Lee Kwan Kok and Another v Wong Chan Tong

[1] The facts of this case are simple and undisputed. The deceased was riding a motorcycle, no. FL 3928L, when he was involved in a collision with a van, no. GR 8895D, driven by the defendant. The deceased passed away within one hour from the injuries suffered as a result of the accident. The 1 plaintiff is the administrator of the Estate of the deceased and he commenced this action against the defendant for the benefit of the Estate and the dependants of the deceased, namely his father, mother and younger sister. The 2 plaintiff is the owner of the motorcycle and his claim is against the defendant for damages in relation to the motorcycle. At trial, liability was settled at 80% to the defendant and the matter proceeded for assessment. After hearing the evidence, I made certain awards and my grounds are as follows.

[2] There are five categories of claims – (i) general damages for pain and suffering; (ii) general damages for loss of dependency; (iii) special damages; (iv) damage to the motorcycle; and (v) bereavement. I will deal with them sequentially.

[3] This head of claim was predicated on the fact that the deceased, if conscious after the accident, would be in great pain. It was clear from the evidence of PW 5 Mr Tan Chan Hua, who witnessed the accident, that the deceased was conscious for at least 20 minutes after the accident and that he was in pain. In particular, the relevant extract from my notes of evidence read:

[4] Counsel for the 1 plaintiff asked that I award the sum of $15,000 and cited as authority the case of Anto Anthony Fedric Palamoothi (Unreported decision in DC Suit No 561 of 1996) in which the trial judge awarded $10,000. However, the case summary tendered does not elaborate on how long the deceased was conscious for. As such, I think that the decision of Lai Kew Chai J in See Ah Haw v Ong Hock Thian [1984 – 1985] SLR 442, the facts of which are stated by Woo Bih Li J in Tan Harry v Teo Chee Yeow [2004] 1 SLR 513, was more relevant. In that case, the deceased lived for a day before he died. Lai Kew Chai J had awarded $1,000 for pain and suffering. Given the circumstances here and allowing for inflation, I felt that a sum of $3,000 for pain and suffering would be appropriate.

[5] The issue here was as to the appropriate award to be made for the loss of dependency. Hence, the 1 plaintiff must show that the dependants have sustained some pecuniary loss as a result of the death of the deceased. The main complication here was that the deceased was a young man who had started a new job in the navy before his untimely death. As such, there was little evidence as to how much he would give to his dependants each month. However, it was clear over the past two years, the deceased was employed in a factory and he gave each of his parents $200 every month.

[6] The deceased’s father (PW2) gave evidence that his son told him that he intended to give $300 to each of his parents after he started working in the navy. The relevant extract from my notes read:

[7] Having carefully observed PW2’s demeanor in court, I saw no reason to doubt his testimony. He was clear and frank. His testimony was unshaken by cross-examination and I believed him when he told the court of the conversation that he had had with the deceased. Furthermore, I noted that an increase in the monthly payment to his parents was likely as the deceased was drawing a higher salary than before and his personal expenses were low since the Navy provided him with his meals while he was in training. Lastly, his salary would be increased after he finished the training,

[8] Similarly, I saw no reason to doubt that the deceased gave $175 to his mother (PW3) for household expenses and $150 per month to his sister (PW4). This can be seen from PW3’s testimony (whom I also found to be a credible witness) where she stated:

[9] What I found difficult to accept was counsel for the 1 plaintiff’s contention that the Court should award a higher multiplicand, as the deceased’s salary would increase significantly over the years. In particular, at paragraph 18 of his written submission, he stated that:

[10] The document that counsel referred to does not support this argument. What the document stated was that a ‘SWO’, which I understood to be a Senior Warrant Officer (the most senior non-commissioned officer rank in the Navy), would draw a salary of S$4,963 to S$6,441. I did not think it consonant with common sense to believe that the deceased would be promoted within four years of joining the Navy from the rank of lance corporal to the rank of Senior Warrant Officer, a jump of 10 ranks. Further, the evidence of PW 5 Tan Chan Hua and PW 6 Tan Chun Siong supported my view as they were recently promoted to the rank of 2 Sergeant (seven ranks below Senior Warrant Officer) after serving two years of their bond period.

[11] Hence, while I accepted that there would be an increase in the deceased’s monthly salary over time, it would not be of the scale that the counsel for the 1 plaintiff contends. Furthermore, even if the deceased’s salary did increase, this did not mean that he would necessarily have given more to his parents: on this, see Woo Bih Li J’s decision in Tan Harry at [17]. Lastly, I took into account the possibility of the deceased eventually marrying and the consequent expectation of a reduction in his contribution to his dependants. As such, I saw no basis to adopt the multiplicand of $700 suggested by counsel for the 1 plaintiff and preferred to adopt a multiplicand of $300 for each of his parents, $150 for the sister and $175 for household expenses.

[12] In relation to the appropriate multiplier to award, I followed the approach of Woo J in Tan Harry and Judith Prakash JC (as she then was) in Lim Fook Lau & Anor v Kepdrill International Incorporated SA [1993] 1 SLR 917 and calculated the multiplier from the date of death of the deceased. On that fateful day, the deceased was 25 years old, his father was 50 years old and his mother was 46 years old. The average life expectancy for a Singaporean male today is 77 years and 81 years for a female (see MOH’s website at http://www.moh.gov.sg/corp/publications/statistics/population.do). I took into account the possibility that the deceased may eventually get married with the possible termination in his contribution to his parents and further considered the decision of Yong Pung How CJ in Hong Kong Bank Trustee (Singapore) Ltd v Rajinder Singh [1992] 2 SLR 31 where Yong CJ used a multiplier of 8 in relation to a deceased who was single and 33 years old with a mother who was 56 years old at the time of the deceased’s death. As such, I adopted a multiplier of 10 and 12 for the father and mother respectively. As I saw no reason to distinguish between the allowance paid directly to his mother and the money paid to his mother for household expenses, I adopted a multiplier of 12 for that as well.

[13] As for the sister, she was 13 years old on the date of the death of the deceased. I accepted that the deceased would continue to provide her with an allowance until she reached 21 years of age and used a multiplier of 5 for her.

[14] Thus, I made the following awards for dependency:

[15] I should mention that counsel for the defendant’s reliance on the case of Tan Harry for the proposition that the value for the flat (which has now been fully paid out from the housing loan insurance) must be deducted from the dependency claim was completely misconceived. The headnote of that case clearly states at [5] that “sums payable on the death of the deceased under any contract of assurance or insurance, sums payable as a result of the death under the Central Provident Fund Act (Cap 121) and any pension or gratuity which is paid as a result of the death are not to be taken into account in assessing general damages on a dependency claim.” Furthermore, this case merely echoes the position stated in s 22(1)(a) Civil Law Act (Cap 43). As such, I failed to see how the case stood for the proposition that counsel sought to rely upon.

[16] With regards to the special damages, these claims related to the funeral expenses, the letter of administration and the medical expenses. The 1 plaintiff claimed the sums of $10,518.00, $2,945 and $100 respectively. Counsel for the defendant prayed that the sums of $7,000, $2,500 and $0 respectively be awarded instead.

[17] In respect of the funeral expenses, counsel for the 1 plaintiff stated in his written submissions that this amount was derived “by adding the receipts from pages 52 – 58 and 62 – 66 PBOD.” Having looked at these receipts, I noted that they were almost all in Mandarin and the 1 plaintiff had not provided the Court with translated copies. As such, I did not know what these documents were for. Furthermore, even if I assumed that these were all receipts for the funeral expenses, I did not understand how the sum of $10,518 was reached, for when I added up all the totals reflected on each receipt, I did not reach the sum of $10,518. As such, with regret, I held that the claim for $10,518 had not been proved and awarded the sum of $7,000 instead.

[19] This was the 2 plaintiff’s claim. For convenience, I set out below, in full, counsel for the 2 plaintiff’s written submissions on this issue.

[20] I had problems with these submissions. First, there was no proof that the 2 plaintiff had incurred this loss. All the documents tendered in support at PBOD 44 - 47 were marked attention to Mr Tan Chun Siong (the 2 plaintiff). Yet, he denied making payment. This can be seen from the exchange recorded in my notes that:

[23] Additionally, counsel for the 2 plaintiff did not address his claims for the survey fee and loss of use in his written submissions. I was not sure whether the 2 plaintiff had abandoned his claim in this respect. In any event, I did not know what proof the 2 plaintiff was relying on to show these losses especially since the only receipt that I could find on the survey fee (at PBOD 44) was again addressed to the 2 plaintiff whom as I had mentioned earlier had denied paying anything. Similarly, counsel did not refer me to any proof that there was a loss of use of eight days beside an estimate at PBOD 45 that the estimated time for repair was 8 days. The 2 plaintiff’s affidavit was completely silent on this point. Neither did counsel for the 2 plaintiff explain why $30 per day would be the appropriate sum for me to award. Moreover, since I had held that it would not have been reasonable for the 2 plaintiff to send his bike for repair, there was no reason to award him for the loss of use based on the number of days that the bike was being repaired. As such, since these claims was claimed as special damages and they had not been proved, I could not award anything to the 2 plaintiff for the survey fees and his loss of use.

[24] Lastly, I awarded the 1 plaintiff, by consent, a bereavement claim of $10,000 per s 21 of the Civil Law Act (Cap 43).

[25] In summary, I made the following awards in respect of the 1 plaintiff:

26. For the avoidance of doubt, I should add that these sums have not yet taken into account the fact that the defendant is only liable for 80% of the claim. I awarded interest at 6% per annum from the date of service of the writ to the date of judgment for the general damages for pain and suffering and interest at 3% per annum from the date of the accident to the date of judgment for the special damages. I also made consequential orders and orders as to costs.