YAC v YAD [2026] SGFC 34

MSS 25 of 2025 (“MSS 25”) was the Mother’s application to vary an order for child maintenance. That order was entered into, by consent, on 11 September 2024. It provided that the Father was to pay a total monthly sum of $1500 as child maintenance for the two children. This sum was to be paid on the 21st day of each month.

Some three months later, the Mother applied, in MSS 25, for an upwards variation of that maintenance order. She asked that the Father be ordered to pay a total of $2200 in child maintenance for both the children.

However, at the trial before me, the Mother changed the basis for her application. She confirmed that she sought a variation of the maintenance order as she needed the extra money to pay for tuition classes that she had planned to enrol the children in.

To succeed in her application, the Mother must prove either that there has been a change in her circumstances or that of the children, or that there was some other good cause shown to the satisfaction of the court: s 72 of the Women’s Charter 1961. In the alternative, the court may also vary the present agreement for child maintenance if the court is satisfied that it is reasonable and for the welfare of the child to do so (s 73 of the Women’s Charter 1961; see VSL v VSM and other appeals and another matter [2021] SGHCF 33 at [23]).

The Mother had not proven a change of circumstances to justify varying the maintenance order. The position she had taken was that she needed the maintenance order to be varied so as to afford the additional tuition classes that she wanted to send both the children for. She said this was to enable them to keep up with their studies. But the point was that these expenses had not yet been incurred, nor was there concrete proof that they would actually be incurred. The plain wording of the statute makes clear that there must have been a change in circumstances – it is not sufficient to simply point to a potential change in circumstances to justify an upwards variation of the maintenance order.

Apart from this, no good cause had been shown to me as to why the order should be varied. I was conscious of the fact that the order which the Mother sought to vary was a consent order. While the Mother claimed that she had agreed to the consent order because of what the mediator had apparently told her, namely that she could come back and file an application to increase the amount of maintenance if the amount provided for was insufficient, I did not take that into account for the simple reason that what is said and done in mediation must remain beyond the view of the trial court.

Ultimately, it was the Mother’s decision to enter into that consent order. It was always open to her to seek legal advice to understand her options and to decide what was the best course to take. Having made her decision, she cannot now seek to reverse course by pointing to what the mediator had allegedly told her. At the end of the day, that maintenance order was a reflection of what the Mother and the Father had agreed upon. It is clear from our jurisprudence that there is a need to hold parties to their self-concluded bargains and that it is not the function of the court to allow parties to “revisit their agreements to improve on their previous bargains, or to reverse the compromises they have consciously chosen to make”: TGZ v THA [2019] SGFC 97 at [46]. In this connection, it has been said that the court may not be sympathetic to matters that could have been foreseen when the consent order was entered into: WYH v WYG [2024] SGHCF 34 at [5].

In the present case, at the time the consent order was entered into, both the children were already in primary school. It was thus apparent to me that the matter of tuition was something that could indeed have been foreseen, and provision made for, at the time parties entered into the consent order.

Given this, I was not inclined to disturb the terms of the consent order that had been entered into.

Further, I did not find there to be a basis to vary the maintenance order pursuant to s 73 of the Women’s Charter 1961. I did not accept, in the present case, that it was reasonable, or in the children’s welfare, for an increased amount in maintenance to be provided for so that they could attend tuition classes. For one, there was no evidence put before me to demonstrate that tuition was indeed a necessary expense. And even accepting that the children may have needed further academic support, there was no reason why either the Father or the Mother could not step in to provide that support instead of outsourcing it to a tuition center.

Finally, I would also add that the fact that the children were growing up was not a good basis for me to vary the maintenance order pursuant to s 73 of the Women’s Charter. As was noted by the learned District Judge in VDB v VDC [2019] SGFC 139 at [9], it cannot be assumed that the child’s expenses would necessarily increase because they had grown up – that is because different types of expenditure may be incurred at various stages of a child’s life.

I thus dismissed the Mother’s application in MSS 25 and strongly encouraged both parents to work together to do their part in ensuring that both the children are supported in their academic journey.