High Court · Decided 30 April 2018
Abhilash s/o Kunchian Krishnan v Yeo Hock Huat and ano ther
Feedback & support[2018] SGHC 107 · Case no. Suit No 917 of 2016 · 37 paragraphs
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Introduction
Background
- [4]
[4] Mr Abhilash is in the business of manufacturing machines for the aerospace industry. He ran his business through two companies, one of which was called Vanilla Aviation Pte Ltd (“Vanilla Aviation”). Near the end of 2003, he met Mr Yeo, who was, at that time, running a successful business manufacturing and selling industrial washing machines to international clients. Mr Yeo operated his business through a number of companies with the “JCS” namesake, one of which was called JCS-Echigo Pte Ltd (“JCS-Echigo”). With the hope of expanding his business into manufacturing for the aerospace industry, Mr Yeo formed a business partnership with Mr Abhilash for that purpose and set up a company called JCS-Vanilla Pte Ltd. The company was later renamed JCS-Vanetec, who is the second defendant in this action. For convenience, I shall refer to it by its existing name.
- [5]
[5] At JCS-Vanetec’s inception, its 10,000 shares were held in the proportion of 50.99%, 0.01%, and 49% by Mr Yeo, Ms Elise Hong (who was an officer of JCS-Echigo), and Mr Abhilash through Vanilla Aviation respectively. JCS-Vanetec later issued more shares and the proportions of its shareholding also changed as a result. At present, JCS-Vanetec has issued 550,000 shares. Mr Yeo holds 433,500 shares, which is 78.8% of JCS-Vanetec’s shareholding. One of Mr Yeo’s companies, JCS Group Co Ltd (“JCS Group”), holds 40,000 shares, which is 7.3%. Mr Abhilash holds 76,500 shares, which is 13.9%.
Consent order and issues to be determined
Parties’ positions
- [17]
[17] Mr Abhilash’s principal submission was that JCS-Vanetec should be valued on an income basis, specifically, through the discounted cash flow method, by which JCS-Vanetec’s future cash flow may be used to calculate the present value of the company. Mr Abhilash argued that the income basis of valuation was appropriate because JCS-Vanetec was a going concern, and also because it had a significant amount of goodwill, which was evidenced by existing contracts, past investment offers, and certifications which qualified JCS-Vanetec to manufacture aerospace components for well known companies.
- [18]
[18] Mr Abhilash’s valuation expert, Mr Sridhar Rao (“Mr Rao”), produced two main estimations of JCS-Vanetec’s value. The first was performed on an income basis, and the value of JCS-Vanetec was determined to be $39,649,308. The second was performed on an investment basis, and the value of JCS-Vanetec was determined to be $75,699,572. Mr Abhilash submitted that the true value of the company was in between these two figures, and that therefore, the value of his 13.9% shareholding in the company should correspondingly be between $4,963,697 and $9,476,829.
Issues
(a) Which of the primarily three methods of valuation suggested by the parties’ experts was applicable: the investment basis, the income basis or the net assets basis?
- [21]
[21] In summary, my view was that the net assets basis was the applicable basis of valuation, rather than the other two bases suggested. Mr Thio’s valuation was the only valuation conducted on that basis. As there was no basis for any modification, Mr Thio’s valuation was accepted. I turn now to explain my views.
Issue 1: Valuation methods
The investment basis
- [26]
[26] Nevertheless, I found, that there was no factual basis for adopting the investment approach. While Shanghai Ossen did make an initial proposal in 2015 to invest in JCS-Vanetec, the offer was subject to a due diligence check which was never carried out, arising from Mr Abhilash’s failure to cooperate in accepting the proposal. The offer has evaporated, and it is entirely speculative as to whether another company may have similar interest. There are other methods of producing vanes and, even in respect of the particular method being used by JCS-Vanetec, there may well be other businesses capable of using the same method. In this regard, it was Mr Abhilash’s evidence that JCS-Vanetec’s first machine was purchased second-hand from the Netherlands, it was not designed by him or custom-built to his unique specifications.
Income basis or net asset basis for fair market valuation
- [27]
[27] On the premise that JCS-Vanetec’s fair market value was the basis of my assessment, I turn then to explain the accounting method upon which I assessed the fair market value of the shares.
- [29]
[29] Mr Thio accepted at the hearing that generally, the income approach is preferred to the net assets approach for a company which is going concern, such as JCS-Vanetec. His rationale for using the net assets basis of valuation was that this was the most appropriate for a loss-making company. He reiterated the point made at para 2.1.1 of his expert report that the net assets approach is suited to loss-making businesses. This was because, using an income basis of valuation, specifically in the form of the discounted cash flow method of valuation, yielded a negative value for JCS-Vanetec. He attempted a valuation of JCS-Vanetec using this method, and at para 3.3.1 of his report, he explained:
- [30]
[30] In coming to his conclusion, Mr Thio had projected an increase in revenues for JCS-Vanetec. May to December 2016 revenues were projected to increase by 125.3% in FY2017 to account for potential new business and then revenues were projected thereafter to increase steadily by 20% per annum. He also projected an increase in gross margin from 22.6% in FY2017 to 39% in FY 2021. Despite this, JCS-Vanetec was expected to become profitable only in FY2021 after cumulative losses of $2.7m from FY2016 May to FY2020 in December.
- [31]
[31] Mr Abhilash argued for an income approach on two grounds: first, that JCS-Vanetec is a going concern; and second, that JCS-Vanetec possesses intangible assets which not only have inherent value but also have the potential to generate future revenue. The first argument was tenuous. The common understanding of a “going concern” is a company that is operating with a turnover that enables the company to be self-sustaining: see, for example, Poh Fu Tek at [37] where Coomaraswamy J discusses how an income valuation may be based either on a company’s profits or future cash flows. In the present case, it is not disputed that JCS-Vanetec is historically a loss-making company that has been kept afloat by Mr Yeo’s capital injections and various bank loans. Barring a record of sufficiently strong historical revenue upon which to project future profits, there was no basis upon which to adopt an income basis valuation. It was not disputed that, without more, the company must be attributed a negative value. Accordingly, it was the second argument that was important to the analysis: it was crucial for Mr Abhilash to establish that JCS-Vanetec’s intangible assets could generate future revenue for the company. On this hypothesis, JCS-Vanetec would cease to be loss-making, and the income expected to be generated would make the income basis plausible.
- [32]
[32] I focused, therefore, on the intangible assets which were foundational to Mr Rao’s valuation. These assets comprised: (a) JCS-Vanetec’s contract with a Chinese original equipment manufacturer (“OEM”) called Aviation Industry Corporation of China (“AVIC”); (b) JCS-Vanetec’s certifications with various other OEMs; and (c) JCS-Vanetec’s patent application for a specialised industrial process it applies, referred to as the “cold-roll forming process”.
JCS-Vanetec’s intangible assets
- [33]
[33] It is appropriate, before I set out my analysis of these assets, to explain the standard of proof to which I held Mr Abhilash. In so far as Mr Abhilash submitted that the three intangible assets I have set out above represent sources of future revenue for JCS-Vanetec, he need only have shown that it was reasonable for his expert, Mr Rao, to regard them as such. That is because, as Coomaraswamy J highlights in Poh Fu Tek at [42], there is “no provable truth with regard to the future”, and that “where an expert makes an assumption as to a future event, the court must consider both qualitatively whether the expert’s assumption is reasonable in the light of the evidence and also quantitatively the likelihood of the assumed event actually materialising”. However, it should go without saying that insofar as Mr Abhilash relied on present facts to make good those reasonable assumptions, those facts had to be proved on a balance of probabilities.
(1) The AVIC contract
- [34]
[34] The first of the three intangible assets is a contract between JCS-Vanetec and AVIC (“the AVIC contract”). This is a contract for JCS-Vanetec to manufacture a product called the S3001 HPC Airfoil Assembly, which is essentially a ring component used for the manufacture of aeroplane engines, for AVIC. For convenience, I will call these products Engine Rings. There are essentially two aspects of the AVIC contract which were in dispute for the purpose of determining the value which the contract is likely to bring to JCS-Vanetec in the future:
(a) What is the nature of the deal contemplated in the AVIC contract?
(b) Does the AVIC contract represent a potential for future sales with AVIC?
- [35]
[35] I examine each question in turn.
(a) Nature of the deal contemplated in the AVIC contract
- [36]
[36] I accepted Mr Yeo’s evidence that the AVIC contract contemplates a project in which JCS-Vanetec will design and manufacture a prototype ring to be used in the manufacture of aeroplane engines. I also accepted his evidence that such contracts are awarded to other vendors, with the OEM having the final decision as to which vendor it will engage to manufacture that specific component for the engine that the OEM produces.
- [37]
[37] I accepted Mr Yeo’s evidence because it is consistent in my view with the objective documentary evidence before me, which include the following:
(a) First, the terms of the AVIC contract itself specify the delivery of a fixed number of initial articles for submission as part of a “project”, instead of stipulating unit prices and expected volumes in the manner characteristic of a manufacturing and supply contract.
(b) Second, timelines in a presentation slide by Aero Engine Corporation of China, a government-owned corporation in the business of aerospace engineering which is related to AVIC, shows that the initial design stage for the engine development is scheduled to run from 2016 to 2020 and that airworthiness is expected to be completed only in 2027. These slide correspond with Mr Yeo’s testimony on the timelines.
(c) Third, external media articles confirm that the AVIC engine development project is still in the initial development stage and is not expected to complete airworthiness certification until 2025. While these articles, without more, do not conclusively prove the truth of their contents, they nonetheless provide support for Mr Yeo’s testimony.
- [38]
[38] Accordingly, I found that the AVIC contract was for the manufacture by JCS-Vanetec of a prototype ring component which AVIC may or may not eventually select for the manufacture of its engine. Mr Abhilash led no evidence on the likelihood of AVIC accepting JCS-Vanetec’s product, or on the value of the contract itself. All he could suggest was that JCS-Vanetec is “on the brink” of being AVIC’s “supplier” for the Engine Rings – not even that it has become AVIC’s supplier – and in any case, there was no evidence to show that JCS-Vanetec is in fact close to securing such a deal. Therefore, there was no means by which I could measure the value of any future business with AVIC.
(b) Potential for future sales with Chinese OEMs
- [39]
[39] As the AVIC contract was for a prototype ring only, it did not indicate that there would be a stream of future revenue for JCS-Vanetec through business with AVIC, let alone with other Chinese OEMs.
- [40]
[40] Further, Mr Abhilash produced no documentary evidence to persuade me that sales of Engine Rings to Chinese OEMs are to be reasonably expected any time before 2025 or 2027. This is only to be expected, given that the AVIC project, as the evidence shows, is still in its developmental stage. Mr Abhilash also produced no documentary evidence on the sale price of the Engine Rings, as the defendants correctly observed. While his valuation expert, Mr Rao, assumed that Engine Rings may be sold to AVIC at a constant price of $50,170, there was simply no objective evidence for such a price. Mr Rao admitted in cross-examination that this was his own estimate; and clearly, I could not give any weight to this estimate because Mr Rao was here as an expert in the valuation of companies, not as an expert in the sale and manufacture of aircraft components.
- [41]
[41] In my judgment, Mr Abhilash had no reasonable basis to show that the AVIC contract reasonably represented a source of future revenue for JCS-Vanetec such that the income basis would be more appropriate for valuing the company.
- [42]
[42] In this regard, Mr Abhilash argued that any such uncertainty should not mean that the AVIC contract should be entirely excluded from an expert’s projection of JCS-Vanetec’s future earnings but instead needs only to be taken into account, under the income basis, by increasing the applicable discount rate on a discounted cash flow analysis. Mr Abhilash stated that this was how the court in Poh Fu Tek accounted for the fact that there might be no future sales relationship between the company being valued in that case and a client of that company called Roxol.
- [43]
[43] In my view, Mr Abhilash’s reliance on that aspect of Poh Fu Tek was misplaced. In that case, there was clear evidence that the company being valued had past sales with Roxol, which the court held to be a sufficient basis for the expert to project future similar sales despite the uncertainty of such sales actually materialising: Poh Fu Tek at [89]. In contrast, in this case, it is not disputed that JCS-Vanetec has never sold any goods to AVIC prior to the AVIC contract. There is no evidence that these two companies have a prior business relationship.
(2) JCS-Vanetec’s certifications
- [44]
[44] Next, Mr Abhilash suggested that JCS-Vanetec’s future sources of revenue may also be estimated by its business relationships with other OEMs, who have certified it to be their supplier. In this regard, Mr Abhilash relied on (a) a certificate of approval issued by Rolls Royce; (b) a certificate of registration issued by the United Registrar of Systems for fabricating components for aircraft engines; and (c) a certification to be a vane supplier to General Electric.
- [46]
[46] Accordingly, I found that the certificates Mr Abhilash relied upon are an insufficient basis to make any reasonable assumption about JCS-Vanetec’s future sales.
(3) Patent application for cold-roll forming process
- [48]
[48] Again, while I did not doubt that this technology may well be put to good use, Mr Abhilash produced no evidence to help me estimate its worth in enabling JCS-Vanetec to generate future sales. Moreover, Mr Abhilash did not deny that no patent has been obtained for this technology; and the defendants point out that no patent has been obtained even though the patent application was made four years ago in 2013. Moreover, JCS-Vanetec is not the only company in the world that has the cold-roll forming technology. It is contained in a machine that on Mr Abhilash’s evidence was purchased second-hand from the Netherlands. It was therefore also not clear that the technology sought to be patented was novel. Without expert evidence on how an in-progress patent application should be valued, I had no basis upon which to draw any conclusion on the value that the cold-roll forming process contributed to JCS-Vanetec without reference to the sales it may generate.
Conclusion on basis for valuation
- [49]
[49] Accordingly, none of the intangible assets that Mr Abhilash referred to – the AVIC contract, the certifications and the cold-roll forming process – could reasonably be said to be sources of future revenue for JCS-Vanetec, in large part because he did not produce a single piece of evidence that would assist me in the determination of the existence, likelihood and size of such revenue.
- [50]
[50] In this context, I observe that, as I alluded to at [29], Mr Thio in his expert report performed an assessment of JCS-Vanetec’s value not only on a net assets basis but also on an income basis. Mr Thio’s income basis assessment does not (for good reason, as I have found) take into account future revenue from sales to AVIC, unlike Mr Rao’s valuation. Importantly, on Mr Thio’s assessment, JCS-Vanetec would remain loss-making until the financial year ending 31 December 2018, with a small profit in 2019 and 2020. The valuation of JCS-Vanetec, on the income approach, thus adjusted, still remained at zero. Accordingly, it was in my judgment correct for the defendants to say that Mr Rao’s income projections were “tainted by his completely wrong basis of projecting sales” to AVIC, and that since these projections form a “core part” of Mr Rao’s valuation, his valuation should be rejected. Mr Rao’s valuation was premised on factual assumptions which are not supported by the evidence and it would not be apposite to accept his valuation.
Issue 2: Valuation to be used
- [52]
[52] Mr Thio’s net assets value (“NAV”) valuation was the only available NAV valuation of the company in evidence, and was therefore my starting point. Critically, Mr Rao did not offer a counter-valuation on the NAV basis, and so Mr Abhilash had no viable basis upon which to impugn Mr Thio’s valuation. I also found no basis for adjusting the valuation that Mr Thio had reached. I shall now elaborate.
Should Mr Thio’s valuation be adjusted?
- [53]
[53] Mr Rao did not prepare a counter-valuation of JCS-Vanetec on the net assets basis. His principal criticism against Mr Thio’s valuation was that it failed to take into account the value of JCS-Vanetec’s intangible assets. As I had concluded that those assets did not provide good reason for adopting the income basis of valuation, the issue was how that criticism should affect the NAV analysis. On this question, Mr Rao had no view. During the trial, I asked Mr Rao what his valuation of the company would be on the net assets basis if I were to find the income basis unsuitable. He was unable to give an answer, responding: “I wouldn’t know right off the cuff”. Indeed, he was unable even to comment on how in concrete terms he would differ from Mr Thio’s NAV valuation of JCS-Vanetec. When I asked him whether he had taken a look at Mr Thio’s report and whether he had a view on it, he said, “I would think you should ask Mr Thio, since he is here”. The result is that Mr Abhilash had no expert evidence with which to critique the specific assumptions and calculations that went into Mr Thio’s valuation.
- [55]
[55] Two more submissions made by Mr Abhilash remain to be dealt with. The first was that JCS-Vanetec cannot be worth only $109,589 because a Chinese company called Shanghai Ossen expressed interest in 2015 to purchase all of JCS-Vanetec’s shares for $50m. In the event, the investment did not proceed, but the suggestion was that the mere fact of this investment shows that JCS-Vanetec must be worth more than Mr Thio’s valuation. Mr Abhilash said that Shanghai Ossen “would not have thrown up the figure of S$50 million … if they did not reasonably carry out background checks and were reasonably satisfied that it was justified”.
- [56]
[56] As I have mentioned at [26] above, I rejected the related submission that there was a factual basis for valuing JCS-Vanetec on an investment basis. I also rejected any idea that Mr Thio’s valuation should be adjusted in any way because of this offer, for three reasons. First, the contention that Shanghai Ossen would not have suggested the figure unless they had done their checks is speculation: no evidence on this was led by Mr Abhilash. Second, the offer was subject to a due diligence check which was never carried out. Third, the price offer of $50m is an offer which a specific entity proposed at a particular time. No evidence was led on their particular reasons for so doing, and there is also no evidence that any other entities value JCS-Vanetec in the same way.
- [57]
[57] Mr Abhilash’s other submission was based on the undisputed fact that Mr Yeo in November 2015 arranged for 40,000 new shares in JCS-Vanetec, valued at $37.50 each (and thus having a total value of $1.5m) to be allotted to one of his other companies, JCS-Group Pte Ltd. Accordingly, it was said that JCS-Vanetec’s total shares cannot be worth only $109,589.
- [58]
[58] I rejected this submission for two reasons. First, as the defendants correctly submit, Mr Rao did not challenge Mr Thio’s view that the share price for a share allotment does not necessarily reflect the value of every share in the company, especially where the company is a private company. Second, Mr Yeo provided a positive explanation for the price of $37.50, and it is an explanation that I found sensible. His evidence was that the $1.5m transaction was an injection of capital into JCS-Vanetec, which was then in need of funds. Consideration for that transaction of $1.5m was provided in the form of JCS-Vanetec’s shares, and the number of shares issued was calibrated to ensure that the value of Mr Abhilash’s shareholding after the capital injection would neither be inflated nor diluted excessively. I accepted this evidence. I should make clear that, in coming to this finding, I did not (and it was unnecessary for me to) draw any conclusion about whether Mr Yeo had or had not acted oppressively towards Mr Abhilash’s minority interest: see [6] above.
- [59]
[59] For the reasons above, I accepted Mr Thio’s NAV valuation of JCS-Vanetec as the proper valuation to be adopted.
Should any adjustment be made for transactions challenged by Mr Abhilash?
(a) the payment of $53,500 by JCS-Vanetech to Grant Thornton Advisory Services;
(b) the payment of $535,000 by JCS-Vanetec to JCS Greentech Pte Ltd (“JCS Greentech”), another one of Mr Yeo’s companies, for a washing machine; and
(c) the payment of $780,000 to JCS-Vanetec to JCS Group.
- [61]
[61] During their concurrent evidence, Mr Rao and Mr Thio agreed that transaction (a) had no material effect on the valuation of JCS-Vanetec. There was therefore no need for me to consider it further.
- [63]
[63] Finally, transaction (c) is related to the capital injection of $1.5m that I have mentioned at [57] above. It was not disputed that after JCS Group transferred $1.5m to JCS-Vanetec on 20 November 2015, a Friday, Mr Yeo just three days later on 23 November 2015 withdrew $780,000 to the benefit of JCS Group. Mr Abhilash’s contention, based purely on the short duration within which that substantial sum was withdrawn, was that Mr Yeo was “simply manipulating the accounts and the shareholding of [JCS-Vanetec] to his benefit instead of allowing [JCS-Vanetec] to be able to rely on the funds to continue or even to increase its production capacity”.
- [64]
[64] I rejected this submission for two reasons. First, Mr Thio’s evidence, which was not challenged, was that even if the $780,000 was paid out improperly, that would not affect the NAV valuation of JCS-Vanetec. That was sufficient to dispose of the issue. Second, and in any event, I found that Mr Abhilash had failed to show on a balance of probabilities that the transaction was in some way improper. As the defendants observe, the loan agreement underlying the capital injection of $1.5m – which was signed by Mr Abhilash himself – provides that the JCS-Vanetec is liable to repay the loan on demand. Mr Abhilash’s forensic accounting expert, Mr Low See Lien, accepted that if the payment of $780,000 was a repayment of a loan “vis-à-vis the terms and contracts of a loan”, then there is no impropriety in the repayment. Against this factual context, Mr Abhilash failed to persuade me that there was on a balance of probabilities anything improper about the repayment.
Conclusion