A contempt appeal failed but the jail term was cut for obstructing a property transfer

[1] The law of contempt of court seeks to uphold the standing of the court. Its fundamental purpose is to ensure that the court’s orders and authority are respected so as to promote the effective administration of justice in our legal system; it is the means by which the court upholds its own legitimacy, especially when persons scandalise the court or intentionally disobey its orders. This appeal focuses on the latter type of contempt.

[5] The Judge answered the question above in the affirmative, and we agreed. We dismissed the appeal, although we reduced the sentence from four weeks’ imprisonment to two weeks’ imprisonment. These are our detailed grounds.

[6] The background to this matter is stated more fully in the Judgment (HC). We set out the details germane to the present appeal.

[7] The parties were in a short-lived relationship from 2016 to 2019. The respondent transferred substantial sums of money to the appellant to purchase, among other things, assets in Singapore. One such asset was the Property, which was purchased with the respondent’s money.

[8] The Judge agreed with the respondent’s claims in Suit 625 that his moneys were not transferred to the appellant as a gift, but in furtherance of their intention to eventually live together as husband and wife. Therefore, when the parties’ relationship broke down, the respondent was entitled to claim the return of the moneys and assets pursuant to the established rules of property law. What is relevant to this appeal is that the Judge granted a declaration that the respondent owned 100% of the Property: Judgment (HC) at [94]. This finding was upheld on appeal: Judgment (AD) at [65].

[11] On 21 November 2023, some eight months after the Judge’s decision was delivered in OA 806, the respondent applied for permission to commence committal proceedings against the appellant vide HC/SUM 3588/2023 (“SUM 3588”). On 5 February 2024, the Judge granted permission for committal proceedings to be brought against the appellant.

[12] On 7 February 2024, the respondent commenced committal proceedings against the appellant vide HC/SUM 392/2024 (“SUM 392”). It is relevant at this juncture, and material to this appeal, to refer to the procedural requirements that the respondent had to fulfil once the court granted its permission to bring the committal application against the appellant. Under O 23 r 4(1) of the ROC 2021, the committal applicant must:

[13] On 19 February 2024, the Relevant Documents were served on the appellant via email. However, this was before any application for dispensation of personal service or substituted service had been made. Two unsuccessful attempts were made at personal service of the Relevant Documents on the appellant on 19 February 2024 and 21 February 2024.

[15] The Judge agreed that personal service should have been effected, but observed that the 14 day requirement “may only apply to the filing, and not to the service”. Nevertheless, “[o]ut of an abundance of caution”, the Judge granted an extension of time to the respondent to serve the Relevant Documents personally within seven days of 8 March 2024 (ie, the date of the hearing), and if personal service could not be effected, to make an application for substituted service or dispensation of service within seven days thereafter.

[16] Personal service of the Relevant Documents was attempted unsuccessfully on 9 March 2024. On 15 March 2024, the respondent applied for the dispensation of personal service on the appellant or substituted service vide HC/SUM 738/2024. The Judge granted permission for substituted service on 1 April 2024. Substituted service was effected on the appellant on 9 April 2024 by way of email.

[17] The hearing of SUM 392 took place on 19 August 2024. On 21 August 2024, the Judge delivered his decision. The Judge found the appellant liable for contempt of court and sentenced her to one month’s imprisonment.

[27] On the procedural front, the appellant claimed in her written submissions that the Judge erred by granting the respondent an extension of time to effect personal service of the Relevant Documents on her. She argued that the respondent’s failure to effect personal service within 14 days of being granted permission to commence committal proceedings (as required by O 23 r 4(1) of the ROC 2021) should have removed the court’s jurisdiction over the committal application, and that the Judge’s decision to grant the extension of time deprived the appellant of procedural safeguards under the Rules of Court.

[30] On the substantive front, the appellant claimed that the alleged breaches did not amount to contempt for the same reasons which she had advanced below, that:

(d) The appellant did not possess the requisite mens rea.

[31] Finally, the appellant claimed that the custodial sentence was unduly harsh and disproportionate, as the respondent had already obtained legal title to and possession of the Property before the contempt proceedings were commenced, and thus she did not have the “usual” opportunity to purge her contempt, which would have allowed her to mitigate her offence.

[32] The respondent argued that no extension of time was necessary to effect personal service, as there was no requirement for personal service to be effected within 14 days of the court granting permission to bring the committal application. Further, the appellant did not dispute that service was properly effected after the hearing on 8 March 2024 was adjourned. The Judge plainly had the power to grant such an extension under O 3 r 2(1) and O 3 r 4(1) of the ROC 2021. There was no prejudice occasioned to the appellant in any case as she was present and represented at the 8 March 2024 committal hearing.

[33] On the substance of the appellant’s appeal, the respondent submitted that:

[35] There were four issues before us on appeal:

(a) Whether the Judge erred in extending the time for the respondent to cure his alleged failure to effect personal service under O 23 r 4(1) of the ROC 2021;

(c) Whether the appellant’s failure to sign the transfer form and hand over the Certificate of Title for the Property amounted to contempt of court; and

(d) Whether the custodial sentence was proportionate in the circumstances.

Whether the Judge erred in extending the time for the respondent to cure his failure to effect personal service under O 23 r 4(1) of the ROC 2021

[36] We held that the Judge did not err in granting the extension of time to the respondent to serve the Relevant Documents on the appellant.

[37] As highlighted by the Judge, a plain reading of O 23 r 4(1) of the ROC 2021 shows that it does not require personal service to be effected within 14 days of obtaining permission to bring the committal application. We reproduce O 23 r 4 in its entirety below to illustrate our point:

[39] Furthermore, we held that the purpose of the 21-day period under O 23 r 4(2) of the ROC 2021 was to ensure that the contemnor had sufficient time to prepare her defence before the committal application was heard. Plainly, more than 21 days had elapsed between the date when substituted service was effected (9 April 2024) and the actual date when the committal application was heard (19 August 2024).

[40] Although the fixing of the first hearing date on 8 March 2024 did not comply with the 21-day requirement, this did not mean that the entire application was defective. That was a strained and impractical reading of this rule. As we pointed out to Mr Yap at the hearing of this appeal, there was no reason why this rule could not be complied with by adjourning the first hearing for the committal application until service was duly effected and for 21 clear days to elapse between the service and the committal hearing.

[42] In fact, under O 52 r 3(3) and (4) of the ROC 2014, the sections on (a) the timeline within which the committal application should be brought; and (b) the requirement for personal service were in distinct sub-rules:

[43] In our view, the new ROC 2021 did not intend to create a new “timeline” within which a committal applicant had to serve the committal application. Therefore, there was in fact no need for the Judge to have granted the extension of time for personal service to be effected. Indeed, the Judge remarked that he had done so “[o]ut of an abundance of caution”.

Whether the appellant’s failure to sign the transfer form and hand over the Certificate of Title for the Property amounted to contempt of court

[53] As conceded by Mr Yap during the appeal hearing, the appellant did not know that the respondent had invoked the option to procure the Registrar to sign the transfer form. She was not informed of this by the respondent’s solicitors. Nor was she informed as to when the transfer of the Property to the respondent was completed.

[54] It would thus appear that the appellant’s failure or refusal to sign the transfer form was not because she thought that her signature was no longer required. The inquiry as to whether an act amounts to contempt of court should be examined from the perspective of the alleged contemnor ie, the appellant. Based on the evidence, she remained in deliberate breach in her continuing refusal to sign the transfer form.

[58] Second, in an email dated 21 July 2023 to the SLA, which was sent by the appellant’s lawyer on her behalf, the appellant objected to the respondent’s application for a replacement Certificate of Title for the Property. Although this was denied by the appellant, in our view, there was no conceivable reason why the appellant’s lawyer would have sent the email to the SLA without the appellant’s instructions.

[59] Third, the appellant’s caveat filed on 1 November 2023 was also consistent with her intention to obstruct the transfer. While the Judge found that the caveat did not amount to an act of contempt because the caveat ultimately did not prevent the transfer, it did not detract from the obstructive conduct of the appellant in her efforts to thwart the transfer of the Property.

[61] We concluded, bearing in mind the appellant’s multiple acts to obstruct the transfer of the Property, that a custodial sentence was warranted.

[62] In considering the factors set out in Sembcorp Marine Ltd v Aurol Anthony Sabastian [2013] 1 SLR 245 at [67]–[68] (“Sembcorp Marine”) as cited by Mr Sandhu, we did not evaluate them in a mechanistic way. These factors were not checkboxes to be ticked off and had to be considered based on the circumstances of the present case.

[64] It was also an aggravating factor that the appellant lied before the Judge in the contempt proceedings, although we formed the view that she appeared to come clean in the later part of the hearing when confronted with the letter which her lawyers had sent to the court.

[66] For these reasons, we dismissed the appeal but reduced the appellant’s sentence from one month’s imprisonment to two weeks’ imprisonment.