Court of Appeal · Decided 9 June 2023
The Republic of India v Deutsche Telekom AG
Feedback & support[2023] SGCA(I) 4 · Case no. Civil Appeal No 1 of 2023 (Summons No 4 of 2023) · 35 paragraphs
✱ What happened, in plain English
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Grounds of decision
Official text from eLitigation
Introduction
- [2]
[2] SUM 4 raised the question of the legal basis upon which the court may make orders to protect the privacy of arbitration enforcement proceedings in Singapore. I dismissed SUM 4 on 25 April 2023 and now provide the detailed grounds for my decision.
Facts
The parties
- [3]
[3] The appellant is the Republic of India (“India”). The respondent, Deutsche Telekom AG (“DT”), is a multinational company incorporated under the laws of the Federal Republic of Germany.
Background to the dispute
The present application
- [8]
[8] The present application in SUM 4 proceeded on two bases: ss 22 and 23 of the International Arbitration Act 1994 (2020 Rev Ed) (“IAA”) read with O 16 r 9(1) of the Singapore International Commercial Court Rules 2021 (“SICC Rules 2021”), and/or the court’s inherent powers. Specifically, India sought the following orders (the “SUM 4 Orders”):
(a) that CAS 1 and any application filed in CAS 1, including this application, be heard in private;
(b) that any information (including the identities of the parties) or document relating to CAS 1 or any application filed in CAS 1 not be revealed or published and be concealed;
(c) that the court file for CAS 1 be sealed from inspection by any third parties;
(d) that the identity of the parties not be identified in any hearing lists;
(e) that, if any judgment or grounds of decision is given in CAS 1, this application, or any other applications filed in CAS 1, there be no publication, including in any law report or professional publication, of the identities of the parties or any other information that may reveal the identities of the parties; and
(f) costs of and incidental to this application be in the cause of the appeal in CAS 1.
The parties’ cases
- [9]
[9] It is important to note that India’s case rested primarily on its contention that the SUM 4 Orders were necessary to protect the confidentiality of the Arbitration. India submitted that the Appeal would entail the disclosure of confidential information because the Arbitration formed its essential factual background and the Appeal arose from the OS 8 proceedings. Details of another related arbitration between Devas and Antrix were also raised in SUM 155 and it was submitted that this too should be subject to the principle of confidentiality. While India accepted that some information relating to the Arbitration had been published online, India maintained that the confidentiality of the Arbitration had not been entirely lost, and that there was information pertaining to OS 8 and the Appeal which was not yet in the public domain.
- [10]
[10] India also contended that it would be in the interests of justice for this court to grant the orders sought. There was a real risk that India would suffer prejudice if the SUM 4 Orders sought were not granted because information relating to the Arbitration had already been misused by third parties (such as an entity known as “DevasFacts”) to portray India negatively.
- [12]
[12] DT also submitted that India’s reliance on the court’s inherent powers to grant sealing orders did not assist its case because it was not in the interests of justice to invoke these powers. The principle of open justice should be the predominant consideration in the present circumstances, this being an investment-treaty arbitration which would touch on matters of public interest.
- [13]
[13] In any case, DT also contended that there was no basis for this court to exercise its inherent powers given the lack of a nexus between the OS 900 Enforcement Proceedings and the alleged misuse of information that was said to have taken place as part of a public relations campaign run by anonymous entities to harm India’s reputation. Rather, India’s purported concerns in this regard lacked bona fides given that India had been content to publicise decisions and information relating to the Arbitration when this was in its own interests.
The law on protecting the confidentiality of arbitrations and related proceedings
- [15]
[15] That being said, the general rule may be departed from in certain circumstances – for instance, in cases involving an abuse of process or the need to prevent a miscarriage of justice or when a statute provides otherwise. The last of this was relevant here because the Appeal pertained to arbitration-related proceedings, and the court’s power to grant privacy orders has been statutorily provided for in ss 22 and 23 of the IAA, which read as follows:
- [17]
[17] However, beyond setting out the position on the terms I have just outlined, ss 22 and 23 of the IAA shed limited light on the nature of the interest in confidentiality that is protected. I therefore approached the determination of that interest by considering the purpose that underlies these provisions, having regard to their legislative history.
- [18]
[18] The IAA was largely based on the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (the “Model Law”). The drafters of the Model Law had been averse to proposals to provide for the confidentiality of arbitral awards, and so chose to leave the position open (UNCITRAL, Report of the Secretary-General: possible features of a model law on international commercial arbitration, UN Doc A/CN.9/207 (14 May 1981) at para 101).
- [19]
[19] When the IAA was first enacted on 27 January 1995, it did not include provisions in the form of the present ss 22 and 23. While Parliament did make provision for the confidentiality of court proceedings arising from arbitrations in s 22, that position was essentially the reverse of the present position. In short, the default position under s 22 (as it was first enacted) was that such proceedings would be open, but these could be heard in private on application to the court. Section 22 at the time provided as follows:
- [20]
[20] This remained the position for almost the next three decades until the present iteration of s 22 of the IAA came into effect on 1 April 2022 by virtue of the Courts (Civil and Criminal Justice) Reform Bill (Bill No 18/2021). The overall effect of the amendment was to bring the legislation in line with what had become the prevailing practice by providing that court proceedings relating to arbitration will be private unless the court orders otherwise. Significantly, the Minister’s second reading speech clarified that Parliament’s underlying intention was and had been to protect the confidentiality of the arbitral proceedings (see Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (13 September 2021) vol 95 (Edwin Tong Chun Fai, Second Minister for Law)) (“the Minister’s speech”):
- [21]
[21] It follows that the confidentiality interest that was meant to be secured by the present, and in my view, even the original, iteration of s 22 of the IAA is ultimately linked to protecting the confidentiality of the arbitral proceedings by ensuring that the related court proceedings are heard in private. In my judgment, this suggestion that is contained in the Minister’s speech that I have extracted above also accords with a common-sense view of the matter. There is no independent interest in the confidentiality of court proceedings. On the contrary, such proceedings are almost always open. And so, when the court gets involved at the stage of enforcement or setting-aside proceedings, the reason why the statute provides for confidentiality is that this is rooted in the conventionally private nature of arbitration proceedings. But for this fact, there would typically be no question of the concomitant enforcement proceedings being conducted in private.
- [22]
[22] In line with this, ss 23(3) and (4) provide that if the cloak of privacy is retained, the court may nonetheless publish certain information as long as steps are taken to protect the confidentiality of information that a party “reasonably wishes to remain confidential” or that a party “reasonably wishes to conceal”. It is clear from this that the interest is directed at preserving confidentiality.
- [23]
[23] In sum, in my judgment, the purpose of ss 22 and 23 of the IAA is to protect the confidentiality of the arbitration itself and the interest in keeping any enforcement proceedings confidential under the IAA is essentially a derivative interest designed ultimately to protect the confidentiality of the underlying arbitration. This is borne out by the Minister’s statement in Parliament when the Bill introducing these provisions was read, and also by the text of ss 22 and 23 read together in context.
- [24]
[24] This is also consistent with the fact, as I have noted above (at [14]), that imposing a cloak of privacy on court proceedings is an exceptional measure that departs from the general rule that such proceedings are subject to the principle of open justice. In the present context, the departure from that principle is provided for by statute, but given that this was rooted in the need to protect the confidentiality of the arbitration proceedings, where the confidentiality of the arbitration has been lost, then the principle of open justice would weigh strongly in favour of lifting the cloak of privacy that has been provided for by the statute.
- [25]
[25] Significantly, India did not appear to contend otherwise. As I have noted above at [9], India’s primary contention was that the confidentiality of the arbitral proceedings had not been entirely lost.
My decision
- [26]
[26] As I have noted (at [8]), India relied on two bases: (a) ss 22 and 23 of the IAA read with O 16 r 9(1) of the SICC Rules 2021, and/or (b) the inherent powers of the court. On either footing, the threshold question was whether the confidentiality of the arbitral proceedings had been lost.
- [27]
[27] In my judgment, this was clearly a case where the confidentiality of the Arbitration had been lost, as a consequence of which there was no basis for maintaining the confidentiality of the enforcement proceedings in Singapore under ss 22 and 23 of the IAA. In these circumstances, I was satisfied that there was insufficient basis to override the strong interest in open justice in curial proceedings. I elaborate on these points below.
The confidentiality of the Arbitration had been lost
- [28]
[28] The court should not be made to go through an empty exercise to protect confidentiality when there is nothing left to protect. As was noted in Dorsey James Michael v World Sport Group Pte Ltd [2014] 2 SLR 208 (“Dorsey James") at [63], citing Attorney-General v Observer Ltd [1990] 1 AC 109 at 282C (albeit with respect to the law of confidentiality):
- [29]
[29] If the information in question is known to the public at large, it would be idle (in the sense of being both unrealistic and pointless) to seek to deal with it as though it was confidential (Dorsey James at [64], citing R G Toulson and C M Phipps, Confidentiality (Sweet & Maxwell, 3rd Ed, 2012) at para 3-112). Indeed, as I have already observed (see above at [22]), s 23(3)(b) of the IAA speaks of protecting information that a party wishes to “remain” confidential which would suggest that the court is not required to protect information that is already in the public sphere.
- [30]
[30] As pointed out by DT, there had already been multiple disclosures of considerable information relating to the Arbitration, the identity of the parties and enforcement proceedings in Singapore and abroad.
- [31]
[31] First and most significantly, the Interim and Final Awards issued in the Arbitration were available online on third-party sites. Likewise, the award issued in a related arbitration between Devas and Antrix – which India had submitted should also be subject to the principle of confidentiality (see above at [9]) – was available online.
- [32]
[32] Second, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court’s decision refusing India’s application to set aside the Interim Award was publicly available. While the names of DT, Devas and Antrix were redacted, India’s identity was revealed in the decision.
- [33]
[33] Third, an article had been published in the Global Arbitration Review (the “GAR Article”) on 15 March 2022 expressly identifying India and DT as parties to the enforcement proceedings in Singapore. India submitted that the GAR Article was published without substantiation from formal court documents. But this ignores the fact that India’s lawyers had proceeded to effectively confirm the identities of the parties to which the GAR Article referred to – which then brings me to the next disclosure of information.
- [34]
[34] Fourth, India’s own lawyers in Singapore had published a LinkedIn post on 16 March 2022 naming India as a party to the Singapore enforcement proceedings, stating the size of the Final Award and providing a web link to the GAR Article. This was subsequently taken down only after DT’s lawyers wrote to India’s lawyers in Singapore on the matter. It nonetheless constituted the dissemination of information relating to the Singapore enforcement proceedings on a widely accessible platform.
- [35]
[35] Fifth, information pertaining to DT’s enforcement proceedings against India in other jurisdictions had also entered the public domain. For instance, pleadings, submissions and declarations filed in the enforcement proceedings in the USA were publicly available. Moreover, the decision of the Higher Regional Court of Berlin allowing DT’s request for partial enforcement of the Final Award was publicly accessible (albeit in German) and received coverage in a publicly available article.
- [37]
[37] Finally, the decisions of the NCLT, the NCLAT and the Indian Supreme Court on Antrix’s application to wind up Devas in India were publicly available, and it was undisputed that these decisions had disclosed the identities of India and DT as well as the outcome of the Arbitration.
- [38]
[38] In light of these disclosures of information, the confidentiality of the Arbitration had substantially been lost. There was hence no compelling interest in keeping the enforcement proceedings in Singapore confidential.
- [42]
[42] Therefore, the confidentiality of the enforcement proceedings in Singapore did not merit continued protection under ss 22 and 23 of the IAA. For completeness, I turn briefly to consider the court’s inherent powers.
There was no basis for the court to exercise its inherent powers to grant the SUM 4 Orders
- [43]
[43] In my judgment, recourse to the inherent powers was unhelpful in the present context. It should be noted that India’s position was supported by the presumptive position of privacy provided for in the statute. India would only need to invoke the inherent powers as an alternative to the statutory position, and that would only be the case where the court had concluded that the presumptive statutory position had been displaced for good reason. In such circumstances, there would be no basis for invoking the court’s inherent powers unless this was done to protect some other interest that was independent of that protected by the statutory provision. That was not the case here because India’s position was advanced on essentially the same grounds, namely that the Arbitration was confidential. Having held that that was no longer the case here when considering the position under ss 22 and 23 of the IAA, an argument for the exercise of inherent power founded on the same grounds struck me as hopeless. It should be noted that the inherent powers of the court must be exercised judiciously based on the touchstone of necessity (Siva Kumar s/o Avadiar v Quek Leng Chuang and others [2021] 1 SLR 451 at [57], citing Wee Soon Kim Anthony v Law Society of Singapore [2001] 2 SLR(R) 821 at [27]). The position could be otherwise if there was some other independent basis which warranted invoking the inherent powers of the court, but that was not the case here.
- [44]
[44] India also submitted that the disclosure of information in the Appeal would provide more ammunition for the efforts of third parties to tarnish India’s reputation and this justified invoking the court’s inherent powers. In support of its claim, India had exhibited Twitter posts, website headlines, and statements from third parties such as “DevasFacts” which appeared to express the opinion that India’s conduct with respect to the various arbitrations was repressive and wrongful.
- [45]
[45] I disagreed with India’s submission. An intrinsic feature of open justice is that the conduct of all parties is open to be scrutinised by those who may be interested. The private interest of a party not to be seen in an adverse light does not warrant a grant of privacy orders in a departure from the principle of open justice.
- [46]
[46] In any event, I did not see how further information which would be disclosed in the Appeal would assist these third parties in their alleged attempts to tarnish India’s reputation. To the contrary, in so far as there was public attention and controversy surrounding DT’s enforcement efforts, it would likely be in India’s interest to open the proceedings in the Appeal so that the public could be apprised of its side of the story.
- [47]
[47] Hence, I was satisfied that it was not in the interests of justice for the court to exercise its inherent powers to protect the confidentiality of the Appeal or the present proceedings.
Conclusion