[2026] SGDC 130

District Judge Sharmila Sripathy-Shanaz:

[1] The law stands as a guardian of the vulnerable, the voiceless and the defenceless. Its protection extends, as it must, to those who are powerless to advocate for themselves.

[2] Animals are among those in need of such protection. As Jeremy Bentham observed with stark clarity in his writing on the humane treatment of animals, “the question is not, can they reason? Nor, can they talk? But, can they suffer?” Animals cannot cry out for help in terms we understand, nor shield themselves from cruelty. Yet these limitations do not diminish their right to protection. They are, after all, sentient beings, and it is their capacity to suffer that engages the protection of the law.

[3] It follows that the deliberate infliction of harm and suffering is not merely a wrong against the animal; it is an affront to the basic standards of humanity, decency and morality that the law exists to uphold. Such conduct demands a firm and uncompromising response. A deterrent sentence is thus imperative to mark the gravity of the offences, vindicate the values the law protects and send an unequivocal message that cruelty towards the vulnerable, whether human or animal, will not be tolerated but will be met with the full force of the law.

[4] The accused has pleaded guilty to three charges of animal cruelty punishable under s 42(4)(b)(i) of the Animals and Birds Act 1965 (“ABA”):

(a) On 22 September 2024, he caused pain and suffering to a cat by stabbing it twice on its dorsum, thereby inflicting wounds. This is an offence under s 42(1)(c) of the ABA and forms the basis for the 5th Charge (DAC-901674-2025).

(b) On 7 October 2024, he kicked and tortured a cat by holding it above his head, flinging it to the ground with considerable force, repeatedly kicking and stomping on it, and thereafter throwing it from a high floor of a building, causing its death. This is an offence under s 42(1)(a) of the ABA and forms the basis for the 1st Charge (DAC-920148-2024).

(c) On 13 March 2025, while on bail, he tortured a cat by dragging it by its tail and slamming its head against a wall multiple times, causing severe injuries which led to its death. This is an offence under s 42(1)(a) of the ABA and forms the basis for the 6th Charge (DAC-904755-2025).

[5] Three similar charges, relating to the stabbing of three other cats and the infliction of wounds, have been taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing.

[6] These ex tempore grounds set out the factors underpinning the sentence imposed and may be supplemented should the need arise.

[7] Deterrence assumes primacy in the sentencing of animal cruelty offences, having regard to the acute vulnerability of animals protected by the ABA, the prevalence of such offences over the years and the inherent difficulty in detecting them: Public Prosecutor v Lin Pengli Barrie and another appeal [2025] SGHC 133 (“Lin Pengli Barrie”) at [21] to [26].

[8] Section 42 of the ABA encompasses a range of offending, from acts of mistreatment that do not involve bodily injury (s 42(1)(a)), to omissions (whether rash or unreasonable) that cause an animal unnecessary pain and suffering (s 42(1)(c)), as well as permitting an animal unfit for work to be so employed (s 42(1)(d)). Within this spectrum, deliberate acts of violence against animals necessarily fall at the more serious end, as they involve the conscious and intentional infliction of harm and reflect a markedly higher degree of culpability. Where such acts result in grievous injury or death, the harm caused is at its highest, for the suffering inflicted is severe, and in cases of death, irreversible. Such offences must therefore be regarded among the gravest forms of offending under s 42 and warrant correspondingly severe punishment: Lin Pengli Barrie at [36].

[9] Against this backdrop, I turn to consider the appropriate sentences in the present case.

[10] The harm occasioned by these offences is exceedingly grave. In both instances, the abused cats, E1 and E6, died from the injuries inflicted. Each was subjected to savage and unrelenting brutality, enduring inhumane suffering before death.

[11] The abuse inflicted on E1 was nothing short of vicious and unabating. The accused hoisted E1 above his head and hurled it to the ground with force before embarking on a sustained barrage of kicks and stomps over a period of one minute and twenty seconds. By the end of this merciless assault, E1 lay limp, but still alive. Yet the violence did not cease. In a final, callous act, the accused lifted E1 by its tail and flung it from a high floor to its death. The ferocity of the attack is laid bare by the catastrophic and extensive injuries inflicted to the head, dental structures, forelimbs, thoracic cavity, spine and soft tissues, and, most starkly, the complete displacement of E1’s head from the spinal column. The injuries underscore both the intensity of the violence and the profound suffering inflicted.

[12] The 6th Charge concerns violence of a similarly harrowing nature. The accused dragged a yowling E6 by its tail and repeatedly slammed its head against a wall, escalating the force with each successive blow. The injuries inflicted were severe, including significant trauma to the thoracic cavity and severe intracranial trauma from subdural congestion and haemorrhage in the brain. Death did not come swiftly. E6 remained alive in the aftermath of the assault, exhibiting signs of acute distress including sporadic jumps before collapsing limp. Relief from this agonised state came only when it was euthanised more than three hours later, after any prospect of recovery had been deemed futile.

[13] I next assess the accused’s culpability. Foremost, the offending conduct was deliberate and purposeful. In relation to E1, the accused persisted in inflicting violence over a sustained period, notwithstanding the animal’s visible distress as it ran in circles in a futile attempt to evade the assault, before eventually being rendered incapacitated. In relation to E6, the accused escalated the force applied with each successive blow. This relentless cruelty and the calculated application of force in a manner that maximised pain and injury, evince a chilling disregard for suffering and a deeply entrenched intention to inflict harm.

[14] Second, the offence involving E1 was premeditated. Prior to the offence, the accused had searched online for cases involving cat abuse and the sentences imposed, to gauge the punishment he might face if apprehended. He had also searched for media reports relating to his earlier acts of stabbing cats. These online inquiries reveal forethought and a preoccupation with both the commission of such acts and their legal consequences, and bear the hallmarks of conduct shaped by thought and calculation. This inference is reinforced by the fact that the accused returned to locate E1 after having earlier noticed it while make food deliveries in the area. The offence was therefore neither indiscriminate nor opportunistic, but targeted. Taken together, these facts disclose a considered decision to engage in unlawful conduct. As observed in Ng Kean Meng Terence v Public Prosecutor [2017] 2 SLR 449 at [44(c)], the presence of planning and premeditation reflects a heightened degree of criminality.

[15] Third, and relatedly, the accused took deliberate steps to avoid detection by seeking to conceal his identity during the commission of the 1st Charge with a hooded sweatshirt and mask. Such measures to evade detection and thwart law enforcement efforts aggravate culpability, as they evince a calculated attempt to avoid the consequences of one’s actions: Public Prosecutor v Ahirrudin Al-Had bin Haji Arrifin [2022] 5 SLR 407 at [65], cited with approval in Lin Pengli Barrie at [42].

[16] Having regard to the irreversible and devastating harm suffered by E1 and E6, and the high culpability disclosed, I find that the offences fall at the furthest end of the spectrum of animal cruelty contemplated by s 42 of the ABA: Lin Pengli Barrie at [36] and Public Prosecutor v Kwong Kok Hing [2008] 2 SLR(R) 684 at [44]. In the circumstances, I consider a starting point of 17 months’ imprisonment warranted for the 1st and 6th Charges.

[17] I turn next to the 5th Charge. While the harm occasioned in this offence does not rise to the same level of egregiousness as the other proceeded charges, it is nonetheless grievous. E5 sustained two wounds, one of which was 6.5 cm in depth and penetrated the abdominal cavity. The veterinary evidence indicates that the injury must have been inflicted with force. E5 endured these injuries until it was discovered by a member of the public and brought to a veterinary clinic for treatment the following day. The pain and suffering in the intervening period would have been significant. This is borne out by the fact that even a day after the incident, E5 could tolerate no more than minimal intervention; clipping of its fur and brief cleaning of the wound with saline was described as “as much as the cat could handle.”

[18] The accused’s culpability in respect of this offence is significant. The manner of offending is deeply disturbing. The video footage shows the accused acting with cold, calm calculation as he interacts with E5 and strokes it before stabbing it. Unsure if the first stab had inflicted injury, the accused went in search of E5 to stab it again. This was not a momentary lapse of judgment, but a deliberate and considered course of conduct evincing an unyielding resolve to ensure that harm had been inflicted.

[19] The offence was also premeditated. In the days preceding the incident, the accused researched how to torture cats and, having settled on stabbing as his preferred method, further researched where to stab a cat to inflict injury without causing death. He also searched for information on the likely penalties for killing a cat. These were not idle or abstract inquiries; they were directed towards the formulation of a plan to harm cats. Thereafter, in execution of that plan, the accused purchased a knife which he then used to carry out the offence.

[20] The accused’s post-offence conduct, in taking steps to dispose of incriminating evidence by discarding the knife used in the commission of the offence, constitutes an aggravating factor, for the reasons set out at [15] above.

[21] Taken together, I find that a starting point of 13 months’ imprisonment for the 5th Charge is warranted. This lower starting point, relative to the 1st and 6th Charges, reflects the comparatively lower harm occasioned by this offence, notwithstanding the similarly high culpability involved.

[22] I now turn to consider whether other factors warrant an adjustment to the starting points identified above.

[23] There is aggravation arising from the commission of the 6th Charge while the accused was on bail, as it discloses a heightened need for specific deterrence: Vasentha d/o Joseph v Public Prosecutor [2015] 5 SLR 122 at [63], cited in Lin Pengli Barrie at [56]. Taking this into account, I apply an uplift of one month to the starting point for the 6th Charge, resulting in an adjusted sentence of 18 months’ imprisonment.

[24] Apart from the accused’s plea of guilt, which I address at [26] below, I find no other factors warranting any moderation of the sentences to be imposed. Although the accused had Persistent Depressive Disorder and Adjustment Disorder with Depressed Mood at the time of the offences, these conditions bear no causal or contributory link to the offending conduct. The offences were also “not a symptomatic manifestation” of his psychiatric conditions. They therefore do not diminish his culpability: Public Prosecutor v Chia Kee Chen and another appeal [2018] SGCA 30 at [112] and Ho Mei Xia Hannah v Public Prosecutor [2019] SGHC 211 at [27]. The Defence does not contend otherwise.

[25] I also do not regard the accused as a first offender. While he has no antecedents in the sense of prior convictions, this is merely because the law had not yet caught up with him for his earlier misdeeds: Chen Weixiong Jerriek v Public Prosecutor [2003] SGHC 103 at [15].

[26] The final issue concerns the weight to be accorded to the accused’s plea of guilt. The Sentencing Advisory Panel’s Guidelines on Reduction in Sentences for Guilty Pleas (“PG Guidelines”), provide that the earlier an accused indicates an intention to plead guilty, the greater the reduction in sentence ought to be: Public Prosecutor v S Iswaran [2024] SGHC 259 at [135] to [136]. Ordinarily, a plea of guilt indicated at Stage 1 of the guidelines, would warrant a reduction of up to 30%. However, in grave cases of offending, the sentencing considerations of deterrence and retribution should not be unduly displaced merely by reason of the offender’s plea of guilt. In such circumstances, the full extent of the reduction contemplated by the PG Guidelines would not be warranted: Public Prosecutor v Foo Li Ping and another matter [2025] 4 SLR 1 at [75], cited in Lin Pengli Barrie at [60].

[27] In the present case, I accept that the accused’s early plea of guilt, indicated at Stage 1, merits some consideration. However, having regard to the gravity of the present offences – which rank among the most egregious instances of animal abuse – only a limited reduction is justified. I therefore apply a reduction of 10% to the individual sentences, resulting in the following adjusted sentences:

[28] The cumulative effect of the accused’s deplorable, sadistic and serial abuse of six different cats over several months, as reflected in the offences taken into consideration, warrants an aggregate sentence of 31 months’ imprisonment. This is achieved by ordering the sentences for the 1st and 6th Charges to run consecutively. In my judgment, the aggregate sentence properly reflects the overall criminality of his conduct.

[29] The sentence of imprisonment is backdated to the date of arrest, 7 October 2024, and will take into account the time the accused has spent in custody, and exclude the period during which he was on bail. The accused was on bail from 30 October 2024 to 13 March 2025 when he was re-arrested.

[30] Pursuant to s 43B(1)(b) of the ABA, I also disqualify the accused from owning any animal or any class of animals for a period of 12 months starting from the date of his release from prison.

[31] The manner in which a society treats its most vulnerable speaks directly to the standards it is prepared to uphold. The law must stand firm in protecting those who cannot protect themselves. The sentence imposed reflects the court’s condemnation of the accused’s barbaric acts against defenceless creatures and makes plain that such sadism will be met with stern and uncompromising punishment.

Lynda Lee (Attorney General’s Chambers),

for the Public Prosecutor;

Jeeva Arul Joethy (Regal Law LLC ) for the Accused.