Court of Appeal · Decided 8 May 2026
A winding-up bid over a disputed debt failed and was found to be an abuse of process
Singapore Commodities Group Co, Pte Ltd v Founder Group (Hong Kong) Ltd (in liquidation)
Feedback & support[2026] SGCA 24 · Case no. Court of Appeal / Civil Appeal No 36 of 2025
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A winding-up bid over a disputed debt failed and was found to be an abuse of process
Summary by laws.sg·Paragraphs [148], [152]
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Grounds of decision
Official text from eLitigation
- [1]
[1] This was the second appeal to come before us involving these parties. The respondent applied for the appellant to be wound up on the basis of an unpaid debt arising from a sale and purchase contract for copper cathodes. The appellant, however, disputed the debt on the basis that the contract was a sham and that the respondent had not delivered any copper cathodes to it. The parties proceeded to arbitrate the dispute over the debt which resulted, perhaps unexpectedly, in a stalemate as the tribunal found that the debt had been neither disproven by the appellant nor proven by the respondent. This unusual result spawned two new areas of disputes that were the subject of a previous appeal and the one before us here.
- [2]
[2] The first appeal we heard last year concerned whether the respondent was entitled to payment out of a sum of money that had been paid by the appellant into court pending the resolution of the dispute in the arbitration and the disposal of the winding-up application. We answered this in the negative as the respondent had not established the existence of the debt in the arbitration. We thus set aside the payment out order that had been made by a Judge of the General Division of the High Court (“Judge”), reinstated the respondent’s winding-up application which had been withdrawn following the payment out order, and remitted the winding-up application to the Judge: see Singapore Commodities Group Co, Pte Ltd v Founder Group (Hong Kong) Ltd [2025] SGCA 35 (“SG Commodities (No 1)”).
- [3]
[3] In SG Commodities (No 1), we highlighted that the Judge would have to consider, in light of the result of the earlier arbitration, whether the winding-up application could be maintained based on the principles laid down in the decisions of this court in AnAn Group (Singapore) Pte Ltd v VTB Bank (Public Joint Stock Co) [2020] 1 SLR 1158 (“AnAn”) and Founder Group (Hong Kong) Ltd v Singapore JHC Co Pte Ltd Ltd [2023] 2 SLR 554 (“Founder Group (CA)”). What these decisions broadly establish is that parties to an arbitration agreement cannot bypass their agreement to resolve disputes over the existence or otherwise of a debt through arbitration by presenting a winding-up application based on that alleged debt. Thus, while a court hearing a winding-up application will generally engage in a light-touch review of the merits of a dispute over the existence of the debt to the extent of inquiring if there is a triable issue over the debt, an arbitration agreement that governs any disputes over the debt would generally preclude any form of merits review of the dispute. Accordingly, if the debtor raises a dispute over the debt that is subject to arbitration, the general rule is that the winding-up application will be dismissed as the applicant will be precluded by the arbitration agreement from establishing the debt in the winding-up proceedings and hence its standing as a creditor to apply for the winding-up of the debtor, although a stay of the application may exceptionally be ordered.
- [4]
[4] This appeal arose from the Judge’s decision on remittal in which he ordered the appellant to be wound up. The Judge arrived at this conclusion despite finding, given the outcome of the earlier arbitration, that there remained a dispute over the existence of the debt that was subject to a valid arbitration agreement between the parties. While this would ordinarily have led to the dismissal of the winding-up application based on the general rule as described above, the Judge held that this case fell within the scope of a limited exception, recognised by this court in AnAn, that allowed the court to decide the dispute over the existence of the debt in the usual way if it was satisfied that the dispute had been raised by the debtor in abuse of process. The Judge found that the appellant’s conduct constituted an abuse of process as it had resiled from certain past admissions of the debt. The appellant’s main contention in this appeal was that the Judge had erred in finding that it had acted in abuse of process.
- [6]
[6] We now provide our full grounds of decision, in which we take the opportunity to clarify: (a) the general approach to disputed debts in winding-up applications; (b) the ambit of the abuse of process exception in AnAn; and (c) the circumstances in which a defendant to a winding-up application will be found to have disputed the debt in abuse of the process of the court by resiling from a previous admission of the debt.
Background to the appeal
- [7]
[7] The appellant, Singapore Commodities Group Co, Pte Ltd, and the respondent, Founder Group (Hong Kong) Ltd, were previously part of a group of companies that were owned and controlled by Peking University Founder Group Company Ltd (“PUFG”). However, after reorganisation proceedings were commenced against PUFG in the Beijing First Intermediate People’s Court, the appellant fell under the ownership and control of a consortium of strategic investors, while the respondent remained under the ultimate ownership of PUFG.
- [8]
[8] The dispute between the parties concerned an alleged debt due from the appellant to the respondent under a contract entered into in December 2015 for the sale of copper cathodes from the respondent to the appellant (“Purchase Contract”). The Purchase Contract contained a multi-tiered dispute resolution clause which provided that the parties were to attempt to resolve all disputes in connection with the Purchase Contract or the performance of the Purchase Contract through friendly discussion, failing which the controversy or claim should be submitted to arbitration under the auspices of the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (“CIETAC”). The clause further provided that the governing law of the Purchase Contract was that of the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”).
- [9]
[9] The respondent was wound up on 19 July 2021 by a Hong Kong court and placed under the control of liquidators. According to the respondent, its liquidators discovered upon review of the respondent’s books that there was an outstanding debt of US$14,117,585.50 owing to the respondent from the appellant (“Alleged Debt”). The Alleged Debt was said to be originally evidenced in three audit confirmation letters from the appellant’s auditors to the respondent (“Audit Confirmation Letters”). Although the Audit Confirmation Letters were dated from 2018 to 2022, it appeared that the first Audit Confirmation Letter was erroneously dated as 2018, given that it concerned the appellant’s financial period ended 31 December 2018 and must logically have been issued in 2019. This discrepancy is, however, immaterial for the purposes of the present appeal.
- [10]
[10] On 18 February 2022, the respondent proceeded to issue a statutory demand to the appellant for the amount of the Alleged Debt pursuant to s 125(2)(a) of the Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act 2018 (2020 Rev Ed) (“IRDA”) to be paid within 21 days. The respondent later agreed to grant the appellant an extension of time until 21 March 2022 to respond to the statutory demand.
- [11]
[11] Instead of paying the Alleged Debt, the appellant commenced a CIETAC arbitration against the respondent (“Arbitration”) on 12 April 2022. In the Arbitration, the appellant sought a negative declaration that it did not owe the Alleged Debt to the respondent. The appellant argued that the Alleged Debt did not exist as:
(a) the Purchase Contract was “null and void” under Art 146 of the Civil Code of the PRC because the Purchase Contract was solely for accounting and bookkeeping purposes since the parties did not have an intention to buy or sell copper cathodes at the time the Purchase Contract was signed; and
(b) the respondent had never delivered any copper cathodes to the appellant under the Purchase Contract.
- [12]
[12] The respondent objected to the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal (“Tribunal”) on the basis that, on the appellant’s own case that the Purchase Contract was null and void, the arbitration clause contained within the Purchase Contract had to be invalid. Critically, however, the respondent did not mount a counterclaim for the Alleged Debt in the Arbitration, although it did lead some evidence to prove the existence of the Purchase Contract and the Alleged Debt.
- [13]
[13] Despite the commencement of the Arbitration by the appellant, the respondent filed a winding-up application against the appellant on 27 May 2022 in HC/CWU 120/2022 (“CWU 120”). The respondent relied on two grounds to seek a winding up of the appellant in CWU 120: (a) first, that the appellant was unable to pay its debts within the meaning of s 125(1)(e) of the IRDA (“Insolvency Ground”); and (b) second, that it was just and equitable for the appellant to be wound up within the meaning of s 125(1)(i) of the IRDA (“Just and Equitable Ground”).
- [14]
[14] What transpired next has been detailed in SG Commodities (No 1). In brief, the material facts are as follows.
- [15]
[15] The appellant contested CWU 120. It relied on, among other things, the existence of a dispute over the Alleged Debt that fell within the scope of the CIETAC arbitration clause. The respondent took the position that the appellant had admitted the Alleged Debt in terms of both liability and quantum by way of the Audit Confirmation Letters and the appellant’s books which recorded the Alleged Debt from Financial Years (“FY”) 2016 to 2021. The respondent thus argued that the appellant was acting in abuse of process in trying to get a stay or dismissal of CWU 120 based on the CIETAC arbitration clause.
- [16]
[16] The appellant subsequently applied to pay a sum equivalent to the Alleged Debt (“Sum”) into court, pending the determination of CWU 120 and the ongoing Arbitration. The respondent agreed to the payment in of the Sum and for CWU 120 to be stayed pending the outcome of the Arbitration. It is noteworthy that, at this juncture, the respondent did not press the point that the appellant was acting in abuse of process and that the court should proceed with CWU 120 and order that the appellant be wound up.
- [17]
[17] The Judge then granted the appellant leave to provide “security for [the respondent’s] claim” by payment of the Sum into court pending the determination of CWU 120 and the Arbitration (“Payment In Order”). As a consequence, CWU 120 was stayed until further order. The terms of the Payment In Order were as follows:
- [18]
[18] Sometime later, the Tribunal issued its award following the Arbitration (“Award”). The Tribunal rejected the respondent’s jurisdictional objections, holding that the Purchase Contract was a valid contract that could be used as the basis for the Tribunal’s determination of the rights and obligations of both parties, and that the respondent in fact believed this to be the case. In any event, the doctrine of separability applied pursuant to Art 19 of the Arbitration Law of the PRC, enabling the appellant to invoke the arbitration agreement regardless of the validity of the Purchase Contract.
- [19]
[19] Turning to the substantive merits of the case, the Tribunal declined to grant the negative declaration sought by the appellant. The Tribunal found that the appellant had failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove that the Purchase Contract had been entered into for accounting and bookkeeping purposes without a genuine intention to perform the Purchase Contract. However, the Tribunal also expressed reservations as to whether the respondent had fulfilled its delivery obligations under the Purchase Contract based on the evidence that had been put before it. In particular, the Tribunal noted that the respondent had not submitted any relevant evidence of its delivery of copper cathodes to the appellant under the Purchase Contract, such as the bill of lading and waybill related to the delivery of the goods. The respondent had also not provided any evidence of the terms of delivery including the delivery location, the country of origin of the goods and the quality of goods. Moreover, although the respondent had relied on the Audit Confirmation Letters as establishing that it was “highly probable that there [was] a real creditor-debt[or] relationship” between the parties, the Tribunal was unpersuaded as it found that the Audit Confirmation Letters “[could not] be used as direct evidence to determine the relationship between [sic] creditor’s rights and debts” and were insufficient to prove the positive existence of the Alleged Debt. This was because, under PRC law, an audit confirmation letter was based solely on the corporate accounting records and could include confirmation data that was not reflective of the actual state of affairs. It therefore could not be equated to an account confirmation letter issued by the company itself. Accordingly, despite rejecting the appellant’s claim for a declaration that the Alleged Debt did not exist, the Tribunal expressly caveated its decision by stating that it had not made any finding or ruling as to whether the Alleged Debt did or did not exist. In this regard, the Tribunal noted that the respondent had not mounted a counterclaim in the Arbitration for the Alleged Debt. Presumably, the Tribunal adverted to this omission as the reason it refrained from definitively deciding if the Alleged Debt did or did not exist.
- [20]
[20] After the issuance of the Award, the respondent applied to court for the stay of CWU 120 to be lifted. The Judge lifted the stay by consent of the parties.
- [21]
[21] The respondent then applied for the Sum to be paid out to it or, alternatively, for an order that the appellant be wound up in CWU 120 if the Sum was not paid out to it. The appellant contested this application and asked that CWU 120 be dismissed, and the Sum be returned given that the Arbitration had not established the existence of the Alleged Debt. What is notable is that, for the purposes of its payment out application, the respondent took the position that the appellant was ostensibly cash flow solvent based on its latest financial statements. This was in response to the Judge’s concern that ordering payment of the Sum to the respondent would be prejudicial to the appellant’s unsecured creditors, if the appellant was indeed insolvent. However, at the same time, the respondent maintained that the appellant was unable to pay its debts and should be wound up on the Insolvency Ground if payment out of the Sum was not ordered.
- [22]
[22] Eventually, the Judge ordered that the Sum be paid out to the respondent and granted it leave to discontinue CWU 120. In so doing, the Judge noted, among other things, that both parties agreed that the appellant was solvent and able to pay its debts as they fell due, and that the interests of its other creditors would not prima facie be engaged if the Sum was paid out to the respondent: see Founder Group (Hong Kong) Ltd v Singapore Commodities Group Co, Pte Ltd [2024] SGHC 280 (“SG Commodities (No 1) (HC)”) at [158]–[159].
- [23]
[23] The appellant appealed against the order for payment out and this led to the parties’ first appearance before us in CA/CA 47/2024. We issued our judgment for that appeal in SG Commodities (No 1). We allowed the appeal, holding that the Payment In Order could only be read to mean that the respondent would be prima facie entitled to payment out of the Sum to it if it had established in the Arbitration that it was legally owed the Alleged Debt. Since the respondent had failed to establish that it was a creditor of the appellant in the Arbitration, the condition for payment out was not fulfilled, and there was thus prima facie no basis for the Sum to be paid out to the respondent: SG Commodities (No 1) at [73]–[74]. We also found that the appellant had not abandoned its primary position before the Judge that the Sum should not be paid out to the respondent: SG Commodities (No 1) at [79]–[88].
Decision below
- [25]
[25] In the remitted CWU 120 proceedings, the parties disagreed on two main points, namely, whether the respondent had the requisite standing to pursue CWU 120 and, if so, whether there were sufficient grounds for the appellant to be wound up.
- [26]
[26] Both parties accepted that the requirements in AnAn applied to the question of the respondent’s standing to pursue CWU 120 and that there was a prima facie dispute concerning the Alleged Debt that was referable to arbitration. Although this would usually mean that the respondent had no standing as a creditor of the appellant to pursue CWU 120, the respondent submitted that the appellant had acted in abuse of process by disputing the Alleged Debt in the face of its earlier admissions of the Alleged Debt in the Audit Confirmation Letters, its audited financial statements from FY2016 to FY2021 and a confirmation of balance request purportedly signed by the appellant and affixed with the appellant’s seal (“Confirmation Request”). Accordingly, the respondent invited the court to “exercise its discretion and decide for itself whether the [respondent was] a creditor of the company within the meaning of s 124(1) of the IRDA”. In this regard, the respondent submitted that it had standing either as an actual creditor or contingent creditor of the appellant.
- [27]
[27] The appellant disagreed that it had acted abusively by disputing the Alleged Debt. The appellant emphasised that the Tribunal had deliberately stopped short of finding that the Alleged Debt existed (see [19] above). Moreover, the appellant had also demonstrated that it was disputing the Alleged Debt in good faith by, among other things, voluntarily applying to pay the Sum into court and taking active steps to pursue a determination of the Alleged Debt in the Arbitration. As there was a dispute over the Alleged Debt that fell within the scope of the arbitration agreement and the appellant had not raised the dispute in abuse of process, the respondent did not have standing to pursue CWU 120 and it should therefore be dismissed.
- [28]
[28] As for the grounds for winding up, the respondent argued that the appellant should be wound up on either the Insolvency Ground or Just and Equitable Ground. On the former, the appellant was presumed insolvent due to its failure to satisfy the respondent’s statutory demand within the three-week period under s 125(2)(a) of the IRDA; and, in any event, the appellant was cash flow insolvent due to material uncertainties and discrepancies regarding the company’s ability to pay its debts as and when they fell due, its trading operations and cash flow projections, and the veracity of its financial and accounting records. The respondent also argued that it was just and equitable for the appellant to be wound up due to a clear lack of probity in the conduct of the appellant’s present management. The appellant disagreed that the Insolvency Ground or Just and Equitable Ground had been made out.
- [29]
[29] The Judge held that the respondent had standing as a creditor. Applying the approach set out in AnAn, the Judge found that there was a valid arbitration agreement between the parties and assumed that the dispute over the Alleged Debt fell within the scope of the parties’ arbitration agreement. However, the Judge accepted the respondent’s submission that the appellant was acting in abuse of process by resiling from its prior admissions of the Alleged Debt in the Audit Confirmation Letters. Although it is not entirely clear, the Judge appeared to have considered that there was no bona fide and substantial dispute over the Alleged Debt as he went on to consider if there were grounds for winding up the appellant. In this regard, the Judge held that the Insolvency Ground was established in light of the appellant’s failure to satisfy the statutory demand issued by the respondent for the Alleged Debt and its cash flow insolvency based on the evidence before the court. However, the Judge rejected the respondent’s case on the Just and Equitable Ground.
- [30]
[30] The appellant applied to the Judge for a stay of execution of the winding-up order pending its intended appeal. The Judge granted a partial stay that allowed the winding-up order to take effect subject to several qualifications on the powers of the appellant’s liquidators with a view to generally preserving the appellant’s rights and liabilities. The appellant subsequently filed its notice of appeal against the winding-up order, and an application to this court for a complete stay of execution of the winding-up order pending the appeal. We granted this application, but on the condition that the appeal be expedited.
The parties’ cases
- [31]
[31] On appeal, the appellant’s primary submission was that the Judge erred in finding that the respondent had standing to maintain CWU 120. The dispute over the Alleged Debt fell within the scope of the arbitration agreement between the parties and had in fact been referred to arbitration, but the Arbitration had not conclusively resolved the dispute as to whether the debt existed. Applying the principles in AnAn and Founder Group (CA), this meant that the respondent had no standing as a creditor to present a winding-up application against the appellant based on the Alleged Debt. The Judge should have dismissed CWU 120 on this basis.
- [32]
[32] To the extent that the Judge relied on the abuse of process exception in AnAn to decide the dispute over the Alleged Debt, the appellant submitted that the Judge was wrong to find that it had acted in abuse of process by resiling from its earlier admissions of the Alleged Debt in the Audit Confirmation Letters. Given that the Tribunal had already determined that the Audit Confirmation Letters did not amount to confirmations of debt under PRC law, it was not open to the Judge to revisit the issue and find, on the contrary, that the Audit Confirmation Letters did amount to admissions of the Alleged Debt from which the appellant had improperly resiled. In the circumstances, there was no basis to find that the appellant had acted in abuse of process, and the Judge should have dismissed CWU 120.
- [33]
[33] In any event, the appellant argued that the Insolvency Ground was not made out. The presumption of insolvency arising from the appellant’s failure to satisfy the statutory demand would have been rebutted by the payment of the Sum into court by the appellant. In any event, it was also clear on the face of the appellant’s financial statements that it was solvent and able to pay its debts as they fell due. The appellant also made several further arguments that the respondent was precluded from relying on the Insolvency Ground because it had: (a) agreed that CWU 120 should be stayed for the dispute to be referred to arbitration and thereby waived its right to rely on the deemed insolvency of the appellant based on the statutory demand; and (b) later taken the position that the appellant was solvent in support of its application for payment out of the Sum.
- [34]
[34] The respondent accepted that the Arbitration did not conclusively determine the existence of the Alleged Debt and that there remained a prima facie dispute over the Alleged Debt that fell within the scope of a valid arbitration agreement. However, this did not preclude a finding that the respondent had the requisite standing to pursue CWU 120 because, adopting the reasoning of the Privy Council in Sian Participation Corpn v Halimeda International Ltd [2025] AC 1321 (“Sian Participation”), the question of an applicant’s standing to bring a winding-up application was a distinct inquiry from a determination of the existence of the debt. As we explain at [70]–[72] below, this was inconsistent with the reasoning of this court in AnAn and Founder Group (CA). But, at the hearing before us, counsel for the respondent, Ms Hoang Linh Trang (“Ms Hoang”), confirmed that she was not asking this court to revisit the correctness of its decisions in AnAn and Founder Group (CA). We elaborate on the implications of this below.
- [35]
[35] In any event, the respondent submitted that the Judge was correct to find that the appellant had abused the process of the court in resiling from the admissions of the Alleged Debt in the Audit Confirmation Letters. Despite the Tribunal’s observation that the Audit Confirmation Letters did not constitute confirmations of the Alleged Debt, the Judge was entitled to find that the Audit Confirmation Letters were admissions of the debt because the status of the Audit Confirmation Letters fell to be determined under Singapore law as part of the question of whether the appellant had acted in abuse of process based on the legal framework in AnAn and Founder Group (CA). This was a distinct inquiry from the Tribunal’s comments on the effect of the Audit Confirmation Letters as a matter of PRC law. In this regard, it was well-established under Singapore law that audit confirmations and the unqualified recognition of a debt in a company’s books constituted out-of-court admissions of that debt. Apart from the Audit Confirmation Letters, the appellant had also admitted the Alleged Debt in its audited financial statements for FY2016 to FY2021 and the Confirmation Request. It was therefore incumbent on the appellant to provide a clear and convincing explanation for its change in position to now disputing the Alleged Debt.
- [36]
[36] In this regard, the respondent submitted that the appellant had failed to provide a cogent explanation. The appellant was not entitled to maintain that the Audit Confirmation Letters, its financial statements and the Confirmation Request had reflected the Alleged Debt only for accounting or bookkeeping purposes as this had been rejected by the Tribunal in the Award. In any event, even if the appellant could take the point, it was nonetheless not an acceptable explanation for disputing the Alleged Debt given the “importance of [ensuring] proper corporate governance and bookkeeping” and the need to uphold accounting standards in Singapore.
- [37]
[37] In the event that it did not have standing as an actual creditor due to the dispute over the Alleged Debt, the respondent argued in the alternative that it had standing as a contingent creditor of the appellant given that the Tribunal had found that the Purchase Contract was valid and binding under PRC law and the parties’ remaining dispute only related to whether the contingency that crystallised the Alleged Debt under the Purchase Contract had occurred.
- [38]
[38] As for the grounds for winding-up, the respondent reiterated its submissions below on the Insolvency Ground and the Just and Equitable Ground (see [28] above).
Issue to be determined
- [39]
[39] In our view, the outcome of this appeal turned in the first instance on the issue of whether the respondent had standing as a creditor of the appellant to apply for the appellant to be wound up based on the principles established in AnAn and Founder Group (CA). This was an anterior issue of dispositive significance because, if the respondent was unable to establish that it had standing to apply for an order that the appellant be wound up, the court would decline to wind up the appellant in the absence of another creditor with standing to invoke its winding-up jurisdiction. A finding that the respondent did not have standing would be a sufficient ground for the appeal to be allowed and the winding-up application to be dismissed.
- [40]
[40] It was only if this anterior issue of standing was answered affirmatively that the question of whether a ground for winding up the appellant – namely, the Insolvency Ground or the Just and Equitable Ground relied on by the respondent – had been made out would arise. Ultimately, as we decided that the respondent did not have standing as a creditor of the appellant, it was not necessary for us to determine if either the Insolvency Ground or the Just and Equitable Ground had been established on the facts. We observe, however, that, in so far as the respondent had relied on the statutory demand issued in respect of the Alleged Debt, the dispute over the Alleged Debt not only meant that the respondent did not have standing but also meant that the respondent could not rely on the statutory demand to establish the Insolvency Ground. Nevertheless, we confine our reasons below to the issue of the respondent’s standing to apply as a creditor for the winding up of the appellant.
Applicable legal framework
- [41]
[41] We begin with an overview of the principles governing the treatment of disputed debts in winding-up applications.
The legal framework in winding-up applications generally
- [42]
[42] When a claimant (“C”) brings a winding-up application against a defendant (“D”), three conditions must be met for the court to make a winding-up order on the application:
(a) First, C must have standing as a person with a statutory right to apply for the winding up of D under s 124(1) of the IRDA.
(b) Second, C must establish one or more of the grounds for winding up under s 125(1) of the IRDA.
(c) Third, there must be no reason for the court to exercise its discretion to decline to make a winding-up order notwithstanding that a ground for winding up has been established.
- [43]
[43] The first and second conditions above can be seen as going towards the court’s jurisdiction to wind up a company. Thus, if C does not have standing to apply for the winding up of D as C does not fall within the class of persons listed in s 124(1) of the IRDA, or C fails to establish any of the statutory grounds for winding up under s 125(1) of the IRDA, the winding-up application would be dismissed on the basis that the court simply lacks jurisdiction to wind up the company.
- [44]
[44] The third condition, on the other hand, is a residual discretion which comes into play once the court’s winding-up jurisdiction has been enlivened by establishing the first and second conditions. This follows from how s 125(1) of the IRDA is framed in permissive terms – “[t]he Court may order the winding up of a company” [emphasis added] – although the general rule is that a creditor who establishes the first and second conditions is prima facie entitled to a winding-up order ex debito justitiae: Metalform Asia Pte Ltd v Holland Leedon Pte Ltd [2007] 2 SLR(R) 268 at [61]; BNP Paribas v Jurong Shipyard Pte Ltd [2009] 2 SLR(R) 949 (“BNP Paribas”) at [15]; Sun Electric Power Pte Ltd v RCMA Asia Pte Ltd [2021] 2 SLR 478 at [84].
- [45]
[45] It is worth emphasising that the first (standing) and second (operative ground for winding up) conditions are disjunctive. Thus, C’s failure to meet one condition cannot be compensated for by however strong a case it may have on the other: Mann v Goldstein [1968] 1 WLR 1091 (“Mann v Goldstein”) at 1094–1095. We clarify this as Ms Hoang suggested before us that, even if the dispute over the Alleged Debt should be resolved in arbitration, the court should nonetheless order the winding up of the appellant as it was insolvent and there had been a loss of confidence in the appellant’s management due to “serious allegations of misconduct”, such that an “independent investigator” should be appointed while the parties arbitrated the dispute over the Alleged Debt. However, as we explained to Ms Hoang, this argument was circular as considerations of insolvency or impropriety in the appellant’s affairs went towards establishing grounds for winding up the appellant and would only become relevant after the respondent had crossed the hurdle of having standing to apply for the winding up of the appellant: Founder Group (Hong Kong) Ltd v Singapore JHC Co Pte Ltd [2023] SGHC 159 (“Founder Group (HC)”) at [102]–[103]; Founder Group (CA) at [24].
The treatment of disputed debts in winding-up applications
- [46]
[46] The issue of the respondent’s standing was thus the main sticking point in this appeal. In this regard, it is well-established that if D disputes the debt on which C’s winding-up application is based, this may result in the application being dismissed on the basis of C’s lack of standing. This is because D’s assertion that it does not owe the debt claimed by C is an assertion that C is not a “creditor” of D under s 124(1)(c) of the IRDA and therefore has no standing to present a winding-up application against D: Tallington Lakes Ltd v Ancasta International Boat Sales Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 1712 (“Tallington”) at [5]; Derek French, Applications to Wind Up Companies (Oxford University Press, 4th Ed, 2021) (“Applications to Wind Up Companies”) at para 7.344. In turn, C’s lack of standing will mean that the court has no jurisdiction to make a winding-up order against D, as the power to wind up a company is conferred by statute and “the court has no jurisdiction to exercise a statutory power except on the application of a person qualified by the statute to make it”: Deloitte & Touche AG v Johnson [1999] 1 WLR 1605 at 1611B.
- [47]
[47] The case law has established two approaches that govern how the court responds to the situation where D raises a dispute to the debt claimed by C in a winding-up application brought by C against D. The two approaches are differentiated: (a) first, by the circumstances in which they apply; and (b) secondly, by what they represent in terms of the court’s power and willingness to resolve the dispute over the debt. We elaborate on the two approaches and the differences between them.
Where the dispute is not subject to a valid arbitration agreement
- [48]
[48] The general approach that applies when the dispute raised by D is not subject to any valid arbitration agreement is that the court will consider if D is disputing the debt claimed by C on bona fide and substantial grounds. The mere assertion of a dispute by D will therefore not suffice; instead, C’s standing as a creditor of D will only be called into question if D establishes something that “satisfies the Court that there is something which ought to be tried, either before the Court itself, or in an action, or by some other proceeding”: In re Great Britain Mutual Life Assurance Society (1880) 16 Ch D 246 at 253. In practice, what this means is that the court will consider if D’s defence to C’s claim for the debt raises a triable issue that would have resulted in the court giving D leave to defend if C had brought an application for summary judgment for the debt: Pacific Recreation Pte Ltd v S Y Technology Inc [2008] 2 SLR(R) 491 (“Pacific Recreation”) at [23].
- [49]
[49] If the court finds that D has failed to raise a triable issue on the debt, C’s standing to apply for the winding up of D will not be affected. The court will then proceed to determine the winding-up application by considering if C has established a ground for winding up and if there is any reason to exercise its discretion not to make a winding-up order if a ground for winding up exists.
- [50]
[50] If, on the other hand, the court finds that D has raised a triable issue on the debt, the starting point is that C will have no standing to apply as a creditor to wind up D, unless the court decides the dispute in the winding-up proceedings and does so in C’s favour. In this regard, the general rule is that the court will not decide such a dispute in a winding-up application. This means that, in most cases, the winding-up application will be dismissed on the ground that C has no standing to apply as a creditor of D: Mann v Goldstein at 1098H–1099B; Stonegate Securities Ltd v Gregory [1980] Ch 576 (“Stonegate Securities”) at 579F–580C. But one should not lose sight of the fact that this is a rule of practice that is underpinned by pragmatic and policy-based justifications, which we discuss at [56] below, as opposed to a jurisdictional bar against deciding a dispute in a winding-up application: Founder Group (HC) at [31].
- [51]
[51] At the same time, it is important that the extent of the court’s discretion where D disputes the debt on bona fide and substantial grounds is not taken too far. In this regard, it is necessary not to conflate two distinct issues that arise once D successfully establishes a triable issue on the debt. The first is that, as a matter of law, the existence of a bona fide and substantial dispute on the debt will be sufficient to deny C of standing as a creditor of D, and in turn, the court’s jurisdiction to make a winding-up order against D. The second is that, as a matter of practice, the court will decline to decide a bona fide and substantial dispute raised by D in the winding-up proceedings: Applications to Wind Up Companies at para 7.352. The consequence of this rule of practice is that the court will dismiss or, in rare cases, stay, the winding-up application on the basis of C’s lack of standing.
- [52]
[52] We emphasise this distinction because it appears to have been suggested on occasion that the court has jurisdiction to make a winding-up order against D even if the debt is disputed on bona fide and substantial grounds. For example, in RCMA Asia Pte Ltd v Sun Electric Power Pte Ltd [2020] SGHC 205 (“Sun Electric (HC)”), the High Court said that “the dismissal of winding-up petitions involving disputed debts was a rule of practice, rather than a rule of law” [emphasis in original] (at [82]), and held that “the court has the discretion to order a winding-up notwithstanding that there is a substantial and bona fide dispute in respect of the debt”, albeit “this discretion should only be exercised in exceptional circumstances” (at [86]). The High Court referred, in this connection, to this court’s decision in BNP Paribas for the proposition that “the court’s power to order a winding-up is a discretionary one” (at [87]).
- [53]
[53] To the extent that the High Court in Sun Electric (HC) suggested that the court has the power to wind up D where D disputes the debt claimed by C on bona fide and substantial grounds without resolving the dispute on the debt, we think this overstates the scope of the court’s discretion and elides the two issues set out at [51] above. As we have explained, the effect of a bona fide and substantial dispute as to the debt claimed by C is to deprive C of standing to apply for D to be wound up as C will not be a “creditor” of D under s 124(1)(c) of the IRDA. The result of this is that the court simply has no power to make a winding-up order against D as one of the two conditions for enlivening its winding-up jurisdiction is absent. It is therefore incorrect to say that the court has a discretion to make a winding-up order against D where there remains a bona fide and substantial dispute in respect of the debt because no such discretion exists; in such circumstances, the court does not make a winding-up order because it cannot do so and not because it has elected not to do so. We reiterate that, in such circumstances, the court’s winding-up jurisdiction is simply not engaged.
- [54]
[54] What the court has discretion over is the issue of whether it will invoke its general civil jurisdiction to resolve a dispute over the debt in the winding-up application rather than dismissing (or exceptionally, staying) the application. Thus, while the default position is that the court will have no jurisdiction to wind up D where D disputes the debt on bona fide and substantial grounds, the court has a discretion to decide the dispute in the exercise of its general civil jurisdiction and can, in so doing, cure the deficiency in its winding-up jurisdiction in the event that it decides the dispute in C’s favour such that C’s standing as creditor is established. But it is one thing to say that the court has a discretion to decide a dispute in the exercise of its general civil jurisdiction and thereafter make a winding-up order against D, and quite another to say that the court has a discretion to make a winding-up order against D without deciding the dispute. The former is not inconsistent with the rule that the court cannot exercise a power that is granted by statute – here, the power to wind up a company – outside the terms prescribed by the statute (see [46] above), but the latter is. If the court decides to exercise its general civil jurisdiction and goes on to decide the dispute on the debt in the winding-up proceedings, and finds that the debt exists, ex hypothesi there will no longer be a bona fide and substantial dispute and accordingly no impediment as to C’s standing and the court’s jurisdiction to wind up D, subject to there being an operative ground for winding up under s 125(1) of the IRDA.
- [55]
[55] Nothing in this court’s decision in BNP Paribas supports the existence of a discretion to wind up D where the debt claimed by C is disputed on bona fide and substantial grounds without the court going on to exercise its general civil jurisdiction to decide the dispute. In BNP Paribas, the discretionary element of the court’s power to wind up D that this court was concerned with was the residual discretion that arises after the court’s jurisdiction to wind up D has been enlivened by: (a) C establishing its standing to petition; and (b) C establishing a ground for winding up D (see [44] above). This is a very limited discretion, which is quite different from whether the court will exercise its general civil jurisdiction in a winding-up application to decide whether the debt is owed, and which only arises after the court has chosen to exercise its civil jurisdiction to decide a dispute over the debt (and does so in C’s favour).
- [56]
[56] However, it is also well-established, as mentioned above, that the court will generally decline to exercise its general civil jurisdiction to decide a dispute on the debt in the winding-up proceedings. This practice is underpinned by two main reasons. First, practically speaking, the procedure in winding-up proceedings is generally ill-suited for determining disputes of fact that may require pleadings, production of documents and cross-examination of witnesses: Coilcolor Ltd v Camtrex Ltd [2016] BPIR 1129 at [32]. That said, this is not an insurmountable hurdle as the court may adopt such procedures as it thinks necessary to resolve the dispute over the debt if it decides to do so: Pacific Recreation at [20]–[22]. The second reason is thus the more pertinent one, and it is that, as a matter of policy, the court is keen to guard against the risk of the threat or pendency of winding-up proceedings being abused as a means of exerting improper pressure against a company that genuinely disputes the debt: Tallington at [5]; Parmalat Capital Finance Ltd v Food Holdings Ltd [2009] 1 BCLC 274 at [9]. This was neatly explained by Chadwick J in Re a company (No 006685 of 1996) [1997] 1 BCLC 639 as follows (at 642b–d):
The same concern about the coercive use of winding-up proceedings also underpins the general rule that, instead of staying the winding-up proceedings pending the resolution of the dispute over the debt in another forum, the court will dismiss the winding-up application outright: In re JN 2 Ltd [1978] 1 WLR 183 at 187H.
- [57]
[57] To summarise, the general approach is characterised by two features:
(a) first, a limited inquiry into the merits of the dispute to determine if the debt is disputed on bona fide and substantial grounds (ie, the triable issue standard); and
(b) second, upon the identification of a bona fide and substantial dispute over the debt, the existence of a discretion to exercise the court’s general civil jurisdiction to decide the dispute in the winding-up proceedings, even if this would be very rarely exercised in practice.
Where the dispute is subject to a valid arbitration agreement
- [58]
[58] Neither of the two features which we have just referred to are applicable where the dispute raised by D is subject to a valid arbitration agreement between C and D. The short reason is that the agreement between the parties to resolve disputes over the debt in arbitration significantly curtails the court’s discretion to inquire into the merits of the dispute and, in turn, C’s standing to apply for a winding-up order. The arbitration agreement circumscribes the discretion of the court to exercise its general civil jurisdiction to decide the dispute in the winding-up proceedings, as to do so would be contrary to their agreement as to their choice of forum to resolve their differences. The upshot of this is that the general approach, which essentially entails a triable issue standard of review (as applied in a summary judgment application), is not appropriate where the parties have agreed to resolve their disputes through the process of arbitration, and not through court proceedings.
- [59]
[59] This was first recognised in the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Salford Estates (No 2) Ltd v Altomart Ltd (No 2) [2015] Ch 589 (“Salford Estates”). There, Sir Terence Etherton C (as he then was) held (at [40]) that the intention as manifested in the arbitration legislation – in England and Wales, the Arbitration Act 1996 (c 23) (UK) – was to “exclude the court’s jurisdiction to give summary judgment” and thus:
As his Lordship noted, any other approach would encourage parties to present a winding-up petition as a means to circumvent the arbitration agreement (at [40]):
- [60]
[60] In AnAn, we broadly agreed with the decision in Salford Estates and held that an arbitration agreement will displace the general approach taken by the court in relation to disputed debts in winding-up applications if the dispute is subject to the arbitration agreement. We further held that, in assessing if there is a valid arbitration agreement between C and D and whether the dispute raised by D falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement, the court should adopt a prima facie standard of review (at [56] and [92]). This aligned with the approach taken in applications for a stay of court proceedings in favour of arbitration under s 6 of the Arbitration Act 2001 (2020 Rev Ed) and s 6 of the International Arbitration Act 1994 (2020 Rev Ed) (at [61]). As we explained, such alignment promoted coherence in the law and, echoing the concern expressed by Etherton C in Salford Estates, prevented the outflanking of an arbitration agreement by the simple device of reframing a claim for a debt in the form of a winding-up application (at [63]):
- [61]
[61] In short, if the parties have agreed to resolve disputes over the debt in arbitration, it would be inappropriate for the court to review the merits of the dispute because this would be inconsistent with the parties’ agreed mode of dispute resolution. Given the kompetenz-kompetenz principle (ie, that the arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction), the court should not consider the questions of whether there exists a valid arbitration agreement between C and D and whether the dispute falls within the scope of such an agreement at a degree of scrutiny above the prima facie threshold: Tomolugen Holdings Ltd v Silica Investors Ltd [2016] 1 SLR 373 at [29] and [67]; Founder Group (CA) at [28(c)]. It follows a fortiori that, if the court will not generally examine the merits, it cannot exercise the discretion it has to decide a dispute as part of its general civil jurisdiction in the winding-up proceedings; that discretion is, as a general rule, displaced by the parties’ agreement to arbitrate. Given that the court will not decide the merits of the dispute over the debt where there is an arbitration agreement, C will in turn be unable to establish its standing as a creditor of D, and as a result, the court will not have jurisdiction to wind up D.
- [62]
[62] But, at the same time, we also recognised in AnAn the need for a safety valve to “check against abuses of [the prima facie] standard of review” as it may be all too convenient for D to obtain a dismissal of the winding-up application by asserting a dispute that appears prima facie to be subject to a valid arbitration agreement between C and D: AnAn at [93]. A safety valve was necessary because dismissing (or exceptionally staying) the winding up proceedings was ultimately an exercise of discretion by the court, and not a case of the court ordering an automatic or mandatory stay or dismissal upon it being shown that there was a prima facie dispute that is subject to arbitration: AnAn at [94]. Instead, it was necessary to strike an appropriate balance between enforcing the parties’ agreement to arbitrate and preventing an abuse of process of the court on the other: AnAn at [96]. Thus, we held that the prima facie standard of review should be subject to an “overarching restriction” that the court will not stay or dismiss the winding-up application where to do so would amount to an abuse of the process of the court: AnAn at [97]. While the threshold of abusive conduct was “very high” and the categories of conduct that could meet this threshold were not closed, we noted that one example where an abuse of process may be found is when D raises a dispute to the debt in the face of an earlier admission of it as regards both liability and quantum: AnAn at [99]. As the abuse of process exception, and this specific type of abuse in the form of D resiling from a previous admission of the debt, formed the crux of the respondent’s case in this appeal, we will elaborate on this in our analysis below.
- [63]
[63] Following our decision in AnAn, it has been settled that, rather than applying the general approach of assessing if the debt is disputed by D on bona fide and substantial grounds and potentially going on to decide that dispute, the court will ordinarily dismiss or, in exceptional cases, stay, a winding-up application brought by C if:
- [64]
[64] Subsequently, in Founder Group (CA), we clarified how the principles in AnAn tied into the question of C’s standing as a creditor of D to apply for D to be wound up. As we have explained earlier, under the general approach, a bona fide and substantial dispute (or the existence of a triable issue as to the debt) would deprive C of standing to apply as a “creditor” of D under s 124(1)(c) of the IRDA, the result of which is that the court will have no basis to exercise its winding-up jurisdiction to make such an order against D: Founder Group (CA) at [32]–[33]. The same applies, with appropriate modification for the lower prima facie standard of review, where D raises a dispute over the debt that is subject to an arbitration agreement. To put it simply, where D raises a dispute that is prima facie within the scope of an arbitration agreement, the effect of this is that C will have no standing to apply as a creditor to have D wound up until the dispute has been resolved in arbitration; unless C has standing, the court will have no basis to exercise its winding-up jurisdiction to make such an order against D, and the winding-up application will be ordinarily dismissed. This is, however, subject to the abuse of process safeguard established in AnAn which, if engaged on the facts, would exceptionally allow the court to apply the general approach to winding-up applications notwithstanding the arbitration agreement: Founder Group (CA) at [36], [37] and [63].
- [65]
[65] This suffices as a restatement of the current position under our law. But, at this juncture, we pause to observe that, while AnAn and Founder Group (CA) remain authoritative in this jurisdiction on the effect of an arbitration agreement on the treatment of disputed debts in winding-up applications, the courts of other jurisdictions have taken a different view of the matter. More specifically, unlike AnAn and Founder Group (CA) which establish that an arbitration agreement will displace the general approach of identifying if the dispute raises a triable issue (and the court potentially going on to decide that dispute as part of its general civil jurisdiction), the apex courts of the British Virgin Islands (the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council) and Malaysia (the Federal Court of Malaysia) have held that the general approach should apply regardless of whether there is an arbitration agreement between the parties.
- [66]
[66] In Sian Participation, the Privy Council held that the correct approach in a winding-up application involving a disputed debt was to consider if the debt was disputed on genuine and substantial grounds, and this was unaffected by whether the debt on which the application had been brought was subject to an arbitration agreement or an exclusive jurisdiction agreement (at [99]). In this regard, the Board repudiated the reasoning in Salford Estates (which this court had broadly adopted in AnAn) that the court’s approach to disputed debts in winding-up applications should be aligned with that in stay applications, as having been based on an illegitimate extension of the policy underlying the arbitration legislation (at [94]). While the appeal came before the Board from the Eastern Caribbean Court of Appeal and not as an appeal to the UK Supreme Court, the Board issued a direction that Salford Estates should no longer be followed by the courts of England and Wales (at [124]–[125]). Sian Participation thus represents the current position under English law as well.
- [67]
[67] At the heart of the Board’s decision and its rejection of Salford Estates was its view that, where C brings a winding-up application against D, a dispute over the debt claimed by C arising in that setting does not fall within the scope of an arbitration agreement between C and D as the court in a winding-up application “does not seek to, and does not, resolve or determine anything about the petitioner’s claim to be owed money by the company”. Thus, the presentation of a winding-up application by C on a debt that is disputed by D does not breach the negative obligation imposed by an arbitration agreement not to have disputes over the debt resolved in any forum other than arbitration: Sian Participation at [88]–[89]. The Board considered that the proposition that a winding-up application does not involve the adjudication of C’s claim to be a creditor either as to liability or quantum was supported by how: (a) a winding-up order does not create a res judicata as between C and D over the debt; and (b) the liquidator of D is free to reject C’s proof of debt even if the debt claimed by C was the debt upon which a winding-up order had been made against D: Sian Participation at [33].
- [68]
[68] In its recent decision of V Medical Services M Sdn Bhd v Swissray Asia Healthcare Co Ltd [2025] 2 MLJ 744 (“Swissray”), the Federal Court of Malaysia also had occasion to consider the position and to decide if Malaysian law should adopt the approach in AnAn or the approach in Sian Participation. The court ultimately decided in favour of the latter and held that a court hearing a winding-up application should consider if the debt was “genuinely disputed on substantial grounds” even if there was an arbitration agreement between the parties (at [162]). Notably, instead of focusing on how the winding-up application did not decide a dispute over the debt like the Board did in Sian Participation, the Malaysian court preferred to emphasise two other points:
(a) First, the importance of drawing a clean separation between the spheres of operation of the arbitration and insolvency regimes in light of their different underlying policies, which meant that there should no alignment of the approach to disputed debts in winding-up applications with the approach in stay applications (at [138]–[140], [147]–[150] and [162(a)]).
(b) Second, the collectivist nature and purpose of winding-up proceedings as involving the determination of whether D was insolvent in the interests of D’s creditors, which distinguished a dispute over the debt in a winding-up application from a simple bilateral dispute between C and D over the debt (at [146], [162(d)]–[162(f)] and [162(h)]).
- [69]
[69] As prefaced at [34] above, the issue of whether the current approach in AnAn and Founder Group (CA) should be reconsidered in light of these developments in other jurisdictions did not arise in this appeal as Ms Hoang confirmed before us that the respondent was not seeking to challenge the correctness of the prevailing Singapore position and was arguing its case based on the existing state of the law. We had put this question directly to Ms Hoang as it appeared to us that the respondent had drawn some inspiration from Sian Participation based on some aspects of its case below and in this appeal. We say this because, in the respondent’s written submissions and during Ms Hoang’s arguments at the hearing, Sian Participation was relied on for the proposition that a winding-up application did not involve an adjudication of any dispute raised by D over the debt on which C claimed standing to apply for D’s winding up, as a means of getting around certain findings or statements that the Tribunal had made in the Award as to whether the Alleged Debt was owed to the respondent. It was not satisfactory that, despite confirming early on in her submissions that the respondent was not inviting this court to revisit AnAn and Founder Group (CA), Ms Hoang went on to rely on the aforesaid proposition in Sian Participation without appreciating that it was inconsistent with the existing law as laid down in AnAn and Founder Group (CA).
- [70]
[70] In light of this, we take the opportunity to state that, until a party mounts a successful challenge against AnAn and Founder Group (CA) before this court, the position under Singapore law continues to be as set out in those cases. We also take the opportunity to make clear that, although Sian Participation and Swissray may not necessarily be inconsistent in all respects with AnAn and Founder Group (CA), care must be taken when referring to the former pair of decisions as certain lines of reasoning or propositions articulated therein are fundamentally inconsistent with the current approach of our courts. We provide two examples of this.
- [71]
[71] First, the view taken in Sian Participation that a dispute over a debt in a winding-up application is not caught by an arbitration agreement between the parties is inconsistent with this court’s decision in AnAn. The Board’s approach appears to be based on interpreting the obligation imposed by an arbitration agreement as an obligation of a more limited scope that prevents the parties from obtaining a final adjudication on the merits of their dispute in a forum other than arbitration. On this view, it would not be inconsistent with the parties’ agreement to arbitrate for the court to assess if the debt is disputed on bona fide and substantial grounds. However, the approach in AnAn adopts the opposing perspective and considers that the court should not engage in any form of merits review as that is a matter which the parties have reserved to the arbitral tribunal (at [1]). This underlies the rejection of the triable issue standard where there is an arbitration agreement between the parties in AnAn (see [58]–[61] above).
- [72]
[72] Second, in contrast to our decision in Founder Group (CA), the decisions in Sian Participation and Swissray do not appear to have considered the anterior question of whether a dispute over the debt will affect C’s standing to apply for the winding-up of D as a creditor of D. As explained above, under the general approach, the effect of a bona fide and substantial dispute as to the debt is to deprive C of standing to invoke the winding-up jurisdiction of the court. The court has a discretion, however, to exercise its general civil jurisdiction to decide the dispute, and if it chooses to do so, the deficiency in C’s standing would be cured if the dispute is decided in its favour. In the context of arbitration agreements, the position is modified to accommodate the lower prima facie threshold of review, but the point remains that a prima facie dispute over the debt falling within the scope of an arbitration agreement will deprive C of standing. As the arbitration agreement would also generally prevent the court from exercising any discretion pursuant to its general civil jurisdiction to decide the dispute in the winding-up application, C will be required to establish its standing by obtaining a resolution of the dispute in arbitration as the parties’ agreed forum. Although the Board in Sian Participation and the Malaysian Federal Court in Swissray held that the general approach should apply even where there exists an arbitration agreement, neither appears to have considered the effect of a dispute as to C’s standing to invoke the court’s winding-up jurisdiction to make a winding-up order against D.
- [73]
[73] We highlight these differences only to make the point that Sian Participation and Swissray do not appear wholly reconcilable with AnAn and Founder Group (CA). Given Ms Hoang’s confirmation that the respondent was content to argue this appeal on the basis of the present state of the law in Singapore, as stated in AnAn and Founder Group (CA), that was the approach upon which our analysis of the merits of this appeal was based. However, this also meant that, in so far as certain of the respondent’s arguments drew on aspects of Sian Participation that were inconsistent with AnAn and Founder Group (CA), those arguments necessarily had to be rejected, as we point out below.
The respondent failed to establish its standing as a creditor of the appellant
- [74]
[74] Based on the legal framework as set out above, the question of the respondent’s standing as a creditor to apply to wind up the appellant fell to be determined by an application of the approach in AnAn and Founder Group (CA). Accordingly, CWU 120 ought to be dismissed or stayed based on the respondent’s lack of standing if the following three conditions were present:
- [75]
[75] The first two conditions were not in issue in this appeal. It was common ground before us that there was a valid arbitration agreement between the parties and that the dispute over the Alleged Debt fell within the scope of the arbitration agreement. This was also consistent with the Judge’s decision below. It thus followed that, unless the appellant had acted in abuse of process in disputing the Alleged Debt (as the Judge found), in which case the general approach would be applied to assess if there was a triable issue as to the existence of the Alleged Debt, CWU 120 should be dismissed on the basis that the respondent did not have standing to apply for the appellant’s winding up as a creditor of the appellant. No issue of a stay of CWU 120 arose as the respondent did not suggest, either before us or before the Judge that, even if the court should find that the appellant had not acted in abuse of process, a stay of CWU 120 should be ordered instead of dismissing it outright (see [78] below).
- [76]
[76] As mentioned, this was an unusual case because the parties had already proceeded to arbitration over the Alleged Debt and obtained the Award. However, the Arbitration did not conclusively resolve the dispute over the Alleged Debt. As explained above, while the appellant failed to obtain a declaration as to the non-existence of the Alleged Debt in the Arbitration, the Tribunal also made it clear in the Award that it was not deciding that the respondent was owed the Alleged Debt. To reiterate, this was because the Tribunal had concerns about whether the respondent had performed the Purchase Contract, as the respondent was unable to produce even basic trade documents to substantiate its claim that it had delivered the copper cathodes to the appellant under the Purchase Contract (see [19] above). As we pointed out in SG Commodities (No 1) (at [92]), this meant that the Award did not establish the existence of the Alleged Debt and provided no basis for the respondent to assert that it was a creditor of the appellant. The respondent accepted this.
- [77]
[77] Given that the Arbitration failed to resolve the dispute over the Alleged Debt, as we pointed out to Ms Hoang, there seemed to be nothing to stop the respondent from commencing a fresh arbitration to obtain an award affirming the existence of the Alleged Debt and its standing as a creditor of the appellant. Indeed, both parties confirmed before us that it was common ground that there was nothing under PRC law in terms of a doctrine akin to res judicata or the rule in Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100 (“Henderson”) that might preclude the respondent from commencing a fresh arbitration to establish the Alleged Debt.
- [78]
[78] Despite this, the respondent informed the Judge below that it did not intend to commence a fresh arbitration and was thus not seeking a stay of CWU 120 for that purpose. Similarly, before us, Ms Hoang stated that while the respondent was reserving its right to commence a new arbitration, it intended to press on with its arguments that the Judge below was right in granting a winding-up order against the appellant in CWU 120. Based on the approach in AnAn and Founder Group (CA), the only way the respondent could possibly achieve this was by establishing that the appellant had acted in abuse of process in disputing the Alleged Debt, such that the court should apply the general approach and determine the issue of the respondent’s standing for itself. In this regard, the respondent argued that the appellant’s conduct constituted an abuse of process as its dispute of the Alleged Debt was an attempt to resile from prior admissions of the Alleged Debt in the Audit Confirmation Letters and its audited financial statements from FY2016 to FY2021. Thus, the only real issue was whether the appellant had acted in abuse of process.
The scope of the abuse of process inquiry
- [79]
[79] As mentioned at [61] above, the application of the prima facie standard means that a winding-up application will be dismissed or stayed as long as there exists a dispute over the debt that is referrable to arbitration, regardless of whether the defences put forth by the defendant company are valid or credible. As the court does not engage in any form of merits review, there is the risk that a defendant will conjure up a dispute over what is in truth an undisputed debt for the sole purpose of staving off a winding-up application. The court in AnAn was alive to this and therefore introduced the abuse of process exception as a safeguard to curb against such abuses of the prima facie standard of review: AnAn at [93].
- [80]
[80] However, the abuse of process safeguard must be applied in a manner that is consistent with the underlying premise of the approach in AnAn. It would be incongruous for the court to reject any inquiry into the merits of the parties’ dispute based on the application of the prima facie standard of review (and the rejection of the triable issue standard), only to engage in a back-door review of the merits under the guise of considering if there has been an abuse of process. Thus, we emphasised that “the abuse of process control mechanism cannot be used as a gateway for parties to introduce arguments on the merits”; in particular, the fact that the defendant’s defence may be plainly unmeritorious would not be grounds for a finding of abuse of process: AnAn at [99]–[100].
Abuse of process by resiling from an admission of the debt
- [81]
[81] Although abuse of process can manifest in a number of forms and the categories of abusive conduct are not closed, a paradigm example of abuse is where a defendant resiles from an earlier admission of the debt: BWG v BWF [2020] 1 SLR 1296 (“BWG”) at [55]. Where this occurs, there is the possibility that the defendant has contrived a dispute that did not previously exist for the sole purpose of playing for time. This is because the law treats a “dispute” referable to arbitration and an “admission” by the defendant as two sides of the same coin, in that a “dispute” would exist for the purposes of triggering an arbitration agreement so long as the defendant does not admit the claim: Tjong Very Sumito v Antig Investments Pte Ltd [2009] 4 SLR(R) 732 (“Tjong Very Sumito”) at [56]. Thus, if the defendant has at any point in time before the winding-up application against it made an admission of the claim, it will mean that there was no dispute between the parties until the time of the winding-up application. A subsequent change of tune when the defendant is faced with a winding-up application gives rise to the suspicion that it is acting cynically in disputing the debt. Thus, in AnAn we held that absent a “clear and convincing” reason for the defendant’s change of position, the court would generally find that there has been an abuse of process (at [94]).
- [82]
[82] However, an applicant creditor may attempt to engage in an improper back-door review of the merits of the defence under the abuse of process inquiry. In our view, that was exactly what the respondent did in the present case.
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