumed to be retroactive in effect until and unless expressly stated or plainly indicated otherwise.

  197. [74] In Hue An Li, the Court of Appeal elaborated on the four factors as follows (Hue An Li at [124]):

  198. [76] The number of penalty orders imposed on an offender does not affect the aggregate amount of gratification being disgorged through those penalties. If the offender receives gratifications, the law already provides that he will have to disgorge the full amount to the state upon conviction. This case merely changed the aggregate in-default imprisonment term, which only applies to the extent that Mr Chang fails to pay the penalty. Here, it was undisputed that Mr Chang had the means to pay the aggregate amount of the penalty orders. Therefore, there was no serious or demonstrable injustice shown which would justify the application of the doctrine of prospective overruling.

  199. Amalgamated charges

  200. [77] The issue of amalgamated charges did not arise for decision in this case. Pursuant to s 124(8) of the CPC, where a person is convicted on an amalgamated charge, the court may sentence that person to two times the amount of punishment to which that person would otherwise have been liable if that person had been charged with and convicted on any one of the incidents of commission of the offence.

  201. Conclusion

  202. [79] For the reasons set out above, we answered the Question in the affirmative:

  203. [80] Mr Chang’s conviction on the 19 charges and his sentence of 80 months’ imprisonment continued to stand. There were 19 penalty orders issued, each matching the value of gratification stated in each charge. The total amount of the penalty orders was $5,877,595 with an aggregate in-default imprisonment term of 120 months.