General Division of the High Court · Decided 29 October 2024
The sum paid into court was to be paid out to the claimant as the arbitration victor
Founder Group (Hong Kong) Ltd (in liquidation) v Singapore Commodities Group Co, Pte Ltd
Feedback & support[2024] SGHC 280 · Case no. Companies Winding Up No 120 of 2022 (Summons No 620 of 2024)
✱ The decision, in one line
Not legal advice
The sum paid into court was to be paid out to the claimant as the arbitration victor
Summary by laws.sg·Paragraphs [4], [154]
There is no fuller plain-English summary of this judgment yet.
Ask about this judgment →Grounds of decision
Official text from eLitigation
Introduction
- [1]
[1] There are two applications before me: (a) a winding up application (“the CWU”); and (b) an application for money to be paid out of court (“the Payment Out Application”). I heard both applications jointly on 19 July 2024.
The CWU
- [2]
[2] The first application before me is the CWU. The claimant presented the CWU against the defendant in May 2022. In the CWU, the claimant claims that the defendant is insolvent because the defendant has failed to pay a debt in the sum of US$14.12m (“the Debt”) that fell due from the defendant to the claimant in December 2015.
- [3]
[3] The defendant denies the existence of the Debt. As a result, the defendant commenced arbitration against the claimant in April 2022 seeking a finding that the Debt does not exist (“the Arbitration”).
- [4]
[4] In September 2022, by consent, I stayed the CWU until the conclusion of the Arbitration upon the defendant paying a sum equivalent to the Debt, ie, US$14.12m, into court (“the Sum”).
- [5]
[5] In November 2023, the Arbitration concluded with an award (“the Award”). In the Award, the arbitral tribunal (“the Tribunal”) expressly declined to find that the Debt does not exist (see [38] below). It also expressly declined to find that the Debt does exist (see [40] below). The parties agree that the conclusion of the Arbitration means that the stay of the CWU had to be lifted. But the parties differ over the consequence that follows from the Award on the outcome of the two applications before me.
- [6]
[6] I should make clear at this juncture that I use the term “the Debt” to refer to the claimant’s claim that the defendant owes it the sum of US$14.12m purely for convenience. My use of that term should not be taken to imply that I have made or now make any finding that the defendant actually does owe a debt of US$14.12m to the claimant. Like the Tribunal, I have made and make no such finding.
The Payment Out Application
The appeal
- [12]
[12] The defendant has now appealed against my decision.
The background facts
The parties
- [17]
[17] The defendant is a company incorporated in Singapore. Its principal business is the general wholesale trade of, amongst other things, forest products and chemical products.
- [18]
[18] Until 2021, the claimant and the defendant were both ultimately owned and controlled by a company incorporated in the PRC known as Peking University Founders Group Company Ltd (“PUFG”). PUFG is broadly speaking, the commercial arm of Peking University (see Nuoxi Capital Limited (in liquidation) v Peking University Founder Group Company Limited [2022] 2 HKC 1 and Nuoxi Capital Limited (in liquidation in the British Virgin Islands) v Peking University Founder Group Company Limited [2022] 5 HKLRD 837). In 2021, as a result of PUFG’s actual or apprehended insolvency, PUFG’s business was reorganised under the supervision of the First Intermediate People’s Court in Beijing. In this reorganisation, a consortium of strategic PRC investors acquired a tranche of PUFG’s assets. This tranche included the defendant.
- [19]
[19] Since 2021, therefore, the claimant and the defendant are no longer both under the ultimate ownership and control of PUFG. The defendant is now under the ultimate ownership and control of the consortium of strategic PRC investors. As for the claimant, although it remains under the ultimate ownership of PUFG, it is now under the control of its liquidators. Its liquidators were appointed on a petition presented by PUFG’s offshore bondholders. PUFG’s offshore bondholders are aggrieved by PUFG’s reorganisation because it makes no provision for the offshore bondholders’ economic and other interests.
- [20]
[20] For these reasons, although the CWU appears in form to be a straightforward winding up application by a creditor against a debtor, it is in substance a contest between (on the claimant’s side) the economic and other interests of PUFG’s offshore bondholders and (on the defendant’s side) the economic and other interests of the consortium of strategic PRC investors.
The claimant’s claim against the defendant
- [21]
[21] After taking control of and reviewing the claimant’s books and records, the claimant’s liquidators formed the view that the defendant owes the Debt to the claimant. They formed this view on the basis of four documents:
(a) The first document is a contract dated 17 December 2015 (“the Contract”) under which the defendant agreed to buy from the claimant 3,000 tons (+/- 5%) of copper cathodes at a price of US$4,712 per ton for delivery in December 2015.
(b) The second document is an invoice dated 28 December 2015 issued by the claimant to the defendant in the sum of US$14.12m for just over 2,900 metric tonnes of copper cathodes (“the Invoice”).
(c) The third document is an audit confirmation that the defendant’s Singapore auditor sent to the claimant in February 2019.
(d) The fourth document is an audit confirmation that the defendant’s PRC auditor sent to the claimant also in February 2019.
- [22]
[22] The two audit confirmations are, in form, a letter issued by the defendant’s Singapore and PRC auditors to the claimant informing the claimant that the defendant’s books, as at 31 December 2018, show that the defendant owes the Debt to the claimant. Each auditor then invites the claimant to sign and affix its company stamp at the foot of the letter above words acknowledging that the confirmation correctly states the balance due from the defendant to the claimant. The claimant duly signed, stamped and returned the acknowledgments in both audit confirmations.
- [23]
[23] Curiously, on 3 May 2022 – while the Arbitration was pending – the claimant received from the defendant’s Singapore auditor a further audit confirmation dated 18 March 2022 asking the claimant to confirm that the defendant owes the Debt to the claimant. Although this is an odd feature of the case, nothing ultimately turns on it.
The claimant demands payment of the Debt
- [24]
[24] In October 2021, the liquidators issued a letter of demand to the defendant demanding that the defendant pay the Debt to the claimant within 14 days. The defendant failed to comply with the demand.
- [25]
[25] In February 2022, the liquidators’ solicitors issued a letter of demand to the defendant. This letter demanded that the defendant pay the Debt to the claimant within 21 days, failing which the defendant would be presumed under s 125(2)(a) of the Insolvency Restructuring and Dissolution Act 2018 (2020 Rev Ed) (“the Act”) to be unable to pay its debts within the meaning of s 125(1)(e) of the Act. The defendant failed to comply with this demand as well.
- [26]
[26] In March and April 2022, the parties attempted to agree the terms of a standstill and to resolve by negotiation the claimant’s claim for payment of the Debt. They were ultimately unable to resolve the claim. Under cl 13 of the Contract, the parties are obliged to submit any claim that they are unable to resolve by negotiation to the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (“CIETAC”) to be resolved by arbitration.
The defendant commences the Arbitration
- [27]
[27] On 12 April 2022, pursuant to cl 13 of the Contract, the defendant commenced the Arbitration with CIETAC by filing a request for arbitration.
- [28]
[28] In its request for arbitration, the defendant accepted: (a) that the claimant and the defendant had in fact entered into the Contract; and (b) that the claimant had in fact issued the Invoice to the defendant under the Contract. The defendant nevertheless asserted that the Debt did not exist on two grounds.
(a) First, the Contract was “null and void” under Article 146 of the Civil Code of the PRC because the Contract did not represent “the true intention” of the claimant and the defendant. The defendant asserted that:
(i) both the claimant and the defendant had, in December 2015, “no actual demand for the sale and purchase of electrolytic copper”; and
(ii) the Contract and the Invoice were issued only “for the process of bookkeeping”.
(b) Second, the claimant had never delivered any copper cathodes to the defendant under the Contract.
- [29]
[29] On 9 May 2022, the defendant informed the claimant that it had lodged the request for arbitration with CIETAC. On the next day, 10 May 2022, the claimant received a letter from CIETAC enclosing the defendant’s request for arbitration.
The claimant presents the CWU
- [30]
[30] On 27 May 2022, the claimant presented the CWU against the defendant. The primary ground on which the claimant seeks to wind up the defendant is that the defendant is deemed by s 125(2)(a) of the Act to be unable to pay its debts within the meaning of s 125(1)(e) of the Act because the defendant has, for three weeks after service of the statutory demand (see [25] above): (a) neglected to pay the Debt; and (b) neglected to “secure or compound” for the Debt to the claimant’s reasonable satisfaction. The alternative ground on which the claimant seeks to wind up the defendant is that it is “just and equitable” to do so within the meaning of s 125(1)(i) of the Act.
- [31]
[31] Before the CWU could come up for hearing, and in view of the ongoing Arbitration, the parties quite sensibly agreed to stay the CWU until the conclusion of the Arbitration upon the defendant paying the Sum into court. But s 130(1) read with s 126(2) of the Act posed a potential obstacle to the defendant’s power to pay the Sum into court. Those provisions render void any disposition of the defendant’s property after 27 May 2022, the date on which the claimant presented the CWU, unless the court orders otherwise. To avoid any issues arising under these provisions, the defendant applied for leave under s 130(1) of the Act to pay the Sum into court in September 2022.
The defendant pays the Sum into court
- [34]
[34] On 4 November 2022, the defendant duly paid the Sum into court.
- [36]
[36] In the absence of any such provision, the parties are agreed that the defendant paid the Sum into court pursuant to O 3 r 2(2) of the Rules:
The Tribunal issues the Award
- [37]
[37] In November 2023, the Tribunal issued the Award. The two key issues in the Arbitration were the two issues that the defendant had advanced in the request for arbitration (see [28] above). Those two issues were, in brief: (a) whether the Contract is null and void under Art 146 of the PRC Civil Code because it was signed only for “the process of bookkeeping” or “[a]ccounts [p]rocessing”; and (b) whether the claimant delivered any copper cathodes to the defendant under the Contract.
- [38]
[38] On the first ground, the Tribunal expressly declined to make a finding that the Debt does not exist. The critical paragraph of the Award on this issue is the following:
- [39]
[39] It is a significant point that the Tribunal found only that the defendant had failed to prove that the Contract does not represent the true intention of the parties. A finding that the Contract does represent the true intention of the parties is not the logical corollary of a finding couched in these terms. After all, this finding does not exclude the possibility that the claimant too could “fail to prove” that the Contract does represent the true intention of the parties.
- [40]
[40] On the second ground, the Tribunal expressly found that the claimant had failed to prove that it delivered any copper cathodes to the defendant under the Contract. The critical paragraph of the Award on this issue is the following:
- [41]
[41] It is also a significant point the Tribunal found only that the claimant had failed to prove that it did deliver copper cathodes to the defendant under the Contract. This finding too does not exclude the possibility that the defendant too could “fail to prove” that the claimant did not deliver copper cathodes to the defendant under the Contract.
- [42]
[42] The Tribunal concluded the substantive section of the Award by reiterating that it declined to find in favour of the defendant on its arbitration request, ie, to make a finding that the Debt does not exist. But the Tribunal went on expressly to point out that its finding against the defendant did not mean that the Tribunal had found in favour of the claimant, ie had found that the Debt does exist. This, the Tribunal noted, is especially the case in the absence of any counterclaim by the claimant inviting the Tribunal to make any such finding in the claimant’s favour:
The stay of the CWU is lifted
- [43]
[43] In January 2024, the claimant’s solicitors wrote to the court noting that the defendant had lost in the Arbitration. They asked for the stay of the CWU to be lifted so that it could be finally disposed of and the Sum released to the claimant:
- [44]
[44] In February 2024, I lifted the stay of the CWU by consent. Although both parties agreed that the stay should be lifted, they each took a different view on the effect of the Award on the outcome of the CWU. I accordingly gave directions: (a) for the parties to file further evidence and submissions addressing the effect of the Award on the outcome of the CWU; and (b) for the CWU to be heard.
The Payment Out Application
- [45]
[45] Before the CWU could be heard pursuant to my directions, the claimant filed the Payment Out Application. I directed the Payment Out Application and the CWU to be heard together at a joint hearing.
The parties’ positions
- [46]
[46] The parties set out their positions for the joint hearing in written submissions filed in April 2024 and, upon my direction, in supplementary written submissions filed in July 2024. The parties then attended before me on 19 July 2024 for the joint hearing.
The claimant’s position
The defendant’s position
- [49]
[49] The defendant’s position changed in a critical way between its written submissions and its oral submissions on the joint hearing.
On the Payment Out Application
- [52]
[52] In its supplementary written submissions filed in July 2024, the defendant reiterated this position, ie, that the Payment Out Application must be dismissed in the absence of an express finding that the Debt does exist:
On the CWU
- [54]
[54] The defendant’s position on the CWU has remained constant in its written submissions and in its oral submissions.
- [55]
[55] Its position is that – regardless of the outcome of the Payment Out Application – the CWU should be dismissed for two alternative reasons. First, the defendant’s failure to comply with the statutory demand is incapable of raising the presumption of insolvency under s 125(2)(a) of the Act because the Award made no finding that the Debt does exist. Second, even if the Award did make a finding that the Debt does exist, the claimant has failed to establish either of the two alternative grounds it relies upon. In other words, the defendant submits that it is not insolvent, and also submits that it is not just and equitable to wind the defendant up:
- [56]
[56] I begin by considering the Payment Out Application before turning to consider the CWU.
The proper approach to the Payment Out Application
- [58]
[58] My task is instead to exercise the procedural discretion that is conferred by O 3 r 2(2) of the Rules. My objective is, in the words of O 3 r 2(2) itself, to do justice consistently with the Ideals set out in O 3 r 1(2). Although the discretion is a broad and unfettered one, it is nevertheless a judicial discretion. Exercising the discretion is therefore a multifactorial exercise which requires me to take into consideration all the relevant circumstances of the case.
- [60]
[60] Given the multifactorial nature of this discretionary exercise, however, the factors I have identified cannot be exhaustive. So too, no one factor can be dispositive. The task of doing justice consistently with the Ideals cannot readily be confined to a framework of principles fixed a priori, however flexible that framework and those principles may be.
- [62]
[62] I analyse these five factors in turn.
The exercise of the discretion
The claimant does not assert a right to the Sum
- [63]
[63] As I have pointed out, the claimant does not submit that it is entitled to the Sum as a matter of substantive right. Thus, it does not claim, for example: (a) that the parties entered into a contract under which the claimant agreed to consent to a stay of the CWU in consideration of the defendant agreeing to pay the Sum into court; (b) that that contract attached a legally-binding condition regulating when and to whom the Sum should be paid out of court; and (c) that that condition has now been satisfied so as to endow the claimant with a substantive contractual right, as against the defendant, to payment out of the Sum.
- [64]
[64] So too, the claimant does not submit that it is entitled to payment of the Sum as a matter of procedural right. Thus, it does claim the Sum as a matter of right under any provision of the Rules such as, for example, O 14 r 4(3). That provision applies only to money paid into court in an action for debt or damages (see O 14 r 1). The CWU is not an action in debt; even more so it is not an action for damages. That is why the Sum was paid into court under O 3 r 2(2), not under O 14 r 1. Equally, O 27 r 8 is of no assistance to the claimant. That provision deals only with the mechanics of payment out of court. Indeed, the purpose of O 27 as a w hole is not to set out the substantive or procedural legal rules that mandate a payment into court or out of court. The purpose O 27 as a whole is instead to prescribe the mechanics of payments in and out, and the Accountant-General’s obligations while holding money paid in.
The claimant asserts the Sum is security for the Debt
- [65]
[65] Although the claimant claims no contractual right to the Sum, it does submit that the Sum is its security for the Debt. “Security” generally means a right that a creditor has against an asset of his debtor that entitles the creditor to have recourse to that asset if the debtor defaults in paying the debt and which right will prevail in favour of the creditor over the rights of unsecured creditors in the debtor’s subsequent insolvency.
- [66]
[66] The claimant’s case is that it became a secured creditor of the defendant at common law, upon and by reason of the defendant’s payment of the Sum into court under the Rules. The claimant, therefore, asserts that it should now be allowed to have recourse to the Sum, given that: (a) the defendant failed to establish in the Arbitration that the Debt does not exist; and (b) the defendant has failed to pay the Debt.
- [67]
[67] A creditor faces two types of risk as against its debtor. The first is the risk that the debtor will refuse to pay the debt even though it has enough money to pay all of its unsecured creditors in full. I shall refer to this first risk as “collection risk”. The second is the risk that the debtor will be unable to pay the debt because it does not have enough money to pay all of its unsecured creditors in full. I shall refer to this second risk as “insolvency risk”.
- [68]
[68] The defining feature of security – and the core of the claimant’s claim that the Sum is its security for the Debt – is that the creditor is protected not only against collection risk but also against insolvency risk.
- [69]
[69] The security interest that the claimant asserts in the Sum is, of course, quite unlike the ordinary security that a debtor grants a creditor under, for example, a mortgage, a charge or a pledge. The first and most fundamental difference is that the security which the claimant claims is one that arose at common law, upon and by virtue of the payment into court under the Rules. An ordinary security interest arises out of contract, not by operation of law.
- [70]
[70] There are three further significant differences between the security that the claimant claims and ordinary security. First, a party who pays money into court parts outright with that money such that it is no longer his property (see [103] below). But an ordinary security interest must and can only subsist in an asset or class of assets that are or will become the property of the debtor. Second, the claimant accepts that its security can be defeated by the exercise of a discretion such as the one that the claimant now invites me to exercise under O 3 r 2(2). But ordinary security is a substantive contractual right that has a substantive proprietary dimension. Neither this contractual right nor its proprietary dimension can be defeated by the exercise of a discretion, let alone a discretion that is merely procedural rather than substantive or remedial. Third, part of the claimant’s case, as I will show (see [148] below), is that its security interest in the Sum arose and subsists even if the Award did not find that the Debt does exist. But ordinary security cannot even exist if there is no underlying current or future obligation whose performance it secures. If the Debt does not exist, the claimant cannot possibly have an ordinary security interest in the Sum simply because there is no liability of the defendant for that interest to secure.
- [72]
[72] The defendant agrees with the claimant on this issue of law. Thus, the defendant accepts that the claimant became “in effect a secured creditor” of the defendant upon and by reason of the defendant’s payment of the Sum into court under the Rules.
- [74]
[74] Whatever the reason may actually be for the defendant’s tactical decision to agree with the claimant on this issue, I make no finding on it and need say no more about it.
Three broad categories of payment in
- [75]
[75] Although the parties now agree that a security interest arose in the Sum in favour of the claimant upon and by reason of the payment into court under the Rules, I do not accept that that is the correct position in law for the reasons that follow.
- [76]
[76] The cases that the parties have cited to me show that a litigant pays money into court for three broad purposes, that can be categorised as follows:
- [77]
[77] In the first category, a litigant who makes an offer of compromise to the opposing litigant may support the offer by paying money into court to demonstrate his earnestness, ie, that his offer is a serious offer and that he is good for the money. In the second category, a litigant who has sought and obtained a forensic advantage may demonstrate his good faith in obtaining the advantage by paying money into court, ie, to show that he has done so for a proper purpose and not as a delaying tactic or for another collateral purpose. In the third and final category, an express procedural rule may permit or require a litigant to pay money into court and may go on expressly to prescribe that that money is to be “security” for a potential obligation to the opposing litigant.
- [78]
[78] In my view, it is only in the third category that the litigant’s payment into court is protection for the opposing litigant against not only collection risk but also insolvency risk. That is because it is only in the third category that there is express legislative mandate for treating the payment into court as security in the ordinary sense of the term, ie, as protection against both risks. Without express legislative mandate, it appears to me that the Rules intend – by merely permitting or requiring a litigant to pay money into court without more – to protect the litigant’s opponent against only collection risk and not against insolvency risk.
- [79]
[79] I transpose my last point to the facts of this case. It does not appear to me that it was the intent of the Rules that the claimant should ordinarily receive payment of the Sum out of court in full satisfaction of the Debt and in priority to all of the defendant’s unsecured creditors simply because the claimant: (a) happened to be the first creditor to be sufficiently motivated to present a winding-up application against the defendant; (b) happened to rest its winding up application on a disputed debt; and therefore (c) happened to be the first creditor to be in a position extract a payment into court from the defendant as the price of staying the CWU while the existence of that disputed debt was adjudicated.
- [81]
[81] This outcome would also be forensically absurd. It would give a claimant who rests his winding up application on a disputed debt a substantial advantage over a claimant who rests his winding up application on a wholly undisputed or even indisputable debt. The former claimant will be in a position to obtain security for the disputed debt by extracting a payment into court as the price of staying the winding up application. The latter claimant will not.
- [82]
[82] For all of these reasons, this outcome, in my view, requires express legislative mandate.
- [83]
[83] To establish my point, I consider the case law on each of these three categories in turn.
(1) By way of an offer of compromise
- [84]
[84] In the first category, a litigant may pay money into court to support an offer of compromise. For example, O 14 r 1(1) of the Rules permits a defendant who is contesting an action in debt or for damages to pay a sum of money into court as an offer to compromise one or more of a claimant’s causes of action. This leaves the claimant free to consider the defendant’s offer purely on its commercial and forensic merits, knowing that the offer is serious and that the defendant is good for the money. If the merits of the offer are sufficiently compelling, the claimant can accept the money paid into court under O 14 r 3(1). The claimant is then “entitled to receive payment of that sum in satisfaction” of the compromised causes of action under O 14 r 3(6).
- [85]
[85] In my view, and as a matter of principle, the intent of O 14 is that the money paid into court protects the claimant against only collection risk and not against insolvency risk.
- [86]
[86] The parties have cited two English cases that fall into the first category. I analyse them in turn.
(A) Peal Furniture
- [88]
[88] The English Court of Appeal held that the judge at first instance had exercised his discretion correctly in ordering the money in court to be paid out to the defendant. In part, this was because “if it turned out that the [defendant] company were indeed insolvent, [the plaintiffs] would be given a preference over the general body of creditors, which would produce a result which in a general sense would be inequitable” (at 468E per Shaw LJ). As Roskill LJ put it (at 469E):
- [92]
[92] But if a claimant secures judgment at a time when the defendant is insolvent, there is no reason why the court should, in the exercise of its general discretion and in the absence of any express legislative mandate in O 14, convert the claimant from an unsecured creditor of the defendant into a preferred or secured creditor of the defendant simply because the defendant chose to make an offer of compromise to the claimant under the rubric of O 14 r 1. No such advantages would ensue if a defendant were to make an offer of compromise to a claimant in correspondence and to demonstrate the earnestness of the offer by paying a sum of money to its solicitors to be held as stakeholders in their client account, pending the claimant’s acceptance of the offer.
- [93]
[93] In my view, the analysis in Peal Furniture is correct in that it recognises that the pari passu principle and the statutory scheme of preferential debts in s 203 of the Act are deeply-embedded principles of insolvency law and, further, recognises that an express legislative mandate is required to detract from those principles. Neither O 14 nor O 3 r 2(2) contain any such mandate.
(B) Sherratt
- [96]
[96] Hutchison J preferred Peal Furniture over this line of authority. He distinguished the line of authority on the basis that those cases had been decided under procedural rules that were materially different from the English equivalent of O 14 then in force. Considering that material difference, he preferred the reasoning in Peal Furniture because it had been decided under the same procedural rules as the applications before him and because, in any event, it accorded with deeply embedded principles of insolvency law (at 747E).
- [97]
[97] The English Court of Appeal reversed Hutchison J and held that the money should be paid out to the plaintiff instead of to the defendant. It held that the ratio in Peal Furniture was “totally inconsistent” (at 750E) with the long line of English authority that had been cited to Hutchison J. The court therefore held that Peal Furniture had been decided per incuriam (at 756H). Further, there were no material differences in the procedural regime governing payment into court when that line of authority had been decided and the English equivalent of O 14 currently in force (at 756H).
- [98]
[98] Accordingly, the English Court of Appeal held that, where a defendant pays money into court under the English equivalent of O 14, the plaintiff should not be deprived of the advantage gained by the payment in, even in the defendant’s subsequent insolvency (at 757E). The money in court protects the plaintiff not only against collection risk but also against insolvency risk.
- [99]
[99] According to Oliver LJ, there was nothing unfair or inequitable about this outcome, despite what was said in Peal Furniture, because, by paying the money into court, the defendant was in effect tendering payment of the sum claimed to a creditor at that time of the payment in (at 757E-G):
- [100]
[100] With the greatest respect, I do not find this reasoning persuasive. When a defendant pays money into court under O 14 r 1(1), he is not tendering payment of a debt or a claim to a creditor. He is paying money into court as required by O 14 r 1(1) to support an offer of compromise of a dispute. The offer of compromise, if accepted, gives rise to a fresh contract that extinguishes the underlying debt or claim, it does not discharge the underlying claim by accord and satisfaction.
- [104]
[104] All of this is undoubtedly true. As Oliver LJ points out, once a litigant pays money into court, he is neither a creditor nor a cestui qui trust of the Accountant-General (at 758A). The money paid into court, from that point onwards, is no longer the property of that litigant. The disposition of that money is at large. It is not a matter purely of the law of property or indeed the law of contract. It is indeed entirely in the broad and unfettered discretion of the court. That is, of course, subject to the Rules and the judicial nature of the discretion.
(2) As the price of a forensic advantage
- [107]
[107] In the second category, a party may pay money into court as the result of seeking and obtaining a forensic advantage, as the price for that advantage. For example, on a summary judgment application, a defendant who has established nothing more than a defence “of a dubious nature” may nevertheless stave off summary judgment and obtain leave to defend upon condition that he pays a sum of money into court (see O 9 r 17(7)(d) of the Rules). So too, as in this case, a defendant in a winding up application who disputes that it owes a debt to the claimant may pay an equivalent sum of money into court as the price of securing a stay of the winding up application while the existence of the disputed debt is adjudicated.
- [108]
[108] The parties cite two cases in this category. In my view, neither case establishes that a that every litigant’s payment into court always protects every opposing litigant against not only collection risk but also against insolvency risk simply upon and by virtue of the payment into court under the Rules.
(A) Shandong
- [109]
[109] The first case is the decision of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal in Shandong Chenming Paper Holdings Ltd v Arjowiggins HKK 2 Ltd [2022] 5 HKC 318 (“Shandong”).
- [110]
[110] In Shandong, a corporate debtor anticipated a winding up petition by a creditor. The creditor’s debt arose from an arbitration award. It was therefore not merely undisputed but in fact indisputable. The debtor commenced pre-emptive proceedings against the creditor seeking to establish that the Hong Kong insolvency court had no jurisdiction over the debtor. Whether the Hong Kong insolvency court had jurisdiction over the debtor was a live issue because the debtor was a company incorporated in the PRC, not in Hong Kong.
- [113]
[113] The court held that it did not need to hear from the third-party funder because the funder must have known that it was paying the money into court to “secure” the debt while the debtor was pursuing its appeals against the jurisdictional challenge. As Fok and Lam PJJ said (at [90]):
The claimant relies on the dictum in italics to submit that, in the present case too, the defendant’s payment of the Sum into court was to secure the claimant’s interest in obtaining payment of the Debt.
(B) Ng Kin Siu
(C) The effect of these cases
- [117]
[117] Even though both parties advance this submission, I reject it. There are four features in both Shandong and Ng Kin Siu that lead me to conclude that those cases cannot support the weight of the submission that the parties attempt to rest on them.
- [119]
[119] Second, the money paid into court in Shandong did not come from the debtor but from a third-party funder. As such, that money could never have been available for distribution to the debtor’s creditors. It is true that, unlike the company in Shandong, the debtor in Ng Kin Siu paid his own money into court (at [4]). But the critical point in Ng Kin Siu remains that the case did not proceed on the basis that the debtor was insolvent. Therefore, in that case too, just like in Shandong, there was no need to consider unsecured creditors’ interests.
- [122]
[122] For all of the above reasons, I do not consider either Shandong or Ng Kin Siu to be authority for the proposition that every litigant’s payment into court always protects every opposing litigant against not only collection risk but also against insolvency risk simply upon and by virtue of the payment into court under the Rules.
(3) Pursuant to a specific rule which deems the payment to be “security”
- [124]
[124] In my view, this is the only category in which there is a legislative mandate to hold that a litigant’s payment into court protects the opposing litigant not only against collection risk but also against insolvency risk.
- [127]
[127] I make two points about Cheng Lip Kwong.
- [131]
[131] In my view, an inroad into principles as fundamental and as deeply embedded in our insolvency law as the pari passu principle and s 203 of the Act must have an express legislative mandate. It is only in this third category where that requirement is met.
Conclusion
- [132]
[132] For all of the above reasons, I do not accept that the Sum was at common law the claimant’s security for the Debt in the sense that it protects the claimant against not only collection risk but also against insolvency risk simply upon and by virtue of the payment into court under the Rules. I therefore do not consider that the parties’ characterisation of the Sum as security for the claimant can be one of the factors I take into account in the exercise of my procedural discretion on the Payment Out Application.
What the parties intended when the defendant paid the Sum into court
- [133]
[133] As I have pointed out, it is not the claimant’s case that the defendant paid the Sum into court in performance of its obligations under a contract that binds the parties. My inquiry into the parties’ intention is therefore merely an inquiry into their consensus ad idem, falling short of a contract, that led to them asking me to stay the CWU upon the defendant’s payment into court.
- [135]
[135] There can be no ambiguity on the first aspect. It is common ground that the parties intended the Sum to be paid out upon the Arbitration concluding with an Award. And it is beyond dispute that this event has occurred.
- [136]
[136] It is only on the second aspect that there is ambiguity. There are two possibilities on the second aspect:
(a) The first possibility is that the Sum should be paid out to whoever was the victor in the Arbitration. If the claimant was the victor, the Sum should be paid out to the claimant. If the defendant was the victor, the Sum should be paid out to the defendant.
(b) The second possibility is that the Sum should be paid out according to the Tribunal’s finding as to whether the Debt does or does not exist. If the Tribunal found that the Debt does exist, the Sum should be paid out to the claimant. If the Tribunal found that the Debt does not exist, the Sum should be paid out to the defendant.
- [137]
[137] There can be no doubt that the claimant was the victor in the Arbitration. Therefore, if the first of the two possibilities was the parties’ intention, there can be no doubt that the parties intended the Sum now to be paid out to the claimant. But if the second of the two possibilities was in fact the parties’ intention, then it is not possible now to give effect to that intention. That is because both the claimant and the defendant failed to secure from the Tribunal a finding in their favour as to the existence or non-existence of the Debt.
- [138]
[138] Defendant’s counsel accepts that the parties’ intention at the time the defendant paid the Sum into court was the second of these two possibilities (see [171]–[173] below). Unfortunately, I cannot, in the exercise of my discretion, give any weight to advancing the parties’ intention because the parties’ intention has been frustrated. That is because the Tribunal disposed of the Arbitration despite expressly declining to find that the Debt does not exist and also that the Debt does exist.
- [139]
[139] This curious state of affairs has come about because of four features of the Arbitration:
(a) First, by commencing the Arbitration, the defendant reversed the natural forensic roles of a putative creditor and a putative debtor in a dispute over a debt. The putative debtor (the defendant) was the claimant in the Arbitration; and the putative creditor (the claimant) was the respondent in the Arbitration.
(b) Second, following from the first feature, the only substantive relief that the defendant (as the putative debtor) sought in the Arbitration was what amounts to a negative declaration, ie, a finding by the Tribunal that the Debt “does not exist”.
(c) Third, the claimant (despite being the putative creditor) chose not to bring a counterclaim in the Arbitration seeking a positive finding by the Tribunal that the Debt does exist.
(d) Fourth, following from the second and third features, the Tribunal was able to dispose of the arbitration simply by making a negative finding on the burden of proof rather than by making an affirmative finding on the underlying facts, ie, by finding only that the defendant had failed to prove that the Debt does not exist rather than finding as a fact that the Debt does exist.
- [140]
[140] The result of these features is that the claimant was the undoubted victor in the Arbitration. And that necessarily means that the defendant failed to secure a finding by the Tribunal that the Debt does not exist. But the claimant, by not bringing a counterclaim, gave the Tribunal no opportunity to make a finding in the Award that the Debt does exist. The claimant therefore left the Tribunal no room to make any such finding in the Award. Further, the Tribunal, by couching its finding against the defendant as a finding merely on the burden of proof, made it at least theoretically possible that the claimant could – in a hypothetical future arbitration – also fail to prove that the Debt does exist. In other words, as the Tribunal itself expressly held (see [42] above), its finding that the defendant had failed to prove that the Debt does not exist does not imply, as a matter of necessity and logic, that the Debt must exist.
- [141]
[141] As such, I cannot exercise my discretion on the Payment Out Application so as to advance the parties’ intentions because that intention has been frustrated.
Defendant’s counsel’s new position at the joint hearing
- [143]
[143] In oral submissions, defendant’s counsel has abandoned the position set out in his written submissions and advances a new position. He has told me expressly:
(a) that the defendant no longer objected to the Payment Out Application, even though it did not consent to it;
(b) that the defendant accepted that the Sum was the claimant’s security for the Debt pending the outcome of the Arbitration;
(c) because the outcome of the Arbitration was adverse to the defendant, the defendant did not have a claim to the Sum; but
(d) the only proviso he attached was that the defendant did not accept that the Award did find that the Debt does exist.
- [144]
[144] Defendant’s counsel has advanced his new position in three separate passages and on three separate occasions. At the very outset of the joint hearing, he said:
- [145]
[145] As part of his submission that the Sum was security for the Debt, defendant’s counsel submitted that the defendant had no claim to the Sum simply because it did not succeed in the Arbitration:
The judgment continues past this page. Read the rest at eLitigation.