JJQ v JJR

Tribunal Magistrate Lee Li Choon:

[1] The Claimant filed two claims at the Employment Claims Tribunal (“ECT”) against the Respondent, his former employer. They are:

[2] I heard both claims – ECT/10989/2025 and ECT/11110/2025 – on 23 February, 30 March and 7 May 2026 (half day), and delivered my decision with brief reasons on 12 May 2026.

[3] ECT/10989/2025 was a claim relating to a specified employment dispute, being a wrongful dismissal dispute under s 14(2) of the Employment Act 1968 (“EA”), where an employee considers that he has been dismissed without just cause or excuse by his employer. It is a claim under item 1 of the Third Schedule of the Employment Claims Act 2016 (“ECA”).

[4] ECT/11110/2025 was claim relating to a specified employment dispute, being a specified statutory dispute for payment of salary under ss 21, 22 or 23 of the EA. It is a claim under item 17 of the Second Schedule of the ECA.

[5] Following my decision on 12 May 2026, the Respondent filed an application for permission to appeal to the District Court – ECTDJ/1020/2026 – on 17 May 2026, disputing my order for payment of salary for the period 1 March 2026 to 30 April 2026 in the relation to ECT/11110/2026. The initial grounds of appeal were stated as follows:

[6] Permission to appeal was subsequently granted. The Notice of Appeal sets out the following grounds, namely that a question of law is involved and that the claim fell outside the jurisdiction of the tribunal:

[7] In relation to ECT/10989/2025, I found no evidence that the Claimant had been compelled to work on public holidays against his wishes, nor of any non-payment of salary prior to March 2025, that could constitute a “course of conduct” on the Respondent’s part amounting to constructive dismissal. I found that the allegations against the Claimant regarding his failure to remit monies collected, coupled with the Respondent’s withholding of salary payments towards the end of his employment, were more likely than not the real reasons for his resignation. I therefore concluded that his resignation in those circumstances could not be characterised as involuntary. Accordingly, I found that there was no constructive dismissal that could substantiate the Claimant’s claim under s 14(2) of the EA.

[8] In relation to ECT/1110/2025, which is the Claimant’s claim for payment of salary under ss 21, 22 or 23 of the EA, it is undisputed that the prescribed claim limit is $30,000 in accordance with s 12(7) of the ECA read with Regulation 17(2) of the Employment Claims Regulations 2017.

[9] The claim in ECT/11110/2026, as supported by the CRC, is based on alleged non-payment or short payment of salary for the period 1 August 2024 to 3 January 2025. In his claim form, the Claimant stated that his claim comprises:

[10] These Grounds of Decision address my findings in ECT/11110/2025, as well as the question of law framed in the Notice of Appeal and the issue of whether the claim as awarded fell outside the jurisdiction of the ECT.

[11] The Claimant, a foreign worker on an employment pass, was hired by the Respondent as a sales manager from 17 February 2023. In that role, he was responsible for promoting, managing and running the operations of the Respondent’s food catering business serving foreign workers at their dormitories and construction sites. It was undisputed that his role also required him to deliver food orders to foreign workers.

[12] The Claimant’s monthly salary was $10,400 until January 2025, when it was raised to $10,900 in conjunction with his promotion from sales executive to sales manager.

[13] On 15 April 2025, the Claimant tendered his resignation by email and WhatsApp to the Respondent’s director, giving two weeks’ notice and bringing his employment to an end on 30 April 2025.

[14] According to the Claimant, his resignation was due to the following reasons:

[15] As stated above, these reasons led the Claimant to file two claims before the ECT.

[16] The Respondent’s defence to the allegations of short or non-payment of salary for the alleged period of non-payment stated in the claim form was as follows:

[17] Regarding the alleged cash salary payments for November 2024 and January 2025, the Claimant denied receiving any such payments and asserted that throughout his employment, his salary had been paid exclusively by bank transfer.

[18] Regarding his absence from work on home leave from 13 August to the end of September 2024, and from 3 to 15 January 2025, the Claimant argued that his home leave was not on a no-pay basis as alleged by the Respondent but had been agreed between the parties to be on a paid leave basis, in recognition of off-in-lieu he had accumulated since 2023 for working on public holidays and rest days.

[19] The Respondent did not dispute that the Claimant was not paid his salary for March and April 2025. This was confirmed by the Respondent’s representative at all three days of the hearing – 23 February, 30 March, and 7 May 2026. Their justification for non-payment was that the Claimant had not carried out any work during those two months, and they relied on the following facts in support: (i) the Claimant’s brother’s company was incorporated on 17 February 2025; and (ii) on 17 March 2025, the Claimant was issued an Employment Pass to work there. The Respondent therefore alleged that the Claimant had been working in his brother’s company during those two months.

[20] The Respondent further alleged that an internal review conducted around January 2025 revealed discrepancies in their customers’ accounts, and that the Claimant, who was solely responsible for managing all their customers’ accounts, was responsible for or had absconded with a shortfall of S$178,821.04 in payments from their customers. The Respondent therefore contended that the ECT claim was frivolous and without basis, and had been commenced to conceal the true nature of the breakdown in the employer-employee relationship.

[21] I found the allegations concerning the Claimant having absconded with the Respondent’s money to be irrelevant to the claims before the ECT. That said, based on an update from the police on 6 April 2026, it appeared that no further action would be taken against the Claimant in respect of the alleged “offence of criminal breach of trust by an employee”. On this issue, as intimated at the hearing before me, the Respondent had commenced a civil suit against the Claimant for the said monies.

[22] Based on the factual background, I determined the issues for the claim in ECT/11110/2025 to be:

[23] On this issue, I applied the evidential burden of proof laid down in s 105 of the Evidence Act – that the burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on the person who wishes the court to believe in its existence, unless any law provides otherwise. As it was the Respondent that sought to establish that salary payments had been made, the evidential burden fell on the Respondent to prove that the Claimant was paid his November 2024 and January 2025 salary in cash.

[24] I then proceeded to examine the evidence submitted by the Respondent, taking each category of evidence in turn.

[25] The Respondent submitted copies of the payment vouchers for salary payments for November 2024 and January 2025 as evidence. As there was a dispute over the authenticity of these vouchers, the Respondent was directed to produce, and did produce, the original copies of all salary payment vouchers for my inspection.

[26] Based on a visual inspection of the original payment vouchers, I found as follows:

[27] A comparison between the Claimant’s bank statements and the payment vouchers relating to salary payments via “Account Transfer” showed consistent salary amounts being transferred to the Claimant’s bank accounts in accordance with the salary due for the corresponding months. Whilst there were discrepancies in payment dates, I placed little or no weight on these, as they could be attributable to processing time lags in the Respondent’s finance department or in the bank’s processing of transfers. I did not find them material to the question of whether the payment vouchers accurately reflected salary payments to the Claimant insofar as bank transfers were concerned.

[28] During the hearing on 23 February 2026, when queried about the signatures on the salary vouchers, the Claimant acknowledged that the signatures were his – except, coincidentally, for those appearing on the payment vouchers pertaining to salary payments that were the subject of his claim, namely the August 2024, November 2024, and January 2025 salaries. Whilst he denied having signed those vouchers, he acknowledged that the signatures resembled his. The Claimant offered no explanation for the presence of signatures resembling his on each of these payment vouchers, nor did he allege that his signature had been forged.

[29] I therefore found no basis to treat the payment vouchers stamped “Cash Payment” differently from those marked “Account Transfer”.

[30] There were other noteworthy aspects of the payment vouchers and bank statements. First, for the August 2024 and January 2025 salaries, the amounts recorded were consistent with the Respondent’s position that those were pro-rated due to the Claimant’s home leave. Second, the absence of any salary voucher or bank transfer for September 2024 was consistent with the Respondent’s position that the Claimant was not entitled to be paid for that month, having been away on home leave throughout. Third, the payment date for the August 2024 pro-rated salary as reflected in the payment voucher corresponded with the bank transfer deposit in the Claimant’s bank account on 4 October 2024, which was in turn consistent with the Respondent’s explanation that payment was made only after the Claimant returned to Singapore from India.

[31] On the basis of all the above, I found no reason to reject the signed payment vouchers as evidence of their contents – namely, that the amounts stated were paid by the stated mode on or around the dates recorded – and I concluded that the payment vouchers tendered by the Respondent accurately reflected the salary payments made to the Claimant.

[32] The Respondent called three witnesses – the Respondent’s director, Mr Shaffi, their former director, Mr Neo, and their staff, Mr Sakthivel – to testify regarding the cash salary payments made to the Claimant for the November 2024 and January 2025 salary.

[33] Mr Neo’s testimony corroborated Mr Shaffi’s account that the latter paid the Claimant his November 2024 salary in cash on 31 December 2024. Mr Sakthivel’s testimony corroborated Mr Shaffi’s account that the latter paid the Claimant his January 2025 salary in cash on 18 February 2025.

[34] I also found both Mr Neo’s and Mr Sakthivel’s testimony to be specific and detailed, including particulars of why each was present in the office when the payments were made and what they witnessed. Mr Neo testified that he was in the office on 31 December 2024 for year-end accounting, and that he overheard a discussion between the Claimant and Mr Shaffi regarding the Claimant’s failure to hand over payments collected from customers – which the Respondent explained as the reason for the late salary payment. Similarly, Mr Sakthivel testified that the January 2025 salary payment was delayed because “collection money came in late”. Both Mr Neo and Mr Sakthivel witnessed Mr Shaffi hand cash to the Claimant and saw the latter sign the payment voucher, though neither was certain of the exact amount paid.

[35] Both Mr Neo’s and Mr Sakthivel’s testimony remained intact under cross-examination by the Claimant.

[36] A closer examination of the relevant payment vouchers confirmed that the payments were recorded as made in cash on 31 December 2024 and 18 February 2025 respectively, with a signature appearing above the “Cash Payment Received” stamp. The Claimant conceded, when queried, that the signatures resembled his.

[37] I therefore concluded that the oral testimonies of the Respondent’s three witnesses regarding the cash payment of the November 2024 and January 2025 salaries were further corroborated and substantiated by the signed payment vouchers.

[38] Turning to the Claimant’s evidence, the bank statements did not contradict the Respondent’s position. The Claimant had not produced any evidence of non-payment, such as messages chasing for salary. Conversely, the Respondent’s evidence showed the Claimant sending two chasers for his November 2024 salary – once on 24 December 2024 and again on 27 December 2024 – with no further chasers after that date. This was consistent with the evidence that payment of the November 2024 salary was made on 31 December 2024. As for the January 2025 salary, there was no evidence of the Claimant making any enquiry about payment at all.

[39] Based on my analysis of the evidence submitted by both parties, I concluded that the Respondent paid the Claimant his salary for November 2024 and January 2025 in cash, as alleged.

Whether the Claimant was entitled to salary payment for the period 13 August 2024 to the end of September 2024 and 3 to 15 January 2025 when he was on home leave in India.

[40] The Claimant’s case was that he was entitled to be paid during his home leave because:

[41] Again, I applied s 105 of the Evidence Act and placed the evidential burden on the Claimant, as it was he who asserted his entitlement to paid home leave.

[42] The Claimant produced no evidence of any agreement between the parties that his home leave would be on a paid basis.

[43] Whilst the Claimant’s evidence showed he received food orders from customers whilst in India and forwarded them to the Respondent for follow-up, I was not persuaded that this demonstrated that he was working in a manner that would entitle him to salary payment. According to the Respondent, those orders came from existing customers who continued to send orders to the Claimant whilst he was on leave, and the Claimant had merely forwarded them to the Respondent for follow-up.

[44] Mr Shaffi testified that he had asked the Claimant to hand over all customer information to the Respondent before departing for India, but the Claimant had refused to do so. I inferred from this that it was never the Respondent’s intention for the Claimant to continue working whilst in India or to be paid for doing so.

[45] Furthermore, on the Claimant’s own account, his role required him to deliver food as well as perform administrative work in the office. Since it was undisputed that the Claimant could not have performed these aspects of his work whilst on home leave in India, it was clear that he was unable to fulfil the full scope of his duties during that period.

[46] In the absence of a clear agreement that he would be paid whilst on home leave, I found that the Claimant was not entitled to salary for that period.

[47] As regards the Claimant’s assertion that his home leave constituted off-in-lieu for working on public holidays, I further found that whilst his evidence showed he worked on 11 public holidays in 2024 and all public holidays up to April in 2025, it did not establish any agreement entitling him to off-in-lieu for doing so, nor that any such off-in-lieu entitlement extended to the full duration of his home leave absences.

[48] There was also no evidence regarding the Claimant’s leave entitlement. Given the undisputed duration of his home leave, it was clear he took more than the standard 14 days of annual leave in 2024 and more than his pro-rated leave entitlement in 2025.

[49] I therefore found that the Claimant had not proven that he was entitled to be paid during his home leave from 13 August to the end of September 2024 and from 3 to 15 January 2025.

[50] As stated above, the Respondent did not dispute that the Claimant was not paid his salary for March and April 2025. Its basis for non-payment was that the Claimant was absent from work during those months.

[51] On this issue, the evidential burden fell on the Respondent, as it was the Respondent that sought to establish that the Claimant was absent from work during March and April 2025.

[52] In my view, whilst the Respondent’s evidence showed that it had begun querying the Claimant about his collection of payments from customers from around end-December 2024, and that Mr Shaffi had lodged a police report against the Claimant on 16 April 2025 alleging that the Claimant had failed to remit monies collected from the Respondent’s customers since December 2024, this evidence did not establish that the Claimant was absent from work.

[53] The Respondent’s case theory was that the Claimant had colluded with his brother to set up a competing company and had gone to work for his brother whilst still employed by the Respondent. The Respondent pointed to that company initially sharing the same registered address as the Respondent as evidence of such collusion.

[54] As noted above, I was of the view that the allegations concerning the non-remittance of monies collected from the Respondent’s customers were not relevant to the claims before me. It was also my understanding that the matter was the subject of ongoing civil proceedings.

[55] A perusal of the ACRA Bizfile submitted showed that a company called “Maroofa Enterprise Pte. Ltd” was incorporated on 17 February 2025. The Claimant testified at the hearing on 7 May 2026 that the company was started by his brother without any involvement from him, and that whilst he subsequently went to work for that company, he only commenced employment there on 1 June 2025. The Claimant also stated that he was the one who had disclosed to the Respondent that he had obtained approval for an Employment Pass to work at that company, which he said demonstrated that he had nothing to hide. When queried about the nature of that company’s business, it appeared that it engaged in food delivery rather than food catering.

[56] It was undisputed that the Claimant was in Singapore during March and April 2025.

[57] On the facts, beyond the Respondent’s bare assertion, there was simply no evidence to show that the Claimant was absent from work or had failed to carry out his duties for the Respondent during those months.

[58] The mere fact that the Claimant had subsequently moved to work for his brother’s company, and that the relevant paperwork had been submitted to the Ministry of Manpower whilst he was still in the Respondent’s employment, was insufficient for me to conclude that the Claimant had already commenced work for that company and was therefore unable to perform work for the Respondent, as the Respondent alleged.

[59] In contrast, the Claimant’s evidence showed that he took orders for the Respondent’s business from 1 to 31 March 2025 and from 1 to 30 April 2025.

[60] On the evidence before me, I found that the Respondent’s allegation that the Claimant was absent from work during March and April 2025 was not made out.

[61] Under s 23(1) of the EA, an employee who terminates his contract of service by giving due notice to his employer must be paid his total salary still owing to him on the day his employment is terminated. Given that it was not disputed that the employment ended on 30 April 2025, I was of the view that it fell within my remit to identify the non-payment of salary for those months – and the reasons offered in justification – as a relevant issue in determining the claim for non-payment of salary under ss 21, 22 and 23 EA. This is so notwithstanding that the issue is neither supported by the period of claim stated in the CRC nor specifically pleaded in the claim.

[62] At the trial before me, the Respondent’s case for non-payment turned not on whether the Claimant was paid, but on whether there was any justification for withholding payment. The Respondent’s justification was that the Claimant had not performed any work during March and April 2025, and the Respondent relied on the incorporation of the Claimant’s brother’s company during that period as substantiation of this. I did not find in the Respondent’s favour on this issue.

[63] As it was undisputed that the salary for those months had not been paid and the Respondent’s justification for non-payment had not been made out, I awarded the Claimant his salary for March and April 2025.

[64] Based on my findings of fact, I concluded that the Claimant was not entitled to any further salary payments for the period specified in the CRC – 1 August 2024 to 3 January 2025.

[65] However, as my findings of fact on the non-payment of salary for March and April 2025 were against the Respondent, I proceeded to award the Claimant his salary for those two months, amounting to $21,800 ($10,900 X 2 months).

[66] The Respondent’s appeal pertains to this order made in ECT/11110/2025. As permission to appeal has been granted, I now set out my views on the grounds of appeal.

[67] As stated above, during the hearings on 23 February, 30 March and 7 May 2026, the Respondent’s representative had confirmed on each occasion that no salary had been paid to the Claimant for the last two months of his employment – March and April 2026. The Respondent’s justification for non-payment was that the Claimant had not performed any work for the Respondent during those months.

[68] I note that this justification was also the Respondent’s initial ground of appeal. As I have found that this justification for non-payment of salary was not supported by the available evidence, the initial ground of appeal pertained to a finding of fact. On that basis, permission to appeal would not have been granted, as the appeal would have amounted to no more than a disagreement with my finding of fact.

[69] Nevertheless, as the Respondent has amended its grounds of appeal and permission to appeal has been granted on those amended grounds, I shall proceed to address them. They are:

Whether the ECT has jurisdiction to hear and determine a salary claim outside the period specified in the Claim Referral Certificate (“CRC”)

[70] Section 3 of the ECA provides that before a claimant lodges a claim against a respondent at the ECT, the claimant must submit to the Commissioner for Labour a mediation request relating to every specified employment dispute for which the claim will be lodged.

[71] Under s 2 of the ECA, a “specified employment dispute” is defined as “a specified contractual dispute, a specified statutory dispute or a wrongful dismissal dispute”. Under the same provision, a “specified contractual dispute” is defined as “a dispute, relating to a payment of an amount of money, which arises out of or in the course of employment under a contract of service, about any matter specified in the First Schedule”, and a “specified statutory dispute” is defined as “a dispute, relating to payment of an amount of money, about any matter specified in the Second Schedule”. In other words, a specified employment dispute that is a specified contractual dispute is a dispute relating to payment of monies under a contract of service about a matter that falls within the list of disputes in the First Schedule of the ECA, and a specified employment dispute that is a specified statutory dispute is a dispute relating to payment of monies about a matter that falls within the list of disputes in the Second Schedule of the ECA.

[72] On the facts, and as stated in the CRC, the specified employment dispute in this case is a specified statutory dispute – specifically, a specified statutory dispute under item 17 of the Second Schedule of the ECA, being an employee’s entitlement to payment of salary in accordance with ss 21, 22 and 23 of the EA.

[73] As the Claimant resigned on 15 April 2025 with two weeks’ notice, pursuant to s 23(1) of the EA, the Respondent was liable to pay the total salary due to him up to the day his contract of service ended, and that payment was to be made on the day his contract of service ended, namely 30 April 2025.

[74] Accordingly, the Claimant’s mediation request in relation to ECT/11110/2025 was for a specified statutory dispute under item 17 of the Second Schedule of the ECA, pursuant to his entitlement to payment of salary in accordance with s 23(1) of the EA.

[75] Section 3(2)(d) of the ECA requires the claimant to bring his mediation request no later than six months after the last day of his employment. As reflected in the CRC, the Claimant submitted his mediation request within this prescribed period, on 17 July 2025.

[76] Where mediation is not successful, s 6(2) of the ECA provides that the approved mediator to whom a specified employment dispute is referred must issue to the claimant a CRC in respect of every unresolved specified employment dispute listed in the mediation request.

[77] As mediation before the mediator at the Tripartite Alliance for Dispute Management (“TADM”) was unsuccessful, the Claimant was issued with the CRC on 8 August 2025.

[78] The CRC stated that the total amount alleged to be payable under the unresolved specified employment dispute is $30,000. It also stated that the unresolved specified employment dispute is set out in item 1 of the Annex to the Certificate, which reads as follows:

[79] Section 12(1) of the ECA provides that the ECT has jurisdiction to hear and determine any claim in respect of which all applicable requirements set out in subsections (2) to (7) are satisfied. For this case, the applicable requirements under the relevant subsections of s 12 of the ECA are as follows:

My views on whether the ECT’s jurisdiction is limited to the period specified in the CRC.

[80] Pursuant to s 9A of the Interpretation Act 1965, an interpretation of a provision of a written law that would promote the purpose or object underlying the written law is to be preferred to an interpretation that would not.

[81] As outlined by the Court of Appeal in Attorney-General v Ting Choon Meng and another appeal [2017] 1 SLR 373 (at [57] – [71]), and as applied in Tan Cheng Bok v Attorney-General [2017] 2 SLR 850 (at [37]), the court's task when undertaking a purposive interpretation of a legislative text should proceed in three steps:

[82] Applying these principles to the interpretation of the applicable requirements governing the ECT’s jurisdiction under s 12(1) of the ECA, the following requirements are clear on the ordinary meaning of the provision and are satisfied on the facts of this case:

[83] The ECT’s jurisdiction, and in particular the question of whether and how it is circumscribed by the CRC, may be examined by considering the legislative purpose behind two of the jurisdictional requirements: (i) that a claim brought before the ECT must relate to a specified employment dispute; and (ii) that the claim must be supported by a CRC.

[84] In introducing the Bill establishing the ECT, the Minister for Manpower, Mr Lim Swee Say, stated the following during the Second Reading (Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (16 August 2016) vol 94):

[85] As stated, the ECT was established to take over the Labour Court’s functions and, beyond that, to cover a broader range of disputes. The types of claims which the ECT can hear are laid out in the First and Second Schedules of the ECA, which Parliament intended to be closely monitored through tripartite consultations and updated from time to time accordingly.

[86] In relation to the ECT’s jurisdiction, the requirement that a claim be predicated on a specified employment dispute serves to ensure that the dispute falls within the category of disputes deemed appropriate for the ECT to hear following tripartite consultations. The legislative purpose behind this requirement is therefore to circumscribe the ECT’s jurisdiction by reference to the type of dispute, rather than by any other criterion.

[87] It is for this reason that s 12(4) of the ECA imposes the jurisdictional requirement that the amount alleged to be payable must relate to a specified employment dispute listed in the First or Second Schedule of the ECA.

[88] In the same parliamentary speech, Minister Lim Swee Say further stated:

[89] As is evident from the above, Parliament made mediation before an MOM-approved mediator a mandatory step before a claim may be brought before the ECT. The purpose is to afford parties the opportunity to resolve their employment disputes amicably, thereby ensuring that the overall process remains efficient and affordable.

[90] In summary, the requirement that a claim brought before the ECT be supported by a CRC issued in respect of the specified employment dispute serves to ensure that parties have undergone this mandatory mediation step for that particular dispute. The CRC is proof that this step has been taken, and the requirement that the specified employment dispute in the CRC correspond to the specific dispute for which the claim is filed ensures that the claim relates to a type of dispute that the ECT has the power to hear and determine.

[91] It is for these two reasons that s 12(5) of the ECA requires a CRC to have been issued in respect of the specified employment dispute for which the claim is lodged before the ECT is vested with jurisdiction.

[92] Based on the ordinary meaning of s 12 of the ECA and the legislative purpose behind the provision, I am of the view that the period stated in the CRC does not go to the ECT’s jurisdiction. In other words, the ECT’s jurisdiction is not circumscribed by the periods stated therein. Rather, those periods serve to contextualise the amount alleged to be payable. As is apparent from the CRC, for this case, there is no breakdown of the various amounts alleged to be payable within the specified period stated in the CRC itself.

[93] As is clearly apparent from the CRC, the date of 1 August 2024 is stated as the date from which the amount of $30,000 alleged to be payable as salary began to accrue (“the start date”), and the date of 3 January 2025 is stated as the date on which the amount ceased to accrue (“the end date”). As the Claimant’s employment was terminated by his giving two weeks’ notice and ended on 30 April 2025, the date on which salary ceased to be payable pursuant to s 23(1) of the EA should have been 30 April 2025, not 3 January 2025. In that regard, the date of 3 January 2025 stated as the end date in the CRC is clearly in error.

[94] I make a further observation regarding the CRC. Under rule 20A Employment Claims Rules 2017, the ECT may, at any time before the conclusion of the proceedings, adjourn them to allow the relevant mediator to correct any error in a CRC issued in relation to those proceedings. There have been cases where the ECT has referred matters back to the MOM-approved mediator to correct an error in the CRC or its Annex. In retrospect, I could have adjourned the hearing to allow the period stated in the CRC to be amended to reflect the end date on which salary ceased to accrue as 30 April 2025.

[95] Reading the ECA as a whole, it is clear that the legislation directs the ECT to adopt a judge-led approach to the adjudication of claims before it (s 20(2) of the ECA). This approach includes identifying the relevant issues in the claim (s 20(2)(a) of the ECA), ensuring that relevant evidence is adduced by the parties (s 20(2)(b) of the ECA), and inquiring into any matter which the tribunal considers relevant to a claim (s 20(5) of the ECA). Under s 20(5) of the ECA, the ECT may inquire into any matter it considers relevant, including matters that have not been raised by any party.

[96] It is therefore well within the ECT’s power to identify issues which the parties themselves have not raised. The legislation is designed to ensure that the tribunal exercises its powers to dispense justice as it thinks fit, for the just, expeditious and economical disposal of the claim before it, bearing in mind that the parties are typically lay persons who may not be familiar with the law or their legal entitlements.

[97] On the facts of this case, the Claimant had alluded to non-payment of salary as a reason for his resignation and had indeed relied on it to support his allegation that he was forced to resign in his wrongful dismissal claim.

[98] To put it plainly, this was a case where the period of March and April 2025 was simply not pleaded or was inadvertently omitted, whether by the Claimant himself or by the approved mediator.

[99] It was therefore well within my remit, exercising the judge-led powers vested in the ECT, to identify that the end date for the amount of $30,000 alleged to be payable was in fact 30 April 2025, and to determine whether there was non-payment of salary up to that date.

[100] In conclusion, I am of the view that the period stated in the CRC is not a jurisdictional criterion under s 12 of the ECA and does not go to, or affect, the ECT’s jurisdiction. As the ECT’s jurisdiction is not limited to the period specified in the CRC, my award of salary for March and April 2025 – which remained undisputedly unpaid and for which the Respondent’s justification for non-payment was not made out – was not made outside the ECT’s jurisdiction.

Whether the claim was outside the jurisdiction of the ECT given that the amount awarded for March and April 2025, when added to the amount specified in the claim for the period 1 August 2024 to 3 January 2025, would bring the total to $51,800, exceeding the ECT’s prescribed limit.

[101] On the facts, the total amount alleged to be payable is $30,000, with no breakdown of the various amounts that are allegedly payable within the period specified in the CRC.

[102] Notably, in the claim form, the amount stated to be payable for January 2025 was $1,300, rather than the full amount for 3 to 15 January 2025 that was the alleged period of non-payment.

[103] When asked to explain how he arrived at the figure of $1,300 as the unpaid salary for January 2025, the Claimant testified that he had capped his salary claim to $30,000, as advised by TADM and the $1,300 was the balance sum within $30,000 after accounting for the earlier periods of alleged non-payment.

[104] Based on the Claimant’s explanation, it would appear that the specified period in the CRC was a function of keeping the alleged total unpaid salary within the prescribed claim limit of $30,000. In other words, the end date of 3 January 2025 was an artificial date adopted for the purpose of keeping the various amounts alleged to be payable from 1 August 2024 within the total of $30,000.

[105] Even so, it is difficult to understand why capping the last payment at $1,300 resulted in an end date of 3 January 2025 or vice versa, as the pro-rated salary figures for 1 to 3 January 2025 do not add up to that conclusion. In any event, the alleged period of non-payment was 3 to 15 January 2025, and not 1 to 3 January 2025. Therefore, the date of 3 January 2025 on the face of the Annex to the CRC is clearly inexplicable.

[106] On the facts, there was nothing to prevent the Claimant from including all alleged non-payments across the entire period of alleged non-payment, provided the total amount alleged to be payable was kept within the prescribed claim limit of $30,000, rather than artificially stating the end date as 3 January 2025. A claim for all alleged non-payment of salary with the total amount capped at the prescribed claim limit would plainly not give rise to any jurisdictional issue.

[107] In conclusion, I am of the view that the award was not outside the ECT's jurisdiction.

[108] On the facts, if the period specified in the CRC were to go to jurisdiction, the consequence for the Claimant would be that he is out of time to file a fresh mediation request to the Commissioner of Labour in respect of the period March and April 2025 – given that s 3(1)(d) of the ECA requires a mediation request to be submitted no later than six months after the last day of employment. Indeed, by the time of the first hearing on 23 February 2026, the prescribed time for filing such a request would already have elapsed. If the Claimant or the approved mediator had mistakenly stated 3 January 2025 as the end date on which salary ceased to accrue, and this goes to the ECT’s jurisdiction, the Claimant would have been made to pay a heavy price for the mistake.

[109] Overall, I am of the view that given the ECT’s mandate to take a judge-led approach to the adjudication of disputes before it, it could not have been Parliament’s legislative intent for the ECT’s jurisdiction to be circumscribed by the period stated in the CRC.

The claimant in person;

The respondent in person.