Skip to content
Grounds publishedDecided 12 Feb 2016
Contents

High Court

Independent State of Papua New Guinea v PNG Sustainable Development Program Ltd

Feedback & support

[2016] SGHC 19Case no. HC/Originating Summons No 234 of 20156, 19 May; 30 July; 12 August 2015

What happened, in plain English

There is no plain-English summary of this judgment yet.

Ask about this judgment

Grounds of decision

Official text from eLitigation

  1. Introduction

  2. [1] In this originating summons (“OS 234” or “this OS”), the Plaintiff, the Independent State of Papua New Guinea (“the State”), seeks a declaration that it is entitled to inspect and take copies of all true accounts, books of account and/or records of the Defendant, PNG Sustainable Development Program Limited (“PNGSDP”). This OS is an offshoot of the action in Suit 795 of 2014 (“S 795”), having been commenced after a summons in S 795, which had prayed for the same relief, was dismissed on the ground that the relief prayed for, being final, had to be sought by way of an originating process rather than by an interlocutory application.

  3. [2] PNGSDP has mounted a root-and-branch attack on the State’s alleged right of inspection. Its argument that the State not entitled to the relief it seeks is threefold. First, it is inappropriate to commence this action by way of an originating summons. Secondly (and this is the most hotly contested ground), the State does not have and may not enforce any alleged right of inspection. In particular, it refutes the State’s three arguments, which are based on the Memorandum and Articles of PNGSDP, an alleged collateral contract incorporating the same, and estoppel. Thirdly, even if the State has an enforceable right of inspection, it does not extend to the documents listed in the Schedule to OS 234.

  4. Facts

  5. Parties to the dispute

  6. [3] The plaintiff is the Independent State of Papua New Guinea.

  7. [4] The defendant, PNGSDP, is a not-for-profit company limited by guarantee which was incorporated on 20 October 2001 in Singapore. It is also registered and operating in Papua New Guinea (“PNG”) as an overseas company. It is governed by its Memorandum of Association (“the MA”) and Articles of Association (“the AA”) (collectively “the M&A”), to which the New Rules of the PNG Sustainable Development Program (“the New Program Rules”) are annexed. PNGSDP has four members and its board of directors comprises eight international and Papua New Guinean directors and one independent Singapore director.

  8. Events leading to the incorporation of PNGSDP

  9. The history

  10. [5] In 1976, the State entered into an agreement with the predecessor of BHP Minerals Holdings Pty Ltd (“BHP”) setting out the parameters for the development of the Ok Tedi Mine (“the Mine”), a gold and copper mine in the Western Province of PNG. The terms of the agreement were reflected in the First Schedule to the Mining (Ok Tedi Agreement) Act 1976 (PNG). In accordance with the agreement, Ok Tedi Mining Limited (“OTML”), a company in which both BHP and the State were shareholders, was nominated in 1984 to undertake, construct, develop and operate the Mine. OTML’s primary assets were the Mine and the Special Mining Lease No 1, which afforded mining rights to OTML until 2022.

  11. [6] In 2001, BHP informed the State that it wished to close the Mine ahead of its scheduled mine life basically due to concerns regarding the environmental impact of the Mine. At the time, the shares in OTML were held in the following proportions:

  12. [7] After deliberation, the State informed BHP that the Mine had to continue operating in view of its potential to bring social and economic benefits to the State and, in particular, the people of the Western Province. BHP agreed to negotiate terms upon which the Mine would continue operations.

  13. [8] After 12 months of negotiations, an agreement was reached. This was essentially BHP’s exit plan: under the agreement, BHP would gift its interest in OTML to an independent third party so that mining could continue, in return for certain indemnities and protection from prosecution and a law would be passed to reflect the agreement. In December 2001, the Mining (Ok Tedi Mine Continuation (Ninth Supplement) Agreement Act 2001 (PNG) (“the 2001 Act”) was passed reflecting the agreement between the State and BHP Billiton Limited (“BHPB”), an entity which had been formed by a merger around June 2001 between BHP and Billiton plc. The main elements of this agreement included the following:

  14. (a) An independent company (ie, PNGSDP) would be incorporated in Singapore to hold BHPB’s shares in OTML.

  15. (b) PNGSDP would use the dividend stream from OTML for certain specified purposes and for the benefit of the people of PNG.

  16. (c) BHPB would be given protection against prosecution by the State and an indemnity by PNGSDP against any future proceedings for compensation resulting from the environmental damage caused by the operation of the Mine and this indemnity would be secured by PNGSDP’s assets.

  17. (d) PNGSDP was to operate its business in accordance with certain rules; it would invest one third of its annual dividends from OTML into a fund (“the Development Fund”) to be used for supporting development projects in PNG and the other two thirds into a long-term fund (“the LT Fund”) to be used for sustainable development purposes to benefit the people of PNG after the closure of the Mine.

  18. The formation and operations of PNGSDP

  19. [9] Shortly after the incorporation of PNGSDP in October 2001, the following agreements were entered into to carry into effect the agreement that had been reached between the State and BHPB:

  20. (a) a Master Agreement dated 11 December 2001 between the State, PNGSDP, BHPB, BHP, OTML and the two other shareholders in OTML (“the 2001 Master Agreement”);

  21. (b) a Deed of Indemnity dated 11 December 2001 between PNGSDP and BHPB (“the DOI (BHPB)”);

  22. (c) a Deed of Indemnity dated 11 December 2001 between PNGSDP and the State (“the DOI (State)”);

  23. (d) a Security Deed dated 7 February 2002 between PNGSDP, OTML and Insinger Trust (Singapore) Limited (“ITSL”) (“the Security Deed”);

  24. (e) a Security Trust Deed dated 7 February 2002 between PNGSDP, OTML, BHPB, and ITSL (“the Security Trust Deed”); and

  25. (f) an Equitable Mortgage of Shares dated 7 February 2002 between PNGSDP and ITSL.

  26. I will refer to the above documents, together with the M&A, as “the Transaction Documents”.

  27. [10] At its inception, PNGSDP was governed by the M&A and the Rules of the PNG Sustainable Development Program. (The aforesaid rules were replaced by the New Program Rules in April 2004.) In the words of Sir Mekere Morauta (“Sir Mekere”), who was PNG’s Prime Minister when PNGSDP was incorporated and who is currently the chairman of PNGSDP’s board of directors, safeguards were built into PNGSDP to ensure its corporate integrity. One such safeguard was the decision to incorporate PNGSDP in Singapore. This was, he says, partly motivated by the fact that PNGSDP would remain independent and unaffected by any potential change in the government of PNG. Other safeguards were built into the M&A, to which the State and BHPB specifically agreed, to ensure that funds from OTML would be used to promote sustainable development within PNG and advance the general welfare of its people. In Sir Mekere’s words, the M&A placed a particular emphasis on strong governance mechanisms, accountability and transparency. For example, board meetings could be quorate and board resolutions could be approved only with the blessings of at least one of each of the classes of directors (Class “A” directors were appointed by BHPB and Class “B” directors by certain organs or offices of the State: see Arts 24 and 38 of the AA).

  28. [11] What is important for the purpose of this OS are cl 9 of the MA, Art 52 of the AA and Rule 20 of the New Program Rules. They, loosely speaking, set out the State’s right of inspection and right to information:

  29. [12] PNGSDP began operations in 2002. That was also the year that Sir Mekere ceased to be Prime Minister of PNG. Since then, PNGSDP has committed the equivalent of US$430m to approximately 650 projects and programs in PNG and kept the Prime Minister regularly updated on the status of those projects. In 2004, the members of PNGSDP adopted the New Program Rules as part of the M&A, and this included a requirement for a triennial, independent review. PNGSDP has since undergone two such reviews: in 2007 and 2011.

  30. The disputes after the change in government

  31. [13] In August 2011, there was a change in the government of PNG. Mr Peter O’Neill (“Mr O’Neill”) took over as the Prime Minister. In 2012, Mr O’Neill was appointed Prime Minister again after a general election. It was also in 2012 that Sir Mekere retired from politics. Thereafter, disputes relating to PNGSDP arose. The State and PNGSDP paint diametrically opposed pictures of what happened. The State paints an image of a company gone rogue and determined to shut itself away from a government eager to ensure that funds are deployed properly for the benefit of its people. PNGSDP, on the other hand, paints an image of a company driven to desperate measures by a new (and corrupt) government intent on getting at its assets for less than noble means.

  32. [14] I begin with the State’s version of events. The State says that the new government began to review the manner in which PNGSDP was dealing with its assets. From that review, three main complaints emerged. First, it appeared to the State that PNGSDP had amended the M&A in October 2012, without the State’s consent, in ways which diluted the State’s oversight of PNGSDP. For example, the requirements for a meeting to be quorate and for a board resolution to be valid were changed and the Class “A” directors (which BHPB had nominated) could now appoint their own successors. Pursuant to these changes, Sir Mekere was appointed as an “A” director and chairman on 30 October 2012. On 1 October 2013, almost a year later, Sir Mekere was purportedly added as a member of PNGSDP. On 3 October 2013, the members of PNGSDP passed a further resolution purporting to amend the AA by deleting Art 24B (ie, removing the right of the State or its organs or offices to nominate “B” Directors). Secondly, PNGSDP transferred funds from the LT Fund to the General Fund and the Development Fund, allegedly in breach of the New Program Rules. It also ceased development programmes in PNG in October 2013 on the pretext that it was no longer able to fund the projects. However, at the end of 2012, the Development Fund and LT Fund contained US$158m and US$1.35b respectively. Thirdly (and this is more relevant to OS 234), PNGSDP refused to provide an account of its assets upon the State’s request made in March 2014 pursuant to cl 9 of the MA and Art 52 of the AA.

  33. [15] PNGSDP says quite the opposite. Sir Mekere says that PNGSDP had been acting on recommendations given at the second triennial review in 2011. BHPB had approached PNGSDP with a view to ceasing its nomination of “A” Directors and it was because no other organisations were interested in taking over the role of “A” Directors that PNGSDP and BHPB agreed to allow the incumbent “A” Directors to nominate their successors.

  34. [16] After Mr O’Neill took over as Prime Minister, Sir Mekere and Professor Ross Garnaut (“Prof Garnaut”) (the then-chairman of PNGSDP) met with him and informed him that Sir Mekere would be replacing Prof Garnaut as the chairman. Sir Mekere says that Mr O’Neill did not object. However, Sir Mekere says that it soon became apparent that the State was interested in getting at PNGSDP’s assets and, to this end, started to apply pressure on PNGSDP. On 24 October 2012 (around the same time when BHPB and PNGSDP were exploring the issue of succession planning for PNGSDP’s “A” Directors), Mr O’Neill publicly called on BHPB to transfer control over PNGSDP’s board appointments to the State. In November 2012, the State banned Prof Garnaut from entering PNG on the pretext that a statement he had made to the Australian press about the State’s actions was defamatory. In 2013, the State made known its intention to refuse to grant OTML’s application to extend the duration of the mining lease unless PNGSDP sold its shares in OTML to the State. However, negotiations for the sale of PNGSDP’s shares in OTML ended in stalemate. Eventually, on 19 September 2013, the PNG Government passed the Mining (Ok Tedi Tenth Supplemental Agreement) Bill 2013 and the Mining (Ok Tedi Mine Continuation) (Ninth Supplemental Agreement) (Amendment) Bill 2013, the effect of which was to:

  35. (a) cancel all 122,200,000 ordinary shares held by PNGSDP in OTML and issue 122,200,000 new and fully paid-up ordinary shares in OTML to the State;

  36. (b) grant the Prime Minister the discretion to declare whether compensation would be payable to any person in respect of the legislative amendments and, if so, the amount and terms of compensation;

  37. (c) give the State “all necessary powers to restructure” PNGSDP and its operations; and

  38. (d) amend the Fifth Restated Shareholders Agreement and nullify the charge created by the Equitable Mortgage of Shares Agreement between the Plaintiff and ITSL.

  39. (a) Sir Manasupe Zurenuoc, the Chief Secretary;

  40. (b) Mr Dairi Vele, the Secretary for Treasury; and

  41. (c) Dr Modowa Gumoi, the Provincial Administrator for the Western Province of PNG.

  42. The litigation history

  43. [17] The manoeuvres of both parties eventually led to litigation in Singapore. I will summarise the pertinent milestones in the proceedings to locate this OS within the broader context.

  44. OS 1036 of 2013 and its conversion to S 795/14

  45. [18] On 28 October 2013, PNGSDP filed OS 1036 of 2013 (“the original action”) against PNGSDP and the three members of the “Transitional Management Team” of PNGSDP purportedly appointed by the State on 24 October 2013.

  46. [19] PNGSDP sought two sets of reliefs. First, it sought declarations that the State’s purported removal of PNGSDP’s board of directors on 24 October 2013 was legally ineffective and that those directors retained full authority to manage PNGSDP’s affairs. Next, it sought injunctions restraining the second to fourth defendants from giving instructions in relation to PNGSDP’s property and the management of PNGSDP’s affairs.

  47. [21] In S 795, the State essentially alleges that there was a collateral contract between the State, PNGSDP and BHPB as contained in or evidenced by (inter alia) the M&A, the 2001 Act, the Master Agreement, the DOI (BHPB), the DOI (State), the Security Deed and the Security Trust Deed. One term of this alleged contract was that the structure and constitution of PNGSDP were specifically agreed between BHPB and the State. By this term oversight of PNGSDP was vested equally in BHP and the State (“the Agreed Oversight Structure”). Another term was that the Agreed Oversight Structure could not be amended without the consent of BHP and the State. The Agreed Oversight Structure allegedly provided, inter alia, that BHPB and the State are entitled to information in relation to PNGSDP and access to its books of account, accounting records and other records. These entitlements are allegedly borne out in cl 9, Art 52 and rule 20 of the New Program Rules. The State also alleges, based on PNGSDP’s object of promoting sustainable development within PNG and advancing the general welfare of her people (as set out in cl 3 of the MA), read with other parts of the M&A and New Program Rules and alleged admissions by PNGSDP, that PNGSDP is also a charitable purpose trust.

  48. [23] PNGSDP denies the State’s allegations and counterclaims for a declaration that the State’s purported removal of PNGSDP’s directors and CEO/managing director on or around 24 October 2013 is void and that they have full authority to manage its business.

  49. The injunction application

  50. [24] On 2 April 2014 (before the conversion of the original action), the State filed Summons 1669 of 2014 (the “injunction application”) against PNGSDP for an injunction restraining it from dealing with or disposing of certain assets, namely, the assets in the General Fund, the Development Fund and LT Fund, and its interests in various joint ventures and subsidiaries including OTML.

  51. (a) copies of its management accounts on a quarterly or more frequent basis;

  52. (b) copies of reports given by portfolio managers; and

  53. (c) to the extent that the information was not apparent from the management accounts, consolidated statements of PNGSDP’s assets and liabilities.

  54. Subsequently, I dismissed the application made by the State for leave to appeal against this decision.

  55. Applications for inspection

  56. [28] The State responded to that decision by filing this OS on 17 March 2015, as a stand-alone proceeding to obtain substantially the same reliefs as those sought in SUM 5440. PNGSDP has vigorously opposed this OS. The bulk of its submissions relate to whether the State has standing to inspect PNGSDP’s books. PNGSDP argues that the State has no rights either under the M&A or under any collateral contract, and any arguments it has as regards estoppel must fail. The State on the other hand argues that it must succeed, especially in light of the many admissions it says PNGSDP has made to the effect that the State has a right of inspection.

  57. Issues before this court

  58. [29] The central issues that arise are as follows:

  59. (a) whether the State has a right to inspect PNGSDP’s true accounts, and in particular:

  60. (i) whether the State may derive rights under the M&A of a company of which it is not a member;

  61. (ii) whether the State has a right of inspection under a collateral contract with PNGSDP; and

  62. (iii) whether PNGSDP is estopped from denying the State’s right of inspection; and

  63. (b) if so,

  64. (i) what classes of documents this right of inspection extends to; and

  65. (ii) whether this right of inspection includes the taking of copies.

  66. Issue 1: Whether the State used the appropriate originating process

  67. [30] This first issue is not a substantive issue per se, but it sets the stage against which the facts are to be found.

  68. [31] PNGSDP’s foremost objection is that this OS should have been commenced by way of a writ rather than an originating summons because there were disputes of fact. Its two main submissions on this point address two main lines of argument that have been advanced by the State, namely, the arguments on admissions (ie, estoppel) and the collateral contract. First, PNGSDP denies having made any admissions; it says that the statements in issue were mischaracterised as admissions and the issue of whether it made admissions is one that should be tested at trial. Secondly, the State denies that there is any pre-incorporation collateral contract that binds PNGSDP. In particular, it argues that the State has failed to provide evidence of the circumstances leading to the collateral contract, what the terms of the contract are, when the contract was formed, what the consideration was, who entered the contract purportedly on behalf of PNGSDP, and on what authority he or she entered the contract for PNGSDP. These issues, PNGSDP says, cannot be resolved by affidavit evidence. At a more fundamental level, PNGSDP argues that the State cannot, as it has done, rely on untested affidavits in interlocutory applications in other proceeding to apply for final relief. According to PNGSDP, the upshot of this is that reliefs which depend on findings of fact cannot be granted in this OS.

  69. [32] The State’s earlier position that the sole dispute was the proper construction of cl 9 and Art 52 was based on its position that its right of inspection had been admitted and has since been overtaken by its own collateral contract and estoppel argument. The State maintains that converting this OS to a writ action is unnecessary.

  70. [33] In my view, the mere fact that the State has used an originating summons is not fatal to its prayer for relief. It is true that an originating summons is appropriate where no substantial dispute of fact exists (O 5 rr 2–4 of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) (“ROC”)). If disputes of fact arise, the court still has the discretion to allow the originating summons to continue as such rather than converting it to a writ action. In that event, if the summons cannot be decided on the undisputed facts, it will have to be dismissed. In this case, in the light of the State’s position that the matter can proceed in its present form, disputes of fact may have to be resolved against them at this stage. However, as will become apparent, I think the relevant facts are either undisputed or ones which PNGSDP is estopped from denying. In particular, as regards the estoppel argument, I note that PNGSDP is not disputing that certain things were said, but only contends that they should not be characterised in a certain way.

  71. [34] As for PNGSDP’s argument that the affidavits relied on are untested interlocutory affidavits, this does not take it very far. The State filed, on 5 May 2015, a Notice of Intention to Refer to Sir Mekere’s first, second and third affidavits, Mr David Sode’s affidavit dated 18 June 2014 and Mr Timothy Reid’s affidavit dated 7 July 2014. The other affidavits on which it relies are exhibited in the affidavit of Chen Jie’an Jared filed on 17 March 2015 (the same date as the filing of this OS). The affidavits on which the State most heavily relies were filed on behalf of an adverse party. In this situation, PNGSDP can hardly complain that the affidavits are untested or that it was taken by surprise.

  72. Issue 2: Whether the State has a right to inspect all true accounts, books of account and/or records of PNGSDP

  73. [35] I turn now to the most substantive and fiercely contested issue in this OS. As mentioned, the State advances three main arguments:

  74. (a) the State has a right of inspection under the M&A itself;

  75. (b) the State has a right of inspection under a collateral contract comprising the terms of the M&A; and

  76. (c) the State has a right of inspection by virtue of estoppel (whether by representation or convention).

  77. Issue 2A: the M&A argument

  78. Under statute

  79. [36] I have concluded that there can be no right of inspection under the M&A itself. PNGSDP is generally correct to submit that the State, as a non-party to the M&A, has no standing to enforce the M&A even if it purports to confer rights on the State. The constitutional documents of a company form a contract between the company and its members inter se by virtue of s 39(1) of the Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed) (“the Act”), which reads:

  80. [37] The State argues that it does not follow from s 7(2) of the CRTPA that a non-member or a member not acting qua member has no standing to enforce the M&A. I agree: s 7(2) per se does not rule out the possibility that non-members of a company may nevertheless enjoy a common law right to enforce a company’s M&A. However, as I discuss below, I have not been able to find such a right at common law.

  81. At common law

  82. [38] As a general proposition, the common law has been extremely reluctant to consider the M&A otherwise than as a contract between the company and its members only. The classic decision is Hickman v Kent or Romney Marsh Sheepbreeders’ Association [1915] 1 Ch 881 (“Hickman”) at 900, in which Astbury J articulated three principles:

  83. [39] The State’s first objection to PNGSDP’s reliance on Hickman is that Hickman was concerned only with the question of whether there was a contract between a member and the company. This question corresponds to the third principle in the extract cited above; the other two principles – in particular the first, on which PNGSDP relies – were strictly speaking obiter. That may be true, but the law in Singapore on this point has not stood still. I will return to this point later.

  84. The local position

  85. [40] PNGSDP submits that Hickman represents the common law position in Singapore, as it has been followed by the Federal Court in Malayan Banking Ltd v Raffles Hotel Ltd [1965-1967] SLR(R) 161 (“Malayan Banking”) at [14] and by Lai Siu Chiu J in Guoh Sing Leong alias Quek Sing Leong the Administrator of the Estate of Guoh Koh Boey (deceased) v Hock Lee Amalgamated Bus Co (Pte) Ltd [1995] SGHC 279 (“Guoh Sing Leong”) at [53]. It was also more recently referred to by the Court of Appeal in Chee Kheong Mah Chaly v Liquidators of Baring Futures (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2003] 2 SLR(R) 571 (“Chaly Chee”) at [24].

  86. [41] The State submits that PNGSDP has not stated the law accurately. First, Malayan Banking is distinguishable. It concerned a situation where the defendant-appellant (Malayan Banking), to whom the plaintiff-respondent (Raffles Hotel) assigned the reversion of a lease, purported to appoint itself as a director of Raffles Hotel pursuant to Raffles Hotel’s Articles of Association and where Raffles Hotel later sought a declaration that this purported appointment was invalid. The State argues that this case is different in three aspects: it did not concern a situation where both company and non-member sought to enforce the M&A against each other; it did not deal with the issue of whether a non-member may enforce the M&A of a company limited by guarantee; and it did not consider a line of UK cases in which a director, though not party to the M&A qua director, was entitled to enforce the M&A. Secondly, Guoh Sing Leong concerned a case where the plaintiff, as administrator of his late father’s estate, sued a company for the balance of dividends due and payable on the shares that had been held by his late father. Lai Siu Chiu J held that the company was entitled, under its Articles of Association, to set-off any dividends payable to a member against any sums owing by that member to it. Thus, Lai J’s reference to Hickman was clearly obiter. Thirdly, the reference to Hickman in Chaly Chee was strictly speaking obiter because the question raised in that appeal was whether an article in the M&A had been incorporated into the contract between the respondent company and the appellants, who were the partners of the respondent’s audit firm.

  87. [42] In my view, Malayan Banking presents insuperable difficulties for the State on this issue as none of the three grounds on which the State seeks to distinguish it is valid.

  88. [43] First, Malayan Banking simply cannot be distinguished on the basis that Raffles Hotel did not seek to enforce its M&A against Malayan Banking. An attempt by A to enforce a right under the M&A against B cannot by that act give B a right under the M&A; it is at best evidence that A believes B to have obligations (and, by extension, rights) under the M&A. If Raffles Hotel had sought to enforce the M&A against Malayan Banking, Malayan Banking could have argued (as the State in this case could have) that, as a non-party to the M&A, it could not come under any obligations by virtue of the M&A. The point is that the proposition that non-members derive no rights under a company’s M&A was ratio, both in the High Court (Raffles Hotel Ltd v Malayan Banking Ltd (No 2) [1965] MLJ 262 at [20]–[32] per Winslow J) and in the Federal Court, and it applies squarely to the present case.

  89. [44] Secondly, a distinction founded on whether the company is limited by shares or by guarantee is a red herring. The State has gone too far in suggesting that the common law is or should be more lenient in affording rights to third parties where the company concerned is limited by guarantee (as opposed to shares) where there are effectively no real members. PNGSDP’s reply (with which I agree) is that there is no basis for any such distinction between a company limited by shares and one limited by guarantee. The principal distinction between these two types of companies concerns the liability of members. The legal differences between these two types of companies have been set out in the Act; in particular, ss 35(4) and 38 have listed the differences in the constitutional documents of companies limited by shares on one hand and companies limited by guarantee on the other. Section 38(1) in fact addresses the issue of provisions in M&As of companies limited by guarantee that purport to confer a right on non-members to divisible profits. In the light of these provisions, there is hardly any room to suggest that Parliament intended companies limited by guarantee to be treated differently from companies limited by shares in terms of the enforceability of other rights conferred on non-members.

  90. [45] Thirdly, I do not think that the developments in the common law suggest that the position in Malayan Banking should be considered afresh and reversed. Those cases (which I explain below at [49]–[62]) at most show that a member can enforce a right conferred by the M&A upon him in another capacity and that a non-member may enforce a right by virtue of a collateral contract.

  91. [46] The Malayan Banking decision was rendered by the Federal Court on 22 December 1965, ie, during what is often considered the “anomalous period” where the Federal Court still heard appeals from decisions of courts in independent Singapore. It seems to be well-accepted that decisions of the Federal Court on appeal from Singapore are binding on the basis that such decisions emanated from a court that was at the time of decision part of Singapore’s judicial system (see, eg, Mah Kah Yew v Public Prosecutor [1968-1970] SLR(R) 851 (HC) at [12]–[16] per Wee Chong Jin CJ; Ng Sui Nam v Butterworth & Co (Publishers) Ltd [1987] SLR(R) 171 (CA) at [50]; Chin Seow Noi v Public Prosecutor [1993] 3 SLR(R) 566 (CA) at [48] per Yong Pung How CJ; and Freight Connect (S) Pte Ltd v Paragon Shipping Pte Ltd [2015] 5 SLR 178 at [53]–[54]). Thus, I am bound by Malayan Banking as a matter of stare decisis.

  92. [47] The State calls in aid that the Hickman principles have “given rise to much academic debate” and “may not be wholly desirable” (Walter Woon on Company Law (Tan Cheng Han SC gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, Revised 3rd Ed, 2009) (“Walter Woon”) at paras 4.50–4.52) and have been outflanked by cases which have let members enforce rights afforded to it in other capacities. In my view, these do not bring the State very far. Those cases (and the corresponding comments in Walter Woon) relate to the second principle in Hickman (which states that a member may only enforce a right in the M&A qua member). In any event, these cases may now be explained on the basis that a member has a right to require the company to act in accordance with its M&A even if the result would be indirectly to protect a right given to him in another capacity.

  93. The position in other common law jurisdictions

  94. [48] In my view, PNGSDP is correct to submit that the position in Hickman is representative of the law in other major common law jurisdictions. A closer look at the decisions from each jurisdiction shows that the Hickman position is, without exception, good law.

  95. (I) United Kingdom

  96. [49] PNGSDP’s point is essentially that Hickman remains good law in the UK and the Company Law Review recommended leaving the law as it was. Paul L Davies, Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 8th Ed, 2008) at paras 3-16 and 3-17 summarises the law at some length but I cite only a short passage below:

  97. [50] The State cited five English cases (two of which were decided after Hickman) which it says suggest that directors can enforce the M&A even though they are not party to it qua director. Having considered them, I think they do not support the State’s stand. In every case, the director deriving a right or coming under an obligation by virtue of the M&A was in fact a member of the company and the court was also careful to state that such rights and obligations arose by virtue of membership and not directorship.

  98. [51] The cases are Pulbrook v Richmond Consolidated Mining Co (1878) 9 Ch D 610, Imperial Hydropathic Hotel Co, Blackpool v Hampson (1882) 23 Ch D 1, Salmon v Quin & Axtens Limited [1909] 1 Ch 311, Hayes v Bristol Plant Hire Ltd [1957] 1 All ER 685, and, finally, Rayfield v Hands and others [1960] Ch 1. In this last case, the M&A of the company provided that “[e]very member who intends to transfer shares shall inform the directors who will take the said shares equally between them at a fair value …” Vaisey J held that the directors were bound to purchase the plaintiff shareholder’s shares upon notice from him. Most crucially, it was made plain (at 6) how the defendant directors were so bound:

  99. (II) Australia

  100. [52] PNGSDP also points out that Hickman represents the position in Australia, citing Magill v Santina Pty Ltd [1983] 1 NSWLR 817 (“Magill v Santina”) and Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Fuelbanc Australia Limited [2007] FCA 960 (“ASIC v Fuelbanc”) as authority. The State’s reply is that the issue of whether the M&A of a company confers a contractual right enforceable by a non-member did not arise in either case.

  101. [53] The State is correct only in so far as Magill v Santina is concerned. However, in ASIC v Fuelbanc, what the Federal Court said on this issue was very much part of its ratio. The ultimate issue in that case was whether the defendants had contravened s 601ED(5) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Australia) by operating an unregistered managed investment scheme. In concluding that the defendants had been operating a managed investment scheme as defined in s 9 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Australia), the court considered that para (d) of that definition, which exempted a “body corporate” from the scheme, did not apply. Heerey J had this to say:

  102. [54] It appears that the position articulated in Hickman v Kent is entrenched in Australian law. The Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia came to the same conclusion in Marketing Advisory Services (MAS) v Football Tasmania Ltd (2002) 42 ACSR 128. The conservative position as regards a company’s M&A has also found favour with the High Court of Australia in Bailey v New South Wales Medical Defence Union Ltd (1995) 132 ALR 1 and with Australian texts more generally. The Australian authorities can be of no assistance to the State.

  103. (III) Hong Kong

  104. [55] The third jurisdiction I consider is Hong Kong. PNGSDP submits that Moulin Global Eyecare Holdings Ltd v Olivia Lee Sin Mei [2010] 2 HKLRD 1096 (“Moulin Global”) is authority for the proposition that a company’s M&A affords no rights to third parties. The State’s reply is that this case failed to consider John v Price Waterhouse [2002] 1 WLR 953 (“John v PW”) and also reached a different conclusion from that of the Singapore court in Chaly Chee.

  105. [56] Moulin Global concerned cross-appeals against a striking-out application against the plaintiff company by the defendant, its director. The company brought suit against the director for alleged breaches of director’s duties. The director in turn relied, inter alia, on the plaintiff company’s bye-laws (which was in this case its articles) indemnifying her in respect of non-wilful conduct. The Court of Appeal decided that the director’s action should not be struck out. In so concluding, Rogers V-P (with whom Tang V-P and Le Pichon JA agreed) decided that whether the bye-laws had been incorporated into a deed of indemnity entered into between the company and director was a matter that should proceed to trial. For present purposes, what is more important is Rogers V-P’s other holding:

  106. [57] The case of John v PW does nothing for the State here since the rights of the non-member (in that case, the auditors) arose by virtue of a collateral contract. That is an argument for later.

  107. (IV) Malaysia

  108. [58] The fourth jurisdiction which PNGSDP says has adopted the position in Hickman is Malaysia, as seen in RHB Bank Ltd v Pharmmalaysia Bhd [1998] 7 MLJ 753. In this case, the plaintiff brought an action against the defendant company to enforce its M&A, ie, to compel the company to split a share certificate subsequent to the sale of some shares which had been the subject of that share certificate. An issue as to its standing arose because the shares were registered not in its name but in its nominee’s name. The State submits that judgment was found in the plaintiff’s favour in this case, as the court rejected the company’s technical argument (ie, that the proper party should be the plaintiff’s nominee) by saying that the plaintiff’s nominee could be joined as a co-plaintiff. This argument does not bring the State very far. The plaintiff there was in fact purporting to enforce a right in the M&A which had been granted qua member to a member, namely, its nominee. However, in the present case, the State is simply attempting to enforce the M&A as a third party; it is not exercising a right in the M&A conferred on a nominee.

  109. (V) Canada

  110. [59] The fifth jurisdiction which PNGSDP says has adopted the position in Hickman is Canada, as seen in James Young v The Newfoundland Dried Squid Exporters Association, Limited [1950] 2 DLR 772. For present purposes, what is pertinent is Dunfield J’s pronouncement at [40]–[42] that the M&A may be enforced by a member qua member only. In holding this, Dunfield J was guided by Hickman. Accordingly, the Canadian position is of no help to the State as far as this issue is concerned.

  111. (VI) New Zealand

  112. [60] The State’s last hope may be found in a decision of the New Zealand Supreme Court, Woodlands, Limited v Logan [1948] NZLR 230 (“Woodlands”), which it says stands for the proposition that a non-member may have rights in the M&A. This case requires a closer look.

  113. [61] There, one Mr Lowry had been appointed as the plaintiff company’s managing director. He was entitled under Art 18(e) of the company’s M&A to appoint a successor by will, failing which the executors and trustees of his will were apparently entitled to do so under Art 18(f). The relevant parts of Art 18 provided:

  114. [62] With respect, it is unclear what Cornish J had in mind. At face value, Woodlands supports the proposition that non-members may enforce rights supposedly conferred on them if they may do so by self-help and without resorting to legal proceedings, but not otherwise. However, Woodlands differs from the present case. Woodlands was not a case of a non-member trying to enforce a right against an unwilling company. Notwithstanding the fact that the non-member (the executors and trustees of the late Mr Lowry’s will) was named as the first defendant, the case was really one which concerned a dispute between two groups of shareholders (the second and third defendants) regarding the effect of a non-member’s conduct on the contract as between themselves. As such, the case did not venture beyond the bounds of Hickman v Kent. This view can also be seen from the prefatory remarks by Cornish J at 234:

  115. [63] None of the authorities in the common law jurisdictions I have considered show that third parties can derive rights from the M&A, and the State’s argument based on the M&A itself must therefore fail.

  116. Issue 2B: The collateral contract argument

  117. [64] The next main argument run by the State is that there was a collateral contract which gives the State a right to inspect PNGSDP’s books. I should note that part of the collateral contract argument rests on whether an estoppel may be raised – this is an issue I discuss below.

  118. [65] Even though the M&A itself does not afford rights to third parties, the State is correct that an enforceable collateral contract may exist between the company and third parties that incorporate the M&A of that company as part of its terms. This point is relatively uncontroversial. It can be seen, for example, from Moulin Global and Young v Newfoundland Dried Squid Exporters Assn. It can also be seen from In re Anglo-Austrian Printing and Publishing Union [1892] 1 Ch 158 (CA) and In re New British Iron Company [1898] 1 Ch 324 (where the Court held that the M&A was enforceable by non-member directors as its provisions were embodied in the contract between the company and the director), as well as in Chaly Chee at [22]–[24] and John v PW at [26] (where the auditor was entitled to enforce the indemnity provisions in the relevant M&A on the basis of its contract of engagement with the company).

  119. [66] The State’s case on the collateral contract is that the alleged contract has the following attributes:

  120. (a) the contract was made between the State, BHPB and PNGSDP;

  121. (b) its terms are in the provisions of the M&A;

  122. (c) the agreement was reached at the time of PNGSDP’s incorporation and would have come into existence by 19 October 2001 (being the date on which the terms of the M&A were finalised and signed by PNGSDP’s first two subscribers) or, at the latest, on 20 October 2001 (being the date of PNGSDP’s incorporation); and

  123. (d) it is collateral to the M&A itself.

  124. Preliminary sub-issue: whether a finding of a collateral contract here will create an issue estoppel in S 795

  125. [67] During the hearing I expressed concern that an issue estoppel will be raised if there is a finding in this OS that a collateral contract exists. I suggested that this OS be heard and decided at the same time as S 795. The State was not agreeable to this proposal and indicated that it preferred for this OS to be heard independently. I am, therefore, deciding this OS on the basis of the facts before me at this stage. The impact, if any, that my decision here may have on the arguments and evidence and decision in S 795 is something that will have to be dealt with when that matter comes on for hearing. I do not propose to consider it now.

  126. Whether the requirements for a collateral contract were satisfied

  127. [68] It is common ground between the parties that a collateral contract requires a promissory (rather than representational) statement, certainty of terms, separate consideration and intention to be legally bound (Goldzone (Asia Pacific) Ltd (formerly known as Goldzone (Singapore) Ltd v Creative Technology Centre Pte Ltd [2011] SGHC 103 (“Goldzone”) at [45]).

  128. [69] The parties have stated some general principles regarding collateral contracts that should be borne in mind:

  129. (a) The key motif and advantage of collateral contracts generally is the ability to achieve a substantively just and fair result (Ang Sin Hock v Khoo Eng Lim [2010] 3 SLR 179 (“Ang Sin Hock”) at [75]).

  130. (c) There is also the supposed danger of commercial uncertainty, which makes courts generally reluctant to find a collateral contract (it being a finding of last resort) and requiring clear proof that the requirements of a binding contract have been met (Dynasty Line Ltd (in liquidation) v Sukamto Sia and another appeal [2014] 3 SLR 277 (“Dynasty Line”) at [18]).

  131. (1) Whether a collateral contract was precluded by the Transaction Documents

  132. [70] The foremost attack advanced by PNGSDP is that the alleged collateral contract is precluded by the Transaction Documents. It relies on Dynasty Line at [23]–[24], where the court stated that a collateral contract that precedes the main agreement would be rendered void if the latter contained a term inconsistent with the former and, in particular, if the latter contained an entire agreement clause.

  133. [71] On the basis that the collateral contract preceded the main contract, PNGSDP argues that the Transaction Documents preclude the existence of the collateral contract. I think PNGSDP’s view is wrong.

  134. [72] PNGSDP first relies on cl 8.7 of the Master Agreement to argue that the M&A confers no rights on the State. This reads:

  135. [73] PNGSDP next relies on cl 12 of the DOI (State), an entire agreement clause, to argue that any collateral contract would be precluded. The clause provides:

  136. [74] I thus take the view that the Transaction Documents do not preclude the existence of a collateral contract of the type asserted by the State.

  137. (2) Whether there was consensus

  138. [75] The State argues that there was agreement on the terms. Given that the alleged terms of the contract are those found in the M&A and that the contract was a pre-incorporation contract, this element seems relatively uncontroversial as a brief recapitulation of the facts will make clear. It is undisputed that in early 2001, BHP indicated an intention to exit as a shareholder in OTML. The formation of PNGSDP on 20 October 2001 resulted from negotiations between the State and BHPB (by this time, BHP had merged with Billiton plc to become BHPB). The very fact that PNGSDP was incorporated must have meant that the State and BHPB had agreed on the terms of the M&A. This much was also admitted in Sir Mekere’s second affidavit. In my view, the State and BHPB would have purported to contract on PNGSDP’s behalf because they must have intended PNGSDP to be bound by the obligations in the M&A.

  139. [76] The State argues that the terms are sufficiently certain and PNGSDP has not taken issue with this point.

  140. [77] What PNGSDP takes issue with is that the alleged terms were not promissory or contractual in nature and effect. To this end, it relies on Lemon Grass Pte Ltd v Peranakan Place Complex Pte Ltd [2002] 2 SLR(R) 50 (“Lemon Grass”). There, the plaintiff operated a restaurant in premises leased from the defendant. A doorway leading to a corridor separated the restaurant from an adjacent café. This doorway was used by the plaintiff’s patrons as a short cut to the toilets until the tenants who took over from the café sealed up that part of the corridor. The plaintiff sued, alleging, inter alia, a collateral contract giving the plaintiff the right of access through the corridor on the basis of representations made by the defendant’s director, one Mr Ong. This was rejected by Belinda Ang Saw Ean JC (as she then was), who held:

  141. [78] In my view, PNGSDP’s argument is ill-conceived. The statements which PNGSDP says do not have contractual effect are not part of the contract; they are supposedly admissions or subsequent conduct which amount to evidence of an earlier contract. The statements which are actually relevant are the clauses, articles and rules contained in the M&A; those are promissory in nature. PNGSDP’s strongest argument in this respect is perhaps that the agreement was not that PNGSDP would owe the State a contractual duty to comply with the terms of the M&A, but simply that PNGSDP would be incorporated on those terms. However, such an argument would fail to account for PNGSDP’s conduct which I examine at [96]–[121] below.

  142. (3) Whether a collateral contract can exist even if its date of creation cannot be precisely identified

  143. [79] PNGSDP stated in its earlier submissions that the State could not identify a date on which the collateral contract was entered into. Based on this, it made two main arguments. First, the fact that the State’s case was unclear raised factual disputes that made it inappropriate for the matter to be heard as an originating summons. Secondly, PNGSDP could not respond properly to the State’s case.

  144. [80] A failure to identify the creation of a contract would mean a failure to identify the date on which the agreement was given. However, this is a non- issue. First, in its latest submissions, the State has stated clearly its case that the collateral contract would have come into existence by 19 October 2001 (ie, the date on which the terms of the M&A were finalised and signed by PNGSDP’s first two subscribers) or, at the latest, on 20 October 2001 (ie, the date of PNGSDP’s incorporation). Read charitably, this could be said to be consistent with its previous submissions which stated that agreement was given “at the formation of” PNGSDP. Secondly, the particulars are sufficient. It appears that stating the date of the alleged agreement is a requirement of pleading rather than a substantive legal requirement (since it overlaps with acceptance). In Singapore Civil Procedure 2015 (G P Selvam ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 2015) at para 18/12/5, it was written:

  145. (4) Whether there was separate consideration

  146. [81] The issue of whether the State provided good consideration for PNGSDP’s promise to allow inspection of its documents is a thorny one in this case. The parties accept that a collateral contract requires separate consideration but the State, relying on Lemon Grass at [119], says that such consideration is easily proven.

  147. [82] The State’s primary argument is that consideration is provided for by the subsequent incorporation of PNGSDP on the provisions of the M&A. The State argues, in the alternative, that consideration moved from the various parties to the agreement in the following fashion:

  148. (a) BHP was able to transfer its shares in OTML to PNGSDP to exit the Mine;

  149. (b) the State was able to ensure the continued operation of the Mine;

  150. (c) the State (pursuant to the Ninth Supplemental Act) forbore from pursuing civil, administrative or criminal actions in respect of any environmental claims it may have had against BHPB; and

  151. (d) PNGSDP indemnified the State and BHP for any environmental claims.

  152. [83] PNGSDP takes issue with the primary argument on the basis that this would have been a pre-incorporation contract which had not been ratified in accordance with s 41 of the Act. This argument will be dealt with below. However, PNGSDP does not otherwise seem to dispute that causing the incorporation of PNGSDP is good consideration. There may be discomfort about the fact that the consideration given for a company’s promise is the incorporation of that company, in other words, that one is contracting with a non-entity for its creation. However, I think the objections fall away upon scrutiny. Such alleged consideration moving from the State appears to be a detriment to it in so far as it is put to expense in causing the incorporation of PNGSDP. Although the State is a promoter of PNGSDP, a promoter has no legal duty to bring into existence a company it promotes even if it is said to be a fiduciary of the company. Sufficiency of consideration is, accordingly, not a problem. What is more questionable is whether the requirement that consideration be requested by the promisor is met. In this case, it would be strange to say that, prior to its incorporation, a company has asked for its incorporation as consideration for a promise made by it. This difficulty can, however, be overcome if one considers that the more appropriate (and natural) analysis is that the consideration was asked for by a party contracting on the (pre-incorporated) company’s behalf qua promoter. After all, promoters of companies may purport to enter contracts on behalf of pre-incorporated companies, which may then ratify such contracts upon incorporation (s 41 of the Act).

  153. (5) Whether there was intention to be legally bound

  154. [84] Another of PNGSDP’s objections is that there was no intention to be bound, which is a requirement for a legally binding collateral contract (Goldzone at [46]). The State appears to be arguing that the requisite intention was present as the collateral contract formed part of the suite of agreements (including the M&A and the other Transaction Documents) which were entered into as a result of negotiations between the State and BHPB and which appeared to be legally binding in the sense that both parties intended that if “the contract was not honoured subsequently, the aggrieved party could invoke the assistance of the court” (Gay Choon Ing v Loh Sze Ti Terence Peter and another appeal [2009] 2 SLR(R) 332 (“Gay Choon Ing”) at [71]). PNGSDP appears to make three arguments. First (and in an earlier set of submissions), the State’s consistent characterisations of PNGSDP’s conduct as “admissions” relates to an admission as to a pre-existing state of affairs, ie, that the State may enforce the M&A despite being a non-member and does not suggest how the collateral contract was intended to be binding. Secondly, even if the M&A and Transaction Documents are binding on the parties thereto, the State has not shown how the separate collateral contract itself was intended to be binding; in fact, it was not an oversight that the Transaction Documents did not provide for the alleged rights to be legally binding. Thirdly, cl 8.7 of the Master Agreement contemplates that third parties cannot derive rights under it.

  155. [85] The law recognises however that there is a presumption of contractual intention which is raised in a commercial setting (Gay Choon Ing at [72]; Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corp Ltd v Jurong Engineering Ltd [2000] 1 SLR(R) 204 (“HSBC v Jurong Engineering”) at [43]). This presumption can be displaced by clear evidence and the onus is a heavy one (Edwards v Skyways Ltd [1964] 1 WLR 349 at 355 per Megaw J). Often, the evidence required is an express exclusion (eg, “honour clauses” in Rose & Frank Co v J R Crompton and Brothers, Limited [1923] 2 KB 261); an implied exclusion of contractual intent is found in narrow circumstances, eg, where the alleged terms of the contract are uncertain or incomplete (HSBC v Jurong Engineering at [56]). This is not the case here, especially since PNGSDP did not even try to argue that the terms of the contract were uncertain. PNGSDP has admitted that the Transaction Documents and M&A bind the parties thereto but says the State has not discharged its onus of showing “clear evidence” that a collateral contract was not meant to be binding. I do not think that PNGSDP’s first argument on the characterisation of PNGSDP’s conduct as admissions adds anything substantial to its argument. I have already expressed my views on cl 8.7 of the Master Agreement above. The only point worth making is that such an entire agreement clause is not found in the M&A; the analysis might be different if the M&A itself had a clause stating that third parties may derive no rights under it.

  156. [86] In the circumstances, I think that a valid contract has been made between the State and BHPB.

  157. Ratification

  158. [87] As the State’s primary case is that the collateral contract was made no later than the day on which PNGSDP was incorporated, an issue arises as to whether the contract was ratified by PNGSDP. In this regard, s 41(1) of the Act provides that:

  159. [88] PNGSDP raises two main objections. First, there was no pre-incorporation contract which could have been entered into on behalf of PNGSDP, as the State and BHPB were parties in their own right and there is no evidence to show that the only other possible contracting party (ie, the subscriber, DrewCorp Services Pte Ltd (“DrewCorp”)) had acted on PNGSDP’s behalf. Secondly, even if such a contract existed, it was not ratified. The collateral contract was not the M&A per se and what the State has done is to rely on PNGSDP’s conduct and statements to contrive a case of ratification.

  160. [89] PNGSDP’s first objection misses the point, as the State has clarified its position that DrewCorp was never a party to the collateral contract; it was simply discharging its professional duties by acting on the instructions of BHPB and the State, from whose agreement PNGSDP ultimately came about. The collateral contract could be and was in fact entered on PNGSDP’s behalf by the State and/or BHPB. That they could is, the State says, borne out in Rafferty v Madgwicks [2012] FCAFC 37 (“Rafferty”), where two promoters of a company were inferred to have entered a pre-incorporation contract that bound the company.

  161. [90] The dispute in Rafferty concerned a business venture to manufacture and sell certain goods entered into by two groups of persons who, for convenience, were represented by Mr Rafferty and Mr Donovan respectively. The business venture was established by three instruments: a Heads of Agreement (“HOA”), a Joint Venture and Shareholders’ Agreement (“JVSA”) and a Rights Agreement (“RA”). The issue was whether T2W, the company which was incorporated subsequently, was a party to the HOA. The relevant passages read:

  162. [91] The State says that BHPB and the State must have been contracting on PNGSDP’s behalf, considering the circumstances leading to PNGSDP’s incorporation, the rights conferred by PNGSDP on BHPB and the State and PNGSDP’s subsequent conduct and admissions. In rebuttal, PNGSDP argues that the State’s reliance on Rafferty is misplaced because the present action is an originating summons and, crucially, the court is unable to make three findings of fact that the court in Rafferty did. These were that certain parties were the promoters of the company, that the promoters had entered into an express written agreement, and that the written agreement expressly contemplated that the company would establish a business venture.

  163. [92] In my view, it is possible to say that the State and BHPB entered a collateral contract in their own right and on behalf of PNGSDP. It is possible to infer on the facts that BHPB and the State were promoters of the company. A “promoter” is not defined in the Act and judicial definitions have varied, but for present purposes I think it suffices to say that the State (or BHPB) is “one who undertakes to form a company with reference to a given project and to set it going, and who takes the necessary steps to accomplish this purpose” (Twycross v Grant (1877) 2 CPD 469 at 541 per Cockburn CJ). It is hard to see why the State and BHPB would not be promoters. Next, PNGSDP is right if there was no written agreement contemplating that the company would establish some business venture. However, this problem is easily overcome. The collateral contract in this case may not itself be written, but it is based on a written document, in this case the constitution of PNGSDP. There is one last concern in Rafferty which I highlight. The court said that Mr Donovan and Mr Rafferty were, under the HOA, to hold the shares in and constitute the directors of the new company (at [142]). In this case, neither the State nor BHPB ever became members of PNGSDP. This, however, does not present much difficulty considering the circumstances under which PNGSDP was formed. PNGSDP was formed as part of BHPB’s exit plan from the Mine and while PNGSDP was meant to be operationally independent of the State, it was contemplated that the State would retain some oversight. Ultimately, this was just a factor going towards the question of whether the State and BHPB could have been contracting on behalf of (the pre-incorporated) PNGSDP at the time of contract.

  164. [93] The State’s reply to PNGSDP’s second objection (ie, lack of ratification) seems unsatisfactory. The State simply repeats its position, to which PNGSDP has already objected. In my view, however, ratification can, in the circumstances here, be implied. PNGSDP has, through its conduct, considered the obligation to permit inspection to be binding on it. In my view, such conduct could not be explained on the basis that the company was acting under a misapprehension that it was obliged to respect third party rights under the M&A because at that stage it was aware that third parties enjoyed no rights under the M&A. The source of the obligation had to be somewhere other than the M&A itself – the most plausible explanation by far is that the source of this obligation was a collateral contract which included a right of inspection as part of its terms. PNGSDP is, in my judgment, estopped from asserting otherwise. This will become clearer in my discussion on estoppel below.

  165. Issue 2C: The estoppel argument

  166. [94] The third line of argument raised by the State is, essentially, that PNGSDP had made admissions on which the State relied to its detriment and from which it would be inequitable to allow PNGSDP to resile; accordingly, PNGSDP is estopped from denying the State’s right of inspection. This argument took shape only in the third and fourth round of submissions and, even so, remains unclear. The State appears to be relying on estoppel as a cause of action. The traditional view is, of course, that estoppel cannot be so used except in the case of proprietary estoppel. That species of estoppel is not involved here. Since I have found that there is a collateral contract, it is not necessary for me to decide whether there is present here any type of estoppel that is capable of granting the plaintiff a cause of action. Thus, the discussion on estoppel that follows is conducted strictly in the context of whether PNGSDP is estopped from denying ratification of the collateral contract. The kinds of estoppel that will be considered in this connection are estoppel by representation and estoppel by convention. I will first consider whether the elements of the same exist in this case.

  167. Whether there was a representation (or a shared assumption on the basis of which parties conducted themselves)

  168. [95] The State relies on a whole series of matters which allegedly show that PNGSDP admitted that the State had a right of inspection. The matters raised comprise affidavits, submissions, pleadings, correspondence and conduct over a 17-month period.

  169. (1)(I) The original action (OS 1036 of 2013)

  170. [96] The first two alleged admissions relate to the institution of the original action on 28 October 2013.

  171. [97] First, there is the very fact that PNGSDP commenced the original action seeking relief in respect of the M&A and, crucially, naming the State as the defendant in that action. The State submits that PNGSDP must have thought that the M&A was enforceable by PNGSDP as against the State for it to have named the State as defendant and, correspondingly, it must have accepted that the M&A was enforceable against PNGSDP by the State. PNGSDP submits that it was not trying to enforce the M&A against the State or asking the court to prescribe or proscribe the State’s conduct; instead, it was simply seeking a declaration that its board of directors was entitled to manage it.

  172. [98] On balance, I think the institution of the original action was not equivocal. PNGSDP’s prayers for injunctive relief and for a declaration that the State’s purported removal of PNGSDP’s board of directors is legally ineffective are not inconsistent with PNGSDP’s denial of the State’s alleged right of inspection. However, this is less true of the prayers for declarations that the then-directors of PNGSDP retained full authority to manage its business, that PNGSDP may not be restructured in a manner inconsistent with its M&A, and that PNGSDP’s assets shall be applied in accordance with its M&A. In these aspects, PNGSDP arguably fails to address the State’s point, ie, that PNGSDP must have named the State as the defendant because it intended the outcome of the OS to be binding on the State and, consequently, it must have believed or at least accepted that the State had a right to enforce the M&A against it.

  173. [99] Next, the State points to Sir Mekere’s first affidavit, which was also sworn on 28 October 2013:

  174. (1)(II) S 795, the summons for amendment and the appeal

  175. [100] When the original action was converted to S 795 on 25 July 2014, PNGSDP filed pleadings which the State says contained admissions of its right to inspect. To give some context, the State’s Statement of Claim reads:

  176. [102] However, events then took an interesting turn. After commencement of this OS, PNGSDP filed an application in S 795 to amend the Defence and Counterclaim there to remove what were alleged to have been admissions. These amendments were allowed by the Assistant Registrar on 9 June 2015 and I upheld that decision on appeal. The amendments, however, do not render moot the State’s arguments that the Defence and Counterclaim contain admissions. First, the amendments cannot erase the fact that PNGSDP once pleaded that the State had the right to inspect its true accounts. I do not think that it is a good enough reason to say that these amendments were made because the State was mischaracterising them in SUM 5440 (the State’s summons to inspect PNGSDP’s accounts). Secondly, the circumstances in which the amendments were allowed are crucial. The gist of the State’s claim in S 795 is not that the State has a right of inspection, but that there is an agreement which contains the Agreed Oversight Structure. The amendment was allowed as it would help to enable the true controversy in the suit to be decided and as it caused no irreparable prejudice in S 795. Thirdly, PNGSDP has kept its prayer for a declaration at para 96(b) of its Defence and Counterclaim (Amendment No 1), which reads:

  177. (2) SUM 1669 – the injunction application

  178. [103] The next set of alleged admissions relates to PNGSDP’s conduct in relation to the State’s application for an injunction to restrain PNGSDP from dealing with or disposing of the assets in its various funds.

  179. [104] The State first points to Sir Mekere’s second affidavit, which was sworn on 22 April 2014 and for the purposes of resisting the injunction application:

  180. [105] Next, the State submits that Mr Nish Shetty, counsel for PNGSDP, admitted at the hearings of the injunction application on 28 May 2014 and 30 July 2014 that the State was entitled to information from PNGSDP’s books and records and, crucially, that this admission was material in the court’s decision to dismiss the State’s prayer for an injunction. The State relies on the following excerpt from the 28 May 2014 Notes of Arguments:

  181. [106] It is notable that by this time Mr Shetty was aware of the legal consequences of the State being a non-party to the M&A. This can be seen from PNGSDP’s submissions tendered on 28 April 2014:

  182. (3) The actual inspection of documents in September 2014

  183. [107] The third set of admissions is a series of correspondence between the parties’ solicitors which culminated in an actual inspection of certain documents at PNGSDP. The State says that the correspondence between the parties shows that PNGSDP effectively admitted the State’s right of inspection. The salient portions are reproduced below:

  184. (a) First, the State’s solicitors (whom I shall call WP) wrote on 6 August 2014 for the exercise of the rights of inspection under cl 9 and Art 52. The relevant paragraphs read:

  185. In response, PNGDSP’s solicitors (whom I shall call CL) did not dispute that the right to inspection existed; instead, they simply wrote to inform WP that they were taking instructions and in the meantime their client’s rights were reserved.

  186. (b) Secondly, WP wrote again on 18 August 2014 asserting that the State’s right of inspection under cl 9 and Art 52 was undisputed and pressured CL to respond. WP wrote:

  187. CL’s reply on 19 August 2014 did not dispute the State’s right of inspection, but asserted instead that PNGSDP’s directors were entitled under Art 52 to determine the conditions under which an inspection pursuant to cl 9 could be made. CL wrote:

The judgment continues past this page. Read the rest at eLitigation.