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Grounds publishedDecided 7 Jul 2025
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Court of Appeal

A statement in a letter of indemnity was found true and not fraudulently made

Banque de Commerce et de Placements SA, DIFC Branch and another v China Aviation Oil (Singapore) Corp Ltd

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[2025] SGCA 33Case no. Court of Appeal / Civil Appeal No 1 of 2025

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A statement in a letter of indemnity was found true and not fraudulently made

Summary by laws.sgParagraphs [5], [119]

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Grounds of decision

Official text from eLitigation

  1. Introduction

  2. [1] This appeal raises some interesting issues arising from the prevalent use of letters of indemnity to facilitate payment under letters of credit. This practice is particularly common in transactions involving the sale and purchase of bulk or liquid cargo where multiple parties in a chain of contracts would each be selling and buying the same parcel of the cargo, usually on identical terms save for the price.

  3. [2] For such chain contracts, it is usual for the parties to facilitate payment through a letter of credit payable against a letter of indemnity issued by the relevant seller in lieu of the shipping documents, including the original bill of lading. This is in recognition of the fact that in transactions involving chain contracts, the shipping documents will not be in the possession of every seller in the chain to enable each seller to present these documents for the purpose of obtaining payment under the letter of credit. This is to be expected given the back-to-back nature of the contracts in the chain. In this light, the letter of indemnity would typically warrant, inter alia, that the shipping documents are valid, and that the seller is entitled to possession of the documents of title to the cargo, in particular the original bills of lading.

  4. [4] The above perspective is crucial for a proper understanding of the purpose and effect of a letter of indemnity in the context of a transaction financed by a letter of credit. In this case, the second appellant (“BCP Geneva”) issued a letter of credit (the “Geneva LC”) to finance the purchase of a parcel of gasoil by its customer, Zenrock Commodities Trading Pte Ltd (“Zenrock”), from the respondent (“CAO”). The Geneva LC expressly provided for payment against presentation of a letter of indemnity, “in the event that [the] original [bills of lading] and/or shipping documents … are not available at the time of presentation”. BCP Geneva agreed to finance the Geneva LC on the strength of a bare assignment of receivables payable by PetroChina International (East China) Co Ltd (“PetroChina”) to Zenrock, the party who was contracted to buy the same parcel of cargo from Zenrock. Significantly, the purchase by PetroChina was not secured by any letter of credit. This meant that in the event of PetroChina’s cancellation of the back-to-back contract with Zenrock, BCP Geneva’s recourse would be against the credit of Zenrock, given that BCP Geneva had accepted that it would not be able to exercise any form of control over the delivery of the cargo. This was a risk which BCP Geneva was well aware of and readily accepted. That risk later materialised when PetroChina cancelled its contract with Zenrock and Zenrock became insolvent.

  5. [5] It was under these circumstances that the appellants brought a claim against CAO to recover the sum paid up under the Geneva LC. Various causes of action were pursued in the court below but in this appeal, the claim is limited to the tort of deceit on the premise that the representation in CAO’s letter of indemnity was false and was made without an honest belief in the truth of that representation.

  6. The material facts

  7. [7] BCP Geneva, the second appellant, is an entity registered in Switzerland and the head office of a bank specialising in commodity trade financing. At the material time, the first appellant, Banque de Commerce et de Placements SA, DIFC Branch (“BCP Dubai”) was a branch of the bank that was registered in the Dubai International Financial Centre (“DIFC”). The relationship between these entities was such that any financing or loan transactions that BCP Dubai undertook were subject to approval by BCP Geneva. In other words, BCP Geneva could disapprove any transaction or customer proposed by BCP Dubai. The appellants will collectively be referred to as “BCP”, for ease of reference. CAO (the respondent) is a Singapore-incorporated company that is in the business of trading jet fuel and other oil products.

  8. [8] As we alluded to earlier, this appeal stems from a series of back-to-back sale and purchase transactions initiated by Zenrock involving 260,000 (+/- 5%) barrels of gasoil containing 500 parts per million sulphur (the “Cargo”). At the material time, Zenrock was a Singapore-incorporated trading house and an approved trading counterparty of CAO. Zenrock entered into judicial management in July 2020 and has since been wound up.

  9. [9] It is not disputed on appeal that Zenrock had engineered a series of transactions relating to the Cargo. After Zenrock purchased the Cargo from Petco Trading Labuan Company Ltd (“Petco”), it initiated a circular transaction in which the title to the Cargo was passed instantaneously and sequentially through a series of parties and eventually back to itself – title to the Cargo passed first from Zenrock to Golden Base Energy Pte Ltd (“Golden Base”), then to Shandong Energy International (Singapore) Pte Ltd (“Shandong”), then to CAO, and finally back to Zenrock who in turn on-sold the Cargo to Petrolimex Singapore Pte Ltd (“Petrolimex”). In other words, contrary to BCP’s expectations, the Cargo was never eventually sold to PetroChina (see [4] above and [12] below).

  10. [10] Depicted diagrammatically, title to the Cargo passed as follows –

  11. [11] As may be observed, CAO, the respondent in this appeal, was party to the set of transactions labelled (b) in the diagram above. In particular, it had contracted to purchase the Cargo from Shandong by way of the “Shandong-CAO Contract”, and then to sell the Cargo to Zenrock by way of the “CAO-Zenrock Contract”. Both Contracts were dated 21 January 2020. According to CAO, it had agreed to serve as an intermediary between Zenrock and Shandong because the former wanted to purchase the Cargo on 45-day credit terms while the latter was only willing to offer 10-day credit terms. CAO earned a profit of US$62,254.32 for its part in this transaction.

  12. BCP’s financing of the CAO-Zenrock Contract

  13. [12] On 18 January 2020, Zenrock approached BCP Dubai to seek financing for its purchase of the Cargo from CAO. The proposed financing transaction was on the following terms:

  14. (a) The “import leg”: BCP Dubai would finance Zenrock’s purchase of the Cargo from CAO for an estimated amount of US$20m. Payment was to be made by way of a deferred LC, the due date for payment being 45 days after the date of the bill of lading issued in respect of the Cargo.

  15. (b) The “export leg”: Zenrock would then on-sell the same Cargo to PetroChina on an open account basis, with payment falling due 45 days after the date of the bill of lading issued in respect of the Cargo. The proceeds of Zenrock’s sale of the Cargo to PetroChina would be directly credited into Zenrock’s account with BCP Dubai.

  16. In this manner, BCP Dubai’s financing was to be on a “self-liquidating” basis, in that the proceeds of Zenrock’s sale to PetroChina (the export leg) would be used to directly reimburse the financing that BCP Dubai provided to Zenrock (the import leg).

  17. [13] While BCP Dubai considered the deal to be “doable”, it requested Zenrock to provide further details regarding inter alia whether there would be any payment undertaking from PetroChina, given that the export leg was to be on an open account basis. It also requested copies of the Shandong-CAO Contract and the CAO-Zenrock Contract, along with the draft terms of the Geneva LC that was to be issued. Zenrock provided these documents to BCP Dubai. Materially, the draft LC provided that CAO could claim payment against presentation of its commercial invoice and a suitable letter of indemnity, in the event that the original bills of lading and shipping documents were unavailable at the time of presentation. Zenrock also informed BCP Dubai that PetroChina “[would] not issue any [payment undertaking] or [parent company guarantee]” as per their market practice.

  18. [14] As negotiations with Zenrock were ongoing, BCP Dubai simultaneously began preparation of an internal memorandum with respect to the proposed deal, for the approval of BCP Geneva’s Credit Committee (see [7] above). In this memorandum, BCP Dubai noted that “a [c]orporate [g]uarantee or undertaking of any sort will not be provided by [PetroChina’s] mother/holding company”. It also highlighted that payment under the Geneva LC could be alternatively triggered by CAO’s presentation of an invoice and letter of indemnity, in the event that the shipping documents were unavailable.

  19. [15] BCP Geneva’s Credit Committee responded positively to the transaction proposed in this memorandum. Notably, BCP’s then-head of commodity trade finance, Mr Yvan Rodo, opined that the transaction was to be classified as “[transactionally]/unsecured”, given that the LC issued would be “possibly negotiable against commercial invoice and LOI” if the shipping documents were “missing”. However, since the invoice and letter of indemnity were to be issued by a “reputable supplier” (ie, CAO), this was to be regarded as a “strong mitigating risk factor” [emphasis added]. Mr Rodo also considered Zenrock’s financial standing to be “acceptable versus the underlying transaction and risk proposed to the bank”. Mr Pierre Galtié, who was also BCP’s head of commodity trade finance, noted that although “[n]egotiation possible both side against LOI [sic] … the recourse on Zenrock is satisfactory” [emphasis added]. In the circumstances, BCP Dubai’s proposed financing transaction with Zenrock received unanimous approval by BCP Geneva’s Credit Committee.

  20. [16] BCP Geneva later informed BCP Dubai that the Geneva LC was to be “issued through BCP Geneva indicating as applicant bank BCP Dubai” – in other words, BCP Geneva would issue the Geneva LC in favour of CAO as the beneficiary.

  21. [17] Hence, on 23 January 2020, BCP Dubai issued a letter of credit numbered DUB-101026/MSK (the “Dubai LC”) to BCP Geneva. On the same day, BCP Geneva issued a letter of credit numbered GE-157465/AJP in favour of CAO. This was the Geneva LC (see [4] above). As CAO did not consider BCP Geneva to be an investment-graded bank, CAO required the Geneva LC to be confirmed by UBS Switzerland AG (“UBS”). UBS duly added its confirmation to the Geneva LC on 30 January 2020.

  22. Payment terms under the Geneva LC

  23. [18] The Geneva LC confirmed that CAO was entitled to claim payment under the CAO-Zenrock Contract, in either of the following ways:

  24. (b) Presentation of a letter of indemnity: If CAO could not provide original copies of the Shipping Documents including the endorsed b/ls, Field 47A(10) of the Geneva LC stated that CAO could nevertheless claim payment by delivering its signed invoice alongside a letter of indemnity prepared in the form prescribed, which required CAO to “represent and warrant the existence, authenticity and validity of the [original Shipping Documents]”.

  25. The issuance of the CAO LOI

  26. [19] The Shandong-CAO and CAO-Zenrock transactions were managed by CAO’s gasoil operator, Ms Chng Chai Ling, Cindy (“Ms Chng”). From 23 to 27 January 2020, Ms Chng received regular updates from Inspectorate Malaysia Sdn Bhd (the “Inspectorate”) regarding the loading status of the Cargo on board the nominated vessel, the PETROLIMEX 18 (the “Vessel”). The time at which the Cargo was loaded onboard the Vessel was designated in both the Shandong-CAO and CAO-Zenrock Contracts as the time at which the title to the Cargo would be passed.

  27. [20] On 27 January 2020, the Inspectorate informed Ms Chng that the loading operation was completed. Alongside documents verifying the existence, quality and quantity of the Cargo, Ms Chng also received copies of the non-negotiable bill of lading numbered PP 052/19 (the “NN b/ls”), which state:

  28. [21] As may be observed, the NN b/ls contained an attestation clause which confirmed that the Master of the Vessel had signed a set of three original b/ls. In her affidavit, Ms Chng testified to her belief that the original b/ls were in the possession of Petco, but that they would subsequently be delivered to Natixis, Singapore (“Natixis”), as the bank financing the purchase of the Cargo from Petco. Ms Chng believed that the original b/ls would eventually be endorsed and delivered to CAO down the chain of the sale contracts (see [9] above).

  29. [22] On 5 February 2020, Ms Chng received Shandong’s commercial invoice and letter of indemnity (the “Shandong LOI”) in relation to the Cargo. The Shandong LOI provided:

  30. We will refer to the bolded statement above as the “Representation”. As will become clear, the outcome of the present appeal turns almost entirely on the proper construction of this Representation.

  31. Events leading to the commencement of the proceedings below

  32. [25] On 12 March 2020, BCP Geneva paid a sum of US$19,091,491.80 to UBS, who in turn disbursed the same sum to CAO. BCP Geneva went on to debit BCP Dubai’s inter-branch account for the same amount, pursuant to the terms of the Dubai LC (see [17] above). BCP Dubai, in turn, debited this amount from Zenrock’s account with BCP and credited its inter-branch account with BCP Geneva.

  33. [26] BCP Dubai expected this sum to be repaid by the receivables due under the contract between Zenrock and PetroChina (see [12] above). However, despite numerous chasers sent to PetroChina, repayment was not received. On 29 April 2020, BCP Dubai received a copy of a tripartite agreement between Zenrock, PetroChina and Golden Base, stating that Zenrock had agreed to sell the Cargo to PetroChina, who would subsequently sell the Cargo to Golden Base. It had also been agreed that PetroChina would be absolved from any liability if it did not receive the Cargo from Zenrock or payment from Golden Base, and that PetroChina was entitled to unilaterally terminate its contracts with Zenrock and Golden Base, without any consequence. On the same date, BCP Dubai discovered that the tripartite agreement had been cancelled. No explanation was provided to BCP as to why the contract was cancelled. Several days later, on 4 May 2020, an application was taken out by a separate party to place Zenrock under interim judicial management.

  34. The decision below

  35. [28] In Banque de Commerce et de Placements SA, DIFC Branch v China Aviation Oil (Singapore) Corp Ltd [2024] SGHC 145 (the “Judgment”), the Judge below (“the Judge”) dismissed all of BCP’s claims against CAO.

  36. BCP Dubai had no standing to sue CAO

  37. [29] As a preliminary point, the Judge held that BCP Dubai did not have standing to claim against CAO. During cross-examination, it was revealed that BCP Dubai had ceased to operate as a branch of BCP Geneva since June 2022 and had instead been operating as a representative office. BCP had not discharged its burden of proving that BCP Dubai should be allowed to maintain the suit as an emanation of BCP notwithstanding its change in status: Judgment at [36].

  38. [30] The Judge therefore observed that the proper plaintiff in Suit 675 was BCP Geneva, as the issuing bank of the Geneva LC. However, BCP Dubai had duly credited BCP Geneva under the Dubai LC – in effect, BCP Geneva, as the only party who had legal capacity to sue, might not be able to show that it had suffered compensable losses: Judgment at [38].

  39. The CAO-Zenrock Contract was not a sham or fraudulent transaction

  40. [31] BCP argued in the proceedings below that the CAO-Zenrock Contract was a sham or a fraudulent transaction, and that CAO did not sell any physical cargo to Zenrock. BCP’s case was that there had been two chains of transactions (respectively, “Series A” and “Series B”), only one of which involved genuine sale and purchase of the Cargo (ie, Series A) –

  41. [32] These arguments were rejected by the Judge. The evidence in Suit 675 demonstrated CAO’s intention to enter into genuine contracts involving genuine cargo. That the CAO-Zenrock was part of a circular trade did not ipso facto render it a sham; there are legitimate reasons for contracting parties to enter into such circular trade agreements, including to earn arbitrage profits, brokerage fees, or to obtain liquidity of funds while trading: Judgment at [55]–[71]. The Judge also found that the Series A and Series B transactions formed a single chain of contracts. Accordingly, the CAO-Zenrock Contract was a genuine contract that took place against the broader Series A transactions: Judgment at [126]–[135].

  42. CAO was not liable in the tort of deceit

  43. [33] The outcome of BCP’s claim in the tort of deceit turned primarily on the proper interpretation of the Representation. The parties put forth the following competing interpretations:

  44. (a) Literal Interpretation: BCP argued that the Representation should be construed literally, ie, that CAO had represented the actual existence, authenticity and validity of the endorsed b/ls. Since there were no endorsed b/ls in existence at the time when the Representation was made, the Representation was thus false: Judgment at [178].

  45. [34] The Judge began by observing that the exercise of interpreting the Representation would bear some similarity to the interpretation of contractual terms, in so far as the court can have regard to the context in and purpose for which the statement was made: Judgment at [173]–[175]. Having considered the commercial purpose of the CAO LOI and the terms of the other relevant agreements, the Judge found CAO’s proposed interpretation to be the “only logical way” to read the Representation: Judgment at [187].

  46. [35] Field 47A(10) of the Geneva LC stated that CAO may present a letter of indemnity to claim payment, “in the event that [the original bills of lading] and/or shipping documents … are not available at the time of presentation”. In other words, the unavailability of the endorsed b/ls was a precondition to the presentation of the CAO LOI: Judgment at [181], [188]. BCP’s argument that CAO had warranted the actual existence of the endorsed b/ls at the time of presentation would render Field 47A(10) of the CAO LOI completely otiose: Judgment at [181], [187].

  47. [36] The Judge also found this purposive interpretation to be consistent with the terms of the CAO-Zenrock Contract and the internal context of the CAO LOI. The CAO-Zenrock Contract stated at cl 8(c) that CAO may obtain payment by presenting a letter of indemnity, “in the absence of … a full set of clean original bills of lading” [emphasis added]. The CAO LOI refers to Zenrock “having agreed to accept delivery of the [Cargo] without having been provided with relevant documents required under the [CAO-Zenrock Contract] including … the [endorsed b/ls]” [emphasis added]. BCP’s literal interpretation of the Representation would run contrary to the effect of these clauses and statements: Judgment at [182]–[186].

  48. [37] Following from the above, the Judge found that the Representation was not false. CAO did not represent to BCP that it had possession of the endorsed b/ls and original shipping documents at the time when CAO presented the CAO LOI and Invoice: Judgment at [190]. In any event, CAO did not make the Representation to BCP, as both the CAO LOI and Invoice were addressed to Zenrock. This would have made clear to any reasonable bank in BCP’s position that the contents of these documents were not directed at nor promised to BCP: Judgment at [160], [193]. Additionally, these documents were presented to UBS (the confirming bank) rather than BCP. BCP’s proper recourse would have been either to refuse reimbursing UBS or to pursue recovery of payment from UBS if there had been fraud on the documents: Judgment at [160]. Lastly, the Judge found that BCP had suffered no detriment as a result of the Representation. Properly construed, the proximate cause of BCP’s loss was Zenrock’s fraud and subsequent insolvency: Judgment at [197].

  49. BCP failed in all of its other claims

  50. [38] Given that the appeal is limited to the tort of deceit, it is not necessary to address the Judge’s rejection of BCP’s other claims including the fraud exception, negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract, unjust enrichment and unlawful means conspiracy.

  51. The parties’ submissions on appeal

  52. Whether BCP Geneva could have suffered loss in its capacity as the issuing bank

  53. [39] BCP is not appealing against the Judge’s finding that BCP Geneva was the only proper plaintiff in Suit 875. It submits, however, that “loss suffered by BCP Dubai is loss suffered by BCP Geneva”, because BCP Dubai was a branch office of BCP when the transactions were entered into. CAO disagrees. It submits that even if BCP Dubai suffered loss, BCP Geneva suffered no loss as the issuing bank. BCP treated losses suffered by different branches differently, keeping different accounts. The separate treatment of BCP Dubai and BCP Geneva was manifested by BCP Geneva debiting BCP Dubai’s inter-branch account with the losses; and BCP Dubai issuing the Dubai LC to BCP Geneva, before the latter issued a separate letter of credit to UBS.

  54. Whether the Representation was false

  55. [40] There is no appeal against the Judge’s finding that the CAO-Zenrock Contract was not a sham and that the Series A and Series B transactions formed part of a single sale chain. Instead, its case on appeal rests fundamentally on its interpretation of the Representation – all of BCP’s arguments proceed on the premise that this court should accept its proposed interpretation over that submitted by CAO.

  56. [43] The essence of CAO’s case is that the Judge correctly interpreted the Representation by reference to the underlying context of the transaction and the terms of related documents, including the CAO LOI, the Geneva LC and the CAO-Zenrock Contract.

  57. Whether the Representation was fraudulently made

  58. [44] BCP avers that CAO had made the Representation fraudulently because CAO either knew that the Representation was false, or had no honest belief that it was true, or was reckless as to its truth.

  59. [47] In response, CAO submits that it had genuinely and reasonably believed in the truth of the Representation in the purposive sense. CAO took various steps to ascertain the truth of the statements in the CAO LOI, including receiving regular updates from the Inspectorate and Shandong and cross checking the relevant copy shipping documents and assurances provided in the Shandong LOI. In the circumstances, CAO honestly believed that there was a genuine shipment of Cargo and that the b/ls had been issued; and further, that Shandong would endorse and hand down these Shipping Documents to CAO in due course.

  60. [48] CAO avers that the alleged indicia of dishonesty highlighted by BCP must be weighed against the various operational steps taken by CAO to verify the truth of the contents of the CAO LOI. In any event, BCP’s argument regarding the NN b/ls is unmeritorious because the documentary instructions related to the endorsement of the original b/ls to CAO rather than the issuance to CAO as the named consignee. Therefore, the fact that the NN b/ls named Natixis as the consignee was not a departure from the documentary instructions. The fact that Ms Chng had deleted certain terms from a draft version of the CAO LOI does not prove dishonesty or recklessness. CAO explains that it did not know precisely when the b/ls would be received from Shandong, and thus did not wish to provide a corresponding undertaking to Zenrock. Lastly, CAO was under no obligation to investigate Natixis’ role in the chain of sale contracts.

  61. Whether the Representation was made to BCP

  62. [49] BCP argues on appeal that the Judge erred by applying the wrong inquiry. The correct inquiry is whether representations were made “with the intention that it should be acted upon by the plaintiff, or by a class of persons which includes the plaintiff”: Panatron Pte Ltd and another v Lee Cheow Lee and another [2001] 2 SLR(R) 435 (“Panatron”) at [14]. Applying that inquiry, the Judge ought to have concluded that CAO intended for BCP to act upon the CAO LOI such that the Representation was made to BCP, for the following five reasons:

  63. (c) Third, whom the CAO LOI was addressed to is not determinative, as issuing banks often rely on representations made on the face of documents presented for payment.

  64. (d) Fourth, the Judge’s decision as to reliance substantially undermines the manner in which the existing documentary credit system is practised, where shipping and cargo documents are often not addressed to banks but are required under the letter of credit. Banks only trade on documents and it is therefore imperative that all documents are materially accurate as to their content.

  65. (e) Fifth, although the CAO LOI was presented to UBS rather than BCP, UBS was BCP’s agent for receiving, reviewing and remitting documents presented for payment under the LC. Consequently, representations made to UBS under the CAO LOI pursuant to the Geneva LC are to be attributed as having been made to BCP: referring to Grains and Industrial Products Trading Pte Ltd v Bank of India and another [2016] 3 SLR 1308 (“Grains”) at [73].

  66. [50] CAO argues that the Judge correctly held that CAO did not make any representation to BCP, much less with any intention for BCP’s reliance. The CAO LOI was addressed to Zenrock and CAO twice rejected Zenrock’s attempt to have the CAO LOI addressed to BCP during negotiations. Furthermore, CAO had insisted on a confirmed letter of credit; the interposition of a confirming bank militates against any intention by CAO to make representations to BCP. CAO also presented the CAO LOI to UBS, not BCP.

  67. [51] Additionally, under Field 78 of the Geneva LC, BCP Geneva’s obligation to reimburse UBS was triggered on receipt of UBS’s SWIFT confirmation of a compliant presentation, and not on BCP’s own determination of compliance (or reliance on the contents of the presented documents). Field 78 was specifically inserted into the Geneva LC at UBS’s insistence, who had rejected an earlier version of Field 78 which provided that BCP’s reimbursement obligation would only be triggered on BCP Geneva’s receipt of the complying documents.

  68. [52] In response to BCP’s points, CAO submits:

  69. (a) The mere reference to the endorsed b/ls does not confer a benefit to BCP. In any event, the inserted reference to the endorsed b/ls in the CAO LOI was not intended to confer a benefit on BCP; CAO had understood it as Zenrock’s instructions to CAO on the intended endorsee of the endorsed b/ls.

  70. (b) The contents of the CAO LOI, including the Representation, were, by their nature, directed and addressed exclusively to Zenrock.

  71. (c) BCP led no evidence supporting its claim that the Judge’s decision would undermine the documentary credit system. Moreover, just because “banks only trade on documents” (ie, the principle of autonomy), does not mean that banks invariably rely on representations in presented documents or that beneficiaries intend such representations to be made to banks.

  72. (d) BCP did not plead that UBS was its agent. In any case, UBS was not BCP’s agent because (i) Field 78 does not include instructions for UBS to receive and review the documents on BCP’s behalf; and (ii) BCP’s reliance on Grains is misplaced, as Grains concerned a nominated bank, not a confirming bank.

  73. Whether BCP relied on the Representation

  74. [53] BCP submits that the Judge applied the wrong test in determining reliance. He applied the “proximate cause” test in JSI Shipping (S) Pte Ltd v Teofoongwonglcloong [2007] 4 SLR(R) 460 (“JSI Shipping”) at [141] and Standard Chartered Bank (Singapore) Ltd v Maersk Tankers Singapore Pte Ltd [2023] 4 SLR 572 (“Maersk”) at [51], [56]–[57] and [60]. These cases, BCP argues, are inapposite as they dealt not with the tort of deceit, but with the tort of negligence, and breach of contract and the tort of conversion respectively.

  75. [54] The correct test for reliance under the tort of deceit is, according to BCP, found in Alwie Handoyo v Tjong Very Sumito and another and another appeal [2013] 4 SLR 308 (“Alwie Handoyo”) at [187]–[188]. This court considered it to be settled law that reliance exists where “… a misrepresentation plays a real and substantial part, though not by itself a decisive part, in inducing a plaintiff to act”. The representation need only be an inducing cause, not the inducing cause.

  76. [55] CAO counters that the Judge correctly applied the “proximate cause” test in Maersk and JSI Shipping, given BCP’s pleaded case that the representations and warranties in the CAO LOI were contractual warranties, and its cause of action in negligence. In any event, BCP as the representee must show that the misrepresentation was actively present in its mind or operated in its mind in inducing it to act. That could not have been true here as (a) the Representation was not made to BCP, and UBS, not BCP, paid CAO; (b) BCP considered its security to be the PetroChina receivables, not the endorsed b/ls; and (c) BCP reimbursed UBS pursuant to its reimbursement obligation rather than in reliance on any representation by CAO.

  77. Whether the Representation caused BCP’s loss

  78. [56] CAO argues on appeal that causation must be proved independently from reliance in a claim for deceit, referring to Raiffeisen at [7] and [52]–[73]. Since BCP Geneva as the issuing bank had been fully reimbursed by BCP Dubai, any purported reliance on the Representation could not have caused BCP Geneva’s loss. Zenrock’s fraud and insolvency was the cause of BCP’s loss.

  79. [57] In response, BCP relies on Smith New Court Securities Ltd v Citibank NA [1997] AC 254 at 284-285 for the proposition that the court adopts a pragmatic and commonsense test of whether the fraud was a substantial factor in producing loss to establish a sufficient causal connection. The fraud need not be the sole cause. In this case, BCP’s loss from the disbursement of moneys under the LC was plainly caused by the presentation of the CAO LOI (containing the Representation). This chain of causation was not severed by BCP Dubai reimbursing BCP Geneva, as they are one legal entity. Nor was it severed by Zenrock’s insolvency, as it was only wound up on 20 September 2020, months after moneys were disbursed on 12 March 2020.

  80. [58] In any event, CAO admits that the use of the CAO LOI was the “alternative trigger to payment” under the LC. CAO’s fraud (assuming it existed) was therefore proximate both in time and in terms of its contractual impact in triggering payment under the LC.

  81. The issues

  82. [59] The appeal gives rise to the following issues:

  83. (a) whether BCP has the standing to sue;

  84. (b) whether the Representation was false;

  85. (c) whether the Representation was fraudulently made;

  86. (d) whether the Representation was made to BCP; and

  87. (e) whether there was reliance by BCP which caused the loss.

  88. Our decision

  89. Whether BCP Geneva suffered loss in its capacity as the issuing bank

  90. [60] It is undisputed that BCP Dubai had no standing to sue CAO, as it was merely a branch office (later becoming a representative office) of BCP Geneva. Under Singapore law, which applied by default since DIFC law was not pleaded, a bank's branches are considered emanations of the main bank, forming a single legal entity: Sinopec International (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Bank of Communications Co Ltd [2024] 3 SLR 476 at [49].

  91. [61] The Judge and CAO appeared to take the view that BCP Geneva did not suffer any loss, because it was BCP Dubai who suffered the loss. With respect, we disagree. In cases involving an issuing bank as the victim of deceit, the loss is considered suffered as soon as the bank pays out the money in reliance on the false representations made: Carrier Singapore at [110], referring to Standard Chartered Bank v Pakistan National Shipping Corp and others [2001] 1 All ER (Comm) 822 at [52], per Potter LJ. When BCP Geneva disbursed funds to CAO via UBS in March 2020, BCP Dubai was still a branch office of BCP Geneva, meaning they were legally one entity. Therefore, under Singapore law, any loss "incurred" by BCP Dubai was legally speaking a loss incurred by BCP Geneva.

  92. [62] It is irrelevant that BCP accounted for the losses suffered by different branches separately. We agree with the Judge’s observations that “the question of how commercial parties relate to each other in relation to a letter of credit is conceptually different from the juridical status of a party to sue in a particular court”: Judgment at [37]. Similarly, regardless of how a single legal entity might organise its accounting structure across different departments, that does not alter the principle that these departments collectively constitute one legal entity.

  93. [63] Hence, BCP Geneva has standing to sue CAO, and is entitled to be compensated for the loss if CAO were indeed liable under the tort of deceit.

  94. Whether the Representation was false

  95. [65] It is important to highlight at this juncture that in considering a claim in the tort of deceit, the court must first assess whether the representation was false, and then separately, whether it was made fraudulently. These are discrete inquiries that must be conducted from different perspectives: Krakowski and another v Eurolynx Properties Ltd and another (1995) 130 ALR 1 at 11 and Spencer Bower, Turner & Handley, Actionable Misrepresentation (LexisNexis, 5th Ed, 2014) at para 4.12. In particular:

  96. (a) In assessing falsity, the court will have regard to the sense in which the representation would be understood by a reasonable person in the position of the representee (see [71] below). The court “does not consider the representor’s perspective in assessing substantial falsity” [emphasis in original]: Ernest Ferdinand Perez De La Sala v Compañia De Navegación Palomar, SA and others and other appeals [2018] 1 SLR 894 (“Ernest Ferdinand”) at [173]. Therefore, for the purpose of the falsity analysis, it is relevant and necessary for a court to objectively assess the proper meaning that was conveyed by a representation when understood from the perspective of the representee, to arrive at a “correct interpretation” of the statement that was made.

  97. (b) As regards fraud, however, this must be assessed with reference to the representor’s subjective understanding of the statement made. To this end, the objectively correct interpretation of the representation, which was arrived at for the purpose of the falsity analysis, is generally irrelevant. We will elaborate on this point at [97]–[106] below.

  98. [66] Following from the above, in the context of the present appeal, while we will examine whether the Judge correctly preferred CAO’s interpretation of the Representation over BCP’s, this determination will ultimately have no impact on the crucial inquiry of whether CAO had an honest belief in the truth of the Representation; and following from this, whether there can be a finding of fraud. Nevertheless, it remains a necessary plank of the falsity inquiry.

  99. The Judge correctly preferred CAO’s interpretation of the Representation

  100. (1) The contextual approach to interpretation

  101. [69] We begin by rejecting BCP’s submission that the Judge applied the wrong approach in construing the Representation. The gist of BCP’s argument is that, by applying the principles of contractual interpretation and by accepting CAO’s purposive interpretation of the Representation, the Judge failed to consider the nuances of a claim founded in the tort of deceit. Given that this tort protects a representee’s right not to be lied to, the focal point of the inquiry should have been what BCP, as the representee, objectively understood the Representation to mean. To this end, the parties’ shared commercial purpose underlying the transaction and CAO’s own commercial purpose in presenting the CAO LOI, should have been irrelevant to the exercise of the interpretation.

  102. [70] As a matter of terminology, we should note our preference for the phrase ‘contextual interpretation’ rather than ‘purposive interpretation’, the latter being more commonly associated with the exercise of statutory interpretation. With that said, nothing turns on the Judge’s (or CAO’s) use of such a phrase.

  103. [71] Where a claim in deceit is mounted on a written representation, it is clearly necessary for the court to first determine its proper meaning. While BCP rightly points out that this inquiry must be conducted from the perspective of a reasonable person in the representee’s position, a court is by no means confined to adopting a literal reading of the statement made. It is well-established that the particular words used must be read in the context that they were used. This may, depending on the facts of each case, require a consideration of any or all of the following non-exhaustive list of factors: (a) the purpose for which a document came into existence; (b) why the statements contained in the document were made; (c) by whom the statements were intended to be read; and (d) the entire course of negotiations leading up to the making of the representation: Wee Chiaw Sek Anna v Ng Li-Ann Genevieve (sole executrix of the estate of Ng Hock Seng, deceased) and another [2013] 3 SLR 801 (“Anna Wee”) at [36], citing with approval Society of Lloyd’s v Jaffray and others [2002] EWCA Civ 1101 (“Jaffray”) at [52]; Ernest Ferdinand at [173] and The Law of Contract in Singapore (Andrew Phang Boon Leong gen ed) (Academy Publishing, 2nd Ed, 2022) (“Phang”) at para 11.013.

  104. [72] In other words, it will always be open to the court to take into account the context of the underlying transaction to arrive at the proper interpretation of a representation that was made in the course of the transaction. We see no reason why the parties’ shared commercial purpose should not be considered as part of that context. Moreover, it must also be appreciated that the Representation is contained within the CAO LOI, a contractual document as between CAO and Zenrock. Although BCP may not have been privy to that contractual relationship, this does not alter the nature of the CAO LOI and of the representations contained therein, especially since BCP is claiming to have relied on it. Therefore, in so far as the Judge applied contractual interpretation principles in his interpretation of the Representation, we do not find this approach to be objectionable. This was not a case where the claim in deceit was founded upon an oral statement, or any other representation made in a non-contractual context.

  105. (2) The use of letters of indemnity in chain contracts

  106. [73] Following from the above, it is clear that a proper interpretation of the Representation will first require an understanding of the purpose and effect of the CAO LOI. Typically, in transactions involving liquid cargo such as gasoil, it is common to find a chain of contracting parties that each make a margin from a series of back-to-back sale and purchase transactions. In this case, there can be no dispute that such a chain of contracts was expressly contemplated by the relevant parties: (a) Zenrock requested CAO to act as an intermediary between itself and Shandong, such that CAO entered into both the Shandong-CAO and CAO-Zenrock Contracts (see [11] above); and (b) BCP was equally aware that the transaction would involve a chain of parties; it was at least aware that Zenrock had purchased the Cargo from CAO under a back-to-back sale arrangement with PetroChina (see [12] above). To be clear, it is neither relevant nor necessary for a party in the chain (such as CAO) to know the identity of all the contracting parties in the chain of transactions. The point is that both BCP and CAO would at least have had a contractual expectation for the Shipping Documents, including the original b/ls, to move down and along the sale chain.

  107. [74] In the nature of chain contracts, it is also usual for parties to arrange for payment by letter of credit against the presentation of a letter of indemnity. It is apparent from the terms of the Geneva LC, the CAO LOI, and the CAO-Zenrock Contract, that this arrangement was expressly agreed to in this case:

  108. (a) The Geneva LC: Field 47A(10) expressly provided that payment under the Geneva LC could be made against presentation of the CAO LOI and commercial invoice, in the event that the Shipping Documents including the original b/ls were not available (see [18(b)] above).

  109. (c) The CAO-Zenrock Contract: Pursuant to cl 8(c) of the Contract, CAO could receive payment for the Cargo from Zenrock by presenting its signed invoice and letter of indemnity “in the absence of [the Shipping Documents]”.

  110. [76] In response to the above, BCP raised an interesting argument that the presentation of a letter of indemnity to trigger payment under a letter of credit does not in and of itself imply that the required shipping documents were unavailable. BCP relies on the decision of the England and Wales High Court (“EWHC”) in Trafigura Beheer BV v Kookmin Bank Co [2005] EWHC 2350 (Comm) (“Trafigura”), where it was held that a letter of indemnity could be used to claim payment in two alternative situations, either where the shipping documents were unavailable for presentation, or when these documents did not conform with the form or requirements as agreed to by the parties: Trafigura at [25].

  111. [78] Kookmin claimed against Trafigura on the basis that it had fraudulently misrepresented that the b/ls were “not available”. Kookmin submitted that this representation was false because Trafigura did in fact have a set of b/ls available to it for presentation. The EWHC rejected Kookmin’s argument, construing the term “not available” to encompass a situation where there were no conforming b/ls available for presentation (at [25]):

  112. [79] Given that the present appeal does not concern a situation where CAO was in possession of non-conforming b/ls but nonetheless chose to present the CAO LOI to claim payment, we express no concluded view on the correctness of the Trafigura decision. With that said, it would be pertinent for us to point out that letters of indemnity are generally intended as an alternative means for a party to claim payment, if the required shipping documents are unavailable for presentation. It is at least arguable that an implicit representation would follow, viz, that the required documents would otherwise have been compliant with the form and requirements as agreed to by the parties, had they been available at the time of presenting the letter of indemnity. It appears to us that the Trafigura judgment cannot be interpreted as a license for a beneficiary to present a letter of indemnity, in a case where it clearly knows that the required shipping documents in its possession are non-conforming.

  113. [81] Second, even if we were to adopt the decision in Trafigura and accept that a letter of indemnity can be used to claim payment when the required documents are non-conforming, this will not ultimately assist BCP. Even if CAO had possessed a set of non-conforming b/ls which it elected not to present, BCP would still have suffered the same loss. BCP would still not have had possession of the endorsed b/ls and would thus have remained unable to control delivery of the Cargo prior to making payment under the Geneva LC.

  114. (3) CAO’s interpretation of the Representation is to be preferred

  115. [82] Having outlined several general principles by reference to which the Representation should be interpreted, we now explain our agreement with the Judge’s (and CAO’s) interpretation of the Representation.

  116. [84] Next, there were several arguments that BCP made in the proceedings below but which it has since abandoned on appeal. However, several significant consequences flow from these concessions, and we summarise them in turn.

  117. (a) BCP is not appealing against the Judge’s finding that the CAO-Zenrock Contract was not a sham (see [40] above). It therefore follows that BCP accepts that the CAO-Zenrock Contract was a genuine contract involving actual cargo. This was confirmed by Mr Siraj at the appeal hearing. By extension, BCP must thus accept that the Shandong-CAO Contract was similarly genuine, since the two contracts were on a back-to-back basis. It would also follow that CAO’s representations that it was entitled to possession of the Shipping Documents and to the Cargo, and that it had good title to the Cargo, were true. Indeed, BCP argued in the proceedings below that these statements were false, but has since abandoned them on appeal.

  118. [91] BCP’s interpretation of the Representation is accordingly rejected. As this submission was the foundational plank to BCP’s appeal, we will now go on to explain why, having rejected BCP’s interpretation, the entire appeal must fail.

  119. The Representation was not false

  120. [94] Before concluding on this point, we note that CAO’s interpretation of the Representation carries an element of futurity, ie, a promise to do something in the future. The Judge also acknowledged this: Judgment at [188]. We emphasise that, as the law stands, statements which convey promises as to future intention cannot constitute actionable representations for the purposes of a claim in deceit: Deutsche Bank AG v Chang Tse Wen [2013] 1 SLR 1310 at [94]. However, a promise as to the future may sometimes contain implied representations of past or present fact, which may, depending on the facts, form actionable representations: Ernest Ferdinand at [172(a)]; UniCredit Bank AG v Glencore Singapore Pte Ltd [2023] 2 SLR 587 (“UniCredit (CA)”) at [85]–[87]. With that said, since BCP’s pleaded interpretation of the Representation contains no element of futurity and has been rejected, we need not determine whether any actionable implied representations arise from CAO’s interpretation of the Representation.

  121. [95] We therefore find that BCP’s claim in fraudulent misrepresentation was correctly dismissed by the Judge.

  122. Whether the Representation was fraudulently made

  123. [96] Although the above findings are sufficient to dispose of the appeal, we will nevertheless proceed to explain why, even if we had accepted BCP’s interpretation of the Representation and found that it was false, BCP’s appeal would still have failed for the lack of a finding of fraud.

  124. CAO’s honest belief should be assessed with reference to its subjective understanding of the Representation

  125. [97] Had BCP been successful in establishing that its interpretation of the Representation was to be preferred, and by that meaning that the Representation was false, the question that would have followed is whether CAO’s honest belief should be assessed by reference to: (a) the meaning of the Representation as was objectively determined by the court for the purpose of the falsity analysis; or (b) as it was subjectively understood by CAO. In our judgment, it is the latter approach that must be correct. Indeed, Mr Siraj confirmed at the appeal hearing that this was also BCP’s position.

  126. [98] It is well-established that dishonesty is the touchstone of a claim in deceit. To prove dishonesty, it must be shown that a false representation was made: (a) knowingly; (b) without belief in its truth; or (c) recklessly, careless whether it be true or false: Chan Pik Sun v Wan Hoe Keet (alias Wen Haojie) and others and another appeal [2024] 1 SLR 893 (“Chan Pik Sun”) at [67], citing with approval Derry v Peek (1889) 14 App Cas 337 at 374. As will become clear from the cases discussed below, these indicia should be assessed by reference to the representor’s subjective understanding of the representation made. This will be the case, even if the court accepts the representee’s pleaded interpretation of the statement as being objectively correct for the purpose of the falsity analysis.

  127. [99] In Anna Wee, an ex-husband represented that he was prepared to pay a fixed amount in child maintenance “despite his financial position”. It later emerged that the husband had failed to disclose substantial portions of his assets, and the wife argued that the husband had made a fraudulent misrepresentation. The term “despite his financial position” was considered to be ambiguous – it could refer either to the husband being financially unable to pay any higher sum of child maintenance (as argued by the wife-representee), or it could be the case that the husband was merely posturing to pay a lower monthly maintenance sum. The latter interpretation was preferred, and it was held that the husband had not made a false representation.

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