High Court · Decided 19 December 2017
Mukherjee Amitava v DyStar Global Holdings (Singapore) Pte Ltd and others
Feedback & support[2017] SGHC 314 · Case no. Originating Summons No 863 of 2015
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Grounds of decision
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Introduction
- [2]
[2] The plaintiff brings this application against four defendants. The first defendant is the company itself. The other defendants are three out of the five directors of the company: Ruan Weixiang, Xu Yalin and Yao Jianfang.
- [4]
[4] The plaintiff has appealed against my decision. I now set out my grounds.
The factual and legal background summarised
Factual background
The parties’ relationship
- [5]
[5] The company is an investment holding company incorporated in Singapore. It holds shares in a number of subsidiaries operating in a number of countries. The company together with its subsidiaries are known collectively as the DyStar group. The DyStar group is in the business of providing products and services to the textile industry.
- [6]
[6] As a matter of form, the company has three shareholders: (a) Senda International Capital Limited (“Senda”) which owns about 62% of the company; (b) Well Prospering Limited (“Well Prospering”) which owns one share in the company; and (c) Kiri Industries Ltd (“Kiri Industries”) which owns about 38% of the company. As a matter of substance, however, the company is effectively owned by only two shareholders. Senda and Well Prospering are both wholly-owned subsidiaries of a company incorporated in China and listed in Shanghai known as Zhejiang Longsheng Group Co Ltd (“Longsheng”). Longsheng’s control of Senda and Well Prospering therefore gives it ultimate control of 62% of the company. Longsheng is, in effect, the company’s sole majority shareholder. That makes Kiri Industries, in effect, the company’s sole minority shareholder.
- [7]
[7] The legal relationship between the company’s shareholders began with, and is now governed by, a share subscription and shareholders’ agreement which they entered into in 2010. The shareholders’ agreement stipulates, among many other things, that the company’s board is to comprise five directors. Three directors are to be appointed by Well Prospering, and therefore ultimately by Longsheng. Two directors are to be appointed by Kiri Industries. The plaintiff and one Manishkumar Pravinchandra Kiri are Kiri Industries’ appointees. Mr Ruan, Mr Xu, and Mr Yao are Longsheng’s appointees (“the Longsheng Directors”).
The plaintiff applies under s 199
- [8]
[8] In July 2015, the plaintiff wrote a letter addressed to the company and to each Longsheng Director. In this letter, he asked the company’s “management [to] make available the documents and/or information as set out in the enclosed schedule … for [his] review, in advance of the next board meeting”. The defendants did not, in terms, reject the plaintiff’s request. But neither did the defendants make the documents and information available for the plaintiff as he had requested.
- [9]
[9] The plaintiff took out this application in September 2015. The principal relief which he seeks is set out in prayer 1 of this application, ie, that:
The schedule referred to in prayer 1 of the plaintiff’s application is virtually identical to the schedule annexed to his July 2015 letter (see [8] above). I make certain observations about the width of this schedule at [140] to [143] below.
- [10]
[10] At the highest level of generality, the single issue which I have to decide is whether I should exercise my power under s 199 of the Act to compel the defendants, or any one or more of them, to permit the plaintiff to inspect the material which he has enumerated in the schedule to his application. But to set out the issues before me with more granularity, it is first necessary to consider the statutory scheme of s 199 and the well-established common law principles which are applicable to that section.
Legal background
- [12]
[12] The plaintiff has invoked in this case only a director’s statutory right of inspection. I therefore need not say anything further about the common law right of inspection under Singapore law or about its scope or interaction with the statutory right.
The statutory scheme
- [13]
[13] The starting point in understanding a director’s statutory right of inspection is s 199(1) of the Act. This section creates the company’s duty to keep accounting and other records in the following terms:
As I will show (see [159] below), the phrase “accounting and other records” is a recurring theme throughout the Act and in the case law on s 199. For simplicity, unless the context indicates otherwise, I shall use the word “records” as shorthand for the longer phrase “accounting and other records” within the meaning of s 199(1).
- [14]
[14] A director’s statutory right to inspect a company’s records arises under s 199(3). That section provides as follows:
- [15]
[15] The curious thing about s 199(3) is that it creates a duty without specifying on whom the duty lies or how the duty is to be enforced. That is the result of the following three observations which I make about s 199(3):
(a) First, the part of s 199(3) which deals with inspection is framed in the passive voice. It therefore does not specify on whom rests the express duty to permit a director to inspect the records. By necessary implication, the duty must, at the very least, lie on the company (Wuu at [25]). It is the company which is, by s 199(1), obliged to keep the records in the first place. It is the company which has property in the records. It is the company which has physical control of the records or, at the very least, de jure and very often also de facto control of the means by which to assert physical control over the records. It is also the company in general meeting, through its supervisory powers over the company’s directors and management, which has the power to make the ultimate decision for the company as to whether to open its records for inspection under s 199(3). The question which then arises is whether s 199(3) by implication imposes an additional personal duty on each director to ensure that the records are open for inspection by the directors at all times. That is a question which I analyse, to the extent necessary to determine this application, at [99] to [123] below.
(b) Second, because s 199(3) expressly creates a duty – imposed at the very least on the company – to keep the company’s records at all times open for the directors to inspect, it must also create a right vested in each director to inspect those records. Every duty – to be a duty in the true sense of the word – must have a correlative right. Looked at in that way, s 199(3) creates by necessary implication a correlative right vested in a director.
- [18]
[18] Section 199(6) makes it a criminal offence to breach any of the duties under s 199:
I make two observations on s 199(6):
(a) First, the offence under s 199(6) extends to a default in compliance with any subsection of s 199. That encompasses on its face a default under s 199(3) as well as under s 199(1). So within the express scope of the offence under s 199(6) is the situation where a director is able to bring himself within s 199(3) but is not permitted to inspect the company’s records.
(b) Second, criminal liability under that section is the only express consequence which s 199 provides for a default in complying with the duty to keep the company’s records open for inspection by a director under s 199(3). But a criminal conviction following such a default does not, in itself, secure for the aggrieved director the inspection which he seeks. There is nothing within s 199(3) – or indeed within s 199 itself – which expressly permits an aggrieved director to secure specific civil relief in the event of a breach of s 199(3). In that sense, there appears to be a gap in s 199.
The common law principles
- [20]
[20] A set of fundamental principles have developed in the case law on how s 199(3) is to be interpreted and applied (see, eg, Wuu at [25]–[33] and Hau Tau Khang at [13]–[15]). These fundamental principles are common ground between the parties. It therefore suffices for present purposes simply to state the principles without exposition or analysis:
(a) A director’s statutory right to inspect records is an “absolute” right. But it is absolute not in the sense that it is inviolable. It is absolute in the sense that the director has a prima facie right to inspect the records and does not have to demonstrate any particular ground or need for inspection (Wuu at [27] and [33]; Hau Tau Khang at [15(e)]).
(b) The purpose of a director’s right to inspect records is to enable him to perform his statutory duties as a director. This extends to all of his duties as a director and is not confined to those duties which relate to the accounts (Hau Tau Khang at [22]).
(c) A director has no right to inspect records if he is exercising the right, not to advance the interests of the company, but for some ulterior purpose or to injure the company. An ulterior purpose is any purpose which is unconnected to the discharge of the director’s duties (Wuu at [33]; Hau Tau Khang at [15(e)] and [34]).
(d) An ulterior purpose suffices, in itself, to defeat the director’s right to inspect the company’s records even if that ulterior purpose will not cause any detriment to the company. It is for this reason that the Court of Appeal in Wuu used an intention to cause detriment to the company as but an example of what would amount to an ulterior purpose (Wuu at [32]) and used the disjunctive “or” in holding that a director’s right “will be lost where it is exercised not to advance the interests of the company but for some ulterior purpose or to injure the company” [emphasis added] (Wuu at [33]; see also Hau Tau Khang at [34]).
(e) The burden of proving that a director is exercising his right to inspect records for an ulterior purpose lies on those who oppose inspection. Discharging that burden requires “clear proof” which suffices to satisfy the court affirmatively that the director is seeking to inspect the records for an ulterior purpose (Wuu at [34]; Hau Tau Khang at [15(c)]).
(f) If a director does provide reasons for exercising his right to inspect records, even though he is under no obligation do so, it is open to the court to examine those reasons to see if they reveal an ulterior purpose. That is the approach which Steven Chong J (as he then was) took in Hau Tau Khang at [36].
- [21]
[21] I make a small point about terminology. The cases use the term “ulterior purpose” in some contexts and the term “improper purpose” in other contexts. I have used “ulterior purpose” consistently in the synthesis at [20] above and will do so throughout this judgment. I do not consider any of the cases to have drawn a distinction between the two terms insofar as a director’s right to inspect records is concerned. If any distinction can sensibly be drawn, it seems to me that an ulterior purpose, purely as a matter of language, encompasses an improper purpose but is not confined to it. To say that a director is exercising his right of inspection for an improper purpose suggests to me that his purpose is capable of being a wrong in itself, for example, to cause detriment to the company’s interests contrary to his duties to the company. Exercising a right for an ulterior purpose suggests, more broadly, that the director is exercising the right for any purpose which is not its intended purpose, ie, that the director seeks inspection otherwise than to enable him to perform his statutory duties as a director (see [20(b)] above). That would obviously encompass an improper purpose (as I have defined it), but would also include any purpose which might not otherwise be a wrong but which is nevertheless not the purpose for which s 199(3) confers the right.
The elements of an application to inspect under s 199(3)
- [22]
[22] Returning to the statutory scheme of s 199(3) considered in the light of these fundamental principles drawn from the case law, three elements must be satisfied before a director’s right to inspect the company’s records arises:
(a) The person who wishes to inspect the company’s records must be a director of the company;
(b) The documents which the director wishes to inspect must be the company’s “accounting and other records” within the meaning of s 199(1) or a subset of those records; and
(c) The director must seek inspection for a proper purpose.
- [23]
[23] The burden of proving the first element above must rest on the putative director. It is he who asserts that he is a director. In almost all cases, that burden will be discharged so easily that this element will not even be disputed. Whether or not the party seeking inspection is a director of the company is a matter of record, unless he relies on the extended definition of “director” in s 4(1) of the Act. If that is the case, issues of fact may arise on this element. The burden of proof on those issues of fact should rightly rest on the putative director.
- [24]
[24] The burden of proving the second element must also rest on the putative director. If the director asks only to compel the company to permit him to inspect the company’s “accounting and other records”, thereby tracking the language of s 199(1), then the second element is ex hypothesi established and cannot be disputed. However, if the director chooses to specify the documents which he wishes to inspect, either individually or by categories, it is right that he should have to show that the documents which he wishes to inspect do indeed form part of the company’s “accounting and other records” within the meaning of s 199(1). After all, it is he who has chosen to go beyond the statutory phrase by enumerating a priori the specific documents which he wishes to inspect.
- [25]
[25] The burden of disproving the third element – which is the only element likely to be in issue in the majority of applications – lies squarely on those who seek to prevent the director from inspecting the company’s records (see [20(e)] above).
Issues to be decided
- [26]
[26] With that summary of the factual and legal background, I can now summarise with more granularity the parties’ positions and the issues I have to decide.
- [27]
[27] It is common ground that the burden is on the defendants to show why the plaintiff should not be permitted to inspect the company’s records (see [20(e)] above). To discharge this burden, the Longsheng Directors on the one hand and the company on the other present separate arguments through separate counsel. The bulk of the arguments for the defendants have been, however, presented by counsel for the Longsheng Directors. Counsel for the company confines his separate submissions to the potential for detriment to the company’s interests if the plaintiff’s application were to be allowed. In all other respects, counsel for the company associates himself with the Longsheng Directors’ submissions. Without intending any disrespect to either counsel for the defendants, I will now summarise the defendants’ arguments without drawing a distinction between the separate arguments which each counsel presented to me.
- [28]
[28] The defendants advance four grounds to oppose the application:
(b) Second, the plaintiff has wrongly named the Longsheng Directors as defendants to this application.
(c) Third, the plaintiff’s request is outside the ambit of s 199(3) of the Act because it is too wide and too vague.
(d) Fourth, the plaintiff seeks inspection for an ulterior purpose.
The focus of the defendants’ submissions was on the fourth ground. Nevertheless, I shall consider in turn each of the four grounds which the defendants advance.
- [29]
[29] Before I do that, however, it is necessary to address three incidental but fundamental preliminary questions which arose in the course of submissions. These questions warrant closer examination because the answers to them are not settled:
(a) First, what procedure should an aggrieved director follow in asking the court to compel the company to permit him to inspect its records?
(b) Second, what is the standard of proof to be met by a party opposing an aggrieved director’s application for relief?
(c) Third, what if a director seeks to inspect a company’s records for mixed purposes which are ulterior in part but legitimate in part?
- [30]
[30] I turn now to analyse these three questions. The analysis which follows assumes that the plaintiff is within s 199(3). In other words, I assume without deciding for the time being that each of the three elements I have enumerated at [22] above are satisfied such that the plaintiff’s statutory right to inspect the company’s records has arisen.
The procedure to be followed
- [31]
[31] The plaintiff brings his application under s 199 of the Act. But he did not, when the application was filed, specify which subsection of s 199 he relied on. Does any subsection of s 199 empower a court to grant the plaintiff the relief he seeks by this application?
The plaintiff’s application without procedural basis
- [33]
[33] That relief does not come within the scope of s 199(3). That provision obliges the company to make its records available for the directors to inspect. But, as I have observed (see [15]–[18] above), it is clear on the face of s 199(3) – especially by comparison to s 199(5) and s 199(6) – that s 199(3) does not empower the court to grant specific civil relief for a breach of the duty under s 199(3). Further, even if one looks beyond s 199(3) to s 199 as a whole, it contains no provision empowering the court to enforce specifically the duty under s 199(3).
- [35]
[35] The only provisions which could conceivably provide specific relief for an aggrieved director are the general enforcement provisions in the Act. These are found in ss 399 and 409A.
The plaintiff amends his application
- [36]
[36] When I put this point to plaintiff’s counsel, he conceded that his application was without procedural basis insofar as it relied on s 199 alone. He therefore applied orally to amend his application so as to bring it under ss 399 and 409A in addition to s 199.
- [37]
[37] Although this procedural point was not one which counsel for the Longsheng Directors took, he opposed the plaintiff’s application to amend. After hearing submissions, I allowed the application. The procedural point appeared to me to be entirely technical. Allowing the amendment did not change the factual or legal basis of the plaintiff’s application. In particular, the amendment did not require any fresh evidence to be obtained and adduced or any fresh legal arguments to be formulated and presented. It is for that reason that the defendants were able to confirm that they would not require the hearing to be adjourned even if the plaintiff’s application to amend were to be allowed.
- [39]
[39] As a result of the amendment, the plaintiff’s application proceeded before me as an application under either or both of s 399 and s 409A of the Act arising from a breach of s 199(3). It was common ground that, for present purposes and on the facts of this case, it is not necessary to distinguish between the scope or effect of these two general enforcement provisions. Either or both of those provisions suffice to give the plaintiff a procedural basis for the relief he seeks.
- [40]
[40] I now turn to consider these two provisions more closely.
Section 399 and s 409A
- [41]
[41] Section 399 of the Act expressly empowers the court to compel an immediate inspection of any document when a person, in contravention of the Act, refuses or fails to permit the inspection of that document:
- [42]
[42] Section 409A of the Act expressly empowers any person affected by a contravention of the Act to apply to the court for what is, in effect, either a prohibitory injunction to restrain non-compliance with the Act or a mandatory injunction to compel compliance with the Act:
- [43]
[43] A refusal or failure to permit a director to inspect the company’s records under s 199(3) falls within the scope of s 399(1), s 409A(1) and s 409A(2). The first two of these provisions are expressly premised on a contravention of the Act. The third of these provisions, s 409A(2), is premised on a refusal or failure to do what the Act requires to be done. That type of a refusal or failure necessarily amounts to a contravention of the Act. Section 409A(2) is therefore also premised on a contravention of the Act, albeit implicitly. Section 199(3) in terms imposes a duty on a company to permit a director who comes within s 199(3) to inspect the company’s records. A failure to comply with that duty is a contravention of the Act for the purposes of both s 399 and s 409A.
- [44]
[44] An academic writer has suggested that it is 409A(1) which provides a means of enforcing a director’s statutory right of inspection (Terence Tan, “A Director’s Statutory Rights of Inspection of Accounts” (1994) 6 SAcLJ 118 (“Tan, Director’s Statutory Rights”) at 126–127). But it appears to me more natural to say that an aggrieved director is seeking to compel the company to open the company’s records for his inspection rather than seeking to restrain the company from failing to keep the records open for his inspection. A mandatory injunction under s 409A(2)(b) is therefore likely to be the most appropriate relief in most cases of this type, rather than a prohibitory injunction under s 409A(1)(b).
Relief under s 399 and s 409A is discretionary
- [45]
[45] There is one interesting consequence of this analysis. Both s 399 and s 409A use the permissive “may” in empowering the court to grant relief under each section. No doubt that is by analogy with the equitable remedy of an injunction for which those provisions are the statutory analogue, as suggested by the heading to s 409A. The relief under each section is therefore expressly discretionary in nature.
- [46]
[46] If my analysis is correct, therefore, it means that the court has a residual discretion to decline relief to an aggrieved director even if he is squarely within s 199(3), ie, if all three elements set out at [22] above are resolved in his favour. No doubt that residual discretion will be exercised very rarely, given the absolute nature of the director’s statutory right to inspect the company’s records. But that discretion nevertheless exists, albeit at the point at which the court considers the remedy rather than the right.
- [48]
[48] However, nothing turns on this point in the case before me. I have made a finding of fact on an application for final relief that the plaintiff is seeking inspection for an ulterior purpose. The result is that he has no right to inspect the company’s records. But there are statements in the authorities which might, on one reading, suggest that there is no residual discretion to refuse inspection even if a director brings himself within s 199(3) and it cannot be shown by those opposing inspection that he is seeking to inspect the records for an ulterior purpose (see Conway at 90C, Wuu at [32]; Hau Tau Khang at [15(f)]). If that is the correct reading of those statements, that suggestion may have to be considered more closely when the point arises for decision.
The standard of proof
- [49]
[49] The second preliminary issue is the standard of proof to be met by a party alleging that a director is seeking to exercise his right to inspect for an ulterior purpose. While the parties accept that the authorities are clear that the burden on that issue rests on those who oppose inspection, they also accept that the authorities are “vague” on the standard of proof which that person must meet.
- [50]
[50] I begin by examining the authorities that have touched on this issue. In Edman v Ross (1922) 22 SR (NSW) 351, Street CJ held that unless there is “clear proof to the contrary” [emphasis added], the court will assume that a director is exercising his right of inspection for the company’s benefit (at 361). In Wuu, the Court of Appeal accepted that the standard is “clear proof” sufficient “to satisfy the court ‘affirmatively’” that the director is exercising his right of inspection for an ulterior purpose (at [34]):
Chong J made the same point in Hau Tau Khang at [35], emphasising that the threshold to establish an ulterior purpose is a “high one”.
- [51]
[51] I do not read these statements as departing from the well-established rule that the standard of proof on all issues in a civil case is proof on the balance of probabilities. The Court of Appeal restated that rule most recently in Alwie Handoyo v Tjong Very Sumito and another and another appeal [2013] 4 SLR 308 at [159]. The references to “clear proof” and the need “to satisfy the court ‘affirmatively’” in the authorities on s 199 can best be understood by analogy with cases of fraud. The court has often said that making a finding of fraud in a civil case requires cogent evidence because a finding of fraud has serious consequences. That does not, however, raise the standard of proof for an allegation of fraud beyond the usual civil standard of proof on the balance of probabilities. It is simply a facet of the principle that the more serious the finding which a court makes, the stronger the proof which the court will require to make that finding. That principle does not require a civil court to seek proof going beyond the balance of probabilities before finding fraud. The standard of proof in civil cases remains at all times proof on the balance of probabilities (Alwie Handoyo at [161]).
- [53]
[53] That is all that is meant by the references in the authorities to a requirement of clear proof or affirmative satisfaction. Accordingly, the defendants’ burden is to show affirmatively and by clear evidence – but ultimately only on the balance of probabilities – that the plaintiff seeks to inspect the company’s records for an ulterior purpose.
Mixed purposes
- [54]
[54] The final preliminary issue is this: what if a director is motivated by mixed purposes, comprising both proper and ulterior purposes, in seeking to exercise his right to inspect the company’s records? Should his application succeed or fail?
- [55]
[55] I begin by accepting the analysis of Mahon J in Berlei Hestia (NZ) Ltd v Fernyhough [1980] 2 NZLR 150 that a director’s “right” of inspection under the New Zealand equivalent of s 199(3) is, at least for present purposes, best analysed as being in the nature of a power to inspect rather than a right to inspect (at 165). A director cannot be said to be have a right to inspect if he seeks to exercise that right for an ulterior purpose. The ulterior purpose extinguishes the right even before it can be purportedly exercised. By contrast, a director can be said to have a power to inspect whether or not he exercises it for its proper purposes. The exercise of a power by a fiduciary for ulterior purposes is controlled by the equitable doctrine of a fraud on the power, not by extinguishing the power. As Mahon J said (at 164–165):
I note in passing that the Court of Appeal in Wuu accepted (at [25]) that a director exercising his right to inspect that company’s records under s 199(3) is, for the purposes of the proper purpose principle, in the same position as a director exercising a power vested in him as a fiduciary.
Position in England
- [56]
[56] In England, the position at common law is that a director who exercises a power for a combination of proper and improper purposes does so validly only if his primary or dominant purpose in doing so is a proper purpose (Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd and Others [1974] AC 821 at 832F–832G per Lord Wilberforce). This was restated most recently by the UK Supreme Court in Eclairs Group Ltd and another v JKX Oil and Gas plc [2016] 1 BCLC 1 (“Eclairs”) at [17]–[19] per Lord Sumption and at [51]–[52] per Lord Mance. The court will take the purpose which was the weightiest in the director’s mind as his primary or dominant purpose. In this context, the weightiest purpose is the purpose about which the director feels most strongly in exercising the power (Eclairs at [19]). I shall use the word “weightiest” consistently in this sense.
- [57]
[57] What is notable about Eclairs is that Lord Sumption was prepared obiter to propose that a director’s primary or dominant purpose for exercising a particular power should henceforth be determined, not by looking at what the director’s weightiest purpose was, but by applying the “but for” test of causation. On this test, an improper purpose will not be a director’s primary or dominant purpose for exercising a power – even if it was his weightiest purpose for doing so – if the director can show that, even if he had had regard only to proper purposes instead of the improper purpose, he would have exercised the power in the same way.
- [58]
[58] Although Eclairs was a decision on the general duty of a director exercising a power and not specifically about a director seeking to exercise his power to inspect the company’s records under the English equivalent of s 199(3), both counsel before me relied on Eclairs as indicating the approach which the court should take where a director acts for mixed purposes under s 199(3). It is therefore necessary to consider that case in a little more detail.
- [59]
[59] In Eclairs, a company’s directors exercised a particular power under its articles of association by resolving to prevent two minority shareholders from voting at an upcoming general meeting. Each director voted to exercise the power for one or both of two purposes. For convenience, I shall call them purpose A and purpose B. At trial, Mann J found (Eclairs Group Ltd and another v JKX Oil and Gas plc and others [2014] 1 BCLC 202 at [235]) that: (a) one director had exercised the power primarily for purpose A; (b) two directors had exercised the power for both purpose A and purpose B giving equal weight to each, ie, with neither purpose being the weightiest purpose; and (c) four directors exercised the power primarily for purpose B.
- [60]
[60] The minority shareholders challenged the resolution as being the result of an exercise of the directors’ power for an improper purpose. It was common ground at trial that purpose A was a proper purpose for exercising the power. What was in dispute was whether purpose A was the only proper purpose for exercising the power. The directors’ case was that it was not, and that purpose B was equally a proper purpose. Mann J disagreed. He held that purpose A was the only proper purpose. It followed that purpose B was an improper purpose. The result of Mann J’s findings was that the weightiest purpose for a majority of the board (four out of seven directors) in exercising the power was an improper purpose. Mann J accordingly set aside the resolution.
- [61]
[61] Critically, the directors in Eclairs did not advance at trial a causation argument based on the “but for” test. They did not argue in the alternative that, even if purpose B was not a proper purpose, acting for purpose B had had no causative effect on how the directors had exercised the power because they would have exercised the power in precisely the same way even if they had had regard only to purpose A. It was Mann J who raised this as a possible argument for the first time in the course of closing oral submissions. But he rejected the directors’ attempt to adopt this argument as part of their case at so late a stage. Because it had not been part of their case in the evidential phase, the directors had given no evidence on this hypothetical scenario and the minority shareholders had had no opportunity to cross-examine the directors on it. However, in case he was wrong in declining to allow the directors to adopt this argument as an alternative, Mann J found on the evidence which was available to him – such as it was – that the directors would have exercised the power in the same way even if they had had regard only to purpose A.
- [62]
[62] Before the Supreme Court, the only live argument arising from Mann J’s judgment was his reasoning which I have summarised at [60] above. In particular, the causation argument was not canvassed in argument before the Supreme Court (see Eclairs at [49]–[50]) because the directors did not appeal against Mann J’s decision refusing to allow them to adopt that argument as part of their case.
- [63]
[63] Lord Sumption delivered the leading judgment in the UK Supreme Court. He agreed (at [41]) with Mann J that: (a) purpose A was the only proper purpose for exercising the power; (b) that purpose B was therefore an improper purpose; and (c) that the directors’ resolution therefore had to be set aside. All of the other Supreme Court justices agreed with Lord Sumption on this part of his judgment. These holdings were all that were necessary to dispose of the appeal in the minority shareholders’ favour given the oral arguments presented on appeal.
- [64]
[64] In obiter dicta, however, Lord Sumption (with whom Lord Hodge agreed) expressed the view that the causation argument which Mann J had raised and addressed in his judgment was correct in law (Eclairs at [21]–[22]). In other words, Lord Sumption was prepared to hold that, where a fiduciary (such as a director) has in mind both a proper and an ulterior purpose in exercising a power, and where the weightiest purpose for doing so is the improper purpose, a challenge to the exercise of the power will nevertheless fail if the fiduciary can prove that he would have exercised the power in the same way even if he had had regard only to the proper purpose. By the same token, where the weightiest purpose for which the fiduciary exercised the power is a proper purpose, a challenge to the exercise of the power will nevertheless succeed if the party challenging it can prove that the fiduciary would have exercised the power in the same way even if he had had no regard to the proper purpose.
- [65]
[65] This amounts to saying that, where a director exercises a power for both a proper and an improper purpose, his primary or dominant purpose ought to be identified by ascertaining the “but for” cause for his exercise of the power rather than by ascertaining the weightiest purpose for his exercise of the power. As Lord Sumption said (at [21]):
Put this way, replacing the “weightiest purpose” test with the “but for” test operates bilaterally: both in favour of and against the fiduciary.
- [66]
[66] Lord Sumption accepted that both tests would often lead to the same result in practice. But he opined that the “but for” test was preferable for two reasons, one conceptual and one practical. The conceptual reason was that adopting the “but for” test assimilated the rule applicable to directors exercising a power with the general rule applicable to all other fiduciaries exercising a power. That rule, based on the equitable doctrine of a fraud on the power, is that a fiduciary’s exercise of his power is invalid unless all of the purposes for which he exercises it are proper purposes. Looked at that way, it is anomalous to uphold the exercise of a director’s power on the basis that his primary or dominant purpose was a proper purpose. That means that a challenge to a director’s exercise of a power will fail even if one of his less weighty purposes was an improper purpose, whereas a challenge to a fiduciary’s exercise of a power in the same context would succeed. By the same token, it is conceptually difficult to justify setting aside a director’s decision merely because his weightiest purpose was an improper purpose if that improper purpose had no causative effect on the exercise of the power (Eclairs at [21]).
- [68]
[68] Lord Clarke was inclined to agree with this part of Lord Sumption’s judgment but preferred not to reach a final conclusion on the issue because it did not arise for decision in that case (Eclairs at [46]). Lord Mance too preferred not to express a view on this issue until it arose for decision. But he expressed several doubts about Lord Sumption’s alternative analysis (Eclairs at [50]–[55]). Lord Neuberger agreed with both Lord Clarke and Lord Mance.
- [69]
[69] As I said, this part of Lord Sumption’s judgment in Eclairs is obiter dicta. In addition, he was in the minority in advocating this approach to identifying a director’s primary or dominant purpose as the approach to be applied to future cases. The position at common law in England remains, therefore, that a challenge to the exercise of a power by a director who has exercised the power for both a proper and an ulterior purpose will turn on whether the director’s primary or dominant purpose in exercising the power was a proper purpose, only in the sense of the proper purpose being the weightiest purpose for which he exercised it (see [56] above).
Position in Australia
- [70]
[70] In Whitehouse and another v Carlton Hotel Pty Ltd (1987) 162 CLR 285 (“Whitehouse”), the High Court of Australia considered the “but for” test in the context of a director’s exercise of a power. Like Eclairs, the issue in Whitehouse was also a director’s duty to act for proper purposes generally, and not in the context of exercising his right to inspect a company’s records under the Australian equivalent of s 199(3).
- [71]
[71] In Whitehouse, a director had allotted shares to his two sons. The other shareholders complained that the allotment was for an ulterior purpose, ie, to prevent them from exercising control over the company (at 288–289). The High Court of Australia agreed with the other shareholders, finding that the allotment of the shares was to favour one group of shareholders over another and therefore an ulterior exercise of the director’s power to allot shares (at 291–292).
- [72]
[72] In coming to their decision for the majority, Mason, Deane and Dawson JJ noted that the case before them was not one in which the director had acted for a combination of proper and ulterior purposes. Nevertheless, they expressed the view obiter that where a director exercises a power for multiple purposes, some of which are proper purposes and some of which are ulterior purposes, the exercise of the power will nevertheless be voidable if the ulterior purpose was the “but for” cause of the director exercising the power as he did, even if the weightiest purposes for his doing so were proper purposes (Whitehouse at 294):
- [73]
[73] The important point about Whitehouse is that the majority endorsed the “but for” test as operating only unilaterally, ie, either as the only ground for setting aside a director’s exercise of a power or as an additional ground for doing so. They did not in terms endorse it operating bilaterally as Lord Sumption did in Eclairs, ie, as a ground for both upholding and avoiding the director’s exercise of the power (see [65] above). Lord Mance made this very point in Eclairs (at [53]) when he expressed the need for caution in accepting Lord Sumption’s new principle as the principle to be applied going forward in a case in which the issue did not arise for decision.
Conclusion on mixed purposes
- [74]
[74] As I have pointed out, both Eclairs and Whitehouse are cases on a director’s general obligation to exercise his powers for proper purposes. I leave aside for the moment, without expressing any view on it, whether the “but for” test suffices to identify a director’s primary or dominant purpose within the sphere Lord Sumption intended his dicta to operate and whether it can do so bilaterally. It suffices only to say that Lord Mance pointed to a number of reasons why Lord Sumption’s analysis was: (a) difficult to reconcile with the existing case law on the exercise of a corporate power by a director as opposed to the exercise of a discretionary power by a trustee (at [51]–[52]); (b) difficult to reconcile with the existing case law on mixed purposes (at [53]); and (c) created at least as many practical difficulties as it appeared to solve (at [54] –[55]).
- [75]
[75] But even if Lord Sumption is correct in advocating the “but for” test within that sphere, it appears to me that there are three difficulties with trying to apply the “but for” test to a director exercising his power to inspect records under s 199(3) of the Act.
- [76]
[76] First, the power under consideration in Eclairs was one which the company’s constitution vested in the directors to exercise for and on behalf of the company as its agent. It is to address the principal-agent problem which arises when an agent exercises a power for a principal that equity requires a director to have the power’s proper purpose as his primary or dominant purpose for exercising it. Further, the exercise of the directors’ power in Eclairs actually altered the company’s legal rights and obligations. It prevented the aggrieved minority shareholders from exercising their right as against the company and as against the company’s other shareholders to vote at the general meeting. That potential to alter a company’s rights or obligations is another aspect of the principal-agent problem which is the reason for equity’s requirement.
- [77]
[77] The power to inspect the company’s records under s 199(3) is not a power which the director exercises for and on behalf of the company as its agent. It is a personal power vested in the director – albeit one given to him to enable him properly to perform his duties as a director – which the director exercises in the first instance for himself alone. Further, a director’s power to inspect the company’s records under s 199(3) is – as far as the company is concerned – a legally neutral act. A director exercising the power to inspect does not and cannot in itself alter any of the company’s rights or obligations, whether as between the company and its shareholders, as between the shareholders inter se or as between the company and third parties. Exercising the power merely vindicates the director’s statutory right to inspect the company’s records. All of this suggests that the test for ascertaining a director’s purpose in the usual case of a director exercising a power for and on behalf of the company as its agent to bind the company in its legal relations with third parties is not a useful guide for ascertaining a director’s purpose in exercising the power to inspect records under s 199(3).
- [78]
[78] Second, Lord Sumption’s principle makes sense only when it is applied to a power which has actually been exercised. A director’s purpose for exercising a power does not become susceptible to sensible forensic examination until that purpose is irrevocably attached to an actual exercise of that power. Until the power is actually exercised, the director’s purpose remains entirely amorphous and, most importantly, mutable. Any challenge to a director’s future exercise of a power on the grounds that the director intends to do so for an ulterior purpose is entirely hypothetical. It can easily be defeated simply by the director changing his stated purpose for the future exercise. It is only after a power has actually been exercised that it makes any sense at all to ask what was the director’s primary or dominant purpose in exercising the power and to ask Lord Sumption’s further question: “Would the director have exercised the power in the same way if he had acted only for a proper purpose?”.
- [79]
[79] In practical terms, a director’s purpose in seeking to inspect the company’s records under s 199(3) will always be analysed before the inspection takes place. If it is found that the director’s weightiest purpose for seeking inspection is an ulterior purpose, his application to compel inspection fails. It makes no sense then, given that the director has not actually inspected the documents, to give the director a second bite of the cherry by asking the further question which Lord Sumption’s dicta in Eclairs poses: “Would the director still want to inspect the records if he were acting for a proper purpose?”.
- [80]
[80] Third, the incidence of the burden of proof in relation to purpose is different in the two classes of case. In Eclairs, as in every case where a director is called upon to justify the exercise of a power for and on behalf of the company, the burden rests on the director to show that he exercised the power for a proper purpose. In the present application, as in every application to inspect a company’s records, the burden rests on those opposing the inspection to show that the director seeks to inspect the company’s records for an ulterior purpose. The innovation of Lord Sumption’s dicta in Eclairs is to give a director an additional ground on which to justify the exercise of a power. But a director on an application under s 199(3) has no burden to justify the exercise of the power to inspect the records at all. Further, even if one views the majority’s dicta in Whitehouse strictly – as recognising the “but for” test of purpose either as the only or an additional ground on which to invalidate the exercise of a director’s power where the weightiest purpose is a proper purpose – it would mean that a director’s right to inspect the company’s records would be defeated even if the weightiest purpose for seeking inspection is a proper purpose. That appears to me to be too great an inroad into the director’s prima facie right to inspect under s 199(3), particularly when the preceding two points I have made are kept in mind.
- [81]
[81] For these reasons, I hold that the test to be applied in determining whether a director’s primary or dominant purpose in seeking to inspect the company’s records under s 199(3) is an ulterior purpose is to ask whether an ulterior purpose is the weightiest purpose for which he seeks inspection, ie, whether the purpose about which he feels most strongly in seeking to inspect the records is an ulterior purpose. I do not consider that there is any scope for the “but for” analysis to apply, either bilaterally in the Eclairs sense or unilaterally in the Whitehouse sense, when considering the director’s power to seek inspection of a company’s records under s 199(3).
Has there been a contravention of the Act?
- [83]
[83] It is a condition precedent for granting relief under s 399, s 409A(1) and s 409A(2) that there has been a contravention of the Act (see [43] above). The burden of establishing that the condition precedent for relief under this section is satisfied must rest on the director, as the person seeking the relief. However, consistently with the absolute nature of the director’s right to inspect the company’s records, that burden will be easily discharged where the contravention is a failure to comply with s 199(3).
- [84]
[84] The defendants say that there has been no contravention of the Act on the facts. Those facts are as follows.
- [85]
[85] In June 2015, Kiri Industries commenced a minority oppression suit against Senda and the company seeking relief under s 216 of the Act. That action has been transferred to the Singapore International Commercial Court and is now being tried.
- [87]
[87] The plaintiff’s letter elicited three further letters, all dated 1 August 2015.
(a) The first letter was from Senda to the company. Senda took the position, as against the company, that the plaintiff was seeking to review the enumerated documents and information for an ulterior purpose and that whether the plaintiff should be allowed to do so was a matter for the company’s directors to decide as a board in the interests of the company. The implication of that position is that it was not for the company’s management to decide unilaterally whether to supply the enumerated documents and information to the plaintiff.
(b) The second letter was from the company to the plaintiff signed by its chief executive officer setting out management’s response. They informed the plaintiff – adopting the position which Senda had taken as against the company – that: (i) whether to accede to the plaintiff’s request to review the documents and information was a matter for the company’s directors to decide as a board; and (ii) the request had accordingly been referred to the directors.
(c) The third letter was a joint letter from the three Longsheng Directors to the plaintiff. They took the position that: (i) the plaintiff’s complaint in his letter that information was being withheld from him was part of the subject-matter of the minority oppression suit which Kiri Industries had commenced against Senda in June 2015; (ii) Senda’s concern that Kiri Industries, Mr Manishkumar and entities related to both of them were wrongfully competing against the company was also part of subject-matter of the minority oppression suit; and (iii) the Longsheng Directors were accordingly concerned that the documents and information which the plaintiff now sought to review might not be used to further the interests of the company but instead for the purposes of the minority oppression suit or to compete with the company.
- [88]
[88] The Longsheng Directors’ letter concluded by making the plaintiff’s request for documents subject to the plaintiff first addressing the Longsheng Directors’ concerns about wrongful competition:
- [89]
[89] The plaintiff responded to the company and to the Longsheng Directors by two separate letters, both dated 7 August 2015. He made four points in the two letters: (a) he was statutorily entitled to the “information” enumerated in his July 2015 letter; (b) the fact that the “information” which he sought was the subject of legal proceedings did not defeat his statutory entitlement to it; (c) he denied that either Kiri Industries or Mr Manishkumar were competing with the DyStar group; and (d) he rejected the Longsheng Directors’ attempt to make his right to the “information” conditional on his addressing the Longsheng Directors’ allegation that Kiri Industries was wrongfully competing with the DyStar group.
- [90]
[90] On these facts, the defendants submit that they have not refused the plaintiff access to the information in question. Instead, what they did was to invite the plaintiff to discuss his request with them after he had addressed their allegations about wrongful competition. The plaintiff failed to respond to that invitation. Therefore the Act has not been contravened and the plaintiff’s application ought to be dismissed.
- [91]
[91] I do not accept this submission. In the analysis which follows, I assume that the plaintiff sought to review the documents set out in the schedule to his July 2015 letter for a proper purpose.
- [92]
[92] The first point I make is that at least part of what the plaintiff sought to inspect by his July 2015 letter falls within the scope of the term “accounting and other records” of the company within the meaning of s 199(1). Despite that, he has not yet been permitted to inspect any of the company’s records. That appears to me – at the very minimum – to amount to a “failure” to comply with the Act within the meaning of s 399(1) and s 409A(2)(b). A “failure” for the purposes of these provisions can be entirely passive and can be established by an omission to act in the face of a duty to act. That failure suffices, in itself, to enliven my power under both s 399(1) and s 409A(2)(b).
- [93]
[93] Second, even if I were to focus on the words “contravention” and “refusal”, within the meaning of s 399(1), s 409A(1)(b) and s 409A(2)(b) of the Act, I consider that there has been a contravention of s 199(3) of the Act or a refusal to comply with it even though the Longsheng Directors’ August 2015 letter does not, on its face, refuse inspection. On the assumptions I have made, the plaintiff, acting for a proper purpose, asked by his July 2015 letter to be allowed to review certain documents, some of which at least are the company’s “accounting and other records” within the meaning of s 199(1). He has not been permitted to inspect those records to date. The root cause of that is the condition precedent which the Longsheng Directors attached unilaterally in the concluding paragraph of their August 2015 letter to the plaintiff’s absolute right to inspect, requiring the plaintiff to address their allegation that Kiri Industries was engaging in wrongful competition with the DyStar Group. There is no legal basis for a company or its directors to attach a condition precedent to a director’s exercise of a right to inspect the company’s records under s 199(3) (see Wuu at [36]). That right is an absolute right, in the sense I have already described (see [20(a)] above). The Longsheng Directors’ response to the plaintiff’s letter amounted to a constructive refusal even if it did not amount to an express refusal.
- [95]
[95] For present purposes, it suffices to say that I am satisfied that the Longsheng Directors, when they wrote their August 2015 letter, had no intention of acceding to any part of the plaintiff’s request in his July 2015 letter. The Longsheng Directors, through their majority on the company’s board, have the power to direct the company’s management. I have no doubt that the Longsheng Directors would never have allowed the plaintiff to inspect anything even if: (a) the plaintiff had provided the explanation sought in paragraph 6 of the August 2015 letter; (b) responded to the Longsheng Directors’ invitation to discuss his request further; and (c) limited his request only to those documents which indisputably fell within the scope of “accounting and other records”.
- [96]
[96] If the position were otherwise, the Longsheng Directors would not have defended this application root and branch as doggedly as they did. The invitation in paragraph 6 of the Longsheng Directors’ August 2015 letter was a disingenuous attempt to dress up, for future tactical forensic advantage, a door which the Longsheng Directors intended to hold firmly closed as one which they were holding ajar.
- [97]
[97] I find, therefore, that there has been a contravention of the Act sufficient to enliven my power under s 409A(1)(b) and also a refusal – or, at the absolute minimum, a failure to comply with the Act – sufficient to enliven my power under both s 399(1) and s 409A(2)(b).
Have the Longsheng Directors been correctly joined?
- [98]
[98] The defendants’ second ground of opposition to the plaintiff’s application is that the Longsheng Directors have been incorrectly joined to this application.
- [99]
[99] The plaintiff cites Lim Kok Leong v Seen Joo Co Pte Ltd and others [2015] 1 SLR 688 (“Lim Kok Leong”) to argue that the Longsheng Directors have been properly joined as defendants in this application. In Lim Kok Leong, Tan Siong Thye J held (at [56]–[63]) that the statutory obligation to permit inspection under s 199(3) is – unlike the common law obligation – an obligation not only of the company but also of its directors and managers. He therefore upheld the plaintiff’s decision in that case to bring his application against not only the company but also against its executive directors.
- [100]
[100] The defendants, on the other hand, argue that the statutory basis for Tan J’s decision in Lim Kok Leong has changed because a material aspect of s 199(1) on which Tan J relied for his decision has since been deleted by amendment. Tan J held (at [61]–[62]) that the class of persons who were obliged to permit a director to inspect the company’s records under s 199(3) must be determined by reference to the class of persons who were obliged to keep those same records under s 199(1). Section 199(1), as it stood when Lim Kok Leong was decided, imposed the duty to keep those records expressly on both the company and on its “directors and managers”. That was why Tan J held that the Act imposed a duty not only on the company but also on the directors and managers to permit inspection of those records under s 199(3). Given the wording of s 199(1) then, it was entirely appropriate to hold the directors responsible for contravening s 199(3) and therefore also to join them to an aggrieved director’s application for civil relief.
- [101]
[101] But, the defendants go on to point out, s 199(1) was amended with effect from 1 July 2015 by deleting the phrase “and the directors and managers thereof” from s 199(1). The result is that the duty to keep a company’s records under s 199(1) now rests on the company alone. As a result, the Longsheng Directors ceased with effect from 1 July 2015 – a date before both the plaintiff’s July 2015 letter and this application – to be under any obligation to keep the company’s records under s 199(1). They therefore cannot be held to be in breach of s 199(3) for failing to permit the plaintiff to inspect those records. The Longsheng Directors should therefore never have been joined to this application.
- [102]
[102] There is considerable force in the defendants’ arguments. As a matter of the plain meaning of language, the current wording of s 199(1) imposes the obligation to keep a company’s records on the company itself and on no other person. That plain meaning is reinforced by the fact that the current wording of s 199(1) is the result of deleting the phrase “and the directors and managers thereof” from s 199(1). The deletion is evidence of a clear intent to remove a company’s directors and managers from the class of persons subject to the duty to keep the company’s records under s 199(1) in its original form.
- [103]
[103] The legislative history of this deletion from s 199(1) further reinforces the plain meaning of the current s 199(1) as its true construction, being the intended result of the deletion. The deletion was effected by s 114(a) of the Companies (Amendment) Act (No 40/2014) (“the amendment Act”) enacted on 8 October 2014. The amendment Act was the culmination of a seven-year process of law reform which began in April 2007 with the formation of a distinguished steering committee chaired by Professor Walter Woon to review and rewrite the Act.
- [105]
[105] The Ministry of Finance (“MOF”) accepted the steering committee’s recommendation on s 199(1) (Ministry of Finance’s Responses to the Report of the Steering Committee for Review of the Companies Act (3 October 2012) at paras 237–238). However, MOF’s response did not address the steering committee’s conclusion that no reform was required of the class of persons subject to the duty under s 199(1). Instead, MOF’s response simply accepted the steering committee’s conclusion that no reform of s 199 was required to provide a comprehensive list of the type of accounting records that were to be kept.
- [106]
[106] Up to this point, there appears to have been no positive intention on the part of the government stakeholders driving this suite of reforms to the Act to change the class of persons subject to the duty to keep the company’s records under s 199(1): the duty was to remain upon the company “and the directors and managers thereof” as recommended by the steering committee.
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