Skip to content
Grounds publishedDecided 4 May 2026

District Court

MPM Capital Pte Ltd v Despace Project and Design Pte Ltd and another

Feedback & support

[2026] SGDC 155Case no. District Court Originating Claim No 1516 of 20259 paragraphs

What happened, in plain English

There is no plain-English summary of this judgment yet.

Ask about this judgment

Grounds of decision

Official text from eLitigation

  1. Introduction

  2. [1] DC/SUM 552/2026 (“SUM 552”) was an application by Despace Project and Design Pte Ltd (“Despace”) and Mr Sum Chong Fai (“Mr Sum”) for Mr Sum, the sole director and shareholder of Despace, to act on behalf of Despace in DC/OC 1516/2025 (“OC 1516”), which was a claim filed by MPM Capital Pte Ltd (“MPM Capital”) against both Despace and Mr Sum. MPM Capital’s case was that Despace had breached various loan agreements with MPM Capital that Mr Sum had guaranteed.

  3. My decision

  4. [3] As mentioned, MPM Capital did not object to SUM 552 save that it contended that the Condition should be imposed. I was satisfied that Mr Sum was duly authorised by Despace to represent it and had “sufficient executive or administrative capacity or is a proper person to represent the company” (see the requirements in O 4 r 3(3) of the Rules of Court 2021), such that permission should be given to authorise Mr Sum to represent Despace.

  5. The High Court’s decision in Bulk Trading

  6. [4] In relation to the Condition, learned counsel for MPM Capital referred me to the High Court’s decision in Bulk Trading SA v Pevensey Pte Ltd and another [2015] 1 SLR 538 (“Bulk Trading”). In Bulk Trading, the first defendant, Pevensey Pte Ltd (“Pevensey Singapore”) sought leave for its sole shareholder and controlling director, Mr Agus Salim (“Mr Salim”) to represent it in the underlying proceedings, namely, a claim by Bulk Trading SA (“Bulk Trading”) against Pevensey Singapore and the second defendant, PT Pevensey Indonesia. The High Court dismissed the application for two main reasons.

  7. [5] First, the application failed to comply with O 1 r 9(4)(a)(iii) of the Rules of Court (2014 Rev Ed) as Mr Salim’s supporting affidavits were silent on the reasons why leave ought to be granted for him to represent Pevensey Singapore. The court regarded this as a serious defect, given that it left the court without any material upon which to exercise its discretion. The omission also gave rise to concerns about whether Mr Salim would be of meaningful assistance to the court and whether he appreciated the obligations that came with the right to represent Pevensey Singapore (Bulk Trading at [91]–[92]).

  8. [7] Although the application was dismissed based on the reasons above, the High Court went on to examine other factors which might be relevant for consideration for future applications under O 1 r 9(2). In particular, the High Court found that it was open to the court to impose conditions when granting leave for corporate self-representation (Bulk Trading at [123]). In the event that leave was granted, Bulk Trading submitted that the following three conditions should be imposed (Bulk Trading at [124]):

  9. [8] The High Court opined that the above conditions were “fair and reasonable and would be consistent with the need to take into account the interests of the other party” (at [125]). It is also clear that the High Court did not hold that such conditions should be imposed as a matter of course in all cases of corporate self-representation.

  10. The present application contrasted

  11. [9] In the present application, the Condition that MPM Capital sought to impose mirrored the second condition at [7] above. I was of the view that the present application differed from the situation in Bulk Trading in two material respects, which militated against the imposition of the Condition.

  12. [10] First, as alluded to at [5]–[6] above, the High Court in Bulk Trading had doubts about whether Mr Salim understood his obligations and would be of assistance to the court and found the bona fides of the corporate self-representation application to be questionable. In contrast, nothing suggested that Mr Sum and/or Despace had hitherto acted unreasonably or improperly.

  13. Conditions that render an officer personally liable for the company’s legal costs

  14. (a) The fact that the non-parties are the only shareholders and directors of a company and would therefore be the real and only beneficiaries of any successful outcome in the litigation should not be the overriding factor in consideration, for otherwise “any court which rules against any closely-held company would have to order costs against its shareholders and directors personally” and “drive a coach and horses through the doctrine of the separate liability of the company” (at [91(a)]).

  15. (b) It is not a principle of law that where a corporate litigant is unable to pay costs, the successful party will be able to look to any person with a close connection to that company for costs. The corporate veil is usually only lifted where there is fraud or highly unconscionable conduct (at [91(b)]).

  16. (c) That said, while impropriety or bad faith on the directors’ or shareholders’ part in causing the company to bring proceedings is an important factor in deciding whether they should be made personally liable for costs, there is no strict requirement that this needs to be made out before an adverse costs order can be made against them (at [93]).

  17. (d) The controlling director of a one-man company might be made liable for costs if the company’s defence is found not to be advanced in good faith, as, for example, where the company has been advised that there is no defence, and the proceedings are defended out of spite or for the sole purpose of causing the plaintiffs to incur irrecoverable costs (at [105]).

  18. [17] Above all, the purpose of imposing conditions on the grant of permission for corporate self-representation is to ensure the proper and efficient administration of justice (Bulk Trading at [123]). I did not think that the Condition was necessary to maintain the integrity of the proceedings and to ensure that the due administration of justice is not compromised by Mr Sum’s representation of Despace. Accordingly, I declined to impose the Condition.

  19. Conclusion