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Grounds publishedDecided 2 Apr 2026

Family Court

YBD v YBC

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[2026] SGFC 49Case no. SSP 2397 of 2025District Court Appeal No 22 of 2026

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] It was in the evening of 30 September 2025 when the Applicant left the matrimonial home. She was carrying [A], her five-month-old son, in a baby carrier strapped to her chest. She did not take much with her. She went to her mother’s home and did not return. She filed a police report two weeks later. These are the bare facts of how this case came to court. Behind them lies a story that began, as many family violence cases do, not with a dramatic incident but with the slow accumulation of smaller ones. A newly forged marriage. A newborn child, only born months earlier in the April of 2025. An argument about the temperature of water used for formula milk preparation that ended not in resolution or compromise, but with a footrest kicked aside, a mobile phone snatched from the Applicant’s hand and thrown onto the sofa, slightly less than a month postpartum. Four months after that came the kick that ended the marriage’s first year and brought her, on that September night, to the door with her infant son and nowhere else to go. How should the law respond to conduct of this kind? The kind of conduct which leaves no bruises, that a man on the street might not recognise as family violence, but that a person living within it may experience as a slow intrusion into her sense of safety. This is the question at the heart of this judgment.

  3. [2] What conduct amounts to emotional or psychological abuse? The words are not strangers to everyday speech. If anything, they have never been more familiar. A generation that has grown up with the language of trauma, narcissism, toxicity and gaslighting, absorbed not only from therapists and self-help books but from social media feeds and online communities dedicated to naming and sharing the experience of harm, reaches for these concepts with a fluency that would have been unimaginable a decade ago. That growing awareness has given people the vocabulary to not only recognise but also articulate what was done to them. But vocabulary is not the law. The law demands more than a label. It asks a court to distinguish between the pain that is an inevitable feature of human relationships (eg, the unkind word, the door shut too firmly, the silence that lingers too long), and conduct that has crossed into something the law recognises as abuse, for which it will restrain, and if necessary, punish. Where exactly that line falls under the new provisions of the Women’s Charter 1961 (2020 Rev Ed) (“the Charter”) is a question that the courts are still working out.

  4. [3] The Applicant applied for a Personal Protection Order (“PPO”) against the Respondent pursuant to s 60A of the Charter. Both parties were unrepresented and presented their cases in person. I delivered my oral decision on 11 March 2026, granting the PPO and making a counselling order of the court’s own motion under s 60E(2)(a) read with s 60E(3)(a). This marriage is, by any measure, still young. It was not yet two years old at the date of this judgment and had been tested almost from its first months by the pressures of new parenthood. Counselling may assist them in developing the communication and conflict resolution strategies that [A]’s upbringing will require of them, whatever the future their new marriage holds. The Respondent has appealed my decision to the High Court.

  5. [4] These are my written grounds. So far as I am aware, this remains among the first cases arising under the new emotional or psychological abuse provisions of the Charter. The provisions have been in force for little over a year. The law is still developing and it is doing so against a backdrop of a growing number of applications to the Family Courts (a point explored at [14] below). The uncertainty that presently attends the scope of s 58B(4) and the standard that governs its application, has been a source of practical difficulty not only for potential applicants and their advisers but also for the courts themselves in navigating the new terrain. Even though I had earlier delivered my oral grounds to the parties at the conclusion of the hearing on 11 March 2026, it is with the novel issues engaged in the present case in mind that I provide these fuller grounds.

  6. [5] The reader who seeks a summary of the rather lengthy discussion on the scope of emotional or psychological abuse under s 58B(4) and the standard governing its application is directed to [103]–[107] below. These grounds are by the standards of a first instance decision lengthy. However, this reflects the genuine uncertainty that presently attends the new landmark amendments. As this may very well be the first case to be placed before the High Court for guidance, I have undertaken an extended analysis of the issues brought on by the new provisions not just to scope out the outstanding issues, but also to fully develop my reasons for how those issues may be addressed.

  7. Background

  8. [6] The parties were married sometime in July 2024. They have one child together, [A], born 11 April 2025. The first year of this marriage thus saw the birth of their son. [A] was approximately five months old at the time of the most recent incident. Following their marriage, the parties moved into the Respondent’s family home, a five-bedroom apartment, shared with the Respondent’s parents, his youngest brother, and a domestic helper. The Respondent’s other siblings were overseas.

  9. [7] The Applicant filed this application on 2 December 2025 following what she says were three incidents spanning the first year of the marriage, which last ended in the Respondent kicking her in the abdomen while she was holding their five-month-old infant on 30 September 2025. That incident caused her to leave the matrimonial home with [A] that night, take up residence at her mother’s home, and file a police report on 14 October 2025.

  10. [8] The three incidents are:

  11. (a) 3 February 2025, when the Respondent allegedly shouted at the Applicant while she was seven months pregnant, over sleeping arrangements in the Respondent’s sister’s room;

  12. (b) 6 May 2025, when the Respondent allegedly kicked aside a footrest, snatched and threw the Applicant’s mobile phone, and shouted at her during a dispute about the temperature of water used in the preparation of formula milk; and

  13. (c) 30 September 2025, when the Respondent kicked the Applicant while holding [A].

  14. The law under the new family violence regime

  15. [9] The Women’s Charter (Family Violence and Other Matters) (Amendment) Act 2023 (No 21 of 2023), which came into force on 2 January 2025, brought about the most significant reform to the family violence regime since the Charter’s enactment. The amendments implemented the recommendations of the Report of the Taskforce on Family Violence released on 23 September 2021 with the aim of better protecting survivors and enhancing the rehabilitation and accountability of perpetrators.

  16. [10] The previous definition of family violence in s 64 of the Charter (now repealed) contained four limbs. These included placing a member in fear of hurt, causing hurt, wrongful confinement, and causing continual harassment with intent to cause anguish, and made no express reference to emotional or psychological abuse. The new provisions under ss 58A–60F of the amended Charter reconstitute “family violence” around three categories of abuse spanning physical, sexual, and emotional or psychological abuse. This definition aligns the Charter with the analogous provisions in the Children and Young Persons Act 1993 (2020 Rev Ed) (“CYPA”) and the Vulnerable Adults Act 2018 (2020 Rev Ed) (“VAA”), which had preceded the Charter in formally recognising emotional harm.

  17. [11] The two categories of family violence engaged in this case are physical abuse under s 58B(2) and emotional or psychological abuse under s 58B(4):

  18. [12] Two further provisions set out the scope of abuse. Section 58B(5) provides that “abuse may take the form of (a) a single instance of conduct or behaviour; or (b) a course of conduct or behaviour.” Section 58B(6) extends abuse to conduct not directly targeted at the family member, provided it is “capable of being seen, heard or otherwise perceived (directly or indirectly)” by that person. Three illustrations accompany s 58B and provide further guidance on its application:

  19. [13] Physical abuse under s 58B(2)(a)(i) is satisfied where conduct causes, or threatens to cause, personal injury or physical pain. No proof of actual injury is required. Where a respondent invokes the self-defence exception under s 58B(2)(c)(i), the force used must have been proportionate to the threat and appropriately directed to averting rather than retaliating against it: TEK v TEJ [2015] SGFC 89 (“TEK v TEJ”) at [14]–[15]; XBC v XBD [2024] SGFC 63 (“XBC v XBD”) at [11]–[12]. The self-defence exception is preventive in character. It does not sanction punitive or retaliatory force. The domestic context, including the close relationship between the parties is a relevant consideration in assessing proportionality of force employed and whether the force was appropriately used: XBC v XBD at [12].

  20. [14] Emotional or psychological abuse was unknown to the previous family violence regime as an independent basis for protection. Its express statutory recognition in s 58B(4) is a significant development that requires judicial elaboration. The practical significance of s 58B(4) has become apparent quickly. In the first year in which the new provisions were in force in 2025, emotional or psychological abuse was cited as the sole basis in approximately 32 per cent of the 1,484 PPOs issued by the Singapore courts: Theresa Tan, “‘The emotional abuse is relentless’: Dad gets personal protection order for daughter against mum”, The Straits Times (22 February 2026). These figures show that s 58B(4) is not an insignificant provision. It is evidently being actively invoked as an independent ground for protection, and in a substantial proportion of cases, it is the only ground. The need for judicial clarity on the scope of s 58B(4) and the standard of proof it demands is therefore not merely academic.

  21. [15] I observe that the social phenomenon the provision addresses is one whose boundaries are contested even in the disciplines such as psychology, social work, and sociology, which have studied it for decades. Some facts that amount to emotional or psychological abuse may at first blush appear subtle or insufficiently serious. That impression can be misleading. As then-Minister of State for Social and Family Development Ms Sun Xueling (“MOS Sun”) stated during the Second Reading of the Women’s Charter (Family Violence and Other Matters) (Amendment) Bill (Bill No 18/2023, 9 May 2023) (Singapore Parl Debates; Vol 95, Sitting No 106; [4 July 2023] (Ms Sun Xueling, Minister of State for Social and Family Development) (“Second Reading of the FV Bill”):

  22. [16] At the time of this decision, no less than six Singapore Family Court published decisions have applied or elaborated upon s 58B(4) since it came into force: see eg, XNY v XNZ [2025] SGFC 69 (“XNY v XNZ”); XWB v XWC [2025] SGFC 135 (“XWB v XWC”); XPX v XPW [2026] SGFC 30 (“XPX v XPW”); XZU v XZV [2026] SGFC 31 (“XZU v XZV”); XXW v XXX and other matters [2026] SGFC 23 (“XXW v XXX”); and YAE v YAF [2026] SGFC 35 (“YAE v YAF”). These decisions have helpfully begun to chart the contours of the provision. In these grounds, I seek to develop the analysis further, drawing in particular on a comparative survey of common law jurisdictions that have grappled with the question of what standard of assessment should be employed in their own domestic violence legislation. I do so while bearing in mind that Singapore’s legislation differs from those of other jurisdictions: see Lim Meng Suang and another v Attorney-General [2013] 3 SLR 118 (“Lim Meng Suang”) at [70]. The comparative materials are thus not cited as direct authority but as aids to reasoning about an area of law that is, across the common law world, still being developed.

  23. The structure of s 58B(4) of the Charter: two complementary limbs under limb (a) and limb (b)

  24. [17] Section 58B(4) contains two limbs that are complementary rather than cumulative. For convenience, I refer to these limbs as “Limb (a)” and “Limb (b)”, respectively. Each limb may independently establish emotional or psychological abuse, and a finding under one does not require engagement with the other:

  25. (a) Limb (a) (“torments, intimidates, harasses or distresses a person”): This limb is directed at the character of the conduct and its impact on the person. In Public Prosecutor v Lam Leng Hung and others [2018] 1 SLR 659 (“Lam Leng Hung”), Andrew Phang JA described, at [76], the ordinary meaning of a word or phrase as the “‘proper and most known signification’ … which comes to the reader most naturally by virtue of its regular or conventional usage in the English language and in the light of the linguistic context in which that word or phrase is used.” The dictionary meaning of a word is helpful in this regard. I point out here that the terms employed in Limb (a) are drafted as verbs and not nouns. These four verbs describe distinct but possibly overlapping modes of abuse:

  26. (i) “Torments” means “to make somebody suffer very much” (Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, Oxford University Press, online ed, entry “torment”). It connotes suffering of a severe kind.

  27. (ii) “Intimidates” means “to make timid or fearful: frighten; especially: to compel or deter by or as if by threats” (Merriam-Webster Dictionary, Merriam-Webster Inc, online ed, entry “intimidate”).

  28. (iii) “Harasses” means “to annoy persistently” or “to create an unpleasant or hostile situation for especially by uninvited and unwelcome verbal or physical conduct” (Merriam-Webster Dictionary, Merriam-Webster Inc, online ed, entry “harass”).

  29. I note that a synonym of a word may be useful in the exercise of construing the ordinary meaning of a word: see Sumitomo Corp Capital Asia Pte Ltd v Salim Anthony and Other Applications [2004] 4 SLR(R) 451 at [9]. In its synonymic sense, the word “implies petty persecutions or burdensome demands that exhaust one’s nervous or mental power” (Merriam-Webster Dictionary, Merriam-Webster Inc, online ed, entry “harass”).

  30. (iv) “Distresses” as a verb means conduct causing “pain or suffering affecting the body, a bodily part, or the mind” (Merriam-Webster Dictionary, Merriam-Webster Inc, online ed, entry “distress”). It implies an external and usually temporary cause of great physical or mental strain and stress (Merriam-Webster Thesaurus, Merriam-Webster Inc, online ed, entry “distress”).

  31. I would only caveat the analysis above bearing in mind the observations in Oliver Jones, Bennion on Statutory Interpretation: A Code (LexisNexis, 6th Ed, 2013) at p 1058, cited in Lam Leng Hung at [75]:

  32. Even though the dictionary meanings of the words cannot be the end all and be all when one asks what is the proper and most known signification of the words employed in s 58B(4), they would at least provide a starting point to this inquiry.

  33. Finally, I would also observe that in relation to the words employed, the learned DJ observed in XPX v XPW at [44(a)], Limb (a) “is framed in action terms” and focuses on “the nature of a respondent’s conduct” (emphasis added).

  34. (b) Limb (b) (“causes or may reasonably be expected to cause mental harm to a person, including thoughts of suicide or inflicting self-harm”): This limb is directed at the consequences of conduct in terms of psychological injury. As the DJ noted at [44(b)], this limb focuses on “the consequences of the respondent’s conduct” (emphasis added). The illustrations of suicide and self-harm signal that Limb (b) is calibrated at sufficiently serious psychological harm. Mere upset, annoyance or distress, without more, will not ordinarily meet this threshold of mental harm: XPX v XPW at [44(b)].

  35. [18] The two limbs serve different but complementary purposes given the disjunctive manner in which they are drafted. Limb (a) captures conduct that causes emotional disturbance (including disturbance falling short of the requisite mental harm under Limb (b)), provided that disturbance is genuine and exceeds ordinary friction. Limb (b) is an additional way to catch cases where mental injury is severe, whether or not the character of the conduct fits neatly within the four verbs in Limb (a). A single incident may engage either or both limbs.

  36. Is the court’s assessment of emotional or psychological abuse under Limb (a) guided by an objective, subjective, or some other standard?

  37. [19] The most significant unresolved question in the interpretation of s 58B(4) which has yet to receive the attention of the High Court is the standard of assessment when determining whether conduct “torments, intimidates, harasses or distresses a person” under Limb (a). Does the court ask:

  38. (a) whether this particular complainant was in fact tormented, intimidated, harassed, or distressed (ie, a purely subjective approach);

  39. (b) whether the conduct would have had that effect on a hypothetical reasonable person in the complainant’s situation (ie, a purely objective approach); or

  40. (c) something else entirely?

  41. [20] This question has practical significance because the answer determines how proof of emotional and psychological abuse operates in court in terms of what must be established, through what evidence, and to what standard.

  42. [21] I address this question in three steps. First, what the text of the provision and the parliamentary materials disclose. I am mindful that a faithful application of the text read in line with the established principles of statutory interpretation in Singapore must be the primary guidepost. Second, so far as they are relevant, I attempt also to sketch out the comparative experience of other common law jurisdictions that have come to confront squarely the manifestation of emotional or psychological abuse and its associated conduct by the name of coercive control as an aspect of family violence as understood in modern times. And third, what standard should govern under the new provision of emotional or psychological abuse under s 58B(4) in the Charter and what are the nuances, if any, to the application of this standard to each of the limbs in the provision.

  43. Statutory text and parliamentary materials

  44. [22] The starting point is s 9A of the Interpretation Act 1965 (2020 Rev Ed) (“IA”), which mandates that a purposive approach be taken to the interpretation of all written law in Singapore. The provision requires that an interpretation that would promote the purpose or object underlying the written law is to be preferred over one that would not promote that purpose or object. The Court of Appeal in Tan Cheng Bock v Attorney-General [2017] 2 SLR 850 (“Tan Cheng Bock”) at [37]–[54] set out the three-step framework that a court should apply. First, ascertain the possible interpretations of the text by reference to its ordinary meaning in context; Second, ascertain the general or specific legislative purpose of the provision either from the text itself or from extrinsic materials to the extent permitted by s 9A(2)–(3) of the IA. And third, compare the possible interpretations with the legislative purpose to determine which interpretation best promotes that purpose.

  45. [23] Extrinsic materials that may be considered include explanatory statements to the Bill and parliamentary speeches recorded in the Hansard: s 9A(3)(b) and (c) of the IA. These are not used as substitutes for the statutory text, but as aids to confirm or vary an ordinary meaning arrived at from the text itself. It is this framework that I apply to the interpretation of s 58B(4) in what follows.

  46. [24] The text and parliamentary materials reveal some immediately apparent points about the specific purpose that Parliament has for the new provision.

  47. [25] First, the provision is harm-focused, not intention-focussed. MOS Sun stated in her closing speech during the Second Reading of the FV Bill that “the definition of family violence looks to the harm caused by the perpetrator, rather than the intention of the perpetrator, and this is deliberate.” The consequence is that proof of the respondent’s subjective intention to cause distress, harassment, intimidation, or torment is not required. The question is what the conduct did to the complainant or would objectively do to someone in their position.

  48. [26] Second, Limb (b) plainly partially employs an objective approach in one of its two components by its express terms. The phrase “may reasonably be expected to cause mental harm” (emphasis added in italics and bold) is plainly an objective standard. It does not require proof that mental harm was actually caused, and the adverb “reasonably” introduces the perspective of the reasonable person. I will explore the significance of the precise manner in which Limb (b) has been drafted when I set down my observations below (at [54]–[75]) on the applicable approach that should be taken for the two components in Limb (b).

  49. [27] Third, and significantly, the Explanatory Statement to the Women’s Charter (Family Violence and Other Matters) (Amendment) Bill (Bill No 18/2023, 9 May 2023) (“Explanatory Statement”) drew a deliberate distinction between conduct that distresses and conduct that is merely offensive. It states that “the definition of emotional or psychological abuse refers to conduct or behaviour that distresses an individual, and not to conduct or behaviour that is offensive to an individual”: Explanatory Statement at Clause 2(b)(iv). Clause 2(b) of the Explanatory Statement states:

  50. [28] It is evident from the Explanatory Statement that a court applying s 58B(4) does not ask whether the conduct is offensive (or unpleasant or socially unacceptable). It asks whether the conduct distressed, intimidated, harassed, or tormented the protected person, or caused or may reasonably be expected to cause that person mental harm.

  51. [29] It follows that when we look at Limb (a) which uses active verbs in the present tense (“torments, intimidates, harasses or distresses”) without the qualifier of “may reasonably be expected” in Limb (b), this admits of some uncertainty as to whether Parliament intended a subjective, objective or a hybrid standard of assessment for Limb (a). But, as I discuss below (at [48]–[53]), a purely subjective or objective reading produces practical difficulties that Parliament cannot have intended.

  52. Survey of the approaches in other common law jurisdictions

  53. [30] Before turning to the comparative materials, I should explain the nature and scope of the survey that follows. The foreign provisions examined below are not confined to statutory definitions of emotional or psychological abuse in terms identical or similar to s 58B(4). They span two distinct categories:

  54. (a) First, provisions that directly define emotional or psychological abuse in family violence legislation such as Victorian state legislation and Commonwealth (federal) legislation in Australia; and

  55. (b) Second, provisions that criminalise or regulate coercive control as a discrete form of domestic harm such as those in the United Kingdom, New South Wales, Ireland and Scotland.

  56. [31] I include both categories because they illuminate a common underlying question that s 58B(4) also raises. Coercive control is not a discrete legal concept in Singapore law, nor is it the primary lens through which s 58B(4) should be read. I elaborate on that below at [87]–[94]. What I observe at this juncture is that coercive control is one of the more extensively studied and litigated manifestations of emotional or psychological abuse in intimate relationships, and it is also a category that Parliament specifically had in mind when enacting s 58B(4) in the spousal context: Second Reading of the FV Bill. The two concepts do overlap. Coercive control is widely understood, including under s 58B(4) itself, as a form of emotional or psychological abuse. It is one defined by both its cumulative and context-dependent character and one which operates through the slow erosion of a person’s autonomy and sense of self. Several common law jurisdictions have had to grapple with coercive control precisely because it raises the same question that s 58B(4) raises, viz, when a course of conduct causes harm that is cumulative and contextual, how should a court assess whether the statutory threshold has been crossed? Because conduct amounting to coercive control would, on Singapore’s statutory provision, fall within the penumbra of s 58B(4), any local court interpreting that provision will thus inevitably have to confront questions about what coercive control means and whether particular conduct partakes of its character.

  57. [32] Next, it cannot be emphasised enough that Singapore’s s 58B(4) is, after all, a sui generis provision suited to the context of Singapore. Its language, legislative history, and policy considerations wholly differ from those of every foreign statute surveyed below. Indeed, the High Court was clear in its observations in Lim Meng Suang ([16] supra) at [70] that:

  58. [33] I refer to these materials only as illustrations of how courts and legislatures have reasoned through that fundamental question. They are not a primary, or even secondary, guidepost to the conclusions I have reached on the proper interpretation of s 58B(4), to borrow the language employed in Lim Meng Suang. The function of the comparative survey is the more limited one of framing the interpretive issues that Singapore courts must confront. Foreign jurisprudence can illuminate the range of choices available and the difficulties of application that other systems have encountered when grappling with the same amorphous concept of emotional or psychological abuse and its other associated terms. That said, it cannot supply the answer, which must be reached independently and exclusively by reference to the statutory text, the legislative history, and the extrinsic materials permitted under s 9A of the IA, construed according to the framework in Tan Cheng Bock ([22] supra). My reasoning proceeds on that basis throughout and should not be misconstrued to be relying on the foreign legislation and authorities as either a supporting or even confirmatory basis of the conclusions I have reached.

  59. [34] The final preliminary point concerns the nature of several of the comparative materials. Some of the foreign authorities surveyed involve standards employed in the criminal context. I refer to these not because criminal standards govern here. A PPO application under the Charter is a civil proceeding and the standard of proof is the balance of probabilities: s 60A(1) of the Charter; UNQ v UNR [2020] SGHCF 21 at [24]–[28]. The experience of foreign jurisdictions is nonetheless instructive for a specific and limited purpose. Emotional and psychological abuse is both a phenomenon particular to each jurisdiction’s legal tradition and a universal problem that legislatures around the world have been called upon to address. As I will cover in this judgment, this is really the main interpretative issue confronting the local courts’ application of the new provisions under s 58B(4) of the Charter for which a range of possible interpretations may be taken. How a foreign legislature has crafted the standard of abuse (ie, by what it requires by way of impact, intent or proof) illuminates the path that Singapore courts may explore in deciding as between a subjective, objective or some other standard of assessment.

  60. (1) United Kingdom

  61. [35] The UK has developed different standards for dealing with emotional or psychological abuse and its associated concept, coercive control. These reveal the full spectrum of possible approaches within that jurisdiction.

  62. (a) The criminal standard under s 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 (c 9) (UK) (“UK SCA 2015”) requires that the behaviour “has a serious effect on B.” This is defined as causing B to fear that violence will be used against them on at least two occasions or causing B “serious alarm or distress which has a substantial adverse effect on B’s usual day-to-day activities” (s 76(2) UK SCA 2015). This appears from its plain wording to be a subjective assessment of the effect on B in that it requires fear or alarm or distress to have been caused. The behaviour must also be engaged in “repeatedly or continuously.” The perpetrator’s state of mind is assessed objectively as under s 76(5), the perpetrator “ought to know” that which “a reasonable person in possession of the same information would know.” The overall requirements thus appear from their plain reading to require a mixed standard. It is subjective as to actual impact but can be objective as to the perpetrator’s state of mind, with the additional requirements of repetition and continuity that mean a single incident cannot suffice.

  63. (b) Outside the criminal context, s 1(3) of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 (c 17) (UK) (“UK DAA 2021”) defines “abusive” behaviour to include “psychological, emotional or other abuse”. It expressly provides that “it does not matter whether the behaviour consists of a single incident or a course of conduct”.

  64. (c) In one of the first known reported cases in the UK Family Courts on coercive control in F v M [2021] EWFC 4 (“F v M”) (a case decided before the UK DAA 2021 came into force), Hayden J applied a holistic contextual assessment that appears to be predominantly objective in character. The learned Judge first observed (at [4]) that there was very little reported case law in the UK Family Courts considering coercive and controlling behaviour. His Honour then provided in the following terms:

  65. Crucially, his formulation of coercive control as “a range of acts designed to render an individual subordinate and to corrode their sense of personal autonomy” (emphasis added) seems to at least consider the nature of the offender’s conduct as one part of the analysis. His observation (at [109]) that “key to assessing abuse in the context of coercive control is recognising that the significance of individual acts may only be understood properly within the context of wider behaviour” imports a contextual analysis to such conduct.

  66. (d) The Court of Appeal (Civil Division) of England and Wales’ landmark decision in Re H-N and Others (Children) (Domestic Abuse: Finding of Fact Hearings) [2021] EWCA Civ 448 (“Re H-N”) is also instructive, for among other things, its comprehensive discussion of how the UK has grappled with the impact of family violence and its eventual encompassment of emotional or psychological abuse and coercive control as these terms have come to be known.

  67. (i) The Court traced the evolution in the UK Family Court’s understanding of what constitutes domestic abuse. The starting point, the Court observed, was the UK’s Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Homes Act 1976, which was so narrow in its conception of “domestic violence” that it required evidence of actual bodily harm before a power of arrest could even be attached to an injunction (at [23]). Even after this statutory breakthrough, judges through the 1980s tended to treat domestic violence as a purely adult matter (at [24]). What changed the picture fundamentally was the growing recognition that it is possible to be a victim of controlling or coercive behaviour or threatening behaviour without ever sustaining a physical injury, and that specific incidents, rather than being free-standing matters, may form part of a wider pattern of abuse (at [27]).

  68. (ii) The Court addressed Family Proceedings Rule 2010: Practice Direction 12J — Child Arrangements and Contact Orders: Domestic Abuse and Harm (“PD12J”), originally implemented in 2008, which imposes on the UK’s Family Court a mandatory step-by-step framework for cases involving allegations of domestic abuse (at [9]–[10]). The Court noted that PD12J was expanded in 2017 and now defines domestic abuse to encompass “any incident or pattern of incidents of controlling, coercive or threatening behaviour, violence or abuse,” expressly including “psychological, physical, sexual, financial, or emotional abuse” (at [26]). Crucially, PD12J defines “coercive behaviour” as acts “used to harm, punish, or frighten the victim” and “controlling behaviour” as acts “designed to make a person subordinate and/or dependent” (at [26]). Although the structure of the definition of “domestic abuse” in the Domestic Abuse Bill (or the UK DAA 2021 which has since come into force) currently differs from that in PD12J, the Court observed that the content is substantially the same. The Court found that PD12J, as expanded, remained fit for purpose and properly reflected modern understanding of domestic abuse (at [28]).

  69. (iii) The Court then endorsed F v M, commending it as essential reading for the family judiciary (at [30]). The Court reproduced Hayden J’s central observation that coercive and controlling behaviour involves a pattern of acts whose impact must be assessed cumulatively rather than in isolation (at [29]).

  70. (iv) The Court made clear that coercive and controlling behaviour may cause serious emotional and psychological harm regardless of whether there has been any episode of actual violence or sexual abuse. A pattern of abusive behaviour is as damaging to those within the household as any specific factual incident (at [31]).

  71. (v) The Court was equally clear about the outer boundary of the concept. Endorsing the approach of Peter Jackson LJ in Re L (Relocation: Second Appeal) [2017] EWCA Civ 2121 at [61], the Court held that “not all directive, assertive, stubborn or selfish behaviour, will be ‘abuse’” (albeit in the specific context of proceedings concerning the welfare of a child) and that “much will turn on the intention of the perpetrator of the alleged abuse and on the harmful impact of the behaviour” (at [32]).

  72. The standard applied by the UK Family Court as set out in Re H-N is therefore one that assesses the cumulative pattern of conduct in context, recognises psychological and emotional harm as equally serious forms of abuse as physical violence. It requires an assessment of both the nature of the conduct and its harmful impact and maintains a meaningful threshold below which ordinary relational friction does not cross into actionable abuse.

  73. (2) Australia

  74. [36] In Pickford & Pickford and Another (2024) 70 Fam LR 85 (“Pickford”), the Full Court of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia considered comprehensively the definition of family violence under s 4AB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“Australia FLA 1975”), which encompasses “violent, threatening or other behaviour by a person that coerces or controls a family member, or causes the family member to be fearful.” The Full Court was unanimous on two propositions of significance.

  75. (a) First, perpetrator intent is not a necessary element of a finding of coercive or controlling conduct, though it will very often be relevant and even decisive as a factual matter (at [111] per Austin and Williams JJ; at [2] per McClelland DCJ; at [46] per Aldridge and Carew JJ).

  76. (b) Second, and critically, the victim’s subjective perception or experience alone is insufficient. Determining whether conduct coerces or controls “requires deeper evaluation than simply a party’s experience or perception” (at [31] per McClelland DCJ; at [105], [107], [111] per Austin and Williams JJ).

  77. [37] Beyond these points of agreement, two views emerged on the structure of the definition. Austin and Williams JJ held that the two limbs demand different standards:

  78. (a) “coerces or controls” is an objective concept — “the coercion or control must be an objective actuality”;

  79. (b) whereas “causes the family member to be fearful” is assessed subjectively by reference to the victim’s actual reaction, without any requirement of reasonableness (at [109]–[111] and [113]–[114]).

  80. [38] The majority comprising Aldridge and Carew JJ (with McClelland DCJ agreeing) declined to limit the definition to those two types of behaviour, holding that s 4AB should not be read down by artificial limitations and that the finding of coercive or controlling behaviour is ultimately “an evaluative one, having regard to all of the circumstances and all of the evidence before the court” (at [41]–[43] and [52]). McClelland DCJ emphasised that the key to the inquiry is “an appreciation of a pattern or series of acts, the impact of which will usually be both intersecting and cumulative, rather than incident specific” (at [5]). The Full Court also endorsed the fact-finding approach articulated by Aldridge and Carew JJ, which requires the court to identify the behaviour complained of, its full context including any explanation by the alleged perpetrator and also the impact on the alleged victim. It also requires the court to explain why the behaviour does or does not amount to coercive or controlling conduct, noting expressly that “mere assertion by the alleged victim that they feel coerced or controlled is insufficient” (at [48]).

  81. [39] At the state level, the Family Violence Protection Act 2008 (Vic) (“FVPA Vic”) defines “emotional or psychological abuse” in s 7 as “behaviour by a person towards another person that torments, intimidates, harasses or is offensive to the other person.” This formulation is strikingly similar to s 58B(4)(a), save that Singapore adopts the word “distresses” in place of “is offensive to.” The Victorian provision is fundamentally conduct-focused, with no express requirement to consider the impact on the victim. In New South Wales, s 54D of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) creates a criminal offence of abusive behaviour towards intimate partners which requires, among other elements, that a reasonable person would consider the course of conduct would be likely, “in all the circumstances, to cause any or all of the following, whether or not the fear or impact is in fact caused”, fear of violence, or a serious adverse impact on the capacity to engage in ordinary day-to-day activities. The express words “whether or not the fear or impact is in fact caused” dispense with proof of actual subjective impact. That said, s 54D appears to be a more demanding provision than this single element suggests. It also requires the perpetrator to specifically intend the course of conduct to coerce or control the other person. This is an element absent from the text of Singapore’s s 58B(4).

  82. (3) Canada

  83. [40] Section 264 of Canada’s Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46 (Can) creates the offence of criminal harassment. Section 264(1) reads: “No person shall, without lawful authority and knowing that another person is harassed or is reckless as to whether the other person is harassed, engage in conduct referred to in subsection (2) that causes that other person reasonably, in all the circumstances, to fear for their safety or the safety of anyone known to them.” The provision thus contains two distinct concepts: “[H]arassment”, which features as part of the knowledge (or mens rea) element, requiring the accused to know that the complainant is harassed; and second, “fear for safety”, which is the prohibited consequence the conduct must cause. It is the first concept, harassment, that is instructive by analogy to Singapore’s s 58B(4)(a).

  84. [41] In R v Sillipp (1997) 120 CCC (3d) 384 (“Sillipp”), Berger JA held that “harassment” in this sense demanded proof of something substantially more than being “vexed, disquieted or annoyed”, with the appropriate synonyms being “tormented, troubled, worried, plagued, bedeviled and badgered” (at [16]). As for the “fear for safety” consequence, the Court applied a mixed subjective-objective standard requiring both actual fear and objectively reasonable fear in all the circumstances, with the reasonableness inquiry not excluding the particular vulnerabilities of the complainant (at [18] and [27]).

  85. [42] As for family proceedings, s 1 of the British Columbia’s Family Law Act, SBC 2011, c 25 (BC, Can) (“BC FLA”) defines “psychological or emotional abuse” as part of “family violence” to include, among other things, “intimidation, harassment, coercion or threats” and expressly provides that the definition applies “with or without an intent to harm a family member.” Perpetrator intent is not necessary.

  86. (4) New Zealand

  87. [43] New Zealand’s Family Violence Act 2018 (NZ) (“NZ FVA 2018”) defines “family violence” under ss 9(1) read with s 9(2) to include psychological abuse, which is in turn defined in s 11 to include “intimidation or harassment” and threats of physical or sexual abuse, among other things. Section 9(3) further provides that violence includes a pattern of behaviour that “is coercive or controlling (because it is done against the person to coerce or control, or with the effect of coercing or controlling, the person)” (emphasis added). The provision thus creates two disjunctive bases. The first turns on purpose which looks at the nature of the conduct. There must be conduct done “because” it is to coerce or control. The second turns on the effect, regardless of the perpetrator’s intent. Section 10(2) goes further, expressly providing that a number of acts forming part of a pattern of behaviour “even if all or any of those acts, when viewed in isolation, may appear to be minor or trivial” may amount to abuse.

  88. (5) Ireland

  89. [44] Ireland’s s 39(1) of the Domestic Violence Act 2018 (Ire) (“Irish DVA 2018”) provides that a person commits an offence of coercive control where he or she “knowingly and persistently engages in behaviour” (emphasis added) that: (a) is controlling or coercive; (b) has a serious effect on a relevant person; and (c) a reasonable person would consider likely to have a serious effect on a relevant person. Under s 39(2), a “serious effect” means the behaviour causes the person to fear that violence will be used against her, or causes serious alarm or distress that has a substantial adverse impact on their usual day-to-day activities. The Irish provision thus requires perpetrator’s intent (“knowingly”), repetition (“persistently”), actual subjective impact (“has a serious effect”), and objective confirmation of that impact by reference to a reasonable person’s point of view.

  90. (6) Scotland

  91. [45] Scotland’s Domestic Abuse (Scotland) Act 2018 (asp 5), on the face of the statutory text, adopts an objective approach to the offence of engaging in abusive behaviour towards a partner or ex-partner. Section 1(2) provides that a further condition is whether “a reasonable person would consider the course of behaviour to be likely to cause B to suffer physical or psychological harm.” Section 4(1) then provides in unambiguous terms that “the commission of an offence under section 1(1) does not depend on the course of behaviour actually causing B to suffer harm of the sort mentioned in section 1(2).” No proof of actual impact is thus required. The provision is notable because it expressly removes the need for the complainant to establish or articulate their own psychological harm. The offence is made out by the objective likelihood of harm as assessed by the reasonable person.

  92. The appropriate standard of assessing emotional or psychological abuse is the Contextualised Objective Approach

  93. [46] Applying the three-step purposive framework in Tan Cheng Bock ([22] supra), I turn to the question of the appropriate standard of assessment.

  94. (a) The first step requires the court to ascertain the possible interpretations of the text by reference to its ordinary meaning in context. The text of Limb (a) of s 58B(4)(a) (“torments, intimidates, harasses or distresses”) admits of ambiguity as to whether a subjective, objective or a hybrid standard governs.

  95. (b) The second step requires the court to ascertain the legislative purpose (both general and specific) of the provision, from the text itself and from the extrinsic materials to the extent permitted by s 9A of the IA. As the parliamentary materials surveyed above show, the specific and not merely general purpose of s 58B(4) is to protect survivors from emotional and psychological harm assessed by reference to what was done to them rather than what the respondent intended.

  96. (c) The third step requires the court to select the interpretation that best promotes that purpose. Of the available interpretations, I find that the Contextualised Objective Approach does so. It is objective enough to give consistent and predictable notice of what conduct is prohibited and contextualised enough to capture the relational character of emotional abuse that a purely decontextualised reasonable person standard would miss. An appropriate and workable standard for s 58B(4)(a) of the Charter is therefore what I would describe as the “Contextualised Objective Approach”, which may be described as follows: The court asks whether the conduct was, assessed in its full relational and situational context, of a character that would objectively torment, intimidate, harass, or distress a person in the complainant’s position, having regard to the specific nature and history of the relationship, the domestic setting, any known vulnerability of the complainant, the power dynamics between the parties, and the cumulative effect of prior incidents.

  97. That said, I should qualify that this approach as framed is not a checklist. It is a description of the evaluative standard to guide the court’s assessment which must be both objective and yet sensitive to the complainant’s circumstances and relational context. The point is that the court cannot take a purely subjective or objective approach when it comes to the application of Limb (a).

  98. [47] This approach is broadly consistent with the standard adopted by the learned Magistrate in XXW v XXX and other matters ([16] supra). The Magistrate developed in his detailed analysis (at [47]–[57]) that “an objective approach should be taken in assessing whether there had been emotional and/or psychological abuse”, framed as asking “whether a reasonable person, in the position of Y, would be tormented, intimidated, harassed or distressed by X’s conduct or behaviour.” The learned Magistrate grounded this reasoning in the penal consequences of a PPO breach, that because any contravention of a PPO renders further acts of family violence a punishable offence, the standard for establishing family violence must be objective enough to give both parties and courts clear notice of what is and is not acceptable conduct: XXW v XXX at [48]–[52]. I respectfully agree with, and build upon, that reasoning. The Contextualised Objective Approach I adopt is consistent with the learned Magistrate’s formulation but makes explicit what his approach implies, which is that the reasonable person must be placed in the complainant’s actual relational position, with full regard to the history and dynamics of the specific relationship and not assessed as a generic bystander divorced from context. This appears to have been what the Magistrate intended when he described the approach as the “objective approach”, as he later went on to hold (at [57]) that “one must also have regard to the circumstances of the case (including Y’s particular characteristics), as well as the relevant context in which the alleged conduct or behaviour had taken place”. This qualification of the objective approach matters because the same conduct, such as turning off a fan without explanation or the forceful throwing of a bottle at a wall may carry an entirely different complexion depending on what has preceded it between these particular parties. The Contextualised Objective Approach preserves the objectivity required by the penal consequences argument while ensuring that context, which is central to how emotional and psychological harm actually operates, is not stripped away.

  99. [48] I arrived at this formulation by reasoning through the difficulties presented by the two pure alternative approaches under a purely subjective or objective approach.

  100. [49] A purely subjective approach which asks only whether this particular complainant was in fact distressed, intimidated, harassed, or tormented, is problematic for two related reasons. The first, as the Magistrate identified in XXW v XXX at [48]–[52], is that it provides no objective notice of what conduct is prohibited. Whether a respondent’s act crosses the threshold would turn entirely on the internal psychological state of the particular complainant. This is not something the Respondent can claim to really know in every case, which may vary from person to person, and which gives courts no consistent basis for decision. That sits uneasily with the penal consequences that attach to a breach of a PPO, which demand a standard capable of giving clear and consistent notice to both parties of what is and is not acceptable conduct. I respectfully agree with the Magistrate’s reasoning on this point.

  101. [50] The second difficulty is what I would describe as practical, if I may put it that way. Limb (a) employs the four verbs “torments, intimidates, harasses or distresses” which, on their face, describe a wide spectrum of possible emotional states. A purely subjective standard would open the provision to claims by anyone who has subjectively experienced distress, intimidation, harassment, or torment as a result of a respondent’s conduct, however unreasonable or idiosyncratic that reaction may be. This concern is sharpened when Limb (a) is compared with Limb (b). As I explain below (at [67]), Limb (b) contains its own internal safeguard. It is anchored in mental harm, ie, harm serious enough to cause thoughts of suicide or self-infliction of injury. The illustrations of suicide and self-harm signal that Limb (b) operates at the more severe end of psychological injury, and as I discuss in the context of Limb (b) below at [65(a)], the causation inquiry under that component of the limb is one established through objective evidence of mental harm rather than through subjective self-reporting alone. Limb (a) contains no equivalent explicit severity marker. If its terms are interpreted purely subjectively, the provision risks being invoked in respect of conduct that any robust relationship must be expected to weather. These may include the unkind word, the argument that goes too far, the silence that persists too long. A contextualised objective standard prevents this by requiring the court to assess whether a reasonable person in the complainant’s position would have been genuinely tormented, intimidated, harassed, or distressed, not merely whether this particular complainant says she was.

  102. [51] A third difficulty with the purely subjective approach is more fundamental and goes to the logical structure of the provision itself. On a proper reading of s 58B(4), Limb (a) and Limb (b) are directed at different inquiries. As the learned DJ observed in XPX v XPW ([16] supra) at [44], Limb (a) “focuses on the nature of a respondent’s conduct” and “is framed in action terms: ‘torments, intimidates, harasses or distresses’”, while Limb (b) “focuses on the consequences of the respondent’s conduct.” Assuming that this distinction is one which is correct, this distinction has a logical implication. If Limb (a) is, at its core, concerned with the character of the respondent’s conduct, asking, in effect, what the conduct did or was capable of doing then the frame of inquiry is, by its nature, conduct-facing rather than complainant-facing. The question is not primarily what the complainant felt, but what the conduct was. A purely subjective standard, which asks only whether this particular complainant was in fact distressed, would invert this assessment entirely by reorienting the inquiry away from the conduct and toward the complainant’s internal psychological state. This would effectively collapse the distinction between Limb (a) and Limb (b) and render it otiose. In my judgment, the statutory canon of interpretation that “that the thing may rather have effect than perish” (ie, the principle of effectiveness as encapsulated by the Latin maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat) is applicable here and it requires that each limb be given an interpretation that is distinctly significant. A purely subjective standard for Limb (a) would deprive it of that distinctiveness by making it less functionally distinguishable and would effectively become a weakened version of the consequence inquiry under Limb (b). I do not think this can be right, but of course, this argument is only sound if the distinction in XPX v XPW at [44] is correct, which in my respectful view, it is based on the manner in which Parliament has drafted s 58B(4) and for the reasons I have sketched out above.

  103. [52] Next, the alternative purely objective approach of asking only whether a generic reasonable person would have been affected, without regard to the specific relational context, faces the opposite difficulty. It strips away precisely the context that gives emotional or psychological abuse its character. Whether a particular act is intimidating depends heavily on what preceded it in this relationship, on the power dynamics between these parties, and on the complainant’s specific vulnerabilities. Conduct that appears unremarkable to a stranger may be profoundly intimidating when viewed against a history of aggression. A purely decontextualised reasonable person standard would fail to capture the most characteristic forms of emotional harm, which derive their coercive force precisely from parties’ existing relational history.

  104. [53] In my judgment, the Contextualised Objective Approach, and this is one which many of my sister and brother judges have come to apply, best resolves both difficulties. It preserves the objectivity required by the penal notice argument identified in XXW v XXX ([16] supra) and prevents the floodgates concern by anchoring the assessment in what a reasonable person in the complainant’s position would have experienced. It simultaneously contextualises that reasonable person by placing them in the complainant’s actual relational circumstances, ensuring that the ordinary-seeming act is assessed against the relational backdrop that gives it meaning. The personal sensitivity that no reasonable person would share is excluded from this inquiry. That said, the harm that a reasonable person in the complainant’s position would have actually suffered must also be considered.

  105. The standards of assessment under Limb (b): two disjunctive components requiring different approaches

  106. [54] A fundamental interpretive question confronts the court in reading Limb (b). The provision states that emotional or psychological abuse means conduct that “causes or may reasonably be expected to cause mental harm to a person, including thoughts of suicide or inflicting self-harm.” On its face, the text raises two potentially distinct triggers for s 58B(4) to apply as suggested by the use of the word “or”: (a) conduct that causes mental harm; or (b) conduct that may reasonably be expected to cause it. In interpreting s 58B(4), this Court must thus address which of the following interpretations should prevail:

  107. (a) Limb (b) is to be read as two disjunctive components governed by different standards of assessment; or

  108. (b) Limb (b) is to be read such that a single uniform standard (ie, the Contextualised Objective Approach) applies across the entirety of Limb (b) without distinction.

  109. [55] The difficulty of this question is underscored by the experience of Australia, where the Full Court of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1) as a superior court for family law matters in Australia was required to confront a similar interpretative problem. Even that court found itself divided. That the Full Court in Pickford ([36] supra) was called upon to determine whether a provision structured in disjunctive terms demanded a single uniform standard or two different ones, and that it produced a plurality of opinions, is itself indicative of the difficulty. For that reason, the Full Court's treatment of this question illuminates the terrain that our courts have to navigate under s 58B(4).

  110. [56] In Pickford ([36] supra), the Full Court of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia confronted the interpretation of Australia’s definition of “family violence” under s 4AB of the Australia FLA 1975 that contained one limb directed at the nature of the conduct (ie, behaviour that “coerces or controls”) and another directed at its consequence upon the victim (ie, behaviour that “causes the family member to be fearful”):

  111. [57] In addressing the proper interpretation of this provision, the following passage from Austin and Williams JJ’s judgment at [109] in referring to the definition as set out at [55] above, addressed the interpretive choice they confronted:

  112. [58] Austin and Williams JJ held that the “causes fearfulness” limb, focusing as it does on the victim’s reaction rather than the nature of the behaviour, called for a different standard from the objective one governing the coercion and control limb. In Their Honours’ view, this standard should be one described to be “subjective”. In contrast, the majority in Pickford comprising Aldridge and Carew JJ, with McClelland DCJ agreeing (at [3]), took a broader view of the definition above. Their Honours declined to limit “family violence” to only two types of behaviour (ie, that which coerces or controls and that which causes fear) and instead opted to treat the overall inquiry as an evaluative one having regard to all the circumstances (at [41]–[43] and [52]). This is a broader holistic approach that the majority preferred.

  113. [59] The divergence of views in Pickford serves to illustrate that two principal approaches are available to a court grappling with a provision structured as s 58B(4) is. The first is a uniform approach applying the Contextualised Objective Approach across both components of Limb (b) without distinction. I observe that this would be more aligned with the majority’s view in Pickford. The second is a differentiated approach recognising that the first component, which asks what actually happened to this complainant, calls for a different standard from the second which instead asks what a reasonable person in the complainant’s position would be expected to experience in future. For the avoidance of doubt, I have illustrated these two possible interpretative approaches through the reasoning in Pickford not because the reasoning in that decision can apply here, but because the Full Court there had occasion to confront the same interpretative issue, indeed, they do illuminate the interpretive choice that local courts must make.

  114. [60] In my view, based on the text of s 58B(4)(b), Limb (b) should be read as comprising two disjunctive components that call for the application of different standards. Parliament drafted Limb (b) in two disjunctive ways when it employed “causes” for actual harm that has occurred, and “may reasonably be expected” for harm that has not yet occurred but is anticipated. In other words, the use of the past-present tense for “causes” suggests a consequence that has already materialised (or at the maximum, continuing). The use of what I would describe as future-facing language for “reasonably expected” points to an anticipated one. In my judgment, different approaches must be taken for either component because to apply the same standard to both would be to read “causes” as if it meant “would reasonably be expected to cause”. This would render the distinction Parliament expressly drew otiose, contrary to the principle of effectiveness (known also as ut res magis valeat quam pereat principle). Parliament shuns tautology and does not legislate in vain such that the court should therefore endeavour to give significance to every word in an enactment: Tan Cheng Bock ([22] supra) at [38], citing JD Ltd v Comptroller of Income Tax [2006] 1 SLR(R) 484 at [43].

  115. [61] I observe that the disjunctive interpretation of Limb (b) aligns more with (but is not independently supported or confirmed by) the minority view of Austin and Williams JJ in Pickford. Should the view that a single uniform holistic inquiry be applied across s 58B(4) be adopted? I raise a contrast with the majority’s view in Pickford, not in support of my view above (this is impermissible insofar as I am interpreting a Singapore statute), but to raise some questions which a future court may have to resolve more directly with the benefit of fuller submissions. The majority comprising Aldridge and Carew JJ, with McClelland DCJ agreeing (at [3]), declined to accept the minority’s bifurcation of the Australian definition into only two types of behaviour, viz, an objective “coerces or controls” limb and a subjective “causes fearfulness” limb. Their view was that s 4AB of the Australia FLA 1975 should not be read down by artificial limitations (at [43]), that the overall inquiry is an evaluative one having regard to all the circumstances (at [52]), and that determining whether conduct coerces or controls “requires deeper evaluation than simply a party’s experience or perception” (at [31] per McClelland DCJ). In my view, the true question for a local court, is really not one of selecting as between the minority’s or the majority’s view in Pickford, but whether the subjective approach (which the minority there adopted under the Australian provision for the “causes … fearful” limb) is appropriate for Singapore’s analogous “causes mental harm” component in s 58B(4). This is an inquiry that our local courts have to answer with reference to our own statutory text and other permissible interpretative aids.

  116. [62] Apart from the textual reasons I laid out above at [60], I would proffer an additional reason why a subjective approach is feasible and even preferred when construing Limb (b) of s 58B(4). Singapore’s Parliament has expressly built a seriousness threshold into the provision itself, in the form of the illustrative examples of thoughts of suicide and self-harm. A complainant who cannot establish harm of that serious character will not satisfy Limb (b) regardless of how their account is framed. The subjective inquiry is therefore appropriate in Singapore precisely because the demanding seriousness threshold does the work that any objective standard would otherwise need to do. I would only observe in passing that this same safeguard does not appear to have been built into s 4AB of Australia’s FLA 1975 which plainly only requires that the behaviour “causes the family member to be fearful” (see above at [56]). Singapore’s statutory framework thus makes the subjective approach not only defensible, but also the more natural reading of the provision as Parliament enacted it. I elaborate more on the seriousness threshold under Limb (b) in greater detail at [67] below.

  117. [63] Assuming that a disjunctive reading should be given to Limb (b), I turn then to address the different standards of assessment that apply to each of the two components of Limb (b).

  118. The “causes mental harm” component: a backward-looking factual inquiry

  119. [64] In my respectful view, the proper standard of assessment for the first component (“causes … mental harm”) is to ask: has mental harm of the requisite kind actually occurred, and was it caused by the respondent’s conduct? This approach has been described to be “subjective” by Austin and Williams JJ in Pickford ([36] supra) at [108]–[109], but I would not term the approach to be a subjective standard of assessment in the strict sense. It may be more appropriately described as a factual inquiry directed at what actually happened to the complainant, which is an objective finding of fact, at a higher level of abstraction. The element of subjectivity lies in the nature of the harm itself (this being “fearful” in the Australian context, but “mental harm” in the Singapore context) which can come from the complainant’s own account.

  120. [65] In other words, the court must determine, on a balance of probabilities on all the evidence, whether the requisite harm occurred and whether the respondent’s conduct caused it. The “causes” component is ultimately backward-looking. Two sub-questions arise under this inquiry:

  121. (a) The first is causation. Did the respondent’s conduct cause the harm? This is the familiar inquiry of factual causation which courts undertake across many fields of law. The court assesses the evidence as a whole taking into consideration the complainant’s account, the chronology of events, the nature of the conduct, and any corroborating material, and determines whether the causal link is established. This is an objective assessment in the sense that the court is not bound simply to accept the complainant’s assertion, but it is a factual assessment, not a normative one. The court is finding what happened, not what a hypothetical reasonable person would have experienced.

  122. (b) The second sub-question is the nature and seriousness of the harm. The mental harm required under Limb (b) is not ordinary unhappiness, frustration, or sadness. Applying the well-established statutory canon of interpretation that a word is known by its associates (ie, the Latin maxim noscitur a sociis), “mental harm” must be of a character approaching the gravity of the illustrative examples Parliament chose, which would be thoughts of suicide and thoughts of inflicting self-harm. These examples are telling in a way that deserves attention. Parliament deliberately adopted the word “thoughts.” On this footing, the application of an objective standard may not be fully compatible in assessing a person’s thoughts. A person has had such thoughts or she has not. The inquiry is whether these particular mental consequences (or harm of analogous severity) actually materialised. In my judgment, it is not whether a reasonable person in the complainant’s position would have had such thoughts.

  123. [66] This is important for how the first component operates in practice, particularly in PPO proceedings where parties are frequently unrepresented and without access to psychiatric services. A complainant who has in fact experienced thoughts of suicide or self-harm as a consequence of the respondent’s conduct will in most cases be able to establish this only through their own testimony.

  124. [67] The safeguard against a complainant too readily satisfying the first component lies not in incorporating an objective standard of assessment, but in the seriousness threshold for the kind of mental harm required. Parliament required “mental harm” of a character illustrated by thoughts of suicide and self-harm. These are harms that are plainly grave and serious. Ordinary distress or transient upset does not meet this threshold. A complainant who cannot establish harm of that serious character will not satisfy the first component, regardless of how their account is framed. This is a meaningful and demanding standard. In this respect, the learned DJ’s analysis in XPX v XPW ([16] supra) at [44(b)] that Limb (b) focuses on “the consequences of the respondent’s conduct” and is “calibrated at the more serious end of the spectrum of psychological harm” is directly applicable. The nature of the consequences matters. What does not arise as a separate operative question under the first component is how the harm should have appeared through the eyes of a reasonable observer. The first component asks what actually happened, not what would have been expected to happen.

  125. [68] By way of passing comparison, and bearing in mind that Singapore’s statute differs from foreign provisions, the seriousness threshold built into Singapore’s Limb (b) bears resemblance to Ireland’s approach under s 39(2) of the Irish DVA 2018, which similarly requires that conduct cause “serious alarm or distress” with “a substantial adverse impact on [the complainant’s] usual day-to-day activities.” Both provisions, in their different ways, set a floor below which less serious harms do not suffice.

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