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Grounds publishedDecided 18 Jul 2018

High Court

Lim Ah Leh v Heng Fock Lin

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[2018] SGHC 156Case no. Suit No 449 of 2014

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Grounds of decision

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  1. Introduction

  2. [2] The plaintiff is a citizen of New Zealand and carries on business there. The defendant is a citizen of Singapore and carries on business here. The defendant and the plaintiff are in-laws: the plaintiff’s wife is the defendant’s sister. Sadly, this suit has caused a permanent rift between the defendant and five of her seven siblings – including the plaintiff’s wife – most of whom gave evidence for the plaintiff at trial.

  3. [3] The plaintiff’s case in this action is simple: (i) the defendant became the trustee of all of the money which she received from him; (ii) she therefore owes him a number of fiduciary duties, including a duty to account for how she managed and invested the money; and (iii) she is in breach of those fiduciary duties.

  4. [4] The plaintiff’s claim rests on events which took place as long ago as 1993. The oral evidence before me is stale and the documentary evidence is limited. The passage of time also raises interesting questions at the intersection of the law of limitation and the law of trusts. Those questions have ultimately proved to be determinative of this action.

  5. Summary of my findings

  6. [6] The following is a summary of my findings. The defendant did receive substantially all of the sums of money which the plaintiff claims to have paid to her. It is common ground that the plaintiff did not intend to make a gift of these sums to the defendant. She therefore held each sum, as and when received, on a presumed resulting trust for the plaintiff. That does not mean, in itself, that the defendant owed the plaintiff any fiduciary duties. But she did owe the plaintiff at least a duty to account and a duty not to place herself in a position of conflict between her personal interests and the plaintiff’s interests.

  7. [7] The plaintiff’s claim, however, is time-barred. The plaintiff commenced this action on 28 April 2014. It is common ground that the plaintiff last paid a sum of money to the defendant in 2007. Section 6(2) of the Limitation Act bars a claim for an account in so far as the plaintiff seeks to go back more than six years before the action was commenced. That section applies to an action for an account arising from a resulting trust as it does in the case of one arising from an express trust.

  8. [8] None of the exceptions to s 6(2) created by s 22(1) of the Limitation Act apply. First, the defendant, although in breach of her duty to account, is not in fraudulent breach of that duty. Second, the defendant did not breach her duty not to place herself in a position of conflict between her own interests and those of the plaintiff. Finally, the plaintiff has failed to prove that any of the trust property remains in the defendant’s possession or has been converted by her to her own use.

  9. Factual background

  10. The parties

  11. [10] The plaintiff and his wife, Mdm Heng Fock Too (also known as Elina Lim) married in or around 1990. They live in New Zealand. From 1983 to 2011, the plaintiff managed a number of businesses in New Zealand, including a business exporting wool and sheepskin and an associated retail business in the tourism sector. Both businesses were conducted through a company incorporated in New Zealand known as The Woolbarn Ltd.

  12. [11] The plaintiff and his wife visited Singapore regularly. The plaintiff’s wife had family here and the plaintiff attended travel fairs here. During one of these visits to Singapore in the early 1990s, the plaintiff became acquainted with the defendant. At that time, he was about 50 and she was in her early thirties. She was then a young partner in a book-keeping business called Heng Management Services (“Heng Management”) which she had founded in 1988. She was also a director and a shareholder of a company incorporated in Singapore in 1992 known as Vescoplastics (SEA) Pte Ltd (“Vescoplastics”).

  13. The parties enter into an arrangement

  14. [13] The arrangement between the parties involved, at the very least, the defendant investing the plaintiff’s money and paying the proceeds to the plaintiff from time to time. The defendant made two main investments with the plaintiff’s money.

  15. The Shanghai properties

  16. [14] The first main investment was to purchase an office unit in a Shanghai development. The defendant wanted to set up an office in Shanghai for Vescoplastics and decided to buy an office unit. At the same time, she told the plaintiff that this was an opportunity for him to buy an office unit in the same development. He agreed to invest in two office units. I will call the plaintiff’s two office units the “Shanghai properties”. The purchase of the Shanghai properties was completed in 1998. The defendant’s staff in Shanghai assisted in letting the Shanghai properties and collecting the rent.

  17. [15] The defendant sold the Shanghai properties in 2004. The proceeds of sale were, however, repatriated to Singapore only in 2008. The delay was due to the strict capital controls in place in China.

  18. [16] The money due to the plaintiff from the sale of the Shanghai properties was eventually paid out of China into an account in Singapore with Citibank in the joint names of the defendant and her husband. The defendant kept the plaintiff aware of this. The defendant then used the money in that account to trade in foreign exchange on the plaintiff’s behalf.

  19. [17] The defendant closed this Citibank account in early 2009 and transferred the balance into a new Citibank account in the joint names of the plaintiff, his wife and the defendant. The defendant continued to use the plaintiff’s money in this new Citibank account to trade in foreign exchange. In addition, she used some of the money to invest in gold and to buy shares in Citibank. She did so under the plaintiff’s directions.

  20. The Rochor property

  21. [18] The second main investment which the defendant made with the plaintiff’s money was in shares in a company called GK Holding Pte Ltd (“GK Holding”). The main asset of GK Holding was a commercial property in Sim Lim Square at 1 Rochor Canal Road which was let to retail shops and a food court. I shall call this the “Rochor property”.

  22. [19] The parties invested in shares in GK Holding in two tranches. They acquired the first tranche in 1994. At that time, a shareholder of GK Holding was offering 15% of the company for sale. The defendant told the plaintiff about this opportunity. The plaintiff agreed to buy 10% of GK Holding out of the 15% on offer. The defendant agreed to buy the remaining 5%. The defendant paid Teo Chye Har, a minority shareholder of GK Holding, for these shares. As a result of this purchase, the plaintiff became the legal owner of 15% of GK Holding. He held 10% for himself and the additional 5% for the defendant. In 1999, he transferred that 5% to the defendant.

  23. [20] The parties acquired their second tranche of shares in GK Holding in 2000, when the majority shareholder sold all his remaining shares. The plaintiff purchased an additional 15% of GK Holding and the defendant purchased an additional 20%. As a result, they each now held 25% of GK Holding. Teo Chye Har purchased the remaining shares on offer and increased her shareholding to 50%. The defendant and her husband then took over the day to day management of GK Holding.

  24. [21] At that time, the defendant was also managing a business called Yi Kang Food & Beverage (“Yi Kang”). Yi Kang’s business was running a drinks stall from a unit at the Rochor property which it had leased from GK Holding. In 2005, when Yi Kang’s business picked up, the defendant began to share a portion of its profits with the plaintiff out of goodwill. The defendant later started two other food and beverage ventures which each leased a unit at the food court in the Rochor property from GK Holding. They were known as Dessert@Sim Lim Square LLP and Sleek Espresso Bar.

  25. [22] In 2012, GK Holding sold the Rochor property for about S$39m. The net proceeds of sale were distributed among the shareholders pro rata. The defendant and her husband then bought all the remaining shares in GK Holding from the plaintiff and Teo Chye Har. The plaintiff’s share of the proceeds from the sale of the Rochor property combined with the proceeds of the sale of his shares in GK Holding totalled about $8.75m. He and his wife visited Singapore to collect the money.

  26. The plaintiff seeks an account

  27. [23] In 2012, the plaintiff began agitating for records of the money which he had paid to the defendant and of the investments which she had made on his behalf. He asked for all bank statements, cheques and deposit records, all “inwards cash records, either in Singapore and [sic] foreign currencies”, all “outwards cash payments records” and any relevant financial records “from beginning to now”.

  28. [25] On 28 April 2014, the plaintiff commenced this action.

  29. Summary of parties’ cases

  30. [26] The plaintiff’s case is as follows. He paid the money to the defendant because she had asked him to let her manage and invest his money for him. He completely trusted the defendant and was not actively involved in selecting or managing the investments which she made on his behalf. She held the money for him on a resulting trust and owed him fiduciary duties. But she breached her duty to account and her duty not to place herself in a position of conflict between her personal interest and that of the plaintiff.

  31. [27] Although s 6(2) of the Limitation Act prima facie limits the plaintiff’s entitlement to an account to matters arising six years before he commenced this action, the plaintiff argues that the exceptions in s 22(1) apply. In particular, the plaintiff argues that: (i) the defendant committed fraudulent breaches of trust; (ii) still has trust property in her possession; and (iii) may have converted trust property to her own use. Accordingly, the plaintiff prays for the following principal relief:

  32. [28] The defendant’s response is as follows. She did not receive significant parts of the total sum which the plaintiff claims to have paid her. It was the plaintiff who asked her to help him manage and invest his money. She agreed to do so ex gratia because he was married to her sister. She was not his trustee and did not assume the duties and responsibilities of a trustee. The plaintiff in fact played an active part in managing and investing his money. In any event she has accounted for all the money which she received. Finally, the plaintiff’s action is time-barred by s 6(2) of the Limitation Act and none of the exceptions apply.

  33. [29] The defendant also brings a counterclaim against the plaintiff to recover the sum of S$378,103.88 which she paid to the plaintiff as a goodwill payment, ie without legal obligation, out of her profits from Yi Kang. The defendant indicated, however, that if the plaintiff’s claim fails, she does not intend to pursue her counterclaim. As the plaintiff’s claim has indeed failed, I need say no more on the merits of the defendant’s counterclaim.

  34. Issues to be determined

  35. [30] Five key issues arise for my decision in this action:

  36. [31] I deal with each issue in sequence.

  37. Issue 1: Receipt of money

  38. [32] The plaintiff pleads that between 1993 and 2007, he paid to the defendant in total about US$1.7m, S$2m and RMB 100,000 either in traveller’s cheques or cash. I have found, for the reasons which follow, that the defendant did receive about US$1.4m, S$1.6m and RMB 100,000 of the plaintiff’s money during this period.

  39. [33] To explain my findings, I shall first assess the general credibility of both parties’ evidence on the twenty or so transactions by which the plaintiff alleges he paid this money to the defendant. I will then turn to analyse whether each alleged transaction took place and then calculate the total amount which I have found the plaintiff to have paid to the defendant.

  40. Evidence of the payments

  41. [34] The plaintiff’s evidence on the payments is largely his own oral evidence and the oral evidence of the defendant’s siblings who delivered traveller’s cheques or cash to the defendant on the plaintiff’s behalf. The defendant attacks the credibility of both classes of witness. I therefore consider their credibility in turn.

  42. The plaintiff’s credibility

  43. [35] The defendant attacks the credibility of the plaintiff’s evidence on two grounds.

  44. [36] First, the defendant asserts that the plaintiff is unworthy of credit because he used false names to purchase traveller’s cheques with no good reason for doing so. The defendant also correctly points out that the plaintiff’s use of false names was merely the first stage of an elaborate process by which the plaintiff sent substantial sums of his money from New Zealand to Singapore in the form of cash or traveller’s cheques and then had those sums sent back to him in New Zealand.

  45. [37] I accept the defendant’s contention that the plaintiff had no good explanation for purchasing traveller’s cheques in false names. The only plausible reason was that the plaintiff applied for traveller’s cheques in false names to ensure that the cheques could not be traced back to him. By way of explanation, the plaintiff repeatedly said in cross-examination that he did not think that it was important for him to use his own name when purchasing traveller’s cheques. That is disingenuous. Using a false name is not what an honest man typically does, regardless of whether the underlying matter is important or unimportant. And common sense suggests that even a dishonest man tells the truth when a matter is unimportant to him and lies only when a matter is important to his dishonest intent.

  46. [38] I also find that the plaintiff had no good reason for sending money from New Zealand to Singapore and back to New Zealand. He repeated many times that there was nothing wrong with doing so. He attempted to explain that he did so “to get a better rate”. I took that to mean a better exchange rate. I do not understand that explanation. While profiting from movements in foreign exchange rates, or hedging against those movements, is a plausible reason for converting money back and forth between currencies, that does not require the money to travel literally from New Zealand to Singapore and back again.

  47. [39] The plaintiff was defensive and evasive when cross-examined both about his reason for using a false name to buy the traveller’s cheques and his reason for moving his money from New Zealand to Singapore and back again. To that extent, I consider that the defendant has successfully shown that there is a basis for approaching the plaintiff’s oral evidence with some caution.

  48. [40] Having said that, I do not think that this point ought to affect my assessment of the plaintiff’s oral evidence on the issue I am now considering, ie whether the plaintiff paid this money to the defendant, either personally or through family intermediaries. This is because this point, made in the way the defendant has made it, entails the defendant’s implicitly accepting that the plaintiff did pay money to the defendant and suggests only that he did so for clandestine or illicit reasons.

  49. [41] Moreover, even if I find that the plaintiff purchased travellers’ cheques in false names to ensure that they could not be traced back to him, that finding is no indication of the plaintiff’s ultimate purpose in moving money from New Zealand to Singapore and back again.

  50. [42] So attacking the plaintiff’s credibility in the way that the defendant has done does not assist to prove that the plaintiff did not pay a particular sum of money to the defendant. It assists only to prove that the plaintiff had a dishonest or unlawful ultimate purpose for doing so. But that is no part of any of the defendant’s pleaded defences. Accordingly, I shall not speculate or make any finding on what the plaintiff’s ultimate purpose might be. It suffices to say that the plaintiff’s impaired credibility has only limited effect on how I assess his evidence of his payments to the defendant.

  51. [43] The second way in which the defendant attacks the plaintiff’s credibility is by arguing that he did not have the financial resources to pay the large sums of money which he claims to have paid her. In this regard, the defendant submits that the plaintiff changed his evidence on his income and net worth between 1983 and 2011 (the period during which he ran The Woolbarn Ltd). The defendant observes that in cross-examination, the plaintiff initially testified that he had a net worth of NZ$2m to NZ$3m between 1993 and 2003. It was then pointed out to him that he claimed to have paid in total the equivalent of NZ$3.8m – in excess of his stated net worth – to the defendant during the same period. The plaintiff then adjusted his evidence and claimed that his net worth during this period was NZ$6m, comprising NZ$3.5m in movable assets and NZ$2.5m in real property. The plaintiff also made the further claim – characterised by the defendant as “ludicrous” – that before he started his business in 1983, he already had liquid assets valued at NZ$13m.

  52. [44] While I accept that the plaintiff did modify his evidence, I also accept that he was a man of sufficient means to have made these payments to the defendant. I find that he changed his evidence because he genuinely could not remember the specific details of his financial position from 1983 to 2003 and was attempting to square his memory with the facts presented to him in cross-examination. The plaintiff was asked in cross-examination about matters which took place more than two decades earlier. The deterioration of memory which accompanies that length of time more plausibly explains his inability to recall accurately the details of his historical financial position and to calculate his historical net worth than a supposed desire to conceal the fact that his wealth was more limited than implied by his alleged payments to the defendant.

  53. [45] Moreover, as the plaintiff submits, it is no part of the defendant’s pleaded case that the plaintiff could not have paid the sums of money to her as he alleges because he did not have the financial resources to do so. Had the defendant, through her pleadings, given the plaintiff reasonable notice that she intended to dispute his capacity to pay these sums of money to her, the plaintiff may well have put in additional documentary evidence of his historical financial position to prove that he had the resources to make the payments.

  54. [46] Accordingly, I hold that the defendant’s two principal submissions against the plaintiff’s credibility have a minimal effect on my assessment of that evidence in so far as I am considering the first issue before me, ie whether he paid money to the defendant as he claims. However, as a result of the defendant’s first principal submission, I accept that the plaintiff’s credibility is diminished on the disputed facts which are relevant to the other issues before me.

  55. The plaintiff’s witnesses’ credibility

  56. [47] The plaintiff’s second source of evidence is the oral evidence of the defendant’s relatives who physically delivered cash or traveller’s cheques to the defendant on the plaintiff’s behalf. Specifically, the plaintiff relies on the evidence of Heng Fock Whatt, Heng Fook Seng, Heng Pock Kam, Ting Teng Teow, and Heng Fock Too, who comprise the defendant’s older siblings and one of their spouses.

  57. [48] The defendant did not suggest to any of these witnesses in cross-examination that they had any ulterior motive for testifying against her or for supporting the plaintiff’s case, or that any of them would receive any form of benefit for giving false evidence. In her closing submissions, the defendant suggests that there is a rift in her family which has led the older siblings to ally themselves with the plaintiff. It could be that the defendant is correct. Or it could be that the plaintiff has influenced the defendant’s older siblings to take a position against her. But, as the defendant concedes, no ulterior motive was put to the plaintiff’s witnesses in cross-examination. So the defendant cannot advance that submission now.

  58. [49] There is therefore nothing before me to suggest that any of the defendant’s relatives who testified for the plaintiff have any personal interest in the outcome of this litigation or are motivated by animosity towards the defendant. With the exception of Heng Fock Whatt’s evidence (which I deal with below), the defendant has not, in my view, put forward any plausible basis on which to undermine the credibility of these witnesses. I therefore find their evidence to be credible.

  59. Examining the transactions

  60. [50] The transactions by which the plaintiff paid money to the defendant can be divided into three categories, which I shall refer to as Categories A, B and C respectively. Category A comprises those transactions which the defendant accepts. Category B comprises those transactions which the defendant denies or claims to have no knowledge of, and for which there is evidence other than and in addition to the oral evidence of the plaintiff or his wife. Category C comprises those transactions which the defendant denies and for which the only evidence is the word of the plaintiff or his wife.

  61. Category A

  62. (1) S$460,000 in December 1993

  63. [51] The plaintiff claims that in 1993, he paid a sum of S$460,000 to the defendant using a traveller’s cheque dated 2 December 1993. The traveller’s cheque was addressed to the defendant and sent to her office at Heng Management. The plaintiff has produced a copy of the cheque. The defendant does not deny that she received the cheque or its proceeds. I therefore find that the defendant did receive S$460,000 from the plaintiff in or around December 1993.

  64. (2) S$8,367.40 in May 1995

  65. [52] The plaintiff claims that in May 1995, he paid a sum of S$8,367.40 to Heng Management, ie the defendant’s business, using a traveller’s cheque dated 17 May 1995. He could not recall in cross-examination what he paid this sum for. The defendant’s case is that the plaintiff paid the sum to her office as reimbursement of a sum paid to the travel company Chan Brothers Travel Pte Ltd (“Chan Brothers”) for the plaintiff’s participation in a travel fair. The plaintiff accepted that that could have been the reason for the payment of that sum, but could not be sure.

  66. [53] There is no evidence of a debt owed by the plaintiff to Chan Brothers which Heng Management paid on the plaintiff’s behalf. In the absence of such evidence, I find that the defendant did receive this traveller’s cheque from the plaintiff in or around May 1995. I make no finding as to what happened after that, including how long she was in possession of the cheque or what she did with it or its proceeds, if she did anything at all.

  67. (3) S$128,000 in November 1995

  68. [54] The plaintiff claims that in November 1995, he paid a sum of S$128,000 to the defendant using a traveller’s cheque dated 17 November 1995. The cheque was drawn in favour of the defendant and was sent to her office at Heng Management. The plaintiff has produced a copy of the cheque. The defendant does not deny that she received it. I therefore find that the defendant did receive the sum of S$128,000 from the plaintiff in or around November 1995.

  69. (4) S$208,000 in May 1996

  70. [55] The plaintiff claims that in May 1996, he paid a sum of S$208,000 to the defendant using a traveller’s cheque dated 30 May 1996. The plaintiff has produced a copy of the cheque. The defendant does not deny that she received it. I therefore find that the defendant did receive the sum of S$208,000 from the plaintiff in or around May 1996.

  71. (5) S$460,000 in November 1994

  72. [56] The plaintiff claims that in November 1994, he paid a sum of S$460,000 to Teo Chye Har, the minority shareholder of GK Holding, using a traveller’s cheque dated 7 November 1994. The plaintiff has produced a copy of the cheque. It is not the plaintiff’s case that he sent the cheque to the defendant. Instead, he says that he sent it directly to Teo Chye Har on the defendant’s instructions. Strangely, it appears from the plaintiff’s evidence that the defendant, in giving him those instructions, did not specify the amount to be paid, ie S$460,000.

  73. [57] Nevertheless, the defendant acknowledges the existence of this cheque and explains that it was payment to Teo Chye Har for the first tranche of shares which he purchased in GK Holding. The evidence is clear that the defendant did not receive this cheque or its proceeds, and I so find.

  74. (6) S$168,000 in February 1995

  75. [58] The plaintiff claims that in February 1995, he paid a sum of S$168,000 to Teo Chye Har using a traveller’s cheque dated 17 February 1995. The plaintiff has produced a copy of the cheque. Again, it is not the plaintiff’s case that he sent this cheque to the defendant. Instead, again, he says that he sent it to Teo Chye Har on the defendant’s instructions. In this case the defendant did specify the amount to be paid, ie S$168,000. The defendant acknowledges the existence of this cheque and once again explains that it was payment to Teo Chye Har for the first tranche of shares which he purchased in GK Holding.

  76. [59] As with the previous transaction, the evidence shows that the defendant did not receive this cheque or its proceeds, and I so find.

  77. Category B

  78. (7) S$29,000 in April 1995

  79. [60] The plaintiff claims that in April 1995, he paid a sum of S$29,000 to one Uno Cafim using a traveller’s cheque dated 28 April 1995. The plaintiff has produced a copy of the cheque. It is not the plaintiff’s case that he sent the cheque to the defendant. Instead, he says that he sent it to Uno Cafim on the defendant’s instructions. The defendant claims to have no knowledge of this cheque whatsoever.

  80. [61] As with the cheques addressed to Teo Chye Har, the only finding I need to make here for the purposes of this case is that the defendant did not receive the cheque or its proceeds. I so find.

  81. (8) US$10,000 in December 1995

  82. [62] The plaintiff claims that in or around December 1995, he paid US$10,000 in cash to the defendant through his sister-in-law, Ting Teng Keow (“Mdm Ting”). The defendant denies having received this payment.

  83. [63] Mdm Ting’s evidence is that in or around December 1995, she travelled to New Zealand with her daughter to visit the plaintiff and his feng-shui master. On the evening she was to return to Singapore, the plaintiff handed her a bundle of cash which he instructed her to deliver to the defendant in Singapore. The plaintiff told Mdm Ting that the bundle of cash amounted to US$10,000. As Mdm Ting trusted the plaintiff, she did not count the cash herself. She produced a copy of a page of her passport which shows that she cleared immigration in New Zealand on 9 December 1995. I accept that she was in New Zealand at the time of this alleged payment.

  84. [64] Mdm Ting further testified in cross-examination that after she had returned to Singapore, she duly delivered the bundle of cash to the defendant. In her recollection, the defendant “just take [sic] the money” and gave no acknowledgment in writing that she had received the money. The defendant denies having received this sum of money. But she has not given me any reason not to take Mdm Ting’s evidence at face value.

  85. [65] I therefore find on the balance of probabilities that the defendant did receive a sum of US$10,000 in cash from the plaintiff through Mdm Ting in or around December 1995. I make no finding on what she did with the cash, if she did anything with it at all, and whether it remains in her possession.

  86. (9) RMB100,000 in December 1998

  87. [66] The plaintiff claims that in or around December 1998, he paid the sum of RMB100,000 to the defendant in cash through his brother-in-law, Heng Fook Seng, also known as Vincent. The plaintiff was cross-examined on why this sum was denominated in renminbi and not in US dollars, which was the usual currency for the cash to be delivered to the defendant. The plaintiff explained that the renminbi came from a Chinese tour group who had paid for souvenirs at his shop in in renminbi. The plaintiff explained further that he had kept the renminbi notes and asked Vincent to give them to the defendant so that she could deposit the renminbi in bank accounts in China owned by the plaintiff and the defendant’s businesses there.

  88. [67] Vincent’s evidence is that in December 1998, he and his family travelled to Australia for a holiday and went on to New Zealand to visit the plaintiff. A day before his return flight to Singapore, the plaintiff asked him to deliver RMB100,000 in cash, comprising 1,000 RMB100 notes, to the defendant in Singapore. Vincent recalls clearly that he duly delivered the cash to the defendant upon his return to Singapore, although he could not recall the location of the delivery.

  89. [68] Vincent produced a copy of a page in his passport showing that he cleared immigration in New Zealand on 19 December 1998. I accept that he was in New Zealand at the time of this alleged payment.

  90. [69] The defendant denies receiving this sum of money. But she has not given me any reason not to take Vincent’s evidence at face value. I therefore find on the balance of probabilities that the defendant did receive the sum of RMB100,000 in cash from the plaintiff through Vincent in or around December 1998. Again, I make no finding on what happened after that, including how long the defendant was in possession of that cash or what she did with it, if she did anything with it at all.

  91. (10) US$20,000 in April 1999

  92. [70] The plaintiff claims that in or around April 1999, he paid the defendant US$20,000 in cash through his brother-in-law, Heng Fock Whatt, also known as Andrew. Andrew’s evidence is that in late March 1999, he visited the plaintiff and his wife in New Zealand. While Andrew was there, the plaintiff handed him US$20,000 in cash and asked Andrew to deliver it to the defendant in Singapore. Andrew recalls that the cash was in denomination of US$100. He recalls the transaction because he recalls being concerned that he might not make it through New Zealand customs with that amount of cash. Nevertheless he agreed to do what the plaintiff asked. In the event, Andrew cleared customs without difficulty. The plaintiff called Andrew to check if there had been any problems. When Andrew returned to Singapore, he delivered the US$20,000 to the defendant at her house.

  93. [71] Andrew has produced a letter dated 24 February 2014 which he wrote to the plaintiff confirming that he visited the plaintiff in late March 1999 and delivered US$20,000 in cash to her as requested by the plaintiff. He also stated in the letter that he could not find his old passport which would have contained evidence of his visit to New Zealand at the relevant time.

  94. [72] The defendant rejects Andrew’s account. She points to an earlier letter drafted by the plaintiff’s solicitors and dated 24 September 2013. The earlier letter stated that Andrew had given the defendant US$80,000 in cash on this occasion, not $20,000. The defendant invited the plaintiff to explain this discrepancy in cross-examination. The plaintiff’s response was terse. He said only that the solicitors’ letter had been drafted without Andrew’s confirmation of the amount. The plaintiff testified that he and his wife later realised US$80,000 was not “feasible”, and they obtained confirmation from Andrew that he had actually carried only “two bundle [sic]”, which indicated a sum of US$20,000.

  95. [73] It appears to me that the plaintiff has a reason for revising the figure from US$80,000 to US$20,000 but is unwilling to testify as to what that reason is out of fear that he would reveal the true purpose behind asking Andrew to deliver his money to the defendant. I say this for two reasons.

  96. [74] First, one of the plaintiff’s answers to the defendant’s questions on why he revised the figure was that “Andrew is new to the games [sic]”. When asked what “game” the plaintiff was referring to, he quickly said, “Er, I mean, Andrew to---er, er, they were---he---he---it’s first time he’s carried money for us.” It is suspicious that the plaintiff would characterise the physical delivery of cash from New Zealand to Singapore as a “game”. I need not speculate what that “game” might be. The point is that the plaintiff’s evidence suggests that the novelty of the “game” to Andrew meant that the plaintiff would not have entrusted Andrew with carrying as large an amount in cash as US$80,000.

  97. [75] Second, this reading of the plaintiff’s evidence explains why he thought it was not “feasible” for Andrew to have carried US$80,000. It was not feasible in the sense that the plaintiff would not have thought it appropriate to give Andrew such a large sum of money if that was his first time delivering money to the defendant. That to my mind is a very specific reason that is consistent with the plaintiff’s reticence on the ultimate purpose in sending his money from New Zealand on a return journey to Singapore. That is not, however, the concern of this case. Accordingly, I accept that the defendant has a basis for revising the figure from US$80,000 to US$20,000. His evasiveness on what that basis is says more to me about its propriety than about its absence.

  98. [76] Next, the defendant contends that the letter is self-serving because it was drafted and signed for no purpose other than to support the plaintiff’s case. The defendant’s counsel highlighted to the plaintiff in cross-examination that the wording of parts of the letter is very similar to the wording of the relevant section of the plaintiff’s affidavit of evidence-in-chief. The letter states that the plaintiff had handed Andrew the cash with the “specific request” that the cash be given to the defendant. The plaintiff’s affidavit similarly uses the words “specific request”, albeit to describe how the defendant asked the plaintiff to pay specific sums of money to her. The plaintiff claims not to know the reason for the similar wording. He also denies instructing Andrew to draft the letter.

  99. [77] There is some, albeit limited, force in the defendant’s submission on this point. While the plaintiff denies having a hand in drafting Andrew’s letter, he has volunteered the fact that he confirmed the amount of US$20,000 with Andrew at or around the date of the letter. The use of the term “specific request” could have arisen out of their discussions. And that term on its own is in any event insufficient grounds for the inference that the plaintiff directed Andrew to draft the letter.

  100. [78] In view of both the plaintiff’s and Andrew’s evidence, I find that the defendant did receive a sum of US$20,000 in cash from the plaintiff through Andrew in or around April 1999. Again, I make no finding on what she did with the cash, if she did anything with it at all, and whether it remains in her possession.

  101. Category C

  102. [79] I pause here to make a general point about the evidence on Category C transactions. A substantial part of the plaintiff’s evidence consists of his general description of his usual practice in giving the defendant cash, with no specific evidence of specific details of specific instances in which he did so. In other words, his evidence is based on reconstruction rather than recollection.

  103. [80] Reconstructed evidence is of limited value. It is self-serving and is particularly susceptible to the influence of hindsight. It is therefore a significantly weaker form of evidence than evidence from actual recollection. Saying it has limited value is not, however, to say it has no value whatsoever.

  104. [81] A case like the present involves an allegation of repeated transactions which occurred over a long period of time. It is natural in those circumstances for a witness to have difficulty retrieving specific recollections of specific details of specific transactions. Further, the transactions in this case took place a decade or more in the past. It is therefore also natural that recollections will have faded. In cases of this type, evidence from reconstruction rather than recollection is likely to be all that a witness can offer the court. I cannot, therefore, discount credibility simply because the plaintiff or his witnesses gives evidence from reconstruction rather than recollection. I bear these considerations in mind in my assessment and description of the witnesses’ evidence.

  105. [82] It is also useful first to describe the parties’ evidence on the Category C transactions before each of the transactions is analysed.

  106. [83] The plaintiff’s evidence is that it was his practice to pay the defendant US$100,000 every year. He would withdraw the sum from his savings account in New Zealand, convert it into US dollars, and then bring the cash to Singapore in bundles of US$100 notes. If he travelled from New Zealand to Singapore in the middle of the year, it would have been winter in New Zealand, and so he and his wife would carry the bundles of notes in their winter jackets. When he arrived in Singapore, he would give the cash to the defendant. He, his wife and the defendant would then count the money together. They would then visit a money changer to convert the cash into the desired currency.

  107. [84] The plaintiff’s wife’s evidence is to similar effect. She cannot recall how many times they delivered cash to the defendant in Singapore, only that they did so every time they visited Singapore until 2005. The defendant would pick them up from the airport and they would stay at the defendant’s house for the duration of their visit. They would hand the cash to the defendant at her house and count it there. They would then visit money changers at People’s Park and Parkway Parade to survey the exchange rates on offer before converting the cash into Singapore dollars at the best available rate.

  108. [85] In view of these two accounts, which are of some generality, the defendant questions the plaintiff’s evidential basis for the specific amounts of cash which he alleges he handed to the defendant annually from 1994 to 2005. That basis, as it emerged from the cross-examination of the plaintiff, comprises two aspects. First, the plaintiff assumes a starting point of US$100,000 for each year. He then adjusts that value up or down according to whether, in his recollection, his business in New Zealand did well that year. Second, the plaintiff assumes that he would have made up for any shortfall in any given year in a subsequent year. Thus, if the plaintiff’s business did badly one year and, as a result, he gave the defendant only US$80,000 for that year, he assumes that he would have given her US$120,000 the next.

  109. [86] The defendant characterises this reconstruction of events as “interesting and ingenious” but stops short of submitting that it is not worthy of belief for being too convenient or unreliable.

  110. [87] In my judgment, the defendant’s objections to plaintiff’s evidence for Category C transaction are valid but not fatal. The method by which the plaintiff attempted to recall the amounts which he handed the defendant is naturally reconstructive because those transactions were repeated and happened a decade more earlier, as I have explained.

  111. [88] Moreover, notwithstanding her submissions, the defendant’s own evidence corroborates the plaintiff’s and his wife’s evidence that it was their practice to bring cash into Singapore and visit money changers. First, she says in her affidavit of evidence in chief that after the plaintiff delivered the first S$460,000 in December 1993, “he would still send funds over either by bank draft or by cash”. Second, in cross-examination, the defendant testified that she drove the plaintiff and his wife to visit money changers. She recalled that, after they converted the money into Singapore dollars, they would visit a bank either to purchase a bank draft or to deposit the cash into an account. I discuss this further at [126] below. The defendant also gave evidence that the plaintiff sometimes required her to count the cash he had brought. This was a frustrating activity for her as the counting could have been done at a money changer. In fact, it appeared to me when she was cross-examined on this aspect of the case that she was more concerned to minimise her role in whatever it was she thought the plaintiff was doing by moving his money from New Zealand in Singapore in this way than to deny that she received any cash in this way from the plaintiff.

  112. [89] I now turn to examine the specific transactions under Category C. To avoid repetition, I state from the outset that the analysis of each transaction takes into account the reconstructive nature of the evidence of the plaintiff and his wife, as I have just explained. It also takes into account the basic import of that evidence, namely, that the plaintiff and his wife had an established practice of bringing cash to the defendant in Singapore, and that the defendant at the very least participated in counting that cash and driving the plaintiff and his wife to money changers to convert the cash into the desired currency. Finally, it takes into account the evidence, what little there is, on what happened to this cash. I have found it appropriate to discuss this separately at [126] below only after I have examined the evidence specific to the defendant’s receipt of all the plaintiff’s money.

  113. (11) US$100,000 in August 1994

  114. [90] The plaintiff claims that in August 1994, he and his wife travelled to Singapore and delivered to the defendant a sum of US$100,000 in cash. The plaintiff’s wife remembers that August 1994 was the first time she and her husband brought US$100,000 in cash from New Zealand to Singapore. Corroborating her husband’s evidence, she also says that they each carried a portion of that cash in their winter jackets, and that she also put some of it in her bag.

  115. [91] The defendant denies having received this sum.

  116. (12) US$110,000 in March 1995

  117. [93] The plaintiff claims that in March 1995, he and his wife travelled to Singapore and delivered to the defendant a sum of US$110,000 in cash. The plaintiff testified that 1995 was an “average” year for his business, and he therefore brought the defendant S$110,000. The defendant denies that she received that sum.

  118. [94] In my judgment, the plaintiff has satisfied me on the balance of probabilities that the defendant did at least handle the US$110,000 in March 1995 and therefore did receive that sum from the plaintiff. I make no finding on what she did with the cash, if she did anything with it at all, and whether it remains in her possession.

  119. (13) US$140,000 in October 1996

  120. [95] The plaintiff claims that in October 1996, he and his wife travelled to Singapore and delivered to the defendant a sum of US$140,000 in cash. The plaintiff testified that 1996 was a “very good year” for his business, and he therefore brought the defendant the higher than average sum of US$140,000. The defendant denies that she received that sum.

  121. [96] In my judgment, the plaintiff has satisfied me on the balance of probabilities that the defendant did at least handle the US$140,000 in October 1996 and therefore did receive that sum from the plaintiff. Again, I make no finding on what she did with the cash, if she did anything with it at all, and whether it remains in her possession.

  122. (14) US$100,000 in August 1997

  123. [97] The plaintiff claims that in August 1997, he and his wife travelled to Singapore and delivered to the defendant a sum of US$100,000 in cash. The plaintiff testified that 1997 was an “okay” year for his business, and he therefore brought the defendant US$100,000. The defendant denies that she received that sum.

  124. [98] In my judgment, the plaintiff has satisfied me on the balance of probabilities that the defendant did at least handle the US$100,000 in August 1997 and therefore did receive that sum from the plaintiff. Again, I make no finding on what she did with the cash, if she did anything with it at all, and whether it remains in her possession.

  125. (15) US$180,000 in September 1999

  126. [99] The plaintiff claims that in September 1999, he and his wife travelled to Singapore and delivered to the defendant a sum of US$180,000 in cash. The defendant’s counsel pointed out to the plaintiff in cross-examination that this was significantly larger than the average US$100,000 which the plaintiff would usually pay to the defendant at one instance. The plaintiff gave three reasons for the larger sum. First, he did not give the defendant US$100,000 in 1998. He did however give the defendant US$20,000 in cash in April 1999. So it made sense for him to hand her a further US$180,000 in 1999 so that the average annual sum delivered for the years 1998 and 1999 would be US$100,000. I note that this disregards the RMB100,000 given to the defendant through Heng Fook Seng in December 1998. Second, 1999 was also a “good year” for his business. Third, he had consulted the defendant, who commented that she needed more money that year.

  127. [100] These three reasons do not appear in the plaintiff’s affidavit even though they are quite specific and therefore might reasonably have been expected to have been set out there. But the defendant too did not pursue this point in cross-examination or in her submissions. I also note that these reasons were offered by the plaintiff in a piecemeal fashion and only when it was suggested to him that he was retrospectively apportioning the amount of cash he might have handed the defendant in September 1999. But the defendant has placed before me nothing to contradict the plaintiff’s assertions in this regard. In the circumstances, I consider that the plaintiff’s manifest attempt here to reconstruct what happened in 1999 does not, in itself, lead to the inference that his account is untrue.

  128. [101] I also bear in mind the plaintiff’s and his wife’s evidence on how they delivered cash to the defendant over the years, and the defendant’s concession that she took them to money changers to convert that cash into local currency.

  129. [102] In my judgment, the plaintiff has satisfied me on the balance of probabilities that the defendant did at least handle the US$180,000 in September 1999 and therefore did receive from the plaintiff that sum. I make no finding on what she did with the cash, if she did anything with it at all, and whether it remains in her possession.

  130. (16) US$80,000 in August 2000

  131. [103] The plaintiff claims that in August 2000, he and his wife travelled to Singapore and delivered to the defendant a sum of US$80,000 in cash. The plaintiff testified that he handed a lower sum of US$80,000 to the defendant in 2000 because “there was no project”, and as a result, the defendant told him to “bring in lesser [sic] money”.

  132. [104] The defendant denies that she received this sum.

  133. [105] In my judgment, the plaintiff has satisfied me on the balance of probabilities that the defendant did at least handle the US$80,000 in August 2000 and therefore did receive from the plaintiff that sum. I make no finding on what she did with the cash, if she did anything with it at all, and whether it remains in her possession.

  134. (17) US$80,000 in May 2001

  135. [106] The plaintiff claims that in May 2001, he handed the defendant a briefcase containing cash in the sum of US$80,000 at Changi Airport in Singapore. The briefcase had a combination lock and he told the defendant the combination. He put the cash in a briefcase because he was going to give it to the defendant in a public place and not in her house where it was usually done. He was en route to Bangalore, India with his wife and friends to see a Hindu guru. The plaintiff recalled that this was the only time he, his wife and the defendant did not count the cash together. He testified that the defendant later informed him that it was US$100 short of US$80,000.

  136. [107] The defendant denies that she received that sum.

  137. [108] I find on the balance of probabilities that the defendant did at least handle cash from the plaintiff in the sum of US$80,000 sometime in May 2001 and therefore did receive it from the plaintiff. I make no finding on what she did with the cash, if she did anything with it at all, and whether it remains in her possession.

  138. (18) US$120,000 in June 2002

  139. [109] The plaintiff claims that in June 2002, he and his wife travelled to Singapore and handed the defendant a sum of US$120,000 in cash. The plaintiff explains that amount on the basis that he had given the defendant only S$80,000 the previous year.

  140. [110] The defendant denies that she received that sum.

  141. [111] In my judgment, the plaintiff has satisfied me on the balance of probabilities that the defendant did at least handle the US$120,000 in June 2002 and therefore did receive from the plaintiff that sum. I make no finding on what she did with the cash, if she did anything with it at all, and whether it remains in her possession.

  142. (19) S$230,000 over early 1998, early 2000 and mid 2007

  143. [112] The plaintiff claims that the defendant and her family visited him in New Zealand on three separate occasions: first, in January or February 1998; second, in February or March 2000; and third, in May 2007. The plaintiff’s evidence is that he delivered to the defendant S$230,000 in cash “[d]uring the course of” these three visits.

  144. [113] The defendant denies that she received this sum.

  145. [114] It was further established in cross-examination that the plaintiff gave the defendant S$120,000 on the first visit, S$110,000 on the second visit, and nothing on the third visit. This, I note, is not strictly inconsistent with the plaintiff’s evidence. What does seem unusual is that these sums were in Singapore dollars whereas the plaintiff usually handed the defendant cash in US dollars. The defendant spotted this unusual feature but did not pursue it substantially in cross-examination.

  146. [115] I find that the plaintiff did hand the defendant S$230,000 in early 1998, early 2000 and mid-2007. I make no finding on what she did with the cash, if she did anything with it at all, and whether it remains in her possession.

  147. (20) S$550,000 and US$436,000 on unknown dates

  148. [116] The plaintiff’s evidence is that he sent the defendant three other traveller’s cheques in the total sum of S$550,000. The plaintiff is unable to produce copies of these cheques as evidence. He also refers to two bank drafts issued by the Rotorua National Bank which he purchased in favour of the defendant in the total sum of US$436,000. One draft was in the sum of US$168,000 and the other was in the sum of US$268,000.

  149. [117] The defendant denies having received any of these instruments.

  150. [118] This plaintiff’s case on these five instruments is unsupported by documentary evidence, unlike his case on the instruments in Category A and B. However, I note that the plaintiff admits that he did not keep a full record of all his transactions with the defendant. He states that by the time he thought that something was amiss, it was too late to retrieve the records for some of these transactions. In cross-examination, the plaintiff explained why it was too late by alluding to the fact that the Rotorua National Bank had been acquired by ANZ Bank New Zealand.

  151. [119] Despite the absence of documentary evidence, I accept the plaintiff’s evidence on these five instruments. I do so on three grounds. First, I rely on the available evidence relating to the other transactions by which the plaintiff moved money out of New Zealand. That evidence shows that the plaintiff did want to move significant sums of money out of New Zealand, although I make no finding on why. The point here is that this desire makes the plaintiff’s claim that he paid S$550,000 and US$436,000 to the defendant prima facie credible. Second, the plaintiff has been candid about the fact that he is unable to produce documentary evidence for these transactions. Third, as with many of the transactions I have examined, the defendant has produced no evidence to contradict the plaintiff’s claim.

  152. [120] I therefore find that at some point between 1993 and 2007, the plaintiff did pay to the defendant S$550,000 by way of traveller’s cheques and US$436,000 by way of bank drafts over and above all of the other money which I have found that he paid to her above. I make no finding on what she did with these sums, if she did anything with them at all, and whether they remain in her possession.

  153. Total sums received

  154. [121] I now summarise in three tables the total sum which the plaintiff paid to the defendant from 1993 to 2007. I start with Category A. The only sums in this category on which I have rejected the plaintiff’s case are the traveller’s cheques he sent to Teo Chye Har: see [56]–[58] above. The sums in Category A which I have found the plaintiff paid to the defendant are therefore as follows.

  155. [122] The second table is for Category B. The only sum in this category on which I have rejected the plaintiff’s case is the traveller’s cheque he sent to Uno Cafim: see [60] above. The sums in Category B which I have found the plaintiff paid to the defendant are therefore as follows.

  156. [123] The third and final table is for Category C:

  157. [124] The grand total for all three categories is US$1,376,000, S$1,584,367.40 and RMB100,000. These are the same total figures which the plaintiff’s forensic accounting expert, Mr Leow Quek Shiong (“Mr Leow”), has arrived at in his report. Mr Leow too did not take into account money which the plaintiff paid to Teo Chye Har and Uno Cafim.

  158. [125] Mr Leow’s figures are, however, different from the total sums which the plaintiff claims in his pleadings. Those sums are US$1,656,000, S$2,011,367.40, and RMB100,000. The difference between the sums is US$280,000 and S$427,000. Neither party has explained the difference in these two sums to me. I disregard the differences and consider only those sums in US dollars and in Singapore dollars which I have found the plaintiff paid to the defendant.

  159. How the defendant dealt with the sums

  160. [126] The relief which the plaintiff seeks from the defendant is an account of how she has dealt with these sums. I do not intend to make any conclusive finding on what the defendant did with them. But I consider that her evidence on this aspect of the case corroborates my finding that she did receive these sums. That evidence can be summarised in four points:

  161. (a) First, the defendant and plaintiff opened a joint account with UOB in August 1994, when they first met. This was to hold the plaintiff’s money, because the defendant did not want to mix his money with hers.

  162. (b) Second, the defendant said that she deposited into this account three sums she received under three Category A transactions. The first is an unquantified portion of the proceeds of the traveller’s cheque dated 2 December 1993 in the sum of S$460,000 which was left in the defendant’s hands after paying for the Shanghai properties. The second is the proceeds of the traveller’s cheque dated 17 November 1995 in the sum of S$128,000. And the third is the proceeds of the traveller’s cheque dated 30 May 1996 in the sum of $208,000.

  163. (c) Third, the defendant admits that she deposited the plaintiff’s cash into the UOB joint account. She testified not only to chauffeuring the plaintiff and his wife to money changers to convert the cash they brought in to Singapore, but also to receiving the converted cash in Singapore dollars. They would then together deposit the converted cash into the UOB joint account. This corroborates the plaintiff’s and his wife’s evidence on the same topic: see [88] above. I find that this cash is very likely to be the same cash which I have found the defendant to have received pursuant to the Category B and C transactions, although the evidence is not clear on how much of that cash was in fact deposited into the UOB joint account.

  164. (d) Fourth, there is documentary evidence that the defendant purchased demand drafts in favour of the plaintiff. Copies of the application forms for these demand drafts was produced at trial. These copies all name the defendant as the applicant and the remitter, although the defendant claims that others helped the plaintiff purchase demand drafts. The face value of these drafts were usually debited either from the parties’ joint account with UOB or from the defendant’s sole account with UOB. In this connection, the defendant’s evidence was that she transferred the plaintiff’s money from the joint account with UOB into her sole account with UOB to purchase demand drafts for the plaintiff. On the other hand, some of these drafts were paid for in cash. In cross-examination, the defendant denied having used cash at the bank to purchase demand drafts, although she had no good explanation for why the application forms nevertheless said that the draft had been paid for in cash. If however she was the applicant, she must have had cash on hand to make the application, cash which she in all likelihood received from the plaintiff.

  165. Decision

  166. [127] For all these reasons, I find that from 1993 to 2007, the plaintiff paid to the defendant U$1,376,000, S$1,584,367.40 and RMB100,000.

  167. Issue 2: Resulting trust

  168. [128] The next issue is whether the defendant became a resulting trustee of these sums by virtue of her having received them from the plaintiff with no donative intent on his part. The answer must be that she did. Before supplying my reasons, I should foreshadow that the proper analysis of the resulting trust in the present case, which I undertake in this section, will have some (albeit limited) effect on whether the defendant may be said to owe the plaintiff any fiduciary duties and on the content of those duties, which I shall examine in due course.

  169. [129] The Court of Appeal has expressed a preference for Professor Robert Chambers’ view that a resulting trust arises whenever the intention of a transferor to benefit a transferee is vitiated or absent: Lau Siew Kim v Yeo Guan Chye Terence and another [2008] 2 SLR(R) 108 (“Lau Siew Kim”) at [35] per V K Rajah JA; Chan Yuen Lan v See Fong Mun [2014] 3 SLR 1048 (“Chan Yuen Lan”) at [44] per V K Rajah JA. That preference, however, has not led to an abolition (Lau Siew Kim at [51]) of either the doctrine of presumed resulting trust or the classical distinction between presumed and automatic resulting trusts. Those terms, of course, are the labels for the two sets of circumstances identified by Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council [1996] AC 669 (“Westdeutsche”) at 708A–B as giving rise to a resulting trust:

  170. [130] The case before me does not, on any account, involve an automatic resulting trust. The plaintiff accepts that there is insufficient evidence – nor is it is his case – that he created an express trust which failed. It is, however, common ground that the plaintiff paid money to the defendant voluntarily, not intending to make a gift to her of the money. Therefore, the correct analysis of the resulting trust which arose in this case is that it is a presumed resulting trust, ie the first type of resulting trust which Lord Browne-Wilkinson describes in Westdeutsche.

  171. [131] Since it is common ground that the plaintiff had no donative intent, there is no need to consider whether the presumption that Lord Browne-Wilkinson speaks of has been rebutted. In any event, it would have been an uphill task. The Court of Appeal has held that the strength of the presumption of a resulting trust varies with the circumstances in which the resulting trust arises, and correspondingly, the quality of evidence required to rebut the presumption varies with the strength of the presumption: Lau Siew Kim at [52] per V K Rajah JA. As I will show below, the defendant was actively involved in managing and investing the plaintiff’s assets in a manner which demonstrated her full awareness that the plaintiff had no intention of vesting in her the beneficial interest in his money or in the assets which she acquired with his money. The defendant would have been hard-pressed to rebut the plaintiff’s presumed lack of donative intent.

  172. [132] The defendant argues, however, that a further requirement for a resulting trust is that the transferor must have transferred property into the transferee’s sole name and not into their joint names. The defendant appears to suggest that because some, if not all, of the money which the defendant received was deposited into the UOB joint account, there can be no resulting trust.

  173. [133] I have no hesitation in rejecting this submission. It is inconsistent with Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s authoritative description of the presumed resulting trust, in which he specifically contemplates the gratuitous transfer of property into sole or joint names: Westdeutsche at 708A (see the block quote at [129] above). The submission is also inconsistent with the premise of many family trust cases, including the Court of Appeal’s decision in Lau Siew Kim, in which a frequent bone of contention is whether the presumption of resulting trust over property transferred into joint names is rebutted by the counter-presumption of advancement. Finally, the submission is inconsistent with the early authorities. In In re Vinogradoff; Allen v Jackson [1935] WN 68, a testatrix transferred without consideration war stocks into the joint names of herself and her four-year-old granddaughter. The testatrix continued to receive the income on the stocks until her death. Farwell J held that a presumption of a resulting trust arose, such that “[t]he stock was not the property of the infant, but formed part of the testatrix’s estate”. The principle behind these cases should not be missed. A joint owner of property for which she did not pay, like a sole owner of such property, is vested with legal title to the property. Equity, which will not aid a volunteer, presumes her to be a resulting trustee of that property.

  174. [134] The defendant relies on Alagappa Subramanian v Chidambaram s/o Alagappa [2003] SGCA 20 (“Alagappa”) to support her position. She says that Court of Appeal in that case held that there was a resulting trust “because” the trust funds were deposited into the trustee’s sole account. This is a misreading of the case. Alagappa concerned a family trust managed by two brothers, C and S. One of the issues was whether S was in an overdrawn position with regard to a family account held in their joint names which they were entitled to draw on for their personal expenses. On appeal, S challenged the amount by which the trial judge had found him to be overdrawn. S succeeded by showing that the judge had failed to credit to S, among other sums, a sum of $109,902 in four cheques which S had given C for the purpose of the family account. S was able to prove that C had instead deposited these cheques into his sole account for his own use. So the court found that C was a resulting trustee of the sum of $109,902: Alagappa at [50] per Judith Prakash J (as she then was). Accordingly, it is plain that the existence of the resulting trust had nothing to do with whether that sum was transferred into a joint or sole account per se and everything to do with S’s presumed lack of donative intent in relation to C in giving him the cheques. Alagappa therefore provides no support to the defendant’s submission.

  175. [135] Finally, I note that the defendant did not receive the sums of US$1,376,000, S$1,584,367.40 and RMB100,000 from the plaintiff all at once. That can mean one of two things. First, it can mean that a single resulting trust arose upon the first payment, with every subsequent payment being an accretion to the trust property which was the subject-matter of that single trust. Or it could mean that a separate and fresh resulting trust arose every time the plaintiff paid a sum to the defendant, with that single sum as the trust property. The former analysis might have been correct if I had found that the plaintiff intended to create an express trust by his payment to the defendant in 1993 and continued contributing to the trust property over the years until the trust failed sometime after 2007 and a resulting trust arose. But that is not what happened and not what I have held. I have held that the money was held on a presumed resulting trust, not an automatic resulting trust. The latter is therefore the correct analysis in this case. Conceptually speaking, the series of sums which the plaintiff, acting with no donative intent, paid to the defendant as a volunteer from 1993 to 2007 became the subject-matter of a series of separate resulting trusts, all of which had the defendant as the resulting trustee and the plaintiff as the cestui que trust.

  176. [136] It is, however, also the case that the defendant has not rebutted any of the presumptions of resulting trusts with regard to the twenty or so transactions through which she received the plaintiff’s money. One piece of evidence that the defendant relied on in this regard is her evidence that the plaintiff repaid her in cash a debt which he owed to her arising from her payment on his behalf when he purchased his second tranche of shares in GK Holding. But it is not the defendant’s evidence that any of Category A, B or C transactions was a repayment of this nature. And the plaintiff denies that the debt was even incurred. So the first point I make is that the evidence on which the defendant relies is inconclusive. Second, even if the plaintiff did have donative intent in giving the defendant some money (to pay off his debt to her), there is no evidence that that cash was any part of the total sums which I have found the plaintiff to have paid the defendant.

  177. [137] For these reasons, I conclude that the defendant held the sums of US$1,376,000, S$1,584,367.40 and RMB100,000 on resulting trust for the plaintiff. For convenience, I will consider these sums in the analysis below as being subject to a single resulting trust in favour of the plaintiff. Where however there is a need to analyse allegations of breaches of fiduciary duties in respect of specific sums, I will analyse the individual resulting trust over that sum and the fiduciary duties which go with it: see eg [217] below.

  178. Issue 3: Fiduciary duties

  179. [138] The third issue which I have to determine is whether the defendant, as a trustee under a resulting trust, owes the plaintiff any fiduciary duty or duties, including the duty to account for the money. The proper approach to this issue was set out in the Court of Appeal’s recent decision in Tan Yok Koon v Tan Choo Suan and another and other appeals [2017] 1 SLR 654 (“Tan Yok Koon”), which I will discuss first. I will then consider the existence and nature of the fiduciary relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant, and whether that relationship gave rise to any fiduciary duties on the part of the defendant.

  180. Tan Yok Koon

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