Cheong Ghim Fah and Another v Murugian s/o Rangasamy (No 2)

V K Rajah JC:

[1] In Cheong Gim Fah and another v Murugian s/o Rangasamy [2004] 1 SLR 628, I assigned liability to the extent of 85% to the defendant for causing the death of a jogger in a motor accident. Interlocutory judgment was entered in favour of the plaintiffs with damages to be assessed by the Registrar. On 2 April 2004, an assistant registrar assessed damages due to the deceased’s estate at $216,523.60. This sum falls within the pecuniary limit of $250,000 which represents the jurisdictional scope of the District Court in civil matters.

[5] Section 39 of the Subordinate Courts Act (Cap 321, 1999 Rev Ed) (“SCA”) stipulates:

[6] Order 59 r 27(5) of the RSC stipulates:

[8] Counsel for the defendant, on the other hand, argued that the court’s primary, if not sole, consideration was to have regard to the final amount adjudged. Acceding to the plaintiffs’ arguments would, he contended, open the floodgates encouraging the filing of matters in the High Court that should rightly be commenced in the subordinate courts.

[11] In Australian Master Builders Co Pty Ltd v Ng Tai Tuan [1987] SLR 539, Chan Sek Keong JC (as he then was) opined that s 37 of the SCA gave the High Court an unfettered discretion to transfer, at any time, any proceedings commenced in the High Court by writ of summons to the District Court. He corrrectly pointed out that the words “notwithstanding any other provisions of this Act” vest in the High Court the discretion to increase the ordinary civil jurisdiction of the District Court by means of such a transfer. Chan JC also emphasised that it is not desirable to design specific rules as to when and how the court should exercise its discretion to transfer proceedings. More recently, in Sunlink Engineering Pte Ltd v Koru Bena Sdn Bhd [2003] 2 SLR 452, Tan Lee Meng J, after citing Chan JC’s views, observed that the need to meet another country’s legislation on reciprocal enforcement of foreign judgments did not, without more, confer on a plaintiff the right to be heard in the High Court if the case could in the normal course of events be heard in the subordinate courts. He was concerned that otherwise, a different set of rules could, without exception, apply to every such foreign defendant. This could result in a misallocation of High Court resources, as time could then be unjustifiably spent on claims which ought to be dealt with in the subordinate courts. These are indeed legitimate concerns. It is noteworthy, however, that Tan J, in transferring the subject proceedings to a subordinate court, grounded his decision on the basis that the foreign defendant had not only a presence in Singapore but had also just secured a multi-million dollar contract for the construction of a Singapore school.

[14] On the basis of the then available facts, it was reasonable for the plaintiffs’ solicitors, at the outset, to take the view that the damages their clients might potentially recover would fall in the region of $300,000 to $400,000. There were a number of factual imponderables in play. Commencing proceedings in the subordinate courts would have precluded their clients from recovering damages in excess of the District Court’s jurisdiction. It must be emphasised that s 39(6) of the SCA recognises that if there is “reasonable ground for supposing the amount recoverable” [emphasis added] would be in excess of the subordinate court’s jurisdiction, the strictures imposed do not apply. That the plaintiffs did not in fact ultimately recover an amount in excess of the District Court jurisdiction should not, in the circumstances of these proceedings, be held against them. The test is not one of hindsight but of reasonableness refracted through the factual prism existing when the proceedings were initiated. Needless to say, if solicitors realise that the upper limit of recoverability falls within the subordinate courts’ jurisdiction prior to the commencement of a hearing, steps ought to be taken to immediately transfer the proceedings to the appropriate forum.

[15] There is yet another reason why I was persuaded that it was appropriate to initiate the subject proceedings in the High Court. It seems clear to me that if a subordinate court judgment cannot be enforced as a foreign judgment in another jurisdiction, this could be a “sufficient reason” for initiating the action in the High Court. Historically, common law courts in various jurisdictions have only recognised judgments of other foreign superior courts for the purposes of enforcement (see Halsbury’s Laws of England vol 10 (4th Ed Reissue, 2002) at para 309):

This is a historical anomaly and reality that has to be acknowledged and acceded to. Indeed only judgments of foreign superior courts are recognised in Singapore for the purposes of statutory enforcement: see Reciprocal Enforcement of Commonwealth Judgments Act (Cap 264, 1985 Rev Ed) and Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (Cap 265, 2001 Rev Ed). If the High Court were to turn away litigants whose sole means of enforcing a judgment lies in a foreign jurisdiction and if a judgment of the subordinate courts would not be recognised in that jurisdiction, such litigants would effectively be deprived of any judicial assistance by Singapore courts. That surely cannot be right if Singapore is the appropriate forum to assume jurisdiction for the matters concerned. It is inconceivable that the Legislature intended that the High Court should assume a rigid approach by resolutely declining jurisdiction in such cases, ergo the qualification by means of the safety net of “sufficient reason”. In my view, Singapore is indeed the appropriate jurisdiction for the subject proceedings. I do not interpret Tan J’s decision in Sunlink Engineering ([11] supra) as postulating anything further than that based on the facts of that case, and considering the defendant had assets in Singapore, the High Court was not the appropriate forum. “Sufficient reason” to commence subordinate court proceedings in the High Court, as opposed to the District Court, had not been established in that case as the judgment could, to all intents and purposes, have been enforced in Singapore. Having said that, if indeed there are concerns about an avalanche of such matters coming before the High Court, then this should be a matter for law reform. Perhaps a statutory mechanism to register subordinate court judgments in the High Court to accord them the status of a decision of a superior court through a deeming provision, prior to foreign enforcement, can be contemplated. This should assuage all concerns and fears relating to “floodgates”. It is interesting to note, until 1993, s 46 of the Subordinate Courts Act (Cap 321, 1985 Rev Ed) allowed the District Court to forward judgments to the High Court for execution. Such judgments were, upon receipt, deemed to have “been made by the High Court”. Curiously, this provision appears to have been intended only to facilitate enforcement within the jurisdiction and was unceremoniously repealed by Act 15 of 1993.

[17] I was not, however, in the least impressed by the plaintiffs’ remaining contention that the complexity or importance of the issues raised in the proceedings justified the initiation of proceedings in the High Court. The issues raised in the proceedings, while interesting, were well within the purview and competence of the District Court. Only a case of unusual complexity or one that raises an issue of public interest or an important point of law could ever warrant such a contention. As observed in [12], the correct procedure in such a case is to initiate proceedings in the subordinate courts and then to apply for a transfer to the High Court. Nor is it tenable to either assume or assert that an appeal can be properly obviated by initiating proceedings in the High Court in the first instance. This approach would make a mockery of, and wholly undermine, the statutory scheme for the division of work between the courts and will not be countenanced.