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Grounds publishedDecided 1 Dec 2017

High Court

Tan Eck Hong v Maxz Universal Development Group Pte Ltd and others

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[2017] SGHC 309Case no. Suit No 581 of 2007

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Grounds of decision

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  1. Introduction

  2. Summary and parties

  3. [1] This is a long and involved case. It arises from the development of a piece of land in Sentosa from being the site of a former military barracks into a small hotel-cum-club and then into a multi-million-dollar resort hotel run by an international hotel group. The plaintiff, who is a minority shareholder of the company that owns and runs the hotel, complains that along the journey to this otherwise desirable outcome, the majority shareholder and many of the directors of the company carried on the affairs of the company in a manner which oppressed, and was prejudicial to, his interests. The defendants resist the claims and allege that the plaintiff is trying to force them to buy out his shareholding at an inflated price.

  4. [2] I start by introducing the parties. These are:

  5. I will sometimes hereafter refer to Mr Seeto, Rodney Tan, Mdm Poh, Mr Lim and Mr Gn collectively as “the defendant-directors”. Further for completeness, I note that the current plaintiff was, at the inception of the action in 2007, the seventh defendant but, after the original plaintiff dropped out, Tan Eck Hong took his place as the plaintiff and was removed as the seventh defendant. The sixth defendant was one Wong Choon Hoy but he passed away in the course of the proceedings and the action against him was not continued.

  6. The background

  7. [3] Of necessity what follows is a very brief account of what happened over the years, intended to set the scene and promote understanding of the claims.

  8. [4] In late1994, by way of a Building Agreement, the Sentosa Development Corporation (“SDC”), leased certain land and premises on Sentosa Island to a company called Sijori Resort Pte Ltd (“Sijori RPL”) which developed the buildings on the land (two blocks of old British Army barracks) into a small hotel and club (“Sijori Resort”). The Sijori Resort took in casual guests and also offered memberships (“Sijori Memberships”) which entitled the members to a certain number of free days’ stay at the Sijori Resort each year. Due to its location, the Sijori Resort had considerable potential for development.

  9. [6] In June 2005, the Company was incorporated to be the owner and operator of the hotel and to run the Project. MDG was the Company’s majority shareholder and there were some minority shareholders including one Shen Yixuan (“Mr Shen”). The plaintiff met Mr Seeto sometime in mid-2005 when the latter was searching for investors to help the Company develop the Project. The plaintiff agreed to invest $720,000 and was allotted 65,600 shares in the Company in October 2005.

  10. [7] The Company had to pay Sijori RPL for the acquisition of the Sijori Resort and the transfer of the Building Agreement. Part of the purchase price was to be paid by settling the debts of Sijori RPL. In June 2006, MDG obtained credit facilities, from what was later called VTB Bank, of up to $8m to be used towards the purchase, renovation and refurbishment of the Sijori Resort. I will refer to this as the “VTB Facility”. About half the facility limit was to be used to settle Sijori RPL’s debts to the Bank of China and SDC, to wit, the sums of $3,657,144 and $342,856 respectively. The security for the facility comprised:

  11. [9] One of the conditions that SDC had imposed for the transfer of the Sijori Resort from Sijori RPL and for the lease of the additional plot was that the Company should have and maintain a minimum issued paid-up capital of $4.5m. At that time, however, the Company’s total issued share capital was only $820,000. On 12 October 2006, an extraordinary general meeting of the Company was held to authorise its directors to issue and allot new shares. On 13 October 2006, a directors’ resolution was passed to allot an additional four million shares in the Company to MDG and to approve payment of the allotment moneys being satisfied by offsetting the debt of $4m that the Company owed MDG by reason of the book entries referred in to [8] above. The additional four million shares were duly issued and allotted to MDG and the Company’s indebtedness to MDG was duly capitalised.

  12. [10] On 14 November 2006, completion of the acquisition took place. The cashier’s orders from VTB Bank were released to SDC and the Bank of China. The Building Agreement between SDC and Sijori RPL was novated to the Company pursuant to a Deed of Novation and the Company leased an additional plot of land pursuant to a Supplemental Agreement with SDC. The combined plots of land and premises thereon are now known as 23 Beach View, Sentosa (“the Property”). The Supplemental Agreement with SDC contained the Company’s obligations to refurbish the Sijori Resort and to build a new wing with the temporary occupation permit for the same being obtained by 30 June 2008. Upon completion, the Company took over the running of the Sijori Resort and Mr Seeto and Sebastian Wong looked around for further funds with which to implement the Project. Under the agreement with SDC, Phase 1 of the Project was supposed to be completed by the end of May 2007.

  13. [11] Enter Rodney Tan – he was approached in or around May 2007 to invest in the Company. Rodney Tan was then, and still is, the Group Chairman of the Cairnhill Group of Companies, including Cairnhill Group Holdings Pte Ltd (“CGH”) which would become a major player in the development of the Project. Rodney Tan is, indirectly, practically the sole owner of CGH. He comes from a hotelier background – his father having owned and managed the Cairnhill Hotel in Singapore. Under the CGH banner, Rodney Tan was involved in running a 34-storey hotel in Tianjin, China, and a 28-storey block of service apartments in Hong Kong. According to Rodney Tan, it was because of his substantial personal net worth, good reputation and experience in the hotel management and hospitality industry generally, and his strong relationships with banks, that Mr Seeto approached him to invest in the Company.

  14. [12] Rodney Tan saw the investment potential in the Property and the Project; he was confident that he and his team could convert Sijori Resort from a run-down “zero-star dying hotel” into a five-star hotel. In May 2007, he invested in MDG through a British Virgin Island corporate vehicle, Roscent Group Ltd, by buying 54% of the shares in MDG, including Mr Seeto’s shares. On 1 June 2007, Rodney Tan was appointed a director of MDG, having been appointed a director of the Company slightly earlier, on 24 May 2007. I should state that various changes of shareholding in both MDG and the Company took place thereafter, details of which I need not go into here. As of October 2015, there were only two shareholders in the Company: MDG, holding 12,836,319 fully paid-up ordinary shares, and the plaintiff, holding 833,485 fully paid-up ordinary shares. By then, MDG itself was owned as to 45.2% by Rodney Tan and 52.4% by Cairnhill Treasure Investment (S) Pte Ltd, a company in which Rodney Tan owned 99.98% of the shares.

  15. [14] Rodney Tan asserted that, to get such a big project off the ground, various teams had to work together to provide a variety of services required by the Company. Based on his knowledge and experience of the hotel industry, he considered that the only company that could provide the Company with all the services necessary to complete both phases of the Project successfully at a reasonable price was CGH. Over the course of the next few years, starting on 1 June 2007, the Company entered into various management agreements with CGH. Pursuant to these management agreements, according to Rodney Tan, CGH provided the Company with the following services:

  16. The management agreements and the services provided and fees charged by CGH form the basis for some of the plaintiff’s complaints in this action.

  17. [15] Quite soon after Rodney Tan became involved in MDG, the Company and the Project, he became the main person in charge of all three. Mr Seeto resigned as a director of the Company and MDG a few months later. Sebastian Wong, however, continued to work for both entities. Subsequently, Rodney Tan brought in Mr Lim and Mr Gn to run various aspects of the Project. Mdm Poh, who was Rodney Tan’s wife at all material times, was involved with the Company, first as a supplier of furniture and fittings and, later, as a director at Rodney Tan’s request. Sometime in 2015, the marriage broke down and divorce proceedings were started by Mdm Poh.

  18. [17] It turned out that the Maybank facility granted in 2007 was insufficient for the Company’s needs. In about August 2008, the Company approached Maybank for a substantial increase in its loan facilities. By its letter of 26 August 2008, Maybank offered the Company banking facilities totalling $105,300,000. The security for the enhanced facilities was to be provided by a mortgage-in-escrow over the Property and a personal guarantee from Rodney Tan. Rodney Tan was willing to provide a guarantee for the enhanced amount provided that the Company indemnified him. As a result on 10 September 2008, a Deed of Indemnity (the “First Indemnity”) was executed by the Company and Rodney Tan. Shortly thereafter, on 15 September 2008, the First Indemnity was superseded by a second Deed of Indemnity (the “Second Indemnity”) between the same parties. On 21 September 2008, the Second Indemnity was supplemented by a Supplemental Deed of Indemnity. These three deeds will be referred to collectively as “the Indemnities”.

  19. [18] By the First Indemnity the Company agreed to indemnify Rodney Tan against all liabilities incurred to Maybank in respect of his personal guarantee, to pay him a fee for giving the guarantee and to provide him with cash equivalent to 20% of the guaranteed amount as security for his liability to Maybank. Under the Second Indemnity, as supplemented, the Company agreed to give Rodney Tan an initial security deposit of $2m, a further cash security equivalent to 20% of the guaranteed amount and fees at the rate of 1.5% per annum of the amount guaranteed, such fees to be paid after the Company had discharged its payment obligations to Maybank.

  20. [19] As time went by, the Maybank facilities increased, first to $143,653,000 and then to $199,300,000. By August 2013, the quantum of the guarantee provided by Rodney Tan increased to $200m. Rodney Tan stated that as at September 2015 he was entitled to a cash security deposit in the aggregate sum of $41,860,000 but had only received $40m up to that date. I point out that the granting of the Indemnities and the payments made to Rodney Tan thereunder form the basis of one of the plaintiff’s complaints in this action.

  21. [20] Rodney Tan and his team ran the Project and the Company from June 2007 onwards. The first phase of the Project which comprised the refurbishment of the original building was completed in December 2007 when it was re-opened as the “Heritage Wing” of what was then called the “Treasure Resort Hotel”. The second phase involved the construction of a new multi-storey building. This was undertaken after completion of the Heritage Wing. It proceeded apace until it was completed and opened as the “New Wing” in March 2011. Thereafter, the management of the hotel was taken over by Movenpick AG who ran it as the Movenpick Heritage Hotel, Sentosa until the Company terminated the management agreement some years later. The hotel is now run by another hotel group and is known as Le Meridien Hotel, Sentosa.

  22. [21] I end the account of the factual background here. I have not described all the plaintiff’s complaints. These will be detailed in the section below dealing with the analysis of each complaint. Before I do that, I give a short account of the long and complex history of the present litigation.

  23. This action

  24. The initial proceedings

  25. [22] This action was started on 12 September 2007 by Mr Shen, then a minority shareholder in the Company. He sued MDG, the Company, Rodney Tan, Mr Seeto, Mdm Poh and Wong Choon Hoy for relief against oppressive actions undertaken by them in connection with the management of the Company. One of the things that he complained about was the allotment of four million shares to MDG in October 2006 by way of capitalisation of the alleged debt owing by the Company. At about the same time, another minority shareholder, one Mr Chiang Sing Jeong (“Mr Chiang”) had commenced Suit 568 of 2007 (“Suit 568”) in the High Court against MDG to claim shares in the Company.

  26. [23] The litigation took a rather tortuous course thereafter. Sometime in late 2008, the present plaintiff, Tan Eck Hong, found out about the action. Thereafter, he applied to be added to it as the seventh defendant. This was to enable him to make his own claim of oppression. Tan Eck Hong became the seventh defendant in January 2009. Shortly thereafter, on 14 April 2009, he filed a Notice of Claim against MDG. In this Notice, Tan Eck Hong claimed that MDG was in breach of a shareholders’ agreement made between them in respect of the Company and that MDG had to transfer to him 740,400 shares in the Company.

  27. [24] Subsequently, Mr Shen’s claim was settled and he disposed of his shares in the Company and dropped out as plaintiff. In January 2012, Tan Eck Hong applied for Mr Lim and Mr Gn to be added as the eighth and ninth defendants respectively on the basis that they were party to the oppressive actions of MDG and Rodney Tan. These orders were granted and, subsequently, Tan Eck Hong became the plaintiff. Several amendments of the Notice of Claim took place thereafter. The original claim for 740,400 shares was dropped at some point but, by the time hearing commenced, a number of other claims had been added, some of which echoed the complaints of Mr Shen.

  28. The plaintiff’s claims

  29. [25] As I have mentioned, the plaintiff’s claims in this action went through various changes in the course of the proceedings. At the start of the hearing, the plaintiff presented his Opening Statement and I asked his counsel, Mr Alvin Tan, to confirm that the claims which the plaintiff was proceeding with were those set out in the Opening Statement. I did this because I wanted to be quite sure as to which claims in the Statement of Claim were being prosecuted in view of the number of changes that had taken place. Additionally, I wanted counsel for the various defendants to know what to focus on so that the trial would not be unduly prolonged. Mr Alvin Tan duly gave me this confirmation. In this section therefore, I am recounting the plaintiff’s claims as set out in the Opening Statement. The defendants have alleged that there are differences between the Plaintiff’s Closing Submissions and the Statement of Claim and Opening Statement and that the plaintiff should not be allowed to expand his claims in that way.

  30. [26] First, I set out the complaints of oppression in respect of MDG and Rodney Tan. These are as follows:

  31. [27] Secondly, I set out the plaintiff’s complaints of breach of fiduciary duties on the part of Mr Seeto, Rodney Tan, Mdm Poh, Mr Lim and Mr Gn. The specific complaints, most of which are closely related to the charges of oppression, are as follows:

  32. [28] When the various complaints made by the plaintiff are considered together, it can be seen that they involve ten separate situations. The defendants are involved in these situations to different degrees with Rodney Tan being allegedly involved in all but one, whilst Mr Lim and Mr Gn are each involved in only four. As can be seen from the summaries in [26] and [27] above, the plaintiff has made a claim against MDG for “oppressive acts” while his claims against the defendant-directors are for breach of directors’ duties. It seems that the plaintiff is relying on the alleged breaches of directors’ duties by the defendant-directors to establish his case of minority oppression.

  33. [29] The defendants deny that there was any oppressive conduct or any breach of directors’ duties. They also contend that the plaintiff has no standing to bring his various claims because these are claims of wrongs done to the Company rather than of personal wrongs done to him as a shareholder. Additionally, MDG and Rodney Tan contend that because the defendants had made reasonable buy-out offers to the plaintiff, his continuation of the action was unsustainable and an abuse of the process of the court.

  34. [30] On a separate note, there is an indemnity claim by Mdm Poh against Rodney Tan in the event that she is found to be liable to the plaintiff. For the most part, the indemnity claim has been dealt with by a settlement agreement dated 2 November 2016 between the parties but an issue has arisen under that agreement which they wish the court to resolve.

  35. [31] The plaintiff’s claim is brought under s 216(1) of the Act which allows any shareholder of a company to apply to the court for relief on the basis, inter alia, that the affairs of that company “are being conducted” or the powers of the directors “are being exercised” in a manner oppressive to that shareholder or in disregard of his interests as a member of the company. The courts have considered the meaning and ambit of this section many times over the years and the principles to be applied in considering whether there has been a breach of the section entitling a shareholder to relief are relatively uncontroversial. A brief statement of the applicable principles should be sufficient to set the scene.

  36. [32] The touchstone of a minority oppression claim under s 216(1) is the element of commercial unfairness. Prejudice to the claimant may be an important factor in the overall assessment of unfairness but it is not an essential requirement. The test of commercial unfairness involves a consideration of whether there has been a visible departure from the standards of fair dealing and a violation of the conditions of fair play which a shareholder is entitled to expect. Conduct that is technically unlawful may not be fair and conduct can be unfair without being unlawful. The foregoing summary of the applicable principles comes from Lim Kok Wah and others v Lim Boh Yong and others [2015] 5 SLR 307 (“Lim Kok Wah”) which in turn drew on various pronouncements from preceding cases.

  37. [33] It should be noted that s 216 does not allow the court to interfere with the internal management of companies which are being managed honestly and in accordance with the law. Mismanagement of the company generally does not constitute oppression or disregard of a member’s interests (see Halsbury’s Laws of Singapore, vol 6 (Lexis Nexis, 2010 Reissue) at para 70.161). As it was put in Lim Kok Wah at [135] and [154], the role of the court is not to assess or judge the business or commercial merits of the company’s management decisions.

  38. [34] A particular problem that has arisen for consideration in oppression cases is whether the plaintiff shareholder actually has a complaint that falls under s 216 or whether his action is a disguised derivative action in that he is, in truth, pursuing against the directors of the company causes of action that belong to the company itself. In the present action, various defendants have made the argument that the plaintiff lacks the standing to prosecute the suit against them. They submit that the wrongs alleged in this suit, if they are wrongs, would be wrongs done to the Company and not wrongs suffered by the plaintiff in his personal capacity as a shareholder of the Company. They argue that the plaintiff should not be allowed to use the personal remedy for oppression under s 216 because he should have pursued a derivative action in the name and on behalf of the Company. This argument is partly based on the numerous allegations of breach of fiduciary duties owed to the Company which the plaintiff has made against the defendant-directors.

  39. [35] The leading case in the area is the Court of Appeal decision of Ng Kek Wee v Sim City Technology Ltd [2014] 4 SLR 723 (“Ng Kek Wee”). At [61]–[63] of that case, the court notes the distinction between the personal rights of a shareholder and the corporate rights of the company concerned. This distinction applies even though a managerial or directorial action that impinges the company’s rights may also adversely affect the interests of the shareholder. An action under s 216 is designed to vindicate personal rights and not corporate rights. Despite this, as the court also notes, the distinction between a personal right and a corporate right is rarely clear, and there is nothing objectionable in a s 216 action which is founded upon facts that also disclose a concurrent wrong against the company.

  40. [36] The court in Ng Kek Wee also observes (at [67]–[69]) that an action under s 216 is appropriately brought where the complainant is relying on the wrongfulness of the wrongdoer’s conduct as evidence of the manner in which the wrongdoer has conducted the company’s affairs in disregard of the complainant’s interests as a minority shareholder and where the complaint cannot be adequately addressed by the remedy provided by law for that wrong. To that end, the analytical framework adopted by the Newfoundland Supreme Court in Pappas v Acan Windows Inc (1991) 2 BLR (2d) 180 (Canada) (“Pappas”) (at [67]) provides useful guidance to determine whether a complaint is of an essentially personal or derivative nature (Ng Kek Wee at [70]):

  41. [37] In Pappas, the Newfoundland Supreme Court (at [110]–[111]) considered also the question of whether a personal remedy for oppression can be brought to vindicate intermingled derivative and personal rights, and held that a personal action should not be brought where the derivative and personal claims are interwoven to the extent that they cannot appropriately be separated.

  42. [38] In the circumstances, a close analysis is required of the facts and complaints to decide whether they are more properly wrongs to the Company rather than wrongs to the plaintiff himself. The analysis must take into account whether those wrongs that may be proven caused damage to the plaintiff which was more than simply reflective of the damage caused to the Company so that any relief offered to the Company would not also cure the damage suffered by the plaintiff. Additionally, it must be considered whether the proven wrongs, although in their nature wrongs against the Company rather than wrongs against the plaintiff, demonstrate that the Company was run in a manner which benefited the majority shareholder and the defendant-directors, particularly Rodney Tan, and in disregard of the plaintiff’s interests as a minority shareholder.

  43. [39] I now turn to consider the various complaints in detail. The complaints fall into various categories and I will therefore refer to them by an overall numerical reference, for example, the First Complaint.

  44. Analysis of the Complaints and the defences to them

  45. The First Complaint: Management fees paid by the Company to CGH

  46. [40] Between 1 June 2007 and 1 January 2012, the Company entered into a total of eight management services agreements with CGH as follows:

  47. The plaintiff has made a number of allegations of wrongdoing in connection with these management agreements and the fees paid to CGH pursuant to them. These allegations fall into different categories and I will deal with them accordingly.

  48. The propriety of the agreements

  49. [41] The plaintiff criticises the general propriety of the First, Second and Third MSAs on the following grounds:

  50. [42] In my view, the first two criticisms above are points that indicate a casual approach to corporate governance rather than mismanagement as such. The directors of the Company were fully aware of Rodney Tan’s association with CGH before they asked him to invest in the Company and, indeed, it was because of that association that they approached him. In these circumstances, there was no need for formal disclosure of Rodney Tan’s directorship of CGH. Further, although no board resolution was passed to approve the agreements, the evidence established clearly that the board was aware of the agreements and their implementation.

  51. [43] On the point of experience, whilst CGH might not have had as much experience in the hotel industry as it made out, it had previously run a hotel in Tianjin and Rodney Tan was known as an hotelier because of his experience in the family business that ran the Cairnhill Hotel. Certainly, he had more experience with hotels than Mr Seeto, Sebastian Wong or the plaintiff himself. Considering that the Company had to quickly come up to speed in managing a hotel, it was not obviously unreasonable for it to appoint a manager with more experience in this area rather than try to build up its own team from scratch.

  52. [44] In relation to the fourth point, the plaintiff says that there is no evidence of any tender or enquiry in relation to the first and second agreements. Although the Third MSA has an appendix that shows quotations obtained from other parties, these are said to be “inadequate and purely for the purpose of whitewashing”. The plaintiff submits that the result of the inadequate process was that the first three management agreements were unduly advantageous to CGH and the Company paid fees that were higher than average for the services to be provided.

  53. Fees for hotel management charged from June to October 2007

  54. [47] The plaintiff’s next criticism was that CGH charged the Company fees for hotel management from June to October 2007 although the hotel was not in operation during this period as renovations were being carried out. The difficulty with this criticism is that there is insufficient evidence that the hotel was entirely closed during this three-month period. Mr Seeto testified that it was but Rodney Tan asserted the contrary. The plaintiff has not proffered any reason why Mr Seeto’s evidence should be preferred to that of Rodney Tan. As Rodney Tan was the prime mover of events during that period and was actively trying to raise funds for the Project, he is more likely to have been aware of what was occurring on site at the time. Mr Seeto, on the other hand, had sold his shares in MDG upon Rodney Tan’s entry and he admitted in court that thereafter he was not at the site on a regular basis. I therefore conclude that the plaintiff has not established that the charging of fees for hotel management services from June to October 2007 was improper.

  55. Pre-opening support services

  56. [48] Under the Second MSA, the Company was to pay CGH for “Asset Management & Pre-Opening Support” $31,500 per month from November 2007 till August 2008 and $56,000 per month from September 2008 to January 2010. The plaintiff’s criticism is that this was an unnecessary service and an unnecessary fee because Movenpick AG was obliged to, and did in fact, provide these services pursuant to the pre-opening services agreement dated 18 January 2007 (“Pre-opening Agreement”).

  57. [49] Rodney Tan submits that while Movenpick AG was supposed to provide such services, it did not in fact provide them (with the exception of giving some suggestions for food and beverage concepts) which necessitated the engaging of CGH. The plaintiff, however, contends that:

  58. [50] The plaintiff has provided little evidence to support his allegation. In court he asserted, that while he knew that Movenpick AG had done a lot of work, he was “not sure” as to “exactly what the specifics are”. He confirmed that he received no e-mails from Movenpick AG and did not know whether it had formed a pre-opening team. The evidence from the defendants, on the other hand, was that Movenpick AG had provided minimal services and these therefore had to be supplemented by the CGH team. This evidence includes the following:

  59. [51] The evidence also showed that although Movenpick AG did provide some pre-opening services, these were not substantial. The plaintiff pointed out a collection of documents and correspondence as evidence of Movenpick AG’s provision of the requisite services. These documents do not, however, detract from the point that the services were unsatisfactory. In fact, the documents reinforced the defendants’ point. They comprise 102 pages and 22 e-mail chains in respect of a project that spanned 5½ years and three openings of the hotel. Rodney Tan explained that the e-mails simply contained suggestions rather than the comprehensive plans that were required for the hotel.

  60. [52] The defendants also produced evidence that CGH had provided the necessary pre-opening services. It made arrangements for a pre-opening team for the Company and Mr Lim was given the job of assisting that team in HR matters. Mr Lim’s evidence was that the team comprised more than 20 people and he identified not only the members of the team but also, in detail, the work that they did. Mr Gn testified that CGH provided the Company with all necessary functions required for the pre-opening support such as the general manager, the executive assistant manager, the IT and finance staff, the engineering support and the procurement office.

  61. [53] Having assessed the evidence, I hold that in the circumstances it was reasonable for the Company to hire CGH to provide pre-opening services notwithstanding the Pre-Opening Agreement.

  62. Amount charged by CGH

  63. [54] The plaintiff claims next that the amount charged by CGH was manifestly excessive. He has both general and specific complaints. I deal first with the general complaints.

  64. [58] The plaintiff relied on Mr Seeto’s assertion at trial that the management fees charged by CGH were at a premium and “above reasonable”. This, however, was really Mr Seeto’s opinion rather than established fact. The plaintiff’s further contention was that the management fees were too high because CGH also charged the Company monthly rental despite the fact that the premises concerned were occupied by its own employees. This point does not take the plaintiff very far as it can be assumed that if the Company had had its own staff, it would have had to rent premises to house them. It is not unreasonable that some rental was paid by the Company to CGH for premises occupied by CGH employees who serviced the Company.

  65. Project management fees

  66. [59] Moving on to the plaintiff’s specific allegations, the first of these is that the amount of project management fees charged by CGH was excessive. The plaintiff insists that this allegation is directed at the entire duration of the MSAs, even though in his closing submissions he focussed on the Second MSA, under which the monthly management fees were charged for three services: (a) project management; (b) asset management and pre-opening support; and (c) IT management.

  67. [61] In my view, not much can be made out of the plaintiff’s first argument. First, One Marina Property Services Pte Ltd (“OMPS”) was appointed as project manager in June 2009, and OMPS’s quote showed that its fees were charged on a monthly basis as well. At trial, Mr See explained that this would be the case if the project was already halfway through or was not a “full service” from the beginning. His subsequent explanation for such a difference in approach was:

  68. This explanation, however, does not mean that project managers cannot choose to charge on a monthly basis from the beginning of a project – it just suggests that if a manager takes over halfway, it would prefer not to charge on a percentage basis because if the manager followed the usual practice at that stage, there would be little left for it to charge for.

  69. [62] Moreover, there was also some evidence that CGH’s project management services were more extensive than normal. Rodney Tan gave evidence that while the project management team comprised an in-house technical assistance team, which ensured that problems on-site would be fixed quickly and efficiently, most project management companies did not provide such technical support services, instead requiring the client to employ a separate technical support services team. Furthermore, while Mr See conceded that he assigned only one full-time and one part-time employee for one of the two hotel projects referred to in his expert report, and only one full-time employee for the other, there were more than five full-time personnel in CGH’s project management team.

  70. [63] As for the comparison of CGH fees with those of other firms, I agree with MDG and Rodney Tan that this is a judgment with the benefit of hindsight in the sense that parties could not have known that completion of the Project would be delayed until March 2011. From the Second MSA itself, it is clear that project management fees were contemplated to be payable only from November 2007 to January 2010, ie, a period of 27 months. On this basis, CGH’s project management fees would have come to the lower figure of $1,525,500, well within the range of the fees of the other firms. In his reply submissions, the plaintiff suggests that, once the Project was delayed, the project management fees should have been adjusted. While there may be some superficial attractiveness to this suggestion, it is not clear why this should have been so or, more importantly, on what basis this could have been done. Surely the mere fact of delay alone would be a poor reason for such an adjustment?

  71. [64] The plaintiff’s second ground of attack is that the salary of the CGH project management team does not justify the project management fees charged. Relying on another set of tabulations totalling the salaries of employees for each service provided by CGH to the Company, the plaintiff submits that CGH was making a profit of at least 72%. Relying next on Ms Tan’s tabulations and her evidence that there were only three CGH personnel involved in project management, the plaintiff submits that the salaries of these three personnel for 2009 totalled a mere 17% of the project management fees charged by CGH to the Company.

  72. [65] The plaintiff’s second ground loses its force when it is realised that more than three employees were involved in project management as shown by the evidence overall. Ms Tan’s identification of the three CGH personnel involved in project management was based on her being referred during cross-examination to meeting minutes of two site/progress meetings which had the names of these three personnel. In this regard, it appears that she was almost led to give this evidence, which I think cannot be taken to be representative of all the CGH personnel involved in project management. Rodney Tan’s own evidence was that he assigned more than five full-time employees to work on the Project.

  73. [66] Accordingly the plaintiff has not established that the amount of project management fees charged by CGH was excessive though they might have been high.

  74. OMPS’s consultancy fees from June 2009

  75. [67] The plaintiff’s second allegation is that in addition to charging project management fees, CGH also debited to the Company the consultancy fees of OMPS from January 2010 to March 2012. In June 2009, on Lawrence Chia’s retirement, OMPS was appointed as the project manager. The plaintiff points to contemporaneous documents indicating that it was CGH (and not the Company) that appointed OMPS. His complaint is that CGH should have absorbed the OMPS fees under the management fees charged by CGH instead of debiting them to the Company. The plaintiff also relies on Mr See’s evidence that the scope of works to be undertaken by OMPS was comprehensive for the remaining activities of the Project and covered all items of work that were yet to be carried out at the time of OMPS’s proposal to CGH in June 2009. The point here is that once OMPS took over, there was no project management function left to be performed by CGH.

  76. [68] There was evidence, however, that even after Lawrence Chia left and OMPS was appointed, CGH’s employees continued to assist OMPS. Moreover, Mr See was challenged on his evidence under cross-examination and it became apparent that his evidence may not have been entirely accurate. The upshot of the evidence is that CGH continued to be involved in project management even after the appointment of OMPS. Notwithstanding that, however, it is arguable that CGH’s project management fees ought to have been adjusted (specifically, lowered) to take Lawrence Chia’s departure and OMPS’s appointment into account. At the least, serious consideration ought to have been given to whether an adjustment was required and whether some part of CGH’s project management services could have been dispensed with. The plaintiff’s complaint therefore has some basis although there is insufficient evidence to assess how much money could have been saved. Although Rodney Tan’s evidence is that he did not know of this charging arrangement as the decision-making was delegated to and undertaken by his assistant Jeffrey Chua, I find this difficult to believe. As the plaintiff points out, Rodney Tan was a director of both the Company and CGH and must have or ought to have known that CGH was charging OMPS’s consultancy fees to the Company.

  77. Clause 4 of the Second MSA

  78. [69] The plaintiff’s next allegation relates to cl 4 of the Second MSA which provides, inter alia, that:

  79. The plaintiff’s case is that this provision is “to the undue advantage of CGH, and is not in accordance with general commercial practice”. In his statement of claim, the plaintiff says this clause is to the “undue advantage” of CGH because it effectively means that CGH’s fees are exclusive of all costs and expenses incurred including its staff costs. In addition, the invoices issued by CGH to the Company for the management fees contained a note that the management fees exclude all travel, out-of-pocket, printing and miscellaneous expenses. The plaintiff says that while Rodney Tan initially insisted that he could not remember if such expenses were in fact charged to the Company in addition to the management fees, he eventually accepted when shown the evidence that CGH regularly billed the Company for out-of-pocket expenses. The amounts charged by CGH as out-of-pocket expenses were substantial, and included invoices for the amounts of $100,040.94, $88,192.83, $167,566.29, $82,363.79, $156,432.69.

  80. [70] In itself, it is not unreasonable to have a clause allowing CGH to recover out-of-pocket expenses. The reasonableness of the clause depends, however, on what is covered by out-of-pocket expenses. While cl 4 mentions “copies, prints, telecommunications” as examples, and these are expenses that would be generally be accepted as out-of-pocket, it also states “remuneration of staff and benefits” which are not typical out-of-pocket expenses for a manager who is obtaining a management fee. As director of the Company, Rodney Tan had a duty to ensure that it did not pay unusual fees and expenses. The invoices that CGH sent the Company for out-of-pocket expenses were, sometimes, for very large amounts and Rodney Tan/CGH should have been able to justify these expenses as being properly classified as out-of-pocket expenses. There is no evidence of that. In this regard, the plaintiff’s complaint has weight.

  81. Mr Gn’s consultancy fees

  82. [71] The plaintiff’s fourth allegation relates to Mr Gn. He provided consultancy services to CGH at a monthly fee. This fee of $5,000 per month from February 2010 to January 2011, and of $10,000 from February 2011 up to 2012, was charged by CGH to the Company. There was evidence that Rodney Tan approved these payments by the Company. The problem for the plaintiff in regard to this allegation is that it was not pleaded and therefore cannot be considered since Rodney Tan had no opportunity to answer it.

  83. Management fees when hotel ceased operations

  84. [72] The plaintiff’s fifth allegation is that CGH continued to charge the same management fees even though the hotel ceased operations in June 2009 and only resumed them in March 2011. The plaintiff submits that there should have been some adjustment to the management fees (save for project management) charged over this period as CGH would have had less work to do.

  85. [74] Despite these points made on behalf of the defendants, it appears that Rodney Tan gave no thought at all to the extent to which the work which CGH had to do had been reduced though he must have been aware that the hotel’s closure would be for an extended period. He was content for CGH to continue collecting fees at the old levels. This might have been acceptable for part of the work. It would be recalled that under the Second MSA, the monthly management fees comprised fees for:

  86. As noted earlier, the plaintiff does not assert that (a) ought to have been adjusted during the period of the hotel’s closure. I agree. As between (b) and (c), (b) was the more significant component as it involved monthly fees of $56,000 during this period, as compared to the monthly fees of $12,800 for (c). However, it is logical to assume that both would have required less attention and fewer personnel during the period that hotel operations ceased entirely. If $56,000 a month was a reasonable fee for providing asset management and pre-opening services while the hotel was operating, obviously it would not be reasonable for pre-opening services alone. The problem here is that it is difficult to assess by how much items (b) and (c) were excessive. As a director of the Company, Rodney Tan had a duty to ensure that it did not incur unnecessary expenses. He does not seem to have done much to discharge this duty during the period in question. While I find him to be in breach of duty to the Company in this regard, whether his omission was merely neglectful or demonstrates a deliberate course of promoting the interests of CGH above those of the Company so as to make it oppressive to minority shareholders is something I will consider later in this judgment.

  87. Pre-opening support fees

  88. [75] The plaintiff’s sixth complaint is two-fold. First, the evidence of Rodney Tan (which was, to some extent, corroborated by Mr Gn) was that the pre-opening support services for Phase 2 only commenced in March 2010. The plaintiff claims that, as CGH was charging the Company for pre-opening support from November 2007 pursuant to the Second MSA, the pre-opening fees commenced too early, or were, in the alternative, grossly excessive for the period up to March 2010 at the very least. Second, the plaintiff contends that, notwithstanding Rodney Tan’s evidence that half of the pre-opening support work would have been done by the completion of Phase 2 in March 2011, this was not taken into account and the fees for pre-opening support remained the same under the Third, Fourth and Fifth SAs.

  89. [76] There is a difficulty in that the pre-opening support fee was charged as a lump sum under “Asset Management & Pre-Opening Support”. In other words, there was no individual component for pre-opening support on its own. This poses a problem for the plaintiff at the outset because it makes it difficult for him to even establish what the pre-opening support fees were. However, it can be inferred that the pre-opening support fees were not insubstantial in view of the evidence which Rodney Tan gave on the contributions which CGH made to the pre-opening requirements of the hotel.

  90. [77] I take the same view towards this complaint as I did to the previous one. It shows some neglect of Rodney Tan’s duty to the Company but whether it is also demonstrative of an intention to prefer the interests of CGH (and thus also himself) is something I postpone for further consideration below.

  91. Rodney Tan’s director’s remuneration

  92. [78] The plaintiff’s seventh allegation relates to Rodney Tan’s director’s remuneration of $15,000 per month. The plaintiff points to Mr Seeto’s evidence that this remuneration was paid on the basis that Rodney Tan would, inter alia, liaise and negotiate with SDC with respect to the various contractual obligations owed by the Company. The plaintiff submits that this overlaps “largely” with the asset management services that CGH was to provide and that, given this overlap, the $56,000 charged as asset management fees by CGH was excessive.

  93. [79] It should first be clarified that Rodney Tan’s director’s remuneration was paid only up till June 2009 and that, as already mentioned, the sum of $56,000 was a lump sum charged for both asset management and pre-opening support. More importantly, however, I do not think that the plaintiff has sufficiently proved the validity of this complaint. First, it is not clear why Mr Seeto’s evidence should be taken as the final word as to the basis for Rodney Tan’s remuneration. Second, even if it were so, the overlap alleged by the plaintiff is by no means self-evident. The Second MSA (which is what the plaintiff relies on) sets out the following concerning asset management and pre-opening:

  94. In this connection, MDG and Rodney Tan rightly point out that the plaintiff has not identified with precision a single area of specific overlap between Rodney Tan’s work qua director of the Company, on the one hand, and the asset management services that CGH provided to it, on the other. I also note MDG and Rodney Tan’s objection that this case was not put to Rodney Tan during cross-examination. Consequently, I find little substance in the plaintiff’s complaint over Rodney Tan’s director’s remuneration.

  95. Increase of fees in the Fourth SA

  96. [80] The plaintiff’s eighth allegation relates to the increase in management fees from $125,300 to $130,000 under the Fourth SA, for the period from August 2011 to December 2012. The plaintiff rejects Mr Lim’s evidence that this was on the basis that the Company’s working capital requirements had increased and submits that this increase was unwarranted because by this time, the hotel had already opened and a large part of the pre-opening support had already been completed.

  97. [81] In my view, the plaintiff has not sufficiently proved why this increase was unwarranted. His rejection of Mr Lim’s evidence is misplaced because Mr Lim subsequently clarified that he did not remember why there was such an increase. Any number of reasons could have explained this increase. Rodney Tan points out that this submission was unpleaded and not made in the plaintiff’s opening statement either. It is therefore unsurprising why no such reason has been forthcoming from the defendants. I note further that the increase in fees complained of (3.75%) is not particularly significant. Accordingly, I do not think that there is much merit to this complaint either.

  98. Adjusted management fees under the Second SA

  99. [82] The plaintiff’s next allegation concerns the adjusted management fees payable by the Company to CGH under the Second SA, which the plaintiff contends was to inflate drawdowns from facilities with Maybank. For clarity, it should be noted that the Company drew down on its working capital facility from Maybank whenever it had to pay fees under the Second SA. Under the Second SA:

  100. MDG and Rodney Tan emphasise that the amount of $424,700 was repaid to the Company, such that the management fees paid to CGH remained at $125,300. The same point is made by Mr Lim and Mr Gn, and this does not appear to be disputed by the plaintiff.

  101. [84] Rodney Tan’s second reason is that the adjustment of management fees provided a means to obtain more working capital for the Company from Maybank because Maybank would only provide funds upon submission of invoices issued by the Company’s service providers. The plaintiff submits that Rodney Tan was misleading Maybank by providing CGH management fee invoices for $550,000, when a large proportion of this fee was not for actual services that were provided to the Company. Rodney Tan’s evidence (which the plaintiff appears to accept), however, was that it was one of Maybank’s own representatives, who had suggested this arrangement so that the Company could obtain more working capital. In any event, the main victim of this deception would have been Maybank and not the Company. I note also that the plaintiff also “draw[s] [the court’s] attention to” substantial sums of the Company’s money spent by Rodney Tan to entertain Maybank’s officers, but stops short of suggesting that this was improper.

  102. [85] In addition, the plaintiff submits that the level of debt owed by the Company to CGH (approximately $13.7m as at 31 December 2010, $19.9m as at 31 December 2011 and $25m as at 31 December 2012) is inexplicable in light of the adjusted management fees and Mr Lim’s evidence that the working capital requirement of the Company was about $404,000 (ie, less than the $424,700 prepayment) as of November 2007. In any event, there was also evidence that CGH would extend loans to the Company from time to time in the interests of operational effectiveness and efficiency, and that there were times when the Company’s request to CGH to make payments on its behalf exceeded the prepayment of $424,700. Finally, the plaintiff, in his reply submissions, also appears to have resurrected the point made in his statement of claim but abandoned in his closing submissions that there was an element of “funding” in so far as the funds were payable six months in advance.

  103. [86] In my view, the plaintiff’s submissions have weight. In the first place, since CGH was providing and charging for staff to manage the Company’s finances, among other things, there was little reason to agglomerate the Company’s drawdowns from Maybank. The Company could have made drawdowns to pay bills on a monthly basis as and when the bills came in instead of drawing down the money in advance in anticipation of the bills’ arrival. The staff would in any case be checking the bills and ensuring that only proper ones were paid and it would not have been much extra work for them to draw up a schedule of outstanding invoices on a monthly basis for submission to Maybank. Secondly, there was even less reason to provide for the management fees (including the working capital requirements) to be paid so much in advance. The six-monthly payment scheme only increased the Company’s interest burden without commensurate benefit. Thirdly, as the plaintiff emphasises, the amounts drawn down from the Maybank facilities were usually sufficient to meet the Company’s working capital expenditure and therefore the increasing level of the Company’s debt to CGH over the years is hard to explain. The reasons provided by Rodney Tan for this procedure, in my view, were obfuscatory rather than clarificatory. The upshot of this manner of paying management fees to CGH was that that entity was able to receive large amounts of cash every six months and only had to hand over a fraction of the same to the Company on a monthly basis. It is hard not to conclude that this arrangement benefited CGH far more than it did the Company. It also resulted in the Company being unnecessarily indebted to CGH while at the same time increasing both its interest and capital indebtedness to Maybank, so that putting such a system in place was not only a breach of directors’ duty but also commercially unfair to other shareholders.

  104. Disclosure of the First and Third MSAs

  105. [87] The plaintiff’s next allegation is that Rodney Tan failed to disclose or sought to conceal the First and Third MSAs. He refers to Rodney Tan’s affidavit in a separate suit (viz, Suit 568) and says that Rodney Tan “sought to give the impressions that the only management fees payable by [the Company] to CGH were those under the [Second] MSA”. The plaintiff seems to suggest that the Third MSA only emerged fortuitously during the final tranche of the trial and that it was not voluntarily disclosed by the Company even though the plaintiff’s solicitors had previously made a request for documents which he says included the Third MSA.

  106. [88] It is unclear what this assertion is intended to go towards. The plaintiff’s allegations relate to Rodney Tan’s conduct vis-à-vis his discovery obligations and it is difficult to see how they can be the evidence of a breach of director’s duties (in the context of a claim under s 216 of the Act). In any event, MDG and Rodney Tan have explained that Rodney Tan’s affidavit was filed in support of the Company’s application for leave to raise funds for, inter alia, project management fees payable to CGH and that, in this context, only the Second MSA was relevant. As regards the Third MSA, counsel for MDG and Rodney Tan had stated in an e-mail to counsel for the plaintiff dated 19 September 2016 that matters relating to the Third MSA had not been pleaded and that it was never acted upon by either CGH or the Company. Although this e-mail came after the Third MSA was provided to the plaintiff on 15 September 2016, it does shed some light on Rodney Tan’s position vis-à-vis the relevance of the Third MSA. The plaintiff has attempted to argue that the Third MSA is “clearly relevant as it sheds light on the circumstances and the intention behind the various MSAs”, but it is unclear how this is so. In the premises, I do not think that the plaintiff’s arguments on this point support the First Complaint.

  107. The plaintiff’s calculations regarding the First Complaint

  108. [89] The last set of submissions in this area by the plaintiff does not allege any impropriety but rather sets out the plaintiff’s calculations of the amount that, in his view, should have been paid under the First Complaint. Two alternative calculations are proposed in this regard.

  109. [90] The first calculation is based on the plaintiff’s submission that the management fees stipulated in the Third MSA should have overridden those under the Second MSA from 6 December 2007 (the plaintiff claims that the Company was charged the management fees per the Second MSA up till 31 December 2012). The difference between the monthly management fees in both agreements is as follows:

  110. $125,300 (September 2008 to January 2010)

  111. The plaintiff further proposes deducting the $20,000 membership management fees under the Third MSA from March 2008 onwards, on the basis that there is no evidence that membership management services were being provided by CGH to the Company or that the Company was in need of such services after the Sijori Memberships were transferred out in February 2008. This leaves monthly management fees of $100,800 from November 2007 to February 2008 and of $80,800 from March 2008 to December 2012. The plaintiff further submits that the Company was charged asset management fees of $51,169 per month after 31 December 2012 up till “at least” 31 December 2014, and that on the basis of the Third MSA, this should have been no more than the $30,000 provided for hotel management. In light of these submissions, the plaintiff proposes that the total payable in management fees should be $6,174,600 (before GST).

  112. [91] However, the plaintiff does not have any basis for suggesting that the Third MSA had superseded the Second MSA. As mentioned earlier, MDG and Rodney Tan’s position is that the Third MSA was never acted upon by either CGH or the Company. This position is supported by the fact that unlike the First and Second MSAs, the Third MSA was not engrossed on CGH’s letterhead (even though it is, admittedly, signed). More significantly, the SAs (which were all entered into after the Third MSA) all refer to the Second MSA. Accordingly, I accept the submission of MDG and Rodney Tan that the Third MSA was effectively mutually abandoned.

  113. Contribution of each defendant to the First Complaint

  114. [95] The plaintiff claims that when the First MSA was entered into on 1 June 2007, Rodney Tan was both a director of the Company and CGH and therefore in a position of conflict of interest. No evidence was adduced to show that Rodney Tan had disclosed this conflict to the Company’s board. Even if such disclosure had been made, the plaintiff avers that it would be “of questionable effect because the board consisted of his nominees”. Rodney Tan had also signed the resolutions authorising the entry into the First and Second SAs despite this conflict. The plaintiff further alleges that the First and Second MSAs were initiated by Rodney Tan.

  115. [96] As against Mr Seeto, the plaintiff charges that by signing the First and Second MSAs as well as the resolutions authorising entry into these agreements and by allowing the debit of management fees by CGH to the Company, without proper regard or enquiry as to the services to be provided or the fees to be charged, Mr Seeto was in breach of his fiduciary duties to the Company. With respect to Mdm Poh, the plaintiff points out that Mdm Poh had signed the resolutions authorising the Company’s entry into the First and Second SAs. The plaintiff’s case is that Mdm Poh had neglected to pay any or any sufficient attention to the affairs of the Company even though she generally knew what her role as director was. In not applying her mind to the affairs of the Company, Mdm Poh allowed the wrongful and/or excessive debiting of management fees by CGH to the Company. As for Mr Lim, he had signed the resolutions authorising the Company’s entry into the First and Second SAs and the First to Fifth SAs. The plaintiff submits that Mr Lim had breached his fiduciary duties to the Company by allowing the wrongful increase of management fees that was payable by the Company to CGH. In relation to Mr Gn, the plaintiff contends that he was in breach of his duty to the Company by signing the resolutions approving the Company’s entry into the First and Second SAs, as there was no good reason for the increase of management fees, which was to the obvious disadvantage of the Company.

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